IR 05000275/2018010
| ML18234A112 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem, Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 08/22/2018 |
| From: | Thomas Farnholtz Region 4 Engineering Branch 1 |
| To: | Conway J Pacific Gas & Electric Co |
| References | |
| IR 2018010 | |
| Download: ML18234A112 (19) | |
Text
ust 22, 2018
SUBJECT:
DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT - NRC COMPONENT DESIGN BASES INSPECTION REPORT 05000275/2018010 AND 05000323/2018010
Dear Mr. Conway:
On June 28, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Diablo Canyon Power Plant. NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Adam Peck, Senior Director, Acting Station Director, and other members of the licensee staff. On July 25, 2018, a re-exit teleconference was held with Mr. Mark Sharp, Manager, Design Engineering and other members of the licensee staff, to clarify a change in the characterization of the identified finding. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding was identified during this inspection.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Thomas R. Farnholtz, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos: 50-275, 50-323 License Nos: DPR-80 and DPR-82 Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000275/2018010 and 05000323/2018010 w/Attachment: Documents Reviewed
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers: 05000275, 05000323 License Numbers: DPR-80, DPR-82 Report Numbers: 05000275/2018010, 05000323/2018010 Enterprise Identifier: I-2018-010-0043 Licensee: Pacific Gas and Electric Company Facility: Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 Location: Avila Beach, California Inspection Dates: June 11, 2018 to July 25, 2018 Inspectors: R. Kopriva, Senior Reactor Inspector W. Cullum, Reactor Inspector N. Okonkwo, Reactor Inspector Approved By: Thomas R. Farnholtz, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a baseline inspection at Diablo Canyon Power Plant in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://
www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. NRC-identified and self-revealed findings, violations, and additional items are summarized in the table below.
This inspection was performed between June 11, 2018, and July 25, 2018, by three inspectors from the NRCs Region IV office. One finding was identified during this inspection. The significance of inspection finding is indicated by the color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red), which is determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process.
Their cross-cutting aspects are determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0310, Aspects Within the Cross-Cutting Areas. Violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process.
List of Findings and Violations Failure to install conduit to environmentally qualified solenoid valves in a manner to prevent moisture intrusion and accumulation within the solenoid enclosure.
Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Systems Green None 71111.21N NCV 05000275/2018010-1; 05000323/2018010-1 Closed Introduction:
The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50.49, Environmental Qualification of Electric Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants, for failure to install conduit to environmentally qualified solenoid valves in a manner to prevent moisture intrusion and accumulation within the solenoid enclosure in accordance with Environmental Qualification file IH06, Revision 25.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program -
Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
===71111.21NDesign Bases Assurance Inspection - (Programs)
The inspectors evaluated the following components and listed applicable attributes, during the weeks of June 11 to June 15, 2018, and June 25 to June 29, 2018:
Components ===
(1.) DC-2-10-E-MTR-RHR-P1, Residual Heat Removal Pump 2-1 Motor. The residual heat removal pumps are the fundamental long term means of decay heat removal from the core for any accident or safe shutdown condition. The residual heat removal pump motors are considered to be required for mitigation of all accidents for the full duration of that accident; e.g., two weeks for a main steam line break and one year for a loss of coolant accident.
Attributes reviewed:
a.) System Component Evaluation Worksheet b.) Test Program Considerations c.) Thermal Aging Analysis d.) Post Accident Operability Analysis e.) Margin Analysis f. ) Test Specimen Accuracy Analysis g.) IE Information Notices, Part 21 Notifications h.) Material Procurement And Quality Control Environmental Qualification Requirements i. ) Shelf Life Analysis (2.) DC-1-09-1-S-POS-633, Position indication for the Containment Recircirculation Sump Outlet Valve B (8982 B). The Instrument Class IA motor operator has position switch POS-633 internal to the motor operator. The containment recirc sump outlet valve 8982B is located in the recirculating water chambers, Area GE-GW, elevation 62 and is subject to a harsh radiation environment. The safety function of this valve is to be capable of remote manual opening when switching from the injection to the recirculation mode so that the residual heat removal pumps can take suction from the recirculation sump.
Attributes reviewed:
a.) Post Accident Operability Analysis b.) System Component Evaluation Worksheet c.) Test Program Considerations d.) Thermal Aging Analysis e.) Test Specimen Accuracy Analysis f. ) IE Information Notices, Part 21 Notifications g.) Material Procurement And Quality Control Environmental Qualification Requirements h.) Shelf Life Analysis (3.) DC-1-03-P-VOH-FW-1-LCV-113, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-3 Discharge Header Level Control Switch is located in Area GE, elevation 115. It is subject to Area GE-GW line break conditions and a harsh radiation environment following a loss of coolant accident when the emergency core cooling system is placed on recirculation.
The safety function of this valve is to be capable of 1) remote manual operation for maintaining level in the steam generators, and 2) automatic operation to prevent runout of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 3. The valve could be used following any event that uses the steam generators as the heat sink for decay heat, including essentially all secondary system high energy line breaks and at least some loss of coolant accidents.
Attributes reviewed:
a.) System Component Evaluation Worksheet b.) Test Program Considerations c.) Thermal Aging Analysis d.) Post Accident Operability Analysis e.) Margin Analysis f. ) Test Specimen Accuracy Analysis g.) Material Procurement And Quality Control Environmental Qualification Requirements h.) Shelf Life Analysis (4.) DC-2-04-I-S-POS-441, Position indication for Flow Control Valve FCV-95 which is the motor operated isolation valve which controls main steam to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump. The instrument Class IA motor operator has position switch POS- 441 internal to the motor operator which controls the opening and closing of the valve and also provides instrument Class II valve position indication.
Attributes reviewed:
a.) Environmental qualification package for the Position Indication Valve (PIV)b.) Latest
- (3) Modifications on DC-2-04-I-S-POS-441 c.) Condition reports associated with the PIV d.) Condition report with Root Cause or Cause Analysis performed on PIV e.) Last 3 Preventive Maintenance performed of the PIV f. ) Replacement schedule on PIV and components g.) Vendor Recommended Maintenance on Valve (5.) DC-2-04-P-VOM-MS-2-FCV-95, Limit switch for Motor Operated Valve FCV-95, which is the motor operated isolation valve which controls main steam to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump. The limit switch is an intrigal part of the motor operated valve and is located in Area GE, elevation 115. It is subject to Area GE-GW line break conditions and a harsh radiation environment following a loss of coolant accident when the emergency core cooling system is placed on recirculation. The safety function of this valve is to be capable of opening upon receipt of an auxiliary feedwater safeguards start signal (low-low steam generator level or reactor coolant pump bus undervoltage). Once opened, the valve is not required to be repositioned.
Attributes reviewed:
a.) Environmental qualification package for DC-2-04-P-VOM-MS-2-FCV-95 b.) Latest
- (3) modifications on the motor operated valve for DC-2-04-P-VOM-MS-2-FCV-95 c.) Condition reports on the flow control motor operated valve d.) Condition reports with Root Cause or Cause Analysis performed on motor operated valve e.) Last 3 Preventive Maintenance performed of the motor operated valve f. ) Replacement schedule on motor operated valve and components g.) Vendor Recommended Maintenance on Valve (6.) DC-2-08-I-I-TI-305, Temperature Indicator TI-305 is the letdown heat exchanger room pipe break temperature sensor for the Chemical Volume and Control System.
This valve receives a signal from the letdown pipe break isolation system temperature sensor TI-305 which closes the valve when a high temperature indicative of a line break in the letdown heat exchanger room (Area K, elevation 85) is sensed. The sensor is subject to a harsh radiation environment and letdown line break conditions.
Attributes reviewed:
a.) System Component Evaluation Worksheet b.) Test Program Considerations c.) Thermal Aging Analysis d.) Post-Accident Operability Analysis e.) Margin Analysis f. ) Test Specimen Accuracy Analysis g.) Information Notices, Part 21 Notifications h.) Material Procurement and Quality Control Environmental Qualification Requirements i. ) Shelf Life Analysis j. ) Maintenance Requirements Components Located within Primary Containment (7.) DC-1-10-P-VOM-RHR-1-8702, The limit switch for residual heat removal motor operated valve RHR -1-8702 is an intrigal part of the motor operated valve and is located inside-containment and is subject to harsh environmental conditions from inside-containment accident conditions. The RHR-1-8702 valve is the recirculation to residual heat removal pump suction from Reactor Coolant System Loop 4. The safety function of this valve is to be capable of remote manual operation to align the reactor coolant system to the suction of the residual heat removal pumps to attain cold shutdown conditions under non- loss of coolant accident conditions. Reactor coolant system temperature and pressure interlocks preclude opening these valves until reactor coolant system pressure and temperature are below specified limits.
Attributes reviewed:
a.) System Component Evaluation Worksheet b.) Test Program Considerations c.) Thermal Aging Analysis d.) Post Accident Operability Analysis e.) Margin Analysis f. ) Test Specimen Accuracy Analysis g.) IE Information Notices, Part 21 Notifications h.) Material Procurement And Quality Control Environmental Qualification Requirements i. ) Shelf Life Analysis (8.) DC-1-10-E-MTR-RHR-1-8702, The motor for Motor Operated Valve 8702 is an intrigal part of the valve and is located inside-containment and is subject to harsh environmental conditions from inside-containment accident conditions. The RHR-1-8702 valve is the recirculation to residual heat removal pump suction from Reactor Coolant System Loop 4. The safety function of this valve is to be capable of remote manual operation to align the reactor coolant system to the suction of the residual heat removal pump to attain cold shutdown conditions under non- loss of coolant accident conditions. Reactor coolant system temperature and pressure interlocks preclude opening these valves until reactor coolant system pressure and temperature are below specified limits Attributes reviewed:
a.) Environmental Qualification package for the RHR MOV b.) Latest
- (3) Modifications on MOV CC-1-10-E-MTR-RHR-1-8702 c.) Last 5 Condition Reports on MOV d.) Condition Report with Root Cause or Cause Analysis performed on MOV e.) Last 3 Preventive Maintenance performed of the MOV f. ) Replacement schedule for MOV and components g.) Vendor Recommended Maintenance on Valve (9.) DC-2-07-I-SV-SV-276, Solenoid valve SV-276 for pressurizer power-operated relief Valve (PORV) PCV-456 is located inside containment and is subject to the harsh environmental conditions resulting from inside containment accident conditions. The solenoid valve for PCV-456 (SV-276) requires an extended term (1 year)environmental qualification in support of the low temperature overpressure function.
Solenoid valve SV-276 is Instrument Class IA, because of the low temperature overpressure function.
Attributes reviewed:
a.) Environmental Qualification package for the POV Solenoid valve b.) Latest
- (3) Modifications on DC-2-07-I-SV-SV-276 c.) Condition Reports on Solenoid Valve d.) Condition Report with Root Cause or Cause Analysis performed on Selonoid e.) Last 3 Preventive Maintenance performed of the Solenoid Valve f. ) Replacement schedule for Solenoid Valve and components g.) Vendor Recommended Maintenance on Valve (10.) DC-2-07-I-T-PT-403A, Rosemount Pressure Transmitter PT-403A for Reactor Coolant Hot Leg Loop 4. Pressure transmitter PT-403 is located in the postaccident sample station area (Area GW, elevation 85) which is a mild radiation area but is subject to Area GE-GW line break conditions. The safety function of this component is to provide input to pressurizer power-operated relief valve operation and residual heat removal suction valve opening permissive circuitry.
Attributes reviewed:
a.) System Component Evaluation Worksheet b.) Test Program Considerations c.) Thermal Aging Analysis d.) Post-Accident Operability Analysis e.) Margin Analysis f. ) Test Specimen Accuracy Analysis g.) Information Notices, Part 21 Notifications h.) Material Procurement and Quality Control Requirements i. ) Shelf Life Analysis j. ) Maintenance Requirements (11.) DC-1-04-I-T-LT-539, Unit 1, Steam Generator #3, Narrow Range Rosemount Level Transmitter. The steam generator narrow range level transmitter is located inside containment and is subject to harsh environmental conditions resulting from inside-containment accidents. The safety function of this instrument is to provide inputs to the solid state protection system for 1) reactor trip and auxiliary feedwater actuation (including steam generator blowdown and sample line isolation) on low-low steam generator level, and 2) turbine trip and feedwater isolation of high-high steam generator level.
Attributes reviewed:
a.) System Component Evaluation Worksheet b.) Test Program Considerations c.) Thermal Aging Analysis d.) Post-Accident Operability Analysis e.) Margin Analysis f. ) Test Specimen Accuracy Analysis g.) Information Notices, Part 21 Notifications h.) Material Procurement and Quality Control Requirements i. ) Shelf Life Analysis j. ) Maintenance Requirements Findings Failure to install conduit to environmentally qualified solenoid valves in a manner to prevent moisture intrusion and accumulation within the solenoid enclosure.
Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green None 71111.21N Systems NCV [05000275, 05000323] /
2018010-1 Closed
Introduction:
The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50.49, Environmental Qualification of Electric Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants, for failure to install conduit to environmentally qualified solenoid valves in a manner to prevent moisture intrusion and accumulation within the solenoid enclosure in accordance with Environmental Qualification file IH06, Revision 25.
Description:
The team identified a Green, NCV of 10 CFR Part 50.49, Environmental Qualification, which states, in part,
- (f) Each item of electric equipment important to safety must be qualified by one of the following methods:
- (1) Testing an identical item of equipment under identical conditions or under similar conditions with a supporting analysis to show that the equipment to be qualified is acceptable. Prior to June 18, 2018 the licensee failed to install four solenoids (1-SV-474, 1-SV-455C, 1-SV-276, and 2-SV-276) associated with power-operated relief Valves, as required by the Environment Qualification Binder IH-06, ASCO Catalog NP Solenoid Valves.
Specifically, the installed configuration did not match the tested configuration. The conduit connected to the solenoid housing must be oriented such that it prevents moisture intrusion and accumulation within the solenoid enclosure. If the solenoid fails to energize, the power-operated relief valves would not function as required during a feedwater break or low temperature overpressure transient. This would cause a challenge to the pressurizer safety valves to relieve pressure in a feedwater line break accident or exceeding the pressure/temperature limits for a low temperature overpressure event. The licensee failed to correctly evaluate improper installation of the solenoids in 1995 when a walkdown was performed on the power-operated relief valve solenoids. Based on the walkdown observations, engineering concluded that the existing configuration was acceptable to prevent water intrusion into the solenoid valve enclosure. Based on questions asked during the environmental qualification inspection, the licensee re-evaluated the conduit installation, and determined that the configuration did not comply with Equipment Qualification Binder IH-06, ASCO Catalog NP Solenoid Valves.
Corrective Action(s): To gather more information as an input to the operability determination, the licensee performed a containment entry to physically walkdown the affected solenoid valves. The walkdown confirmed that the orientation of the solenoids was not in accordance with Environmental Qualification Binder IH-06.
The licensee has generated SAPN 50985639 to document the deficiency in the corrective action program. The licensee has also performed an operability determination in which they found the solenoid valves operable.
Corrective Action Reference(s): SAPN 50985639, DA 50985639, AR A0374492, SAPN 50986204, SAPN 50986202, SAPN 50986203, SAPN 50986200
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensee failed to install equipment in the as-tested configuration to demonstrate qualification as required by 10 CFR Part 50.49, Environmental Qualification.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because was associated with the Design attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective. The objective of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone is to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The performance deficiency adversely affected the cornerstone because the initially installed orientation of the environmentally qualified solenoid valves allowed them to be susceptible to moisture intrusion and therefore affected the availability, reliability, and capability of systems to respond to initiating events.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions. The issue screened as having very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design or qualification deficiency that did not represent a loss of operability or functionality.
Cross-cutting Aspect: A cross-cutting aspect was not assigned for this violation because it is not indicative of current plant performance. The only time the licensee specifically evaluated the orientation of conduit to these solenoid valves was in 1995.
Enforcement:
Violation: 10 CFR Part 50.49, Environmental Qualification, states, in part,
- (f) Each item of electric equipment important to safety must be qualified by one of the following methods:
- (1) Testing an identical item of equipment under identical conditions or under similar conditions with a supporting analysis to show that the equipment to be qualified is acceptable.
Contrary to the above, prior to June 18, 2018, the licensee had not installed the conduit to the solenoids in a configuration for which testing of an identical item of equipment under identical conditions or under similar conditions with a supporting analysis to show that the equipment to be qualified was acceptable. Specifically, the licensee failed to install four solenoids (1-SV-474, 1-SV-455C, 1-SV-276, and 2-SV-276) associated with power operated relief valves, as required by the Environment Qualification Binder IH-06, ASCO Catalog NP Solenoid Valves. The installed configuration did not match the tested configuration and would not have maintained equipment qualification against water intrusion. The conduit connected to the solenoid housing must be oriented such that it prevents moisture intrusion and accumulation within the solenoid enclosure. If the solenoid fails to energize, the power operated relief valve would not function as required during a feedwater break or low temperature overpressure transient. This would cause a challenge to the pressurizer safety valves to relieve pressure in a feedwater line break accident or exceeding the pressure/temperature limits for an low temperature overpressure event.
Disposition: This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS DEBRIEFS On June 29, 2018, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Adam Peck, Senior Director, Acting Station Director, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. On July 25, 2018, a re-exit teleconference exit was held with Mr. Mark Sharp, Manager, Design Engineering and other members of the licensee staff, to clarify a change in the characterization of the identified finding. The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Calculations
Revision
Number Title
Or Date
9000013911 Evaluate total thermal energy imparted by LOCA, 0
MSLBIC, and HELBOC
9000013911-006 Evaluate Total Thermal Energy impacted by LOCA, 00
MSLB-IC and HELB-OC
9000013911-006- Evaluate Total Thermal Energy Inparted by the LOCA 00
Temperature Profile bounds MSLB IC. EZ001
9000013922 EZ-002 Environmental Qualification Requirements 12
9000019779-0-1 RSG MSLBOC GE/GW Compartment Temperature March 3, 2011
profile
9000019779-0-1 RSG MSLCOC - GE/GW compartment temperature 0
profiles
9000042398 ABVS, FHBVS, CRVS, TSC Ventilation System April 10, 2018
J-152 IH-32 panel heat rise for energized panel heater 0
STA-232 Thermal response of Rosemount/Barton EQ 0
components in the GE/GW area
Condition Reports (SAPN-)
50476158 50810068 50985362* 50986200* 50986342
50602780 50812831 50985638* 50986203* A0331690
50666628 50920430 50985639* 50986204* A0374492
50671218 50985298*
Condition Reports Generated During the Inspection (SAPN-)
50984877 DA 50985467 DN 50984724 DN 50984944 DN 50986202
50985638 DA 50985639 DN 50984803 DN 50985298 DN 50986203
50986342 DA 50986638 DN 50984877 DN 50985362 DN 50986204
DA 50984918 DN 50984478 DN 50984904 DN 50986200 DN 50986476
DA 50985332 DN 50984699
Design Basis Documents
Number Title Revision
DCM No. T-12 Units 1 and 2 Design Criteria Memorandum T-12, 23A
Pipe Break (HELB/MELB), Flooding and Missiles
9000008191 EQ File IH-32 Rosemount Transmitters 35
9000008281 EQ File IH36 Conax RTDs and Thermocouples 12
Drawings
Revision
Number Title
or Date
15-477-4035-3 Limitorque Wiring Diagram December 29, 1971
2004 Turbine Steam Supply System Sheet 3 109
2010, sht. 3 Residual Heat Removal System 52
2036 Multivariable Instrument Systems Sheet 40 97
2032, sht. 32b Flow Instrument P&ID, Residual Heat Removal system 118
106710, Sht.2 Operating Valve Identification Diagram, Residual Heat 42
Removal system
106733 Steam Generator Level P&ID Sheet 11 17
108004, Sht. 3 Turbine Steam Supply System 86
108004, Sht. 5 Turbine Steam Supply System 10
108032, Sht. 6 Flow Instrument Systems 82
108036, Sht. 7F Multivariable Instrument Systems 76
437592, sht. 1 Electrical Schematic Diagram, Residual Heat Removal 38
Flow Control Valves
437592 Sht. 1 Electrical Schematic Diagram Residual Heat Removal 38
Flow Control Valves
441306, Sht. 1 Schematic Diagram, Reactor Coolant Motor Operated 17
Valves
441309 Sht. 1 Electrical Schematic Diagram Risidual Heat Removal 24
Pumps
455097, Sht. 1 Schematic Diagram, Auxiliary Feed water Pump 16
Turbine Control
Drawings
Revision
Number Title
or Date
455098, Sht. 1 Diagram of Connection, Auxiliary Feed water Pump 11
Turbine motor operated valve
500001 Piping and Mechanical Area Location Plan 11
501712 Electrical Diagram of Connections, Below Elev. 117 - 29
0, Area G
501712 Electrical - Diagram of Connections Below 29
Elev.117-0, Area G
515939 Sht. 1 HELB Compartment Pressurization Study, Plan At 4
Elev. 85-0 Turbine Building
515943 HELB Compartment Pressurization Study, Plan at 2
Elev. 60-0 Auxiliary and Containment Buildings
515944 Fire Protection HELB Compartment Pressurization 3
Study, Plat at Elevatoin 73:-0 Auxiliary and
Containment Buildings
515945 Mechanical HELB Comparment Pressurization Study, 4
Plan at Elev. 85-0 Auxiliary and Containment
Buildings
515949 HELB Compartment Pressurization Study Equipment 2
Location, Section A-A-Auxiliary Building
Environmental Qualification Design Inputs
Revision
Number Title
or Date
9000007087-018- EQ File EH04- Rockbestors Firewall Cables 18
9000007764-025- EQ File IH06 ASCO Catalog NP Solenoid Valves 25
9000007805-011- EQ File IH-07 Limitorque Valve Actuators 11
AQS-21678/TR ASCO Qualification Test Report B
DCM No. T-20 Design Criteria Memorandum T-20 12
Environmental Qualification
Appendix A
EQ File EH10 Raychem Stilan Cable 11
Environmental Qualification Design Inputs
Revision
Number Title
or Date
EQ File EH-11 Raychem Cable Splice Assemblies, Termination Kits & 29
Jacket Repair Tape
EQ File EH-14 Westinghouse Centrifugal Charging And Residual 15
Heat Removal Pump Motors - 9000007358 015 00
EQ FILE IH06 Excerpts From Commonwealth Edison System June 9, 1992
Reference #7 Materials Analysis Department Report M3305-92, June
1, 1991"Determination Of Heat Rise And Activation
Energy Valves Of Coils And Elastomers For Asco NP
Series Solenoid Valves".
EQ FILE IH-06 Asco Letter To Catalog NP-1 Valve Users, Dated October 27, 1989
Reference #6 10/27/89 "U.S. NRC Information Notice # 89-66
EQ File IH-07 Limitorque Valve Actuators - 9000007805-011-00 11
REQ FILE IH-07- Limitorque Valve Actuator Qualification For Nuclear January 11, 1980
Report #B0058 Power Station Service", REPORT # B0058, Tests
Conducted Per IEEE 382-1972,323-1974,344-1975,
DATED 1/11/80
Procedures
Number Title Revision
CF3.ID3 Environmental Qualification (EQ) Procedure 9A
CF5.ID2 Control of Material in Storage 14
DCM No. S-67 Design Criteria Memorandum S67, 125V and 250V DC 17
System
Design Criteria Memorandum T-23 (DCM T-23)
DCM No. T-23 5A
Miscellaneous Electrical Devices
MA1.DC54 Conduct of Maintenance 15
MP E-53.10A Preventive Maintenance of Limitorque Motor 43
Operators
MP E-53.10S Limitorque Swap-out and Switch Settings 16
MP E-53.10V1 MOV Diagnostic Testing 14
MP E-53.10V1 MOV Diagnostic Testing 19
Procedures
Number Title Revision
OP J-9:I 125/250V DC System - Placing in-Service 17
OP J-9:IV 125/250V DC System - Performing a Battery 10A
Equalizing
STP I-1C Routine Weekly Checks Required by Licenses 95
STP I-36- PORV PCV -445C, PCV-456, PVC-474 Actuation 6
PORVEPT Logic
STP M-105 Test of BU N2 Accumulator for PCV-455C, Pressurizer 29
Power Operated Valve
STP M-106 Test of BU N2 Accumulator for PCV-456, Pressurizer 30
Power Operated Valve
STP M-11B Station Battery Condition Monitoring 34
STP V-2D3 Exercising and Position Verification of Valve 8701 and 8
8702
STP V-2T1 Pressurizer Power-Operated Valves 13
STP V-2U5B Exercising AFW Steam Supply Valves FCV-95 and 4B
FCV-152
STP V-3J2 Exercising Pressurizer Power-Operated Relief Valves 13
PCV-455C, 456 and 474
STP V-3M5 Exercising Valves RHR-8701 and RHR-8702 Reactor 15
Coolant Loop 4 to RHR Pump Suction
STP V-3R5 Exercising Steam Supply to Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 21
Turbine Stop Valve, FCV-95
Vendor Technical Document
Number Title Revision
DC-663219-629 Limitorque Type SMB/SB/SBD/HBC Valve Actuator 36
Maintenance Manual
Work Orders
C0072987 R0311652 64033345 64093175 64134928
C0187014 60005323 64033852 64101909 64140463
C0189745 60046014 64033961 64103626 64150960
R0018953 60073643 64043362 64116716 64155680
R0071536 60096938 64045821 64127369 64169246
R0287615 60100785 64047485 64132725 64181947
R0289136 64027077 64091368 64134218
Miscellaneous
Revision
Number Title
Or Date
01-0170-1097 EDS Nuclear Inc., Radiation Shielding Review 3
061808 NUCLEAR CABLE SPLICE I&C & ~ TERMINATION 31
061808 Nuclear cable splice and termination details 31
663217-103 Instructions For Life Line D Vertical Induction Motor 4
With ODP Enclosure
D8300040 Qualification report for pressure transmitters July 13, 2000
Rosemount model 1153 Series D
D8300131 Type test report for pressure transmitters Rosemount B
models 1153 series B and D output code R
D8400102 Qualification report for pressure transmitter model F
1154
D8400323 Test report for submersion testing of model 1153 and A
1154 transmitters
D8400336 Test report for submersion testing of model 353C A
conduit seal
D8700096 Qualification report for Rosemount model 1154 series I
H pressure transmitter
D8800077 Qualification report for Rosemount conduit elbow A
adapter
D9100062 Qualification report R output code electronics with A
N53304 operational amplifier
DIT 1000025198- Design Input Transmittal for EQ File IH-06 Revision 0
008
ECC-0001 Critical Components List (ECC-0001), SMB-1, 7
Reference Drawings 01-408-0013-4, 01-408-0073-4,
and 01-408-0074-4
PO # Refurbish, Testing and Shipping of Hydramotors 3
3500911771
Miscellaneous
Revision
Number Title
Or Date
Safety Evaluation Report October 16, 1974
Supplement 11 Safety Evaluation Report
Supplement 13 Safety Evaluation Report
Supplement 14 Safety Evaluation Report
Supplement 15 Safety Evaluation Report
Supplement 18 Safety Evaluation Report
Supplement 20 Safety Evaluation Report
Supplement 33 Safety Evaluation Report May 1986
Supplement 7 Safety Evaluation Report May 26, 1978
Supplement 9 Safety Evaluation Report
SUNSI Review ADAMS: Non-Publicly Available Non-Sensitive Keyword:
By: RAK Yes No Publicly Available Sensitive NRC-002
OFFICE SRI:EB1 RI:EB1 RI:EB2 SRA:PSB2 C:EB1 C:PBA
NAME RKopriva WCullum NOkonkwo DLoveless TFarnholtz MHaire
SIGNATURE /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/
DATE 08/13/18 08/15/18 08/15/18 08/16/18 08/17/18 08/21/18
OFFICE C:EB1
NAME TFarnholtz
SIGNATURE /RA/
DATE 08/22/18