ML17326A329

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Requests Deletion of License Condition (3)(c),per Encl Revised Response to Question 212.40 in App Q of Fsar. Revision Due to Util Misinterpretation of Requirements Re Check Valve Leak Testing.W/Fee & Affidavit
ML17326A329
Person / Time
Site: Cook American Electric Power icon.png
Issue date: 10/29/1979
From: DOLAN J E
INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO.
To: DENTON H R
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
AEP:NRC:00259, AEP:NRC:259, NUDOCS 7911090472
Download: ML17326A329 (27)


Text

REGULA'TORYINFORMATIONDISTRIBUTIONSYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSIONNBR07911090472.DOC~DATE~79/10/21NOTARIZED~YESDOCKETFACIAL:50316'DonaldC~,CookNuclearPowerPlentyUnit2iIndianaL05000316AOTHBNAME",,AUTHORAFFILIATIONDalAAJ;E.Indiana8Rich,iganPowerCos-'ECIPiNAME>>RECIPIENTTAFFlLIATION'EATONgH.R',OfficeofNuclearReactorRegulation

SUBJECT:

Requestsdeletionof-LicenseCondition(3)(c)iperenclrevisedresponseto.Question212,40inAppQofFSAR,Rev'is.iondueto'util'misinterpietationof-requirementsrecheckvalveleaktesting,H/fee8affidavitsDISTRIBUTIONCODE:A001SCOPIESRECEIVED:LTRJ'NCL:JSIZE:TITLEi.Geneial'istribut>onfor;after-IssuanceofOjerat>ngTL'icNOTES:Lq(QfkZI<~K~~~~~~MDCL&+AL4~ML'd~RECIPIENTCOPIESRECIPIENTCOPIESID'ODE/VAMEt;TTR'NCLIDCaDEiNAMELTTRENCLACTION:.05BCQgg"77INTERNAL!-KGFIL$5COREAPERFTBR1SREACSFTVBR20.EEB22SAINKMANOELDEXTERNALS03LPDR23ACRS1122i11,11i1011161602NRCPDR14TA/EDOi7ENGRBR19PLANTSYSBR21EFLTTRTSYSEPB~DOR04NSICADV13879VXVlTOTAl.NUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED!LTTR~KNCL IIIIIIt"II'IIg~II1ItH5Ir'55I5'IleJI INDIANAIIMICHIGANPOWERCOMPANYPi6.BOX18BOWLINGGREENSTATIONNEwYoRK,N.Y.10054October29,1979REP;NgC;Q0259.DonaldC..CookNuclearPlantUnitNo.2DocketNo.50-316LicenseNo.DPR-74Mr.HaroldR.Denton,DirectorOfficeofNuclearReactorRegulationU.S,NuclearRegulatoryCommissionWashington,D.C.20555

DearMr.Denton:

'urtherreviewofQuestion212.40ascontainedinAppendixQtotheDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantFinalSafetyAnalysisReport'(FSAR)hasledustoconcludethatsomeofthetestingdescribedintheresponseisnotnecessarytosatisfythestatedstaffcon-cernsandthatthelistsofvalvesneedtoberevised.TheresponsetoQuestion212.40waspreviouslyrevisedinourlettertoMr.EdsonG.CasedatedFebruary17,1978.TheintentofQuestion212.40isthatweleaktestthecheckvalveswhichperformanisolationfunction,ofprotectinglowpressuresafetysystemsfromfullreactorpressure.ThestaffrequiredthateachcheckvalvewhichperformsthisisolationfunctionbeidentifiedandclassifiedASMEIWV-2000categoryACwiththeleaktestingbeingperformedtocodespecifications.Licensecondition(3)(c)wasincludedinourUnitNo.2operatinglicenseinaccordancewiththe'ommitmentsmadeinourresponsetoQuestion212.40.Ourreviewhasindicatedthatinthecaseswherelowpressuresystemsare'isolatedfromfullreactorpressurebycheckvalves,theover-pressureprotectionofthelowpressuresystempipingisprovidedbyASMEcodesafetyreliefvalves.Assuch,thecheckvalveperformsanisolationfunctionbutdoesnotprotectlowpressuresystemsfromfullreactorpressure.OurmisinterpretationofthestaffpositioncontainedinQuestion212.40resultedinthecommitmentsmadeintheresponsewhichbecamelicensecondition(3)(c).Theresultsofourreviewarecon-tainedinarevisedresponsetoQuestion212.40whichisattachedforyourreview.Werequesttha'toperatinglicensecondition'(3)(c)bede-letedinaccordancewiththeattachedrevisiontoQuestion212.40.QaV91109D tr-'Il\NkIIi'r Nr.HaroldR.Denton,Di'rectorAEP;NRC:00259Thisrevisiontothequestion212.40responsedoesnotinyolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionorTechnicalSpecificationchange,norwillitendangerthehealthorsafetyofthepublic.WeintendtoformallyincorporatethisrevisedresponseintotheFSARaspartofafutureAmendment.,OurreviewindicatesthatthisrevisionconstitutesafeeClassIIIAmendmenttothefacilitylicense.Inaccordancewith10CFR170.22,wethereforeencloseacheckfor$4,000,00.Verytrulyyours,JohnE.DolanVicePresidentcc:.R.C.CallenG.CharnoffD.V.Shaller-BridgmanR.S.HunterREW.Jurgensen 0

Resonsetouestion212.40Therearenocheckvalveswhichprotectlowpressurepipingfromfullreactorpressure.ThisoverpressureprotectionisprovMedbysafetyreliefvalvesonthelowpressurepipingsystemsasdescribedbelow.Thisresponseaddressesthestaffconcernsystembysystem.ThedesignpressureoftheboroninjectionsystemishigherthanthedesignpressureoftheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS).Thereforethecheckvalvesintheboroninjectionsystemdonotperformthefunctionofprotectingalowpressuresystemfromfullreactorpressure.ThefunctionofprotectingtheEmergencyCoreCoolingSystems(ECCS)fromfullyreactorpressureisperformedbysafetyreliefvalves.TheECCSlinestotheRCShotlegsareisolatedbynormallyclosedvalves.TheResidualHeatRemovalnormalcooldownlineisisolatedbynormallyclosedvalves.ThecheckvalvesintheotherECCSlinesperformanisolationfunctiononlytotheextentthatanyleakageshouldnotexceedthecapacityoftheassociatedsafetyvalves.Ineachcase,thereareeithertwoorthreecheckvalvesinseriesbetweentheRCSandtheECCScomponentswithalowerpressurerating.TheseseriescheckvalvesarelistedinTable212.40-1alongwiththeassociatedsafetyvalveswhichprotectthelowerpressuresystems.Foreachcheckvalve,the.ratedcapacityandpressurosettingoftheassociatedsafetyvalve(s)areadequatetoprotectthelowpressurepipingsystem.Theallowableleakagerateforeachlistedcheckvalvewasdetermined,verycon-servatively,basedonthelowestreliefcapacityoftheassociatedsafetyvalve(s)andundertheassumptionsthatalltheothercheckvalvesinseriesarefullyopenandthatalltheothercheckvalvesinparallelleakatthemaximumallowablerate.TheperformanceofthecheckvalvesinisolatingtheECCSfromfullreactorpressureistestedatleastonceper72hoursduringoperationalmodes1,2,3and4byTechnicalSpecificationsurveillancerequirement4.4.6.2d.todemonstratethatunidentifiedleakagefromtheRCSislimitedto1gpm.Becausethislimitiswellbelowtheallowableleakageratethroughanycheckvalve,theadequacyofthesecheckvalvestoperformthei'risolationfunctioniscontinuouslyverifiedbysatisfactionofthissurvei'llancerequirement.Becauseofthisrequirement,anygradualde-teri'orationofthecheckvalveseatswillberecognizedandremedied.Thesevalvesarelocatedinsystemsthatarenormallymaintainedfullofliquid,witheitherhighpressureonthedownstreamsideofthediscornodifferentialpressureacrossthedisc.Inthisapplication,whereth'echeckvalveisnormallyclosed,anysudden,severedamagetotheseatingsurfaceisveryunlikely.212.40-2 Thetestfrequencyforexercisingthevalvesidentified'nTable212.40-1isinaccordancewithASI1ESectionXIparagraphIW-3520ofthe1974editionwithaddendathroughthesummerof1975.Thesevalvesarenormallyclosedduringplantoperationandcannotbeexercisedwithoutinitiatingconditionssimilartoasafetyinjection.ThesevalveswillbeexercisedduringcoldshutdownsasstatedinourInserviceInspectionProgramsubmittalsdatedSeptember29,1977andSeptember22,1978(thelatterresubmittedSeptemberll,1979.)ThedesignpressureoftheChemicalandVolumeControlSystem(CVCS)onthedischargesideofthechargingpumpsishigherthanthedesignpressureoftheRCS.ThereforethedischargesideoftheCVCSdoesnotrequirepro-tectionfromfullreactorpressure.Thesuctionsideofthechargingpumpsisprotectedbythesuctionheadersafetyreliefvalve.TheCVCSreciprocatingchargingpumpdischargecheckvalveisnotrequiredtoperformapressureisolationfunctionbecausetheconstructionofamulti-piston,positivedis-.placementpumpprecludespressurepropagationinthereversedirection.Thecentrifugalchargingpumpdischargevalvesperformanisolationfunctiononlytotheextentthatanyleakageshouldnotexceedthecapacityofthesuctionheadersafetyreliefvalve.ThesecheckvalvesarelistedinTable212.40-2alongwiththeassociatedsafetyvalvewhichprotectsthelowpressureportionofthesystem.Thepressuresetpointsandreliefflowcapacityratingsforthesafetyvalvesareadequatetoprotectthelowpressurepipingsystem.Theallowableleakageratewasdeterminedassumingthatallfourcheckvalvesleakatthemaximumallowablerateandthatthereisnorecirculation.However,duringallmodesofplantoperationwiththeReactorCoolantSystemabove220psi,normalpractice.istohaveonechargingpumprunning.Therefore,anyleakagethroughthedischargecheckvalveofanon-operatingcentrifugalchargingpumpisrecirculatedbytheoperatingpumpanddoesnotcauseasignificantin-creaseinthesuctionsidepressure.Thetestingfor"exercising"willbeperformedforthecheckvalvesinTable212.40-2inthesamemannerandatthesamefrequencyasdescribedaboveforthoseinTable212.40-1.212,40-3 I

CheckValveTABLE212.40-1ECCSSERIESCHECKYALVESNomenclatureAlloivableCheckValveProtectingLeakageRate:SafetValves*GPMSI151ESI151WSI152NSI152SSI161L1SI161L2SI161L3SI161L4SI166-1SI166-2SI166-3SI166-4SI170L1SI170L2SI170L3SI170L4ECCSLowHeadSafetyInjectionECCSLowHeadSafetyInjectionECCSSafetyInjectionECCSSafetyInjectionSIHotToColdLegCrosstieSIHotToColdLegCrosstieSIHotToColdLegCrosstieSIHotToColdLegCrosstieAccumulatorDischargeAccumulatorDischargeAccumulatorDischargeAccumulatorDischargeECCSColdLegLoopECCSColdLegLoopECCSColdLegLoopECCSColdLegLoopSV-104ESV-104WSV-98ASV-98BSV-98A5SV-104ESV-98B5SY-104WSY-98B5SV-104WSV-98A8SV-104ESV-100-1SY-100-2SV-100-3SV-100-4SV-98A,SV-100-18(SV-104ESV-98B,SV-100-2&SV-104MSY-98B,SV-100-35SV-104WSV-98A,SY-100-48SV-104E4004002020101010104747474710101010".TheSafetyValvedesignationsarethesameasthoseusedintheUnit2ISIProgram.

e TABLE212.40-2CVCSCENTRIFUGALCHARGINGPUMPSDISCHARGECHECKVALVESCheckValveNomenclatureProtectingSafetValvesAllowableCheckValveLeakageRateGPMCS299ECS299MCS297ECS297iIDischargeDischargeRecirculationRecirculationSV-56SV-56SV-56SV-56

.Mr.HaroldR.Denton,DirectorAEP:NRC:00259STATEOFNEWYORK))ss.COUNTYOFNEWYORK)~ohnEDolan,beingdulysworn,deposesandsaysthatheistheVicePresidentoflicenseesIndiana8MichiganElectricCompanyandIndiana5MichiganPowerCompany;thathehasreadtheforegoingrequestandjustificati'onfordeletionofCondition(3)(c)onLicenseNo.DPR-74andknowsthecontentsthereof;andthatsaidcontentsaretruetothebestofhisknowledgeandbelief.Subscribedandsworntobeforemethis29thdayofOctober,1979.NotaryPublicNOTA.,Y'yUobLcC,5~co~IeotliowYockNo.4c-~~i"Gi92Queiifieoin4ueensCourcyCociiiicsiufi!ediniiswYcckCounty'vccuno5conenoicoicnecoh30,198i

~y,flREMIWpo:I<0+nqo+a*<<+UNITEDSTATESNUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONWASHINGTON,D.C.20555OCT171979IIEMN08It8fgKgI[~opyAllPowerReactorLicenseesAllApplicantsWithApplicationsforaLicenseGentlemen:ThispastMarch,theNRCtransmittedtoyouacopyofVolume3ofNUREG-0460,"AnticipatedTransientsWithoutScramforLightWaterReactors"(ATWS)andacopyofanNRCletterthatwassentthispastFebruarytoeachofthefournuclearreactorvendors.TheletterstothevendorscontainedrequestsforinformationneededtoperformgenericanalysesrelatedtoATWS.AswepointedoutinourMarchletters,thegenericanalyseswerequestedwereintendedtoconfirmthatthemodificationsproposedbytheNRCstafffor.variousclassesofLWRdesignswouldinfactaccomplishthedegreeofATWSpreventionandmitigationdescribedbythestaffinitsreport.Wealsopointedoutthatwehadchosentowork'directlywiththevendorsinobtainingthisinformationinanefforttoconservebothNRCandindustryresources.Werequestedthatutilitiescooperatewiththevendorsinper-formingtherequestedanalyses.IIShortlyaftersendingtheletterstothevendors,theNRCStaffmetwithrepresentativesofeachoftheNSSSvendorsandmanyUtilityrepresenta-tivesinBethesdaonMarch1,1979.Themeetingwascalledtodiscussthe"earlyverification"approachinwhichweplannedtousegenericanalysesasthebasisforrulemaking.Wehopedtherebytoavoidcostlya~dunneces-saryrepetitiveanalysisforindividualplants.Atthemeeting,a,tenta-tiveschedulewasagreedtoforgenericanalysesforeachclasspfplantstobeprovidedinthreeseparatepackagestobesubmittedMayl,ISeptember1,andDecember1,1979.

I ogyv1979ich1meeting,theNRCstaffmetseparatelywith<<yoogofhNSSSvendorsandagreementuppliedintheMay1package.Also,asnoteaATWSstqffreportandthegenericanalysesquestionswUtilities.onA1andsecifictechnicalconcernsraisedbythetotheATWSresolutionpro-ThreeMileIslandaccidentwithregardtoeposedinVolume3ofNUREG-0460.rovideinwriting,within30daysofthemeetingentoftheThreeMileIslandimpactonATWS,toresolveTMIissues,andarealisticATWSdtheTMI-relatedanalyses.rovidingtheneededATWinormboththeMarchrequestanedBecauseoftheheavyMlI1dltdtt*Islandaccidentoccurre.enedtotheATWSissueforthreemonthsoeuiredforThreeiesr1btti1dtioneffortonddodtiofoBWRthepartofthePWRindustryduringthatperio,anofNuclearReactorRegulationwastemporarilyddthreorganized.Withinthisinterimorganizationagrinat-directionofS.HanauertoworkontenreConressthispastJanuaryinNUREG-0-510.edbytheCommissionandreportedtoCongressATWSisoneofthese19issues.suestedthat,forPWRs,theThreeMileIslandAreliminaryNRRStaffreviewsuggestea,,landpreaccidentraisednewquestionswgt.thetechnicalimpactofThreeMiles'hecornletionandreviewoe1roceedasexpeditiouslyaspossible.forBWRsasspecifiedinMarchshouldproceeasedaonJuly25,1979todiscuss,withrepresenta-considerationsarisingfromtheThreevsoiieeigrtthdElo1Aacopyofthestaffminutetesofthatmeetingisatinthestaff:canbeseenrofromtheminutes,atthemeetingisstillbelievedbythestafftobeaseriouserotectionshouldbeprovided.Wesaey0"pstatedthatweareunwillingtowaitanoteryearTWS.

QCT171979gsubsequenttotheJuly25meeting,wehavemetwithrepresentativesofthefourgNSSSvendorsandofsomeUtility/Owners.WehavemetwithGEtodiscussthescopeqftheremaininggenericanalysisinformationtobesuppliedforBWR4/5/6's.WehavealsometwithrepresentativesoftheGEBWR/3Owners,B8W,BEWATWSOwnersGroup,W,WATWSOwnersGroup,andCE.Atallthesemeetings,weconsideredfurthertherequiredinformationandthescheduleforitssub-.mittal.Wehavenowreceivedletters(seethelistinEnclosure2,attached)fromthevariousgroupsdescribingtheinformationtobefurnishedandprojectedschedules.Onthebasisofourreviewoftheselettersandmeetingswiththeindustryrepresentatives,weperceivethattheprojectedresponsesinseveralcaseswouldnotaddressseveralquestionsinour~February15letter.Inparticular,severalitemsarelackingthatwewillneedtojustifyacceptanceofthehardwareapproachesofNUREG0460Vol3ratherthanusingthedesignbasisaccidentapproach.IamdeterminedtosubmitaproposedATWSruletotheCommissionforbothPWRsandBWRsearlyin1980.Thetypeandcontentoftherulewewillproposewilldependcriticallyuponthetypesandcontentoftheinformationavailabletothestaff.Thiswill,ofcourse,includewhateverresponsesareactuallypro-videdbytheindustryinresponsetothequestionsattachedtotheFebruary15staff'letter,theMarchmeetings,andtheThreeMileIslandrelatedconcernsasdiscussedintheJuly25andsubsequentmeetings.Istillbelievethatitispossiblefortheearlyverificationgenericanalysisprogramtoprovideanacceptableresolutionof'heATWSissueandthatthisisthewaytoachieveresolutionwiththeleastpossibleexpenditureofNRCandindustryresources.However,IwanttoreiteratethatthesuccessofthisapproachdependsonwhetherornotalloftheinformationnecessaryforthestafftoconfirmthatitsproposedATWSmodificationsprovideanacceptablelevelofprotection,forallplants,isprovidedbytheindustry.IstronglyencourageyoutojoinorformUtility/OwnersGroups,ifyouhavenotalreadydoneso,andprovidetheresourcesnecessarytosupplytheneededtech-nicalinformationpertainingtoyourplants,eitheroperatingorunderconstruc-tion.ItwouldfurtherreducetheimpactontheindustryaswellasthestaffresourcesiftheATWSeffortcoordinationandthereviewroleisperformedbyoneindustrygroup,Ifyouhayeadditionalquestionsonthegenericanalysisearlyverificationprogramdiscussedinthisletter,pleasecontactMr.AshokThadani,(301-492-7341).Sinly,

Enclosures:

1.NRC-IndustryATWSMeetingSummarydtd7/25/792.ListoflettersfromIndustryonContentofReportSubmittalss~~~H.R,'Denton,DirectorOfficeofNuclearReactorRegulation

'4,ENCLOSURE1gRECg~tp0y~~*4TaskActionPlanA-9UNITEDSTATESNUCLEARREGULATORYCOMhlISSIONWASHINGTON,D.C.20555JUL2P1379MENORANOUtlFOR:S.H.HanauerFROM:

SUBJECT:

A.ThadaniNRC-INDUSTRYATWStlEETING'UIlMARYThtaffmet-withthePWRvendors,theAtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)andesame-w'everalutilityrepresentativestodiscusstheimpactofTMI-2eventsontheATWSresolutionplandescribedinVolume3ofNUREG-0460.Thestaff'adethefollowinginitialremarks:1)ATWSisstillasafetyconcernandprotecionfromtheseeventsmustbeddAlthhplantsneednotbeshutdownimmediatelybecauseofrelativelylowlikelihoodofasevereATWSinaPWRinthenexpofyears,ATMSresolutionwithsuitablespeedisnecessarytopermitanimplementationplanwhichwouldassureanacceptablylowriskfromATWSoverthelifeofnuclearplants.2)Thestaffwouldliketorecei,veindustryviewsontheimpactofTflI-2onATWSandhowtoproceedfromnowontoresolveATWS.ThestaffnotedthattheyintendtoproposeanATMSsolutiontotheCommissionpreferablywithbutifnecessarywithouttheindustryinput.3)InviewofTMI-2accident,thestaffexpressedthefollowinggeneralcon-cernswiththeVol.3proposedresolutionandaskedforindustrycomments.a)WhatassurancedowehavethattheexcessivecalculatedpressuresforsomedesignsmodifiedperAlternative83wouldnotresultinlossofintegrityofreactorcoolantpressureboundary.(Note-Somedesignsmayexperiencepeakpressures-4000psi).b)WouldincreasingthenumberofsafetyvalvesasperAlternative84resultininsufficientoverallriskreductionfWouldtheprimarysystemintegritybemaintained?Woulditbebettertohavelargercapacityvalves' S.H.Hanauerc)nvew0que)Iifstionsaandbabove,thepressurizerreliefandsafetyvalvesmustbequalifiedforwaterrelieftoassurethatthenozzles,'hevalvebodyandthesupports.ructureintegritywillbemaintainedandtoestimatedischargeflowrateandthelikelihoodandeffectsofvalvechatter.d)Iiwofsignificantplantdifferencesinthedesignsofauxiliaryfeedwatersystem,EmergencyCoreCoolingSystemsandotherynvesstemshowwouldtheindustryprovideassurancesthatplantspecificftureshavebeenadequatelyaddressedinthe"EarlyVerification"approachforresolvingATMSasdescribedinNUREG-0460,~eaVol.3.e)OtherLessonsLearnedfromTNI-2.Followingprelim>narycommentsfromtheNRCstaffmembers,G.SorensenofWPPSwhois.alsotheChairmanoftheAIFATMScommittee,madethefollowingcomments.1)ATMSisnotasafetyissuebutratheritisalicensingissuewhichneedsresolution.2)AIFinconcertwiththeindustryhadreviewedATMSinlightofTMI-2andhadconcludedthattheAlternative84fix{mitigation)inVol.3ofNUREG-0460isnotthecorrectsolutiontoATMS.Theindustrybelievesthatthealternative82fix{Prevention-ElectricalPortionofRPS)istheappropriateATMSsolution.3)IndustryrecognizestheTHI-2impactontheroleoftheoperator,histrainingaidsandotherlessonslearnedfromthisevent.TheindustrybelievesthatthereisnoneedtorushtoresolveATWSbecauseofthelowprobabilityofATMSandbecausesomeoftheanticipatedchangestoplantsasaresultofTMI-2accidentreviewwoulddirectresourcestootherissues.FollowingtheAIFpresentation,thestaffraisedtheirconcernsthattheATWSresolution{notyetachieved)gasbeenanythingbuthasty,thattheNUREGdocu-tATHShavebeenoutforsufficientlylongtimeperiod,thatprotectionfromATWSisnecessary,thatTHI-2eventhasraised"oncernswiththeanayH"1sesassumptionsandthereforethehtaffneedsindustrytechnicalassessmentoftheTMI-2impactonATWS.ThestaffsuggestedthattheTHI-2eventindicatesaneedtoansweratleastthefollowingspecificquestions.I,I S.H.Hanauer-3-1)AnalysesindicatethesensitivityofpeakpressuretoAFWSdesignandactuationtimeforsomeplants.Mhyshouldauxiliaryfeedwateractuationnotbedelayedbeyondtechnicalspehificationvalues?WhatbasesareavailabletoassumeAFWSactua-tionearlierthanthetechnicalspecificationvalue?HowdotheanalysestakeintoconsiderationthelimitsonAFWSinjectionrateduetowater~hammerconsiderations?HowistheimpactofflowrestrictorsonsomeAFMSdesignsconsideredintheATWSanalyses?HowarethesignificantplantspecificfeaturesofAFWStreatedintheanalyses?2)Asinquestion1abovehowarethedifferencesinECCSdesignsevaluated?Forexample,forsomeATMSevents,thepressureandthepressurizerlevelremainhiqhenoughsuchthateithertheHPSIcannotbeactuated(becauseofshutoffheadconsiderations)ortheoperatormayfailtoactuateHPSIbecauseofinsufficientavailableinformation.3)WouldsinglefailurecauseallPORVstofailtoopen?Ifso,thenanalysesmustbebasedonallPORVsfailingtoopen.Further,severalplantsareoperatingtodaywithPORVsisolated.Fortheseplantscreditcannotbetakenforrelievingcapabilityofthesevalves.4)WhatassurancedowehavethattheATWSeventswithastuckopensafety.valvehavebeencorrectlyanalyzed?Whatisthepotentialforcoreun-coveringunderthisscenario?WhatistheimportanceofECCSactuation,reactorcoolantpumpsoperation,andthepressurizersafety/reliefvalvedischargemodelonthepotentialforuncoveringofthecore?Further,whyshouldmorevalvesnotbeassumedtostickopenfollowingdischargeofsubcooledwater.5)Forlongtermshutdown,discussthefollowing:a)availableequipment,instrumentationandtheirqualification.(Mustconsidertheeffectofwaterdischargedtothecontainmentviarupturedquenchtank).b)impactoflossofoffsitepowerc)continuedoperation'ofreactorcoolantpumps.Alsoconsidertrippingofreactorcoolantpumps.d)Describenaturalcirculation,includingeffectsofnon-condensables.Isrefluxboilingmodeofoperationanticipated?Ifso,justify.

S.H.Hanauer4-e)WouldoneanticipateBoronprecipitattonproblem?AlsoconsiderTMI-2typeproblemswithpossibleletdownlinepluggingfromBoronprecipitation.f)Howareleakageproblemsfromequipmentoutsidecontainmentconsidered?6)WhyshouldcreditbegivenforoperatoractionevenaftertenminutesfallowinganATWSeventinjtiation7TMI-2experiencedoesnotprovideenoughconfidenceintheabilityoftheoperatortoperformcorrectactionsonlyinthisshorttimeperiodunderhighstressconditions.Inresponse.tothestaffconcernstheindustrymadethefollowingcomnents.AIF1)TheindustryisfrustratedbecausethestaffconcernsimplyconsiderationofmultiplefailuresandsmallLOCAwhicharebeyondthecredibleeventstobeconsideredunderATWS.(Note-safetyvalvestuckopen(smallLOCA)isconsideredananticipatedtransient).2)Industrywouldliketowaitforapproximatelysixmonthsbeforeconsider-ingATWSevaluationstominimizeduplicateexpenditures.l)Whassubmittedresponsestothe2/15/79Mattsonletter.2)Calculatedpeakpressureof2800>2900psi(forAlt,83)andproposedmodificationsinturbinetripandauxiliaryfeedwatersystemactuationcircuitry.3)EPRIexpectstoissuearequestforproposaltoconducttestsonPORVsandsafetyvalvesandsomeresultsshouldbeavailablebyendofCY79.4)Recommendedthat"EarlyVerification"approachshouldbecontinued.CE-EdShearerspeakinforhimself1)TMIraisesfewquestionslikethebehaviorofS/Rvalvesandtheoperatoraction.Further,preventionisbetterthanmitigationandthatmitigationwouldmeanmoreandmoreanalyses.2)Continuewithearlyverification.

aS.H.HanauerBlkW1)Basicallyagreeswiththestaffconcerns.IndustryhaslongerlistofitemsthatcouldimpactATWS.2)Stressanalysesshouldbecompleted.3)LikelihoodofadditionalfailuresbeyondATWSshouldbeconsidered.4)Preventionisbetterthanmitigation.~BLfl061)ATWSisnotasafetypr.oblem.2)EvenifATWSoccurs,nosignificantrisktopublichealthandsafety.3)TMI-2suggestsadesirabilityforrealisticanalyses.TMI-2suggestsaneedtoassurethatanalysesboundthefacilities.4)-Waituntil"LessonsLearned"and"BulletinsandOrders"issuesareresolvedbeforepushingaheadwithATWS.Aftertheaboveindustrycomments,thestaffmadethefollowingconcludingremarks.1)Wedon'tintendtogotoofastonATWS.2)IfEarlyVerificationistobepursuedthenthereisaneedtoassurethat-earlierATWSanalysesarecorrectandreviewtheindustryTMI-2relatedlist.InthisregardtheindustrywasinvitedtomeetwiththestafftodiscussthetechnicalissueswhichimpactATWS.Thestaffaskedtheindus-trytoprovidetheirassessmentofTMI-2impactonATWS,thescopeofIefforttoresolvetheseissues,andthescheduleforperformingthiseffortwithin30days.I3)WecannotwaitanotheryeartomakeprogressinATWS.A.Thadani

Enclosure:

Asstatedcc:Seenextpage S.Hanauercc:Meet)ngAttendeesATWSDistrfbut)onPDRRSBFilesT.Spels ENCLOSUREATWSMeetinwithVendors&AIFJuly25,1979AshokThadaniArthurMcBride.AlanHosierSamirK.SarkarAlanE.LadieuFredT.StetsonRichardG.RateickAndrewJ.RushnokM.SrinivasanF.AkstulewiczG.SorensenT.SpeisF.C.ChernyJ.A.NorbergStuartThickmanKarl0.LayerJ.TedEnosTedMyersRobertDieterickMichaelJ.SalernoS.HardyDuersonBobSteitherGaryAugustineP.M.AbrahamMarkWisenburgMichaelTokarPaulBoehnertDavidBessetteStevenTraismanSamMirandaPatLoftusFredMosbyRogerNewtonCraigGrochmalCharlesA.DaveridRobertL.StrightJosephM.WeissJosephA.GonyeauNRC/DSSB&WWPPSSFP&LYAECA!FDECOOECNRC/DSSNRC/DSEWPPSS/AIFNRC/DSSNRC/DSSNRC/OSDTVA-ENDESBBRAP&LTECoSMUDCPCoB&WWDukePowerUSTVA-OfficeofPowerNRC/DSSNRC/ACRSNRC/ACRSPacificGas&ElectricWWWyleLaboratoryWisconsinElectricPowerStone&WebsterLongIslandLightingCo.SNUPPSGENorthernStatesPower SethM.CoplanClaytonL.Pittiglio~KulinD.DesaiFuatOdarKrisParczewskiRoyHoodsHaroldVanderMolenGururajaraoRangaraoFrankMcPhatterSteveBanwarthWilliamR.MurrayBenRodellDonSwansonPaulY,HoltonTommyErringtonRonClausonCharlesB.BrinkmanC.L.KlingWilliamBenjaminDennyKrepsVilliamE.BurchillA.E.SchererRichardC.L.QlsonNRC/OSENRC/OSENRC/OSSNRC/OSSNRC/DORNRC/DOR~NRC/DORPASNYB&HBGHVirginiaElectric5PowerCo.VEPCOPGECo.BechtelMississippiPowerELightFloridaPowerCorporationCECECommonwealthEdisonCo.CECECEBaltimoreGasItElectricCo.

~ENCLOSURE2I'etterfromR.H.Bucholz(GE)toS.Hanauer,"ATWSGenericAnalyses-ContentofDecember1979Submittal",datedSeptember5,1979.LetterfromD.H.Taylor(BLM)toS.Hanauer,"B8WCommitmentsforATWS",datedSeptember13,1979.LetterA.E.Scherer(CE)toS.Hanauer,"NRCRequestforGeneric,ATWSInformation",datedAugust31,1979.LetterL.0.DelGeorge(BMR3Ownersrepresentative)toS.Hanauer,"ATWSBMR/3PlantsandVermontYankee-GenericAnalysisSupplement",datedAugust28,1979.LetterT.N.Anderson(W)toS.Hanauer,"ATWS",datedAugust24,1979.

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