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PICTORIAL AIDS PAGE TAB DESCRIPTION 2
8.1 RCS ELEVATIONS 8.2 MID LOOP LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION 3
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'e PROCEDUM NO.
REYlSION PAGE NO.
I FTDB-1 TAs 8.0 3
2 of 3
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TAB 8.1 RCS ELEVATIONS UNIT 1 i
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06-20-95 29:86 T@ PW CD 4048263762 stS90 PB5 e
PROCEDURE NO.
REYlSION PAGENC.
i PTDB-1 TAB 8.0 3
3 of 3 TAB 8.2
t oct ---.-. lJ.1!l.=
INSTRUMENTATION l
UPPen TA? - 244' UNIT 1 u
-203' pgggggggg i
LIFEL
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-200' I
133 v : sts j
LENGTH igy.
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- 194 '.
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-..a ORA!N DOWN stowr ocass#
-1sn' Le-19402
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- sex RCP SEALS ---
190'
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- 40s
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i ss a 330Mt OLAS$ #3 t,a-10001 1
NOTE: e This Operator Aid is to be used only when in mid-loop configuration and temporary level instrumentation is installed.
- LI-957 and LI-950 may read higher than actual RCS level if opening between RCS and PRZR is blocked and RCS is pressurised.
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"Avsr Tap Upper "ap LI-950 L 1=
run Lx-0459 Lb459 M.4 LI-957 HL 4*
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V0BTLE ELECTRIC GBERATIM PLAlff IRICLEAR OPERATIW15 MRfTE 2. BIE 1800-MT M 500 m. GEOASIA 30830 4
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A test of the Jacket water system temperature transient during engine starts was conducted.
The purpose of this test I
was to determine the actual Jacket water temperature at the switch locations with the engine in a normal standby lineup, and then followed by a series of starts without air rolling ene angine. to replicate the starts of 3-20-90.
The test snowed that Jacket water temperature at the switch location cecreased from a
standby temperature of 163 degrees F
to
{
approximately 156 degrees F and remained steady.
Numerous sensor cal 1Drations (including Jacket water temperatures),
special pneumatic leak testing, and multiple engine starts and runs were performed under various conditions.
Since 3-20-90, DG1A and DG18 have noen startec i
several times and no' failures or problems have occurrec 4
during any of these starts.
In addition, an undervoltage start test witncut air roll was conducted on 4-6-90 and DU1A started and loaded properly.
I desed on the above facts, it is concluded that the Jacket water high temperature switches were the most probable cause of both trips on 3-20-90.
j 4.
ANALYSIS OF EVENT 1
The loss of offsite power to Class 1E buss 18A03 and the failure of DG1A to start and operate successfully, coupled with DG18 anc 2
RAT 18 being out of service for maintenance, resulted in Unit 1 being without AC power to both Class 1E busses.
With both Class 4
1E busses deenergized, the RHR Svstem could not perform its required safety function.
Based on a noted rate of rise in ene HUS temperature of 16 degrees F, measured at the core ex1t enormocouples over a fifteen minute period, the RCS water woula not have been expected to begin boiling until approximately 1
nour and 50 minutes after the beginning of the event.
Restoration of RHR and closure of the containment equipment hatch were completed well within the estimated 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 50 minutes for the projected onset of boiling in the RCS.
A review of i
information obtained from the Process and Effluent Radiation Monitoring System (PERMS) and grab sample analysis indicated all normal values.
As a
result of this
- event, no increase in i -
radioactive releases to either the containment or the environment occurred.
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V0ETLE ELECTRIC GEMRATIIIB PLAllT i
I 1RICLEAR OPERATICIIS RolffE 2. ODI 1500 MYES80A0. EEGABIA 30830
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A test of the Jacket water system temperature transient during engine starts was conducted.
The purpore of tnis test was to determine the actual Jacket water temperature at the j
switch. locations with the engine in a normal standby lineup, j
i and then followed by a series of starts without mir rolling l
j
.the engine to replicate the starts of 3-20-90.
The test l
showed that Jacket water temperature at the switch location l
standby temperature of 163 degrees F
to decreased' from a
[
'approximately 156 degrees F and remained steady.
)
Numerous sensor calibrations (including Jacket water
. temperatures),
special pneumatic leak testing, and multiple engine start s and runs were performed under various conditions.
S?nce 3-20-90, DG1A and DG18 have been started j
more than 20 times each and no failures or problems have j
occurred during any of these starts.
In
- addition, an undervoltage start test without air cell was conducted on 4-6-90 and DG1A started and loaded properly.
i Based on the above facts, it is concluded that the Jacket l
water high temperature switches were the most probable cause of both trips on 3-20-90.
4 ANALYSIS OF EVENT j
l The loss of offsite power to Class ~ 1E buss 10A03 and the failure i
of DG1A to start and operate successfully, coupled with DG1B and
. RAT 10 being out of service for maintenance, resulted in Unit 1 being without AC power to both Class 1E busses.
With both Class 1
i 1E busses doenergized, the RHR System could not perform its i
recuired safety function.
Based on a noted rate of rise in the NCS temperature of 46 degrees F in 36 minutes, the RCS water would.not have been expected to begin boiling until approximately 96 minutes after the beginning of the event.
Core exit I
thermocouples measured a comparable rate of temperature. rise.
i Restoration of RHR and closure of the containment equipment hatch j
were completed well within the estimated 96 minutes for the i
projected onset of boiling in the RCS.
A review of information obtained from the Process and Effluent Radiation Monitoring System (PERMS) and grab sample analysis indicated all normal values.
As a result of this event, no increase in radioactive i
releases to either the containment or the environment occurred.
4 I
I 6
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1 I
GEORGIAPOWER POWERGENERADON DEPARTMENT YOGTLEELECTRICGENERAUNdM
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NUMBER:
y-63107 00 TrnI:
RequalCurrent Evesas j.
REVIslON: 0
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PROGRAM:
I w OperesorRequal AUTHOR:
G. Kilpatrick DAM MW APPROVED:
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5' 22-70 1
' 9,r INSTRUCIOR GUIDEIJNES:
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i L FORMAT
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A.
Verballecture with visual aids.
l II.
MATERIALS:
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White boar (withinerkers s
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A.
Oralor writana escanla with otherlesson plans IV.
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L PURPOSE STATEMENT:
4 i
. This lesson provides a parloshe updeas of significant plant modiAcedone end procedural changes. In addiden,inforwian from seieased operating events is provided to mintosos lessons learned tnxn aban 4
events.
l IL IJ5T OF OBJEC11VES:
2 a
1 i
1, Describe how operation of laput Error labibit switch resuhed in a Feedweser Isolation during Mode 4 r-
- 2. Describe how operation of the laput Error Inhibit switch.W in "
i ='= of tim Source Range h
i l
- 3. Discuse lessoas leermed from the Unit 2 trip fonowlag the Unit i lose of power event.
Describe how a power excursion event resuhed frame bypassing the h d==&a-alizers.
i 4.
- 5. Describe procedural shooses resulting from the Vogtle specine addioop ennlysis.
4 1
REFERENCES:
(
1.
ER 90.004 c
2.
ER 290.001 3.
LER 90.001
+
4.
LER 90.003 l
5.
LER 90.004 6.
LER 90.005 i
7.
LER 290.003 8.
MEMO 90.006 9.
- 10. PROC 90.005
- 11. PROC 90.006
- 12. PROC 90.007
- 13. PROC 90.008 4
i Page 2
NOTES 1
51.
LESSON OUTUNE.
4 l
A. OPERATINGEVENTS 1.0 IEt 90.001 "Ibe fonmat of the surveillance task nha fcr 14475-2, raman==='w 4
Intepity Vedficesion. Valves OJankleramat==am seenhedin l
locomplete performance,which failed to most the, '
ofTech j
Spec 4.6.1.1.a.
i Following disamry, all valves were verined locked closed and 14475 1 & 2 were revised to inciede all e to be surveilled.
i
,i 2.0 IEt 90.003 Ahor discovering transformours 1AB04X and 1AB0$X wue missing seisade required clamp boks, swhchosers 1AB04 and 1AB05 were declared inoperable and Ted Spec 3.8.3.1 was asesred.
J 1 AB04 was desmorghed and Tech Spec 3.6.3 was amasred becomme j
HV-8112 was ? -.'-H Aher 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />,a unit abandown was i
}
-===a-i and an NUE was declared.
i Appravi-maly 6 hous aber being dessergized, IAB04 was seemergised j
and declared operabis, and Tech Spec 3.6.3 was aslead. However, with j
3.8.3.1 still applicable, the decision was made to contimme abandown, emeering the refueling outage = 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> early.
3.0 LER 90.004 With Source Range chamael N31 inoperable for an 18 momsk chamael I
calibrosion, approval was passed and Mode 6 was amoured. 'the failure to l
cornply with Tech Spec 3.0.4 was recognised Isser and suponed.
i 4.0 LER 90.005 5
While checidag the QHVC,both trains a(FHB Post Accidset V=mitelan were oboarved in operation (Previously Tain A bad basa in 4
service with Train B in stamery). No alenas were duenceed by assemi voorn perenamel, no absonnal radiation a==dh'a== arimamA and FHB was being =miatan==d at a negative pressure. Sinos Train B bad not been s
l delibeesteh sened, it was desenalmed to be an assomatic assuntion of ESF equipment Inveseigstion revealed paranamel failed to verify the low pneare l
acuation sigent was blocked when Train A was placed in service and
)
Tra's B was most psebably acmansed on low pressure when FHB pereommelacans doore wese opened.
l h
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t Page 3 i
. ~ --
l RQ LF 43107-00 i
!(
NOTES EL LESSON OURRE:
1 j
S.0 C "- ' guebisms were equrianced during IR2 following operation j
of thelupet ErrorIshibit swindi.
On several 4 both asures reage dsencears wue desmergised when j
both Impet lirror Imbibit GEI) switches were pa=leia==d to Desarr:
i
)
When the IE! swhck is posidemed to DGegrr, a signal to desmorgise
)
I a.
the sauron range doestners is genereesd. This is nonmally== dad i
beesume both treins ese seguired to desmargise the doencears; i.e. loss i
l of either train would eBow the denectors to seemergise.
i
- b. If the SR d= amen =s see energised, this sissal does not aanmath j
I desesrgise the duesmus. sinne boei moins me aquired. However, i
once tbs other train's swhek is _, '" ".the SRdseactors are 1
I desessgismL i
In Mode 4 with long cycle roche esemblished, SSPS was being opermoed j
to support reactor trip bypass breaker esseing. Feedweser Isoledon was accessed when the Mode Selector switch was pa=lel==d to Atatsut following operados of the IEI switch.
When the IE! switch is posidened to INNIErr, luputs to the logic i
s.
cards are opened, remuning any prentisting sigenL This removed the actuadon signal and cleared the accendon " block".
4 i
b.
When the IE! swhch was posidamed to Atutaut, the inputs were reinssated, and the actuadon eigent was gamermoed whhout a block.
l This signal energised the ansest misys, but the assedsted sisves were inhibited with the Mode Selector swhek is 7Esr.
i When the Mode Salessor switch was poshioned to orsaATE,11SV AC was ruinstated to the sieves and a Feedweest Isolation was c.
acmassed.
e l
6.0 The following dwaribelessoasleermed from the Unit 2 trip followlas 1
faulty differential elayacmeden.
During event reconstruction decennimados of equipment penblems is e
j a.
impaimd if sehr and supm.me meet whbom % each hem that occuruL Paceden have basa noviend to requim l
daa==*=* nan yder to assemena.
j b.
With RCP 1 or 4 saammd and sprey valves in auso, spray flow will j
be short cycled though the idle spray header, reducing the spray flow avallable forpmasse esseroL 1
l The PRZR pmasure somemper's desmand will integress (further opening the spray valves) until a PORV is opened.1herefess, the sprey valve for the kBe RCP should in asemally closed.
I R
e i
i
LESSON OUnRE:
7.0 A power escurwen occurred on Unit 2 when the standby e i
peg was started following the trip of a hesser drain pamp. During the event, power :==aland > 100% for a 9 minutes with a peak power of 105.2 %.
When the h demias were bypassed for backwesh med a.
precoat, MFP suction pressure increased slightly. This immensed pressure resuhed in a dennese in HDT pump discharge flour and a l
- "; increase inHDTlevel.
I 1bs W ecmenon j
- b. As HDT level contimmed to lacreens, the high level dump valve pin was haerted,
failed to open and level sueched the high level seipoint.
tehnenes auto i
'Perados At this point the MSUT drain velves and Hesser 4 estruction valve c.
were closed. When Hesser 4===sW valve seashed > 75%
cleesd, Hester 5 marmel level ensarol valves sessived a cines
]
signal.
i 5
i PsedwenerHesser5 Matsure Aspereene LV 4282 Drain Tank f
(
ws am-d*4dI swee7seones
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reade.a.rH.s,4
,,s NV 4343 j
Drain Teek
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l LV.4362 serra anse w a==
wrro w i
l HeesarDeinTank I
i d.
Whk the HDT besienny isoleasd, level then basis to decsease and
~2j tripped the passy aslow level.
When the HDT pusep tripped, the sammary osedsmssee pump was
~
e.
seerted. he soplanessant of " hot" hasser drains wth 'eeld" condammans seduced feedemaer tempsesure sad assmed a dauense in Tavs.
f.
As Tavs lowered, poshive seactivhy was added and sincear power immensed, an OPAT Red Seap and Turbine Rumheck was hMy initissed. At this point, seestor and tur66se power wue mensuelty sudsoud and m adn==d at 90%.
pese $
4-RQ.LP.63107.oo IIL IJ!$50N OUTIJNE:
NCHES I
B. DESIGNCHANGES l
1.0 The foneerlag Unit 1 esmerouars beve been changed to comerol the 4
process vies the parameter G.e. the =up" penbbutton will raise e and ibe %=n* puebbuem wHIlower as-p.-eme).
t 1.T10549 MFFT A Bandag OG i:
1-TIC 5499 MFFT B Beartag 00 17107097 GemeneerH Cooler 2
1-11C7116 Turtene Labe 00 Cooler 1-TIC 7356 EHC Cooler i
l
C. PROCEDURE
CHANGES 1.0 Vedoms UDPs TedSpec A==ad===t2sanows w heeniemladadoesdurtag c
Mode 5 with the loops not nued and Mode 6. This is e by j
opennag 12cs.U4176 and 12cs.U4177 underadminisuudv enamois provided shuuk=m Margin mquisessens en met and the High Flux at shadown alarm is operable et 2.3o thmes bachyound.
4 12 coo.c,12co6.c, and 12co7.c beve been avised to nuow opening er these valves for abort parlede et tism chaudemy commet parvided Ted j
4 speecompliamesla maimatand.
2.0 1x-:u' Iwe e- " a;noe-u -
Vogtle specific addiosp analysis H=hadama were immerporased as follows:
The mia===* beach meet be capable of being closed within 57 a.
minutes or verined closed prior to reducing level below 191'.
l
- b. If SG moszb dans ese to tunnued wkh a said leg opening eenshushed, a veut peak thsough am SG manway en a het leg that wul not be desessed samt be emahushed. In this situation, the l
PRZR enamany is not auf5eiset to adequaesty nuevo the best lead generesad fonowles alossof RHR.
t Darias aldloop operesians,4 e==*='====* Cooung Units wul be I
c.
l epsabis and apable of being stened if mquired.
i 1
3.0 13011 1/2. Residual Heat Ramsval Svanese
\\
Section 4.9 was adami, providing dhoction for operades RHR with one j
mais of sold les discharge flowpath lealssed for 3=*====== This i
seeden pmvides seidemme ser i an d== and menorseien era main.
i t
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i*
NOTES 1
El.
IJi3 SON OUTLDE:
1 4.0 12ent1/i r"--a al mad C.'.; - d.- ~ = " =1= 2. -
'1 Des to industry probisses with red tip wearing, the ARO position for j
esseelandabandownrodsis, ' ";changedtoadmisdaswearat l
say ese poskien. As a residt, Tech Spec Ah 29 vedmons rod a
insertion 11ades to 222 snaps sad 13502-1 & 2 wue revised to provids i
direction for repositieming sods to the ARO position using FIDB Tab i
14.
Neess were added to ensure abe "tip to tip* disesnoe existias prior av
.- g i
la addidos,140001 & 2 aour segehe vestfying skuedose rods a 222 snaps for shunde== marsin verifkation.
5.0 191W f a== af All AC Ptnsur 4
1 Sasuple tisse are no langer required to be checked shut whom 4
a.
verifying RCS is isolased. These valves are so imager onesidered i
"audor" RCS lankage pushs.
4 4
b.
Operssors see erected to andry =+a====a= to install addleinmal J
emergsacylighting for pselonged loss of au AC.
4 Ah B sad C wee added to eBow verifflag QA and CVI 1
c.
nsing the ERF compuser.
4 6.0 19't!1.C. *
- to 7'- = 7tsuur " -
' - / ATWT r
Se sp 6a RNO mow dueces loost trip of Bascoor Trip sad Bypass husekers istore local trip of MG Set supply brunkers.
l L
D. TECH SPEC C
^' - -)
- i. '
I 1.0 Tech Some 3.4.1.4 s
RCS loops are enesidered filled when te RCS is filled and venned G.a.
SG tubes me full) and level has been maintained > 192' elevasion.
i 2.0 pHB past AacidmetVamtilation Actuation Wish the AP assassion sigent blocked, the FHB Pest Accident a.
Va=*ita*i==i sysesus is asesidered aparabis. AP accussion was i=a==ela==Ily amateded fresaTech Specs.
- b. The actuation of the PHB Fest Accidset V--sin aa= system by a AP j
signal is a suponshis event. NUREG.1022 says that even if the l
ESF h is spesisus er inessessary, the asematica is l
}
8* portable.
i i
pues 7 6
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