IR 05000346/2018011
| ML18309A341 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 11/05/2018 |
| From: | Karla Stoedter NRC/RGN-III/DRS/EB2 |
| To: | Bezilla M FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co |
| References | |
| IR 2018011 | |
| Download: ML18309A341 (19) | |
Text
ber 5, 2018
SUBJECT:
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATIONNRC DESIGN BASES ASSURANCE INSPECTION (TEAMS); INSPECTION REPORT 05000346/2018011
Dear Mr. Bezilla:
On October 5, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a Triennial Baseline Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Teams) inspection at your Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. On October 25, 2018, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Blair, Plant Manager, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has identified two issues that were evaluated under the risk significance determination process as having very-low safety significance (Green). The NRC has also determined that two violations are associated with these issues. Because the licensee initiated condition reports to address these issues, these violations are being treated as Non-Cited Violations (NCVs), consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy. These NCVs are described in the subject inspection report.
If you contest the violations or significance of these NCVs, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555 0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC resident inspector at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Karla Stoedter, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 50-346;72-014 License Nos. NPF-3 Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000346/2018011 cc: Distribution via LISTSERV
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a Design Bases Assurance (Team) Inspection at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. Findings and violations being considered in the NRCs assessment are summarized in the table below.
List of Findings and Violations Inadequate Procedure Could Lead to a Potential Water Hammer Event in the Service Water System Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV None 71111.21M 05000346/2018011-01 Closed The inspectors identified a finding of very-low safety significance (i.e., Green) and an associated Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR),
Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to prescribe an adequate procedure for placing the standby service water (SW) pump in service following the failure of an operating SW pump. Specifically, Procedure DB-OP-02511,
Loss of Service Water Pumps/Systems, contained instructions which could result in a water hammer event within the SW system if forebay level was less than 566 feet.
Failure to Verify the Adequacy of Fast Bus Transfer Scheme Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV None 71111.21M 05000346/2018011-02 Closed The inspectors identified a finding of very-low safety significance (i.e., Green) and an associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensees failure to verify the adequacy of design of the fast bus transfer scheme. Specifically, the licensee failed to have an adequate analysis to ensure a successful fast bus transfer from the auxiliary transformer to the startup transformers during a loss of coolant accident.
Additional Tracking Items None
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs)in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html.
Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection ProgramOperations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
===71111.21MDesign Bases Assurance Inspection (Teams)
The inspectors selected the components listed below based primarily on the scenario approach. The scenarios selected were: loss of offsite power and station blackout. The inspectors evaluated the following components and listed applicable attributes, permanent modifications, and operating experience:
Component ===
- (1) Service Water Pump and motor (P3-2)a) Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR)/Technical Specifications(TS)/
Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) Licensing Basis Requirements b) Visual non-intrusive inspection to assess the installation configuration, material condition, and potential vulnerability to hazards c) Operating procedures d) Protection against external events: Flooding e) Maintenance Effectiveness f) Modifications g) System Health h) Generic Letter 89-13, Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment Program i) Translation of vendor specifications j) Mechanical/structural design: flow balance/head capacity, minimum flow, runout flow, required submergence (net positive suction head/vortexing), level setpoints and instrument uncertainty, hydraulic transients (water hammer), gas intrusion, room heat up, and room ventilation k) Test/inspection procedures, acceptance criteria, and recent results: Quarterly In-Service Testing (IST) surveillances comprehensive IST surveillances, TS instrument surveillances, and flow balance tests l) Control logic for start/stop pump m) Electrical design calculations and considerations: voltage drop, degraded voltage effects, minimum voltage, protective relays, cable ampacity, brake horsepower, and emergency power.
- (2) 125/250 Volt Direct Current Motor Control Center and Charger (D2_ED and DBC2P)a) UFSAR/TS/TRM Licensing Basis Requirements b) Visual non-intrusive inspection to assess the installation configuration, material condition, and potential vulnerability to hazards c) Operating procedures d) Protection against external events: flooding, seismic, high energy line break, and fire e) Maintenance effectiveness f) Modifications g) System health h) Test/inspection procedures, acceptance criteria, and recent results: load testing, TS surveillances, and relay calibration.
i) Electrical design calculations and considerations: loading, short circuit, voltage regulation, coordination, bus capacity, overcurrent protection, loss of voltage, cable ampacity, protective relays and trip set points, charger sizing, breaker settings and ratings to prevent spurious tripping.
- (3) 480 Volt Alternate Current Motor Control Center (BF12A)a) UFSAR/TS/TRM Licensing Basis Requirements b) Visual non-intrusive inspection to assess the installation configuration, material condition, and potential vulnerability to hazards c) Operating procedures d) Protection against external events: flooding, seismic, high energy line break, and fire e) Maintenance effectiveness f) Modifications g) System health h) Translation of vendor specifications i) Test/inspection procedures, acceptance criteria, and recent results: load testing, terminal corrosion resistance, and relay calibration.
j) Electrical design calculations and considerations: loading, short circuit, voltage regulation, coordination, bus capacity, containment penetration protection, control circuit voltage drop, loss of voltage, cable ampacity, protective relays and trip set points, breaker settings and ratings to prevent spurious tripping.
Component Large Early Release Frequency (1 Sample)
- (1) Pressure Operated Relieve Valve (RC11)a) UFSAR/TS/TRM Licensing Basis Requirements b) Operating Procedures c) Modifications d) Maintenance effectiveness e) System health f) Translation of vendor specifications g) Control logic for automatic functions h) Test/inspection procedures, acceptance criteria and recent results.
Permanent Modification (6 Samples)
- (1) Engineering Change Package(ECP) 15-0379, Replace Molded Case Circuit Breakers
- (2) ECP 13-0024-001, Revise Setpoints for Make-up Tank Level
- (3) ECP 14-0376-011/14-0376-012, Change Integrated Control System Steam Generator High Level Limit from 93.5% to 96% and 96% to 99%
- (4) ECP 16-0050-000, Replace Station Blackout Diesel Radiator
- (5) ECP 05-0086, Containment Air Coolers Service Water Piping Modification
- (6) ECP 02-0707-005; Battery Charger Change
Operating Experience (1 Sample)
- (1) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Generic Letter 2006-02, Grid Reliability and the Impact on Plant Risk and the Operability of Offsite Power Review of Previously Identified Inspection Issues
- (1) NCV 05000346/2015008-01, Vulnerability of Emergency Diesel Generator Cross-Tie to a Nonessential Bus
- (2) NCV 05000346/2015008-02, Failure to Comply with IEEE 308-1971 for the Required Independence of Safety-Related Essential Inverter Distribution Systems
- (3) NCV 05000346/2015008-03, Failure to Incorporate the Design Analysis Required Acceptance Limit into Surveillance Procedure Review of Operator Actions
- (1) Manual start of station blackout diesel generator
- (2) Loading of the station blackout diesel generator
- (3) Restoration of containment air coolers following loss of service water
- (4) Replacement of failed service water pump with the spare pump
INSPECTION RESULTS
Inadequate Procedure Could Lead to a Potential Water Hammer Event in the Service Water System Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green None IP71111.21M NCV 05000346/2018011-01 Closed The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (i.e., Green) and an associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to prescribe an adequate procedure for placing the standby service water pump into operation following a redundant SW pump failure. Specifically, the abnormal procedure for placing the standby pump into operation contained instructions that would cause a water hammer event within the SW system if forebay level was less than 566 feet.
Description:
The safety-related SW system design at Davis-Besse contains three pumps and two independent essential load cooling loops. Per TS 3.7.8, Service Water System, two SW loops are required when the reactor operates in Modes 1-4. Any of the three pumps can be aligned to a loop to meet the TS. Upon the loss of a service water pump and the cessation of water flow in one service water train, Abnormal Operating Procedure DB-OP-02511, Loss of Service Water Pumps/Systems, directed the operators to realign the standby SW pump. The inspectors reviewed Abnormal Operating Procedure DB-OP-02511 and determined the sequence of actions prescribed by the procedure had the potential to cause a water hammer event by collapsing water vapor in a large section of the SW piping against a closed motor operated valve.
To further understand the issue discussed above, the inspectors reviewed the existing water hammer calculation. The inspectors found the licensee had modified the SW system, revised associated operating procedures, and performed the extant water hammer analysis following a 2003 water hammer event. In addition, the inspectors found the water hammer analysis only considered two specific events: a loss of offsite power (LOOP) and a LOOP concurrent with a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). During these two events, the licensee determined drainage would occur from the SW piping for approximately 30 seconds. However, the inspectors were concerned the water hammer analysis did not bound the condition prescribed by the abnormal operating procedure since the procedure required the operators to realign and start the standby SW pump, an evolution that can last 40 minutes as determined from a field walkdown with operators. The team determined approximately 40 feet of SW piping could drain within 20 minutes if the forebay water level was lower than 566 feet (TS low level is 562 feet).
Corrective Actions: The licensee issued a standing order specifying the abnormal procedure should not be executed as written, and provided guidance in the form of an engineering evaluation request. On October 4, 2018, the licensee revised the abnormal operating procedure such that when the level of the forebay is lower than 566 feet, the licensee is to take further actions to fill and vent the piping system and avoid the occurrence of a water hammer event.
Corrective Action Reference: CR-2018-08578
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to prescribe an appropriate procedure for placing the standby SW pump in service following the failure of an operating SW pump was contrary to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, and was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the licensee established Abnormal Procedure DB-OP-02511, Loss of Service Water Pumps/Systems, Revision 18 as their procedure for placing a standby pump into service following the loss of an operating pump, but it contained instructions that could result in a water hammer event.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more-than-minor because it adversely affected the Mitigating System attribute of the Procedure Quality, and adversely impacted the objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the sequence of steps in the procedure as written could result in a water hammer event which was not analyzed.
Significance: The finding was evaluated in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, using Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions. The finding screened as of very-low safety significance (Green) because the performance deficiency was not a design or qualification issue; it did not represent a loss of system function; and the train was neither inoperable for greater than its allowed outage time nor was it inoperable for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Specifically, the inspectors confirmed that over the last three years the conditions needed for the water hammer did not occur.
Cross-cutting Aspect: The error in the procedure sequence is not indicative of current licensee performance because it was established in 1990 when the abnormal operating procedure was first written. Subsequent revisions of the procedure, including those written in 2005 to address the piping modification, did not affect the sequence.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, states in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings.
Contrary to the above, from April 26, 1990, to October 3, 2018, the licensee failed to prescribe a procedure appropriate to the circumstance for placing the standby SW pump in service following the failure of an operating SW pump. Specifically, the licensee established Abnormal Operating Procedure DB-OP-02511, Loss of Service Water Pumps/Systems, as their procedure for placing the standby SW pump in service following the loss of a normally operating pump. However, this procedure contained instructions which when implemented could have resulted in a water hammer event within the SW system.
Disposition: This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Verify the Adequacy of Fast Bus Transfer Scheme Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green None 71111.21M NCV 05000346/2018011-02 Closed The inspectors identified a finding of very-low safety significance (Green) and an associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensees failure to verify the adequacy of design of the fast bus transfer scheme. Specifically, the licensee failed to have an adequate analysis to ensure a successful fast bus transfer from the auxiliary transformer to the startup transformers when required.
Description:
The UFSAR Section 8.2.1 states: One or both of the two 345kV overhead lines to the startup transformers will be available to supply all essential loads within a few seconds of a loss-of-coolant accident. In order to accomplish this, upon the receipt of a safety feature actuation signal, the essential loads are started on the auxiliary transformer after which a fast transfer will occur so that the loads can be powered from the startup transformers.
During their review of Calculation C-EE-00.3.02-035, Fast Bus Transfer Analysis, the inspectors uncovered the calculation incorrectly modeled the main generator as supplying power when it should have been modeled as consuming power prior to a fast bus transfer after a reactor trip in a LOCA scenario. Additionally, the inspectors identified the licensee had incorrectly assumed a synch check relay was present in the circuit for LOCA scenarios. With these errors in place, the pre-established acceptance criteria of having a less than 60-degree angle difference between source and transfer bus voltages could not be met, and there was reasonable doubt on whether the transfer could have successfully happened without damaging the motors.
The licensee performed a preliminary analysis to determine whether the motors would be able to sync into the startup transformers without damage. This preliminary evaluation determined the acceptance criteria would be exceeded, but the motors would experience no damage.
However, the licensee also performed an additional evaluation to confirm the preliminary evaluations results. Following this more detailed evaluation, the licensee confirmed the fast bus transfer would operate as expected (no breakers will trip, the motors will not be damaged, and the degraded voltage relay will not trip). The licensee also determined that although the 60-degree angle difference acceptance criteria could not be met, the failure to meet this acceptance criteria for this specific scenario was not pertinent. Specifically, the angle difference was used to monitor the proper operation of the sync check relay. However, the sync check relay was not required to operate during a LOCA-related fast bus transfer.
Therefore, the first evaluation used an incorrect criteria to determine the success of the bus transfer.
Corrective Actions: The corrective actions implemented at the time of the inspection was to re-perform the analysis.
Corrective Action Reference: CR-2018-08775
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined the failure to verify the adequacy of the fast bus transfer scheme design during a LOCA as specified by UFSAR, Section 8.2.1, was contrary to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control.
Screening: The performance deficiency was determined to be more-than-minor because it affected the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of Design Control and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring reliability, availability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensee did not verify the capability of the fast bus transfer scheme to work as designed since it incorrectly modeled the sequence in which the fast bus transfer scheme occurred, and contained an incorrect acceptance criteria. Due to these errors there was reasonable doubt on whether the safety-related motors would remain capable of operating during the fast bus transfer from the auxiliary transformer to the startup transformers. Additionally, this issue is similar to IMC 0609 Appendix E, example 3.j in that the calculational error resulted in a condition where reasonable doubt existed regarding operability.
Significance: The finding was evaluated using the Significance Determination Process (SDP)in accordance with IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, using Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions. The finding screened as of very-low safety significance (Green) because the finding was a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system or component (SSC), and the SSC maintained its operability and functionality. Specifically, the licensee re-performed the evaluation and concluded the bus transfer would occur successfully.
Cross-cutting Aspect: This item is not reflective of current performance due to Calculation C-EE-00.3.02-035 being approved more than 3 years ago.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, requires, in part, that the licensee provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of design, such as by the performance of design reviews, by the use of alternated or simplified calculational methods, or by the performance of a suitable testing program. The UFSAR Section 8.2.1 establishes:
One or both of the two 345kV overhead lines to the startup transformers will be available to supply all essential loads within a few seconds of a loss-of-coolant accident. The licensee established Calculation C-EE-00.3.02-035, Fast Bus Transfer Analysis, Revision 0 as their method for verifying the adequacy of this design.
Contrary to the above, from January 30, 2015 to October 18, 2018, the licensee failed to verify the adequacy of the design. Specifically, Calculation C-EE-00.3.02-035 incorrectly modeled the plant configuration for a fast bus transfer after a reactor trip in a LOCA scenario, and had incorrect acceptance criteria. This resulted in the calculation not adequately verifying that all essential loads would be available within a few seconds of a LOCA.
Disposition: This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was controlled to protect from public disclosure. The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On October 25, 2018, the inspector presented the Design Bases Assurance Team inspection results to Mr. Blair, Plant Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
71111.21MDesign Bases Assurance Inspection (Teams)
Corrective Action Documents Generated as a Result of this Inspection
- CR-2018-08301; NRC DBAI 2018: Revision to calculation EC118B incorporates overly
conservative acceptance criteria; 09/20/2018
- CR-2018-08332; NRC DBAI 2018: DB-OP-06016 R37 (CACs) L&P 2.2.16 embedded in
L&P 2.2.15 DCR; 09/20/2018
- CR-2018-08334; 2018 NRC DBAI identified: UFSAR 9.2.1 and DB-OP-02511 SW Return Line
swap times contradictions; 09/21/2018
- CR-2018-08352; NRC DBAI 2018: UFSAR Descriptions of SBODG Function are Inconsistent;
09/21/2018
- CR-2018-08365; NRC DBAI 2018: SW Pump Room Ventilation Calculation; 09/21/2018
- CR-2018-08425; NRC DBAI 2018: Calculation C-EE-006.01-027 Open Assumption not
tracked and associated change in strategy not updated; 09/24/2018
- CR-2018-08444; NRC DBAI 2018: Installation of HLA Breaker in 2009 for BF1217 not
documented in design documents; 09/25/2018
- CR-2018-08450; NRC DBAI 2018: Relay Setting Sheet 1-19-110 not updated to reflect spare
status for breaker BF1207; 09/25/2018
- CR-2018-08470; NRC DBAI 2018: Evaluate installation of secondary protection to provide full
containment penetration protection for containment air coolers; 09/25/2018
- CR-2018-08503; NRC DBAI 2018: Grid real time contingency analysis programs inadequate;
09/26/2018
- CR-2018-08522; NRC DBAI 2018: Study calculation C-EE-003.02-035 contains an incorrect
statement; 09/27/2018
- CR-2018-08543; NRC DBAI 2018: Study calculation C-EE-003.02-035 references relay 32
instead of 32A; 09/27/2018
- CR-2018-08560; NRC DBAI 2018: Potential deficiency identified in procedure DB-OP-02511;
09/28/2018
- CR-2018-08659; NRC DBAI 2018: Incorrect modeling of SFRCS loads in calculation C-EE-
2.01-010 for C5762Z; 10/02/2018
- CR-2018-08666; NRC DBAI 2018: Use of inconsistent names/descriptions of the generator
protection 32 and 32A relays in design documents; 10/02/2018
- CR-2018-08681; NRC DBAI 2018: Study Calculation C-EE-003.02-035 incorrectly uses the
25-1 relay as providing sync check for an auto fast bus transfer; 10/03/2018
- CR-2018-08759; NRC DBAI 2018: Unclear UFSAR Sections; 10/05/2018
- CR-2018-08775; NRC DBAI 2018: Main generator incorrectly modeled in C-EE-003.02-035;
10/05/2018
Corrective Action Documents
- CR-2015-01028; NRC CDBI 2015: On-Site AC Bus Sources Modes 5 and 6
Non-Conservative Acceptance Criteria; 01/23/2015
- CR-2015-01862; NRC CDBI 2015Inverter supplied loads not protected from tornado
missiles; 02/12/2015
- CR-2015-02476; NRC CDBI 2015EDG Powering Nonessential 4160V Bus; 02/26/2015
- CR-2005-01022; Minor Correction Required for Calculation EC118; 02/02/2005
- CR-2006-02166; Additional Issues Identified During Review of CA 06-00207-08 for
Calculation EC1118B; 04/28/2006
- CR-2012-07850; Motor starters did not meet minimum voltage test criteria; 05/13/2012
- CR-2012-09807; Concerns with Preventative Maintenance 2271 voltage testing on Safety
Related Motor Starters; 06/15/2012
- CR-2012-17864; Formal Evaluation Required for Fast Bus Transfer; 11/12/2012
- CR-2014-13985; HPI Pump 2 Motor doesn't meet PO requirements; 08/05/2014
- CR-2015-03080; Update on thermal issues with BEF151 and BEF152MC1-3 CAC 3 power;
03/10/2015
- CR-2015-04791; BEF151 thermal heating was not corrected; 04/06/2015
- CR-2015-09797; New CdM level RED for BEF151 due to the thermal levels associated with
the "A" phase upper switch termination; 07/20/2015
- CR-2017-00967; CAC 3 as 2 tripped immediately after being started in FAST speed at
conclusion of monthly test; 01/28/2017
- CR-2017-11255; C93-3 Backdraft Damper Flange Bolt Broken; 11/08/2017
- CR-2003-03765; AC Electrical System Loading ChangesService Water Pump Motor;
05/14/2003
- CR-2017-04943; SW2390 SW Return Isolation valve closed light socket not working;
05/02/2017
- CR-G201-2011-97983; SBODG High Temperature alarmed during run for DB-OP-06334;
07/20/2011
- CR-2012-11584; Continuing SBODG High Jacket Water Temperature; 07/25/2012
- CR-2018-08334-ATA-01; NRC DBAI identified: Correct UFSAR 9.2.1 SW Returns swap times;
09/24/2018
Engineering Change Package
- ECP 14-0376-011; Change Integrated Control System Steam Generator High Level Limit from
93.5% to 96%; Revision 0
- ECP 14-0376-012; Change Integrated Control System Steam Generator High Level Limit from
96% to 99%; Revision 0
- ECP 02-0707-000; Battery Charger Replacement (Trains 1 & 2); Revision 8
- ECP 02-0707-005; Battery Charger Replacement (DPC2P); Revision 2
- EC118B; Evaluation of Protection Provided for Containment Electrical Power Penetrations;
Revision 6
- EC118B; Evaluation of Protection Provided for Containment Electrical Power Penetrations;
Revision 7
- ECP 15-0379-000; BEF151 and BEF153 Molded Case Switch Replacement; Revision 0
- ECP 15-0379-002; BEF153 Molded Case Switch Replacement; Revision 1
- ECP 16-0379-002; Install Filtration for SW Pump Motor #1 (MP3-1); Revision 1
- ECP 17-0069; BEF153 Circuit Breaker Replacement; Revision 0
- ECR 05-0086; Service Water Modifications to Install Check Valves and Vacuum Breakers;
Revision 12
- ECP 13-0024-002; ECP Design Report Revise Setpoints for Make-Up Tank Level; Revision 3
- ECP 16-0050-000; SBODG Radiator Tube Bundle Replacement; Revision 0
- ECP 16-0050-001; SBODG Radiator Tube Bundle Replacement Implementation Documents;
Revision 3
Work Orders
- WO 200233297; Battery Charger DBC2P Preventive Maintenance; 12/22/2008
- WO 200313658; Battery Charger DBC2P Preventive Maintenance; 10/08/2010
- WO 200353285; Battery Charger DBC2P Preventive Replacement; 07/14/2012
- WO 200378309; Battery Charger DBC2P Preventive Maintenance; 07/14/2012
- WO 200389994; Battery Charger DBC2P Replace Battery Charger; 10/01/2012
- WO 200427649; Replace Current Transformers associated with Battery Charger DBC2P;
10/08/2010
- WO 200428539; Troubleshooting Battery Charger DBC2P Walk-In Circuit Board; 10/08/2010
- WO 200513191; Replace Amp Meter on Battery Charger DBC2P; 08/27/2014
- WO 200562851; Battery Charger DBC2P Preventive Maintenance; 01/31/2014
- WO 200562852; Battery Charger DBC2P Preventive Maintenance; 09/15/2015
- WO 200567126; Battery Charger DBC2P Preventive Maintenance; 09/15/2015
- WO 200614872; Battery Charger DBC2P Preventive Maintenance; 09/15/2015
- WO 200614780; DBC2P Battery Charger Surveillance Test; 04/19/2017
- WO 200742610; On-Site DC Bus Surveillance; 08/17/2018
- WO 200743366; Station Battery and Charger Weekly Surveillance; 08/21/2018
- WO 200267588; Test breakers BF1214, BF1215, and BF1217; 08/27/2009
- WO 200287896; Test breaker BF1212; 10/17/2011
- WO 200312816; Clean MCC F12A; 06/08/2010
- WO 200315747; Test breaker BF1225; 10/06/2011
- WO 200393116; Service Water Pump 2 Lubricate Motor; 01/17/2012
- WO 200397566; Service Water Pump 2 Clear Motor Cooling Screens; 02/25/2012
- WO 200424198; Test breaker BF1209; 04/23/2013
- WO 200440819; Test replacement breaker for BF1205; 01/16/2014
- WO 200470901; Service Water Pump 2 Test Cable; 03/04/2014
- WO 200497432; Install protective covers on MCC F12A; 11/21/2013
- WO 200510821; Meggar cable from MCC F12A to BF1284; 02/19/2014
- WO 200554842; Test breaker BE1194; 05/24/2017
- WO 200591572; Service Water Pump 2 Refurbish Motor; 06/11/2015
- WO 200630833; Service Water Pump 2 Test Motor; 04/24/2018
- WO 200637494; Swap breaker buckets BEF153 with BEF151; 07/31/2015
- WO 200649779; Replace breaker BEF153; 08/25/2016
- WO 200683228; Emergency Diesel Generator 2 184 Day Test; 07/26/2018
- WO 200686837; Surveillance Test for 13.8kV Bus A & B Transfer; 03/15/2018
- WO 200686838; Surveillance Test for Off-site AC Sources Bus Transfer; 03/12/2018
- WO 200686863; Integrated Test of SFRCS Actuation Channel 2; 03/16/2018
- WO 200742614; On-Site Bus Sources Lined Up, Available and isolated (Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4);
08/17/2018
- WO 200503891; SBODG Dead-Bus Load Test; 05/26/12
- Work Order 200655471; SBODG Jacket Water Radiator tube bundle replacement; 08/09/2017
- Work Order 200648416; Perform SBODG Monthly Test; 7/14/2017
Calculations
- C-CSS-002.01-011; Anchorage Assembly Analysis / Battery Chargers; Revision 0
- SCN E-855Q-01-01; AMETEK Solid State Control Supplier Deviation Request (associated with
ECP 02-0707 equipment); Revision 1
- C-EE-015-.07-010; Cable Ampacity Calculation; Revision 0
- C-ME-030.01-004; Low Voltage Switchgear Rooms Cooling Loads; Revision 2
- C-EE-002.01-010; DC calculation - Battery and Charger Sizing, Short Circuit and Voltage
Drop; Revision 33.
- C-EE-006.01-019; Protective Relay Setpoint Calculation for: Battery Charger (BKR BF1209);
Revision 2
- C-CSS-02.01-002; Structural Integrity Verification of Mod 87-1045 Replacement Meter
Support Plate; Revision 2
- C-CSS-002.01-007; Replacement Type 195 Meter Relay Seismic Evaluation; Revision 0
- C-CSS-002.01-010; Seismic Evaluation for New and Replacment Components Located in DC
Motor Control Centers
- C-CSS-DCMCC-002; SQUG Evaluation for DC MCC-2; Revision 0
- C-EE-002.01-009; High and Low Voltage Setpoints for DCMCC Meter Relays; Revision 1
- C-CSS-099.20-031; Tornado dP Barrier Pressure Retention Evaluation; Revision 0
- C-NSA-000.02-011; Turbine Building HELB Environments; Revision 1
- C-EE-003.02-035; Fast Bus Transfer Analysis; Revision 0
- C-EE-004-01-050; 4.16 kV Bus Motor Residual Voltage Calculation; Revision 0
- C-EE-004.01-001; Protective Relay Setpoint for Service Water Pump Motor 1-1; Revision 5
- C-EE-005.01-024; Protective Relay Setpoint Calculation for: Containment Air Cooler Fan 1-3
(BE105); Revision 5
- C-EE-005.01-025; Protective Relay Setpoint Calculation for: Containment Air Cooler Fan 1-3
(BF105); Revision 8
- C-EE-005.01-025; Protective Relay Setpoint Calculation for: Containment Air Cooler Fan 1-3
(BF105); Revision 9
- C-EE-005.01-031; Protective Relay Setpoint Calculation for: Incoming to MCC F12A (Bkr.
BF114); Revision 2
- C-EE-006.01-019; Protective Relay Setpoint Calculation for Battery Charger (Bkr. BF1209);
Revision 2
- C-EE-006.01-020; Protective Relay Setpoint Calculation for Battery Charger (Bkr. BF1212);
Revision 3
- C-EE-006.01-021; Protective Relay Setpoint Calculation for: Pressurize Heater Ch. 2 (Bkr.
BF1217); Revision 0
- C-EE-006.01-027; Protective Relay Setpoint Calculation for: Pressurize Heater Ch. 2 (Bkr.
BF1217); Revision 3
- C-EE-006.01-029; Motor Thermal Overload Relay Heater Selection; Revision 3
- C-EE-013.10-001; 480V Breaker Coordination to Meet Common Power Source Criteria for
Appendix "R"; Revision 5
- C-EE-015.03-007; Operating Load Inputs for AC Power System Analysis; Revision 2
- C-EE-015.03-008; AC Power System Analysis; Revision 7
- C-EE-015.03-010; Short Circuit Analysis for AC Power System; Revision 2
- C-EE-015.06-002; Cable Tray Weight for Trays Over 60%; Revision 0
- C-EE-015.07-010; Cable Ampacity Calculation; Revision 0
- RA-EP-02880; Internal Flooding; Revision 04
- Calculation 15.50; Evaluation of Fire Suppression System Impact on Auxiliary Building &
Intake Structure Flooding; Revision 1
- Calculation 54.22; Effect of Flooding From Water Treatment Building Into Tunnel, Lowest
Essential Valve Located at 574-6 in Valve Room; Revision 0
- C-ME-021-02-003; Domestic Water Flooding of SW Tunnel; Revision 0
- 67.007; Service Water Pump Room Ventilation System Pressure Drop; Revision 1
- 67.005; Service water Pump Room Ventilation System Capacity; Revision 5
- 67.001; Service Water Pump Area Ventilation, Revision 2
- MPR-2749; Davis Besse Containment Air Coolers Evaluation of Alternatives for Waterhammer
Concern Resolution; Revision 0
- MPR-2809; Design Report for the Davis Besse Containment Air Coolers Service Water Piping
Modification; Revision 1
Letters
- Letter from AMETEK Solidstate Controls to Design Engineering, Davis-Besse Nuclear Power
Station, RE: Davis-Besse Battery Chargers; 10/04/2018
- Interconnection Service Agreement among PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. and FirstEnergy
Nuclear Operating Company and American Transmission Systems, Incorporated; 06/01/2011
- Letter from FENOC to NRC, Response to NRC Generic Letter 2006-02; 04/03/2006
- Letter from FENOC to NRC, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding
Resolution of Generic Letter 2006-02, Grid reliability and the Impact on Plant Risk and the
Operability of Offsite Power; 01/31/2007
- Letter from NRC to FENOC, Response to Generic Letter 2006-02, Grid Reliability and the
Impact on Plant Risk and the Operability of Offsite Power; 05/07/2007
Drawings
- E-1 Sh. 1; A.C. Electrical System One Line Diagram; Revision 39
- E-1 Sh. 2; A.C. Electrical System One Line Diagram; Revision 88
- E-1 Sh. 3; Station Distribution Transformers Tap Settings; Revision 7
- E-1043 Sh. 1; Emergency Diesel Generator 1-2 Loading Table; Revision 28
- E-2 Sh. 1; 25kV & 13.8kV Metering and Relaying One Line Diagram; Revision 15
- E-2 Sh. 2; 25kV & 13.8kV Metering and Relaying One Line Diagram; Revision 8
- E-2014; Fuse Table; Revision 11
- E-21 Sh. 1; 13.8kV Relay and Metering Three Line Diagram Bus-A; Revision 18
- E-21 Sh. 2; 13.8kV Relay and Metering Three Line Diagram Bus-B; Revision 18
- E-3; 4.16kV Metering and Relaying One Line Diagram; Revision 45
- E-31B Sh. 3; Elementary Wiring Diagram Generator and Transformer Protection Tripping and
Lock-Out Relay Ckts; Revision 15
- E-31B Sh. 4A; Elementary Wiring Diagram Generator and Transformer Protection Tripping
and Lock-Out Relay Ckts; Revision 5
- E-31B Sh. 9; Elementary Wiring Diagram Generator and Transformer Protection Tripping and
Lock-Out Relay Ckts; Revision 18
- E-32B Sh. 19; Elementary Wiring Diagram, 13.8 kV Bus A (B) Tripping and Lockout Relays;
Revision 7
- E-32B Sh. 20A; Elementary Wiring Diagram 13.8 kV Feeder Breakers Bus A(B) Auxiliary
Relays; Revision 5
- E-37B Sh. 4; Essential Unit Substations MCC Feeder Circuit Breakers; Revision 15
- E-4 Sh. 2; "F" Buses 480V Unit Substations One Line Diagram; Revision 50
- E-48B Sh. 6A; Elementary Wiring Diagrams, Lake Water System, Service Water Pump 1;
Revision 11
- E-48B Sh. 6B; Elementary Wiring Diagrams, Lake Water System, Service Water Pump 1;
Revision 13
- E-6 Sh. 1; 480V.A.C. M.C.C. (Essential) One Line Diagram; Revision 91
- E-6 Sh. 2; 480 V.A.C. One Line Diagram; Revision 99
- EC0106AX; Synchrocheck Relay Setting; Revision 0
- OS-055 Sh. 1; Operational Schematic Main Power System; Revision 19
- OS-055 Sh. 2; Operational Schematic Main Power System; Revision 40
- M-012E; P&ID Screenh Wash and Cooling Tower Make-Up System; Revision 19
- OS-020 SH. 1; Operational Schematic Service Water System; Revision 102
- E-48B SH. 12A; Elementary Wiring Diagram Lake Water System CTMT CLR 1-1 IN ISO VLV;
Revision 1
- OS-033A; Operational Schematic Containment Air Cooling and Recirculation System;
Revision 29
- M-041A; Service water Pumps and Secondary Service water System; Revision 32
- M-041B; Primary Service Water System; Revision 72
- M-041C; Service Water System for Containment Air Coolers; Revision 47
- 80661-001-000; NBD-51 Backdraft Damper; 12/07/1979
- M-525-90-3; Velan 2-1/2 inch Gate Valves Bolted Bonnet Forged Motor Operator; Revision 12
- OS-038B Sht. 1; Operational Schematic, Miscellaneous H&V Systems; Revision 20
- BU02735 W18; Electric motor data Sheet; Revision T2
- M-241D; Service water System Auxiliary Building-Return piping; Revision 27
Procedures
- DB-OP-01300; Switchyard Management; Revision 14
- DB-OP-02521; Loss of AC Bus Power Sources; Revision 26
- DB-OP-06016; Containment Air Cooling System Procedure; Revision 37
- DB-OP-06311; 345 kV Switchyard No. 1 (Main) Transformer, No. 11 (Auxiliary) Transformer,
and Startup Transformers (01 and 02); Revision 49
- DB-OP-06317; 480V System Switching Procedure; Revision 27
- DB-OP-06318; 120/240 Volt and 480 Volt MCC Switching; Revision 18
- DB-OP-06900; Plant Heatup; Revision 69
- DB-OP-06902; Power Operations; Revision 63
- DB-OP-06903; Plant Cooldown; Revision 53
- DB-OP-01000; Operation of Station Breaker; Revision 35
- DB-OP-02511; AOP Loss of Service Water Pumps/Systems; Revision 19
- DB-OP-06016; Containment Air Cooling System Procedure; Revision 37
- DBBP-OPS-1013; Control of Time Critical Actions; Revision 3
- NOP-OP-1013; Control of Time Critical Operator Actions; Revision 3
- DBBP-OPS-0018; Non-Control Room Assigned Operator Coordination During Abnormal and
Emergency Operations; Revision 3
- DB-SC-04274; SBODG Dead-Bus Load Test; Revision 9
- DB-OP-02521; Loss of AC Bus Power Sources; Revision 26
- DB-OP-02000; EOP - RPS, SFAS, SFAS Trip, or SG Tube Rupture; Revision 30
- DB-OP-02700; EOP - Station Blackout; Revision 1
- DB-OP-02000; EOP Bases and Deviation Document for DB-OP-02000; Revision 22
- DB-PF-04704; Component Cooling Water System Heat Exchanger 1; Revision 10
- DB-SP-03005; Service Water Train 1 Cold Forebay Design Flow Verification; Revision 5
- DB-SP-03004; Service Water Train 2 Design Flow Verification; Revision 7
- DB-OP-02511; Abnormal Procedure Loss of Service water Pumps/Systems; Revision 18
- DB-OP-02511; Abnormal Procedure Loss of Service water Pumps/Systems; Revision 19
(revised as a result of the inspection)
- DB-PF-03098; Closure and Leak Testing of SW270; Revision 8
- DB-PF-03099; Closure and Leak Testing of SW271; Revision 7
Miscellaneous:
- DB-M4-05504; Auxiliary Transformer X11 Tap Changes; Revision 0
- DB-ME-05501; Startup Transformer X01 Tap Changes; Revision 4
- DB-ME-05502; Startup Transformer X02 Tap Changes; Revision 4
- E-008-00154; Instruction and Maintenance Manual for Motor Control Centers 446920IM-0;
Revision 7
- E-008Q-00150; Vendor Manual, Series 2100 Motor Control Centers Molded Case Circuit
Breakers Information Notice ; 12/2013
- E-008Q; Technical Specification for Operational Phase for AC and DC Motor Control Centers;
Revision 4
- FENOC Quality Assurance Program Manual; 03/13/2018
- M-045-00012; Vendor Manual, Service Water Pump Motor; Revision 7
- M-45-8-2; Induction Motor Data Sheet; Revision 1
- NPIR; Nuclear Plant Interface Requirements; Revision 5
- PJM Manual 39; Nuclear Plant Interface Coordination; Revision 16
- PRA-DB1-AL-R05 04-17; PRA Notebook: Low Voltage System
- PRA-DB1-AL-R05 04-27; PRA Notebook: Switchyard 345 kV System
- RSS 1-01-003A; Relay Settings, 13.8 KV Bus A; Revision 3
- RSS 1-01-007A; Relay Settings, 13.8 KV Bus A; Revision 1
- RSS 2-03-300; Relay Settings, #1 Generator Protection 25kV; Revision 3
- SD-003A; System Description for 4160 Volt Auxiliary System; Revision 6
- SD-008A; System Description for the 13.8 kV System; Revision 6
- SD-008B; System Description for the 345 kV System; Revision 4
- SD-009; System Description for Low Voltage System; Revision 6
- SD-018; System Description for Service Water System; Revision 5
- SD-022B; Containment Air Cooling and Recirculation System; Revision 4
- Service Level Agreement, Engineering, Construction, Operations & Maintenance; 07/26/2005
- ATA-2018-18821; DB-OP-02511 SW AOP Time for Isolation for CTMU Line Break Update;
09/17/2018
- C-CSS-005001-007, Attachment C; Impact of Switchgear Racked-Out Breakers Due to
Seismic Event; Revision 0
- Serial Number 1651; Response to Station Blackout Rule; 04/17/1989
- Serial Number 1786; Supplemental Station Blackout (SBO) Response for Davis-Besse;
04/02/1990
- Serial Number 1842; Supplemental Station Blackout (SBO) Response for Davis-Besse;
09/06/1990
- Serial Number 2033; Safety Evaluation of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit
Number 1, Station Blackout Rule 10 CFT 50.63 (TAC Number M68536); 03/31/1992
- Serial Number 2143; Implementation of Commitments Associated with the Station Blackout
Rule, 10CFR50.63 (TAC Number M68536); 05/12/1993
- 7749-M-23; Component Cooling Heat Exchangers Data Sheet; Revision 2
- TD-38933; Data Sheet for Automatic Self Cleaning Strainers; 05/23/2000
- ST-31343; R.P. Adams Pro-Edge Automatic Strainer Capacity Chart; 01/09/1999
- Notification 601189516; Engineering Evaluation Request; 10/01/2018
- DB-OP-00000; Day Shift Unit Log; 10/01/2018
- 05-03558; Regulatory Applicability Determination for Modification to install Check Valves and
Vacuum Breakers; Revision 1
- SD-018; System Description for Service Water System; Revision 5
- SD-028F; System Description for Miscellaneous Buildings Heating, Ventilating, and Air
Conditioning System; Revision 5
- NRC Generic Letter 89-13 Service water Reliability Program Manual; Revision 3
- 10 CFR 50.59 Screen 16-00493; SBODG Radiator Tube Bundle Replacement; Revision 00
- Regulatory Applicability Determination 16-00493; SBODG Radiator Tube Bundle
Replacement; Revision 00
- Document for DB-OP-02000, Administrative Issue Only, No Safety Concern; 6/29/2018
- ATA-2018-15753; Revise SW return lines swap time in Bases and Deviations Document for
DB-OP-02000 Emergency Procedure; RPS, SFAS, SFRCS, TRIP OR SG TUBE RUPTURE;
Revision 22
- Notification 601180349; SBODG Functionality Temperature Limits; 08/09/2018
- DB-SC-04271; SBODG Monthly Test; 7/14/2017
- DB-OP-06334; SBO DG Operating Procedure; Revision 27
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