IR 05000275/2022011
| ML22215A284 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 08/09/2022 |
| From: | Vincent Gaddy NRC/RGN-IV/DORS |
| To: | Gerfen P Pacific Gas & Electric Co |
| References | |
| IR 2022011 | |
| Download: ML22215A284 (16) | |
Text
August 09, 2022
SUBJECT:
DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT - DESIGN BASIS ASSURANCE INSPECTION (TEAMS) INSPECTION REPORT 05000275/2022011 AND 05000323/2022011
Dear Ms. Gerfen:
On June 30, 2022, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Diablo Canyon Power Plant and discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Diablo Canyon Power Plant.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Vincent G. Gaddy, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Signed by Gaddy, Vincent on 08/09/22 Docket Nos. 05000275 and 05000323 License Nos. DPR-80 and DPR-82
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000275 and 05000323
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000275/2022011 and 05000323/2022011
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2022-011-0009
Licensee:
Pacific Gas and Electric Company
Facility:
Diablo Canyon Power Plant
Location:
Avila Beach, CA
Inspection Dates:
June 13, 2022, to June 30, 2022
Inspectors:
J. Braisted, Senior Reactor Inspector
D. Bryen, Reactor Inspector
R. Deese, Senior Reactor Analyst
S. Graves, Senior Reactor Inspector
R. Kopriva, Senior Reactor Inspector
D. Loveless, Senior Reactor Analyst
S. Makor, Reactor Inspector
N. Okonkwo, Reactor Inspector
D. Reinert, Reactor Inspector
Approved By:
Vincent G. Gaddy, Chief
Engineering Branch 1
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a design basis assurance inspection (teams) inspection at Diablo Canyon Power Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Include the Most Severe Temperature from a Design Basis Event in the Electric Equipment Qualification Program Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000323,05000275/2022011-01 Open/Closed None 71111.21M The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.49(e)(1) when the licensee failed to include the most severe temperature at the 480 VAC switchgear and 125 VDC battery charger/inverter rooms in the electric equipment qualification program.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
===71111.21M - Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Teams) The inspectors evaluated the following components and listed applicable attributes, permanent modifications, and operating experience:
Design Review - Risk-Significant/Low Design Margin Components (IP Section 02.02) (4 Samples)
From June 13, 2022, to June 30, 2022, the team inspected the following components and listed applicable attributes.
Valve Testing Procedures and performance history to assure consistency with vendor and industry recommendations
Component maintenance history and corrective action reports to verify the monitoring of potential degradation
Design basis documents and calculations including maximum expected differential pressure, minimum required stem thrust, and weak link analysis to verify valve and actuator functionality is within acceptable limits
Normal and emergency operating procedures
Piping, instrumentation, and wiring diagrams
Vendor installation, operation, and maintenance manuals
Corrective Action program documents
- (2) Unit 1 Residual Heat Removal Pump 1-2 Suction from Loop 4 Hot Leg Valve RHR-8700B
Calculations for limiting process conditions, valve sizing and switch settings, and motor terminal voltages
Evaluations of thermal binding and pressure locking
Procedures for and results of inservice, surveillance, and diagnostic testing
Emergency operating procedures
Piping, instrumentation, and wiring diagrams
Vendor installation, operation, and maintenance manuals
Corrective action program and preventive maintenance documents
- (3) Unit 2 480V Motor Control Center (MCC) Bus G
Reviewed the load flow, voltage drop, short circuit, and protection and coordination calculations
Reviewed preventative/predictive maintenance procedures and activities for the MCC and circuit breakers
Reviewed MCCB ratings to ensure they were appropriately applied within their vendors ratings
Reviewed design basis for MCC to ensure all environmental qualification ratings were appropriately applied and maintained
Reviewed thermal overload ratings to ensure they appropriately coordinate with DVR time delay setting
Reviewed compliance with RG 1.106 for thermal overload bypass/coordination for safety-related motor operated valves
- (4) Unit 1 Instrumentation AC Distribution Panel PNL 14
Preventative maintenance schedule for thermography and exercising of the breakers
Calculations for electrical distribution system loading, steady-state and transient voltages, and maximum short-circuit levels up and downstream of the panel
Protective device settings and circuit breakers ratings to confirm adequate selective protection and coordination up and downstream of the panel
Vendor manual
Single-line diagrams of the distribution panel
Maintenance history and corrective action program to verify the monitoring of potential degradation immediately upstream and downstream of the panel
Visual inspection to assess material condition, the presence of hazards, and consistency of installed equipment with design documentation and analyses Design Review - Large Early Release Frequency (LERFs) (IP Section 02.02)===
From June 13, 2022, to June 30, 2022, the team inspected the following component and listed applicable attributes.
Design requirements and specifications
Vendor manuals
Wiring diagrams
Surveillance history and corrective action program documentation to verify the monitoring of potential degradation
Visual inspection to assess material condition, the presence of hazards, and consistency of installed equipment with design documentation and analyses
Modification Review - Permanent Mods (IP Section 02.03) (5 Samples)
From June 13, 2022, to June 30, 2022, the team inspected the following modifications and applicable attributes.
- (1) Modification 1000025210. Unit 2 Auxiliary Saltwater Discharge Vent Line
Design change documentation and evaluations
Auxiliary saltwater system minimum required flow calculation
Vent piping installation field change notifications
- (2) Modification 1000025448. Unit 1 and 2 4kV Switchgear Ventilation High Energy Line Break (HELB) Impact
Calculations for switchgear room environmental conditions
Material condition of ventilation dampers and associated equipment
Normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures
Ventilation damper inspection records
- (3) Modification 1000025506. Unit 1 and 2 480V HVAC Tornado SSD Actions
Calculation for equipment damage temperatures and auxiliary building room heat up analyses
Off-normal procedures for auxiliary building ventilation
Test procedures for temporary ventilation equipment
Relevant portions of the updated final safety analysis report and equipment control guidelines
- (4) Modification 1000024876. Unit 1 Startup Transformer 1-1 Bushings Arresters - Rev.1
Electrical characteristics of Bushing and Surge Arrester
Replacement Bushing and Surge Arrester material construction
Replacement Bushing and Surge Arrester performance characteristics and sizing
New support structure construction and seismic characteristics
- (5) Modification 1000025507. Unit 0 Component Cooling Water Pump Motor Refurbishment - both Units, but neither at the same time since it was a document change only to be able to accept a refurbished CCP pump
Material and Storage condition of CCW Pump
CCW Pump inspection records
Design Change documents related to the CCW Pump Refurbishment
Review of Operating Experience Issues (IP Section 02.06) (4 Samples)
From June 13, 2022, to June 30, 2022, the team inspected the following operating experience issues.
- (1) Operating Experience Notification Number 51028289: Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Trip and Throttle Valve Failed to Latch following Manual Trip
- (2) Operating Experience Notification Number 51110876: Westinghouse NSS PWR Thermal Shield Degradation
- (3) Operating Experience Notification Number 51096228: Main Feedwater Pump Oil Pump Tripped due to Motor Overload
- (4) Operating Experience Notification Number 51103566: Reactor Trip due to Generator Step-Up Transformer Failure
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Include the Most Severe Temperature from a Design Basis Event in the Electric Equipment Qualification Program Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000323,05000275/2022011-01 Open/Closed None 71111.21M The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.49(e)(1) when the licensee failed to include the most severe temperature at the 480 VAC switchgear and 125 VDC battery charger/inverter rooms in the electric equipment qualification program.
Description:
The inspectors reviewed design change package (DCP) 25506 which revised the licensing basis to explicitly credit manual operator actions (propping open doors and the use of portable ventilation fans) to ensure adequate cooling of the electric equipment served by the 480 VAC switchgear room and 125 VDC inverter room ventilation system following a design basis tornado event. The postulated tornado causes a loss of offsite power and is assumed to disable the ventilation system because the system was not designed to withstand the tornado wind loads. The licensee provides shielding to other structures, systems, and components (or exceptions specifically approved by the NRC) to ensure that safe shutdown (hot shutdown, mode 4), and if required, cold shutdown (mode 5), can be achieved and maintained in the event of a tornado. The DCP involved several calculation and procedure revisions, which the inspectors also reviewed.
The inspectors reviewed calculation M-912, HVAC Interactions for Room Heat Up Due to Loss of HVAC, Revision 0, which determined the time-dependent temperature relationship in various rooms following a loss of ventilation from three different design basis events: fire, station blackout, and tornado. The inspectors focused their review on the portions of the calculation which directly supported implementation of DCP 25506. As a result, the inspectors noted that the period of evaluation for the tornado event was 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />; temperatures were analyzed to reach 147.3 degrees Fahrenheit in one of the 125 VDC battery charger/inverter rooms and 182.0 degrees Fahrenheit in one of the 480 VAC switchgear rooms; room temperature limits were 185 degrees Fahrenheit for those rooms; and room temperatures were rising at the end of the period of evaluation, even when crediting manual operator actions.
The inspectors also reviewed calculation M-911, Equipment Damage Temperatures During a Loss of HVAC, Revision 5, which established the room temperature limits (equipment damage temperatures) for the design basis events analyzed in calculation M-912. Calculation M-911 utilized engineering judgement based on existing documentation to evaluate the ability of equipment to operate at elevated ambient temperatures and stated that the results were not intended for use with any electric equipment within the 10 CFR 50.49 environmental qualification program. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed one of the referenced documents, NUMARC 87-00, Guidelines and Technical Bases for NUMARC Initiatives Addressing Station Blackout at Light Water Reactors, November 1987, and noted that the design basis event analyzed assumed offsite power would be restored after four hours; did not assume normal ventilation systems would remain disabled; and did not consider the 480 VAC switchgear room and 125 VDC battery charger/inverter rooms dominant areas of concern.
Title 10 CFR 50.49 requires, in part, that certain electric equipment important to safety be qualified to remain functional during and following design basis events to ensure the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition. However, excepted from this rule is electric equipment important to safety which is located in a mild environment. A mild environment is one that would at no time be significantly more severe than the environment that would occur during normal plant operation, including anticipated operational occurrences. Title 10 CFR 50.49 also requires, in part, that the licensee keep a list of the qualified electric equipment and retain the qualification file in an auditable form. And the electric equipment qualification program must include, and be based on, temperature, pressure, humidity, radiation, chemicals, and submergence at the location and for the duration the equipment is required to remain functional.
Finally, the inspectors noted that the room temperature limits, as described in equipment control guideline (ECG) 23.1, Area Temperature Limits, for the 480 VAC switchgear and 125 VDC inverter rooms is less than or equal to 103 degrees Fahrenheit and that the limits shall not be exceeded by more than 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> or by greater than 30 degrees Fahrenheit when the equipment is required to be operable. Consequently, the inspectors determined that the increase in room temperatures caused by the design basis tornado event, as determined in calculation M-912, meant that the 480 VAC switchgear rooms and 125 VDC battery charger/inverter rooms were no longer mild environments when compared to the normal room temperature limits. Therefore, the electric equipment in those rooms would need to be qualified to remain functional for the anticipated temperatures resulting from a design basis tornado event and for its duration. Since the licensees electric equipment qualification program was not based upon the time-dependent temperature in those rooms resulting from the most severe design basis event, the inspectors determined the licensee was in violation of 10 CFR 50.49.
Corrective Actions: The licensee reviewed calculation M-912 and found several conservatisms. Specifically, M-912 uses constant electric equipment (heat) loads throughout the 72-hour period of evaluation, whereas the licensee could transition the plant to safe shutdown in less time and shed non-essential loads sooner thereby limiting the maximum and long-term temperature rise in the affected rooms. Likewise, the licensee could take the credited manual operator actions earlier in the event to also limit the maximum and long-term temperature rise.
Corrective Action References: Notification 51157308
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to include the most severe temperature at the 480 VAC switchgear and 125 VDC battery charger/inverter rooms in the electric equipment qualification program in accordance with 10 CFR 50.49(e)(1) was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, regardless of the conclusion of the operability or functionality determination, calculation M-912 determined that the electric equipment in the 480 VAC switchgear and 125 battery charger/inverter rooms would have exceeded the ECG 23.1 temperature (and time) limits for operability. Consequently, the inspectors determined that there was a reasonable doubt about the electric equipments environmental qualifications, which reduced assurance in the equipments availability and reliability and required the licensee to revise the calculation to resolve the qualification concerns.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Using Exhibit 2 - Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating system, structure, or component and that the system, structure, or component maintained its operability or probabilistic risk assessment functionality.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: None Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations 50.49(e)(1) requires that the electric equipment qualification program must include and be based on the following:
- (1) Temperature and pressure. The time-dependent temperature and pressure at the location of the electric equipment important to safety must be established for the most severe design basis accident during or following which this equipment is required to remain functional.
Contrary to the above, prior to June 29, 2022, the licensee failed to include the time-dependent temperature at the location of the electric equipment important to safety for the most severe design basis accident following when this equipment is required to remain functional. Specifically, the licensee did not include the most severe time-dependent temperature for the electric equipment in the 125 VDC battery charger/inverter and 480 VAC switchgear rooms following a design basis tornado event in its electric equipment qualification program.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
On June 30, 2022, the inspectors presented the design basis assurance inspection (teams) inspection results to Ms. Paula Gerfen and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Calc
- 9000041048
ASSOCIATED CKT Analysis - Fire Protection
2-00
Maximum Length of 120VAC Control Circuits
Sizing and Setting of MCCB's and Thermal Overload Relays
399-DC
4kV Switchgear Room Component Temperature Limits
11/13/2018
9*9205-6-1
Verification of 460 VAC Class 1E Motor Operated Valve
(MOV) Motor Terminal Voltages During Starting and
Running
6A
9000006092
Motor Operated Valve Limiting Process Condition Evaluation
9000009149
(195C-DC)
Evaluation of Thermal Overload Relay Settings for 460VAC
Class 1E MOV/MOD Motors
9000019170
FSAR Table 6.3-5 Update
9000033359
Units 1&2 Load Flow, Short Circuit, and Motor Starting
14A
9000035423
Motor Operated Valve Sizing and Switch Setting
Calculations
9000039757
Equipment Damage Temperatures During a Loss of HVAC
9000039758
HVAC Interactions for Room Heat Up Due to Loss of HVAC
9000041048
(Legacy 134A-
DC-T)
ASSOCIATED CKT ANALYSIS - FIRE PROTECTION
2-00
9000042340
Anchor Darling Double Disc Gate Valves
DHV1-006.18
Fire Dampers 1-FD-20, 22, 24 Seismic Qualification
HVAC-82-11
Calculate Room Temperature at 4.16kV Switchgear Rooms
and 4kV Cable Spreading Rooms
11/13/2018
Calculations
M-988
Auxiliary Saltwater System
8B
Corrective Action
Documents
Notification
(SAPN)
50853202, 51103566, 51028389, 51032709, 50656744,
50656953, 51005999, 51061637, 51110191, 51110193,
261382, 50600264, 50577978, 50636744, 50510616,
51002959, 51020392, 50398185, 50938230, 50636744,
51110876, 51118825, 51132004, 51132005
Corrective Action
Documents
Notification
(SAPN)
51152923, 51152924, 51156208, 51156287, 51156335,
51156336, 51156360, 51156709, 51156925, 51157186,
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Resulting from
Inspection
51157307, 51157308, 51157405, 51157455, 51157463,
51157465, 51157499, 51157226, 51157228, 51157229
2010, Sheet 3,
Page 0
Residual Heat Removal System
437592, Sheet 1,
Page 0
Electrical, Schematic Diagram, Residual Heat Removal Flow
Control Valves
441220, Sheet 1
Unit 2 Electrical Single Line Diagram For Station Auxiliaries
441238, Sheet 1
Unit 2 Electrical Single Line Meter & Relay Diagram 480 V
System Bus Section 2G
663219, Sheet
537, Page 1
Mechanical, ASA Series 300 14" No. S70WDD Gate Valve
663393, Sheet 38
Unit 2 Electrical Arrangement of 480V Switchgear Bus 2G
Drawings
DAF-D-2217
Trap Door Fire Dampers
E
DCN 000025266
.
Install fuses on the Non-Class 1E ammeter circuits
associated with the U1 vital batteries and battery chargers
o
DCN 2000001057
Unit 1 230-kV Startup Transformer Bushing, Surge Arrester,
Surge Counter, and 230-kV Bus Replacement
DCN 2000001678
25VDC Vital Battery & Charger Unfused Non-Class 1E
Ammeter Circuits
DCN 2000001679
25VDC Vital Battery & Charger Unfused Non-Class 1E
Ammeter Circuits
DCP 1000025210
Auxiliary Saltwater Vent Line
DDN 2000001928
CCWP Motor Refurbishment
Rev. 0
DDP 1000025448
4.16 kV Switchgear Room and Cable Spreading Room
Ventilation System Damper Closure
Engineering
Changes
DDP 1000025507
CCWP motor refurbish
Rev. 0
IST Program Bases Document
663333-8
Vendor Document - Unit 2 Start-Up Transformer Type LT
663336-12
Vendor Document - IF, IG & IH Control Center Drawings
Motor Control Center
663336-20
Vendor Document - Units 1 & 2 Westinghouse Electric Corp.
Instructions & Spare Parts Lists For Type W Control Centers
663357-42
Power Transformer Instruction Book
Miscellaneous
663358-51
Vendor Document - ABB Instructions for Erection &
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Operation Outdoor Transformer Bushing
663393-1
Vendor Document - Unit 2 Instructional Book Motor Control
Center
Applicability
Determination
U1 Startup Transformer 1-1 Bushing and Lightning Arrester
Replacement Rev 1 (DDP 1000024876)
DC 663219-505-
Maintenance Manual for Anchor/Darling Double-Disc Gate
Valves 2-1/2 and Over
PG&E Letter letter provides design details for the AMSAC in
response to the NRC safety evaluation of Westinghouse's
topical report WCAP-10858-A, "AMSAC Generic Design
Package," which was approved by the NRC in a letter from
Charles E. Rossi (NRR) to L. D. Butterfield (Westinghouse
Owner's Group) dated July 7, 1986.
October 30,
1987
DCM No. S-64
DESIGN CRITERIA MEMORANDUM S-64 480-V SYSTEM
DCM S-38B
DESIGN CRITERIA MEMORANDUM NO. S-38B
ATWS Mitigation System Actuation Circuitry (AMSAC)
Rev. 6
DCP 1000025266
Design Change Package Summary and Evaluation
o
DCP 1000025266
Design Change Package Summary and Evaluation
FRS 663195-17
Functional Requirements AMSAC
Rev. 0
OE NRC IERL4-
13-54_2022 copy
INPO Event Report 13-54 Level 4,
2/10/2013
OM8.1D6
Fire Protection Change Evaluation Screen for 125VDC Vital
Battery & Battery Unfused Non-Class 1E Ammeter
1/18/17
Operating
Experience
OE 488760 from SAPN 51103566
11/12/2020
Operating
Experience
SAPN 51103566 Evaluation - 488760 - Vogtle Unit 2
Reactor Trip Due Generator Step-up Transformer Failure
PG&E Letter
Response to NRC Generic Letter 95-07, "Pressure Locking
and Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated
Gate Valves"
10/11/1995
Response-RFI-
167
Response-RFI-167 for Design Verification Testing
n/a
SER Compliance
SAFETY EVALUATION OF THE AMSAC SYSTEM
8/15/1988
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
with ATWS
System Health
Report
64A/B - 480V Vital & Non-Vital
Rev. 1
AMSAC Generic Design Package
Rev. 1
AD13.ID5
Inservice Testing Program
AD2.ID1
Procedures and Work Plan Use and Adherence
AR PK03-01
AR PK15-09
Electrical Rooms Temp Monitor
CF3.ID3
Environmental Qualification (EQ) Program
CF3.ID4
Design Calculations
23B
EOP E-1.3
Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation
EOP E-1.3
Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation
25B
MP I-23-T.1
Electrical Equipment Room Area Temperature Monitoring
Channels Calibration
MP M-3.7A
Terry Turbine Trip Valve FCV-152 Maintenance
OM5.ID5
Quality Assurance Program for AMSAC Equipment
Rev. 5
OP H-10:IV
Auxiliary Building General Ventilation - Off Normal Operation
OP H-11
Turbine Building Ventilation
OP1.ID2
Time Critical/Sensitive Operator Action
PEP 18-04
OP H-5:V and OP H-10:IV Temporary Ventilation Equipment
Test
STP M-70B
Inspection and Testing of Fire Dampers
STP P-RHR-ST
Test of RHR Pump Trip from RWST Level Channels
STP V-2D28
Exercising and Position Verification of Valve 87008
3A
STP V-2D2B
Exercising and Position Verification of Valve 8700B
STP V-3L14
Exercising valve SI-8980, RWST to RHR Pump Suction
STP V-3M4B
Exercising RHR Pump 2 Suction Valve 8700B
Procedures
TS1.ID16
Plant Doors
Self-Assessments STP V-2J3
Outside Containment Residual Heat Removal Isolation
Valves
Work Orders
Work Order (WO)
64135964, 64136547, 64266744, 64242277, 64248326,
64104958, 64120727, 64136944, 64090172, 64161783,
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
64174825, 64237076, 64204312, 68026512, 68026513,
64133915, 68049140-0010,
68049140-0020, 68049161-
0010, 68049140-0030, 68049162-0010, 68049161-0020,
68049161-0030, 8049162-0020
68049162-0030,
68049141-0010, 68049141-0020
68049141-0030,
68049166-0010, 68049166-0020 68049166-0030,
68049167-0010, 68049167-0020, 68049167-0030,
68049163-0010, 68049163-0020, 68049163-0030