IR 05000275/2022002
| ML22213A231 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 08/10/2022 |
| From: | Rick Deese NRC/RGN-IV/DORS |
| To: | Gerfen P Pacific Gas & Electric Co |
| References | |
| IR 2022002 | |
| Download: ML22213A231 (30) | |
Text
August 10, 2022
SUBJECT:
DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000275/2022002 AND 05000323/2022002
Dear Ms. Gerfen:
On June 30, 2022, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2. On July 7, 2022, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. A. Peck, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff.
The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Three findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. Three of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC resident inspector at Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC resident inspector at Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Signed by Deese, Richard on 08/10/22 Richard W. Deese, Acting Branch Chief Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000275, 05000323 License Nos. DPR-80, DPR-82
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers: 05000275 and 05000323 License Numbers: DPR-80 and DPR-82 Report Numbers: 05000275/2022002 and 05000323/2022002 Enterprise Identifier: I-2022-002-0008 Licensee: Pacific Gas and Electric Company Facility: Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 Location: Avila Beach, CA Inspection Dates: April 1 to June 30, 2022 Inspectors: A. Athar, Resident Inspector N. Greene, Acting Senior Resident Inspector M. Hayes, Senior Resident Inspector N. Hernandez, Acting Senior Resident Inspector S. Lichvar, Project Engineer J. Nadel, Senior Resident Inspector D. Nani, Project Engineer J. O'Donnell, Senior Health Physicist E. Simpson, Health Physicist P. Vossmar, Senior Project Engineer Approved By: Richard W. Deese, Acting Branch Chief Projects Branch A Division of Operating Reactor Safety Enclosure
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Potential Missile Hazards Near the 500 kV Switchyard Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green [H.13] - 71111.01 Systems NCV 05000275,05000323/2022002-01 Consistent Open/Closed Process The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, for the licensees failure to adequately implement casualty procedure CP M-16, Severe Weather. Specifically, on April 12, 2022, the licensee failed to identify and control potential missile hazards around the 500 kV switchyard during high wind conditions as required by the procedure.
Inadequate Procedure Renders Residual Heat Removal Pumps Vulnerable to Seismically Induced System Interactions Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green None (NPP) 71111.13 Systems NCV 05000275,05000323/2022002-02 Open/Closed The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, for the licensees failure to establish an adequate procedure for draining the reactor coolant system. Specifically, licensee procedure OP A-2:II, Reactor Vessel -
Draining the RCS to the Vessel Flange - With Fuel in Vessel, was inadequate because it left the residual heat removal system vulnerable to seismically induced system interactions.
Failure to Maintain Emergency Diesel Generator Maintenance Procedures Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green None (NPP) 71152A Systems NCV 05000323,05000275/2022002-03 Open/Closed The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a for failure to maintain maintenance procedures associated with safety-related equipment. Specifically, the licensee failed to maintain maintenance procedures that ensured the emergency diesel generator fuel system would remain operable following maintenance.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 began the inspection period shutdown in planned refueling outage 23. On April 22, 2022, Unit 1 began a controlled power ascension and achieved 28 percent power. That evening, Unit 1 reduced power to 2 percent due to a steam generator blowdown flash tank issue. On April 26, 2022, Unit 1 began a controlled power ascension, and returned to full power on April 30, 2022. Unit 1 remained at full power for the remainder of the inspection period.
Unit 2 began the inspection period at full power. On April 25, 2022, Unit 2 reduced power to 98 percent due to a feedwater heater issue. On April 30, 2022, Unit 2 returned to full power.
Unit 2 remained at full power for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Impending Severe Weather Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the overall preparations to protect risk-
-significant systems from impending severe weather due to high winds on April 13, 2022.
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Unit 1 emergency diesel generator 1-2 on April 7, 2022
- (2) Unit 1 component cooling water pump 1-2 on May 3, 2022
- (3) Unit 2 component cooling water pump 2-3 on May 17, 2022
Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater trains associated with pumps 2-2 and 2-3 on May 11, 2022.
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Units 1 and 2 intake structure on April 6, 2022
- (2) Unit 1 containment, 91-foot elevation, on April 8, 2022
- (3) Unit 1 containment, 140-foot elevation, on April 11, 2022
- (4) Unit 1 turbine building, 119-foot elevation, on May 16, 2022
- (5) Units 1 and 2 radiological control area and H block, 85-foot elevation, on May 17, 2022
71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures
Inspection Activities - Internal Flooding (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the:
- (1) Unit 2 emergency diesel generator 2-3 room on June 2, 2022 The inspectors completed section 03.01.3. This completes the sample that was partially completed and documented in Integrated Inspection Report 05000275/2022001 and 05000323/2022001 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML22143A881).
71111.08P - Inservice Inspection Activities (PWR) PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) The inspectors verified that the reactor coolant system boundary, risk significant piping system boundaries, and containment boundary are appropriately monitored for degradation by reviewing the following activities from March 25 to April 27, 2022:
03.01.a - Nondestructive Examination and Welding Activities Ultrasonic Examination, Low Pressure Injection Line 235, WIB-3 Ultrasonic Examination, Low Pressure Injection Line 236, WIB-74 Ultrasonic Examination, Low Pressure Injection Line 237, WIB-174 VT-2 Visual Exams of all Reactor Vessel Bottom Mounted Instrumentation Nozzles 03.01.c - Pressurized-Water Reactor Boric Acid Corrosion Control Activities The inspectors reviewed the following boric acid leak evaluations: SAPN
===50488036, 50571516, 50571518, 50680172, 50680176, 50680228, 50808823, 50808851, 50817895, 50914887, 50914937, 50914953, 50914954, 50914961, 50915111, 50915116, 51016207, 51016259, 51016280, 51090969, 51090989, 51090997, 51091008, 51091014, 51091027, 51093128, 51093229, 51095560, 51097301, 51097302, 51103071, 51103656, 51103658, 51104434, 51106747, 51108530, 51108531, 51123559, 51129666, 51133394, 51140337, 51140442, 51140444, 51140446, 51140447, 51147465, 51147509, 51147519 Problem Identification and Resolution The inspector reviewed over 60 notifications associated with inservice and operating experience issues and concluded that NDE/ISI related issues and operating experience are put into the corrective action program at low levels to ensure conditions and problems are identified. No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01)
=
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during Unit 1 low power physics testing on April 21, 2022.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated a crew of licensed operators during simulator training on May 11, 2022.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) Units 1 and 2 safety-related (Maintenance Rule System 39A) and non-safety-related (Maintenance Rule System 39B) radiation monitors on May 16, 2022
- (2) Units 1 and 2 emergency lighting maintenance and test on June 2, 2022
- (3) Unit 2 condensate system on June 7, 2022 The inspectors completed section/sections 03.01.3. This completes the sample that was partially completed and documented in Integrated Inspection Report 05000275/2022001 and 05000323/2022001 (ML22143A881).
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (7 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Unit 1 outage Yellow risk window while centrifugal charging pumps (CCP) 1-1, 1-2, and 1-3 were inoperable on April 4, 2022
- (2) Unit 1 outage Yellow risk window while auxiliary salt water/component cooling water heat exchanger (ASW/CCWHX) 1-2 was not available and the startup transformer was cleared during lowered inventory on April 14, 2022
- (3) Unit 1 emergent replacement of steam generator blowdown flash tank relief valve on April 22, 2022
- (5) Unit 1 MS-1-5397 steam leak repairs on April 27, 2022
- (6) Unit 2 component cooling water pump 2-2 maintenance outage window on May 17, 2022
- (7) Unit 2 emergency diesel generator 2-3 major maintenance outage window on May 24, 2022
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Unit 1 steam leak on terry turbine for auxiliary feedwater pump 1-1 on April 29, 2022
- (2) Technical Support Center air particulate radiation monitor (RM) 68 light fault on May 3, 2022
- (3) Unit 1 accumulator 1-1 pressure lowering on May 3, 2022
- (4) Unit 1 safety injection pump 1-1 mechanical seal leakage on May 18, 2022
- (5) Unit 1 auxiliary feedwater pump 1-1 tappet nut on June 2, 2022
- (6) Unit 1 oil leak on main bank transformer A sudden pressure relay on June 30, 2022
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02)
(1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
- (1) installation of leak repairs for MS-1-5397 test connection valve on June 1, 2022
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance testing activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
- (1) Unit 1 component cooling water pump 1-1 on May 3, 2022
- (2) control room ventilation system supply fan S-36 on May 5, 2022
- (3) Unit 2 component cooling water pump 2-2 on May 17, 2022
- (4) Unit 2 emergency diesel generator 2-3 major maintenance outage window on May 27, 2022
- (5) Unit 1 auxiliary feedwater pump 1-3 on May 27, 2022
- (6) Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater pump 2-1 on May 31, 2022
71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated refueling outage 1R23 activities from April 1 to April 22, 2022. The inspectors completed inspection procedure sections 3.01.c, 3.01.d, and 3.01.e. This completes the sample that was partially completed and documented in Integrated Inspection Report 05000275/2022001 and
===05000323/2022001 (ML22143A881).
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance testing activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01) ===
- (1) Unit 1 emergency diesel generator 1-3 routine monthly surveillance run on April 19, 2022
- (2) Unit 2 exercising full length control rods on May 5, 2022
- (3) Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater pump 2-2 routine surveillance on May 12, 2022
Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 comprehensive test of motor-driven auxiliary feed pump 1-3 on April 27, 2022
- (2) Unit 1 residual heat removal pump 1-1 suction valve quarterly test on May 19, 2022
Containment Isolation Valve Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 1 containment isolation valve testing during refueling outage 1R23 (valve 659C safety injection accumulator sample line) on April 5, 2022
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated:
- (1) The inspectors evaluated a simulator-based licensed operator (B crew) requalification training that included implementation of the licensee's emergency plan on May 31,
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls
Radiological Hazard Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated how the licensee identifies the magnitude and extent of radiation levels and the concentrations and quantities of radioactive materials and how the licensee assesses radiological hazards.
Instructions to Workers (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated how the licensee instructs workers on plant-related radiological hazards and the radiation protection requirements intended to protect workers from those hazards.
Contamination and Radioactive Material Control (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors observed/evaluated the following licensee processes for monitoring and controlling contamination and radioactive material:
- (1) licensee surveys of potentially contaminated material leaving the radiological control area (RCA)
- (2) workers exiting the RCA from the Unit 1 containment building during refueling outage 1R23
Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (IP Section 03.04) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's control of radiological hazards for the following radiological work:
- (1) inservice inspection of the special lifting device (SLD2) in a high contamination area using radiation work permit (RWP) 22-1083
- (2) sampling of cation resin transfer to the spent resin storage tank 01 using RWP 22-0042
- (3) downposting a ventilation room after securing from fuel movement using RWP 22-1004
- (4) maintenance on reactor coolant pump 1-3 maintenance using RWP 22-1050 High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls (IP Section 03.05) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated licensee controls of the following high radiation areas (HRA) and very high radiation areas (VHRA):
- (1) VHRA - Unit 1, 91-foot elevation of the containment building, under reactor vessel plug
- (2) VHRA - Unit 1, 91-foot elevation of the containment building, letdown orifice room (during fuel moves)
- (3) VHRA - Unit 1, 85-foot elevation of the fuel handling building, fuel transfer tube area (during fuel moves)
- (4) HRA - Unit 1, 91-foot elevation of the containment building, regenerative heat exchanger room
- (5) HRA - Unit 1, 100-foot elevation of the auxiliary building, liquid hold up tank room Radiation Worker Performance and Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency (IP
Section 03.06) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance as it pertains to radiation protection requirements.
71124.03 - In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation
Permanent Ventilation Systems (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the configuration of the following permanently installed ventilation systems:
- (1) control room ventilation system
- (2) fuel building ventilation system
Temporary Ventilation Systems (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the configuration of the following temporary ventilation systems:
- (1) high efficiency particulate air filtration (HEPA 9.10.13 and HEPA 9.10.11) utilized for the 140-foot containment deck for SLD2 work tent
Use of Respiratory Protection Devices (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees use of respiratory protection devices such as negative demand respirators, powered air purifying respirators/hoods, and self-contained breathing apparatuses (SCBAs).
Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus for Emergency Use (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees use and maintenance of SCBAs.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS05: Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs) Sample (IP Section 02.04) ===
- (1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2021, through March 31, 2022)
- (2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2021, through March 31, 2022)
MS06: Emergency AC Power Systems (IP Section 02.05) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2021, through March 31, 2022)
- (2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2021, through March 31, 2022)
MS07: High Pressure Injection Systems (IP Section 02.06) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2021, through March 31, 2022)
- (2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2021, through March 31, 2022)
OR01: Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness Sample (IP Section 02.15) (1 Sample)
- (1) January 1, 2021, through March 31, 2022 PR01: Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Effluent Occurrences (RETS/ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences Sample (IP Section 02.16) (1 Sample)
- (1) January 1, 2021, through March 31, 2022
71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) emergency diesel generator 2-3 equipment reliability common cause evaluation on June 6, 2022
- (2) seismically induced system interaction potential in residual heat removal pump rooms on June 8, 2022
71152S - Semiannual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution Semiannual Trend Review (Section 03.02)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program for potential adverse trends in equipment reliability that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Potential Missile Hazards Near the 500 kV Switchyard Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green [H.13] - 71111.01 Systems NCV 05000275,05000323/2022002-01 Consistent Open/Closed Process The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, for the licensees failure to adequately implement casualty procedure CP M-16, Severe Weather. Specifically, on April 12, 2022, the licensee failed to identify and control potential missile hazards around the 500 kV switchyard during high wind conditions as required by the procedure.
Description:
On April 11, 2022, the licensee experienced wind gusts greater than 58 mph and entered casualty procedure CP M-16, Severe Weather, revision 20. The licensee identified areas impacted by high wind, reviewed missile inspection guidelines, and then performed walkdown inspections of those areas.
On April 12, 2022, the inspectors performed a walkdown of the switchyard area outside of the protected area and identified a large number of unsecured potential airborne missile hazards within 300 feet of the 500 kV switchyard. Items found included chain link fencing materials, scaffold parts, wooden spools of various sizes, a plastic handwash station, temporary power supply materials (cords, power strips), pallets and plywood, scrap lumber pieces, aluminum pallets, an aluminum ladder, a foam kneeling pad, a wheel chock, and a shovel.
The inspectors informed the licensee, and the licensee promptly took action to secure or remove the missile hazards. The site remained in procedure CP M-16 throughout most of day shift on April 12, 2022. The inspectors noted that step 9.6, area walkdowns, of procedure CP M-16 was not marked as being completed. The licensee provided additional documentation that the area around the 500 kV switchyard had been walked down for missile hazards and that the procedure was not properly marked in error.
On April 12, 2022, Unit 1 was in a planned refueling outage, the plant was shut down and fuel movements were in progress. Unit 2 was operating at full power. Due to planned maintenance on the 230 kV offsite power line, the 500 kV power line was the only source of offsite power. If the 500 kV power line deenergized the site would be in a loss of offsite power; Unit 1 refueling equipment would only be powered by the emergency diesel generators, and Unit 2 would have tripped and would have also been reliant on the emergency diesel generators to power safety-related equipment.
Site casualty procedure CP M-16, Severe Weather, step 9.6, Note 1 highlights that, Objects at the laydown areas near the 500-kV and 230-kV switchyards experience higher winds than most of the site, and often contain substantial metal debris which may become airborne and impact electrical equipment, and Note 2 instructs, The pertinent portions of AD4.ID4 are Responsibilities, Transformer and Electrical Switchyard Protection, and Airborne Assessment Guidance. Procedure AD4.ID4, Temporary Storage Process, revision 5, contains additional direction for securing missile hazards near the switchyards.
Procedure AD4.ID4, section 5.11, Transformer and Electrical Switchyard Protection, step 5.11.2 requires, in part, that the licensee ensures there is a switchyard exclusion zone of 300 feet surrounding the perimeter of the 230 kV and 500 kV switchyards, minimize storage within the switchyard exclusion zone(s), do not have loose material in the switchyard exclusion zone; plastic, sheet metal, plywood, or other such material during high winds or severe weather are prohibited within 300 feet of the switchyard perimeters.
Procedure AD4.ID4, section 8, Airborne Assessment Guidance, requires the licensee to perform visual observation of the inside of the switchyard and the area within 300 feet of the outer switchyard fence to ensure the following: no loose material (under 500 pounds)with the potential to become airborne, housekeeping is acceptable, and equipment, trash, or other transient material that could affect electrical components in the event of high winds or severe weather are restrained or secured.
Corrective Actions: The licensee restored compliance by immediately removing or securing the missile hazards.
Corrective Action References: notification 51149739
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensees failure to implement a required procedure for identifying and controlling missile hazards during severe weather is a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, on April 12, 2022, the licensee failed to assess and control potential missile hazards around the 500 kV switchyard during high wind conditions as required by site procedures.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Manual Chapter 0609, appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors used NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, to evaluate the finding for its impact on the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. The initial screening directed inspectors to use appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, to determine the significance of the finding.
Since Unit 1 was shutdown, appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process, was considered, but because the site risk was bounded by the operating Unit (Unit 2), appendix A was used. Using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, appendix A, exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not involve the loss or degradation of equipment specifically designed to mitigate a severe weather initiating event for greater than 14 days.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.13 - Consistent Process: Individuals use a consistent, systematic approach to make decisions. Risk insights are incorporated as appropriate. The inspectors determined the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with consistent process. Specifically, the licensee failed to use a consistent process to identify and remove or secure loose items that weighed less than 500 pounds and were within 300 feet of the 500 kV switchyard as required by site procedures.
Enforcement:
Violation: Technical Specification 5.4.1.a requires, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, revision 2, appendix A, February 1978. Regulatory Guide 1.33, appendix A, section 6.w, requires procedures for combating Acts of Nature (e.g., severe weather). The licensee established casualty procedure CP M-16, Severe Weather, to meet the Regulatory Guide 1.33, requirement. Step 9.6 of procedure CP M-16, Severe Weather, revision 20, requires walkdowns to be performed for missile hazards, and that the walkdowns follow additional guidance from site procedure AD4.ID4, Temporary Storage Process, revision 5. Procedure AD4.ID4, section 5.11, Transformer and Electrical Switchyard Protection, step 5.11.2 requires, in part, that the licensee ensures there is a switchyard exclusion zone of 300 feet surrounding the perimeter of the 230 kV and 500 kV switchyards, minimize storage within the switchyard exclusion zone(s), do not have loose material in the switchyard exclusion zone; plastic, sheet metal, plywood, or other such material during high winds or severe weather are prohibited within 300 feet of the switchyard perimeters.
Contrary to the above, on April 12, 2022, the licensees visual observations of the area within 300 feet of the 500 kV switchyard failed to ensure the area did not contain loose material in the switchyard exclusion zone; plastic, sheet metal, plywood, or other such material during high winds or severe weather are prohibited within 300 feet of the switchyard perimeters.
Specifically, the licensee did not secure chain link fencing materials, scaffold parts, wooden spools of various sizes, a plastic handwash station, temporary power supply materials (cords, power strips), pallets and plywood, scrap lumber pieces, aluminum pallets, an aluminum ladder, a foam kneeling pad, a wheel chock, and a shovel. As a result, the loose items had the potential to initiate a loss of offsite power.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Inadequate Procedure Renders Residual Heat Removal Pumps Vulnerable to Seismically Induced System Interactions Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green None (NPP) 71111.13 Systems NCV 05000275,05000323/2022002-02 Open/Closed The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, for the licensees failure to establish an adequate procedure for draining the reactor coolant system. Specifically, licensee procedure OP A-2:II, Reactor Vessel -
Draining the RCS to the Vessel Flange - With Fuel in Vessel, was inadequate because it left the residual heat removal system vulnerable to seismically induced system interactions.
Description:
On April 14, 2022, the resident inspector was performing a walkdown of the Unit 1 residual heat removal (RHR) pump rooms while both RHR pumps were providing shutdown core cooling. The pump rooms were protected as a risk mitigating action for Yellow shutdown risk while the reactor coolant system (RCS) level was at lowered inventory coincident with a single source of offsite power.
In both Unit 1 RHR pump rooms, the resident inspector found a large liquid drain barrel, unrestrained, and subsequently reported the observation to the Unit 1 shift manager. Upon consulting the Seismically Induced System Interaction Manual, the shift manager determined that the RHR pump rooms are considered target areas for seismically induced system interaction concerns. As such, in accordance with the licensee procedure AD4.ID3, SISIP Housekeeping Procedure, it is unacceptable for large liquid drain barrels to be unrestrained inside of the RHR pump rooms. In order to restore compliance with the licensees seismically induced system interaction program (SISIP), the licensee removed the large liquid drain barrels from the rooms and replaced them with hoses run to the RHR pump room sumps.
The licensee determined that the large liquid drain barrels had been placed in the RHR pump rooms as directed by procedure OP A-2:II, Reactor Vessel - Draining the RCS to the Vessel Flange - With Fuel in Vessel, during the referenced evolution. The inspectors noticed that the procedure directs the licensee to place these large liquid barrels in the RHR pump rooms, but does not provide any instruction to restrain the barrels, despite a previous notification (SAPN 50538176) identifying the same issue in the Unit 2 RHR pump rooms and recommending that a SISIP-related precautionary statement be added to procedure OP A-2:II, Reactor Vessel - Draining the RCS to the Vessel Flange - With Fuel in Vessel. Thus, the inspectors determined that licensee procedure OP A-2:II, Reactor Vessel - Draining the RCS to the Vessel Flange - With Fuel in Vessel, revision 51, was inadequate because step 4.7.2 directs licensee personnel to place poly bottles in the RHR pump rooms without providing guidance to restrain the bottles, thereby leaving the RHR pumps vulnerable to seismically induced system interactions.
Corrective Actions: Upon identification of this issue, the licensee promptly removed the large liquid drain barrels from the room and replaced them with hoses run to the RHR pump room sumps. Furthermore, the licensee has revised procedure OP A-2:II, Reactor Vessel -
Draining the RCS to the Vessel Flange - With Fuel in Vessel, to remove reference to the large liquid drain barrels.
Corrective Action References: notifications 51149994, 51151605, 50538176, and 51151606
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to establish an adequate procedure for draining the reactor coolant system to the vessel flange level with fuel in the vessel in accordance with the requirements of plant technical specifications was a performance deficiency that was within the licensee's ability to foresee and correct.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, unrestrained large liquid drain barrels in the RHR pump rooms could leave the RHR pumps vulnerable to a seismically induced system interaction if a seismic event were to occur while the unrestrained liquid drain barrels were present in the room.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, appendix G, Shutdown Safety SDP. The finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green) because, although it was a deficiency affecting the seismic qualification of the RHR system, the RHR system maintained its operability.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.
Enforcement:
Violation: Technical Specification 5.4.1.a requires, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, revision 2, appendix A, dated February 1978. Regulatory Guide 1.33, revision 2, appendix A, section 3.c, identifies procedures pertaining to draining the reactor coolant system as recommended procedures. Licensee procedure OP A-2:II, Reactor Vessel - Draining the RCS to the Vessel Flange - With Fuel in Vessel, revision 51, was established to meet this requirement.
Contrary to the above, prior to April 14, 2022, the licensee failed to establish adequate written procedures for draining the reactor coolant system to the vessel flange level with fuel in the vessel. Specifically, procedure OP A-2:II, Reactor Vessel - Draining the RCS to the Vessel Flange - With Fuel in Vessel, revision 51, step 4.7.2, directs licensee personnel to place poly bottles in the RHR pump rooms, without providing guidance to restrain them, which would leave the RHR pumps vulnerable to seismically induced system interactions.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Maintain Emergency Diesel Generator Maintenance Procedures Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green None (NPP) 71152A Systems NCV 05000323,05000275/2022002-03 Open/Closed The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a for failure to maintain maintenance procedures associated with safety-related equipment. Specifically, the licensee failed to maintain maintenance procedures that ensured the emergency diesel generator fuel system would remain operable following maintenance.
Description:
On June 28, 2021, during a maintenance test run for governor tuning on emergency diesel generator (EDG) 2-3, operators identified a fuel oil leak from cylinder 1R.
An operator secured the EDG by pressing the local emergency stop button. The fuel injection pump cover for cylinder 1R was removed, and the joint at the 1R fuel inlet piping banjo bolt was found to be leaking. The banjo bolt was loose enough that it was able to be rotated by hand. Once the banjo bolt was finger-tightened into the fuel injector pump housing, the fuel oil leak stopped.
The fuel oil for each cylinder on the EDG is provided by a left and right fuel rail manifold, with a hard pipe fuel inlet connection. From the fuel rail manifold, the fuel oil flows down this fuel inlet pipe and into the fuel injector pump. The fuel inlet piping is approximately 5 inches long and is secured to the fuel rail manifold with two special cap screws on the upper end and secured to the fuel injection pump with one banjo bolt on the lower end. Extent of condition checks of the other EDG banjo bolt torques were completed on October 13, 2021, and the licensee determined there were eight additional banjo bolts found loose among the six EDGs on-site, the lowest of which was 65 ft-lbs on EDG 2-1.
In 2011, the licensee modified the emergency diesel generator banjo bolt gasket design with an updated model from the vendor, switching from a copper crush gasket to a steel washer O-ring design. Vendor documents specify a minimum torque of 100 ft-lbs for the new O-ring design, a reduction of the minimum torque of 150 ft-lbs from the copper crush gasket design.
Unlike copper washers, the new steel washer O-ring design does not yield during tightening of the fuel inlet pipe-to fuel pump banjo bolt connection. This makes the orientation of the fuel inlet pipe relative to the fuel manifold boss more dependent on fuel pump positioning and could increase the likelihood of a gap existing at one or more corners of the joint due to the mating faces not being parallel.
In 2014, EDG 2-2 inlet-to-fuel-header special cap screw on cylinder 1L was found broken. An extent of condition was performed, and the EDG 2-3 inlet-to-fuel-header special cap screw on cylinder 8L was found cracked. That resulted in an unplanned concurrent inoperability of two emergency diesel generators. The licensee concluded maintenance procedure MP M-21.11, Diesel Engine Fuel Injection Pump Maintenance, did not provide details on bolting connection fit-up and proper bolt-up sequence. As a corrective action, the licensee revised procedure MP M-21.11 with updated vendor maintenance instructions, upgraded cap screw torque values and provided specific installation sequence into maintenance procedures.
Additionally, in 2014 the licensee identified that the design of the injection pump inlet assembly is a rigid, structural connection between the fuel inlet manifold and injection pump.
This rigid connection makes it difficult to achieve metal to metal contact during the fit-up of the inlet assembly.
The licensees first cause evaluation for the 2021 banjo bolt fuel leak event determined the failure mechanism was a combination of normal engine vibration, thermal and system pressure cycling, all varying with the load profile, causing the bolt to work loose over time.
The inspectors questioned the validity of the cause evaluation that the bolt loosening was the result of normal engine vibration, and the licensee revised the cause analysis and performed a calculation to determine the minimum torque preload requirement for the banjo bolt connection. The inspectors reviewed calculation 900042585, Evaluate Minimum Acceptable Torque for DEG Fuel Injection Fuel Oil Retaining Bolts (Banjo Bolts), dated January 10, 2022. The calculation determined that, under normal engine vibration, a minimum torque of approximately 49 ft-lbs was required. The licensee's revised cause evaluation concluded that the likely cause was inadequacies contained in maintenance procedure MP M-21.11.
First, the sequence of steps in procedure MP M-21.11 may have resulted in misalignment of the banjo fitting to the fuel injection pump, allowing the banjo bolt to loosen during normal engine operation, causing a leak at the joint. Procedure MP M-21.11, step 10.1.8, requires a trial fit-up of the fuel injection pump, banjo fitting and fuel inlet manifold to achieve proper alignment between the three components. This initial fit-up is performed without the banjo bolt O-rings or the cap screw manifold gasket in place. After this initial fit-up, procedure MP M-21.11 does not instruct maintenance personnel to torque the fuel injection pump hold down bolts. In procedure MP M-21.11, step 10.1.12, the banjo fitting is then removed to install new O-rings on the banjo bolt and a spiral gasket between the fuel inlet pipe and the fuel manifold. During the banjo fitting removal and reinstallation, the fuel injection pump is susceptible to unintended movement since it is not yet torqued down. This has the potential to result in misalignment of the fuel injection pump to banjo fitting connection.
Additionally, a dual-action step in procedure MP M-21.11 may have resulted in inadequate tightening, allowing the banjo bolt to loosen during normal engine operation, causing a leak at the joint. Specifically, procedure MP M-21.11, revision 13, step 11.1.15, states Torque 'banjo bolt' to 100 ft-lbs but continues in the same step and sentence AND Injection Pump hold down bolts to 60 ft-lbs in the order necessary to ensure no binding of fuel rack. There is one space to initial this two-part step. This procedure step is inadequate because it does not prompt the worker to parse the actions into separate steps, and a sign-off could not accurately track that both steps were performed. Finally, procedure OM15.ID8, Human Performance Error Prevention Tools, step 9.4.2, states, in part, to use independent verification when returning technical specification required equipment to service.
Procedure OM15.ID8, step 5.1.2.c, requires documentation for independent verification as an error prevention technique to prevent latent errors, and defines a latent error as An error, act, or decision disguised to the individual that results in a latent condition until revealed later either by an event, active errors, testing, or self-assessments. Procedure MP M-21.11 did not document any independent verification for a latent error, which resulted in the banjo bolt on cylinder 1R loosening.
Corrective Actions: The licensee subsequently updated procedure MP M-21.11 to remove the identified deficiencies.
Corrective Action References: notifications 51124262, 51133376, 51133375
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to maintain adequate work instructions or maintenance procedures to properly torque and perform alignment of components associated with the safety-related emergency diesel generator fuel oil system components was a performance deficiency that was within the licensees ability to foresee and correct.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, EDG 2-3 was less reliable following maintenance after the work instructions were found to not properly torque and align EDG 2-3 fuel oil components.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Manual Chapter 0609, appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The finding was screened as having very low safety significance (Green) because it was not a design deficiency; did not represent a loss of system function; did not represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train for longer than its technical specification allowed outage time; and did not result in the loss of a high safety-significant nontechnical specification train.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.
Enforcement:
Violation: Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, requires, in part, that written procedures shall be maintained covering activities referenced in Regulatory Guide 1.33, revision 2, appendix A, dated February 1978, to include safety-related activities carried out during operation of the reactor plants. Regulatory Guide 1.33, section 9, Procedures for Performing Maintenance, step a. states, in part, that maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment should be performed in accordance with written procedures, documented instructions, or drawings appropriate to the circumstances. Maintenance procedure MP M-21.11, Diesel Engine Fuel Injection Pump Maintenance, revision 13, was a written procedure that covered an activity that could affect the performance of emergency diesel generators.
Contrary to the above, on April 17, 2015, the licensee performed maintenance on safety-related equipment with a written procedure that was not appropriate to the circumstances.
Specifically, procedure MP M-21.11 failed to include adequate instructions to perform maintenance on the emergency diesel generator fuel oil system, and as a result, EDG 2-3 developed a significant fuel oil leak during a maintenance test run on June 28, 2021.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
On April 8, 2022, the inspectors presented the occupational radiation safety inspection results to Mr. A. Peck, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
On April 27, 2022, the inspectors presented the inservice inspection results to Ms. P. Gerfen, Senior Vice President, Generation and Chief Nuclear Officer, and other members of the licensee staff.
On July 7, 2022, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. A. Peck, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
71111.01 Corrective Action Notifications 51149739
Documents
Procedures AD4.ID4 Temporary Storage Process 5
CP M-16 Severe Weather 20
71111.04 Corrective Action Notifications 51136742, 51153003
Documents
Drawings 107703 AFW Unit Two Piping Schematic 71
OP J-6B:II-A Diesel Generator 1-2 - Alignment Checklist 1
Miscellaneous LCV-111 Indicated Open with Valve Closed 11/23/2021
LD-1 Instructor Lesson Guide: Auxiliary Feedwater System 16
U2 AFW Q4 - Unit 2 AFW System Health Report Quarter 4 2021 05/05/2022
21
Procedures OP AP-15 Abnormal Operating Procedure Loss of Feedwater Flow 7
OP D-1:II Auxiliary Feedwater System - Alignment Verification for Plant 31A
Startup
OP F-2:I Component Cooling Water System - Make Available 47
OP J-6B:II Diesel Generator 1-2 - Make Available 45
OP K-10 Systems Requiring Sealed Component Checklists 47
OP K-10D Sealed Component Checklist for Auxiliary Feedwater System 20
OP K-10E2 Sealed Component Checklist for Component Cooling Water 11
Pump 1-2
OP K-10K Sealed Valve Checklist for Emergency Diesel Generators 12
OP1.DC20 Sealed Components 20
STP P-AFW-22 Routine Surveillance Test of Motor-Driven Auxiliary 18A
Feedwater Pump 2-2
STP P-AFW-23 Routine Surveillance Test of Motor-Driven Auxiliary 20
Feedwater Pump 2-3
STP P-AFW-A23 Comprehensive Test of Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater 6
Pump 2-3
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
71111.05 Corrective Action Notifications 51149201, 51149202
Documents
Drawings 111805-10 Fire Preplan Unit 1 & 2 Radiological Control Area (RCA) & H 3
Block, Elevation 85-foot
111805-11 Fire Preplan Radiological Control Area (RCA) & H Block, 1
Elevation 85-foot Unit 1 & Common
111805-38 Fire Preplan Containment Building Elev. 140' 2
111805-54 Fire Preplan Unit 1 Turbine Building, Elevation 119-foot 3
111805-55 Fire Preplan Unit 1 Turbine Building, Elevation 119-foot 2
111805-72 Fire Preplan Intake Structure 2
11805-36 Fire Preplan Containment 91' and 117' 1
71111.06 Calculations F.4 Probabilistic Risk Assessment Internal Flood Analysis 1
Miscellaneous Moderate Energy Line Break (MELB) Re-Analysis Report 1991
Maintenance Rule Basis Document for System 21A, Diesel 3
Generator System
71111.08P Corrective Action Notifications 51093128, 51093229, 51095560, 51097301, 51097302,
Documents 51103656, 51103658, 51104434, 51106747, 51108531,
51123559, 51129666, 51133394, 51140337, 51140447
Corrective Action 51148863 NRC Question on TQ1.ID12 Color Vision
Documents 51149040 Personnel Certification with Response
Resulting from 51149041 Missing Eye Record with Response
Inspection 51149455 QH Self-Assessment NDE Personnel Qualifications and
Certifications
Drawings 102007, Sheet 4, Diablo Canyon Power Plant - PG&E CO. Residual Heat 71
Page 0 Removal System
2010, Sheet 3, Diablo Canyon Power Plant - PG&E CO. Residual Heat 52
Page 0 Removal System
Miscellaneous FLOC DC-1-10-P- RHR SUCT VLV 1 LOOP 4 L-OFF
P-LINE-2524
SAPN 51067384 2020 ISI Self-Assessment Report
NDE Reports ISI X-CRDM 1R23 Bottom Vessel Instrumentation Exam Report 04/15/2022
Procedures STP R-8C Containment Walkdown for Evidence of Boric Acid 11
TQ1.ID12 Qualification and Certification of NDE Personnel 9
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
71111.12 Corrective Action Notifications 51079218, 51105018, 51125305, 51128709, 51136623,
Documents 51142816, 51145786, 51153616
Miscellaneous System 39 - Rad Monitors Health Report and Goal Setting 02/16/2022
Update
71111.13 Corrective Action Notifications 50538176, 50951476, 51095570, 51150733, 51151443,
Documents 51153872, 51154367
Miscellaneous Temporary Modification Data Sheet: 60144183 04/26/2022
Timeline for Feedwater Heater 2-1C Repair and Associated 05/02/2022
OP O-36 Protected Equipment SSC and Component List for U2 05/17/2022
Procedures AD7.DC6 On-Line Maintenance Risk Management 28
AD7.ID14 Assessment of Integrated Risk 30
AD8.DC55 Unit 1 Outage Safety Checklist - Mode 6 RCS Level Greater 44
Than or Equal to 111'
MP M-54.1, Att. 4 Torque Calculation Form 26
OP C-8:VI Feedwater Heater 2-1 A, B, C Removal From and Return to 11
Service
OP O-36 Protected Equipment Postings 27
PEP M-56.9 Control of Temporary On-Line Leak Sealing Using 5
Contractors
Work Orders WO 60144184, 60144383, 60144441, 64140990, 64141000,
64141004,
71111.15 Corrective Action Notifications 50625568, 51094645, 51145553, 51147165, 51151815,
Documents 51152352, 51153872, 51156701
Miscellaneous 1C24 D-14-003 TAG Removal List (Equip: 1-14-E-MTR-CCWP1) 05/03/2022
51150985 Request for ECG 39.1 Extension 0-RM-68 04/21/2022
Procedures MP M-3.7 Terry Turbine Throttle Trip Valve (FCV-152) Disassembly 7
and Assembly
MP M-3.7A Terry Turbine Trip Valve FCV-152 Maintenance 14
OM 7.ID12 Operability Determination 42
OP D-1:IV Turbine-Driven AFW Pump - Restart or Make Available After 20
STP I-39-R68.A Functional Test of TSC Particulate, Iodine and Noble Gas 6
Monitor (RM-68, 69, 83)
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
STP I-39-R68.B Technical Support Center Radiation Monitors (RM-68, 69, 12
and 83) Calibration
STP M-86 Leak Reduction of Systems Outside Containment Likely to 24
Contain Radioactive Materials Following an Accident
STP P-AFW-11 Routine Surveillance Test of Turbine-Driven Auxiliary 39
Feedwater Pump 1-1
STP P-AFW-11 Routine Surveillance Test of Turbine-Driven Auxiliary 39
Feedwater Pump 1-1
STP P-AFW-A11 Comprehensive Testing of Turbine-Driven Auxiliary 17
Feedwater Pump 1-1
Work Orders WO 60143288, 60144642, 64122387, 64194103, 64250579,
262462
71111.18 Corrective Action Notifications 51150733, 51150899, 51151047, 51151582
Documents
Drawings 102004-3 Unit 1 Turbine Steam Supply System 109
106704-2 Steam Generator 3 & 4 HP Turbine West Side Main Steam 110
Supply
Miscellaneous Form 69-10430 TMOD, Unit 1 Leak Repair MS-1-5397 04/25/2022
Form 69-21097 10 CFR 50.59/72.48 Screen: Unit 1 Leak Repair MS-1-5397 04/25/2022
Work Orders WO 60144183
71111.19 Corrective Action Notifications 51152394, 51152395, 51154652, 51155004, 51155005
Documents
Miscellaneous 0-TS-22-0070 Tech Spec Tracking Sheet 05/09/2022
Procedures OP F-2:11 Unit 2: Component Cooling Water System - Changing Over 14
Pumps and Common Components
OP F-2:11 Unit 1: Component Cooling Water System - Changing Over 15A
Pumps and Common Components
OP H-5:I Control Room Ventilation - Prepare for Service 23
OP H-5:IV Control Room Ventilation System Mode Changes 14
OP J-6A:IV-F 4160 Volt Bus F Breaker Code Orders 9
STP P-AFW-21 Routine Surveillance Test of Turbine-Driven Auxiliary 32
Feedwater Pump 2-1
STP V-3P6B Exercising Valves LCV-115 and 113 Auxiliary Feedwater 29
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
Pump Discharge
Work Orders WO 64261098, 64264442
71111.20 Corrective Action Notifications 51148075, 51148136, 51148177, 51148185, 51148188,
Documents 51148232, 51148263, 51150630, 51150631, 51150632,
51150633, 51150634, 51150635, 51150636, 51150637
Procedures OP B-2:VI RHR - Draining the Refueling Cavity 30
OP A-3:II Control Rod System Normal Operation 18
OP B-8DS2 Core Loading 73
OP L-1 Plant Heatup from Shutdown to Hot Standby 102
OP L-2 Hot Standby to Startup Mode 46
OP O-33 System Make Available Checklist 18
PEP R-8DS2 Core Loading Sequence 04/11/2022
STP R-6 Low Power Core Reload Physics Tests 21
71111.22 Corrective Action Notifications 51151753, 51151804, 51152560, 51152561, 51152562,
Documents 51152563, 51152564, 51152565
Procedures AFW 1-1 Overspeed Trip Device
AD13.DC1 Control of the Surveillance Testing Program 51
AD13.ID1 Control of Plant and Equipment Tests 14A
AD13.ID5 Inservice Testing Program 15
STP M-16F Test Train B Slave Relays K609 (Safety Injection) and K633 19
(AFW Pump 2 Start)
STP M-9A3 Diesel Generator 1-3 Routine Surveillance Test 14
STP P-AFW-22 Routine Surveillance Test of Motor-Driven Auxiliary 18A
Feedwater Pump 2-2
STP P-AFW-A13 Comprehensive Test of Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump 10
1-3
STP R-1A Exercising Full Length Control Rods 28
STP V-3 Exercising Safety Related Valves - General Procedure 23
STP V-3M4A Exercising RHR Pump 1 Suction Valve 8700A 11
STP V-3P6A Exercising Valves LCV-110 and LCV-111 Auxiliary 28A
Feedwater Pump Discharge
STP V-659C Penetration 59C Containment Isolation Valve Leak 13A
Work Orders WO 64116369, 64194354, 64246718, 64250577
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
71124.01 ALARA Plans RWP 21-2020 2R22 Reactor Disassembly and Reassembly 04/19/2021
Post Job ALARA
Review
RWP 21-2050 2R22 Reactor Coolant Pump Work 05/04/2021
Post Job ALARA
Review
RWP 21-2061 2R22 Containment Valves and Breaches 05/03/2021
Post Job ALARA
Review
RWP 22-0042 Radioactive Waste Activities 01/04/2022
ALARA Plan
RWP 22-1020 1R23 Reactor Disassembly and Reassembly 03/07/2022
ALARA Plan
RWP 22-1050 RWP 22-1050 Reactor Coolant Pump Work 03/16/2022
ALARA Plan
RWP 22-1061 1R23 Containment Valves and Breaches 03/03/2022
ALARA Plan
RWP 22-1083 1R23 SLD2 Inspection 03/14/2022
ALARA Plan
Procedures RCP D-310 RCA Access Control 27
RCP NISP-RP.02 Radiation and Contamination Surveys 4
RCP NISP-RP.04 Radiological Posting and Labeling 3
RCP NISP-RP.05 Access Controls for High Radiation Areas 5
RCP NISP-RP.11 Radiological Protection Fundamentals 0
RCP RW-20 Spent Resin Sampling 9
RP1 Radiation Protection 10
RP1.DC6 Radiation Protection Code of Conduct 6
RP1.ID16 Radiation Worker Expectations 16
RP1.ID17 Control and Storage of Non-Special Nuclear Material 0A
SPG-7 - Unit 1 Operations Plant Evolution Survey and Posting Guide 02/04/2019
Radiation 81986 1R23 140' CTMT Upper Internals Move to Stand 04/01/2022
Surveys 82001 1R23 140' CTMT Down Post from HRA post Upper Internals 04/01/2022
Move
2006 SLD2 bullpen setup 04/01/2022
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
2023 1R23 140' CTMT SDL2 area survey and map updates 04/02/2022
2024 1R23 140' CTMT SLD2 Scaffold Build 04/02/2022
2067 1R23 Unit 1 Containment 140' SLD2 Inspection and Pre- 04/03/2022
Surface Preparations Survey
2075 1R23 Unit 1 CTMT 140' SLD2 Prep and Inspect 04/03/2022
2112 1R23 140' CTMT SLD2 Inspection Post Prep 04/04/2022
2128 140' containment SLD2 coatings prep 04/04/2022
2150 1R23 140' CTMT SLD2 10 Year ISI Inspection Repainting 04/05/2022
Radiation Work RWP 22-0042 Radioactive Waste Activities 00
Permits (RWPs) RWP 22-1050 1R23 Reactor Coolant Pump Work 00
RWP 22-1083 1R23 SLD2 Inspection 00
Self-Assessments No. 2022-IA-02 2022 Radiation Protection Programs Audit 01/31/2022
51137120 Pre-Inspection on Radiological Hazard Assessment and 02/08/2022
Exposure Controls
71124.03 Calibration PortaCount Serial Calibration Certificate 02/10/2021
Records Number
8030131514
PortaCount Serial Calibration Certificate 06/22/2021
Number
8030143720
PortaCount Serial Calibration Certificate 10/11/2021
Number
8030143721
Corrective Action SAPN 51093943, 51094649, 51094653, 51099553, 51101159,
Documents 51101673, 51102107, 51102749, 51106818, 51109066,
51111440, 51111441, 51111967, 51118191, 51123056,
51124871, 51125492, 51125945, 51126490, 51128721,
51130891, 51133137, 51134397, 51136389, 51137113,
51137244, 51138406, 51138608, 51138695, 51139652,
51139724, 51142030, 51142473, 51142601, 51144406,
51145813
Drawings 501365-1 Unit-2 Ventilation Flow Diagram Auxiliary Building 18
501366-1 Unit-2 Mechanical Ventilation Flow Diagram 30
511159-1 Units-1 and -2 Mechanical Control Room Flow Diagram 21
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
59316-1 Unit-1 Ventilation Flow Diagram Auxiliary Building 23
59317-1 Auxiliary and Fuel Handling Building Supply and Exhaust Air N/A
Systems
Miscellaneous DCPP Form 69- Inspection and Maintenance Checklist for MSA FireHawk numerous
21549 SCBA
Facepiece Test Results numerous
Complete SCBA Test Results numerous
Certificate of Compliance with CGA G-7.1-2018 Grade L numerous
Procedures RCP D-410 Issuing Respiratory Protective Equipment 21
RCP D-712 MAXAIR Powered Air Purifying Respirator 2
RCP D-732 Respirator Fit Testing 27
STP M-53 Control Room Ventilation System - DOP and Halide 22
Penetration Tests
STP M-6A Routine Surveillance Testing of Control Room Ventilation 59
System
Self-Assessments Quick Hit Self- In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation 02/28/2022
Assessment
report
71151 Miscellaneous EAC Tech Spec Reports Q2 2021-Q1 2022
EAC U1 UAI Derivation Report
EAC U2 UAI Derivation Report
HPI U1 UAI Derivation Report
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
HPI U2 UAI Derivation Report
HPI-CVCS Tech Spec Reports Q2 2021-Q1 2022
HPI-SI Tech Spec Reports Q2 2021-Q1 2022
71152A Corrective Action Notifications 51088130, 51088141, 51115230, 51117574, 51124036,
Documents 51124043, 51124262, 51149994
Miscellaneous Seismically Induced System Interaction Manual 13
20-IA-09 2020 Quality Assurance Program Audit
21 Q4 U1-03B System Health Report 2021 Q4 Unit 1 Auxiliary Feedwater 05/05/2022
21 Q4 U1-09 System Health Report 2021 Q4 Unit 1 Safety Injection 05/05/2022
21 Q4 U1-61 System Health Report 2021 Q4 Unit 1 Main Generator 05/05/2022
21 Q4 U2-03B System Health Report 2021 Q4 Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater 05/05/2022
21 Q4 U2-09 System Health Report 2021 Q4 Unit 2 Safety Injection 05/05/2022
21 Q4 U2-61 System Health Report 2021 Q4 Unit 2 Main Generator 05/05/2022
21-AS-3 Station Equipment Reliability Assessment 02/04/2021
21-AS-9 DCPP Equipment Reliability Policy and Performance 10/21/2021
21-IA-10 2021 Problem Prevention and Corrective Action Program 09/27/2021
Audit
21-IA-11 2021 Engineering and Maintenance Rule Audit 12/02/2021
PHC Top 10 Top Ten Equipment Reliability Issues 05/03/2022
Issues
Procedures OP A-2:II Reactor Vessel - Draining the RCS to the Vessel Flange - 51
With Fuel in Vessel
OP B-2:VII Residual Heat Removal System - Fill and Vent 12
27