IR 05000275/2018010

NRC Component Design Bases Inspection Report 05000275/2018010 and 05000323/2018010

ML18234A112
Person / Time
Site:	Salem, Diablo Canyon
Issue date:	08/22/2018
From:	Thomas Farnholtz Region 4 Engineering Branch 1
To:	Conway J Pacific Gas & Electric Co
References
IR 2018010
Download: ML18234A112 (19)

Text

August 22, 2018

SUBJECT:

DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT - NRC COMPONENT DESIGN BASES INSPECTION REPORT 05000275/2018010 AND 05000323/2018010

Dear Mr. Conway:

On June 28, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Diablo Canyon Power Plant. NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Adam Peck, Senior Director, Acting Station Director, and other members of the licensee staff. On July 25, 2018, a re-exit teleconference was held with Mr. Mark Sharp, Manager, Design Engineering and other members of the licensee staff, to clarify a change in the characterization of the identified finding. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One finding was identified during this inspection.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Thomas R. Farnholtz, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety

Docket Nos:

50-275, 50-323 License Nos: DPR-80 and DPR-82

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000275/2018010 and 05000323/2018010 w/Attachment: Documents Reviewed

Enclosure U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Inspection Report

Docket Numbers:

05000275, 05000323

License Numbers:

DPR-80, DPR-82

Report Numbers:

05000275/2018010, 05000323/2018010

Licensee:

Pacific Gas and Electric Company

Facility:

Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2

Location:

Avila Beach, California

Inspection Dates:

June 11, 2018 to July 25, 2018

Inspectors:

R. Kopriva, Senior Reactor Inspector

W. Cullum, Reactor Inspector

N. Okonkwo, Reactor Inspector

Approved By:

Thomas R. Farnholtz, Chief

Engineering Branch 1

Division of Reactor Safety

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a baseline inspection at Diablo Canyon Power Plant in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://

www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. NRC-identified and self-revealed findings, violations, and additional items are summarized in the table below.

This inspection was performed between June 11, 2018, and July 25, 2018, by three inspectors from the NRCs Region IV office. One finding was identified during this inspection. The significance of inspection finding is indicated by the color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red), which is determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process.

Their cross-cutting aspects are determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0310, Aspects Within the Cross-Cutting Areas. Violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process.

List of Findings and Violations

Failure to install conduit to environmentally qualified solenoid valves in a manner to prevent moisture intrusion and accumulation within the solenoid enclosure.

Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000275/2018010-1; 05000323/2018010-1 Closed None 71111.21N Introduction:

The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50.49, Environmental Qualification of Electric Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants, for failure to install conduit to environmentally qualified solenoid valves in a manner to prevent moisture intrusion and accumulation within the solenoid enclosure in accordance with Environmental Qualification file IH06, Revision 25.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

REACTOR SAFETY

===71111.21NDesign Bases Assurance Inspection - (Programs)

The inspectors evaluated the following components and listed applicable attributes, during the weeks of June 11 to June 15, 2018, and June 25 to June 29, 2018:

Components===

(1.)

DC-2-10-E-MTR-RHR-P1, Residual Heat Removal Pump 2-1 Motor. The residual heat removal pumps are the fundamental long term means of decay heat removal from the core for any accident or safe shutdown condition. The residual heat removal pump motors are considered to be required for mitigation of all accidents for the full duration of that accident; e.g., two weeks for a main steam line break and one year for a loss of coolant accident.

Attributes reviewed:

a.) System Component Evaluation Worksheet b.) Test Program Considerations c.) Thermal Aging Analysis d.) Post Accident Operability Analysis e.) Margin Analysis f. ) Test Specimen Accuracy Analysis g.) IE Information Notices, Part 21 Notifications h.) Material Procurement And Quality Control Environmental Qualification Requirements i. ) Shelf Life Analysis

(2.)

DC-1-09-1-S-POS-633, Position indication for the Containment Recircirculation Sump Outlet Valve B (8982 B). The Instrument Class IA motor operator has position switch POS-633 internal to the motor operator. The containment recirc sump outlet valve 8982B is located in the recirculating water chambers, Area GE-GW, elevation 62 and is subject to a harsh radiation environment. The safety function of this valve is to be capable of remote manual opening when switching from the injection to the recirculation mode so that the residual heat removal pumps can take suction from the recirculation sump.

Attributes reviewed:

a.) Post Accident Operability Analysis b.) System Component Evaluation Worksheet c.) Test Program Considerations d.) Thermal Aging Analysis e.) Test Specimen Accuracy Analysis f. ) IE Information Notices, Part 21 Notifications g.) Material Procurement And Quality Control Environmental Qualification Requirements h.) Shelf Life Analysis

(3.)

DC-1-03-P-VOH-FW-1-LCV-113, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-3 Discharge Header Level Control Switch is located in Area GE, elevation 115. It is subject to Area GE-GW line break conditions and a harsh radiation environment following a loss of coolant accident when the emergency core cooling system is placed on recirculation.

The safety function of this valve is to be capable of 1) remote manual operation for maintaining level in the steam generators, and 2) automatic operation to prevent runout of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 3. The valve could be used following any event that uses the steam generators as the heat sink for decay heat, including essentially all secondary system high energy line breaks and at least some loss of coolant accidents.

Attributes reviewed:

a.) System Component Evaluation Worksheet b.) Test Program Considerations c.) Thermal Aging Analysis d.) Post Accident Operability Analysis e.) Margin Analysis f. ) Test Specimen Accuracy Analysis g.) Material Procurement And Quality Control Environmental Qualification Requirements h.) Shelf Life Analysis

(4.)

DC-2-04-I-S-POS-441, Position indication for Flow Control Valve FCV-95 which is the motor operated isolation valve which controls main steam to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump. The instrument Class IA motor operator has position switch POS-441 internal to the motor operator which controls the opening and closing of the valve and also provides instrument Class II valve position indication.

Attributes reviewed:

a.) Environmental qualification package for the Position Indication Valve (PIV)b.) Latest

(3) Modifications on DC-2-04-I-S-POS-441 c.) Condition reports associated with the PIV d.) Condition report with Root Cause or Cause Analysis performed on PIV e.) Last 3 Preventive Maintenance performed of the PIV f. ) Replacement schedule on PIV and components g.) Vendor Recommended Maintenance on Valve

(5.)

DC-2-04-P-VOM-MS-2-FCV-95, Limit switch for Motor Operated Valve FCV-95, which is the motor operated isolation valve which controls main steam to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump. The limit switch is an intrigal part of the motor operated valve and is located in Area GE, elevation 115. It is subject to Area GE-GW line break conditions and a harsh radiation environment following a loss of coolant accident when the emergency core cooling system is placed on recirculation. The safety function of this valve is to be capable of opening upon receipt of an auxiliary feedwater safeguards start signal (low-low steam generator level or reactor coolant pump bus undervoltage). Once opened, the valve is not required to be repositioned.

Attributes reviewed:

a.) Environmental qualification package for DC-2-04-P-VOM-MS-2-FCV-95 b.) Latest

(3) modifications on the motor operated valve for DC-2-04-P-VOM-MS-2-FCV-95 c.) Condition reports on the flow control motor operated valve d.) Condition reports with Root Cause or Cause Analysis performed on motor operated valve e.) Last 3 Preventive Maintenance performed of the motor operated valve f. ) Replacement schedule on motor operated valve and components g.) Vendor Recommended Maintenance on Valve

(6.)

DC-2-08-I-I-TI-305, Temperature Indicator TI-305 is the letdown heat exchanger room pipe break temperature sensor for the Chemical Volume and Control System.

This valve receives a signal from the letdown pipe break isolation system temperature sensor TI-305 which closes the valve when a high temperature indicative of a line break in the letdown heat exchanger room (Area K, elevation 85) is sensed. The sensor is subject to a harsh radiation environment and letdown line break conditions.

Attributes reviewed:

a.) System Component Evaluation Worksheet b.) Test Program Considerations c.) Thermal Aging Analysis d.) Post-Accident Operability Analysis e.) Margin Analysis f. ) Test Specimen Accuracy Analysis g.) Information Notices, Part 21 Notifications h.) Material Procurement and Quality Control Environmental Qualification Requirements i. ) Shelf Life Analysis j. ) Maintenance Requirements

Components Located within Primary Containment

(7.)

DC-1-10-P-VOM-RHR-1-8702, The limit switch for residual heat removal motor operated valve RHR -1-8702 is an intrigal part of the motor operated valve and is located inside-containment and is subject to harsh environmental conditions from inside-containment accident conditions. The RHR-1-8702 valve is the recirculation to residual heat removal pump suction from Reactor Coolant System Loop 4. The safety function of this valve is to be capable of remote manual operation to align the reactor coolant system to the suction of the residual heat removal pumps to attain cold shutdown conditions under non-loss of coolant accident conditions. Reactor coolant system temperature and pressure interlocks preclude opening these valves until reactor coolant system pressure and temperature are below specified limits.

Attributes reviewed:

a.) System Component Evaluation Worksheet b.) Test Program Considerations c.) Thermal Aging Analysis d.) Post Accident Operability Analysis e.) Margin Analysis f. ) Test Specimen Accuracy Analysis g.) IE Information Notices, Part 21 Notifications h.) Material Procurement And Quality Control Environmental Qualification Requirements i. ) Shelf Life Analysis

(8.)

DC-1-10-E-MTR-RHR-1-8702, The motor for Motor Operated Valve 8702 is an intrigal part of the valve and is located inside-containment and is subject to harsh environmental conditions from inside-containment accident conditions. The RHR-1-8702 valve is the recirculation to residual heat removal pump suction from Reactor Coolant System Loop 4. The safety function of this valve is to be capable of remote manual operation to align the reactor coolant system to the suction of the residual heat removal pump to attain cold shutdown conditions under non-loss of coolant accident conditions. Reactor coolant system temperature and pressure interlocks preclude opening these valves until reactor coolant system pressure and temperature are below specified limits Attributes reviewed:

a.) Environmental Qualification package for the RHR MOV b.) Latest

(3) Modifications on MOV CC-1-10-E-MTR-RHR-1-8702 c.) Last 5 Condition Reports on MOV d.) Condition Report with Root Cause or Cause Analysis performed on MOV e.) Last 3 Preventive Maintenance performed of the MOV f. ) Replacement schedule for MOV and components g.) Vendor Recommended Maintenance on Valve

(9.)

DC-2-07-I-SV-SV-276, Solenoid valve SV-276 for pressurizer power-operated relief Valve (PORV) PCV-456 is located inside containment and is subject to the harsh environmental conditions resulting from inside containment accident conditions. The solenoid valve for PCV-456 (SV-276) requires an extended term (1 year)environmental qualification in support of the low temperature overpressure function.

Solenoid valve SV-276 is Instrument Class IA, because of the low temperature overpressure function.

Attributes reviewed:

a.) Environmental Qualification package for the POV Solenoid valve b.) Latest

(3) Modifications on DC-2-07-I-SV-SV-276 c.) Condition Reports on Solenoid Valve d.) Condition Report with Root Cause or Cause Analysis performed on Selonoid e.) Last 3 Preventive Maintenance performed of the Solenoid Valve f. ) Replacement schedule for Solenoid Valve and components g.) Vendor Recommended Maintenance on Valve

(10.) DC-2-07-I-T-PT-403A, Rosemount Pressure Transmitter PT-403A for Reactor Coolant Hot Leg Loop 4. Pressure transmitter PT-403 is located in the postaccident sample station area (Area GW, elevation 85) which is a mild radiation area but is subject to Area GE-GW line break conditions. The safety function of this component is to provide input to pressurizer power-operated relief valve operation and residual heat removal suction valve opening permissive circuitry.

Attributes reviewed:

a.) System Component Evaluation Worksheet b.) Test Program Considerations c.) Thermal Aging Analysis d.) Post-Accident Operability Analysis e.) Margin Analysis f. ) Test Specimen Accuracy Analysis g.) Information Notices, Part 21 Notifications h.) Material Procurement and Quality Control Requirements i. ) Shelf Life Analysis j. ) Maintenance Requirements

(11.) DC-1-04-I-T-LT-539, Unit 1, Steam Generator #3, Narrow Range Rosemount Level Transmitter. The steam generator narrow range level transmitter is located inside containment and is subject to harsh environmental conditions resulting from inside-containment accidents. The safety function of this instrument is to provide inputs to the solid state protection system for 1) reactor trip and auxiliary feedwater actuation (including steam generator blowdown and sample line isolation) on low-low steam generator level, and 2) turbine trip and feedwater isolation of high-high steam generator level.

Attributes reviewed:

a.) System Component Evaluation Worksheet b.) Test Program Considerations c.) Thermal Aging Analysis d.) Post-Accident Operability Analysis e.) Margin Analysis f. ) Test Specimen Accuracy Analysis g.) Information Notices, Part 21 Notifications h.) Material Procurement and Quality Control Requirements i. ) Shelf Life Analysis j. ) Maintenance Requirements

Findings

Failure to install conduit to environmentally qualified solenoid valves in a manner to prevent moisture intrusion and accumulation within the solenoid enclosure.

Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems

Green NCV [05000275, 05000323] /

2018010-1 Closed None 71111.21N

Introduction:

The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50.49, Environmental Qualification of Electric Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants, for failure to install conduit to environmentally qualified solenoid valves in a manner to prevent moisture intrusion and accumulation within the solenoid enclosure in accordance with Environmental Qualification file IH06, Revision 25.

Description:

The team identified a Green, NCV of 10 CFR Part 50.49, Environmental Qualification, which states, in part,

(f) Each item of electric equipment important to safety must be qualified by one of the following methods:

(1) Testing an identical item of equipment under identical conditions or under similar conditions with a supporting analysis to show that the equipment to be qualified is acceptable. Prior to June 18, 2018 the licensee failed to install four solenoids (1-SV-474, 1-SV-455C, 1-SV-276, and 2-SV-276) associated with power-operated relief Valves, as required by the Environment Qualification Binder IH-06, ASCO Catalog NP Solenoid Valves.

Specifically, the installed configuration did not match the tested configuration. The conduit connected to the solenoid housing must be oriented such that it prevents moisture intrusion and accumulation within the solenoid enclosure. If the solenoid fails to energize, the power-operated relief valves would not function as required during a feedwater break or low temperature overpressure transient. This would cause a challenge to the pressurizer safety valves to relieve pressure in a feedwater line break accident or exceeding the pressure/temperature limits for a low temperature overpressure event. The licensee failed to correctly evaluate improper installation of the solenoids in 1995 when a walkdown was performed on the power-operated relief valve solenoids. Based on the walkdown observations, engineering concluded that the existing configuration was acceptable to prevent water intrusion into the solenoid valve enclosure. Based on questions asked during the environmental qualification inspection, the licensee re-evaluated the conduit installation, and determined that the configuration did not comply with Equipment Qualification Binder IH-06, ASCO Catalog NP Solenoid Valves.

Corrective Action(s): To gather more information as an input to the operability determination, the licensee performed a containment entry to physically walkdown the affected solenoid valves. The walkdown confirmed that the orientation of the solenoids was not in accordance with Environmental Qualification Binder IH-06.

The licensee has generated SAPN 50985639 to document the deficiency in the corrective action program. The licensee has also performed an operability determination in which they found the solenoid valves operable.

Corrective Action Reference(s): SAPN 50985639, DA 50985639, AR A0374492, SAPN 50986204, SAPN 50986202, SAPN 50986203, SAPN 50986200

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The licensee failed to install equipment in the as-tested configuration to demonstrate qualification as required by 10 CFR Part 50.49, Environmental Qualification.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because was associated with the Design attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective. The objective of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone is to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The performance deficiency adversely affected the cornerstone because the initially installed orientation of the environmentally qualified solenoid valves allowed them to be susceptible to moisture intrusion and therefore affected the availability, reliability, and capability of systems to respond to initiating events.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions. The issue screened as having very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design or qualification deficiency that did not represent a loss of operability or functionality.

Cross-cutting Aspect: A cross-cutting aspect was not assigned for this violation because it is not indicative of current plant performance. The only time the licensee specifically evaluated the orientation of conduit to these solenoid valves was in 1995.

Enforcement:

Violation: 10 CFR Part 50.49, Environmental Qualification, states, in part,

(f) Each item of electric equipment important to safety must be qualified by one of the following methods:

(1) Testing an identical item of equipment under identical conditions or under similar conditions with a supporting analysis to show that the equipment to be qualified is acceptable.

Contrary to the above, prior to June 18, 2018, the licensee had not installed the conduit to the solenoids in a configuration for which testing of an identical item of equipment under identical conditions or under similar conditions with a supporting analysis to show that the equipment to be qualified was acceptable. Specifically, the licensee failed to install four solenoids (1-SV-474, 1-SV-455C, 1-SV-276, and 2-SV-276) associated with power operated relief valves, as required by the Environment Qualification Binder IH-06, ASCO Catalog NP Solenoid Valves. The installed configuration did not match the tested configuration and would not have maintained equipment qualification against water intrusion. The conduit connected to the solenoid housing must be oriented such that it prevents moisture intrusion and accumulation within the solenoid enclosure. If the solenoid fails to energize, the power operated relief valve would not function as required during a feedwater break or low temperature overpressure transient. This would cause a challenge to the pressurizer safety valves to relieve pressure in a feedwater line break accident or exceeding the pressure/temperature limits for an low temperature overpressure event.

Disposition: This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

EXIT MEETINGS DEBRIEFS

On June 29, 2018, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Adam Peck, Senior Director, Acting Station Director, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. On July 25, 2018, a re-exit teleconference exit was held with Mr. Mark Sharp, Manager, Design Engineering and other members of the licensee staff, to clarify a change in the characterization of the identified finding. The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Calculations

Number

Title

Revision

Or Date

9000013911

Evaluate total thermal energy imparted by LOCA,

MSLBIC, and HELBOC

9000013911-006

Evaluate Total Thermal Energy impacted by LOCA,

MSLB-IC and HELB-OC

9000013911-006-

Evaluate Total Thermal Energy Inparted by the LOCA

Temperature Profile bounds MSLB IC. EZ001

9000013922

EZ-002 Environmental Qualification Requirements

9000019779-0-1

RSG MSLBOC GE/GW Compartment Temperature

profile

March 3, 2011

9000019779-0-1

RSG MSLCOC - GE/GW compartment temperature

profiles

9000042398

ABVS, FHBVS, CRVS, TSC Ventilation System

April 10, 2018

J-152

IH-32 panel heat rise for energized panel heater

STA-232

Thermal response of Rosemount/Barton EQ

components in the GE/GW area

Condition Reports (SAPN-)

50476158

50810068

50985362*

50986200*

50986342

50602780

50812831

50985638*

50986203*

A0331690

50666628

50920430

50985639*

50986204*

A0374492

50671218

50985298*

Condition Reports Generated During the Inspection (SAPN-)

50984877

DA 50985467

DN 50984724

DN 50984944

DN 50986202

50985638

DA 50985639

DN 50984803

DN 50985298

DN 50986203

50986342

DA 50986638

DN 50984877

DN 50985362

DN 50986204

DA 50984918

DN 50984478

DN 50984904

DN 50986200

DN 50986476

DA 50985332

DN 50984699

Design Basis Documents

Number

Title

Revision

DCM No. T-12

Units 1 and 2 Design Criteria Memorandum T-12,

Pipe Break (HELB/MELB), Flooding and Missiles

23A

9000008191

EQ File IH-32 Rosemount Transmitters

9000008281

EQ File IH36 Conax RTDs and Thermocouples

Drawings

Number

Title

Revision

or Date

15-477-4035-3

Limitorque Wiring Diagram

December 29, 1971

2004

Turbine Steam Supply System Sheet 3

109

2010, sht. 3

Residual Heat Removal System

2036

Multivariable Instrument Systems Sheet 40

2032, sht. 32b

Flow Instrument P&ID, Residual Heat Removal system 118

106710, Sht.2

Operating Valve Identification Diagram, Residual Heat

Removal system

106733

Steam Generator Level P&ID Sheet 11

108004, Sht. 3

Turbine Steam Supply System

108004, Sht. 5

Turbine Steam Supply System

108032, Sht. 6

Flow Instrument Systems

108036, Sht. 7F

Multivariable Instrument Systems

437592, sht. 1

Electrical Schematic Diagram, Residual Heat Removal

Flow Control Valves

437592 Sht. 1

Electrical Schematic Diagram Residual Heat Removal

Flow Control Valves

441306, Sht. 1

Schematic Diagram, Reactor Coolant Motor Operated

Valves

441309 Sht. 1

Electrical Schematic Diagram Risidual Heat Removal

Pumps

455097, Sht. 1

Schematic Diagram, Auxiliary Feed water Pump

Turbine Control

Drawings

Number

Title

Revision

or Date

455098, Sht. 1

Diagram of Connection, Auxiliary Feed water Pump

Turbine motor operated valve

500001

Piping and Mechanical Area Location Plan

501712

Electrical Diagram of Connections, Below Elev. 117 -

0, Area G

501712

Electrical - Diagram of Connections Below

Elev.117-0, Area G

515939 Sht. 1

HELB Compartment Pressurization Study, Plan At

Elev. 85-0 Turbine Building

515943

HELB Compartment Pressurization Study, Plan at

Elev. 60-0 Auxiliary and Containment Buildings

515944

Fire Protection HELB Compartment Pressurization

Study, Plat at Elevatoin 73:-0 Auxiliary and

Containment Buildings

515945

Mechanical HELB Comparment Pressurization Study,

Plan at Elev. 85-0 Auxiliary and Containment

Buildings

515949

HELB Compartment Pressurization Study Equipment

Location, Section A-A-Auxiliary Building

Environmental Qualification Design Inputs

Number

Title

Revision

or Date

9000007087-018-

EQ File EH04-Rockbestors Firewall Cables

9000007764-025-

EQ File IH06 ASCO Catalog NP Solenoid Valves

9000007805-011-

EQ File IH-07 Limitorque Valve Actuators

AQS-21678/TR

ASCO Qualification Test Report

B

DCM No. T-20

Design Criteria Memorandum T-20

Environmental Qualification

Appendix A

EQ File EH10

Raychem Stilan Cable

Environmental Qualification Design Inputs

Number

Title

Revision

or Date

EQ File EH-11

Raychem Cable Splice Assemblies, Termination Kits &

Jacket Repair Tape

EQ File EH-14

Westinghouse Centrifugal Charging And Residual

Heat Removal Pump Motors - 9000007358 015 00

EQ FILE IH06

Reference #7

Excerpts From Commonwealth Edison System

Materials Analysis Department Report M3305-92, June

1, 1991"Determination Of Heat Rise And Activation

Energy Valves Of Coils And Elastomers For Asco NP

Series Solenoid Valves".

June 9, 1992

EQ FILE IH-06

Reference #6

Asco Letter To Catalog NP-1 Valve Users, Dated

10/27/89 "U.S. NRC Information Notice # 89-66

October 27, 1989

EQ File IH-07

Limitorque Valve Actuators - 9000007805-011-00

REQ FILE IH-07-

Report #B0058

Limitorque Valve Actuator Qualification For Nuclear

Power Station Service", REPORT # B0058, Tests

Conducted Per IEEE 382-1972,323-1974,344-1975,

DATED 1/11/80

January 11, 1980

Procedures

Number

Title

Revision

CF3.ID3

Environmental Qualification (EQ) Procedure

9A

CF5.ID2

Control of Material in Storage

DCM No. S-67

Design Criteria Memorandum S67, 125V and 250V DC

System

DCM No. T-23

Design Criteria Memorandum T-23 (DCM T-23)

Miscellaneous Electrical Devices

5A

MA1.DC54

Conduct of Maintenance

MP E-53.10A

Preventive Maintenance of Limitorque Motor

Operators

MP E-53.10S

Limitorque Swap-out and Switch Settings

MP E-53.10V1

MOV Diagnostic Testing

MP E-53.10V1

MOV Diagnostic Testing

Procedures

Number

Title

Revision

OP J-9:I

25/250V DC System - Placing in-Service

OP J-9:IV

25/250V DC System - Performing a Battery

Equalizing

10A

STP I-1C

Routine Weekly Checks Required by Licenses

STP I-36-

PORVEPT

PORV PCV -445C, PCV-456, PVC-474 Actuation

Logic

STP M-105

Test of BU N2 Accumulator for PCV-455C, Pressurizer

Power Operated Valve

STP M-106

Test of BU N2 Accumulator for PCV-456, Pressurizer

Power Operated Valve

STP M-11B

Station Battery Condition Monitoring

STP V-2D3

Exercising and Position Verification of Valve 8701 and

8702

STP V-2T1

Pressurizer Power-Operated Valves

STP V-2U5B

Exercising AFW Steam Supply Valves FCV-95 and

FCV-152

4B

STP V-3J2

Exercising Pressurizer Power-Operated Relief Valves

PCV-455C, 456 and 474

STP V-3M5

Exercising Valves RHR-8701 and RHR-8702 Reactor

Coolant Loop 4 to RHR Pump Suction

STP V-3R5

Exercising Steam Supply to Auxiliary Feedwater Pump

Turbine Stop Valve, FCV-95

Vendor Technical Document

Number

Title

Revision

DC-663219-629

Limitorque Type SMB/SB/SBD/HBC Valve Actuator

Maintenance Manual

Work Orders

C0072987

R0311652

64033345

64093175

64134928

C0187014

60005323

64033852

64101909

64140463

C0189745

60046014

64033961

64103626

64150960

R0018953

60073643

64043362

64116716

64155680

R0071536

60096938

64045821

64127369

64169246

R0287615

60100785

64047485

64132725

64181947

R0289136

64027077

64091368

64134218

Miscellaneous

Number

Title

Revision

Or Date

01-0170-1097

EDS Nuclear Inc., Radiation Shielding Review

061808

NUCLEAR CABLE SPLICE I&C & ~ TERMINATION

061808

Nuclear cable splice and termination details

663217-103

Instructions For Life Line D Vertical Induction Motor

With ODP Enclosure

D8300040

Qualification report for pressure transmitters

Rosemount model 1153 Series D

July 13, 2000

D8300131

Type test report for pressure transmitters Rosemount

models 1153 series B and D output code R

B

D8400102

Qualification report for pressure transmitter model

1154

F

D8400323

Test report for submersion testing of model 1153 and

1154 transmitters

A

D8400336

Test report for submersion testing of model 353C

conduit seal

A

D8700096

Qualification report for Rosemount model 1154 series

H pressure transmitter

I

D8800077

Qualification report for Rosemount conduit elbow

adapter

A

D9100062

Qualification report R output code electronics with

N53304 operational amplifier

A

DIT 1000025198-

008

Design Input Transmittal for EQ File IH-06 Revision

ECC-0001

Critical Components List (ECC-0001), SMB-1,

Reference Drawings 01-408-0013-4, 01-408-0073-4,

and 01-408-0074-4

PO #

3500911771

Refurbish, Testing and Shipping of Hydramotors

Miscellaneous

Number

Title

Revision

Or Date

Safety Evaluation Report

October 16, 1974

Supplement 11

Safety Evaluation Report

Supplement 13

Safety Evaluation Report

Supplement 14

Safety Evaluation Report

Supplement 15

Safety Evaluation Report

Supplement 18

Safety Evaluation Report

Supplement 20

Safety Evaluation Report

Supplement 33

Safety Evaluation Report

May 1986

Supplement 7

Safety Evaluation Report

May 26, 1978

Supplement 9

Safety Evaluation Report

ML18234A112

SUNSI Review

ADAMS:

Non-Publicly Available

Non-Sensitive

Keyword:

By: RAK

Yes No

Publicly Available

Sensitive

NRC-002

OFFICE

SRI:EB1

RI:EB1

RI:EB2

SRA:PSB2

C:EB1

C:PBA

NAME

RKopriva

WCullum

NOkonkwo

DLoveless

TFarnholtz

MHaire

SIGNATURE

/RA/

/RA/

/RA/

/RA/

/RA/

/RA/

DATE

08/13/18

08/15/18

08/15/18

08/16/18

08/17/18

08/21/18

OFFICE

C:EB1

NAME

TFarnholtz

SIGNATURE

/RA/

DATE

08/22/18