ML20092G099
| ML20092G099 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 08/09/1988 |
| From: | Bate G, Stark M GEORGIA POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20092F288 | List:
|
| References | |
| CON-IIT05-002-00A-90, CON-IIT05-099-90, CON-IIT5-2-A-90, CON-IIT5-99-90, RTR-NUREG-1410 GE-LP-88002-, GE-LP-88002-00, NUDOCS 9202190630 | |
| Download: ML20092G099 (30) | |
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VOGTLE ELECTQlC GENERATI L
TRAINING LISS'N fun TlTLE:
CONTINUING TRAINING--RHR MID-LOOP OPER.
NUMBER.CE-LP-88002-00-C PROGRAM:
MAINTENANCE /Qc REYlS10N: 00 AUTHOR:
C.R. BATE DATE:
8/8/88 APPROVED:
Op. T TMd DATE: g/ggg
~
ltGTRUCTOR GUIDELIES:
1.
LESSON PRESENTATION FORMAT--Lecture 2.
LIST OF EQUIPMENT / MATERIALS REQUIRED--Overhead Projector, Transparencies, Student Handout 3.
STUDENT EVALUATION METHOD-Quiz
+
4
- l l
MASTER 30?Y 1
CE-LP-88002-00-C
,, CE07.
REFERENCES:
1.
NRC Generic Letter 87-12:
" Loss of RHR while RCS Partially Filled" 2.
GPC Response to NRC Generic Letter 87-12 3.
NOP-464 4.
LO-LP-60990-00-C
" Case Study for the Loss of RHR Cooling at Diablo Canyon" 5.
CPC Standing Order 1-87-48:
"RER Operation with RCS Partially Filled" 6.
Procedorest a.
12000--Refueling Recovery b.
12006--Unit Cooldown to Cold Shutdown c.
12007--Refueling Entry d.
13005--RCS Draining 2
=.
~.
. -crof GE-LP-88002-00-C
,_i 1.
PURPOSE STATEMENT!
The purpose of this lesson is to provide the student with an understanding of the events
. lcading up to. during, and corrective actions taken f or the loss of RHR at Diablo Canyon Unit 2 nuclear Power Plant and applicable actions taken or to be taken to reduce the possibility of a similar event occurring at Plant Vogtle, ll.
LIST OF OBJECTIVES:
1.
State the initial conditions at Diablo Canyon prior to the loss of RHR cooling.
2.
Describe the events that led to the loss of RHR cooling at Diablo Canyon.
3.
Describe the possible consequences that could have resulted from a sustained loss of RHR cooling.
4.
List the instrumentation utilized at Diablo Canyon for monitoring reactor vessel level.
-5.
List the instrumentation utilized e" Diablo-Canyon for monitoring core temperature.
- 6..
Describe actions taken at Diablo Canyon which had adverse af f ects on the loss of cooling event.
7._
Describe the actions to be taken by GPC to reduce the probability of a similar event-occurring at Plant Vogtle.
8.
List precautions.which maintenance personnel must take while votking on MW0s during drain-dovn conditions.
9 3
GIO7 CE-LP-88002-00-C lll.
LESSON OUTLINE.
NOTES 1.
INTRODUCTION.
A.
Lesson covers followingt 1.
Case study on loss of RHR cooling at Diablo Canyon while the RCS was partially filled (37 additional events have occurred in the industry due to inadequate RCS water level).
2.
Actions taken by GPC in response to the NRC's generic letter 87-12 which questioned utilities to assess the safe operation of PWRs when RCS water level is drained down below the top of the reactor pressure vessel head.
3.
Precautions maintenance personnel should take when performing MW0s during drained-down conditions.
B.
' Discuss Lesson Objectives GE-TP-88002-00-001 II. PRESENTATION A.
Review of RCS/RER/CVCS operation during cold shutdown
~~
condition (mode 5) just prior to refueling (mode 6).
1.
Mode 5-Cold Shutdown a.
Reactor shutdown with Keff less than 0.99.
=b.-
Tavg less than or equal to 200 F.
-2.-
Mode 6-Refueling a.
Reactor shutdown with Keff less than or equal to 0.95.
b.
-Tavg less than or equal to 140 F.
~
3.
RCS CE-TP-88002-00-002 a.
- All four RCPs of f, b.
PZR empty, c.
RCS drained to a level that has the hot leg-piping of the reactor half filled (mid-loop).
4.
RHR l-a.
Both trains operable with at least one train operating.
l 1
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I P
e elo7 cP-1P-AB002-00-C lli.
LESSON OUTLINE:
NOTES b..
RHR inlet _.via at least one hot leg and returned to all-four cold legs.
c.
Minimum flow requirement of 3000 gpm.
d.
Small amount of flow (75 to 120 gpm) sent into CVCS just upstream of letdown heat exchanger for continuous cleanup of reactor Coolant.
5.
CVCS a._
Normal inlet to CVCS from loop 3 cold leg.
b.
Three letdown orifices in service with isolation valves (LO1Vs) open.
c.
Only a small trickle of flow exists through the letdown orifices since flow is dependent on differential pressure and the dp is very low in mode 5.
d.
PCV-131 controlled by PT for desired pressure.
e.
PDP operating to maintain level by balancing letdown and charging.
f.
Seal injection to RCPs injected into No. I seal and thermal barrier.
B.
Initial Conditions at Diablo Canyon prior to loss of GE-TP-88002-00-003
-RHR cooling.
Obj. 1 1.
Mode 5-in preparation for first refueling.
2.
Plant shutdown for 7 days.
3.
Containment equipment hatch open.
4..
Personnel air lock open.
5.-
Containment purge in progress.
-6.
Incore thermocouples disconnected in preparation for reactor vessel head removal.
7.
LLRT of. containment penetrations in progress.
8.
LRVLIS out of. service due to work on PAM systems.-
9.
Train B RRR pump operating with both heat exchangers in service and both trains cross-connected at 87 F.
l l
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0 t!^?
CE-LP-88002-00-0
-Ill.
' LESSON OUTLINE:
NOTES-10.
No, charging pumps running (Diablo Canyon's system of normal charging somewhat dif ferent than Vogtle's).
11.
RCS drained down to mid-loop in pteparation for SC manway cover 'rreoval and channel head entry.
12.
Reactor vessel vented to pressurizer.
13.
Reactor vessel-level monitored by Obj. 4 a.
Tyson tube (one inch) manometer connected to intermediate leg of loop 1.
b.
Two electrical systems (vide and narrow range).
14.
Level controlled by balancing letdown and charging.
- 15. Temperature monitored by temperature elements in Obj. 5 the RRR loop.
C.
Event initiation Obj. 2 1.
Plant operator isolated portion of RCP seal water return line to VCT in preparation for testing s-penetration for air leaks.
2.
All valves necessary for system isolation were independently verified to be closed.
3.
One of the valves labeled " Valve:l" on the TP was improperly seated (operated by a reach rod).
4.
At 2043, a plant engineer opened a valve (valve 2 on TP) to drain the seal water return line to the RCDT in. preparation for LLRT_(nithout notifying the control room of the-test start) then-left the area.
~
5.
With valvs 1 improperly seated. water from CVCS and RCS was draining into RCDT.
~
6.
Control room operator-immediately notices a decrease in VCT level.
7.
ABO notices and reported increased. level in.RCDT.
'Operatorsattemptedtorestore'VbTlevelby 8.
increasing letdown flow from RER into CVCS.
- 9. _
Reactor vessel level started slowly decreasing as indicated.-
6
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lil.
LESSON OUTLINE:
CF-LP-88002-00-C NOTES 10.
Optrators isolated charging and leedown in an
-attempt-to stop the leak.
11.
With the loss of flow into the VCT, water level in VCT decreased rapidly since water was still draining from VCT into RCDT at a rate of 30 gpm.
12.- Reactor vessel level indicator in control room indicated level had stopped decreasing.
i D.
Loss of RHR cooling 1.
At 2125 (42 minutes afcer engineer opened drain valve for his LLRT), control room operators
- noticed fluctuating amperage on running RHR purp.
2.
No. 2 RHR pump secured, then No. 1 pump started but was immediately secured due to fluctuating amps as well.
3.
RHR was lost at this point.
'4.
Decay heat now began heating reactor coolant from 87 F.
5.
With loss of RHR temperature indication of core was also lost since all incore thermocouples were disconnected.
6.
Vortexing and cavitation was suspected as the cause of RHR motor amp fluctuation'due to low
- level in the hot leg piping.
7.
Validity of electVic reactor vessel indicators.
was. suspect due'to vortexing so ABO dispatched to check on tygon tube level inside containment.
-8.
Operators had intention of opening RHR valves aligned to RWST to allow gravity fill to RCS, however, they requested a status of SG manway cover removal to see if any-personnel was in area of manway or inside of channel head.
- 9.
At 2138, VCT outlet valve was closed to stop VCT inventory loss.
- 10..At 2200, plant engineer opened vent valves associated with his LLRT penetration being drained and left the area-to find HP technician to assist in LLRT.
- 11. At 2203, RHR pumps vented.
~
7
CE^
GE-LP-88002-00-C 111.
LESSON OUTLINE:
NOTES
- 12. At 7221 -No. 1 RHR pump-started but still had fluctuating amps so pump was again stopped.
13.
At 2227, NOUE_ declared since RHR lost for more than one hour.
14.
Plant engineer noticed large amount of water associated with his draining evolution.
- 15. At 2230, containment activity levels increasing and air samples ordered.
E.
Restoration of RHR cooling i
1.
At 2241. operators informed that SG manways not removed but some bolts had been detensioned.
2.
RWST to RHR valves were immediately opened for gravity fill into RCS, 3.
At 2250, leak path to RCDT isolated.
4.
At 2254 No. 2 RHR pump started and RHR cooling flow established.
5.
Pump discharge temperatures rose to approximately 220 F and within 5 minutes temperatures dropped to less than 200 F.
6.
_At 2258, personnel in containment reported steam venting from ruptured tygon tube on reactor vessel head vent and was then isolated.
7.
Containment evacuation was ordered.
8.
Steam leakage reported from SG manways.
9.
Decay heat had increased temperature of core from 87 F_to boiling'during loss of.RHR.
- 10. Operators now rectored plant to normal operation.
F.
Potential consequences due to loss of kHR cooling.
-Obj. 3
-1.
Boiling was occurring in reactor core.
2.
Reactor vessel-water level could have boiled-dry and caused core damage with possibic fission j
product-release to containment atmosphere, q
1 3.
.Since air lock and equipment hatch open. fission products could have reached the environment.
l 8
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GE-LP-88002-00-C 111.
LESSON OUTLINE:
NOTES C.
Detrimental Fffects During Event 1.
Outage activities not coordinated with mid-loop operation planned for a lengthy period of time.
2.
Equipmenc hat'ch open during mid-loop operation.
3.
Only core temperature indication was from RHR loop.
- 4..
Operators estimated heatup rate at 1 F/ min but was actually 2.7 F/ min.
5.
Procedural deficiencies were discovered.
6.
Shift briefing did not mention LLRT started, however, it was approved.
7.
Plant engineer did not inform control room of LLRT start.
8.
Work orders that have a potential of draining RCS should not be performed when operating at mid-loop.
9.
Poor communications existed.
10.
Poor design of reach rod for improper seated valve.
11.
An ALERT should have been declared instead of NOUE.
H.
Plant Vogtle's action to reduce enssibility of similar Obj. 7 event as Diablo Canyon loss-of RER.
1.
Generic letter 87-12 frca W"C asked utilities vacious questions on how "h+;y planned to ensure safe operation of. PWR plant curing mid-loop operation.
2.
GPC's response to NRC--not (11 icems discussed, only.,those that are of interest to maintenance personnel.
a.
QUESTION 1: Circumstances when plant would-enter into drain-down condition?
b.
RESPONSE 1:
1)
Refueling operations for head removal.
-2)
Maintenance activities for various components such as RCP seal replacement, SG tube inspections / replacement, repair of RCS boundary valves, etc.
9
nYn7
'CE-LP-88002-00-C lli.-
LESSON OUTLINE:
NOTES c.-
QUESTION 2: Conditions which plant would be in just prior to drain-down?
d.
RESPONSE 2 Discuss initial conditions briefly which are listed as appendix A of response letter.
GE-TP-68002-00-004 e.
QUESTION 31 Control systems and interlocks that could disturb the drain-down l
process?
f.
RESPONSE 3: Discust, control systems and CE-TP-88002-00-005 interlocks which are listed as appendix C of response letter.
1)
If MWO issued for those listed systems.
e:Mrare supervision is aware of the canseouances at mid-1 pop, b
2)
If vori has to be performed or. any of thess 6/stime during mid-loop. care should be exercised to ensure procedural compliance is followed and a questioning attitude maintained throughout as any error could havs an affect on reactor vessel leval.
3)
If possible, no vork should be performed which could-affect reactor vessel level during mid-loop.
.g.
QUESTION 4:
Equipment _ status change coordinettont h.-
RESPONSE 4:
1)- : Changes-to status of equipment for maintenance, testing. or operations which affect plant conditions must be authorized by the shif t supervisor.
2)
'The above statement is true for all modes.
Li.- -QUESTION-5:
RCS overpressure protection?
j.-
RESPONSE 5:
1)
Protection,from overpressure when reactor-vessel head isLin place during-modes 4. 5 and 6'is provided'by'the COPS.
2)
If. pressure is too great for the existing temperature, power operated relief valve (PORV) lif ts to PRT.
10
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. ' ~
~
cins CE-LP-88002-00-C
- lil, LESSON OUTLINE:
NOTES k.
QUESTION 66 Time required to replace containment equipment-hatch if open?
1.
RESPONSE 61 Replacement takes three to four hours and au additional 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br /> FOR LLRT.
m.,
QUESTION 7:
Instrumentation and alarms provided during RCS partial fill?
n.
RESPONSE 7:
1)
Permanent plant instrumentation a)
Discuss instruments listed in Table 2 of CPC response letter.-
GE-TP-88002-00-006 (1) New procedure vill require a minimum of two incore thermo-couples operable any time head installed and level below top head flange.
(2)
If head is to be removed,
+4 disconnection of thermocouples is to be delayed until last possible moment und reinstalled at first opportunity after head replaced, b)
Alarms (1) "RHR Pump Motor Overload" annun.
(2) "RHR Pump-Discharge High Pressure" annun.
(3). No temperature alarms annunciated in control room for use during mid-loop operation.
2)
Temporary connections, piping, and s instrumentation.
a)
One' inch tygon tube connected to RCS at loop 1 intermediate leg and-pressurizer steam space.
(1) Care should be taken not to step on tygon tubing run and report any defects -kinks, tvists, or air binding to supe rvision.
11 l
. -........ ~..
I 0
s crn?'
GE-LP-88002-00-C 111.
LESSON OUTLINE:
NOTES (2)- Tubing will have continuous slope to minimize -air entrapment.
(3) Tubing vill be protected by physical barricts when routed through traffic areas.
(4) Tuoing util be positively identified along route.
(5) Tubing will run upward along-containment wall adjacent to elevation marks.
(6) -Discuss elevation marks and CE-TP-88002-00-007 associated RCS component descriptions.
(7) Operations will assign a continuous. watch station at tubing during mid-loop operation and will walkdown tubing every four hours to ensure tube is free of kinks, etc.
b)
RVLIS is available but not accurate enough for controlling level within a tight band of 6 to 12 inches.
c)
Additional instrumentation planned but not part of letter to-NRC.
(1) Level instrument connected to one-of RCS flov. caps beneath SG and to RTD bypass manifold then wired to SI Accumulator Tank level channel indicator
-in control oom (channel L-952).
(2) Level instrument connected across hot leg pipe with a-30 inch span.
d)
Installations will be part of MWO N
process.
- o..
QUESTION-8:
Pumps required to be operable to control RCS inventory?
12
O G;G7 CE-LP-88002-00-C lli.
LESSON OUTLINE:
NOTES
^
p.
. RESPONSE 8 1)
A min'imum of one of three CVCS charging pumps is required to be operable, therefore, two pumps can be removed f rom service f or maintenance.
2)
Both RHR pumps required to be operable in mode 6 with water level less than 23 feet above the RV flange or in mode 5 with the RCS loops not completely filled, a)
-One train may be inoperable for up to two hours for surveillance teattug.
b)
One train may be deenergized for one hour provided dilution of RCS is not permitted and core outlet temperature is at least 10 F below saturation.
q.
QUESTION 9: Training provided to affected personnel during RCS partial fill?
r.
RESPONSE 9:
1)-
Maintenance Operation Quality Assurance Program /NNO lesson details use of MW0s.
2)
Safety and Admin Controls lascon details proper use of admin, maintenance, and HP
-procedures.
'3)
Equipment Clearance and Tagging lesson details personnel's responsibility according to clearanceLand tagging procedure.
s.
, QUESTION 10: What are planned changen and when are they scheduled to be incorporated?
t.-
RESPONSE 10:
1)
Minimum level during mid-loop will be.188 ft. instead of 187 ft. 6 inches to give a one foot margin to mid-loop (short term).
2)
If RER is lost for more than one hour or temperatures are greater than 200 F, an ALERT vill be declared and containment closure verified (short t e rm).
3 13
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LESSON OUTLINEt NOTES 3).
Work will-be limited-that has potential to decrease RCS inventory when level belos top head flange (short t e ra).
4)
Evaluation to be mJde to install structure aro'und equipment hatch to allow placement of polyethylene curtain over opening (long term).
3.
Precautions for maintenance personnel during mid-loop operations.
Obj. 8 a.
Maintain questioning attitude toward MW0s.
b.
Any unusual or suspicious evolutions should be reported to supervision, such as:-
1)
Unexpected sound of water flow.
2)
Steam leaks.
3)
Air hisses..
c.
WATCH OUT for tygon tube.
~III. SUMHARY A.
Review lesson objectives in preparation'for quiz.-
t 14
o 0
LIST OF OBJECTIVES 1.
State the initial conditions at Diablo Canyon prior to the loss of RHR cooling.
2.
Describe the events that led to the loss of RNR cooling at Diablo Canyon.
3.
Describe the possible consequences that could have resulted from a sustained loss of RHR coo 1Jng.
4.
List the instrumentation utilized at Diablo Canyon for monitoring reactor-vessel level.
5.
List the instrumentation utilland at Diablo Canyon-for monitoring core temperature.
6.
Describe actione taken at-Diablo Canyon which had adverse affects on the loss of cooling event.
7.
Describe the actions to.be taken by GPC to reduce the probability of a similar' event occurring at Plant Vogtle.
8.
List precautions which maintenance personnel must take while working on MWoe during drain-down conditions.
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In,1tima conditions at Diablo Canyon l
1.
Mode 5 in preparation for first refueling 2.
Plant shutdown for 7 days 3.
. Containment equipment hatch open 4.
Personnel air lock open 5.
Containment purge in progrees 6.
Incore thermocouples disconnected in preparation for reactor vessel head removal 7.
LLRT of containment penetrations in progress 8.
RVLIS out of service due to work on PAM sytems 9.
Train B RHR pump. operating with both heat exchangere in service and both traine c,ross-connected at 87 F
- 10. - No charging pumpe running (Diablo Canyon's system of normal charging somewhat-different than Vogtle's) 11.
RCS drained down to mid-loop in preparation for SG manway cover removal and channel head entry.
12.
Reactor veneel vented to preneurizer 13.
Reactor vessel level monitored by a.
Tygon tube (one inch) manometer connected to in*sraediate leg of loop 1 b.
Two electrical eystems (wide and narrow range)
'14.
Level controlled by balancing' letdown and charging
- 15. - Temperature monitored.by temperature elemente in the RNR'locp GE-TP-88002-00-003
~
. NORMALLY EGECTED INITIAL CONDITIONS 1.
The temperature of the RC$ is less than 200 degrees Fahrenholt.
2.
A steam bubble is in the Pressurizer and level ts maintained betwe 17 percent and to percent using the cold calibrated level channel.
3.
Pressurizer pressure is 250 1 25 psig.
4 One or two RCP's are in operation to equalize temperatures.
5.
One or both trains of RNA are in operation maintaining RCS temperature.
Flow in each operating RHR loop is 3000 spa.
6.
Charging and letdown are in operation and one train of PM4 is cross' connected to the letdown-systee.
7.
Both trains of the'CDPS are armed.
8.
blanket at 2 to 5 psig.SG's are at their normal level (45-55% narrow ra 9.
Sefety lajection signals from low steam line pressure and low pressurizer pressure are blocked.
- 10. Both Safety Injection Pumps have their power removed and all Safety Injection accumulators are isolated.
- 11. Deth motor driven Assiliary Feedwater Pumps' have.their
. switches in PULL-19400t.
control-4 GE-tpk 88002 004
PSTENTIAL DISTURBANCES to THE ORAIN-ONN PROCESS r
Svitta Potential Causa
- 1. Automatic closure of RHR Instrument failure, error during suction valves from RCS hot legs maintenance or testing
- 2. Automatic opening of F,assurizer Instrument failure, error during PORV's from COPS maintenance or testing
- 3. Automatic initiation of Emergency Instrument failure, error during Core Cooling System maintenance or testing
- 4. Automatic initiation of Auxiliary Error during maintenance or Feedwater System testing
- 5. Automatic energiration of Error during maintenance or
~
Pressurizer heaters testing
- 6. Closure or opening of letdown Instrument failure, loss of pressure control valve instrument air, error during mathtenance or testing
- 7. Closure or opening of RNR heat Control failure, loss of exchanger outlet valves instrument air, error durie?
maintenance or testing
- 8. Closure or opening cf RNR heat Instrument failure, loss of exchanger bypass valves instrument air, error during maintenance or testing
- 9. Change in charging flow Instrument
- failure, loss of instrument air, error during maintenance or testing i
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VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATit 1i g 7.
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TRAINING STUDENT H U" (' g' IlILE:
CONiisutNo TRAINING--RHR HID-LOOP OPER.
NUMBER: GE-HO-88002-00-001-C l
PROGRAM:
MAINTENANCE / QC REV!SION: 0 f
AUTHOR:
c.R. BATE DATE:
8/8/88 l
APPROVED: Cfyy,pg,fgj DATE:
g/p/,qy
REFERENCES:
i 1.
NRC Generic Letter 87-12:
" Loss of R}(R While RCS Partially Filled" 2.
GPC Response to NRC Generie Letter 87-12 j
3.
NOP-464 i
I 4.
1,0-LP-60990-00-C
" Case Studt on Loss of RHR at Diablo Canyon" i
5.
GPC Standing Order 1-87-48:
"RHR Operation with RCS Partially Filled" 6.
Procedures l
a.
12000-Refueling Recovery b.
12006-Unit Cooldown to Ccid Shutdown c.
12007-Refueling Entry 4
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i STUDENT DATE 1
MASTER C03'
LIST OF OBJECTIVES
==
1.
State the initial conditions at Diablo Canyon prior to the loma of RHR cooling.
~~
2.
Describe the events that led to the loam of RHR cooling at Diablo Canyon.
3.
Describe the pomelble consequences that could have renuited from a austained loss of RHR cooling.
4.
List the instrum:ncation utilized at Diablo Canyon for monitoring reactor vessel level.
5.
List the instrumentation utilized at Diablo Canyon for monitoring corn temperature.
6.
Describe actions taken at Diablo Canyon which had adverse affects on the loss of cooling event.
7.
Describe the actions to be taken by GPC to reduce the probability of a similar event occurring at Plant Vogtle.
- = -
8.
List precautions which maintenance personnel must take while working on Won during drain-down conditions.
O e
4 "M
GE -HO-88002 00\\ -c Bay i of 7
LIST OF OBJECTIVES 4
1.
State the inittal conditions at Diablo Canyon prior to the loss of RNR cooling.
2.
Describe the events that led to the loom of RHR cooling at Diablo Canyon.
3.
Describe the possible consequences that could have resulted from a sustained loss of RHR cooling.
4.
List the instrumentation utilized at Diablo Canyon for monitoring reactor vessel level.
5.
List the instrumentation utilized at Diablo Canyon for monitoring core temperature.
6.
Describe actions taken at Diablo Canyon which had adverse affects on the loss of cooling event.
.o 7.
Describe the actions to be taken by GPC to reduce the probability of a sinalar event occurring at I.
Plant Vogtle.
8.
List precautions which maintenance personnel must take while working on MW0s during drain-down conditions.
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i GE-HO-88oo2 oor-c Page 7 c4 7
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