ML17326A329

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Requests Deletion of License Condition (3)(c),per Encl Revised Response to Question 212.40 in App Q of Fsar. Revision Due to Util Misinterpretation of Requirements Re Check Valve Leak Testing.W/Fee & Affidavit
ML17326A329
Person / Time
Site: Cook American Electric Power icon.png
Issue date: 10/29/1979
From: DOLAN J E
INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO.
To: DENTON H R
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
AEP:NRC:00259, AEP:NRC:259, NUDOCS 7911090472
Download: ML17326A329 (27)
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Text

REGULA'TORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSIONNBR07911090472.DOC~DATE~79/10/21NOTARIZED

~YESDOCKETFACIAL:50 316'Donald C~,CookNuclearPowerPlentyUnit2iIndianaL05000316AOTHBNAME",,

AUTHORAFFILIATION DalAAJ;E.Indiana8Rich,igan PowerCos-'ECIPiNAME>>

RECIPIENTT AFFlLIATION

'EATONgH.R',

OfficeofNuclearReactorRegulation

SUBJECT:

Requestsdeletionof-LicenseCondition (3)(c)iper enclrevisedresponseto.Question212,40inAppQofFSAR,Rev'is.ion dueto'util'misinterpietation of-requirements recheckvalveleaktesting,H/fee 8affidavits DISTRIBUTION CODE:A001SCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR J'NCL:JSIZE:TITLEi.Geneial'istribut>on for;after-IssuanceofOjerat>ngT L'icNOTES:Lq(QfkZI<

~K~~~~~~MDCL&+

AL4~ML'd~RECIPIENT COPIESRECIPIENT COPIESID'ODE/VAME t;TTR'NCL IDCaDEiNAME LTTRENCLACTION:.05BCQgg"77INTERNAL!

-KGFIL$5COREAPERFTBR1SREACSFTVBR20.EEB22SAINKMANOELDEXTERNALS 03LPDR23ACRS1122i11,11i1011161602NRCPDR14TA/EDOi7ENGRBR19PLANTSYSBR21EFLTTRTSYSEPB~DOR04NSICADV13879VXVlTOTAl.NUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED!

LTTR~KNCL IIIIIIt"II'IIg~II1ItH5Ir'55I5'IleJI INDIANAIIMICHIGANPOWERCOMPANYPi6.BOX18BOWLINGGREENSTATIONNEwYoRK,N.Y.10054October29,1979REP;NgC;Q0259.

DonaldC..CookNuclearPlantUnitNo.2DocketNo.50-316LicenseNo.DPR-74Mr.HaroldR.Denton,DirectorOfficeofNuclearReactorRegulation U.S,NuclearRegulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555

DearMr.Denton:

'urther reviewofQuestion212.40ascontained inAppendixQtotheDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantFinalSafetyAnalysisReport'(FSAR)hasledustoconcludethatsomeofthetestingdescribed intheresponseisnotnecessary tosatisfythestatedstaffcon-cernsandthatthelistsofvalvesneedtoberevised.TheresponsetoQuestion212.40waspreviously revisedinourlettertoMr.EdsonG.CasedatedFebruary17,1978.TheintentofQuestion212.40isthatweleaktestthecheckvalveswhichperformanisolation function,ofprotecting lowpressuresafetysystemsfromfullreactorpressure.

Thestaffrequiredthateachcheckvalvewhichperformsthisisolation functionbeidentified andclassified ASMEIWV-2000categoryACwiththeleaktestingbeingperformed tocodespecifications.

Licensecondition (3)(c)wasincludedinourUnitNo.2operating licenseinaccordance withthe'ommitments madeinourresponsetoQuestion212.40.Ourreviewhasindicated thatinthecaseswherelowpressuresystemsare'isolated fromfullreactorpressurebycheckvalves,theover-pressureprotection ofthelowpressuresystempipingisprovidedbyASMEcodesafetyreliefvalves.Assuch,thecheckvalveperformsanisolation functionbutdoesnotprotectlowpressuresystemsfromfullreactorpressure.

Ourmisinterpretation ofthestaffpositioncontained inQuestion212.40resultedinthecommitments madeintheresponsewhichbecamelicensecondition (3)(c).Theresultsofourreviewarecon-tainedinarevisedresponsetoQuestion212.40whichisattachedforyourreview.Werequesttha'toperating licensecondition

'(3)(c)bede-letedinaccordance withtheattachedrevisiontoQuestion212.40.QaV91109D tr-'Il\NkIIi'r Nr.HaroldR.Denton,Di'rector AEP;NRC:00259 Thisrevisiontothequestion212.40responsedoesnotinyolveanunreviewed safetyquestionorTechnical Specification change,norwillitendangerthehealthorsafetyofthepublic.Weintendtoformallyincorporate thisrevisedresponseintotheFSARaspartofafutureAmendment.,

Ourreviewindicates thatthisrevisionconstitutes afeeClassIIIAmendment tothefacilitylicense.Inaccordance with10CFR170.22,wetherefore encloseacheckfor$4,000,00.

Verytrulyyours,JohnE.DolanVicePresident cc:.R.C.CallenG.CharnoffD.V.Shaller-Bridgman R.S.HunterREW.Jurgensen 0

Resonsetouestion212.40Therearenocheckvalveswhichprotectlowpressurepipingfromfullreactorpressure.

Thisoverpressure protection isprovMedbysafetyreliefvalvesonthelowpressurepipingsystemsasdescribed below.Thisresponseaddresses thestaffconcernsystembysystem.Thedesignpressureoftheboroninjection systemishigherthanthedesignpressureoftheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS).Therefore thecheckvalvesintheboroninjection systemdonotperformthefunctionofprotecting alowpressuresystemfromfullreactorpressure.

Thefunctionofprotecting theEmergency CoreCoolingSystems(ECCS)fromfullyreactorpressureisperformed bysafetyreliefvalves.TheECCSlinestotheRCShotlegsareisolatedbynormallyclosedvalves.TheResidualHeatRemovalnormalcooldownlineisisolatedbynormallyclosedvalves.ThecheckvalvesintheotherECCSlinesperformanisolation functiononlytotheextentthatanyleakageshouldnotexceedthecapacityoftheassociated safetyvalves.Ineachcase,thereareeithertwoorthreecheckvalvesinseriesbetweentheRCSandtheECCScomponents withalowerpressurerating.TheseseriescheckvalvesarelistedinTable212.40-1alongwiththeassociated safetyvalveswhichprotectthelowerpressuresystems.Foreachcheckvalve,the.ratedcapacityandpressurosettingoftheassociated safetyvalve(s)areadequatetoprotectthelowpressurepipingsystem.Theallowable leakagerateforeachlistedcheckvalvewasdetermined, verycon-servatively, basedonthelowestreliefcapacityoftheassociated safetyvalve(s)andundertheassumptions thatalltheothercheckvalvesinseriesarefullyopenandthatalltheothercheckvalvesinparallelleakatthemaximumallowable rate.Theperformance ofthecheckvalvesinisolating theECCSfromfullreactorpressureistestedatleastonceper72hoursduringoperational modes1,2,3and4byTechnical Specification surveillance requirement 4.4.6.2d.

todemonstrate thatunidentified leakagefromtheRCSislimitedto1gpm.Becausethislimitiswellbelowtheallowable leakageratethroughanycheckvalve,theadequacyofthesecheckvalvestoperformthei'risolation functioniscontinuously verifiedbysatisfaction ofthissurvei'llance requirement.

Becauseofthisrequirement, anygradualde-teri'oration ofthecheckvalveseatswillberecognized andremedied.

Thesevalvesarelocatedinsystemsthatarenormallymaintained fullofliquid,witheitherhighpressureonthedownstream sideofthediscornodifferential pressureacrossthedisc.Inthisapplication, whereth'echeckvalveisnormallyclosed,anysudden,severedamagetotheseatingsurfaceisveryunlikely.

212.40-2 Thetestfrequency forexercising thevalvesidentified'n Table212.40-1isinaccordance withASI1ESectionXIparagraph IW-3520ofthe1974editionwithaddendathroughthesummerof1975.Thesevalvesarenormallyclosedduringplantoperation andcannotbeexercised withoutinitiating conditions similartoasafetyinjection.

Thesevalveswillbeexercised duringcoldshutdowns asstatedinourInservice Inspection Programsubmittals datedSeptember 29,1977andSeptember 22,1978(thelatterresubmitted September ll,1979.)ThedesignpressureoftheChemicalandVolumeControlSystem(CVCS)onthedischarge sideofthechargingpumpsishigherthanthedesignpressureoftheRCS.Therefore thedischarge sideoftheCVCSdoesnotrequirepro-tectionfromfullreactorpressure.

Thesuctionsideofthechargingpumpsisprotected bythesuctionheadersafetyreliefvalve.TheCVCSreciprocating chargingpumpdischarge checkvalveisnotrequiredtoperformapressureisolation functionbecausetheconstruction ofamulti-piston, positivedis-.placement pumpprecludes pressurepropagation inthereversedirection.

Thecentrifugal chargingpumpdischarge valvesperformanisolation functiononlytotheextentthatanyleakageshouldnotexceedthecapacityofthesuctionheadersafetyreliefvalve.ThesecheckvalvesarelistedinTable212.40-2alongwiththeassociated safetyvalvewhichprotectsthelowpressureportionofthesystem.Thepressuresetpoints andreliefflowcapacityratingsforthesafetyvalvesareadequatetoprotectthelowpressurepipingsystem.Theallowable leakageratewasdetermined assumingthatallfourcheckvalvesleakatthemaximumallowable rateandthatthereisnorecirculation.

However,duringallmodesofplantoperation withtheReactorCoolantSystemabove220psi,normalpractice.

istohaveonechargingpumprunning.Therefore, anyleakagethroughthedischarge checkvalveofanon-operating centrifugal chargingpumpisrecirculated bytheoperating pumpanddoesnotcauseasignificant in-creaseinthesuctionsidepressure.

Thetestingfor"exercising" willbeperformed forthecheckvalvesinTable212.40-2inthesamemannerandatthesamefrequency asdescribed aboveforthoseinTable212.40-1.

212,40-3 I

CheckValveTABLE212.40-1ECCSSERIESCHECKYALVESNomenclature Alloivable CheckValveProtecting LeakageRate:SafetValves*GPMSI151ESI151WSI152NSI152SSI161L1SI161L2SI161L3SI161L4SI166-1SI166-2SI166-3SI166-4SI170L1SI170L2SI170L3SI170L4ECCSLowHeadSafetyInjection ECCSLowHeadSafetyInjection ECCSSafetyInjection ECCSSafetyInjection SIHotToColdLegCrosstieSIHotToColdLegCrosstieSIHotToColdLegCrosstieSIHotToColdLegCrosstieAccumulator Discharge Accumulator Discharge Accumulator Discharge Accumulator Discharge ECCSColdLegLoopECCSColdLegLoopECCSColdLegLoopECCSColdLegLoopSV-104ESV-104WSV-98ASV-98BSV-98A5SV-104ESV-98B5SY-104WSY-98B5SV-104WSV-98A8SV-104ESV-100-1SY-100-2SV-100-3SV-100-4SV-98A,SV-100-18(SV-104ESV-98B,SV-100-2&SV-104MSY-98B,SV-100-35SV-104WSV-98A,SY-100-48SV-104E4004002020101010104747474710101010".TheSafetyValvedesignations arethesameasthoseusedintheUnit2ISIProgram.

e TABLE212.40-2CVCSCENTRIFUGAL CHARGINGPUMPSDISCHARGE CHECKVALVESCheckValveNomenclature Protecting SafetValvesAllowable CheckValveLeakageRateGPMCS299ECS299MCS297ECS297iIDischarge Discharge Recirculation Recirculation SV-56SV-56SV-56SV-56

.Mr.HaroldR.Denton,DirectorAEP:NRC:00259 STATEOFNEWYORK))ss.COUNTYOFNEWYORK)~ohnEDolan,beingdulysworn,deposesandsaysthatheistheVicePresident oflicensees Indiana8MichiganElectricCompanyandIndiana5MichiganPowerCompany;thathehasreadtheforegoing requestandjustificati'on fordeletionofCondition (3)(c)onLicenseNo.DPR-74andknowsthecontentsthereof;andthatsaidcontentsaretruetothebestofhisknowledge andbelief.Subscribed andsworntobeforemethis29thdayofOctober,1979.NotaryPublicNOTA.,Y'yUobLcC, 5~co~IeotliowYockNo.4c-~~i"Gi92Queiifieo in4ueensCourcyCociiiicsiu fi!ediniiswYcckCounty'vccuno5con enoicoicnecoh30,198i

~y,flREMIWpo:I<0+nqo+a*<<+UNITEDSTATESNUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C.20555OCT171979IIEMN08It 8fgKgI[~opyAllPowerReactorLicensees AllApplicants WithApplications foraLicenseGentlemen:

ThispastMarch,theNRCtransmitted toyouacopyofVolume3ofNUREG-0460, "Anticipated Transients WithoutScramforLightWaterReactors" (ATWS)andacopyofanNRCletterthatwassentthispastFebruarytoeachofthefournuclearreactorvendors.Theletterstothevendorscontained requestsforinformation neededtoperformgenericanalysesrelatedtoATWS.AswepointedoutinourMarchletters,thegenericanalyseswerequested wereintendedtoconfirmthatthemodifications proposedbytheNRCstafffor.variousclassesofLWRdesignswouldinfactaccomplish thedegreeofATWSprevention andmitigation described bythestaffinitsreport.Wealsopointedoutthatwehadchosentowork'directly withthevendorsinobtaining thisinformation inanefforttoconservebothNRCandindustryresources.

Werequested thatutilities cooperate withthevendorsinper-formingtherequested analyses.

IIShortlyaftersendingtheletterstothevendors,theNRCStaffmetwithrepresentatives ofeachoftheNSSSvendorsandmanyUtilityrepresenta-tivesinBethesdaonMarch1,1979.Themeetingwascalledtodiscussthe"earlyverification" approachinwhichweplannedtousegenericanalysesasthebasisforrulemaking.

Wehopedtherebytoavoidcostlya~dunneces-saryrepetitive analysisforindividual plants.Atthemeeting,a,tenta-tiveschedulewasagreedtoforgenericanalysesforeachclasspfplantstobeprovidedinthreeseparatepackagestobesubmitted Mayl,ISeptember 1,andDecember1,1979.

I ogyv1979ich1meeting,theNRCstaffmetseparately with<<yoogofhNSSSvendorsandagreement uppliedintheMay1package.Also,asnoteaATWSstqffreportandthegenericanalysesquestions wUtilities.

onA1andsecifictechnical concernsraisedbythetotheATWSresolution pro-ThreeMileIslandaccidentwithregardtoeposedinVolume3ofNUREG-0460.

rovideinwriting,within30daysofthemeetingentoftheThreeMileIslandimpactonATWS,toresolveTMIissues,andarealistic ATWSdtheTMI-related analyses.

rovidingtheneededATWinormboththeMarchrequestanedBecauseoftheheavyMlI1dltdtt*Islandaccidentoccurre.enedtotheATWSissueforthreemonthsoeuiredforThreeiesr1btti1dtioneffortonddodtiofoBWRthepartofthePWRindustryduringthatperio,anofNuclearReactorRegulation wastemporarily ddthreorganized.

Withinthisinterimorganization agrinat-direction ofS.HanauertoworkontenreConressthispastJanuaryinNUREG-0-510.edbytheCommission andreportedtoCongressATWSisoneofthese19issues.suestedthat,forPWRs,theThreeMileIslandAreliminary NRRStaffreviewsuggestea,,landpreaccidentraisednewquestions wgt.thetechnical impactofThreeMiles'hecornletionandreviewoe1roceedasexpeditiously aspossible.

forBWRsasspecified inMarchshouldproceeasedaonJuly25,1979todiscuss,withrepresenta-considerations arisingfromtheThreevsoiieeigrtthdElo1Aacopyofthestaffminutetesofthatmeetingisatinthestaff:canbeseenrofromtheminutes,atthemeetingisstillbelievedbythestafftobeaseriouserotection shouldbeprovided.

Wesaey0"pstatedthatweareunwilling towaitanoteryearTWS.

QCT171979gsubsequent totheJuly25meeting,wehavemetwithrepresentatives ofthefourgNSSSvendorsandofsomeUtility/Owners.

WehavemetwithGEtodiscussthescopeqftheremaining genericanalysisinformation tobesuppliedforBWR4/5/6's.Wehavealsometwithrepresentatives oftheGEBWR/3Owners,B8W,BEWATWSOwnersGroup,W,WATWSOwnersGroup,andCE.Atallthesemeetings, weconsidered furthertherequiredinformation andthescheduleforitssub-.mittal.Wehavenowreceivedletters(seethelistinEnclosure 2,attached) fromthevariousgroupsdescribing theinformation tobefurnished andprojected schedules.

Onthebasisofourreviewoftheselettersandmeetingswiththeindustryrepresentatives, weperceivethattheprojected responses inseveralcaseswouldnotaddressseveralquestions inour~February 15letter.Inparticular, severalitemsarelackingthatwewillneedtojustifyacceptance ofthehardwareapproaches ofNUREG0460Vol3ratherthanusingthedesignbasisaccidentapproach.

Iamdetermined tosubmitaproposedATWSruletotheCommission forbothPWRsandBWRsearlyin1980.Thetypeandcontentoftherulewewillproposewilldependcritically uponthetypesandcontentoftheinformation available tothestaff.Thiswill,ofcourse,includewhateverresponses areactuallypro-videdbytheindustryinresponsetothequestions attachedtotheFebruary15staff'letter,theMarchmeetings, andtheThreeMileIslandrelatedconcernsasdiscussed intheJuly25andsubsequent meetings.

Istillbelievethatitispossiblefortheearlyverification genericanalysisprogramtoprovideanacceptable resolution of'heATWSissueandthatthisisthewaytoachieveresolution withtheleastpossibleexpenditure ofNRCandindustryresources.

However,Iwanttoreiterate thatthesuccessofthisapproachdependsonwhetherornotalloftheinformation necessary forthestafftoconfirmthatitsproposedATWSmodifications provideanacceptable levelofprotection, forallplants,isprovidedbytheindustry.

Istronglyencourage youtojoinorformUtility/Owners Groups,ifyouhavenotalreadydoneso,andprovidetheresources necessary tosupplytheneededtech-nicalinformation pertaining toyourplants,eitheroperating orunderconstruc-tion.Itwouldfurtherreducetheimpactontheindustryaswellasthestaffresources iftheATWSeffortcoordination andthereviewroleisperformed byoneindustrygroup,Ifyouhayeadditional questions onthegenericanalysisearlyverification programdiscussed inthisletter,pleasecontactMr.AshokThadani,(301-492-7341).

Sinly,

Enclosures:

1.NRC-Industry ATWSMeetingSummarydtd7/25/792.ListoflettersfromIndustryonContentofReportSubmittals s~~~H.R,'Denton,DirectorOfficeofNuclearReactorRegulation

'4,ENCLOSURE 1gRECg~tp0y~~*4TaskActionPlanA-9UNITEDSTATESNUCLEARREGULATORY COMhlISSION WASHINGTON, D.C.20555JUL2P1379MENORANOUtl FOR:S.H.HanauerFROM:

SUBJECT:

A.ThadaniNRC-INDUSTRY ATWStlEETING'UIlMARY Thtaffmet-withthePWRvendors,theAtomicIndustrial Forum(AIF)andesame-w'everal utilityrepresentatives todiscusstheimpactofTMI-2eventsontheATWSresolution plandescribed inVolume3ofNUREG-0460.

Thestaff'ade thefollowing initialremarks:1)ATWSisstillasafetyconcernandprotecionfromtheseeventsmustbeddAlthhplantsneednotbeshutdownimmediately becauseofrelatively lowlikelihood ofasevereATWSinaPWRinthenexpofyears,ATMSresolution withsuitablespeedisnecessary topermitanimplementation planwhichwouldassureanacceptably lowriskfromATWSoverthelifeofnuclearplants.2)Thestaffwouldliketorecei,veindustryviewsontheimpactofTflI-2onATWSandhowtoproceedfromnowontoresolveATWS.ThestaffnotedthattheyintendtoproposeanATMSsolutiontotheCommission preferably withbutifnecessary withouttheindustryinput.3)InviewofTMI-2accident, thestaffexpressed thefollowing generalcon-cernswiththeVol.3proposedresolution andaskedforindustrycomments.

a)Whatassurance dowehavethattheexcessive calculated pressures forsomedesignsmodifiedperAlternative 83wouldnotresultinlossofintegrity ofreactorcoolantpressureboundary.

(Note-Somedesignsmayexperience peakpressures

-4000psi).b)Wouldincreasing thenumberofsafetyvalvesasperAlternative 84resultininsufficient overallriskreductionf Wouldtheprimarysystemintegrity bemaintained?

Woulditbebettertohavelargercapacityvalves' S.H.Hanauerc)nvew0que)Iifstionsaandbabove,thepressurizer reliefandsafetyvalvesmustbequalified forwaterrelieftoassurethatthenozzles,'hevalvebodyandthesupports.ructureintegrity willbemaintained andtoestimatedischarge flowrateandthelikelihood andeffectsofvalvechatter.d)Iiwofsignificant plantdifferences inthedesignsofauxiliary feedwater system,Emergency CoreCoolingSystemsandotherynvesstemshowwouldtheindustryprovideassurances thatplantspecificftureshavebeenadequately addressed inthe"EarlyVerification" approachforresolving ATMSasdescribed inNUREG-0460,

~eaVol.3.e)OtherLessonsLearnedfromTNI-2.Following prelim>nary commentsfromtheNRCstaffmembers,G.SorensenofWPPSwhois.alsotheChairmanoftheAIFATMScommittee, madethefollowing comments.

1)ATMSisnotasafetyissuebutratheritisalicensing issuewhichneedsresolution.

2)AIFinconcertwiththeindustryhadreviewedATMSinlightofTMI-2andhadconcluded thattheAlternative 84fix{mitigation) inVol.3ofNUREG-0460 isnotthecorrectsolutiontoATMS.Theindustrybelievesthatthealternative 82fix{Prevention

-Electrical PortionofRPS)istheappropriate ATMSsolution.

3)Industryrecognizes theTHI-2impactontheroleoftheoperator, histrainingaidsandotherlessonslearnedfromthisevent.TheindustrybelievesthatthereisnoneedtorushtoresolveATWSbecauseofthelowprobability ofATMSandbecausesomeoftheanticipated changestoplantsasaresultofTMI-2accidentreviewwoulddirectresources tootherissues.Following theAIFpresentation, thestaffraisedtheirconcernsthattheATWSresolution

{notyetachieved) gasbeenanythingbuthasty,thattheNUREGdocu-tATHShavebeenoutforsufficiently longtimeperiod,thatprotection fromATWSisnecessary, thatTHI-2eventhasraised"oncernswiththeanayH"1sesassumptions andtherefore thehtaffneedsindustrytechnical assessment oftheTMI-2impactonATWS.Thestaffsuggested thattheTHI-2eventindicates aneedtoansweratleastthefollowing specificquestions.

I,I S.H.Hanauer-3-1)Analysesindicatethesensitivity ofpeakpressuretoAFWSdesignandactuation timeforsomeplants.Mhyshouldauxiliary feedwater actuation notbedelayedbeyondtechnical spehification values?Whatbasesareavailable toassumeAFWSactua-tionearlierthanthetechnical specification value?Howdotheanalysestakeintoconsideration thelimitsonAFWSinjection rateduetowater~hammerconsiderations?

Howistheimpactofflowrestrictors onsomeAFMSdesignsconsidered intheATWSanalyses?

Howarethesignificant plantspecificfeaturesofAFWStreatedintheanalyses?

2)Asinquestion1abovehowarethedifferences inECCSdesignsevaluated?

Forexample,forsomeATMSevents,thepressureandthepressurizer levelremainhiqhenoughsuchthateithertheHPSIcannotbeactuated(becauseofshutoffheadconsiderations) ortheoperatormayfailtoactuateHPSIbecauseofinsufficient available information.

3)WouldsinglefailurecauseallPORVstofailtoopen?Ifso,thenanalysesmustbebasedonallPORVsfailingtoopen.Further,severalplantsareoperating todaywithPORVsisolated.

Fortheseplantscreditcannotbetakenforrelieving capability ofthesevalves.4)Whatassurance dowehavethattheATWSeventswithastuckopensafety.valvehavebeencorrectly analyzed?

Whatisthepotential forcoreun-coveringunderthisscenario?

Whatistheimportance ofECCSactuation, reactorcoolantpumpsoperation, andthepressurizer safety/relief valvedischarge modelonthepotential foruncovering ofthecore?Further,whyshouldmorevalvesnotbeassumedtostickopenfollowing discharge ofsubcooled water.5)Forlongtermshutdown, discussthefollowing:

a)available equipment, instrumentation andtheirqualification.

(Mustconsidertheeffectofwaterdischarged tothecontainment viarupturedquenchtank).b)impactoflossofoffsitepowerc)continued operation

'ofreactorcoolantpumps.Alsoconsidertrippingofreactorcoolantpumps.d)Describenaturalcirculation, including effectsofnon-condensables.

Isrefluxboilingmodeofoperation anticipated?

Ifso,justify.

S.H.Hanauer4-e)Wouldoneanticipate Boronprecipitatton problem?AlsoconsiderTMI-2typeproblemswithpossibleletdownlinepluggingfromBoronprecipitation.

f)Howareleakageproblemsfromequipment outsidecontainment considered?

6)Whyshouldcreditbegivenforoperatoractionevenaftertenminutesfallowing anATWSeventinjtiation7 TMI-2experience doesnotprovideenoughconfidence intheabilityoftheoperatortoperformcorrectactionsonlyinthisshorttimeperiodunderhighstressconditions.

Inresponse.to thestaffconcernstheindustrymadethefollowing comnents.

AIF1)Theindustryisfrustrated becausethestaffconcernsimplyconsideration ofmultiplefailuresandsmallLOCAwhicharebeyondthecredibleeventstobeconsidered underATWS.(Note-safetyvalvestuckopen(smallLOCA)isconsidered ananticipated transient).

2)Industrywouldliketowaitforapproximately sixmonthsbeforeconsider-ingATWSevaluations tominimizeduplicate expenditures.

l)Whassubmitted responses tothe2/15/79Mattsonletter.2)Calculated peakpressureof2800>2900psi(forAlt,83)andproposedmodifications inturbinetripandauxiliary feedwater systemactuation circuitry.3)EPRIexpectstoissuearequestforproposaltoconducttestsonPORVsandsafetyvalvesandsomeresultsshouldbeavailable byendofCY79.4)Recommended that"EarlyVerification" approachshouldbecontinued.

CE-EdShearerspeakinforhimself1)TMIraisesfewquestions likethebehaviorofS/Rvalvesandtheoperatoraction.Further,prevention isbetterthanmitigation andthatmitigation wouldmeanmoreandmoreanalyses.

2)Continuewithearlyverification.

aS.H.HanauerBlkW1)Basically agreeswiththestaffconcerns.

IndustryhaslongerlistofitemsthatcouldimpactATWS.2)Stressanalysesshouldbecompleted.

3)Likelihood ofadditional failuresbeyondATWSshouldbeconsidered.

4)Prevention isbetterthanmitigation.

~BLfl061)ATWSisnotasafetypr.oblem.

2)EvenifATWSoccurs,nosignificant risktopublichealthandsafety.3)TMI-2suggestsadesirability forrealistic analyses.

TMI-2suggestsaneedtoassurethatanalysesboundthefacilities.

4)-Waituntil"LessonsLearned"and"Bulletins andOrders"issuesareresolvedbeforepushingaheadwithATWS.Aftertheaboveindustrycomments, thestaffmadethefollowing concluding remarks.1)Wedon'tintendtogotoofastonATWS.2)IfEarlyVerification istobepursuedthenthereisaneedtoassurethat-earlierATWSanalysesarecorrectandreviewtheindustryTMI-2relatedlist.Inthisregardtheindustrywasinvitedtomeetwiththestafftodiscussthetechnical issueswhichimpactATWS.Thestaffaskedtheindus-trytoprovidetheirassessment ofTMI-2impactonATWS,thescopeofIefforttoresolvetheseissues,andthescheduleforperforming thiseffortwithin30days.I3)WecannotwaitanotheryeartomakeprogressinATWS.A.Thadani

Enclosure:

Asstatedcc:Seenextpage S.Hanauercc:Meet)ngAttendees ATWSDistrfbut)on PDRRSBFilesT.Spels ENCLOSURE ATWSMeetinwithVendors&AIFJuly25,1979AshokThadaniArthurMcBride.AlanHosierSamirK.SarkarAlanE.LadieuFredT.StetsonRichardG.RateickAndrewJ.RushnokM.Srinivasan F.Akstulewicz G.SorensenT.SpeisF.C.ChernyJ.A.NorbergStuartThickmanKarl0.LayerJ.TedEnosTedMyersRobertDieterick MichaelJ.SalernoS.HardyDuersonBobSteitherGaryAugustine P.M.AbrahamMarkWisenburg MichaelTokarPaulBoehnertDavidBessetteStevenTraismanSamMirandaPatLoftusFredMosbyRogerNewtonCraigGrochmalCharlesA.DaveridRobertL.StrightJosephM.WeissJosephA.GonyeauNRC/DSSB&WWPPSSFP&LYAECA!FDECOOECNRC/DSSNRC/DSEWPPSS/AIFNRC/DSSNRC/DSSNRC/OSDTVA-ENDESBBRAP&LTECoSMUDCPCoB&WWDukePowerUSTVA-OfficeofPowerNRC/DSSNRC/ACRSNRC/ACRSPacificGas&ElectricWWWyleLaboratory Wisconsin ElectricPowerStone&WebsterLongIslandLightingCo.SNUPPSGENorthernStatesPower SethM.CoplanClaytonL.Pittiglio

~KulinD.DesaiFuatOdarKrisParczewskiRoyHoodsHaroldVanderMolenGururajarao RangaraoFrankMcPhatter SteveBanwarthWilliamR.MurrayBenRodellDonSwansonPaulY,HoltonTommyErrington RonClausonCharlesB.BrinkmanC.L.KlingWilliamBenjaminDennyKrepsVilliamE.BurchillA.E.SchererRichardC.L.QlsonNRC/OSENRC/OSENRC/OSSNRC/OSSNRC/DORNRC/DOR~NRC/DORPASNYB&HBGHVirginiaElectric5PowerCo.VEPCOPGECo.BechtelMississippi PowerELightFloridaPowerCorporation CECECommonwealth EdisonCo.CECECEBaltimore GasItElectricCo.

~ENCLOSURE 2I'etterfromR.H.Bucholz(GE)toS.Hanauer,"ATWSGenericAnalyses-ContentofDecember1979Submittal",

datedSeptember 5,1979.LetterfromD.H.Taylor(BLM)toS.Hanauer,"B8WCommitments forATWS",datedSeptember 13,1979.LetterA.E.Scherer(CE)toS.Hanauer,"NRCRequestforGeneric,ATWSInformation",

datedAugust31,1979.LetterL.0.DelGeorge (BMR3Ownersrepresentative) toS.Hanauer,"ATWSBMR/3PlantsandVermontYankee-GenericAnalysisSupplement",

datedAugust28,1979.LetterT.N.Anderson(W)toS.Hanauer,"ATWS",datedAugust24,1979.

altinoreGas6ElectricCompany50-31750-318CC:JansA.Biddison, Jr.GneralCounselGandEBuildingCharlesCenterBaltimore,tlaryland21203.GeorgeF.Trowbridge, EsquireShaw,.Pittman,PottsandTrowbridge 1800NStreet,tt,tt.Washington, D.C.20036.ttr.R.C.L.OlsonBaltimore Gasand'Electric CompanyRoom922-GandEBuildingPostOfficeBox1475Baltimore,Maryland21203fir.LeonB.Russell,ChiefEnqineerCalvertCliffsI!uclearPowerPlantaltinore GasandElectricCompanyLusoy,ttaryland 20657"BechtelPowerCorporation ATTH:tlr..J.C.JuddChiefNuclearEngineer15740ShadyGroveRoadGaithersburg, ttaryland 20760Combustion Engineering, Inc.ATTN:Nr.P.W.Kruse,HanagerEngineering ServicesPostOfficeBox500t"indsor, Connecticut06095CalvertCountyLibraryPrinceFrederick, Maryland20678ttr.R.M.Douglass, HanaoergualityAssurance Depart>rent Room923Gas5ElectricBuildingP.0.Box1475Baltirrare,Maryland.21203

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