ML20153G263
| ML20153G263 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 08/24/1998 |
| From: | Peebles T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Beth Brown SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9809300018 | |
| Download: ML20153G263 (95) | |
Text
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August 24,1998 Southem Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
ATTN: Mr. Bob Brown, Plant Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager Vogtle Electric Generating Plant P. O. Box 1600 Waynesboro, GA 30830
SUBJECT:
MEETING
SUMMARY
AND
PUBLIC MEETING ANNOUNCEMENT
- JULY 1998 NRC REGION ll EXAMINATION WORKSHOP AND NOVEMBER 1998 TRAINING MANAGERS' CONFERENCE - VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT
Dear Mr. Brown:
Region il facilitated a workshop on Operator Licensing Examination Techniques on July 15, l 1998, conducted at the Richard B. Russell Building. The workshop attendees included l representatives from all Region il facilities. It is our opinion that the workshop was beneficial !
and provided an excellent opportunity for open discussion on the operating test portion of the I operator licensing examination process.
During the workshop, we covered a preliminary response to concerns expressed at the January 1998 workshop and a synopsis was promised, but due to the status of the program, cannot be provided. The slides used for our discussions are enclosed.
Also, I would like to extend an invitation to you, and to members of your operations and training staff, to attend this year's Training Managers' Conference to be held on November 5,1998. Our goal for the meeting is to provide an open forum for discussion of operator licensing issues.
The site for this year's conference will be in the Richard B. Russell Building Auditorium on Spring Street in downtown Atlanta. As of this date, the agenda is open. We encourage you to submit, via telephone, a list of topics that you would like to have discussed.
Additionally, we would appreciate an update of the home addresses of your licensed operators.
Please send them in an envelope marked "To Be Opened by Addressee Only" to either Ms.
Beverly Michael or myself. If you have any questions or need additionalinformation, please contact Bev at (404) 562-4640 or me at (404) 562-4638.
Sincerely, (Original signed by T.A. Peebles)
Thomas A. Peebles, Chief Operator Licensing and Human Performance Branch Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos.: 50-424 and 50-425 License Nos.: NPF-68 and NPF-81
Enclosures:
As Stated 9809300018 980824 ~
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, J. T. Gasser, General Manager, Plant Vogtle Distribution:
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l-OPERATING TEST WORKSHOP ,
I Richard B. Russell Auditorium I July 15,1998 '
8:00 Opening Remarks (Johns Jaudon) i l
8:20 Standard JPM format (SSNTA) 8:40 JPM critical tasks (Hopper & Mellen) !
What constitutes a critical task?
- The importance of measurable criteria?
- Good examples j i
- Bad examples ;
Discrimination (it has to be failable!) !
- Good examples
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- Bad examples l
l 9:30 JPM Questions (Baldwin) i Direct look up. As defined in ES-602. Attachment 1, B.2.e (p.15)
- examples .
- " fixes" to those examples l Use of Open and Closed Reference items as defined in ES-301, D.1.1(p.9) which states: " closed reference items may be used to evaluate the immediate actions for emergency and other procedures, certain automatic actions, operating characteristics, interlocks, and set points.. "
- examples
- " fixes" to those examples 10:30 Administrative JPMs (Steiner) l 11:00 Scheduling (Steiner)
- ways to optimize the material developed l
- simulator bottle necks l
- control room JPMs '
- reasonable daily work loads i
- candidate stress l l
- exam delays I 11:30 Lunch 1:00 Exam predictability and exam security (Payne) 1 1:30 Simulator scenario development (Payne & Hopper)
- scheduling and crew makeup
- evaluation tool
- malfunctions in relation to major event
- level of detail 3:30 Questions and Answers 4:30 Closing i
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REGION 11 WORKSHOP - OPE RATING TEST JULY 15.1998 Richard B. Russell Building Strom Auditorium David Lane Examiner - Sonalysts Larry Kelley Training Advisor- OHN/Pickering John Brewer Manager - Authorization Training - Ontario Hydro Nuclear Carolina Power and Liaht Company Tom Hackler - Requal Training - Brunswick Curtis Dunsmore Initial Training - Brunswick Tony Pearson Initial Training - Lead - Brunswick Terry Toler Instructor - Harris Rick Garner Sperviisor- Ops Training - Harris
' Dwayne Coffey LOCT Supervisor - Robinson Dave Neal OIT Lead - Robinson Scott Poteat Support Lead - Robinson Duke Enerav Corporation - Catawba. McGuire. and Oconee David Re Training Instructor Charles Sawyer Senior Tech Spec James Presten Instructor Brent Moore Instructor Bill Caudill Nuclear Instructor l E. T. Beedle . Instructor - Catawba Reggie Kimray NuclearInstructor Catawba John Supte Operations - Catawba Rob Billings Instructor - McGuire Steve Helms Instructor - McGuire Robby Pope Supervissor - Mcguire Rick Robinson Ops Training Coordinator Oconee Robin Lane Training Instructor Oconee J. R. Steely Training Instructor - Oconee David Covar Nuclear Instructor - Oconee Randall Yarbrough Nuclear Instructor - Oconee Bobby Ayers Ops Instructor - Oconee Florida Power Corporation Ivan Wilson Ops Manager Jack Springer Supervisor Training - Crystal River Johnie Smith Ops Training Supervisor - Crystal River
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I l Operating Test Workshop 2 July 15,1998 l.
Florida Power and Llaht Company Dave Brown Initial Training - St. Lucie I Tim Bolander Simulator and Exams - St. Lucie Mike Croteau instructor- Training - Turkey Point Rich Bretton LOCT Supervisor - Training - Turkey Point South Caronna Electric and Gas Company Jim Callicott Senior instructor Perry Ramicone instructor - V. C. Summer
! Southern Nuclear Operatina Comrsnv. Inc. (SNC)
Tom Blindauer Senior Plant Instructor - Simulator - Farley Bill Oldfield Training - Farley Steve Be Training - Hatch 1
Ken Drawdy Training instructor - Vogtle Thad N. Thompson Ops Training Instructor- Vogtle Perry Tucker Ops Training instructor- Vogtle Michael Henry Nuclear instructor - Vogtle Leon Ray Ops Training Supervisor - Vogtle i Fred Howard Ops Reg instructor - Vogtle i Perry Vannier Initial Training - Vogtle j Charlton Sal Requal Training - Vogtle !
Steve Dyer Requal Training - Vogtle Tennessee Vallev Authority ,
l Phillip H. Case Simulator Instructor- NC Training ;
Denny Campbell Ops instructor -Browns Ferry l l
Marvin Meer Ops Instructor- Browns Ferry l l
Jim Kearney Ops Instructor - Sequoyah Dave Davidson Ops Instructor- Sequoyah i Steve Taylor Ops Instructor - Sequoyah !
' Ricky C. King Senior Ops Instructor - Sequoyah )
Ed Keyser Simulator instructor - Sequoyah l- Tom Wallace Supervisor- Watts Bar ,
- Terry L. Newman Ops Instructor- Watts Bar
- Jack Cox Training Manager- Watts Bar l- John Roden Ops Training Manager- Watts Bar >
Randy Evans HLT Lead - Watts Bar ,
1 r- v. -.r,.
l Operating Test Workshop 3 July 15,1998 1
1 Virainia Electric and Power and Power Company i
. Walt Shura Supervisor ' raining - North Anna Steve Crawford Senior instructor (Nuclear) - North Anna Ken Grove Senior instructor - Surry Ray Simmons Senior Instructor- Surry l
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l EXAH REVIEW GUIDELINES i
I. TECHNICAL ACCURACY Is there more than one correct answer?
Is the given answer correct?
Adecuate data in the stem?
l Is cata in the stem consistent and plausible?
II. PSYCHOMETRICS: The process of applying sound qualitative processes to mental measurements.
l l PSYCHOMETRIC FLAWS THAT COULO DIMINISH THE VALIDITY OF THE EXAMINATION!
FLAW . GUIDANCE APPENDIX B REFERENCE
- 1. Low level of Question should be written to reflect App. B
./ knowledge the level of knowledge most 1.d appropriate for a specific K/A.
When there is a choice try to write the question to reflect the higher level.
l *SEE LEVEL OF KNOWLEDGE BELOW l 2. Low operational Does the question test the intent of App. B validity the K/A? 1.a/b/e Could someone do the job safely and 2.k effectively without being'able to answer the question?
- 3. Low discriminatory Will a less than competent candidate App. B validity miss the item? 1.d l Can a person understand the principle 2.g being tested and still miss the item?
- SEE LEVEL OF DIFFICULTY BELOW.
- 4. Implausible Can a distractor be eliminated with App. B Distractors out understan. ding the concept being 2.b/f/h/m tested?
- 5. Confusing or State the question as concisely as App. B ambiguous language possible but provide all necessary 1.c information.
- 6. Confusing negatives Avoid negative stems. App.B 2.e
- 7. Collection of Each item should focus on one K/A App.B true/ false item determined by the stem. 1.f 2.c
- 8. ba'ckwards logic Examine on a topic in a way that is App.B consistent with how the K/A should be 1.h remembered and used.
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LEVEL OF DIFFICULTY Establish a level of difficulty that will enable an ap)licant who is capable of safe 7y operating the plant to complete and review t1e examination within four hours and achieve a grade of 80 percent or greater. [ES-401 p.4]
1 Since item difficulty can usually be decreased or increased by revision, the examination author need not be overly preoccupied with difficulty when writing i the items. The author should focus on achieving a valid measure of the concept he is attempting to evaluate. [ Appendix B. p. 6]
I LEVEL OF KNOWLEDGE I Level 1: FUNDAMENTAL KNOWLEDGE i The recall or recognition of discrete bits of information. !
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- knowledge of terminology l
- definitions j
./ - set points
- other specific facts Level 2: COMPREHENSION Involves the metal process of understanding the material through I relating it to its own parts or some other material.
- describing or recognizing relationships
- recognizing how systems interact
- consequences or implications of events .
Level 3: ANALYSIS, SYNTHESIS OR APPLICATION Involves assembling. sorting or integrating information to predict an event or outcome. Requires mentally using the knowledge and its meaning to solve problems.
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! NUREG-1021. APPENDIX B. GUIDANCE l 1. Generic Princioles
- a. Ensure that the concept being measured has~a direct, important relation ship to the ability to perform the job.
- b. Make sure that the question matches the intent of the K/A.
- c. State the question unambiguously and precisely.
d, Writ'e the question at the highest level of knowledge reflected in the testing objective,
- e. Avoid questions that are unnecessarily difficult or irrelevant.
.,f . Limit the question to one concept or topic. unless a synthesis of concepts is being tested.
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g Avoid copying text directly forma training or other reference material.
- h. Avoid backward logic questions.
- 2. Other Construction Guidelines
- a. Use four answers.
- b. Do not use "none of the above" or "all of the 'above"
- c. Do not present a collection of true-false statements.
- d. Define the question, task or problem in the stem.
- e. Avoid using negatively stated stems when possible.
- f. Provided sufficient counter balance in questions with multi-part answers.
- g. Include common misconceptions as Distractors.
- h. Make all answer options homogeneous and highly plausible.
I. If the answers have a logical sequence. put them in order.
- j. Avoid overlapping answer options.
- k. Do not include trivial distractors with more important distractors.
- 1. Vary the location of the correct answer.
- m. Avoid specific determiners that give clues as to the correct answer.
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(1) distractors that do not follow grammatically from the stem.
(2) options that can be judged correct or incorrect without reading l
the stem.
(3) equivalent and /or synonymous options which rule out both options.
(4)- an option which includes another option.
(5) implausible distractors.
(6) a correct answer which is longer that the distractors.
(7) cualifiers in the correct answer unless they are used in cistractors. (e.g. probably, ordinarily)
(8) words such as "never" . ~always" which suggest a wrong answer.
(9) a correct option that differs from the distractors in
./ favorableness, style, or terminology.
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l III. BEANS 1
l E54N.E. .554dG. .55-%3^
BEAN LIMIT REFERENCE Knowledge level questions < 50 ES-401 p.4 SRO / RO overlap 5 75 ES-401 p.5 Questions from training class quizzes 5 25 ES-401 p.5 OR last two NRC exams.
Questions from licensee audit exam 50 ES-401 p.5
.(same author for audit exam)
.- Questions from licensee audit exam 55 ES-401 p.5 (independent author for audit exam)
Questions from licensee bank 5 50 ES-401 p.5 New questions at comprehension or 2 10 ES-401 p.5 analysis
JPM CRITICAL TASKS AND MEASURABLE CR::TERIA G. -033ER l i
w meses l
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- 3. Develop Performance Criteria ~
The JPM should have meaningful performance requirements that will provide a legitimate basis for evaluating the examinee's ability to safely operate the system or the plant. Artificially subdividing .,
existing tasks to generate new ones may dilute the value of the JPMs to a point where they become meaningless.
The JPM shall
' identify specific performance standards, or check points, that will permit the examiner to evaluate successful progress toward completing the task in accordance with the procedural references.
Detailed control and indication nomenclature and criteria (e.g., switch positions and meter readings) should be identified whenever possible, even if these criteria are not specified in the procedural step. The JPM should also note any important observations that should be made by the examinee while performing the task. ;
The JPM must clearly identify the task standard; i.e., the predetermined '
outcome (qualitative and/or quantitative) against which task performance will be measured.1Eyepygprg.g_edura]gstepithat
[d~dffectilyj[(tiTetQaccurately,'iin the proper seq.the uehte,a 'e.xaminee must perfor Eise')3I120.rde$tofaEcomplish'the ' task standard shall' be identified as'*dan '
ictitica71 step'and shall have an associated performance standard.
IE there are any specific procedural restrictions on the sequence in which the steps are performed they shall be clearly noted in the JPM. ,
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,Veasurai e 3er"ormance
- ncica : ors A measura.J e 'Jer=ormance incica:or Consis:s o" Josi:ive ac: ions ~;1a: an o.Jserver can o.Jjec:ive y icen~:i =y
- acen Jy an incivicua~(/ crew).
~
Exam'J es:
Ac: ions :acen in :le .E03s suc1 as in resJonse :o an A WS.
Con ~:ro mani'Ju a: ions suc1 as a reac:or :ri'] or ~:le s:ar: o=
manua an .ECCS Jum3.
VerJa - reJor:s or no:1~=1ca; ion o=
aJnorma Jarame ers or conci: 1ons.
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- .nciga : ors : !
Veri =1ca :1on :la: an ex'Jec:ec ,
occurrec:
reS'JonSe ,a5 ,
- .) Veri =ica: ion anc/or ensure S:e'JS w11c1 recuire no ac: 1on. .
1 3aSSiVe oJSerVa ions SuC185 moni :oring :'le 'Jer =ormance o = a SyS:em.
J INE) ~~AS( STANDA1]S
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~~asc s:ancarcs slou c inc~ uce ~
03jec~:ive .recuiremerr:s wi:1 a ~~owa3
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~;o erances agreec u'Jon .3y :le
=aci~ i :y anc :le \ RC.
T1e acce7:ance cri:eria must ae aa~ e
- o ciscrimina:e/icen~;i'y Joor Jer=ormance !
~
3ac Exam 3 es:
~~ ~
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":: 3ressure =a s Je ow 1L00 Js1, :
s:ar: Jum] ...,
is a Jer=ormance measure :la: is no: o3jec: 1ve.
~~
1e l 03 era :or Jer =orming :lis :as< cou~ c
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I conceiva3 y s:ar~: :le Jum] w1en 3ressure reacles 0 asi anc sti~~ no:
vlo a:e :le Jer ormance measure s:a:ec in :le Jrocecure, even :lougl
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- le ~=aci~ i :y icensee ex3ec:s :le i oJera:or ~:0 s:ar: :le
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Jum3 sooner. ~
~~1e \ RC anc ~=aci~ 1~:y icensee snou c agree in writing :la: :le ~imi:s ~=or ~
eac1 C5 or C~~ are acce3ta3 e Jefore
- le examina:1on Jegins.
~
or t1e exam 3 e given a30ve, accing an
acceJta3 e 'Dressure to~erance (e.g.,
wit 11n 200 3si) wou~ c c~ ari =y t1e s :antarc o = :Jer =ormance :la : is exJec :ec .
i
"::mmecia :e.~ y .3 ora :e :le RCS = .Je ow 1ere is no
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roc inser: ion ~ imi:s":
ce =ini: ion o = immecia:e in :lis si :ua :i on . Anywlere =orm one :o :en minu~:es migT: .Je arguec as acce'J:a.] e.
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, Procer Cueing
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Ex:erna~ s :imu~ us slou c Jrom3: an oJera:or :o resJonc Jy : acing certain
~~
ac: ions. 1e incica: ions o= a system
~
or a.~comJonen: ma =unc: ion (inc~ucing
~
i Jassive =ai~ures)Jy me:ers anc a arms mus; Je accurate anc.inc~uc.e a~~
ex]ec :ec. indica : ions.
e JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE j i
,' Provide this page to the Candidate Initial conditions:
A Station Blackout has occurred on Unit 2. Unit 1 is in a LOOP with both Ernergency Diesel Generators in service. The NPS and ANPS have determined the need to crosstie electrical power from the 1 A EDG to the 2A3 4.16 KV switchgear via the SBO AB Bus Crosstie.
l Initiating Cue: l I
The A_NPS has directed you to accomplish the Unit to Unit crosstie to the 2A3 4.16 KV i Bus by performing 2-EOP-99, Table 7 and then 2-EOP-99, App. V within 10 minutes. i l
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0521129, Rev 02 Page 16 of 16
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(C) Indicates a Critical Step PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST
- 1. (C) Eiernent/ Step OPEN and GREEN FLAG the following startup transformer breakers: -
A. Standard: S.U. Transformer 2A (2-30102)
Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN ,
B. Standard: S.U. Transformer 2B (2-30202)
Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN C. Standard: S.U. Transformer 2A (2-20102)
Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN D. Standard: S.U. Transformer 2B (2-20302)
-' GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN Cue:
- 2. (C) Element / Step Ensure the following breakers are GREEN FLAGGED and OPEN:
A. Standard: Aux Transformer 2A (2-30101 ) (2WB7)
Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN
. Standard: Aux Transformer 2B (2-30201) (2W85)
Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN Comments:
C321129, Rev 02 Page 6 of16
(C) Indicafe's a Critical Step PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST l
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- 2. (Cont'd) .8. Standard: Aux Transformer 2A (2-20101) (1WBS)
Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN Standard: Aux Transformer 2B (2-20301) (1W84) l Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN l C. Element / Step Tie breakers between normal and emergency 4160V buses:
l Standard: 4.16 KV Bus Tie 2A2-2A3 (2-20109) l l Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN j 1
Standard: 4.16 KV Bus Tie 2A3-2A2 (2-20209 Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN Standard: 4.16 KV Bus Tie 2B2-2B3 (2-20309)
Cue: GREEN LIG'HT ON, FLAG GREEN Standard: 4.16 KV Bus Tie 283-2B2 (2-20411)
Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN 3"
l D. Element / Step 4.16 KV Bus 2AB Tie breakers l
Standard: Feed to 4.16 KV Bus 2AB (2-20208)
Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN Standard: incoming feeder from 4.16 KV bus 2A3 (2-20505)
Cue: GREEN LIGHT DN, FLAG GREEN Page 7 of 16 0521129. Rev D2
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(C) Indicates a Critical Step PERFORM ANCE CHECKLIST 2.D. (Cont'd) Standard: Incoming feeder from 4.16 KV bus 2B3 (2-20504)
Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN Standard: Feed to 4.16 KV Bus 2AB (2-20409)
Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN .
- 3. (C) Element / Step OPEN the following 4.16 KV feeder breakers to the station service transformers:
A. Standard: Station Service Transformer 2A1 (2-20110)
.. Cue: GREEN LIGfIT ON B. Standard: Station Service Transformer 2A5 (2-20210)
Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON C. Standard: Station Service Transformer 2A2 (2-20213) l Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON D. Standard: Station Service Transformer 2B1 (2-20310)
Cue: GPSEN LIGHT ON l
E. Standard: Station Service Transformer 2B2/285 (2-20402) l Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON Page 8 of15 DC1129. Rev C2
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(C) Indicates a Critical Step PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST l
- 4. (C) Element / Step OPEN and GREEN FLAG the following 480V feeder breakers from the station service transformers:
A. Standard: 480V Bus 2A1 Feeder (2-40103) l Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN l
B. Standard: 480V Bus 2A5 Feeder (2-40361) l GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN Cue:
C. Standard: 480V Bus 2A2 Feeder (2-40219) l l
i Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN l 1
D. Standard: 480V Bus 2B1 Feeder (2-40419)
Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN
,.. E. Standard: 480V Bus 285 Feeder (2-40653)
Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN F. Standard: 480V Bus 2B2 Feeder (2-40503)
Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN SAT UNSAT Comments:
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I 0821129, fiev D2 Page 9 of 16 l
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JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE (C) Indicatss a Critical Step PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST
. 5. (C) Element / Step OPEN the following 480V bus tie breakers A. Standard: 480V Bus Tie 2A2-2AB (2-40220)
Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON l'
I B. Standard: 480V Bus Tie 2AB-2A2 (2-40702)
Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON C. Standard: 480V Bus Tie 2AB-282 (2-40706)
Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON D. Standard: 480V Bus Tie 2B2-2AB (2-40504)
... Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON SAT UNSAT Comments:
0821129 Rev02 hge 10 of15
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. l JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE (C) indicafes a Critical Step PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST I
- 6. (C) Element / Step Establish communications with Unit 1 Standard: ESTABLISH COMMUNICATIONS with Unit 1 via Gai-Tmnics or plant radio (if available).
Cue: COMMUNICATIONS ARE ESTABLISHED 1
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- 7. Element / Step PLACE the following pump switches in the PULL TO LOCK i position: l (C)* A. Standard: 2A ICW Pump l Cue: SWITCH IN PULL TO LOCK B. Standard: 28 ICW Pump Cue: SWITCH IN PULL TO LOCK
. Standard: 2C ICW Pump Cue: SWITCH IN PULL TO LOCK (C) D. Standard: 2A CCW Pump Cue: SWlTCH 1N PULL TO LOCK E. Standard: 2B CCW Pump Cue: SW1TCH IN Pt 'LL TO LOCK Standard: 2C CCW Pump Cue: SWITCH IN PULL TO LOCK SAT UNSAT Comments:
DE21129, Rev C2 Page 11 of16
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< (C) Indicates a Critical Step PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST
- 8. (C) Element / Step Verify the EDG output breaker on the selected 4.16 KV bus is open Standard: VERIFY the EDG output breaker on the selected 4.16 KV bus (2-20211)is OPEN Cue: GREEN LIGHT IS ON. REPORT UNIT 1 IS READY TO CROSSTIE AB 4.16 KV BUSES.
- 9. (C) Element / Step Close in the Unit 2 SBO breaker Standard: CLOSE IN the Unit 2 SBO breaker 2-20501 Cue: RED LIGHT ON I
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- 10. (C) Element / Step Request the Unit 1 control room to close the Unit 1 SBO breaker Standard: REQUEST the Unit 1 control room to close the Unit 1 SBO breaker
, 1-20501.
Cue: UNIT 1 ACKNOWLEDGES REQUEST.
END Element / Step TERMINATION Standard: Student requests Unit 1 to close the Unit 1 SBO crosstie breaker.
Comments-3E21129, Rev c2 Page 12 of 15
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'i (C) indicates a Critical Step PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST
- 1. Element / Step: Peview the EOOS log and determine if channel RM-26-18 (PAG-203) has been declared out of service.
Standard: Verifies RM-26-18 is not out of service.
o+< et
,p *f,,,(
$r*
Cue: RM-26-18 IS NOT OUT OF SERVICE
- 2. Element / Step: . Check the Met Tower for operability -
W Standard: Verifies Met Tower chart recorder working propedy..
Cue: MET TOWER CHART RECORDER TRACKING PROPERLY. t
- 3. Element / Step: Verify gas release permit properly filled out and authorized, enter release permit number and tank to be released on procedure.
Standard: Verifies permit fiided out propedy and authorized, enters release permit number (98-007) and 2C GDT on procedure.
Cue: 98-007 AND 2C GDT ENTERED ON PROCEDURE
- 4. (C) Eiernent/ Step: Verify the following valve alignment:
V5745 Closed VD6142 Open V7071 Open V7070 Open V7072 Locked Closed VS742 Locked Closed Standard: Verify all above listed valves in proper positions Cue: V6745 FULLY CLOCKWISE V06142 FULLY COUNTERCLOCKWISE V7071 FULLY COUNTERCLOCKWISE V7070 FULLY COUNTERCLOCKWISE V7072 FULLY CLOCKWISE WITH LOCK ATTACHED V6742 FULLY CLOCKWISE WITH LOCK ATTACHED i
SAT UNSAT Comments: -
DB211E3. Rev DO Page 5 of 12
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(. - (C) indicates a Critical Step PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST
- 4. Element / Step Check closed FCV-25 9," Continuous Containment / Hydrogen Purge Control Valve Filter inlet."
l Standard: At the NON-SAFETY VEbfTILATION HVAC PANEL:
l VERIFY CLOSED FCV-25-9 Cue: 0%, GREEN LIGHT ON, RED LIGHT OFF SAT ~ UNSAT Comments:
l
- 5. (C) Element / Step Throttle FCV-25-28,
- Continuous Containment / Hydrogen Purge Control Valve Bypass" to approximately 10% OPEN position.
Standard: At the NON-SAFETY VENTILATION HVAC PANEL: POSITION FCV 28 to the open position UNTIL the valve position indicates 1D*/. OPEN
.- Cue: 10%, BOTH RED & GREEN LIGHTS ON l SAT UNSAT Comments:
l
- 6. Element / Step Start HVE-68," Shield Building Exhaust Fan."
Standard: At the B TRAIN EMERGENCY VENTILATION HVAC PANEL:
, .. POSITION HVE-6B control switch to START Cue: RED LIGHT ON, GREEN LIGHT OFF SAT UNSAT Comments:
t-I, i
DE21058, Rev 06 Page 6 of 12 l
i i
l t
,- JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE C, 8 The system / equipment status reflects the overallintent of what the JPM required upon completion.
D. Correctfy perform all critical steps.
All steps where procedural guidance exists may be considered critical. Performance of Off-Normal Operating Procedure immediate actions will be from memory.
l During the course of the JPM, there may be some tasks you will have to perform that I
will require you to implement contingency actions in order to complete them. Even in these' cases, you are expected to make decisions and take actions based on the indications available and in accordance with the facility's'pmcedural guidance.
Initialiaa Cuels): l l l l The ANPS has directed you to respond to the abnormal alarm LAW 1-0120035. j
References:
ONP 1-0120035, Rev 18 During the performance of the task I will tell you which steps to simulate or discuss.
~
Verbalize each step before you do it. This gives you a chance to self-check and use STOP during the performance of each task element. l 1
Verify the position or condition of equipment or components by pointing to the instrumentation and providing a brief explanation of how the indication is used for verification.
l I will provide you with the appropriate cues for steps which are simulated or discussed.
l You may use any approved reference materiais normally available in the execution of this Job Performance Measure, including dogs.
- Do you understand these directions?
- if you have any questions, ask them now, and I will answer them.
l
- During the test I cannot answer questions.
l When you complete all steps correctly, you will pass this job performance measure.
l
- Begin the task now.
0521043. Rev D6 Page 4 cf 10 i
I. JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE f 8 PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST
- 1. Element / Step Verify pressurizer spray, pruportional and backup heaters are operating p,roperty in automatic.
Standard: OBSERVE any of the following Pressurizer pressure indications on RTGB 103 and/or RTGB 106 to DETERMINE improper automatic response: .
PR-1100 PIC-1100X PIC-1100Y PI-1102A PI-1102B PI-1102C PI-1102D PIA-1102ALL PIA-1102BLL PIA-1102CLL PIA-1102DLL Observe the proportional heater control and indication for P-1 and P-2 Observe the B/U heater control and indication for banks B-1 through B-6
, Observe the spray valve controller HlC-1100 NOTE TO EXAMINER: The CUES should provide sufficient information to diagnose the failure of the selected pressure channel LOW. It should be recognized that Pressurizer pressure is y actually increasing. All of the indicators listed may not be used by the operator when diagnosing this problem. The student may refer to Appendix "A" for expected automatic responses. l Cue: For PR-1100, PIC-1100X, P!C-1100Y : 1 SELECTED CHANNEL- DOWNSCALE LOW, NONSELECTED CHANNEL IS =2300 PStA AND SLOWLY INCREASING For other PI instruments:
INDICATED PRESSURE IS =2300 PSIA AND SLOWLY INCREASING For Pressurizer heaters:
SWITCHES IN AUTO, HEATERS LIGHTS INDICATE ON t f*
For Pressurizer spray controller HlC-1100:
INDICATES NO OUTPUT SAT UNSAT j Comments:
OfcHO43, Rev 06 Page 5 cf 10
- m. . . . - . . . . .-. - -- - . . - . -
l JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE s (C) Indica ~tes a Critical Step PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST
- 2. (C) Element / Step 11the selected pressure channel has failed, Then shift to the operable pressure channel.
Standard: At RTGB 103: POSITION HS-1100 to the attemate pressure control channel Cue:
ALTERNATE CHANNEL SELECTED. PROPORTIONAL HEATER OUTPUT REDUCING, SPRAY VALVE OUTPUT RfSING, PZR PRESSURE RETURNING TO NORM AL/
NOTE - The ANPS directs that the rest of the ONP be carried out.
SAT UNSAT Comments:
- 3. Element / Step Verify SE-02-03 and SE-02-04 Auxiliary Spray Valves", are closed Standard: At RTGB 103: DETERMINE keyswitches and indicating lights for SE-02-03 and SE-02-04 to be CLOSED Cue: SE-02-03, SE-02-04 GREEN LIGHTS ON AND RED LIGHTS OFF SAT UNSAT Comments:
- 4. Element / Step Verify power operated relief valves are closed.
Standard:- At RTGB 103:: DETERMINE position indicating lights for both power ,
operated relief valves CLOSED l Cue: PORV-1402, PORV-1404 GREEN LIGHTS ON AND RED LIGHTS OFF SAT UNSAT l
Comments:
l l
De2104, Rev D6 Page 6 cf 10
.c -. -. . _ _ - - - . . _ . . . . .- _ . . . . . . . .._- ._ - - _ -
PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST 4
5.
Element / Step Ensure that PORVs V1402 and V1404 hand switches are in the proper position for existing plant conditions.
Standard: At RTGB 103: DETERMINE PORVs hand switches are in NORMAL Cue: PORVs HAND SWITCHES IN NORMAL SAT. UNSAT Comments:
S.
Element / Step Verify pressure anomaly is NOT caused by a large rate of change of Tavg.
Standard: At RTGB 103: OBSERVE any of.the following indications and DETERMfME that Tavg is fairiy stable:
TR-1111X/1121X, Th1102A, TR-1115/1125, TI-1102B, TIA-1111X, Tb1102C, TIA-1121X, Tb1102D, tlc-1111Y, TIC-1121Y Cue: Tavg HAS DEEN STABLE THROUGHOUT THE EVOLUTION SAT UNSAT Comments:
j l
l
. END Element / Step TERMINATION
- - Standard: The pressurizer pressure control system is responding property to control pressure at 2250 psia.
4 tyn1043. Rev D6 Page 7 ef 10
i -
l.
OPERATING TEST WORKSHOP l RUSSELL BUILDING
! JPM QUESTIONS l
/*
RICK BALbWIN l
l l
JULY 15, '
998 i
)
ES-301, D1(l)
Sta :es~:
T1e arescriatec cues': ions ~or Ca:egories A anc B may inc uce a com 3ination o~ 03en- anc c osec-re erence items. Open-reference i: ems
~
l
~:lat rec uire a 33 icants ':o apply t1eir l knowledge o~ t7e 3 an~: to aos':u atec l norma a3 norma anc emercency
. situatio,ns are preferred. Cl5 sed-reference items may be used to eva uate t7e immeciate ac': ions o l emergency anc.otler arocecures, cer:aln au':o.ma':1.c inter ac':oc<s, ions operat!nc claractens':ics a 33roaria':e :o t,1e aci i:y., se': Doin':s asMin'im use o" closed-reference c ues': ions :la~:
re y sg e y on memory, anc avoid t7e use o~ 0 3en-re~erence _q_ue_s_ttons who_s_e answer can sim :
up if th_e ap_plicant can ind "lly the be lo_ ole _d corre_c_t_d_o_c_ument.
Re~ er ':0.Sec: ion 3.6 o or more guidance regarc.ingAppendix :le .
C ceve gamen~: anc use o~ 03en re~erence c ues':lons "or ~:le wa <-:1roug 1 :es:.
~
i
=
Appendix C:
States: -
- 6. Deve 03 Pre-scriatec rol ow-u a
~ Questions
!f t1e JPM will 3e usec curinc an initia licensinc examination, it sha"incluce a suf icieri: num 3er o" arescriatec answers anc cuestions re"erences (\with to evaluate t7e examinee's
~
uncerstancinc o"':wo <nowlecqe anc/or a oi ity re atec to t7e system or (K/A3 fas<.s:a~:ements More tlan one cuestion may 3e recuirec to e=ective y eva uate some K/A sta':emen:s.
T1e mos: a33roariate "orma~: "or tlis a33lication is t7e short-answer c uestion rec uires ~:he examinee to com.po,sewlich a response ratler than se ect ~ rom amonc a se~: o~ a ternative res3onses as is fle case wi~:1 mu tio e-cloice ma,tclinc, anc. truet.a se c uestio,ns. Kee3 ::le ~o owinc c uice ines, in accition to ~:le ceneric I:em cons:ruction 3rincia es iri A33encix
! 3, in rninc w1en are3arinc :le j c ues:lons:
i a. Provice clear, exa.ici: cirec: ions
! /cuice ines or answerinc ~:le
~
i cuestion so that the exa~minee i uncerstancs what constitutes a j fully correct response.
i Choose words carefully to ensure that t7e stiou ations anc
- recuirements o ~
- le cues: ion are a33roariately conve ec. Worcs i such as " evaluate." y' outline " anc
! "ex3 ain " can invi~:e a o': o ,cetai l tla': is n,ot necessari y re evan:.
f
! 3. IVa <e sure taa': t1e answer key
! res matches {and to) ponee the re in the is limitedquestion.quiremen W1en a 3 3ro aria':e, .
! incicate t7e amoun~: o~ 3ar:ia crecr:
- to De gran'
- ec or an incom o e~:e
~
i answer.
i For cuestions recuirinc comou:a~: ion, specify the dearee of precision
! expected. ~~ry'to ma <e t1e answer j turn ou: :o 3e w1o e num3ers.
4 1 _ -
'c. Avoic civinc away Jar: or a o ~:le answer 3)LYle way t1e cuestion is worc ec -or examo e:
"I~' t7e etcown line 3ecame 03structec, cou c 3 oration o t1e 3 ant 3e accomolislec slortly a ter a reactor tria ':0 au': the 3 an':
in co c slutcown ? l~ so, how?" l A test-wise examinee can rea ize l tlat ~:le answer las :o 3e yes, or e se ':le seconc 3ar: o~ t7e c uestion wou c lave reac some':linc i<e "I' ~ l not, w1y not?"
i
- c. Avoic wla: cou c .3e consicerec "tric<" c uestions in w1ica :le answer
<ey coes no: 3recise y ma~:c1 t1e c uestion. =or exama e as(inc "Fow
~ ~
co t7e Si termina~: ion c, ri~:eria" 61dnce o owinc a S reini':iation?"
im3liss :la: t7e":ermina~: ion cri:eria wi clance, w1en in actua i~:y ~: ley c o no':.
~
l i
- e. Avoid direct look-up quest. ions that only require the examinee to recall where to find the answer to the question.
~~
1e oaera:iona orien:a: ion recuirec ,
o" c uestions on :le wa <-t1rouc 1 :es: l an.c :le examinee's access to ~
re"erence cocumen:s. arcue acains:
~
- le use o" cuestions :la: test for reca anc memoriza: ion. Any questions that do not requi.re a.ny analysis, synthesis, or appl.ication of inTormafion by the examinee should be answerable without the aid of reference materials. Re"er l
- o ES-602., A::ac1merr: :, "or a more ce:ai ec ciscussion o~ cirec: oo <-u.3 c ues : ions.
=orm .ES-602
< is: "or 0 3en-Re"erence, .hes:
RC :ems, Clec "
con:ains a is: o~ cues:lons :la: can De u.sec :o eva ua:e :le sui:aaii:y o"
- le o ow-ua cues:lorjs :3 a_nnec or
- le wa < ~:1rouc 1 Jor:lon o~ :le oaera:inc :es:." A :louc 1 :le _ .
clec< is: was ceve o3ec ~or use in
evaluatinc recua i~ication written examinations, most o' t7e criteria i'i.e., a I exce a t 9 0 1' anc the '
(/A a33I.ra':ing on item, 7), are, y generica Ica3le anc coulc 3e usec as a 3 asis for revising or rejectinc.
3ro 30sec wa <-t1rougl c ues':lons.
~
ES-602 NRC Checklist for Form ES-602-1 l Open-Reference Test items Test Item Level l
- 1. Does each test item have a documented link to important licensee tasks, K/As, and/or ,
facility learning objectives? l
- 2. Is each question operationally oriented (i.e., is there a correlation between job demands and test demands)?
- 3. Is the question at least at the comprehension-level of knowledge?
- 4. Is the context of the questions realistic and free of window dressing and backwards logic?
- 5. Does the item require an appropriate use of references (i.e., use of analysis skills or synthesis of information either to discern what procedures were applicable or to consult the procedures to obtain the answer)?
-6. Is the question a " direct look-up" question, or does one question on the examination compromise another? A " direct look-up question"is defined as a question that immediately directs an licensee to a particular reference where the answer is readily available.
- 7. Does the question possess a high K/A importance factor (3 or greater) for the job position?
- 8. Does the question discriminate a competent licensee from one who is not?
- 9. Is the question appropriate for the written examination and the multiple choice l format?
- 10. Do questions in Section A take advantage of the simulator control room setting?
- 11. Does any question have the potential of being a " double-jeopardy" question?
- 12. Is the question clear, precise, and easy to read and understand?
- 13. Is there on!y one correct answer to the question?
- 14. Does the question pose situations and problems other than those presented during training?
- 15. Does the question have a reasonable estimated response time?
l l
l l
J l
CONCLUSIONS
@ 03en-re erence cuestions whose answer can simaly 3e ookec ua i the a33 icant can inc t7e correct cocument are NOT acceata3 e.
@ Analy. sis, Syntlesis, Com arelen.sion cues:lons slou c 3e usec to avoic c irect oo <-u o 3ro a ems.
@ On a I cuestions w1ere :le exaectec resaonses are mu tiaart, we wil notify t7e cancicate o t7e num3er o
<nown correc': answers anc the num3er neecec or fu crec it.
@ Examiners will as< non-arescriatec ol ow u3 c uestions, as necessary, to clarify or confirm. :le cancicate's uncerstancing o~ arescnatec c uestions or are-a annec tas<s. The o owu'a cuestions slou c 3e to further exo ore ':le ac< o cancicate knowlecce in t1e saeci ic area in c uestion"
~
@ Assign Joint va ues to eac1 answer
~: hat 1as mu :ia e to ensure examiner gracing aarts,istency.
cons
@ Icentify gn t.he cancica':e's shee:':he sta':us o" re~erence ma:enal usage.
@ There is aro30sa to im30se an allowance o only 30% closec-reference c uestions of either Category A or B.
4
)
j l
l 1
.- .....a -- .-~...a---- -nu...,.a,,.,a- . - - . _ - - . .-.2.~-aa-.--,~n x, s a u. --_&-____-a+ . . - - - ~ . - .a.. _ -
4 1
1 i
I DIRECT LOOK QUESTIONS 1
WITH ACCEPTABLE CORRECTION S
7 9
RO Admin. A.1 (Fuel Handling), Question 1 2.1.23 3,9/4.0 l
f QUESTION:
Given the following plant conditions:
e Reactor shutdown for refueling outage
. Unit offline: 1/1/9712:01 AM
+ Entered Mode 3: 1/1/97 2:10 AM Entered Mode 4: 1/1/97 6:17 AM i
Entered Mode 5: 1/1/97 11:45 PM What is the earliest date/ time core ofiload can commence?
ANSWER:
1/5/97 6:10 AM 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> after shutdown i
REFERENCE:
GP-010," Refueling", step 5.3.1 I a
01/06/98 5:43 AM
m x
AUTHORIZED COPY e INIT 5.278 JF needed for SFP water clarity, THEN place the SFP skimmer in service IAW OP-910.
~ ~ ~ ' " ~ ~
5.3 Fuel Assembly and Core Component Movement NOTE: A case evaluation has been performed IAW PLP-037 for each major evolution in this section. The case determination is defined prior to each applicable evolution.
3 5.3.1 t wck that the Reactor has been suberitical for at least 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> AND record hours subcritical. (TRMS 3.12) hrs 5.3.2 Verify EST-001 is complete.
ENG NOTE: The following equipment tests need to be completed prior to moving fuel.
5.3.3 Verify the following equipment necessary to support fuel
.. off-load has been tested IAW EST-030 AND mark the equipment that is not needed to support fuel off-load N/A.
- Fuel Transfer System (Section 8.6.2)
ENG
- Manipulator Crane (Section 8.6.3)
ENG
- CV RCC Change Fixture (Section 8.6.4)
ENG
- New Fuel Handling Equipment (Section 8.4)
ENG i
- NFB New Fuel Lift (Section 8.5.1)
ENG
- SFP New Fuel Monorail (Section 8.5.2)
ENG
- SFP Bridge Crane (Section 8.5.3)
ENG
- SFP New Fuel Elevator (Section 8.5.4)
ENG
~
Rev.36 Page 24 of 79
~
l Decay Time 3.12 3.12 : DECAY TIME TRMS 3.12 Movement of fuel within the core shall not be (CTS 3.8.1.h) initiated prior to 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> after shutdown.
APPLICABILITY: MODE 6.
COMPENSATORY MEASURES CONDITION REQUIRED COMPENSATORY MEASURE COMPLETION TIME i
A. Requirements of TRMS A.1 Susaend movement of fuel Immediately i not met. witlin the core. l l
TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST FREQUENCY l
l None. NA l
3.12 1
T v
Decay Time I
( B 3.12 B 3.1R DECAY TIME BASES I
l The restriction of not moving fuel in the reactor for a period of 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> !
after shutdown reduces the consequences of a fuel handling accident by providing for decay of short-lived fission products and the reduction of fission gas inventory in any potentially failed fuel. Fuel handling accidents i in containment and the Spent Fuel Building have been evaluated by postulating that the failure of all fuel rods in one assembly occurs 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> after shutdown. i l
l l
l B 3.12-1 -
,- ~
o RO Admin. A.1 (Fuel Handling), Question 1 l
2.1.23 1.9/4.0 REFERENCE ALLOWED l
l QUESTION:
l Given the following plant conditions:
l . Reactor shutdown for refueling outage l . Unit offline: 1/1/9812:01 AM l
. . Entered Mode 2: 1/1/9812:38 AM
.. Entered Mode 3: 1/1/98 2:10 AM
. Entered Mode 4: 1/1/98 6:17 AM
, . Entered Mode 5: 1/1/98 11:45 PM 1
What is the earliest date/ time core offload can commence?
ANSWER:
1/5/98 6:10 AM (100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> after shutdown)
REFERENCE:
GP-010, " Refueling", step 5.3.1 1 PLP-100 (Technical Requirements Manual), section 3.12
)
1 I
kY$N 02/13/98 9:58 AM
I o
RO JPM CR-019, Question 2 006 K1,03 4.2/4.3 I QUESTION: l l- Given the plant conditions: )
l
- Mode 1,100% power
!
- Accumulator levels / pressure l "A" 68 % 600 psig "B" 70 % 630 psig "C" 70 % 645 psig ;
Annunciator APP-002-B4 "SI ACCUM A HI/LO PRESS" illuminated l
Describe the basis for NOT being allowed to raise the pressure in the "A" Accumulator and lower the pressure in the "C" Accumulator by simultaneously opening the vent l valves for the two accumulators. l l
ANSWER:
S,imultaneously opening the accumulator vent valves wo . onnect the two accumulator gas spaces. If a large break LOCA were to occur on eithet of the loops ("A" or "C") both accumulators would depressurize invalidating the LOCA analysis.
(Not reauired for credit: Accumulator design capacity is based on one accumulator spilling to the containment floor through the break, the other two accumulators fill the core to the mid-plane.)
REFERENCE:
FSAR section 6.3.2.2.6 OP 202, step 4.20 APP-002-B4 "Si ACCUM A HI/LO PRESS" l
i 01/06/98-5:43 AM
UPDATED FSAR
! 3. Finally the second low level alarm on the RWST sounds. At this
! time, the-operator performs the switchover operation.
The changeover from injection to recirculation is effected by the operator in the Control Room via a series of manual switching operations according to written procedures Valves SI-856A and B are manually closed at the valves.
' Remotely operated valves for the injection phase of the SIS (Figures 6.3.1-1 and 6.3.1-2) which are under manual control, (this is, valves which normally are in their ready position and do not receive a SI signal) have their positions indicated on a common portion of the control board. At any time during operation, when one of these valves is not in the ready position for injection, it is shown visually on the board. Table 6.3.2-1 is a listing of the instrumentation readouts on the control board which the operator can monitor during recirculation. In addition, an audible annunciation alerts the operator to the condition. '
l 6.3.2.2.5.1 Location of the major components required for recirculation. The RHR pumps are located in the RHR pump pit (Elevation 203 ft 0 in.) which is below the basement floor of the Auxiliary Building (Elevation 226 ft 0 in). The RHR pump pit is located between the Containment !
Building and the Auxiliary Building. The residual heat exchangers are located !
on the first floor of the Auxiliary Building. I h
The high head SI pumps, component cooling pumps and component cooling :
1 aeat exchangers are located in the Auxiliary Building (Elevation 226 ft 0 in).
l The service water pumps are located in the intake structure, and the i
redundant piping to the component cooling heat exchangers is run underground. :
l 6.3.2.2.6 Accumulators. The accumulators are pressure vessels filled l
with borated water and pressurized with nitrogen gas. During normal plant l operation, each accumulator is isolated from the RCS by two check valves in series.
Should the RCS pressure fall below the accumulator pressure, the check valves open and borated water is forced into the RCS. Mechanical operation of the swing-disc check valves is the only action required to open the injection
!, path from the accumulators to the core via the cold leg.
The accumulators are passive engineered safety features (ESF) because
, the gas forces injection; no external source of power or signal transmission is needed to obtain fast-acting, high-flow capability when the need arises.
One accumulator is attached to each of the cold legs of the RCS.
The design capacity of the accumulators is based on the assumption that l flow from one of the accumulators spills onto the containment floor through
< the ruptured loop. ine flow from the remaining accumulators provides
! sufficient water to fill the volume outside of the core barrel below the 1
. nozzles, the bottom plenum, and one-half the core.
f L
l l 6.3.2-6 Amendment No. 12 1
4.0 (Continued)
- 16. A :ase evaluation has been performed for each section of this procedure IAW PLP-037. The case determination and any associated additional requirements are defined at the beginning of each section.
- 17. The Dedicated Operator utilized for filling SI Accumulators shall be any active licensed individual other than the Reactor Operator on watch, and shall remain at the RTGB until the filling evolution is complete. ,
- 18. If any SI Accumulator level increases greater than 10% (70 gal) due to inleakage when the RCS pressure is >1000 psig, then the ,
l affected accumulator shall be sampled within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. l (ITS SR 3.5.1.4)
- 19. When drawing an oil sample from an SI Pump, remove the Control Power Fuses. Reinstall the Control Power Fuses when sampling has been completed AND the oil reservoir has been refilled to the 4
normal level. During the interval with fueses removed, the SI Pump is inoperable.
V
- 20. Do N2I open more than one SI Accumulator Vent valve at a time when the SI Accumulators are required to be operable to prevent invalidating the LOCA Analysis. (Westinghouse Memo CPL-96-210)
L
- 21. Operation with RWST level greater than the high level setpoint I
. ._ should be avoided to prevent water level at the Spring Line of .
the RWST.
l I
l 1
OP-202 Rev. 44 Pc7e 10 of 120
RO JPM CR-019, Question 2 006 Kl.03 4.2/4.3 REFERENCE ALLOWED QUESTION:
Given the plant conditions:
. Mode 1,100% power
- Accumulator levels / pressure "A" 68 % 600 psig "B" 70 % 630 psig "C" 70 % 645 psig Annunciator APP-002-B4 "SI ACCUM A HI/LO PRESS" illuminated QUESTION A:
Determine which accumulator parameter (s) are outside the normal operating band.
ANSWER A:
"A" Accumulator pressure is low (normal band = 614 to 646 psig)
)
REFERENCE ALLOWED QUESTION B:
Can this evolution be performed and describe the basis for your response.
ANSWER B:
? Io, not allowed. Simultaneously opening the accumulator vent valves would connect the
, _two accumulator gas spaces. If a large break LOCA were to occur on either of the loops
("A" or "C") both accumulators would depressurize invalidating the LOCA analysis. l (Not required for credit: Accumulator design capacity is based on one accumulator spilling to the containment floor through the break, the other two accumulators fill the core to the mid-plane.)
{
REFERENCE:
FSAR section 6.:'.2.2.6 OP 202, step 4.20 APP-002-B4 "SI ACCUM A HI/LO PRESS" ovl3/93 9:58 AM
,} lg
e RO JPM CR-025, Question 1 l 005 K407 3.2/3.5 l QUESTION:
Given the following plant conditions:
- RCS cooldown is in progress
. Plant is in Mode 4 l RCS Tavs is 348 F
. RCS pressure '
+. PT-402 = 468 psig '
l
+. FT-403 = 470 psig
+ PT-404 = 472 psig What must be done to open!MOV-750/751 to place RHR in service?
ANSWER:
- Reduce RCS pressure (sensed by PT-403) to less than 465 psig
. Verify SI-862A/B "RWST TO RHR" and SI-863A/B "RHR LOOP RECIRC" closed with breakers closed and control power switches in " NORMAL"
REFERENCE:
OP-201, " Residual Heat Removal System", : ,
System
Description:
Residual Heat Removal System ;
01/08/93 12:51 PM
s AUTHORIZED COPY 0,
, 4.0 P'RECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 4.1 Reactor Coolant System temperature and pressure shall be less than 350*F and 375 psig before the Residual Heat Removal System is)Lt iriservice, and the RHR system will be removed from service before RCS pressure and temperature are raised above these values.
4.2 To prevent boiling the CCW liquid contained in an RHR HX, CCW flow should not be isolated to an RHR HX when the temperature of the RHR System is gre'ater than 200*F. (CR 95-00565)
C.3 [heither'RHR-750 nor RHR-751 will open unless the following conditions are satisfied:j
- The breakers fo'r SI-862A and B are closed.
- The breakers for SI-863A and B are closed.
- The control power switches for SI-862A and B are in NORMAL.
- The control power switches for SI-863A and B are in NORMAL.
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, Valves SI-862A and B are closed.
- Valves SI-863A and B are closed.
- RCS pressure is less than 465 psig. .
4.4 SI-862A & B, and SI-863A & B are interlocked so they cannot be opened unless the RHR loop pressure is less than 210 psig.
4.5 When the Residual Heat Removal System :s providing Core Cooling AND seal injection flow is desired to maintain a positive AP across the Thermal Barrier of the Reactor Coolant Pumps, letdown flow through HCV-142 and PCV-145 should be maintained to provide makeup to the VCT.
4.6 When RHR-757C or RHR-757D is closed,3,350 gpm flow, indicated on F1-605, with one RHR pump running or 6,700 gpm flow with two RHR pumps running shall not be exceeded, except as allowed / required by approved test procedures for which flowrates on F1-605 may be as high as 3800 gpm for one pump or 7600 gpm for two pumps.
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Rev. 34 Page 6 of 67 i
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005 K4,07 3.2/3.5 REFERENCE ALLOWED I
QUESTION:
Given the following plant conditions: i
. RCS cooldown is in progress '
- Plant is in Mode 4 l
. RCS T,is 348'F l
. RCS pressure )
! + PT-402 = 461 psig !
+ PT-403 = 470 psig l
+ PT-404 = 472 psig What conditions must be satisfied to open MOV-750/751 to place RHR in service?
ANSWER:
[.5] Reduce RCS pressure (sensed by PT-403) to less than 465 psig
. [.5] Verify SI-862A/B "RWST TO RHR" and SI-863A/B "RHR LOOP RECIRC" closed with breakers closed and control power switches in " NORMAL"
REFERENCE:
i OP-201, " Residual Heat Removal System", step 4.3 System
Description:
SD-003, Residual Heat Removal System I
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' ' RCS Specific Activity 3.4.16 ACTIONS (continued)
- l. ,/ 1 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3 with 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion T,y < 500*F.
Time of Condition A not met.
DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 in the unacceptable region of Figure 3.4.16 1.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.16.1 Verify reactor coolant gross specific 7 days activity s 100/E Ci/gm.
SR 3.4.16.2 -- -- --- --
- NOTE- ----- --- - --- --
Only required to be performed in MODE 1.
h Verify reactor coolant DOSE EQUIVALENT 14 days I 131 specific activity 51.0 yCi/gm.
{
Between 2 and 1 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after a l i THERMAL l
POWER change of a 15% RTP within a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> period (continued) 3.4 46 l.
RCS Specific Activity B 3.4.16 l
BASES (gontinued)
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SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.16.1 REQUIREMENTS SR 3.4.16.1 requires performing a gamma isoto31c analysis as a measure of the gross specific activity of t1e reactor coolant at least once every 7 days. The analysis shall consist of a qualitative measurement of the total radioactivity of the primary coolant in units of Ci/gm.
While basically a quantitative measure of radionuclides with half lives longer than 15 minutes, excluding iodines, this measurement is the sum of the degassed gamma activities and the gaseous gamma activities in the sample taken. This Surveillance provides an indication of any increase in gross specific activity.
Trending the results of this Surveillance allows proper remedial action to be taken before reaching the LC0 limit under normal operating conditions. The Surveillance is applicable in MODES 1 and 2, and in MODE 3 with T at least 500 F. The 7 day Frequency considers the unlikelYflood of a tjross fuel failure during the time.
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SR 3.4.16.2 l This Surveillance is performed in MODE 1 only to ensure iodine remains within limit during normal operation and following fast power changes when fuel failure is more apt to occur. The 14 day Frequency is adequate to trend changes in the iodine activity level, considering gross activity is monitored every 7 days. The Frequency, between 2 and
- 5 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after a power change a 15% RTP within a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 7 period, is established because the iodine levels peak during this time following fuel failure: samples at other times would provide inaccurate results.
SR 3.4.16.3 A radiochemical analysis for s determination is required every 184 days (6 months) with the plant operating in MODE 1 equilibrium conditions. The E determination directly relates to the LCO and is required to verify plant operation within the specified gross activity LC0 limit. The analysis for E is a measurement of the average energies per disintegration for isotopes with half lives longer than 1
o (continued) l I
B 3.4-102
SRO(I) Admin. A.1,(Plant Chemistry), Question 1 l 2.1.14 _2.5/3.3 REFERENCE ALLOWED l
QUESTION Given the following plant conditions:
The plant is at 100% power, equilibrium Xenon, all systems aligned for normal l operation (Jan 15,1998,12:01 AM) l Chemistry personnel report they have completed obtaining RCS and Pressurizer j liquid samples (9:00 AM)
. A runback due to a dropped rod occurred at 9:15 AM
. Recovery actions are in progress QUESTION A:
What are the chemistry sampling requirements for this plant condition?
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ANSWER A: I
[.5] Between 2 and 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> following a reactor power change of215% in I hour (in Mode 1), RCS Dose Equivalent I-131 shall be verified < l.0 micro-curies / gram.
(Between 11:15 AM and 3:15 PM)
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NO REFERENCE ALLOWED QUESTION B:
What is the basis for the time frame after the power change?
l ANSWER:
[.5] Ensure Iodine remains within limit following fast power changes when fuel failure is more apt to occur. 2 to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> following a power change of t 15% in a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> period is established because this is when the Iodine level in the RCS would peak due to fuel l
failure.
REFERENCE:
OMM-001-13," Plant Chemistry", section 5.2 ITS, SR 3.4.16.2 h5 ($l d (:-
02/13/98 9:58 AM
z SRO(I) Admin. A.1,(Plant Chemistry), Question 1 l 2.1.14 - 2.5/3.3 l
QUESTION:
Given the following plant conditions:
. The plant is at 100% power, equilibrium Xenon, all systems aligned for normal operation (Jan 15,1998,12:01 AM)
. Chemistry personnel report they have completed obtaining RCS and Pressurizer liquid samples (9:00 AM)
. A runback due to a dropped rod occurred at 9:15 AM !
. The plant is now stable at ~68% j
. Recovery actions are in progress What are the chemistry sampling requirements and basis for this plant condition?
ANSWER:
Between 2 and 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> following a reactor power change of 215% in I hour (in Mode 1),
RCS Dose Equivalent I-131 shall be verified 11.0 micro-curies / gram. (Between 11:15 AM and 3:15 PM)
Ensure Iodine remains within limit following fast power changes when fuel failure is more apt to occur. 2 to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> following a power change of 215% in a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> period is
. established because this is when the Iodine level in the RCS would peak due to fuel failure.
REFERENCE:
Plant Chemistry", section 5.2 SR 3.4.16.2 i
Ol/08N8 l0:38 AM
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1 POOR QUESTIONS l
KA: 062AA1.01 Importance: 3.4/3.8 i Reference allowed (FSAR)
Question: What is the limiting factor on the amount l of current that can be passed from Unit 1 to Unit 2 l through the SBO crosstie? I Expected Response: The electrical cable between the two units is the limiting factor.
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KA: 033000K303 Importance: 3.0/3.3 Reference allowed Question: What is the response of the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System 'KF', and why, regarding I temperature and level following a Blackout?
' NOTE: Assume NO operator action is taken~
Expected Response: Spent Fuel Pool level and l temperature will increase due to decay heat of the spent fuel assemblies.
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Conduct of Operation (SRO 1)
Fire Brigade l KA: 194001K116 3.5/4.2 Lesson Plan: EAP-SEP
Reference:
Fire Plan, (E-Plan) RP/1000/29 Fire Brigade Response, NSD 112, Fire Brigade Organization, Training, and Responsibilities Task: 2610000, 3710001 Source: NEW PRA 3-18-97 I
- 4. As the Operations Shift Supervisor serving as the Fire Brigade Leader during an actual fire or fire drill, you have several responsibilities. Describe the normal duties as the 1 Fire Brigade Leader at the fire scene?
ANSWER:
1- Serve as the Fire Brigade Commander and direct the Fire Brigade during the event. l l
2- Obtain support as needed such as Security, Radiation Protection, Chemistry, Offsite Fire Department and Hazmat.
(3 - Ensure all fire protection equipment is restore to full capability immediately following the event).
(4 - Complete the Fire Emergency Report and forward the report to the EP (Emergency Planning) Section).
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KA: 062000A401 (3.3/3.1)
Lesson Plan: EL EPD Objective R8 page 25
Reference:
OMP l Task: 002630001 Source: Bank EL 96 (JPM CRO 08) RO QUESTION:
Describe the safety and personnel requirements for manual operation !
of switchyard disconnects, l
ANSWER:
Rubber safety gloves and safety glasses must be worn. i At least two people in the crew performing the task, one of which I is a supervisor.
Nomex suits should be worn by the breaker operator.
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Conduct of Operations (SRO 1)
Self Checking / STAR KA: 194001K101 (3.6/3.7)
Lesson Plan: ADM-OMP
Reference:
OMP 1-22, Job Assignments Task: 3610052 Source: PRA 3-G-97 NEW
- 1. As an SRO (Shif t Supervisor) you have the responsibility of performing Pre-Job Briefs with other operators on your shift, you make the decision of the level of detail and information within the Pre-job Brief.
What are several guidelines that you will use to determine the amount of detail of the Pre-Job Brief presentation and describe the " STAR" component of the Pre-Job Brief?
1 ANSWER:
(2 of 5)
- 1) Complexity of the task Consequences of the task Importance of the task l
Frequency of the task i Unfamiliarly of the task to the pe*former
- 2) " STAR" is a self checking method (that operators use to reduce the potential of errsrs).
("S" - Stop)
("T" - Think)
("A" - Act)
("R" - Review)
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. I ACCEP-~ABLE QUESTIONS Importance: 2.6/3.0
Reference:
Steam Tables Question: The RCS is at 2250 psia, Quench tank pressure is 3.5psig. If a small leak developed in I the seat of Code Safety V 1201, what temperature l would you expect to see on TIA-1107? l Expected Response: 230 degrees I 1
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l Question #1. I KA: 001K5.02 j Importance: 2.9/3.4
Reference:
Unit 2 Plant Physics Curves Question: Unit 2 has 6,000 EFPH on the core and experiences a dropped rod resulting in the NI power level changes from 100% to 93%, what is the approximate worth of the dropped rod? l Expected Response: Approximately 75 to 100 '
pcm.
Question # 2.
KA: 001K5.28 Importance: 3.5/3.8
Reference:
Unit 2 Plant Physics Curves Question: In order to withdraw the same CEA '
without changing the power level or temperature of the RCS, how much would RCS boron concentration have to be changed?(PPM)
Expected Response: approximately 12 PPM (Boron worth for the present conditions is 8.38pcm/ ppm)
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"HLC EXAM DEVELOPMENT EXAM BANK" TEST ITEM DATA SHEET
===========================================================
I. CROSS-REFERENCE DATA 1 RECORD NUMBER: 1427 TYPE: General Use ;
LESSON 1: LOR-SIM-JP-019-A05 LESSON 1 OBJECTIVES: 01 i STYLE: Short Essay /Other POINT VALUE: 1.00 i REVISION: 3 TIME TO COMPLETE: 4 Minutes l ENTERED BY: DATE ENTERED: 10/10/94 MODIFIED BY: '
DATE MODIFIED: 04/27/98 !
DATE LAST USEU: i
~~
(approved by: .
ASSOCIATED TASKS:
No Tasks are currently referenced to this question.
ASSOCIATED K/A's:
206000 A1.01 ROI: 4.3 BROI: 4.4 l Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM REACTOR WATER LEVEL: BWR-2,3,4 controls
REFERENCES:
2 APP A-01 3-1 /R21
===========================================================
II. QUESTION:
HPCI started on high drywell pressure, but tripped on high RPV level.
j Explain how HPCI responds as level lowers from the high level trip to Lo Ievel 3. l j
Additionally, if you wanted to restart HPCI at 120", what actions would be required to perform that action?
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======================================================================= 1 III. ANSWER: i As level lowers, HPCI will not restart until level reaches LL-2 (105"). l HPCI will then reset its trips and start and inject with no operator j action. HPCI will continue to run as level lowers to LL-3. 1 To restart HPCI prior to reaching LL-2, depress the high water level.
trip reset pushbutton, the drywell signal will then restart HPCI and' i ause it to inject.
PAGE 1 OF 1
5
- "NRC JPM 98, Rev 0" EXAMINATION **
QUESTION 3 POINT VALUE: 1.00 Using the attached diagram, explain how it is possible to reset a scram with the mode switch in SHUTDOWN. ;
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$ (;;.3lj d K15C c_____,
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RESET 1' K15A := K15C :':K19C RESET lf 2 REACTOR MANUAL SCRAM m!m SHUTDOWN SCRAM RESET INTERLOCK d TR1P CHANNEL *A3" "' l ' TRIP SYSTEM ,*A' q i Figure 03 Shutdown Scram Reset Interlock 4
I CSC C2 Re, 2: Page EC :f :C' l 4
s JC'3 PERFORMANCE MEASURE Provide this page to the Candidate Health Physics has performed a survey of the Unit 2 Charging Pump rooms and hallway. Given a survey map, determine how each room and hallway should be posted.
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FOR TR AtNWG USE ONLY
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PAUL STEINER l 1
J >V SC-EJ_::\G CO\S::JERA-~::0\S
- Amount of material to be generated:
Licensee Cost.
Licensee Manpower.
Examiner Review Time.
Validation Time on Simulator During Prep-Week.
e The current trend is a shift towards a single JPM set, administered piece by
. piece, with all applicants receiving the same piece each day.
- Considerations with this technique:
Availability of both Simulator and Booth Operators for two shifts.
Sequestering.
Candidate Stress.
Examiner Stress. (No laughing please!) l i
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a roa ems Curren:
e JPMs are lasting 30 minutes to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
Longer is not better.
Take the time it takes a staff instructor to. perform the task, with questions, and double it.
- The last three examinations have run past 10:00 pm and were scheduled to end at 6:00 pm.
- Applicants are arriving at 7:00 am and are not being exam.ined until 7:00 pm. i l
- No margin for error or simulator failure.
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- 3 ERA ~I \ 3 EXAV::\ AT::0\
AJV::\:: S~~RA~~::VE ~~C 3:: CS 3Vs vs Q_ES~~::0\S Paul Steiner
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ES-301 Specific Instructions for Category A
- Although Admin topics may be examined separately, it is preferable, whenever possible, to link, associate, or integrate them with tasks and events conducted during Categories B and C
- Using a single Admin JPM is generally preferred, however, two prescripted questions may be used.
- If the applicant has a "U" in only one !
Admin topic, the examiner may fail the applicant in Category A depending on the '
importance of the identified deficiency
- Topics in the administrative portion of the NRC initial examination are weighted the highest of all examination areas, and are thus the most likely to result in a failing grade.
- A single knowledge weakness / or applicant l error can result in an initial examination fail ure .
T Common Single Failure Points:
o Clearance Error. . :
- Reactivity Balance Error. ;
The key is a balance between questions and JPM's.
1 All JPMs will result in a i long Admin exam, with a.high potential to fail a candidate for a single error.
All questions usually results in a weak Admin exam. I l
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Exami es o= Gooc Acmin J Ms
- Shutdown Margin Calculation.
- Approval of a . Clearance Order.
- ECP Calculation.
- Manual Leak Rate Calculation.
- Risk Matrix Utilization. l
- Off-Site Dose Projection.
- Review a Survey Map and Demonstrate Knowledge of Radiological Hazards in a Work Zone.
- Evaluate the Applicants Scenarios for !
Emergency Plan Application and Make Protective Action Recommendations. !
The key to success with' these types of tasks is solid and thorough validation.
If the task is not clear. and well defined, the applicants will become confused.
- If the task is too long, it will begin to loose its evaluating abi11ty.
Examples of Poor Admin JPMs e Check out a key from the key locker.
- Make a log _ entry.
F e Frisk out an : item. .
Do you want an applicant to fail for touching the surface?
- Make a call-in for emergent work while l reading from a procedure. l i
e Perform.a pre-job brief.
1 These are items of Low l Discriminatory Validity, and if performed poorly can result in severe grading. ;
1 1
Otler Jifficu~ ties dit1 Acmin
- SRO applicants should be evaluated at greater depth on Admin topics. ;
1 There must be a difference between the I R0 and SRO Admin examinations.
- Control Room Software not available on the i simulator or applicants don't have the l proper password.
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- The question does not solicit the answer.
Put validators in the mind set of appli cant. ;
- Assigning point values to multiple answer questions.
The limit is 80%. If there are four answers, the applicant must get a7 7 i four correct.
- Don't require applicants to catch integrity issues, or misspelled words when approving clearances or valve line-ups.
- Direct look-ups are prohibited!
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EXlMINATION SECURITY
- PER 10 CFR 55.49 - " APPLICANTS, LICENSEES, AND FACILITY LICENSEES
' SHALL NOT ENGAGE IN ANY ACTIVITY THAT COMPROMISES THE INTEGRITY OF ANY APPLICATION, TEST, OR.
EXAMINATION BY THIS PART" RULE IMPLEMENTED IN NUREG-1021 e
ES-201 - C.1 & C.2 & C.3 (RESPONSIBILITIES) e ES-201 - D.2 (PERSONNEL RESTRICTIONS) e ES-201 - ATTACHMENT 1 (PHYSICAL SECURITY & EXAM BANK LIMITATIONS) e ;
ES-201 - FORM ES-201-3 (SECURITY AGREEMENT) ,
e ES-205 - GFES EXAM ADMINISTRATION e ES-402 - C.1 (RESPONSIBILITIES) e ES-402 - E.3 (POST-EXAM REVIEWS) e ES-501 - POST-EXAM DOCUMENTATION e APPENDIX D, SECTION F (SIMULATOR SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS)
EXAMPLES INSTRUCTOR SIGNED SECURITY AGREEMENT AND DISCUSSED EXAM CONTENT WITH EXAMINEES '-
REVEALING OF WHAT IS NOT ON THE EXAM (APPLICANTS SHOULD NOT BE ABLE TO PREDICT OR NARROW THE POSSIBLE SCOPE OR CONTENT OF EXAM BASED ON YOUR TEST DEVELOPMENT PRACTICES)
BIAS OF SCOPE, CONTENT, OR LEVEL OF DIFFICULTY OF AN EXAM TO ENHANCE CHANCES OF CANDIDATES PASSING TEST LOSS OF CONTROL OF EXAM MATERIAL (NOT LOCKED UP WHEN LEAVE OFFICE, PARTS OF EXAM LEFT IN COPIER, PARTS OF EXAM LEFT IN. SIMULATOR BOOTH AFTER VALIDATION)
INSTRUCTOR ON SECURITY AGREEMENT INTERACTS WITH SR0(U) CANDIDATE DURING REQUAL (TAUGHT CLASS, EVALUATED SIM. SCENARIOS, SAT-ON AUDIT BOARD)
WRITE EXAM TO SAME FORMAT EVERY TIME S0 IT BECOMES PREDICTABLE ,
CHANGING K/A NUMBERS ON OLD QUESTIONS IN ORDER TO FIT NEW SAMPLE PLAN PERSONNEL NOT ON SECURITY AGREEMENT IGNORE WARNING SIGNS AND WALK IN ON EXAM DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES DRAFT EXAM MATERIAL NOT PROPERLY PACKAGED WHEN SENT TO NRC AND WAS DELIVERED OPEN
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CONSEQUENCES -
NUREG-1600, " GENERAL STATEMENT OF POLICY AND PROCEDURES FOR NRC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS" APPLIES -
IF HAVE INDICATION OF COMPROMISE, ACTION WILL BE TAKEN TO ENSURE AND RESTORE THE INTEGRITY AND SECURITY OF PROCESS. INCLUDES:
- NOT GIVING EXAM MAKING ADDITIONAL CHANGES TO EXAM
~
e VOIDING EXAM RESULTS IF EXAM ALREADY GIVEN . 9 -
REEVALUATING LICENSING DECISIONS PER 55.61(b) ., ,
o '
POSSIBLY IMPOSING ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS INCLUDING:'
CIVIL PENALTIES ORDERS IMPLEMENTATION OF DELIBERATE MISCONDUCT RULE (10~CFR 50.5) -
i t .
t
- . _ _ - _ - _ - - - - .-_-.-n_- . .- - _ .- ___------_ - - - _ ____--__------------_--.-----------_--a- __ _. .
~
EXAM PREDICT /BILITY APPLICANTS SHOULD NOT BE ABLE TO PREDICT OR NARROW THE POSSIBLE SCOP OR CONTENT OF EXAM BASED ON YOUR TEST DEVELOPMENT PRACTICES -
EXAM DEVELOPMENT TECHNIQUES OR RULES SHOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED WITH TH CANDIDATES (e.g. , 25% OF WRITTEN WILL BE OFF THE MOST RECENT EXAM) .
EXAM METHODOLGY SHOULD BE VARIED FROM EXAM TO EXAM (e.g., SECTION A.4 SHOULD NOT ALWAYS BE " CLASSIFY THE SCENARIO" FOR SR0's)
EXAM DEVELOPMENT CRITERIA LIMITATIONS SHOULD NOT ALWAYS BE THE BASIS O THE EXAM CONTENT (e.g., NO OVERLAP WITH THE AUDIT TEST SHOULD NOT BE A RULE STRICTLY FOLLOWED WITH NO EXCEPTION) IF DONE CANDIDATES CAN ,
EXCLUDE EVERY THING FROM THEIR AUDIT AS NOT BEING ON THEIR TEST WHICH NARROWS THE SCOPE.
ALLOW AUDIT AND LICENSE EXAMS TO DEVELOP INDEPENDENTLY AND IDENTIFY TO THE CHIEF EXAMINER THOSE AREAS THAT OVERLAP WITH A PROPOSED RESOLUTION, IF NEEDED.
AREAS TO WATCH: NO OVERLAP FROM AUDIT EXAM '
25% FROM THE LAST TWO NRC EXAMS 50% FUNDAMENTAL KNOWLEDGE NO TEST ITEM REPEATS FROM DAY TO DAY :
WRITTEN EXAM ANSWERS FAVOR a,b c, OR d ALL JPMs DONE ONLY ON A SPECIFIC UNIT
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1 SIMULATOR SCENARIO DEVELOPMEN~~
C. JAY \E G. -033ER l
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CR:: ::CA_ ~~AS (S da; cons:1:u:es a cri:ica~
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l 1e recua 1 =ica: ion examina: ion uses cri :ica~ :as <s (C- s) =or' eva~ ua :ing i
crew Jer=ormance on ~:as
Objectives: To evaluate the students ability to implement ONOPs for loss of a vital .
480V load center, an off-normal Pressurizer pressure and Letdown condition, and j failure of a Steam Generator level transmitter; to perform a normal power :
reduction; and to execute EOPs for a Steam Generator Tube Rupture combined ~ ' ~
with an Excess Steam Demand (EOP-15) l l
initial Conditions: Unit 2 is at 100% power, MOL.
Turnover: Unit 2 is at 100% power MOL. the 2B Char for packing replacement, expected back in four hours.ging The 2Apump Heate-is Drain out ofPump service has a unisolable oilleak requiring the to be taken out of service. Shift instructions is to reduce power to 92%pum an remove the 2A Heater Drain Pump from 3 service.
Additional failures: 2A Containment Spray Pump fails to start on CSAS
. Event Malf. Event Event
. No. No. Tvoe' Descriotion
.- 1 N-BOP Power reduction from 100% to 92% l R-RO L- l 2 1-RO PIC-1100X (PZR pressure transmitter) driftWah- !
3 C-BOP, 2AB Load Center deeneroizes _ . /.1,3 mL ,~ A 4 C-RO 2B CCW Pump trios 5 l-BOP FIC-9011,2A Steam Generator flow transmitter fails
, low.
6 M- 2A Steam Generator tube rupture (250 GPM),2A BOP main steam line break inside containment on reactor M-R O trio.
r, cM. eu,.-r om M nb 4 Wh l i r i
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<- - (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
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Facility' Scenario No.: 1a Op-Test No.: 1 Objectives: To evaluate the students ability to implement ONOPs for loss of a vital 480V load center, an off-normal Pressurizer pressure and Letdown condition, and failure of a Steam Generator steam flow transmitter; to perform a normal power reduction; and to execute EOPs for a Steam Generator Tube Rupture combined with a Main Feedwater line break inside containment (EOP-15)
Initial Conditions: Unit 2 is at 100% power, MOL.
Tumover Unit 2 is at 100% power MOL. The 2A Charging pump is out of service for a lube oil PM, expected back m three hours. The 28 Mam Feedwater Pump has a unisolable discharge flange leak requiring the pump to be taken out of service. 2A Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor is out of service, not expected back this shift. 2-HVS-1 A containment cooler is out of service. Chemistry reports a 15 GPD tube leak on the 2B S/G. Management has decided to continue Shift instructions are to reduce power to 45% andpower remove operations the 2B Main dueFeedwater to the system Pump load.
from service. Thunderstorms have been reported to be approaching the St. Lucie County area Additional failures: A train CSAS fails to actuate and FCV071 A fails to fully open 2B Containment Spray pump develops a sheared shaft on start.
2A Main Feedwater pump fails to trip on low suction pressure 2A Main Feedwater isolation valves fail to c30se on MSIS Event Malf. l Event Event No. No. Type' Description
~
1 N-BOP Power reduction from 100% to 45%
R-RO 2 1-RO PIC-1100X (PZR pressure setpoint) drifts high 3 C-RO 2AB Load Center deenergizes,2B Charging pump tripgna:>
4 N-BOP Realignment of charging and letdown 5 C-BOP 28 CCW Pump trips 1
S ' BOP 2 9 E01", 2A SfG ctccm Se t encmter fci!c hip l l
7 M-BOP 2A Steam Generator tube rupture (250 GPM),2A main '
M-RO feed line break inside corttainment on reactor trip C A train CSAS faifs to actuate l C 2A Main Feed isolation valves fail to close on MSIS i (MFIV failure, continues to feed containment)
C FCV 071 A fails to fully open (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor l l
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ES-301 Simulator Scenario Quality Assurance Checklist Form ES-301-4 v
Fedlity: Date of Exem: Scenario Numbers: / / Operating Test No.:
QUAUTATIVE ATTNSUTES Initials a b c
- 1. The soonense how cieeriy stated okjectives in the scenario senmeries.
- 2. The initial conditions are reeGstic, in that some equipment and/or instrumentation eney be out of service, but it does not cue the speestors into expected events.
- 3. The scenarios censist mostly of related events.
4 Each ewert f- w . consists of a the point in the scenario when it is to be initisted I e the metfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event e the symptoms / cues that will be visible to the crew
- the expected operator actions (by shift position) e the event termination point Gf applicable)
- 5. No more then one norwnschenistic failure (e.g., pipe breek) is incorporated into the scenario without a credible preceding incident such as a seismic event. O
- 6. The ewonts are welid wrth regard to physics and thermodynamics.
l
- 7. Sequencing and timing of ownts is reasonable, eruf suows the examination team to obtain '
complete evaluation resuits commeneurste with the scenario objectives.
- 8. If time compression techniques are used the sceneno summary clearfy so indicates.
Operators have sufficient time to carry out expected activities without undue time constreints. Cues are given.
h
- 9. The simulator modeling is not eftered. 4
- 10. The scenarios have been vesidsted, i
- 12. AllindiWuel operator competencies can be evolueted, as verif.ed using Form ES-301-6 I (submit the form along with the sirnulator scenarios). I I
- 13. Each applicent wu! be significantly inalved in the miremum number of transients and !
events specified on Form ES-301-5 isubmit the form along with the s,mulator scenarios).
. .14 The Jewel of diffcutty is appropriate to support Goensing decisions for each crew position.
TAMGET QUAtlTTTATTVE ATTRIBUTES (pER SCENANO) Actual Attributes - - ~
j i
/ /
- 1. Teeml matfunctions (5-8)
- 2. Metfunctions after EDP entry (1-2) / / j
- 3. Abnonnel ewnts (2-4) / /
- 4. Mejor transients (12) / /
- 5. EOPs entered / requiring substantive actions (1-2) / /
l
- 6. EOP contin 0encies requiring substantwe actions (0-2) / /
- 7. Cntice! tasks (2-3) / /
NUREG-1021 24 of 26 Interim Rev. 8, January 1997
i 1
ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Fom ES-301-5 l OPERATING TEST NO.: I l
Applicant Evolution Minimum Scenario Number Type Type Number 1 2 3 4 Reactivity 1 1
Normal 1 RO Instrument 2 Component 2 Major 1 Reactivity I l
Nomal 0 i As RO Instrument 1 Component 1 1
Major 1
.. SROL-]
l Reactivity 0 Normal 1 As SRO Instrument 1 Costoonent 1 Major 1 Reactivity 0 Normal 1 SRO-U Instrument 1 Component 1
! Major 1 1 Instructions: (1) ^ Enter the operating test number and Fom ES-D-1 l event numbers for each evolution type.
l (2) Reactivity manipulations must be significant as i defined in Appendix D.
Author:
Chief Examiner:
J NUREG-1021 25 of 26 Interim Rev. 8, January 1997
e ES-301 , Competencies checklist Form ES-301-6 I I Applicant #1 Applicant #2 . Applicant #3 RO/SRO-I/SRO-U RO/SRO-1/SRO-U R0/SRO-I/SRD-U Competencies SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO I 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 Understand and Interpret Annunciators and Alarms Diagnose Events
- and Conditions Understand Plant and System Response Comply With and Use Procedures (1)
Operate Control Beards (2)
Communicate and Interact With the Crew Demonstrate Supervisory Ability (3)
Comply With and Use Tech. Specs. (3)
Notes:
(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RD. 1 (2) Optional for an SRO-U. l (3) Only applicable to SR0s.
)
Instructions:
Circle the applicant's license type and enter the event numbers that test the i competency for each scenario in the set.
Author:
Chief Examiner:
NUREG-1021 26 of 26 Interim Rev. 8, January 1997