ML20092F560

From kanterella
Revision as of 11:21, 13 December 2024 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (StriderTol Bot insert)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Training Lesson Plan to Rev 6 to LO-LP-37031-06-C, Loss of All AC Power
ML20092F560
Person / Time
Site: Vogtle  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 12/14/1989
From: Fitzwater L
GEORGIA POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20092F288 List: ... further results
References
CON-IIT05-002-130A-90, CON-IIT5-2-130A-90, RTR-NUREG-1410 LO-LP-37031-06, LO-LP-37031-6, NUDOCS 9202190408
Download: ML20092F560 (15)


Text

i US$RS COPY I

/

7 s/

m l.

GEORGIA POWER POWER GENERATIOa DEPARTMENT

'l " lf$_

s)7 VOGTLE ELECTRIC OENERATING PLANT TRAINING LESSON PLAN TITLE:

LOSS OF ALL AC POWER HUMBER:

LO-LP-31031-06-C PROGRAM:

LICENSED OPERATOR REVISION:

6 SME:

L. RAY DATEt 12/13/89 APPROVED:

DATE:

y

.v INSTRUCTOR CUIDELINES:

1.

LESSON FORMAT A.

Verbal lecture with visual aids II.

MATERIALS A.

Overhead projector B.

Transparencies C.

White board with markers III.

EVALUATION A.

Written or oral exam in conjunction with other lesson plans IV.

REHARKS A.

This leeson plan meets the training commitments made in FSAR Question 730.1 NUKARC Position on Station Blackout.

B.

Ensure students have latest revision of EOP C. -Performance-based instructional units (IUs) are attached to the lesson plan as student handouts. -After the lecture on Loss of All AC Power, the student should be given adequate self-study time for the IUs.

The instructor should direct self-study activities and be available to answer questions that may arise concerning the IU material.

After self-study, the student will perform, simulate, observe, or discuss (as identified on the cluster signoff criteria list) the task covered in the instructional unit in the presence of an evaluator.

9202190408 920116 l kQ

  • D PDR ADOCK 05000424 i f*N d

{t S f g 'a g

s PDR..

LO LGrJSED OPElATOR OLVECT11JS those knowledgesFollowing completion of this lesson LD.LP-37031_C systematically identified for the perfo, the student will possess of the 1055 0F A1.L AC, PO'n'ER tasks rmance

_ 71 LI T G ECTU.E5 1.

Define "lo.ss of all AC power" conditio 1

implications for operation of plant e n. Explain its immediate quipment.

2.

State why the RCP is a primary concern d condition.

uring a loss of all AC 3

Assuming a fixed Icak size, asecondary side depresjurization (plantstate the impact of not starting pa rarne te rs :

a. RCP seal leakage cooldown) on the following
b. RCS coolant mass time to core uncovering c.

4.

Describe the effect of a leak power, on the following parame,ters: concurrent with a loss of all AC

a. pressurfzer level
b. containtaent pressure c.

time to core uncovering 5.

the openstor begin the secondarState tre special concerns re y side depressurization:g the following items shou a.

return to critical condition b.

introduction of non condensible gases 6

State from memory the immediate op erator actions of E0P 19100.

7 State t'ne bases for " Loss of All AC P ower" prccedure.

8.

Using~ EOP 191C0 as a guide, briefly d accomplished.

escribe how each step is 9

Given a NOTE or CAUTION statement f for that NOTE or CAUTION statement rom the EOP, state the bases Page 1

i LO.CL.37 96 LICENSED OPERATOR OBJECTIVES LO.LP 37031.C I

PURPOSE STATENDIT Following completion of this lesson, the student will possess those knowledges systematically identified for the performance of the LDSS OF ALL AC POWER tasks.

-[I LIST OF OBJECTIVES 1.

Define " loss of all AC power" condition. Explain its immediate implications for operation of plant equipment.

2.

State why the RCP is a primary concern during a loss of all AC c ondi'. ion.

3.

Assuming a fixed leak size, state the impact of not starting asecondary side depressurization (plant cooldown) on the following parameters:

RCP seal leakage a.

b. RCS coolant mass time to core uncovering c.

4.

Describe the effect of a leak, concurrent with a loss of all AC power, on the following parameters:

a. pressurizer level b, containment pressure time to core uncovering c.

5.

State the special concerns regarding the following items should the operator begin the secondary side depressurization:

a. return to critical condition
b. introduction of non condensible gases 6.

State from memory the immediate operator actions of E0P 19100, 7.

State the bases for " Loss of All AC Pot'er" procedure.

8.

Using EOP 19100 as a guide, briefly describe how each step is accomplished.

9.

Civen a NOTE or CAUTION statement from che E0P, state the bases for that NOTE or CAUTION statement.

Page 1 1

. - ~ -. - _ - - - '

[\\

m 0

l l

4 LO-LP-37031-0A-c 1

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK l

1 1

l 3

i l

A~A

4 s

LO-LP-37031-06-C REFERENCESI 1.

PLANT VOGTLE PROCEDURES 19100-1 LOSS OF ALL AC POWER 19101-1 LOSS OF ALL AC POWER RECOVERY WITHOUT SI REQUIRED 19102-1 LOSS OF ALL AC POWER RECOVERY WITH SI RF. QUIRED 2.

WOG EMER0ENCY RESPONSE QUIDELINE:

ECA 0.0 LOSS OF ALL AC POWER 3.

COMMITHENTS AND OThERS b

FSAR QUESTION 730.1 UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION STATION BLACKOUT NUMARC POSITION ON STATION BLACKOUT 4.

TRANSPARENCIES LO-TP-37031-001 OBJECTIVES LO-TP-37031-002 RCP SEAL LEAK WITH AND PITHOUT SECONDARY DEPRESSURIZATION LO-TP-37031-003 PRESSURIEER RESPONSE TO LOSS OF ALL AC LO-TP-37031-004 MAJOR ACTION CATEGORIES FOR ECA-00 STUDENT HANDOUTS LO-HO-37031-001 LOSS OF ALL AC POWER 6.

INSTRUCTIONAL UNITS LO-IU-31031-001 RESPOND TO LOSS OF ALL AC POWER LO-IU-37031-002 RECOVER FRO), LOSS OF ALL AC POWER WITH SI REQUIRED

  • em 4

y

~

~

. n %.~

~.

l,

nW;;* 2"l*:C%

s*

A.

  • SLs lesson W 11 of VAA 0. 0
  • Lees9tre the I'PESENTATION of Mi w I'. set udeio If.

=

,, p o o a n v o,1 t... u,.

m A.

General Infomatio g

i. i l.
.I l;; !

n 1.

Definit!.on of loma of all Ao 4

Loss > of yrl<t pu o.,

tlor. of evefet e g4 4 smee f ei r ev 2Leeele e no at it*m 140 8 i mp 4 0 s

. i t r i ea 0.54e sterqjeltsj ot4#

sik pw; sus j

j.

spu-) },:

L; l wad ie*4 o f *;,* %* e s g. s

  • e W

l/o'

  • er* +5s*ir>

y;$s<

e t?

1

% f 's s j,. i y 9$;

t, p +

.s 4 f in L,

? ym *

>s yx #.e

  • ew kgitjk e **

.a s < e~,.. s eA

}*fM.

  • y e+,

4s

+. 4

.;c f

'sA j a.

VM.* we,k r s o,. p 5

a *, !A inse r o %>e Y}

as w

2. a w

e

'O

-5 Taarr*p n

W 4

LMM r

,e

  • u r me

.s

?'* E

.e w

M;K

'.g*' a p

L 3-

<pem j,

s. ;s.

ew'

.e*

s.a wg.

.O pres g,e e

p r

er p y

. akg 5 av sala 4

.n-y.v' rev

  • '.,.nd, yv a

n w

  1. w:.

+m e

=

s

,,s

  • ~#.. dPT

,TM#

"*m3*

F aeor ps**

W'",,., W

.. py x+~

p f,

,0.

. m+.. p

'S A

22

~.x

.s.&-

,,g:

'M

.a MtsZ~% k

,re a,

..w.,

.,12 "

ue y

9.kM*jg " '

f,#

, +

,g

  • r M r.

--py '

1~M sev

>=

,e b,

(

ss'"

,+s

LO-LP-37031-06-C III.

LESSON OUTLINE:

NOTES I.

INTRODUCTION A.

This lesson will give the studeat a general kno. ledge Cover objectives of ECA 0.0 " Loss of All AC Powoc" LO-TP-37031-001 II.

PRESENTATION A.

General Information 1.

Definition of loss of all L power Loss of grid power (RATS) and some combina-Objective 1 a.

tion of events preventieg the emergency diesels from energizing the emergency AC buses 1)

Immediate consequences to plant equip-ment if a21 accomparated by some other event (LOCA, S/G TR) are not severe 2)

If power cannot be tastored, conse-quences to plant and public safety can potentially be extretoe a) Core uncovering 2.

Basis The object of ECA 0.0 is to provide guidance Objective 7 a.

to respond to a loss of all AC power in order to mitigate detestoration of RCS con-ditions while AC power is not available 3.

ECA usage Guidance provided in other EOP's not applic-a.

able following loss of all AC 1)

Other EOP's writ 4ba on the premise that at least one AC emergency bus energized b.

ECA 0.0 has priority crer all other guidelines 1)

Steps include actions that monitor and maintain critical safety functions B.

plant Response to Loss of Power 1.

Chief concern to loss of RCS Fluid through RCS Objective 2 5

e LO-LP-37031-06-C III.

LESSON OUTLINE:

NOTES seals with no makeup capability 2.

Without cooling seal situation degrades over time.

Hay increase to 300 gpm or more 3.

Loss of RCS inventory if maintained would even-tually uncover core 4.

Large (300 gpm) leak with and without secondary Objective 3 depressurization LO-TP-37031-C-002 Note process of transient - drop of RCS a.

pressure until saturated condition at 30 min.

(

b.

Figure 3 assumes secondary steam pressure is gold by S/G safeties.

Figure 4 assumes 100 /hr cooldown is begun Note differences in where RCS pressure c.

stabilized; 1200# vs 600#

d.

Note resulting difference in leak rate e.

Note drop in pressurizer level

  • Depends on leak rate f.

Since leak rate can be affected by depres-surizing the S/0 this will increase the time to core uncovery 5.

Restrictions on use of operator imposed cooldown Objective 5 Return to critical condition due to modera-a.

tor temperature coefficient

1) Without charging pump power you can't borate
2) Can drop pressure to force accumulator injection to add negative reactivity.

However, circumstances may prevent depressuristtion by this amount

3) Problem aided by factors of xenon buildup
4) Seserity of this concern is determined by fuel burnup conditions b.

Introduction of non-condensible gases t

6 9

h

4 LO-LP-37031-06-C III.

LESSON OUTLINE:

NOTES 3

1) Will be unable to isolate accumulators without E8F bus power, also can't vent them
2) Must be controlled by controlling steam release rate from S/O's 6.

Seal loakage is analyzed as break in RCS cold leg at pump discharge Objective 4 Pressuriser level decreases at rate a.

consistent with leak rate

1) Without cooldown pressurizer level charge best-indication of leak rate b.

Containment pressure will incrosse slightly

1) Worst case effects are moderate 2)

Heat removal from containment are via passive means

3) Maximum pressure increase would be approx. 3 poi Time to core uncovering c.

1)

Dependent on a) Leak rate b) Cooldown 2)

Leak rate decreases as pressure decreases

3) Cooldown allows more mass to stay in RCS C.

Major Action Categories of ECA 0.0 1.

Perform immediate actions 2.

Restore AC powet 3.

Maintain plant conditions for optimal recovery 4.

Evaluate energized AC emergency bus 5.

Solrar: recovery guideline after AC power restoration 7

D 4

v LO-LP-37031-06-C III.

LESSON OUTLINE:

NOTES D.

Operator Actions LO-TP-37031-C-004 1.

19100 contains immediate actions sLmilar to first staps of 19000 a.

First four steps, RNO's included (oper?.6. ors Objective 6 must nemorize) 2.

Monitor CSFSTs whi1J in 19100 but do n21 transition to FRPs 3.

Procedure 19100 actions (use 19100 as a guide)

Objective 8 Notes ensure stu-Perform immediate actions verifying RCS dente knos has to a.

iaolation and seceadary heat sink perform each step availability (Ste2e.-4) procedure b.

Restore AC power - optimal recovery is always to do whatever you can to get AC power back ASAP (Steps 5-7)

Maintain plant conditions for optimal c.

recovery.

That is, depressurite the secondary (Steps 8-22)

1) Stwp 16 is a judgement point; SS must guess at expected outage duration a)

If short, hold ground and wait b)

If long, begin depressurization

2) May require local actions to release steam via ARVs. Hard to coordinate cooldown rate with control room
3) While power is off motor breakers are opened and automatic loading defeated to permit operator control on restoration of power
4) operational loop is repeated until power le restored d.

Evaluate energized bus (Step 23-26)

  • Verify selected equipment status Select recovery guideline (Step 27) e.
1) Use 19101 if criteria for SI initiation do not exist 8

b

(

l LO-LP-37031-06-C

!!I.

LESSON OUTLINE:

~~

HOTES

2) Use 19102 if RCS conditions are reasonably normal but SI initiation Le required

- RCS subcooling less than 24 F or

- Pressurizer level less than 9%, or

- ECCS equipment have already been actuated i

4.

Caution statements of 19100-C (not previously objective 9 covered)

Three cautions before Step 6 a.

1) When power is restored to any AC emergency bus, recovery actions should continue starting with Step 24 2)

If an SI signal exists or if an SI signal is actuated during this procedure, it should be reset to permit manual loading of equipment on an AC emergency bus

3) Two NSCW pumps should be available to automatically load on its AC emergency bus to provide diesel generator cooling a) To minimize the deterioration of plant conditions, recovaty actions are started as soon as power is restored.

Step 24 is entered from any step after caution b) Loss of all AC power philosophy is to defeat automatic loading of AC emergency bus c)

If diesels start, cooling water is supplied immediately to prevent loss of diesel b.

Caution before Step 11

1) A faulted or ruptured SG that is isolated should remain isolated.

Steam supply to the TDArW pump must a

be maintained from at least one SC 9

LO-LP-37031-06-c III.

LESSON OUTLINE:

NOTES l

a) First part remind.s operator to keep faulted / ruptured SG~ isolated to maxLmise operator control of t

secondary pressure and mintmite radioactive releasies c.

caution before Step 16 Note before l

I Step 16:

(

l Need to control

1) To prevent injectiota of accumulator S/G depress so nitrogen into the PCS, SG pressure that TDATW pump.

i shcald not be lowered to less than capacity will not l

165 psig be exceeded a) Ensures that accumulatapt nitrogen i

will not impede naturrd circulation

2) SG narrow range level should be maintained greater than 5% (27% for adverse containment) in at least one intact so.

If level cannot be maintained, SG depressuriz< tion should be stopped until level is instored in at least one SG a) Maintains secondary heat sink at all times d.

caution before step 25 1)

The loads placed on ths energized Ac i

emergency bus should not exceed the capacity of the power s)urce a) As equipment is manually loaded on bus operator must not overload i

diesel and cause further loss of bus E.

Recov%ry Without SI Required (19101 ECA 0.1) 1.

Entered only from transition out of 19100-c, step 27 a.

Major action categories 1)

Start' normal operation equipment as necessary 2)

Establish RCPs seal cooling i

10 l

,..-n...-

1-.

..--..-,-,,,,....,v---

,,,,,,,,,=.,,n,--

.,,.,-,,,-~,.,,-,,.,.,..ln..,,..,,n,..n.,w

,n. +...,-

LO-LP-37031-06-C III.

LESSON OUTLINE:

NOTES 3)

Stabilize plant with normal operational systems 2.

Recoveey action plan Check the status of the following Notes ensure stu-a.

dente know h2M to 1)

RCP seals and thermal barriers isolated perform each step of procedure

2) CIA not actuated
3) Verify valve alignment ated load NSCW, ACCW, CCP, and containment fan coolers b.

Establish charging Check ECCS flow not required c.

d.

Increase pressurizer level to 2 19%

Stabilize secondary (S0 level, pressure, e.

and ArW flow) f.

Place ECCS pump handewitches to auto g.

Establish RCP seal flow h.

Establish letdown 1.

stabilize and control pressurizer level and pressure Verifyt l')

Natural circulation 2)

SDM k.

Maintain plant conditions stable 1.

Continue attempts to restore off-site power to all AC buses and at least one RCP 3.

Transition out of_ procedure Occurs when off-site power is finally a.

restored 1)

If RCP started, go to appropriate procedure 2)

If no RCP started, go to " Natural 11

LO-LP-37031-06-c III.

LESSON OUTLINE:

NOTES Circulation Cooldown" - 19002-1 4.

Caution statement of 19101-1 (not previously objective 9 covered)

(cont'd)

Caution statement before Step 7 a.

1)

If so narrow range level lowers to less than 5% (27% for adverse containment) and ArW flow is less than 570 gpm, the MDArW pumps should be manually loaded on the AC emergency bus to supply water to the sus a)

Informs operator under what conditions a MD ArW pump should be started b.

Caution statement before Step 10

1. ) RCP thermal barrier cooling should be established slowly to minimize potential steam flashing of the ACCW system
2) RCS seal injection should be established slowly to mintmito RCP thermal stresses and potential seal failures
3) As a part of subsequent recovery actions, RCPs should not be started prior to a status evaluation a)

By mintmizing the amount of steam formed, any steam introduced into the ACCW system will be condensed thereby preventing system binding or water hammer

~

b)

Prevent further damage to RCP seals and shafts c)

Starting a RCP has the potential for aggravating and damage and increasing the RCS leakage above upper unit est in background document F.

Recovery with SI Requi red flot e s ensure stu-dents know h2h to 1.

Entry from either 19100 or 19101, following perform each step 12 I

LO-LP-37031-06-C

!!I.

LESSON 0JYLINE8 NOTES restoration of emergency power of procedure 2.

Major action categories Start safeguards equipment as necessary a.

b.

Establish RCP seal cooling 3.

Hecove.y action plan a.

Check requirement for transfer to cold leg recirculation (RWST greater than 39%)

b.

Start SIP c.

Align CCP for SI flow, start when RCP seal injection valves are isolated d.

Manually load CCW, RHR, ACCW pumps and four containment coolere Stabilize SG 1evel (NR level 5%-50s, e.

f.

Check containment spray necessary (contain-ment pressure greater than 21.5 peig) 9 Establieh RCP seal cooling 4

h.

Go to 19010-1, E-1 " Loss of Reactor or Secondary coolant" 4.

Caution statement of 19102-1 (not previously Objective 9 covered)

(cont'd)

Loading of energized AC emergency bus a.

should be sequenced with a delay between each component loaded to prevent exceeding the capacity of the DG 1)

By allowing the starting current to

~

decay and minimizing the load on the bus will insure that the operable diesel continues to supply the bus III.

SUMMARY

A.

Review Objectives 1.

CEFINE *LOSSOF ALL AC POWER" CONDITION.

EXPLAIN ITS IMMEDIATE IMPLICATIONS FOR OPERATION OF PLANT EQUIPMENT.

13

f~

\\

LO-LP-37031-06-C III.

LESSON OUTLINE NOTES Loss of grid power (RATS) and some combination of events preventing the emergency diesels from energizing the emergency AC buses Immediate implications (w/o accident) are not severe, long-term can be extreme i.

STATE WHY TIIE ACP IS A PRIMARY CONCSRN DURING A LOSS OF ALL AC CGNDITION.

Failure of RCP seals causing loss of RCS fluid with no makeup capability 3.

ASSUNING A FIXED LEAK SIEE, STATE THE IMPACT OF HOT STARTING A SECONDARY SIDE-DEPRESSURIZATION (PLANT COOLDOWN) ON THE FOLLOWING PARAMETERS RCP SEAL LEAF. AGE RCS COOLANT MASS TIME TO CORE UNCOVERING Seal leakage - as long as RCS pressure is high leak rate will continue, possible getting larger Coolant mass - mass loss will occur faster Time to core uncovery - will be shorter 4.

DESCRIBE THE EFFECT OF A LEAK, CONCURRENT WITH A LOSS OF ALL AC POWER, ON THE FOLLONING PARAMETERS PRESSURIZER LEVEL - continue to decrease CONTAINKENT PRESSURE - alight increase 71ME TO OORE UNCOVERY - dependent on leak rate 5.

STATE THE SPECIAL CONCERNS REGARDING THE FOLLOWING ITEMS SHOULD THE OPERATOR EEGIN THE_

SECONDARY SIDE DEPRESSURIZATION:

RETURN TO CRITICAL CONDITION - unable to establish SDM so ryst monitor reactivity added by MTC INTRODUCTION OF NON-CONDENSIBLE GASES - unable to isolate injection accumulators could if 14

um e

LO-LP-37031-06-C III.

LESSON OUTLINE:

~ ~ '

NOTES introduce H if pressure drops low enough 2

6.

' STATE FROM MEMORY THE IMMEDIATE CPERATOR ACTIONS OF EOP 19100 Reference EOP 10100-1, Steps 1 - 4 7.

STATE THE BASES FOR " LOSS OF ALL AC POWER" PROCEDURE Provide guidance to respond to loss of all AC power in order to mitigate deterioration of RCS conditions while AC power is not available 8.

USING EOP 19100 AS A GUIDE, BRIEFLY DESCRIBE HOW EACH STEP IS ACCOMPLISHED.

Reference EOP 19100-1 9.

GIVEN THE CAUTION STATEMENT FROM THE EOP, STATE THE BASES FOR THAT CAUTION STATEKENT.

Reference Section II.D.4, II.E.4, and II.F.4.

of lesson plan 15

_ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ -