Text

Proposed Tech Specs Revising LCO 3.3.6 Re CVI Instrumentation & LCO 3.9.4 Re Containment Penetrations to Facilitate Outage Planning
	ML20236F163
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	06/26/1998
From:	; SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20236F157	List: ML20236F154; ML20236F163;
References
	NUDOCS 9807020050
	Download: ML20236F163 (51)
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_ _ _ - _ . .

Enclosure 3 Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Request to Revise Technical Specifications Containment Penetrations and Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation Marked-up TS and Bases Pages 9807020050 900626 PDR ADOCK 05000424 E31 P PDR

l Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.6 Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation LCO 3.3.6 The Containment Ventilation Isolation instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.6-1 shall be OPERABLE.

Accorkg 1b Tib/s 3.3 6 -).

APPLICABILITY: E I , 3, nd 9,

[

[urng,RE ERA ..ONS, in mov nt irra ated[el[semb1pswip ACTIONS

NOTE----------------------------------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l

A. Only one radiation A.1 Restore at least two 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months i monitoring channel channels to OPERABLE OPERABLE. status.

(continued)

Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3-49 Amendment No. Aff (Unit I)

Amendment No. K (Unit 2)

Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6 ACTIONS (continued) ;

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. ---------NOTE--------- C.1 Place and maintain Immediately Only applicable during containment purge and j CORE ALTERATIONS or exhaust valves in closed l j

movement of irradiated position.

l fuel assemblies within containment. 98 l C.2 Enter applicable Imediately o no F ctio 7 Conditions and Required th ne r re n1 l Actions of LCO 3.9.4, r t ti act t' n " Containment ch n s i operbi . Penetrations," for d containment purge supply and exhaust isolation No radiation monitoring b :5E $5 ..

channels OPERABLE. penefraf/cyrs gf QB lM ft(UiN$

Required Action and Sfd[MS.

I associated Completion Time for Condition A not met. ,

1 j

3.3-51 Amendment No. # (Unit 1)

Vogtle Units I and 2 Amendment No. / (Unit 2)

( _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

l ,

l 7 Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6 T /@lNA8ii hM0fS 0A 07NilSP4cofite eon 0)T/tw.t Table 3.3.61 (page 9 of 1)

L Contairement ventitetton isolation Instrumentation I

REQUIRED CHANNELS TRIP sETPOINT FUNCTION a gg n l

1. mermael Initiation f.,2f 5,4 2 st 3.3.6.6 a4

2. Automatic Actuation Logic and Ij 2j3jY 2 st 3.3.6.2 NA Actuation Relays st 3.3.6.3 i st 3.3.6.5

3. Conteirment Redietion I g7 g Sp( h(C)W 2 st 3.3.6.1 st 3.3.6.4 st 3.3.6.7 SR 3.3.6.8 l

e. Geseous (b)

(RE 2565C)

I

b. Particutete (b)

(RE 2565A) i I

c. lodine (b)

(RE 25655) 1

d. Aree Lou Range s 15 mr/h(c) s 50s background cd}

(RE 0002, RE 0003)

- r *t t 4 safety injectioF l II ,4I *initietton 5 fmettons and retirements.*'ar ** 'c0 3 3 2. "ES'AS iaatr="'atatian." '=ctiaa 5 I

l (a) Conteirunent ventitetion radiation (RE 2565) is treated as one channel and is considered OPERABLE if the particulate (RE 2565A) and iodine monitors (RE 25658) are OPERABLE or the noble ses monitor (RE 2565C)

! is OPERA 8LE.

(b) setpoints will not exceed the timits of specifications 5.5.4.h and 5.5.4.1 of the Radioactive Ef fluent i I

controls Program.

(c) During CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradlated futt assemblies within contelfvuont.

' (d) During MEs 1, 2, 3, and 4.

3.3-53 Amendment No. 96 (Unit 1)

Vogtle Units 1 and 2 Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2) 1

Containment ventilation Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6 :

f pgeest}s occewing in MODis BASES (continued) C j Mrau k APPLICABLE The safety analyses assume t t the containment remains j SAFETY ANALYSES intact with penetrations unnec sary for core cooling isolated early in the event, wi in approximately 60 seconds. The isolation of the purge supply and exhaust valves has not been analyzed mech istically in the dose calculations, although its rapid i olation is assumed. The containment purge supply and exhaust isolation radiation n

M

I '.38 /8M monitors act as backup to the SI.signaltoensureclosingof the purge supply and exhaust valvesl, !ta ~ % th:

(Hiig /4d/Vid$ddl -" ' '

" disolating containment in the ,

gy, ggg i event of a fuel handling accident during shutdown.

Containment isolation in turn ensures meeting the 4//8M//7jG containment leakage rate assumptions of the safety analyses, go%r//og A/Am is /h AU#gg and ensures that the calculated accidental offsite radiological doses are below 10 CFR 100 (Ref. 1) limits.

g The containment ventilation isolation instrumentation, satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO The LCO requirements ensure that the instrumentation necessary to initiate Containment Ventilation Isolation, listed in Table 3.3.6-1, is OPERABLE.

1. Manual Initiation The LCO requires two channels OPERABLE. The operator can initiate Containment ventilation isolation at any t l

time by using either of two switches in the control Either 4

room (containment isolation Phase A switches).

switch actuates both trains. This action will cause actuation of all components in the same manner as any of the automatic actuation signals.

The LCO for Manual Initiation ensures the proper amount of redundancy is maintained in the manual actuation circuitry to ensure the operator has manual initiation capability.

I Each channel consists of one CIA handswitch and the interconnecting wiring to the actuation logic cabinet.

f (continued)

Revision No. O f Vogtle Units 1 and 2 B 3.3-146

2 r .

W Containment ventilation Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6 BASES LCO 2. Automatic Actuation Looic and Actuation Relays (continued)

The LC0 requires two channels of Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays OPERABLE to ensure that no single random failure can prevent automatic actuation.

Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays consist of the same features and operate in the same manner as described for ESFAS Function 1.b, SI. The applicable MODES and specified conditions for the Containment ventilation isolation portion of these Functions are different and less restrictive than those for their SI roles. If one or more of the SI Functions becomes inoperable in such a manner that only the Containment Ventilation Isolation Function is affected, the Conditions applicable to their SI Functions need not be entered. The less restrictive Actions specified for inoperability of the Containment Ventilation Isolation Functions specify sufficient compensatory measures for this case. -

, fins 2 M FOf b 5'3"N7g

3. Containment Radiation ffAb

- The LCO specifies two required channel of radiation monitors to ensure that the radiation )nitoring instrumentation necessary to initiate C'ntainment ventilation isolation remains OPERABLE. The purge exhaust radiation detectors (RE-2565A, B&C) are treated as one channel which is considered OPERABLE if

~

the particulate (RE-2565A) and iodine (RE-2565B) monitors are OPERABLE or the noble gas monitor (RE-2565C) is-OPERABLE. In addition, two individual channels of containment area low range gamma monitors (RE-0002 & RE-0003) are provided. The two required radiation monitoring channels may be made up of any combination of the above described channels.

For sampling systems, channel OPERABILITY involves more than OPERABILITY of the channel electronics.

OPERABILITY may also require correct valve lineups, sample pump operation, and filter motor operation, as well as detector OPERABILITY, if these supporting features are necessary for trip to occur under the ,

conditions assumed by the safety analyses.

(continued)

Vogtle Units 1 and 2 B 3.3-147 Revision No. O l

I

INSERT FOR PAGE B 3.3-147 l

During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement ofirradiated fuel assemblies in containment, the required channels provide input to control room alarms to ensure prompt operator action to manually close the containment purge and exhaust valves. It is also acceptable during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement ofirradiated fuel to meet f the requirements of this LCO by maintaining the radiation monitoring instrumentation l necessary to initiate containment ventilation isolation OPERABLE, in accordance with l the requirements stated for MODES 1,2,3, and 4 operability.

l l

Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation

' B 3.3.6 l

l l BASES l

l LCO 4. Safety in.iection (continued)

Refer to LCO 3.3.2, Function 1, for all initiating Functions and requirements. The safety injection initiation function is applicable in MODES 1. 2. 3.

and 4 only. gg q uffjo APPLICABILITY The Manual Initiation, Automatic Actuation I .ogic and Actuation Relays, M Containment RadiationUFunctions are required

,, ,n .----

OPERABLE in MODES- 1,,,_2,_, 3, and 4e, z.d dr.'.:; C^"E

. -~

s.en6edamone. Under these conditions, the potential exists for an accident that could release fission product radioactivity into containment; Therefore, the Containment

[ ^ ventilation isolation instrumentation must be OPERABLE in these MODES.

(TN564 f FORh whie in MODES s and 6 without fuel handling in progress, FAG 6 8 3.5-Mb the containment ventilation isolation instrumentation need not.be OPERABLE since the potential for radioactive releases is minimized and operator action is sufficient to ensure post accident offsite doses are maintained within the limits of iteference 1.

ACTIONS The most common cause of channel inoperability is outright failure or drift of the bistable or process module sufficient to exceed the tolerance allowed by unit specific calibration procedures. Typically, the drift is found to be small and results in a delay of actuation rather than a total loss of function. This determination is generally made during the performance of a COT, when the process instrumentation is set up for adjustment to bring it within specification. If the Trip Setpoint is less conservative than the tolerance specified by the calibration procedure, the channel must be declared ii.2perable immediately and the appropriate Condition entered.

A Note has been added to the ACTIONS to clarify the application of Completion Time rules. The Conditions of '

this Specification may be entered independently for each Function listed in Table 3.3.6-1. The Completion Time (s) of (continued)

Vogtle Units 1 and 2 B 3.3-148 Revision No. O l

l INSERT FOR PAGE B 3.3-148 q During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement ofirradiated fuel assernblies in containment, the air locks and equipment hatch may be open provided they are isolable per LCO 3.9.4. Since the airlocks and the equipment hatch can only be closed manually, it is assumed that containment ventilation isolation is accomplished by manually closin, the purge and exhaust ventilation valves. Therefore, only OPERABLE radiation monitors are required to alert the operators of the need for containment ventilation isolation.

i

)

l l

1 l

l 1

1 L___ ____ _ .. . . . . -- -- J

Containment ventilation Isolation Instrumentation

- B 3.3.6 BASES ACTIONS the inoperable channel (s) of a Functicn will be tracked (continued) separately for each Function starting from the time the Condition was entered for that Function.

A.1 Condition A applies to the failure of one required containment ventilation isolation radiation monitor channel.

The failed channel must be restored to OPERABLE status.

Four hours are allowed to restore the affected channel based on the low likelihood of events occurring during this interval, and recognition that one or more of the remaining channels will respond to most events.

F_d Condition B applies to all Containment Ventilation Isolation Functions and addresses the train orientation of the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) and the master and slave relays for these Functions. It also addresses the failure 3 of multiple radiation monitoring channels, or the inability l to restore a single failed channel to OPERABLE status in the time allowed for Required Action A.I.

If a manua.1 or automatic actuation channel is inoperable, no j radiation monitoring channels operable, or the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A are not met, operation may continue as long as the Required Action for the applicable Conditions of LCO 3.6.3 is met for each valve made inoperable by failure of isolation instrumentation.

A Note is added stating that Condition B is only applicable in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4.

C.1 and C.2 Condition C :;;1t x t; 11 ;ec.;;.i..'r-t:tir ~..; ";c.til ;i... :;el.t x;

f ;t.. ; T; l

P=:tix: c.d . oui... . J., tri l x f t': . xt.. ..J ;?;;; c;?;,; f;. ;t.;x r =ti x:. It j dse addresses the failure of multiple radiation monitoring channels, or the inability to restore a single failed i

(continued)

)

B 3.3-149 Revision No. O Vogtle Units 1 and 2 I

l - - - - - _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued) OfL channel to OPERABLE status in the time allow rd for Required Action A.1. If :;;=1 : ert - ti: retert :: :h==1 h

%:;r-9'r, no radiation monitoring channels operablem or the Required Action and associated Completion Time of %

Condition A are not met, operation may continue as long as the Required Action to place and maintain containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves in their closted position is met or the applicable Conditions of LCO 3.9.4, pfR//#//04 g nta{nneng Penetrations " are met for eac Q @ .

d'f Id N Completion Time for these Equ'Ireci Aetions 5s"Immediately.

h kquiridShks, J A Note states that Condition C is applicable during CORE ALTERATIONS and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment.-

SURVEILLANCE A Note has been added to the SR Table to clarify that REQUIREMENTS Table 3.3.6-1 detemines which SRs apply to which Containment Ventilation Isolation Functions.

SR 3.3.6.1 Perfomance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is nomally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations

between the two instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Agreement criteria are detemined by the unit staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is I

(continued)

Vogtle Units 1 and 2 B 3.3-150 Revision No. O i

Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6 BASES

/ bb// )

^

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.6.4 REQUIREMENTS (continued) A COT is perfomed every 92 days on each required channel to ensure the entire channel will perform th intended Function. The Frequency is based on the aff recommendation for increasing the availabi ity of radiation monitors according to NUREG-1366 (Ref. 2). /fiis test verifies the capability of the instrumentation to provide the containment purge and exhaust system isolation.

g g TT setpoint shall be left consistent with the current nit The 8#f',#j specific calibration procedure tolerance.

g gyg ,

O/W/>10Vt.1Ned)fW jff & g ygfl4 \ SR 3 3.6.5 M/N4 N SR 3.3.6.5 is the performance of a SLAVE RELAY TEST. The I gf g,k./pfg SLAVE RELAY TEST is the energizing of the slave relays. )

Contact operation is verified in one of two ways. Actuation i y d '// M equipment that may be operated in the' design mitigation mode l

W/h g is either allowed to function or is placed in a condition where the relay contact operation can be verified without

~

qgy,, fdg, J

operation of the equipment. Actuation equipment that may not be operated in the design mitigation mode is prevented 1

g/444/.r v-

/ from operation by the SLAVE RELAY TEST circuit. For this latter u se, contact operation is verified by a continuity 1

.22 M0 check of the circuit containing the slave relay. This test A/t*

gf, /4/j#/

gg is perfomed every 92 days. The Frequency is acceptable based on instrument reliability and industry operating G /4/4, experience.

L___

SR 3.3.6.6 SR 3.3.6.6 is the performance of a TADOT. This test is a .

check of the Manual Actuation Functions and is performed '

every 18 months. Each Manual Actuation Function is tested l

up to, and including, the master relay coils. In some

' instances, the test includes actuation of the end device (i.e.,pumpstarts,valvecycles,etc.).

The test also includes trip devices that provide actuation signals directly to the SSPS, bypassing the analog process control equipment. The SR is modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints during the TADOT. The (continued)

Vogtle Units 1 and 2 B 3.3-152 Revision No. 0

' Containm nt Psnatrations 3.9.4 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.4 ~ Containment Penetrations LCO 3.9.4 The containment penetrations shall be in the following status:

L a. The e 'pment hatch closed and held in pla e by four bo1t , or ifofM, CQfebk ofbGQ c udj AN- Bre.

b. artdpglsonLl'yThe emergency 4ir lockSjef[ isolated by at st one air (Tyr jf o lock door, andmWeepersonnel air lockijd solable by at

/gl' least one air lock door with a designated individual dp?tdr gst available to close the pensenaud air lock door an Y9/1d 1

N c.

09&f Each penetration providing direct access from t e containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere either:

1. closed by a manual or automatic isolation valve, blin6 flange, or equivalent, or C+ ledsf fwo

2. capable of being closed by M OPERABLE Containment Ventilation Isolation Gyoteen Lvalve.s 1

l APPLICABILITY: During CORE ALTERATIONS, l During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment.

)

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more A.1 Suspend CORE Immediately l l

containment ALTERATIONS.

penetrations not in j

required status. Alg!

A.2 Suspend movement of Immedir.tely '

irradiated fuel assemblies within l

containment. l l

Vogtle Units I and 2 3.9-6 Amendment No. 96 (Unit 1)

Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2)

. Containment Penetrations 3.9.4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE- FREQUENCY Verify each required containment 7 days SR 3.9.4.1 penetration is in the required status.

4 f W

.............N0TE------------ '-------

SR 3.9.4./ 3 Only required for unisolated penetrations

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x.. ::;_;.;d at:x :!; ;;,,;;; x 18 months

Ei!hii: :: r :9 :: r + :" = :

a:= c=:::r: -: -

ys/ru f Veridj af lust ko canfainmgmd;hfjan in mit ofer w lakm W vufi/af/up wfrofin ff0VhlI/1 diftCl dCCt ff lfVA 06- Cwt /Ahtmedf atmosp e -k -Me a afsik ahrrosphers are. O*pNc os' briy closalRee& crdteIrrom, a r_ ]

5 g 3 .9.cf.1 - - - - . .- M o rF_.- - - - - - - - - -. -

0 WyAl$W N W//CN k f ht 0)914 w y n ap u p uswi , &p ht. 0 llfM6fff *

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3.9 7 Amendment No. 96 (Unit 1)

Vogtle Units I and 2 Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2)

Containment Penetrations B 3.9.4 B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS B 3.9.4 Containment Penetrations i

BASES BACKGROUND During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment, a release of fission product radioactivity within containment will be restricted from escaping to the environment when the LCO requirements are met. In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, this is accomplished by maintaining containment OPERABLE as described in LCO 3.6.1,

" Containment." In MODE 6, the potential for containment pressurization as a result of an accident is not likely; therefore, requirements to isolate the containment from the outside atmosphere can be less stringent. The LCO requirements are referred to as " containment closure" rather than " containment OPERABILITY." Containment closure means that all potential escape paths are closed or capable of being closed. Since there.is no potential for containment pressurization, the 10 CFR 50, Appendix J leakage criteria and tests are not required.

The containment serves to contain fission product radioactivity that may be released from the reactor core following an accident, such that offsite radiation exposures are maintained well within the requirements of 10 CFR 100.

Additionally, the containment provides radiation shielding from the fission products that may be present in the containment atmosphere following accident conditions.

The containment equipment hatch, which is part of the containment pressure boundary, provides a means for moving largeequipmentandcomponentsintoand,outgcont,aijment. - '- ' - ~

n ;;nM'" 25"'!!""'."' "~ the equipment _

,4 hatch must be M closda ) j nela in place oy at least Tour bolts. Good engineering j practice dictates that the bolts required by this LCO be approximatelyequallyspacedj The containment air locks, which are also part of the containment pressure boundary, provide a means for personnel access during MODES 1., 2, 3, and 4 in accordance with LCO 3.6.2, " Containment Air Locks." Each air lock has a door at both ends. The doors are normally interlocked to m

prevent simultaneous opening when containment OPE,RABILITY is

[ Altemfinly, .Me. egupmred he'c/r cm bo yen DMVid'd U""..N

, (insk/kclW),% a.tninimwr of few hsysfkeWig (continued) &MP)KC w

'Vogtle Units 1 and 2 B 3.9-13 Revision No. O

Containment Penetrations B 3.9.4 1

)

BASES BACKGROUND required. During periods of unit shutdown when containment (continued) closure is not required, the door interlock mechanism may be disabled, allowing both doors of an air lock to remain open for. extended periods when frequent containment entry is necessary. During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of ^

irradiated fuel assemblies within containments - *

c!:: r; i: ---" % :r;' = , the door interlock mechanism

may remain disabled, but one air lock door must always

--' :!:::d '- tr.-: _---_ . f::, i M . ^.:._ ;; ::- :!

eiemleeinames be isolable by at least one air lock door with a designated ind vidual available to close the peassemel air 1ock door,Of 0 ft.dsf estL 0// /0ck oleer seryth be c{egred The requir,ements for containment

_z -,__:__ x _. penetration

.n_-,:. closure..oneeee r- _

l j

L T:EdiE.3 E ..' 1 5jI.'.[ U E

--"' :--- 1.:.

": :'. ::1 : ::::: ;; ::: are sufficient to efts u/6 esoteset fission product radioactivity release from containment due to a fuel handling accident during refue1in L5191ahrlaMed /e#t C/s'hllf$t of 2 r wtwPlan Seeffon/p pjjf));9 ./h1111 owl 6amme/

Cr,Y @ I4 The Containment Ventilation System consists of two 2 inch penetrations for purge and exhaust of the containment l

atmosphere. Each main or shutdown purge and exhaust system

! contains one motor operated 24 inch valve inside containment and one motor operated 24 inch valve outside containment (HV-2626A,HV-2627A,HV-2628A,andHV-2629A). A second 14 inch mini-purge and exhaust system shares each 24 inch l penetration and consists of one 14 inch pneumatically operated valve inside containment and one outside of containment (HV-26268, HV-26278, HV-2628B, and HV-26298). A 14 inch mini-purge line is connected to each 24 inch line between the 24 inch isolation valve and the penetration both inside and outside containment.

t In MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 the 24 inch main or shutdown purge i.

l and exhaust valves are secured in the closed position. The 14 inch mini-purge and exhaust valves may be opened in these MODES in accordance with LCO 3.6.3,. Containment Isolation !'

Valves, and are automatically closed by a Containment Ventilation Isolation signal. The instrumentation that !

provides the automatic isolation function for these valves !

is listed in LCO 3.3.6, Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation.

l l

f (continued) f ,

Vogtle Units 1 and 2 8 3.9-14 Revision No. 0 1

I

- Containment Penetrations B 3.9.4 BASES BACKGROUND In MODE 6, the 24 inch main or shutdown purge and exhaust (continued) valves are used to exchange large volumes of containment air to support refueling operations or other maintenance activities. During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment any open 24 i

inch valves

.rq ."m4 are c,apable m __ v.. of

,+4 ,being rt:rtiali, closed i., th:

i;;..1 (LC0 3.3.6). The 14 inch mini-purge and exhaust valves, though typically not opened during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment, if opened are also capable of being closed =tr:tir't i., 9- r de+nment

"- "':t t r :::::tta 4;n' (LC.0g,3.Q,e The other containment penetrations that provide direct access from containment atmosphere to outside atmosphere must be isolated on at least one side. Isolat'on may be achieved by a closed automatic isolation valve, a manual isolation valve, blind flange, or equivalent. Equivalent isolation methods allowed under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59 may include use of a material that can provide a temporary, atmospheric pressure, ventilation barrier for the other containment penetrations during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment (Ref. 1).

APPLICABLE During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel

. SAFETY ANALYSES assemblies within containment, the most severe radiological l consequences result from a fuel handling accident. The fuel handling accident is a postulated event that involves damage to irradiated fuel (Ref. 2). Fuel handling accidents, I analyzed in Reference 3, include dropping a single l irradiated fuel assembly onto another irradiated fuel assembly.

)

l To up or th plant confi ration f both r lock oors o n it as ssum in F AR cal lations or dose naly s y at th de:

gnat indi idual f r closur of the ir 1 k loc k d ave ;he ai closed ithin 1 minutes f th fue di ng cide . T 15 mi te dura on was osen st mi fo the r spons capab ity for he pers n who s des gna d for closi g the a/ r lock or. Th NRC (continued)

Vogtle Units 1 and 2 B 3.9-15 Rev. 1-6/97 l

- Containment Penetrations B 3.9.4 BASES APPLICABLE aceptanc of th speci cation s bas on es for 2 SAFETY ANALYSES hof rel se as ell as licen e comm ment r a pe on (continued) dfsign ed to ose th door q ekly. f

-A4eer, e requirements of LCO 3.9.7, " Refueling Cavity Water Level," and the minimum decay time of 100 hours0.00116 days 0.0278 hours 1.653439e-4 weeks 3.805e-5 months prior to CORE ALTERATIONS ensure that the release of fission product radioactivity, subsequent to a fuel handling accident, results in doses that are well within the guideline values specified in 10 CFR 100. Standard Review Plan, Section 15.7.4, Rev.1 (Ref. 3), defines "well within" 10 CFR 100 to be 25% or less of the 10 CFR 100 values. The acceptance limits for offsite radiation exposure will be 25%

of 10 CFR 100 values or the NRC staff approved licensing basis (e g., a specified fraction of 10 CFR 100 limits).

)W S6dLT i fe [ {g;.{n r- p ..:.~ ..;; T., C.;' ...n .i on. .;;

L PMot. 6 3.9-l L

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D hp gy4

% tb LCO This LCO limits the consequenc is of a fuel nandling accident y M in containment by limiting the potential escape paths for gy fission product radioactivity eleased within containment.

y m The LCO requires the equipment t - , ::: d:r '- the h/Jer.sorf/fs/J emergency

air lock 8 and any penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside g

g atmosphere to be clonedj::::;t '-- t M ^" ""2 : s o n . . ' . . ...; . . t p ::: ;...J G= em.;;;;;l :i- 1e d Juv.

0 r c Ap od/t 0 [ . '

: ? ' " ' ^" ""* r:t '

ggj gg'j cith : d..;;,...t J ino. . .J..l . 6.. J te l ~, 19 For OPERABLE containment ventilation penetrations. this LCO ensures thaton ese penetration ametisolable by the the i

Containment Ventilation Isolation C.,;t;;.s The OPERABILITY C fgg] l w requirements for LC0 3.3.6, Containment Ventilation -1

/Dc//h//an /#M//#r T '

Isolation Instrumentation ensure thatfth: :Q:_ ^. . in rm s e ens . ann j

;; T - c :: ;. ; . . . .; d ;;;;^; - ,..; ;;;;. i . .so

/g/g g g ;- km wu ou-a 2nd, th;; ;f;; ;, ;;;t th; .;;....pt !.... owu m i C4 0/h dp 3 , [- ] j $ { (( j ; W E M MM",--d

~ ~ ' ' ' "'"

^*E tglS/ S'O NAf RF e .,blIWwi;?"byN){eosdo}m$tsi&b'hs',$~rffit LC6 " 'i' crewe et et opygerm fg Item b of this LCO includes requirements for both theiG /Jo emergency air 1,ock and the, personnel pir,1ock., h , g ,gyg,,,

.///$d/p oc//s4 /d C/dJe Co#F/A/4dPGP/ ;.._ ;i~ 3 ::S f 5EF:1 P S'd I 5 :[ 1 i i ? ? .:

ferre,,fyffgpy & -rr1'. L mutmies pdMW L dI 5/!# ###'I' (continued)

Vogtle Units 1 and 2 B 3.9-16 Rev. 1-6/97

l INSERT 1 FOR PAGE B 3.9-16 l

The radiological consequences of a fuel handling accident in containment have been )

evaluated assuming that the containment is open to the outside atmosphere. All airborne i activity reaching the containment atmosphere is assumed to be exhausted to the environment within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months of the accident. The calculated offsite and control room operator doses are within the acceptance criteria of Standard Review Plan 15.7.4 and GDC 19. Therefore, although the containment penetrations do not satisfy any of the NRC Policy Statement criteria, LCO 3.9.4 provides containment closure capability to minimize potential offsite doses.

INSERT 2 FOR PAGE B 3.9-16 Equipment closure capability is provided by a designated trained hatch closure crew and the necessary equipment. Personnel air lock closure capability is provided by the availability of at least one door and a designated individual to close it. Emergency air lock closure capability is provided by the availability of at least one door and a designated individual to close it.

1

- Containment Penetrations B 3.9.4 BASES I

[fM& Qif l J OfL LCO The perso sel U air lock8)dequired by Itel ibo this LC0 to (continued) be isolab by at least one air lock door" Bot containment personnel air lock doors may be open during move nt of irradiated fuel in the containment and during COR l ALTERATIONS provide one air lock door is isolable > 4mr

/4 , _. _ _ . 2 : air lock isolable when the following criteria are satisfied: g

1. one air lock door is OPERABLE, i

2. at least 23 feet of water shall be maintained over the top of the reactor vessel flange in accordance with Specification 3.9.7,

3. a designated individual is available to close the door.

OPERABILITY of a containment ,_. -_. 21 air lock door requires that the door seal protectors are easily removed, f w that no cables or hoses are being run through the air 1sck, T ///$gg7 f4g T\ and that the air lock door is capable of being quickly .

closed AJ h re ireme p Ina tne isnt ma n6.in a Tee r' ,

av the eactf ves 1 fl ge ensr res th e is rat

([4(pd 8 3 9-/7 su i en ti to c'4se per onnel lock ollo ng I ss f utd n co ing fore oilin occurs Thi eqt re nt r th persp=nel ir loc may be satis ed t1=+ a-- h ark daa close . J amid tai inn l APPLICABILITY The containment penetration requirements are applicable l during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel I assemblies within containment because this is when there is

! a potential for a fuel handling accident. In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, containment penetration requirements are addressed by LCO 3.6.I, " Containment." In MODES 5 and 6, when CORE .

ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment are not being conducted, the potential for a !

fuel handling accident does not exist. Therefore, under l

these conditions no requirements are placed on containment penetration status. !

(continued)

Vogtle Units 1 and 2 B 3.9-17 Rev. 1-6/97 l

INSERT FOR PAGE B 3.9-17 The equipment hatch is considered isolable when the following criteria are satisfied:

1. the necessary equipment required to close the equipment is available,

'2. at least 23 feet of water is maintained over the top of the reactor vessel flange in accordance with Specification 3,9.7,

3. a designated trained hatch closure crew is available.

Similar to the air locks, the equipment hatch opening must be capable of being cleared of any obstruction so that closure can be achieved as soon as possible.

1 I-L.

1

- Containment Penetrations l

B 3.9.4 BASES (continu d) l ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 If the containment equipment hatch, air locks, or any containment penetration that provides direct access from the l_

containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere is not in l the required status, the unit must be placed in a condition where the isolation function is not needed. This is.

accomplished by immediately suspending CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment, Performance of these actions shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.9.4.1 I (gggygd

'L REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance demonstrat s that eact of the containment penetrations required to be in its clost d position is in that position. The Surveil' ance on the'bpen containment ventilation isolation valve ; will demonstrate that the valves are not blocked from closing. Also the Surveillance will demonstrate that eachpalve operator has motive power, which will ensure that each valve is capable of being closede g -- noronni r _

n+~. t $ ::::;;,,,,,,,,, ,,,,; n :tt-- f:p e -

f. ;... .

The Surveillance is performed every 7 days during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment. The Surveillance interval is selected to be commensurate with the normal duration of time to complete fuel handling operations. Including a surveillance before the start of refueling operations will provide two or three surveillance verifications during the applicable period for this LCO. As such, this Surveillance ensures that a postulated fuel handling accident that releases fission product radioactivity within the containment will not result in a release of fission product radioactivity to the environment.

1AS6$'f f0A \ -

[

$ 0 b'W SR .9.4./b (I y This Surveillance demonstra ;es that each containment ventilation isolation valve ' actuates

' " "' - -- ^"

to its isolation

a S e + "'I ^" tit _^l:t:d positione^

l

'.'J...J;.t'.:: :!;- S The 18 month Frequency maintains l

(continued)

Rev. 1-6/97 l Vogtle Units 1 and 2 B 3.9-18

1

\

INSERT FOR PAGE B 3.9-18 l

SR 3.9.4.2 The equipment hatch is provided with a set of hardware, tools, and equipment for moving the hatch from its storage location and installing it in the opening. The required set of ;

hardware, tools, and equipment shall be inspected to ensure that they can perform the required functions.

The 7 day frequency is adequate considering that the hardware, tools, and equipment are dedicated to the equipment hatch and not used for any other functions.

The SR is modified by a Note which only requires that the surveillance be met for an open equipment hatch. If the equipment hatch is installed in its opening, the availability of the means to install the hatch is not required.

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. Containment Penetrations B 3.9.4 BASES S

SURVEILLANCE 3.9.4 1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS consistency with other similar -

W testing _ requirements. E LLU J.6, "O ainmen Tent iat n;Aoi ion I stru ntati ," add ional ,

co ai nt en lati iso tion ystem s veillan l

r. qui me si lude 12 ur C annel C ck, a 3 day '

ct ti Lo c Te and aste, Relay st, a 9 day an ;

Si e lay est, n 18 onth ADOT, d Chann Cal rati !

d res se te t eve v in the on KTacc rn sT BASI . FAlso, SR 3.6.3.5 demonstrates that the isolation i time of each valve is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program requirements. These Surveillance performed during MODE 6 will ensure that the valves are capable of closing after a postulated fuel handling accident to limit a release of fission product radioactivity from the !

containment. l REFERENCES 1. GPU Nuclear Safety Evaluation SE-0002000-001, Rev. O, ,

May 20, 1988. l

2. FSAR, Subsection 15.7.4.

3. NUREG-0800, Section 15.7.4, Rev.1, July 1981.

l t

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l Vogtle Units 1 and 2 B 3.9-19 Rev. 1-6/97 l

- CST 3.7.6

( 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.6 Condensate Storage Tank (CST) E (Redundant esTJ LC0 3.7.6 One CST shall be OPERABLE with a safety-related volume 2: 340,000 gallons.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. CST volume not within k.1 Align Auxiliary 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months limit. Feedwater pumps to OPERABLE CST.

B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time not met. 32 B.2 Be in MODE 4 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.6.1 verify the CST volume is within limit. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months l

Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.7-15 Amendment No. 96 (Unit 1)

Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2)

. _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - L

CST 3.7.6a 7 PLANT SYSTEMS

3. a Condensate Storage Tank (CST) - (Non-redundant CSTs)

NOTE---------------------------------- -------

This LC shall be applicable to the Unit (s) which have not completed he design mo ifications required for redundant CSTs. This alternate T hnical Specificat n is temporary and will no longer be required when bot units have completed t' modifications required to make the CSTs redundant.

l .....____.... ...........___........____....................... ...........__

LCO 3.7.6a Two CSTs shall be OPERABLE with:

a A combined safety-related volume of 20,000 gallons; and

b. 1e CST aligned to sup ly the Aux' iar Feedwater pum s 11 have a safety-re ated volu ;a 3 0,000 gallons.ps APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2,[nd3, ACTIONS CONDITION EQU D ACTION COMPLETION TIME

\

A. Required CST volume (s) A.I estore volume (s) to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months not within limits, with limits.

Required Action and

< x B. 8.1 Be in MD 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completi \ '

Time not met. .4E s B.2 Be in MODE 4 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months j \

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

[ SURVEILLANCE g FREQUENCY SR .7.6a.1 Verify CST volumes within specified limits. I hours x

Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.7-16 Amendment No. # (Unit 1)

Amendment No. # (Unit 2)

_-m_ __.___m__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _

CST B 3.7.6 BASES LCO established in Reference 4 and exceeds the volume required (continued) by the accident analysis.

The OPERABILITY of the CST is determined by maintaining the tank level at or above the minimum required level. Either CST V4001 or CST V4002 may be used to satisfy the LCO requirement.

order for a single CST to meet the LCO requirements st d above, design modifications are required to all alig nt of the AFW pumps mini-flow lines to the C to which t pump suction is aligned. Prior to the implement ion of the design modification, LCO. .7.6a shall be applicab Prior to completion of the ign modification t volume of water required satisfy the safety analyses at a unit is 420,000 ons. LCO 3.7.6a requires an unmodified unit to main n both CSTs OPERABLE with a combined safetyh elated vo of 2 420,000 gallons.

In addition, LCO 3.7.6a Pequi the CST that supplies the AFW pumps to contain a safe related volume of k 340,000 gallons. The volume spec 'fgr the CST supplying the AFW System is based on the to enk re sufficient time exists for the operator act n required to itch the AFW pump suction supply to e other CST. If combined safety-related volume the safety-related voi required for the i AFW supply i ot as s tains Actions to restore e volume (pecified, LCO 3.7.6a cs) acetothe within limit or to unit in DE where the CSTs are no longer requi OPERA . LCO 3.7.6a is no longer required and may del ed when both units have completed the required ifications.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the CST is required to be OPERABLE.

Due to the reduced heat removal requirements and short period of time in MODE 4 and the availability of RHR in MODE 4, the LCO does not require a CST to be OPERABLE in this MODE.

In MODE 5 or 6, the CST is not required because the AFW System is not required.

(continued)

Vogtle Units 1 and 2 B 3.7-37 RevisionNo./

r-_____________-________-________--- _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ . _ _ - - . _ - _ - . . _ _ _ _ _ - _ - - _ _ - - -

Encirsure 4 Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Request to Revise Technical Specifications Containment Penetrations and Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation Clean Typed TS and Bases Pages l

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i Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.6 Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation LCO 3.3.6 The Containment Ventilation Isolation instrumentation for each -

Function in Table 3.3.6-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.6-1. l ACTIONS

NOTE-------------------------------- =

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Only one radiation A.1 Restore at least two 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months monitoring channel channels to OPERABLE OPERABLE. status.

(continued)

)

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Vogtle Units 1.and 2 3.3-49 Amendment No. (Unit 1)

Amendment No. (Unit 2) l:

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L

Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. --

NOTE- -==--

C.1 Place and maintain Immediately Only applicable during containment purge and CORE ALTERATIONS or exhaust valves in closed I movement of irradiated position.

fuel assemblies within containment. QB No radiation monitoring C.2 Enter applicable Immediately l channels OPERABLE. Conditions and Required Actions of LC0 3.9.4, QB " Containment Penetrations," for Required Action and containment purge supply associated Completion and exhaust isolation Time for Condition A penetrations not in not met. required status.

Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3-51 Amendment No. (Unit 1)

Amendment No. (Unit 2)

Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6 Table 3.3.6-1 (page 1 of 1)

Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS REQUIREMENTS TRIP SETP0lNT

1. Manual Initiation 1,2,3,4 2 SR 3.3.6.6 NA l

2. Automatic Actuation Logic 1,2,3,4 2 SR 3.3.6.2 NA and Actuation Relays SR 3.3.6.3 l SR 3.3.6.5

3. Containment Radiation 1,2,3,4,6(c) 2(a) SR 3.3.6.1 l SR 3.3.6.4 i SR 3.3.6.7 SR 3.3.6.8

a. Gaseous (RE-2565C)

(b)

b. Particulate (b)

(RE-2565A)

c. Iodine (b)

(RE 25658)

d. Area Low Fange 5 15 mr/h(C)

(RE-0002, RE-0003) s 50x t,ackground(d)

4. Safety injection 1,2,3,4 Refer to LCO 3.3.2, "ESFAS Instrtmantation,"

Function 1, for all initiation functions and l requirements.

(a) Containment ventilation radiation (RE-2565) is treated as one channel and is considered OPERABLE f f the particulate (RE-2565A) and lodine monitors (RE-2565B) are OPERABLE or the noble gas monitor (RE-2565C) is OPERABLE.

(b) Setpoints will not exceed the limits of Specifications 5.5.4.h and 5.5.4.1 of the Radioactive Ef fluent Controls Pro 1 ram.

(c) During CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment.

(d) During MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3-53 Amendment No. (Unit 1)

Amendment No. (Unit 2)

CST 3.7.6 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.6 Condensate Storage Tank (CST)

LCO 3.7.6 One CST shall be OPERABLE with a safety-related volume 2: 340,000 gallons.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. CST volume not within A.1 Align Auxiliary 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months limit. Feedwater pumps to OPERABLE CST.

B. Required Action and 8.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time not met. AND B.2 Be in MODE 4 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.6.1 Verify the CST volume is within limit. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.7-15 Amendment No. (Unit 1)

Amendment No. (Unit 2)

CST ,

3.7.6 l I

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Deleted

' This Page Intentionally Left Blank i

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Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.7-16 Amendment No. (Unit 1) l Amendment No. (Unit 2) l t- .______ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ .

Containment Penetrations 3.9.4 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.4 Containment Penetrations LC0 3.9.4 The containment penetrations shall be in the following status:

a. The equipment hatch closed and held in place by four bolts, or if open, capable of being closed; l

b. The emergency and personnel air locks are isolated by at least one air lock door, or if open, the emergency and personnel air locks are isolable by at least one air lock door with a designated individual available to close the open air lock door (s); and I

c. Each penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere either:

1. closed by a manual or automatic isolation valve, i blind flange, or equivalent, or

2. capable of being closed by at least two OPERABLE Containment Ventilation Isolation valves.

APPLICABILITY: During CORE ALTERATIONS, 3 During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within g containment.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more A.1 Suspend CORE Immediately containment ALTERATIONS.

penetrations not in required status. AND A.2 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies within containment.

l Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.9-6 Amendment No. (Unit I)

Amendment No. (Unit 2)

~

f Containment Penetrations 3.9.4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.9.4.1 Verify each required containment 7 days penetration is in the required status.

SR 3.9.4.2 ----------------NOTE---------------------

Only required for an open equipment hatch Verify the capability to install the 7 days equipment hatch.

3.9.4.3 -----------------NOTE-------------------- l Only reqJired for unisolated penetrations.

Verify at least two containment ventilation 18 months valves in each open containment ventilation penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere are capable of being closed from the control room.

i I

Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.9-7 Amendment No. (Unit 1)

Amendment No. (Unit 2)

Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6 BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE The safety analyses assume that the containment remains SAFETY ANALYSES intact with penetrations unnecessary for core cooling isolated early in the event, within approximately 60 seconds. The isolation of the purge supply and exhaust valves has not been analyzed mechanistically in the dose calculations, although its rapid isolation is assumed. The containment purge supply and exhaust isolation radiation monitors act as backup to the SI signal to ensure closing of the purge supply and exhaust valves for events occurring in MODES 1 through 4. Manual isolation (using individual valve handswitches) following a radiation alarm is the assumed means for isolating containment in the event of a fuel handling accident during shutdown. Containment isolation in turn ensures meeting the containment leakage rate assumptions of the safety analyses, and ensures that the calculated accidental offsite radiological doses are below 10 CFR 100 (Ref. 1) limits.

The containment ventilation isolation instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO The LC0 requirements ensure that the instrumentation necessary to initiate Containment Ventilation Isolation, listed in Table 3.3.6-1, is OPERABLE.

1. Manual Initiation The LC0 requires two channels OPERABLE. The operator can initiate Containment ventilation isolation at any time by using either of two switches in the control room (containment isolation Phase A switches). Either switch actuates both trains. This action will cause actuation of all components in the same manner as any of the automatic actuation signals.

The LCO for Manual Initiation ensures the proper amount of redundancy is maintained in the manual actuation circuitry to ensure the operator has manual initiation capability.

Each channel consists of one CIA handswitch and the interconnecting wiring to the actuation logic cabinet.

(continued)

Vogtle Units 1 and 2 B 3.3-146 Revision No.

i

- _ _ _ _ _ l

Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6 BASES

, LC0 2. Automatic Actuation loaic and Actuation Relays l

' (continued)

The LC0 requires two channels of Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays OPERABLE to ensure that no I single random failure can prevent automatic actuation.

Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays consist of the same features and operate in the same manner as described for ESFAS Function 1.b, SI. The applicable MODES and specified conditions for the Containment ventilation isolation portion of these Functions are different and less restrictive than those for their SI roles. If one or more of the SI Functions becomes inoperable in such a manner that only the Containment Ventilation Isolation Function is affected, the Conditions applicable to their SI Functions need not be entered. The less restrictive Actions specified for inoperability of the Containment Ventilation Isolation Functions specify sufficient compensatory measures for this case.

3. Containment Radiation The LC0 specifies two required channels of radiation monitors to ensure that the radiation monitoring instrumentation necessary to initiate Containment ventilation isolation remains OPERABLE. During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in containment, the required channels provide input to control room alarms to ensure prompt operator action to manually close the containment purge and exhaust valves. It is also acceptable during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel to meet the requirements of this LC0 by maintaining the radiation monitoring instrumentation necessary to initiate i containment ventilation isolation OPERABLE, in accordance with the requirements stated for MODES l 1, 2, 3, and 4 operability. The purge exhaust i radiation detectors (RE-2565A, B&C) are treated as one l channel which is considered OPERABLE if the !

particulate (RE-2565A) and iodine (RE-2565B) monitors are OPERABLE or the noble gas monitor (RE-2565C) is OPERABLE. In addition, two individual channels of containment area low range gamma monitors (RE-0002 &

RE-0003) are provided. The two required radiation i monitoring channels may be made up of any combination of the above described channels.

(continued)

Vogtle Units 1 and 2 B 3.3-147 Revision No.

l

Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation

+

B 3.3.6 BASES LCO 3. Containment Radiation (continued) l For sampling systems, channel 0PERABILITY involves more than OPERABILITY of the channel electronics.

OPERABILITY may also require correct valve lineups, sample pump operation, and filter motor operation, as well as detector OPERABILITY, if these supporting features are necessary for trip to occur under the conditions assumed by the safety analyses.

"l (continued)

Vogtle Units I and 2 8 3.3-147a Revision No. l l

Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6 BASES -

4

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l 1

This Page Intentionally left Blank l.

(continued)

Vogtle Units 1 and 2 B 3.3-147b Revision No.

Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6 BASES LCO 4. Safety In.iection (continued)

Refer to LC0 3.3.2 Function 1, for all initiating Functionsandrequirements. The safety injection initiation function is applicable in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 only.

APPLICABILITY The Manual Initiation, Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays, Containment Radiation, and Safety Injectior Functions are required OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. Under these conditions, the potential exists for an accident that could release fission product radioactivity into containment. Therefore, the Containment ventilation isolation instrumentation must be OPERABLE in these MODES.

During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel l' assemblies in containment - the air locks and equipment hatch may be open provided they,are isolable per LC0 3.9.4. Since L the air locks and the equipment hatch can only be closed manually, it is assumed that containment ventilation isolation is accomplished b exhaust ventilation valves.y manually Therefore,closing the >3LEurge and only OPERA radiation monitors are required to alert the operators of the need for containment ventilation isolation.

While in MODES 5 and 6 without fuel handling in progress, the containment ventilation isolation instrumentation need not be OPERABLE since the potential for radioactive releases is minimized and operator action is sufficient to ensure post accident offsite doses are maintained within the limits of Reference 1.

ACTIONS The most common cause of channel inoperability is outright failure or drift of the bistable or process module sufficient to exceed the tolerance allowed by unit specific calibration procedures. Typically, the drift is found to be small and results in a delay of actuation rather than a total loss of function. This determination is generally made during the performance of a COT, when the process instrumentation is set up for adjustment to bring it within specification. If the Trip Setpoint is less conservative thanthetolerancespecifiedbythecalibrationprocedure$e the channel must be declared inoperable immediately and t appropriate Condition entered.

A Note has been added to the ACTIONS to clarify the application of Completion Time rules. The Conditions of this Specification may be entered independently for each Function listed in Table 3.3.6-1. The Completion Time (s) of (continued)

Vogtle Units 1 and 2 B 3.3-148 Revision No.

I

\

Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6 BASES ACTIONS the inoperable channel (s) of a Function will be tracked (continued separately for each Function starting from the time the Condition was entered for that Function.

L.1 Condition A applies to the failure of one required containment ventilation isolation radiation monitor channel.

The failed channel must be restored to OPERABLE status.

Four hours are allowed to restore the affected channel based on the low likelihood of events occurring during this interval, and recognition that one or more of the remaining channels will respond to most events.

L.1 Condition B applies to all Containment Ventilation Isolation Functions and addresses the train orientation of the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) and the master and slave relays for these Functions. It also addresses the failure of multiple radiation monitoring channels, or the inability to restore a single failed channel to OPERABLE status in the time allowed for Required Action A.I.

If a manual or automatic actuation channel is inoperable, no radiation monitoring channels operable, or the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A are not.

met, operation may continue as long as the Required Action for the applicable Conditions of LC0 3.6.3 is met for each valve made inoperable by failure of isolation instrumentation.

A Note is added stating that Condition B is only applicable .

in MODE 1, 2,'3, or 4. I C.1 and C.2 Condition C addresses the failure of multiple radiation I monitoring channels, or the inability-to restore a single failed channel to OPERABLE status in the time allowed for (continued)

-Vogtle Units 1 and 2 B 3.3-149 Revision No.

11

Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6 BASES ACTIONS .C.1 and C.2 (continued)

Required Action A.I. If no radiation monitoring channels l are operable or the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A are not met, operation may continue as long as the Required Action to place and maintain containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves in their closed position is met or the applicable !

Conditions of LCO 3.9.4, " Containment Penetrations," are met for each penetration not in the required status. The l Completion Time for these Required Actions is Immediately.

A Note states that Condition C is applicable during CORE ALTERATIONS and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment.

SURVEILLANCE A Note has been added to the SR Table to clarify that REQUIREMENTS Table 3.3.6-1 determines which SRs apply to which .

Containment Ventilation Isolation Functions. 1 SR 3.3.6.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK _is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the two instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Agreement criteria are determined by the unit staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is (continued)

Vogtle Units 1 and 2 B 3.3-150 Revision No.

Contair. ment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation

B 3.3.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.6.4' REQUIREMENTS

.(continued) A COT is performed every 92 days on each required channel to ensure the entire channel will perform the intended Function. The Frequency is based on the staff recommendation for increasing the availability of radiation monitors according to NUREG-1366 (Ref. 2). For MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, this test verifies the capability of the instrumentation to provide the containment purge and exhaust system isolation. During CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel in containment, this test verifies the capability of the required channels to generate the signals i required for input to the control room alarm. The setpoint shall be left consistent with the current unit specific calibration procedure tolerance.

SR 3.3.6.5.

SR 3.3.6.5 is the performance of a SLAVE RELAY TEST. The SLAVE' RELAY TEST is the energizing of the slave relays.

Contact operation is verified in one of two ways. Actuation equipment that may be operated in the design mitigation mode l 1s either allowed to function or is placed in a condition where the relay contact operation can be verified without oper& tion of the equipment. Actuation equipment.that may not be operated in the design mitigation mode is prevented from operation by the SLAVE RELAY TEST circuit. For this latter case, contact operation is verified by a continuity check of the' circuit containing the slave relay. This test l .is performed every 92 days. The Frequency is accoptable ,

I based on instrument reliability and industry operating I experience.

SR 3.3.6.6 SR 3.3.6.6 is the performance of a TAD 0T. This test is a check of the Manual Actuation Functions and is performed every 18 months. Each Manual Actuation Function is tested up to, and including, the master relay coils. In some instances, the test includes actuation of the end device (i.e., pump' starts, valve cycles, etc.).

The test also includes trip devices that provide actuation signals' directly to the SSPS, bypassing the analog process

-control equipment. The SR is modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints during the TAD 0T. The (continued)

Vogtle Units 1 and 2 B 3.3-152 Revision No.

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I CST B 3.7.6 BASES LCO established in Reference 4 and exceeds the volume required (continued) by the accident analysis.

The OPERABILITY of the CST is determined by maintaining the tank level at or above the minimum required level. Either CST V4001 or CST V4002 may be used to satisfy the LC0 l requirement. i I

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APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the CST is required to be OPERABLE. 1 l Due to the reduced heat removal requirements and short period of time in MODE 4 and the availability of RHR in MODE 4, the LC0 does not require a CST to be OPERABLE in this MODE.

In MODE 5 or 6, the CST is not required because the AFW System is not required. j (continued)

Vogtle Units 1 and 2 B 3.7-37 Revision No.

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Containment Penetrations B 3.9.4 B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS B 3.9.4 Containment Penetrations BASES BACKGROUND During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment, a release of fission product radioactivity within containment will be restricted from escaping to the environment when the LC0 requirements are met. In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, this is accomplished by maintaining containment OPERABLE as described in LCO 3.6.1,

" Containment." In MODE 6, the potential for containment pressurization as a result of an accident is not likely; therefore, requirements to isolate the containment from the outside atmosphere can be less stringent. The LC0 requirements are referred to as " containment closure" rather i than " containment OPERABILITY." Containment closure means that all potential escape paths are closed or capable of being closed. Since there is no potential for containment pressurization, the 10 CFR 50, Appendix J 1eakage criteria and tests are not required.

The containment serves to contain fission product radioactivity that may be released from the reactor core following an accident, such that offsite radiation exposures are maintained well within the requirements of 10 CFR 100.

Additionally, the containment provides radiation shielding from the fission products that may be present in the containment atmosphere following accident conditions.

The containment equipment hatch, which is part of the containment pressure boundary, provides a means for moving large equipment and components into and out of containment.

If closed, the equipment hatch must be held in place by at least four bolts. Good engineering practice dictates that the bolts required by this LC0 be approximately equally spaced. Alternatively, the equipment hatch can be open provided it can be installed with a minimum of four bolts holding it in place.

The containment air locks, which are also part of the containment pressure boundary, provide a means for personnel access during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 in accordance with LC0 3.6.2, " Containment Air Locks." Each air lock has a door at both ends. The doors are normally interlocked to prevent simultaneous opening when containment OPERABILITY is l

(continued) l Vogtle Units 1 and 2 B 3.9-13 Revision No.

Containment P:netratiens B 3.9.4 BASES BACKGROUND required. During periods of unit shutdown when containment (continued) closure is not required, the door interlock mechanism may be disabled, allowing both doors of an air lock to remain open for extended periods when frequent containment entry is .

necessary. During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment, the door interlock mechanism may remain disabled, but one air lock door must always must be isolable by at least one air lock door with a designated individual available to close the air lock door, or at least one air lock door must be closed. ,

l l The requirements for containment penetration closure are sufficient to ensure fission product radioactivity release from containment due to a fuel handling accident during refueling is maintained to within the acceptance criteria of Standard Review Plan Section 15.7.4 and General Design Criteria 19.

! The Containment Ventilation System consists of two 24 inch ;

penetrations for purge and exhaust of the containment '

atmosphere. Each main or shutdown purge and exhaust system contains one motor operated 24 inch valve inside containment and one motor operated 24 inch valve outside containment (HV-2626A, HV-2627A, HV-2628A, and HV-2629A). A second 14 inch mini-purge and exhaust system shares each 24 inch penetration and consists of one 14 inch pneumatically operated valve inside containment and one outside of containment (HV-2626B, HV-2627B, HV-2628B, and HV-26298). A j 14 inch mini-purge line is connected to each 24 inch line l l

between the 24 inch isolation valve and the penetration both inside and outside containment.

In MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 the 24 inch main or shutdown purge )

and exhaust valves are secured in the closed position. The '

14 inch mini-purge and exhaust valves may be opened in these MODES in accordance with LC0 3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves, and are automatically closed by a Containment ,

Ventilation Isolation signal. The instrumentation that provides the automatic isolation function for these valves is listed in LC0 3.3.6, Containment Ventilation Isolation j Instrumentation.

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(continued)

Vogtle Units 1 and 2 B 3.9-14 Revision No.

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s Containment Penetrations B 3.9.4 BASES ;

i BACKGROUND In MODE 6, the 24 inch main or shutdown purge and exhaust ,

(continued) valves are used to exchange large volumes of containment air '

to support refueling operations or other maintenance activities. During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment any open 24 l inch valves are capable 'of being closed (LC0 3.3.6).- The 14 l inch mini-purge and exhaust valves, though typically not opened during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment, if opened are also ,

capable of being closed (LCO 3.3.6). '

The other containment penetrations that provide direct access from containment atmosphere to outside' atmosphere must be isolated on at.least one side. Isolation may be achieved by a closed automatic isolation valve, a manual isolation valve, blind flange, or equivalent. Equivalent isolation methods allowed under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59 may include use of a material that can provide a temporary, atmospheric pressure, ventilation barrier for the other containment penetrations during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment (Ref. 1).

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l APPLICABLE- During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel SAFETY ANALYSES assemblies within containment, the most severe radiological 3 consequences result from a fuel handling accident. The fuel -

handling accident is a postulated event that involves damage to irradiated fuel (Ref. 2). Fuel handling accidents, analyzed in Reference 3, include dropping a single irradiated fuel assembly onto another irradiated fuel assembly.

(continued)

1. Vogtle Units 1 and 2 B 3.9-15 Rev. 1-6/97 l

.- Containment Penetrations B 3.9.4 BASES APPLICABLE The requirements of LC0 3.9.7, " Refueling Cavity Water SAFETY ANALYSES Level," and the minimum decay time of 100 hours0.00116 days 0.0278 hours 1.653439e-4 weeks 3.805e-5 months prior to

-(continued) CORE ALTERATIONS ensure that the release of fission product radioactivity, subsequent to a fuel handling accident, results in doses that are well within the guideline values specified in 10 CFR 100. Standard Review Plan, Section 15.7.4, Rev. 1 (Ref. 3), defines-"well within" 10 CFR 100 to be 25% or less of the 10 CFR 100 values. The acceptance limits for offsite radiation exposure will be 25%

of 10 CFR 100 values or the NRC staff approved licensing basis (e.g., a specified fraction of 10 CFR 100 limits).

The radiological consequences of a fuel handling accident in containment have been evaluated assuming that the containment is open to the outside atmosphere. All airborne activity reaching the containment atmosphere is assumed to be exhausted to the environment within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months of the accident. The calculated offsite and control ' room operator doses are within the acceptance criteria of Standard Review Plan 15.7.4 and GDC 19. Therefore, although the containment penetrations do not satisfy any of the NRC Policy Statement criteria, LCO 3.9.4 provides containment closure capability to minimize potential offsite doses.

LCO This LCO limits the consequences of a fuel handling accident in containment by limiting.the potential escape paths for fission product radioactivity released within containment.

The LC0 requires the equipment hatch, the emergency and personnel air locks, and any penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere to be closed or capable of being closed.

Equipment closure capability is provided by a designated trained hatch closure crew and the necessary equipment.

Personnel air lock closure capability is provided by the availability of at least one door and a designated individual to close it. Emergency air lock closure capability is provided by the availability of at least one door and a designated individual to close it. For the OPERABLE containment ventilation penetrations, this LC0 ensures that each penetration is isolable by the Containment Ventilation Isolation valves. The OPERABILITY requirements for LCO 3.3.6, Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation ensure that radiation monitor inputs to the control room alarm exist so that operators can take timely (continued)

Vogtle Units 1 and 2 B 3.9-16 Revision No.

e' Containment Penetrations J B 3.9.4 l 1

BASES j

LC0 action to close containment penetrations to minimize (continued) potential offsite doses. The LC0 requirements for penetration closure may also be met by the automatic isolation capability of the CVI system.

Item b of this LC0 includes requirements for both the emergency air lock and the personnel air lock. The personnel and emergency air locks are required by Item b of this LC0 to be isolable by at least one air lock door in l each air lock. Both containment personnel and emergency air '

lock doors may be open during movement of irradiated fuel in the containment and during CORE ALTERATIONS provided at I least one air lock door is isolable in each air lock. An air lock is isolable when the following criteria are i satisfied: i

1. one air lock door is OPERABLE, l

2. at least 23 feet of water shall be maintained over the top of the reactor vessel flange i.i accordance with Specification 3.9.7, j

3. a designated individual is available to close the l door. 1 OPERABILITY of a containment air lock door requires that the l door seal protectors are easily removed, that no cables or hoses are being run through the air lock, and that the air lock door is capable of being quickly closed. The equipment j hatch is considered isolable when the following crieteria j are satisfied: l

1. the necessary equipment required to close the equipment hatch is available,

2. at least 23 feet of water is maintained over the top of the reactor vessel flange in accordance with Specification 3.9.7,

3. a designated trained hatch closure crew is available.

Similar to the air locks, the equipment hatch opening must be capable of being cleared of any obstruction so that clo ure can be achieved as soon as possible.

l f (continued) l l Vogtle Units 1 and 2 B 3.9-17 Revision No.

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i A Containment Penetrations B 3.9.4 BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY The containment penetration requirements are applicable during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment because this is when there is a potential for a fuel handling accident. In MODES 1, 2, 5, and 4, containment penetration requirements are addressed by LCO 3.6.1, " Containment." In MODES 5 and 6, when CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment are not being conducted, the potential for a fuel handling accident does not exist. Therefore, under these conditions no requirements are placed on containment L penetration status.

ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 l

If the containment equipment hatch, air locks, or any containment penetration that~provides direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere is not in the required status, the unit must be placed in a condition where the isolation function is not needed. This is accomplished by immediately suspending CORE ALTERATIONS and t

movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment.

Performance of these actions shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.9.4.1 REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance demonstrates that each of the containment

penetrations required to be in its closed position is in that position. The Surveillance on the required open containment ventilation isolation valves will demonstrate ! ;

that the valves are not blocked from closing. Also the l Surveillance will demonstrate that each required valve l :

operator has motive power, which will ensure that each valve ;

is capable of being closed. I i The Surveillance is performed every 7 days during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within ;

containment. The Surveillance interval is selected to be commensurate with the normal duration of time to complete fuel handling operations. Including a surveillance before the start of refueling operations will provide two or three surveillance verifications during the applicable period for this LCO. As such, this Surveillance ensures that a postulated fuel handling accident that releases fission (continued)

Vogtle Units I and 2 B 3.9-18 Revision No.

4'I Containment Penetrations B 3.9.4 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.9.4.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS product radioactivity within the containment will not result in a release of fission product radioactivity to the environment.

SR 3.9.4.2 The equipment hatch is provided with a set of hardware, tools, and equipment for moving the hatch from its storage ,

location and installing it in the opening. The required set l of hardware, tools, and equipment shall be inspected to 1 ensure that they can perform the required functions.

The 7 day frequency is adequate considering that the j hardware, tools, and equipment are dedicated to the equipment hatch and not used for any other functions.

l The SR is modified by a Note which only requires that the surveillance be met for an open equipment hatch. If the equipment hatch is installed in its opening, the availability of the mears to install the hatch is not 3 required.

SR 3.9.4.3 l This Surveillance demonstrates that each containment ventilation isolation valve in each open containment l ventilation penetration actuates to its isolation position.

l The 18 month Frequency maintains consistency with other similar testing requirements. Also, SR 3.6.3.5 demonstrates that the isolation time of each valve is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program requirements. These .

Surveillance Performed during MODE 6 will ensure that the l valves are capable of closing after a postulated fuel i handling accident to limit a release of fission product radioactivity from the containment.

REFERENCES 1. GPU Nuclear Safety Evaluation SE-0002000-001, Rev. O, May 20, 1988.

2. FSAR, Subsection 15.7.4.

3. NUREG-0800, Section 15.7.4, Rev. 1, July 1981.

Vogtle Units I and 2 B 3.9-19 Revision No.

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ML20236F163

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