ML20217H905
| ML20217H905 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 08/08/1997 |
| From: | SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20217H901 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9708130343 | |
| Download: ML20217H905 (57) | |
Text
. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _-
ENCLOSURE 3 VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REVISED REQUEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS -
CREDIT FOR BORON AND ENRICHMENT INCREASE FOR FUEL STORAGE i
INSTRUCTIONS FOR INCORPORATION -
l The proposed change to the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Technical Specifications would be incorporated as ft,!!ows. '
Remove page Insert Page l v and vi* v and vi*
vii' and viii vii' and viii '
3.7-39 through 3.7-43 4.0-1
- and 4.0-2 4.0-1
- and 4.0-2 4.0-4 through 4.0-12 Changes to the Technica: Specification bases would be incorporated as follows:
Remove Page Insert Page iii* and iv iii' and iv B 3,7 92 through B 3.7-98
- Overleaf page containing no change.
9708130343 970008 PDR ADOCK 05000424 E31 P PDR A
TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) n Ll PLANT SYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7-1 3.7.1 Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs) . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7-1 3.7.2 MainSteamIsolationValves(MSIVs) . . . . . . . . . 3.7-5 3.7.3 Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (MFIVs) and Main
'Feedwater Regulation Valves (MFRVs) and Associated Bypass Valves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7-7 3.7.4 Atmospheric Relief Valves (ARVs) . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7-9 3.7.5 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7-11 3.7.6 Condensate Storage Tank (CST) - (Redundant CSTs) . . . 3.7-15 3.7.6a Condensate Storage Tank (CST) - (Non-redundant CSTs) . 3.7-16 3.7.7 Component Cooling Water (CCW) System . . . . . . . . . 3.7-17 3.7.8 NuclearServiceCoolingWater(NSCW) System . . . . . 3.7-19 3.7.9 Ultimate Heat Sink (VHS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7-21 3.7.10 Control Room Emergency Filtration System (CREFS) - Both Units Operating .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7-24 3.7.11 Control Room Emergency Filtration System (CREFS) - One Unit Operating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7-27 3.7.12 Control Room Emergency Filtration System (CREFS) - Both Units Shutdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7-30 3.7.13 Piping' Penetration Area Filtration and Exhaust System (PPAFES) .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7-33 3.7.14 Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Room Cooler and Safety Related Chiller System . . . . . . . . . . 3.7-35 3.7.15 Fuel Storage Pool Water Level ............ . 3.7-37 3.7.16 Secondary Specific Activity ....... . . . . . . 3.7-38 3,7.I2 Fue l Morage Ae! Usrou Co,,e.e,hafan 3.7-37 3, 7, I e Fa e / Assein Up U0'0F U* #
(continued)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 v Amendment No. 96 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2)
i
_ TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)-
, LIST OF TABLEE 1.1-1 MODES ........................ 1.1-7 3.3.1-1 Reactor Trip System Instrumentation . . . . . . . . . 3.3-14 3.3.2-1 Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3-30 3.3.3 Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation . . . . . . . 3.3-42 3.3.4-1_ Remote Shutdown System Instrumentation and Controls . 3.3-45 3.3.6-1 Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation . . 3.3-53 3.3.7-1 CREFS Actuation Instrumentation . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3-59--
3.7.1-1 Maximum Allowable Power Range Neutron Flux High Trip Setpoint with Inoperable Main Steam Safety Valves . 3.7-3 ,
3.7.1-2 Main Steam Safety Valve Lift Settings . . . . . . . . 3.7-4 3.8.4-1 Discharge Test Surveillance Requirements . . . . . . . 3.8-29 3.8.6-1 Battery Cell Parameters Requirements . . . . . . . . . 3.8-35 5.5.9-1 Minsmum Number of Steam Genera' tors to Be Inspected During Inservice Inspection . . . . . . 5.0-18 5.5.9-2 Steam Generator Tube Inspection .. . . . . . . . . 5.0-19 LIST OF FIGURES 2.1.1-1 Reactor Core Safety Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.0-2 3.4.16-1 Reactor Coolant Dose Equivalent I-131 Reactor Coolant Specific Activity Limit Versus Percent of Rated Thermal Power with the Reactor Coolant Specific Activity > 1 #Ci/ gram Dose Equivalent I-131 . . . 3.4-44 o
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 viii Amendment No. 96 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2)
insert for page viii 3.7.18-1 Vogtle Unit i Burnup Credit Requirements for All Cell Storage .3.7-42
- 3.7.18 Vogtle Unit 2 Bumup Credit Requirements for All Cell Storage 3.7_ 4.3.1-1 - Vogtle Unit 1 Burnup Credit Requirements for-3-out-of- 4 Storage 4.0-4 l 4.3.12 Vogtle Unit 2 Burnup Credit Requirements for-3-out-of- 4 Storage 4.0-5 4.3.1 3 Vogtle Unit 2 Burnup Credit Requirements for 3x3 Storage. 4.0-6 4.3.1-4 - Vogtle Units 1 and 2 Empty Cell Checkerboard Storage Configurations 4.0-7 4.3.1-5 Vogtle Unit 2 3x3 Checkerboard Storage Configuration 4.0-8 l- 4.3.1-6 .Vogtle Units 1 and 2 Interface Requirements (All Cell to Checkerboard Storage) 4.0-9 4.3.1-7 Vogtle Units 1 and 2 Interface Requirements ( Checkerboard Storage Interface) 4.0 10 4.3.1-8 Vogtle Unit 2 Interface Requirements (3x3 Checkerboard to All Cell Storage) 4.0-11
'4.3.1-9 Vogtle Unit 2 Interface Requirements (3x3 to Empty Cell Checkerboard Storage) 4.0-12 I
l
__a
Fuel Storage _ Pool Boron Concentration 3.7.16'
/7 3.7- PLANT SYSTEMS 11 3.7.)4' Fuel Storage Pool Boron Concentration LCO 3. 7.) The fuel storage pool boron concentration shall be
= ( g ppm.
APPLICABILITY: When fuel assemblies are stored in the fuel storage pool-and-
-a fuel-sterage-peel-ver4f4 cation-bas net been performed-tiece the 14st-movement-of--fuel-assembl4es-in-the-fuel-eterage-poolv ACTIONS c- .
l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME-A. Fuel storage pool ------------NOTE-------------
baron concentration LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable, not within limit. -----------------------------
A.1 Suspend movement of Immediately fuel assemblies in -
the fuel storage pool.
&!iQ A . 2.1 - Initiate action to Immediately restore fuel storage pool boron concentration to within limit.
2a
-A . 2 . 2 Ver Hy by -Immediately
.admintstrat4ve-means-.
--[Regien 2] fuel -
-stor-age pool verification h : been
-per-formed-s4nce-the--
1::t ::v::st ,i f=i---
-es:=bl i es-in-the-
-fuel storage psel.
%9tle %ib lad 2 71 "bCSTS 3.7-)6 -Rev 1, 01/07/95
i Fuel Storage Pool Boron Concentration 3.7.16 j7 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS I
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY 11 SR 3.7.)6'l Verify the fuel storage pool boron 7 days concentration is within limit.
%9 fle unils I a ,i 2 yo
-WCG STS 3.7,3I -Rev 1, 04/07/95-l
~
Ze m Fuel 3%ge. Poo /
t fuel Assembly StoraIg 3.7.,17 IV 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.)WI 4pont Fuel Assembly Storage in Me Fue / Womge /ha /
c **CekiItes &r fueI si,r9ep( and confhuratlon LCO 3.7.)( The combination of initial enrichment and burnu) of 4eek I9 4 pent fuel usemH)y LtoredYn Jagten-af shall a within the Acceptable *(Burnup Domainy'of Fi$ures3., .'7-1 or in accordancewithSpecification4.1.1.j (3.1.1t-I6G1), 3.2,/9-?[Vrll 2) i APPLICABILITY: Whenever any fuel assembly is stored in=lP:;t;r. :) ef the spent- fuel storage pool.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements of the A.1 --------NOTE---------
LCO not met. LC0 3.0.3 is not applicable.
Initiate action to Immediately move the noncomplying fuel assembly 4 pen
-[P:;t r a ceepYa h rsye .* ko. 2}. +,
loco}io n an SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY
- g c t'C ombt'ndt'e n o f VIS W A t anyec.toon and t
SR 3.7.J '7'.1 Verify b/ administrative meuhfhe initial. Prior to enrichment,4ad burnu~pTof the fuel assembly storing the is in accordance with Figures 3r7-lf-t or fuel assembly G.ndcler49e to o n f,o n Specification'4.3.1.1. in -[Pyter.11 de
~3. 2. It-l(%il 1),3. 7,/f-16 hit.1) Fuelsier*3C foo ILecbon, l
= STS 3.7.)6 41:v 1, 04/07/95 41
50000
)
45000 40000
/
/
35000 , j'
- I /
f
/
g30000 p
3 J A
n >
/
5 25000 ACCEPTABLE j' co x /
3 /
5 /
$ 20000 ,!
tf /
15000 :
, [ '- .
j --
/ UNACCEPTABLE j --
/
/
/
5000
/
)
{
/
0 1,5 2.0 2.5 - 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 Initial U 235 Enrichment (nominal w/o)
Figure 3.7.18-1 Vogtle Unit 1 Burnup Credit Requirements for All Celi Storage Vogtle Units I and 2 3.7-42
_ _ . _ . . _ - . . _ _ _ . . - . _ _ ___m . _ __ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ .
50000 1 4
45000 40000
/
J 35000
/
)
U 30000 ./
f
/
- o. /
/
c /
ACCEPTABLE g 25000 !,
g ,
b ./
/
j 20000 /
/
8 /
u.
/
15000 /
/
r
/
UNACCEPTABLE --.
10000
/
/
/
/
/
5000 /
/
/
i
/ I i 0
1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 Initial U-235 Enrichment (nominal wh)
I Figure 3.7.18-2 Vogtle Unit 2 Burnup Credit Requirements for All Cell Storage Vogtle Units I and 2 3.7-43
Design featureo 4.0 4.0 OESIGN FEATURES (continued) =
4,3 fuel Storage I "*I' # #" "' #"
cre> y an (u n t 2) 4.3.1 Criticality 4.3.1.1 The spent fuel storage racks are designed and shall be maintained with:
- a. Fuel assemblies having a maximum U-235 enrichment k f{crg / I.O W$rn full floded y of g weight percent:
Wil 4 unforded' wade r ,y, k s 0.95 'if fully flooded with-str:terwate ,
C whie4 ladudes cm allounce wN[chincludesanallowanceforuncertaintiesas i fo r uaced Mles ar leg 4 / described in Section 4.3 of the FSAR; in S n6's a hel 7td Annminal10.6inchcentertocenterdistanceNf6A g p .jy pp g 'P betz:- f.ci-essembMeWeeed in the Unit 1 high density fuel storage racts nd
/ jf.
j' Anominal10.58-inchcentertocenter[st in
'/ the north snuth dir tion and a nominal 10.4-in'ch center to center tenee in the east-west direction Mt ::.--fee m -in Saeed in the
[IhSe d Unit 2 high density fuel storage racks.
! 4.3.1.2 The new fuel storage racks are designed and shall be maintained with
- a. Fuel assemblies having a maximum U 235 enrichment of 5.05 weight percent;
- b. k s 0.95 if fully flooded with unborated water, wNichincludesanallowanceforuncertaintiesas described in Sectios 4.3 of the FSAR;
- c. k s 0.98 if moderated by aqueous foam, which iNcludesanallowanceforuncertaintiesas described in Section 4.3 of the FSAR; and
- d. A hominal 21-inch center to center distance between fuel assemblies placed in the storage racks.
(continued)
Vogtle Units 1 end 2 4.0-2 _ Amendment Nn Q6_(Unjt_p
--Amendment-NO A4-{ Unit 4h-
INSERT FOR PAGE 4.0 2
- d. New or partially spent fuel assemblies with a combination of burnup and initial nominal emichment in the " acceptable burnup domain" of Figures 3.7.18 1 (Unit
- 1) or 3.7.18 2 (Unit 2) may be allowed unrestr;cted storage in the Unit 1 or Unit 2 fuel storage pool respectively.
e.
New or partia'ly spent fuel assemblies with a combination of burnup and initial i
nominal enrichment in the " acceptable burnup domain" of Figure 4.3.1 1 may be stored in the Unit I fuel storage poolin a 3 out of-4 checkerboard storage con 0guration as shown in Figure 4.3.1-4.
New cr patially spent fuel assemblics with a maximum initial enrichment of 5.0 weight percent U 235 may be stored in the Unit I fuel storage poolin a 2 out of-4 checkerboard storage configuration as shown in Figure 4.3.1-4.
' Interfaces between storage configurations in the Unit 1 fuel storage pool shall be in compliance with Figures 4.3.1-6 and 4.3.1-7. "A" assemblics are new or partially spent fuel assemblies with a combination of burnup and initial nominal enrichment in the "accep;able burnup domain" of Figure 3.7.181. "B" assemblics are new or partially spent fuel assemblics with a combination of burnup and initial nominal enrichment in the " acceptable burnup domain" of Figure 4.3.1 1. "C" assemblies are assemblics with initial enrichments up to a maximum of 5.0 weight percent U-235.
New or partially spent fuel assemblies with a combination of burnup and init ial nominal enrichment in the " acceptable burnup dorr.ain" of Figure 4.3.1-2 may be stored in the Unit 2 fuel storage pool in a 3-out-of-4 checkerboard storage configuration as shown in Figure 4.3.1-4.
New or partially spent fuel assemblies with a maximum initial enrichment of 5.0 weight percent U 235 may be stored in the Unit 2 fuel storage poolin a 2-out-of-4 checkerboard storage configuration as shown in Figure 4.3.1-4.
New or partially spent fuel assemblies with a combination of burnup and mitial nou. mal enrichment in the " acceptable burnup domain" of Figure 4.31-3 may be stored in the Unit 2 fuel storage pool as " low enrichment" fuel assemblies in the 3x3 checkerboard storage configuration as shown in Figure 4.3.1-5. New or partially spent fuel assemblies with initial nominal enrichments less than or equal to 3.20 weight percent U 235 or having a maximum reference fuel assembly K. less than or equal to 1.410 at 68 'F may be stored in the Unit 2 fuel storage pool as "high enrichment" fuel assemblies in the 3x3 checkerboard storage configuration as shown in Figure 4.3.1-5.
(continued on next page)
ll i !
)
i j INSERT FOR PAGE 4.0 2 (CONTINUED) !
, interfaces between storage configurations in the Unit 2 fuel storage pool shall be in i compliance with Figures 4.3.16,4.3.17,4.3.18, and 4.3.19. "A" assemblics are new or partially spent fuel assemblics with a combination of burnup and initial l nominal enrichment in the " acceptable burnup domain" of Figure 3.7.18 2. "B" i
assemblies are new or partially spent fuel assemblies with a combination of burnup and initial nominal enrichment in the " acceptable burnup domain" of Figure 4.3.1-
- 2. "C" assemblies are assemblies with initial enrichments up to a maximum of 5.0
- weight percent U 235. "L" assemblies are new or partially spent fuel assemblies with a combination of burnup and initial nominal enrichment in the " acceptable ,
burnup domain" of Figure 4.3.1 3. "II" assemblics are new or panially spent fuel I assemblies with initial nominal enrichments less than or equal to 3.20 weight percent U 235 or having a maximum reference fuel assembly K. less than or equal :
to 1.410 at 68 'F. :
. i I
I t
7 h
,_ ,,m, w . - ~ . = -w----*--me-es--wmev-* =e-re-
- P- ' **~ ""7'""*"" - * " '
30000 25000 l
/
20000 /
/
6 /
$ /
/
15000 ACCEPTABLE /
x /
/
} /
$ }
}
' /
10000
/
/ ~
/ -
/ IUNACCEPTABLE [
/
5000
/
l
" l j
r 0
1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 Initial U 235 Enrichment (nominal w/o)
Figure 4.3.1-1 Yogtle Unit 1 Burnup Credit Requirements for 3-out-of-4 Storage Vogtle Units 1 and 2 4.0-4 f
30000 25000 -
l j
i 20000 !
l l
' l-
/
/
15000 ACCEPTABLE /
w !
1 /
8 /
- /
10000 /
)
[
~ /
f l UNACCEPTABLE l-~
5000
/
/
/
/
I 0
1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 Initial U-235 Enrichment (nominal w/o)-
Figure 4.3.1-2 Wgtle Unit 2 Burnup Credit Requirements for 3-out-of-4 Storage s
l l
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 4.0 5
4 dia'd?C LV w 'N % '
i 0~
I' i 50000 ,
t
, (
p--
45000 ----
/
~
/
f- .
40000 /
f
/ - -
35000 / -
l -
2 /
R /
30000 #
/
/
/
25000 l ACCEPTABLE /
co /
>. /
_. )
/
20000 j T> /
2 l 15000
/
/
/ UNACCEPTABLE --
/
)
5000
/ -
~
/
/ .
' I 0
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 Initial U-235 Enrichment (nominal w/o)
Figure 4.3.1-3 Vogtle Unit 2 Hurnup Credit Requirements for 3x3 Storage Vogtle Units I and 2 4.0-6
n l Z Z __
Z == Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z 3-out-of-4 Checkerboard Storage l
lm Z Z E Z Z Z 2-out-of-4 Checkerboard Storage Empty Storage Cell Fuel Asseinbly in Storage Cell Figure 4.3.1-4 Vogtle Units 1 and 2 Empty Cell Checkerboard Storage Configurations Vogtle Units 1 and 2 4.0-7
O O l
11 , I O O o
3x3 Checkerboard Storage 1 ow Enrichment Fuel Assembly in Storage Cell
[ liigh Enrichment Fuel Assembly in Storage Cell Figure 4.3.1-5 Vogtle Unit 2 3x3 Checkerboard Storage Configuration s
Vogtle Units I and 2 4.0-8
A A A A A A Note:
A A A A A A A = All Cell 1:nrichinent inter ce "" 3'" " ' '" '-d A A A A A A 1:nrichtuent
'""'#~ "'" *"
i:mpt) 11 i:mpi) I A A A 11 11 11 A A A
=e=-
1:mpt) 15 I:mpt) A A A Iloundary lletween All Cell Storage and 3-out-of-4 Storage A' A A A A A Note:
A A A A A A A = Aii Ceii I:nrichtnent Interface " " 3 -" " ' ' U '- '
N A A A A A A I:nrichinent C = 2-Out-Of-4 1:mpt) II 1:mpt) I A A A i:nrichinent I:inpty = 1:tupty Cell C i mpty 11 A A A i:mpty C 1:mpt) , A A A a
lloundary lletween All Cell Storage und 2-out-of-4 Storage Note:
- 1. A row of empty cells can be used at the Interface to separate the configurations.
- 2. It is acceptable to replace an asseinbly with an empty cell.
Figure 4.3.1-6 Vogtle Units 1 and 2 Interface Requirements (All Cell to Checkerboard Storage)
Vogtle Units I and 2 4.0-9 l
J
11 rmpi> 11 tmpiy 11 rmp:3 Note:
11 11 11 Il 11 11 n = 3-out-or 4 1:nrichnient h II I mpi) Il Empi) II Empty C = 2-Out Of-4
' 1:nrichnient i Enipty = Einpty Cell rmp:3 C tmpiy ' 11 Il 11 C tmpiy C tmpiy 11 i:mpiy rmp:3 C tmpi> , il Il 11 5
, lloundary lictween 2-out-of-4 Storage and 3-out-of-4 Storage Emp:3 II Empty 11 Il II Note:
Il il 11 11 Empiy 11 a = 3-out or-4 1:nrichment Empi) Empiy Il il il C = 2 Out Of4
\ "- --- --
11
~-
Enrichinent Empty = Empty Cell C empiy C1 rmpiy 11 tmpty Empi) C Empey ' il B 11 C tmpty C Emp:3 11 Empi)
Iloundary lietween 2-out-of-4 Storage and 3-out-of-4 Storage Note:
- 1. A row of empty cells can he used at the interface to separate the configurations.
- 2. It is acceptable to replace an assembly with an empty cell.
Figure 4.3.1-7 Vogtle Units I and 2 Interface Requirements (Checkerboard Storage Interface)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 4.0 10
l A A A A A A Notes l A A A A A A A = All Cell Enrichment 1, = 1.ow 1:nrichment of nier j L L L L A A 313 Checkerboard Il = liigh Enrichment of 3s3 Checi.erboard
! L L L1 L A A l
l i L !! L L A A L L L i L A A 1
a Note:
- 1. A row of empty cells can be used at the interface to separate the configurations.
- 2. It is acceptable to replace an assembly with an empty cell.
Figure 4.3.1-8 Vogtle Unit 2 Interface Requirements (3x3 Checkerboard to All Cell Storage)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 4.0-11
.. )
11 Il 11 11 11 11
- N 8 H s' 3-Out Of-4 Emp:3 II Empt) II Empty II ,
Interface g of 3 3 storage N ,_ _ __
g'_ [g g" gg gg 11 = liigh 1:nrichinent L L L1 L of 3 3 storage tmpe, 11 Erupty = Einpty Cell L 11 L L 11 11 L L LI L tmp:3 11 e
llountlary lictween 3x3 Storage and 3-out-of-4 Storage Notet C tmp:3 C Empt> C tmp:3 8"$[$ . w Enrichinent Empty II Empt3 II Empty C ,
of 3 3 Storage I litterface g' g', , g' g',, gg li a Illgh Enrichinent N Empty of 3x3 Storage C = 2-Out-Of-4 L L Ll L tmp:3 C Enrichinent L 11 L L** 11 cmp:3
"# WF" L L LI L tmp:3 C a
lloundary lietween 3x3 Storage and 2 out-of-4 Storage
- 1. A row of empty cells can he used at the interface to separate the configurations.
- 2. It is acceptable to replace an assembly with an empty cell.
- 3. For the 3-out-of-4 configuration, the row heyond the Low enrichment can swap empty and 11 assemblics, however the next outer row must change the indicated assembly (*) to an empty cell.
- 4. For the 2-out-of-4 configuration, the row heyond the Low enrichment can swap empty and 11 assemblies, however the next outer row of empty and C assemblies must also swap locations.
- 5. If empty cells are in Indicated locations (**), than the face adjacent 11 assemblies can be C assemblies.
Figure 4.3.1-9 Vogtle Unit 2 Interface Requirements (3x3 to Empty Cell Checkerhoard Storage)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 4.0-12
_a
4 TCLE OF CONTENTS 8 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3.7-1 B 3.7.1 Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSys) . . . . . . . . . . . B 3.7-1 B 3.7.2 Main Steam Isolation Valves (HSIVs) . . . . . . . . . B 3.7-7 0 3.7.3 Main feedwater Isolation Valves (MFIVs) and Hain Feedwater Regulation Valves (HFRVs) and Associated Bypass Valves . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3.7-14 8 3.7.4 Atmospheric Relief Valves (ARVs) . . . . . . . . . . . B 3.7-21 l 9 3.7.5 Auxiliaryfeedwater(AFW) System........... B 3.7-26 i B 3.7.6 CondensateStorageTank(CST) . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3.7-35 B 3.7.7 Component Cooling Water (CCW) System . . . . . . . . . B 3.7-40 B 3.7.8 NuclearServiceCoolingWater(NSCW) System . . . . . B 3.7-45 l
B 3.7.9 Ultimate Heat Sink (VHS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3.7-50 B 3.7.10 Control Room Emergency Filtration System (CREFS) -
Both Units Operating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3.7-55 6 3.7.11 ControlRoomEmergencyFiltrationSystem(CREFS)-
One Unit Operating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3.7-64 8 3.7.12 Control Room Emergency Filtration System (CREFS) -
Both Units Shut Down . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3.7-70 B 3.7.13 Piping Penetration Area filtration and Exhaust System (PPAFES) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3.7-75 B 3.7.14 Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Room Cooler and Safety-Related Chiller System . . . . . . . . . . B 3.7-80 B 3.7.15 fuel Storage Pool Water Level . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3.7-85 B 3.7.16 Secondary Specific Activity ............. B 3.7-88 6 3,7,17 Fue l 5/oray foot % %w },a ks, , , , , , , e 3. 7 -7z 153.7.17 %/ Assem//y c/sc,ge , , , , , , , , ,
, , 8 3. 7 - 7 4 I
(continued)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 iv --Rev4t i c , E . 0-
Fuel Storage Pool Boron Concentration 4'
B 3.7.)17 8 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 4 Fuel Storage Pool Boron Concentration B 3.7.)Il BASES l BACKGROUND in the Maximus Density Rack @ R) l(Refs. I and 2)) desig spent fuel storage nd i
d (tinct regions which, for pool 1s divided the purpose into two separate of criticality
! cont are considered as separate pools. ,
storage positions, is desig to (Reg acc rations,h(334]ithamaximumenrichmentof{4 1
le, new wit fuel w j U-235, o x pont fuel regardless of the discharug/ fuel burnup. ,with[2670 storage posito6ns, is
- o designed ; ion 2]date commo fuel of]various initj61 enrichments i
i which have acc lated minimum burnups within the acceptable domainaccordingtoFigure[3.7.17-1),in'theaccompanytr.g i LC0. Fuel assemb tes not meeting the criteria of i Figure [3.7.17-11s 11 be stored in a(cordance with I paragraph 4.3.1.Lin etion 4.3, Storage, g,j i The water in the spent feel storage pool normally contains soluble boron, which resull nylarge subcriticality margins under actual operating cond dns. However, the NRC I guidelines, based upon the a ent condition in which all soluble poison is assumed to ha been lost, specify that of 0.g5 he evalu ed in the absence of the limiting soluble boron. k ,,Hence, the design o both regions is based on the use of unborated/ water, which aintains each region in a subcritical cond 1 operation with the ragionsfullyloaded.)tionduringno The double conti ency principle !
discussed in ANSI 416.1-1975 and the Ap 1 1978 NRC letter (Ref. 3) allows c it for soluble boron u er other abnormal or acci t conditions, since only single accident need considered at one time. Fo exam >1e, the most severe cident scenario is associated wi tw movement of uel from (Region I to Region 2), a accidental misloadi f a fuel assembly in 1: Region 2). Th p could potentia y increase the criticality of Region 2,\ To mitiga , hese postulated criticality related acc d(nts, boron i dissolved in the pool water. Safe operatioh of the MR 4 h no movement of assemblies may therefore be a ieved by trolling the-location of each assembly in accorda ce wi LCO 3.7.17, " Spent- Fuel Assembly Storage." Prior t vesent of an-assembly, it is necessary to perform R 3.7.16.1.
(continued)
Vegfis %.h lui 2 0
-WG1TS- B 3.7-8r -Rev-Ir04/47]SS--
Insert I to D 3.7.17 Fuct assemblies are stoied in high density racks. The Unit I spent fuel storage racks contain storage locations for 288 fuel assemblies, and the Unit 2 spent fuel storage racks contain i
storage locations for 2098 fuel assemblies. Westinghousc 17X17 fuel assemblics with initial enrichments of up to and including 5.0 weight percent U 235 can be stored in any location in the Unit 1 or Unit 2 fuel storage pool provided the fuel burnup-enrichment combinations are within the limits that are specified in Figures 3.7.181 (Unit 1) or 3.7.18 2 (Unit 2) of the Technical Specifications. Fuel assemblics that do not meet the burnup enrichment combination of figures 3.7.181 or 3.7.18 2 may be stored in the storage pools of units 1 or 2 in accordance with checkerboard storage configurations described in figures 4.3,1 1 through 4.3.19. The acceptable fuel assembly storage configurations are based on the Westinghouse Spent Fuel Rack Criticality Methodology, described in WCAP-14416 NP A, 1, (reference 4). This methodology lacludes computer code benchmarking, spent fuel rack criticality calculations methodology, reactivity equivalencing methodology, accident methodology and soluble boron credit methodology.
The Westinghouse Spent Fuel Rack Criticality Methodology ensures that the multiplication factor, K,n, of the fuel and spent fuel storage racks is less than or equal to 0.95 as I
recommended by ANSI 57.2-1983 (Referenc- 3) and NRC guidance (Referenecs 1,2 and 6). The codes, methods and techniques contained in the methodology are used to satisfy this criterion on K n.
The methodology of the NITAWL ll, XSDRNPM S, and KENO-Va codes is used to establish the bias and bias uncertainty. P110ENIX P, a nuclear design code used primarily for core reactor physics calculations is used to simulate spent fuel storage rack geometries.
Reference 4 describes how credit for fuel storage pool soluble boron is used under normal storage configuration conditions. The storage configuration is defined using K.a calculations to ensure that the K.a will be less than 1.0 with no soluble boron under normal 1 storage conditions including tolerances and uncertainties. Soluble boron credit is then used '
to maintain K,a less than or equal to 0.95. The Unit i pool requires 450 ppm and the Unit 2 pool requires 500 ppm to maintain K.nless than or equal to 0.95 for all allowed combinations of storage configurations, enrichments and burnups. The analyses assumed 19.9% of the boron atoms have atomic weight 10 (B 10). The efrects of B 10 depletion on the boron concentration for maintaining K,n s 0.95 are negligible. The treatment of reactivity equivalencing uncertainties, as well as the calculation of postulated accidents j crediting soluble boron is described in WCAP 14416 NP-A, rev.1.
{
This methodology was used to evaluate the storage of fuel with initial enrichments up to and including 5.0 weight percent U 235 in the Vogtle fuel storage pools. The resulting enrichment, and burnup limits for the Unit I and Unit 2 pools respectively, are shown in Figures 3.7.181 and 3.7.18 2. Checkerboard storage configurations are defined to allow storage of fuel that is not within the acceptable burnup domain of figures 3.7.18-1 and 3.7.18 2. These storage requirements are shown in figures 4.3.1-1 through 4.3.1-9. A boion concentration of 2000 ppm assures that no credible slution event will result in a K,a of > 0.95.
, . .. i
Fuel Storage Pool Boron Concentration B3.7.)4 il BASES (continued)
APPLICABLE Mastzaccident. conditions do.not result in an increase-t y SAFETY ANALYSES the activity of either of the two regions. Examples af these' accident conditions are the loss of cooling ) and the (reactivityincreasewithdecreasingwaterdensJt dropping of'a fuel assembly on the top of the-rac .
However accidents can be postulated that c6uld increase the reactivlty. Thisincreaseinreactivity'fsunacceptable with unborated water in the storage,pdol. Thut, for these accident occurrencesgthe presencVof soluble boron in the i_ storage pool prevents etiticalltf in both regions. The I
l pp y' f- postulated accidents are'haalfally of two types. A fuel assembly could be incorrectly transferred from [ Region 1 to Region 2: (e.g., an unjr' radiated fuel assembly or an insuffic< t4d fuel assembly). The second type of postulated ently de 19's accid t is associated'with a fuel assembly djacent to the fullysloaded whichisdrop/
storage rack ped This could have a small positive (Region 2 reactivtty effect on [ Region 23. However, the negative coactivity effect oVthe solub e boron compensates for tie sincreased reactjvity caused by either one of the two postulated accident scenarios. The accident analyses is prov%d in tbdi FSAR,_Section-[15.L4)-(Refv-4)4 I The concentration of dissolved boron in the fuel storage pool satisfies Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Statement.
yoO crifico.li ty LCO The kuel storage pool boron concentration is required to be a: [2300) p m. The specified concentration of dissolved boron in tie fuel storage pool preserves the assumptions-L used in the analyses of the potential f44aPaccide~nt InSe N 3 scent _rios as described in Reference W. ATMs4oncenteetion 7f-44*selved;tererM'E13Maus-requirM ::::::tr ttea fer fuel-assembly-storage-and-sevement-trithin-the feel-stor-age poolv APPLICABILITY This LCO applies whenever fuel assemblies are stored in the spent fuel storage pool., until-a-complete-spent-fuel-storage-
-pool-ver4fication-has-been-perfarmed-following the-last
. movement of fuel assembites in the-spent--fuel-storage pool.
JMs-LCO does-not-apply-following-the-verification,-since-4he-ver t f i c a t t on-woul d -con f i re - t h a t4he re- a re- no- m i sl oaded -
-fuel-a s sembl i e s .- W i t h - no -fu r t he r- fuel- a s sembl y- movement s -i n .
I (continued)
% {-le Wh I a su' 2 'l 3
-STS- B 3.7-82 Rev-1v-04/07/95-
insert 2 for 113.7.17 Most fuel storage pool accident conditions will not result in an increase in K,m Examples of such accidents are the drop of a fuel assembly on top of a rack, and the drop of a fuel assembly between rack modules, or between rack modules and the pool wall.
From a criticality standpoint, a dropped assembly accident occurs when a fuel assembly in l
its most reactive condition is dropped onto the storage racks. The rack structure from a criticality standpoint is not excessively deformed. Previous accident analysis with unborated water showed that the dropped assembly which comes to rest horizontally on top of the rack has sufficient water separating it from the active fuel height of stored assemblics to preclude r.eutronic interaction. For the borated water condition, the interaction is even less since the water contains boron, an additional thermal neutron absorber.
llowever, three accidents can be postulated for each storage configuration wnich could increase reactivity beyond the analyzed condition. The first postulated accident would be a change in pool temperature to outside the range of temperatures assumed in the criticality analyses (50' F to 185 F). The second accident would be dropping a fuel assembly into an already loaded cell. The third would be the misloading of a fuel assembly into a cell for which the restrictions on locs. tion, enrichtnent or burnup are not satisfied.
An increase in the temperature of the water passing through the stored fuel assemblies causes a decrease in water density which would normally result in an addition of negative reactivity. Ilowever, since lloraficx is not considered to be present and the fuel storage pool water has a high concentration of boron, a density decrease causes a positive reactivity addition. The reactivity effects of a temperature range from 32 F to 240 F were evaluated. The increase in reactivity due to the increase in temperature is bounded by the mistoad accident.
For the accident of dropping a fuel assembly into an already loaded cell, the upward axial leakage of that cell will be reduced, however the overall effect on the rack reactivity will be insignificant. This is because the total axialleakage in both the upward and downward directions for the entire fuel array is worth about 0.003 AK. Thus, minimizing the upward only leakage ofjust a single cell will not cause any significant increase in reactivity. Furthermore, the neutronic coupling between the dropped assembly and the already loaded assembly will be low due to several inches of assembly nozzle structure which would separate the active fuel regions. Therefore, this accident would be bounded by the misload accident.
The fuel assembly misloading accident involves placement of a fuel assembly in a location for which it does not meet the requirements for enrichment or burnup, including the placement of an assembly in a location that is required to be left empty. The result of the mistoading is to add positive reactivity, increasing K.n toward 0.95. The maximum required additional boron to compensate for this event is 1250 ppm for Unit 2, and 1150 ppm for Unit I which is well below the limit of 2000 ppm.
Insert 3 for H 3.7.17 The amount of soluble boron required to ofTset each of the above postulated accidents was
' evaluated Ibr all of the proposed storage configurations. That evaluation established the amount of soluble boron necessary to ensure that K,rr will be maintained less than or equal to 0.95 should pool temperature exceed the assumed range or a fuel assembly mistoad !
occur. The amount of soluble boron necessary to mitigate these events was deterndned to be 1250 ppm for Unit 2 and 1150 ppm for Unit 1. The specified minimum boron !
- oncentration of 2000 ppm assures that the concentration will remain above these values.
, in addition, the boron concentration is consistent with the baron dilution evaluation that demonstrated that any credible dilution event could be terminated prior to reaching the boron concentration for a K,rr of > 0.95. These values are 450 ppm for Unit I and 500 ppm for Unit 2.
a
(
1 l
f l
- v. -
- - -,- . , . , - - w , -
r., - - , , , - - - - ,e
i
~
Fuel (torage Pool Boron Concentration 8'
B 3.7.)I 7 BASES APPLICA81LITY progress,-there-ts no-potential-fowsittuaded-fuel-4:9ntinued) assembly-or a-dropped fuel asserbly d ACTIONS A.I. A.2.1. and A.2.2 { do repded The Required Actions are modified by a Note indicating that I I
LCO 3.0.3 does not apply, When the concentration of boron in the fuel storage pool is less than required, immediate action must be taken to ld the occurrence of an accident or to mitigate the f 7 M p# p thr) consequences prec u e of an accident in progress. This is most
/ efficiently achieved by immediately suspending the movement 4, resf"f69FTu~il assMWs.6The concentration of boron is eestoredd
% / simultaneously with suspending movement of fuel assemblies.
An-acca Mie-eiternat ive-i s-to-ver t fy-by-edninistrativeN
/meens-t ut-the-fuel-storage-pool-vert fication-has-been
+arformed-since-the-last-movement-of-fuel-essent1155 irthe) fuel-storage pool.-However,-prior to-resuming-movement-of Ifuel-assembliesntha:cencenkaMon;9.fdoton =*th /
W/ Wifi does not preclude movement of a fuel
(. assembly to a safe position.
If the LC0 is not met while movin assemblies in MODE 5 or 6 LCO0.3 3.gwould irradiated fuel not be apalicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MD)E 1, 2, 3, or 4, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operation. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.
t1 SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.11'.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that the concentration of boron in the fuel storage pool is within the required limit. As long as this SR is met, the analyzed accidents are fully addressed. The 7 day Frequency is appropriate because no major replenishment of pool water is expected to_ take place over such a short period of time. TAe yo,+c L e be ,, ,, ff,
<< nil I a nl a nll 2 fa il shrsp pal /s ivrms/ly cyen, tuhen -ff e ysie is cyvn ibe pels a re Co *Dde H I ~
~
f fe ccmocn for Ue purpose oIcoNucb$) }be. wire l%ce, ;
(continued)
V doUe k,,hIn/2 4ll STS-~ B 3.7-63' -Rev-I r-04/07/97--
F i
M*g jT j Fuel Storage Pool Boron Concentration '
8 3.7.
GASES (continued)f
~
REFELINCES
~1hCallawhsR)DesignConcept,'
FSAR, Appendix 9.1A, 'The Maximum sf6 Rack (
b E. Mscr Chan FacilityhandEvaluationforPrting1.icensav0PR-39andDPR-4!e
- PoorStation) 3 03uble contingsncy pr wip'le of ANSI N16.1-1975, as spcifisddn the April 14,1978 NRC letter (3ectWn 1.2) and implied in trcu NutatoryGuide1.13(Section1.proposedrevisionto 4bAppndixA).
,46 FSAR, Section flhh4)r 4,3, a Muelear Rep olory l Co m m e c uo n , > < he e h a l l f.
il e <>cl0v 4he nsees -from 0. u Gn ' es, lswrr Po.Al,l.ra,r Redew aet Accy l iree of
'O7 f
Ty er,4 Fue 1 3 foray sol llsndld) App $c's lis Apr,1 l% /17Y.
L
%//c On./r Ian/ 2 4(
8 3.7-84 .-Rev-1 r-04/07f ts-MiTS-
Insert 4 for113.7.17 Refstences
- 1. USNRC Standard Resiew Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants. LWR Edition, NUREG 0800, June,1987.
l l 2. USNRC Spent Fuel Storage Facility Design llases (for Comment) Proposed t
Revision 2,1981. Regulatory Guide 1.13.
l 3. ANS, ' Design Requirements for Light Water Reactor Spent Fuel Storage Facilities at Nuclear Power Pations", ANSI /ANS 57.21983.
- 4. WCAP-14416 NP A, rev.1," Westinghouse Spent Fuel Rack Criticality Analysis Methodology", November,1996.
5
i .
4eatF9e;AssemblyStorahe 83.7 !
. /8 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 8 3.7. besty Fuel Assembly Storage I
BASES l BACKGROUND inthegaximu ensity ck (MOR M (Refs. l jhd 2)) des n, the !#ent f I stora pool 's lvided in W two separ e and d
i disfnet"gionsw h, for e purpose critical y 1 c
- sider Lions, conside d as sep ate pools.
! /tegio 1), wit (336 st age posi ns, is de gned to
! acc date n fuelw)i a maxim enrichment f (4.65) %
, U-2 , or s t fuel r ardless the disch ge fuel b up. -( gion 2), ith(2671 storage p itions, signed o accommo ate fuel ' various i itial enp chmen which h e accumu ted mini m burnups thin thyaccep le ;
. domain accordin o Figur .7.17-1, . the acc pany i LCO. Fuel ass blies no meeting t criteri f i
F1 e (3.7.1 -li shall e stored n accord aw p agraph4..l.Lin etion 4.3 Fuel Sto go.
l
{ The w ter in th spent fu storage poo normally con ns ts in large uberiticalit margins sol le boron hich res ;
! u r actua operating nditions, ver, the C j ideline based upo the accide condition i which all i
. soluble otson is a used to hav been lost, ecify tha / '
i , the 11 ting k 0.95 be av usted in t absence o solu e boron. m ence, the d ign of bot egions is ased !
on e use of nborated wa r, which a ntains eac region i a suberi cal conditi. during no al operati with th i egions f y loaded, se double ntingency principle
- discuss in ANSI N. .1-1975 an he April 578 NRC 1 ter (Ref. allows cr it for sol e boron u er other i
~
abno a or acci nt conditiops, since o a sing acc ont need be consideradA t one ti For ex ple, the
- t severe ident seen io is asso ated wi tie venant o uel from [ gion 1 to ion 2] nd accide al f a fuel misloadin sembly in
- egion 2: This cou potenti y increase he critic ty of N ion 2;. o i - mitig a these pos lated crii ality r Tated acc< nts, bo is dissolv in the p water, afe oper ion of h
- with no mov nt of a blies a therefor be ach ved
- b controlli he locat n of eac assembly acco nce ith the acc anying 0. Prior o movene of an
- assembly, #; is neces ary to per na SR 3. 16.1.
SMob /
1 (continued) t4 EMG- M us Int 2 B3.7-g - P= 1 M/M/O b .
m..-. - . - , - ,._e_-..__. -,r...~,---.. ~.m, .-,.-. _~.., ..m. --...,-y
, ...s.,~ _ ._ ,,_. ._ ,__, _ , . - _ _ . . _ , - - - , - . , . - - , , . , . . , . .,
i insert I for 113.7.1S The Unit 1 spent fuel storage racks contain storag3 locations for 288 fuel assemblics, and the Unit 2 spent fuel stora:,e racks contam storage locations for 2098 fuel assemblies.
Westinghouse 17X17 fuel assemblies with an enrichment of up to and including 5.0 weight percent U 235 can be stored in the acceptable storage con 0gurations that are specified in Figures 3.7.181 (Unit 1),3.7.18 2 (Unit 2), and 4.3.1 1 through 4.3.19. The i
acceptable fuel assembly storage locations are based on the Westinghouse Spent Fuel l Rack Criticality Methodology, described in WCAp 14416 Np A, rev.1 (reference 1).
Additional background discussion can be found in Il 3.7.17.
l Westinghouse 17xl7 fuel assemblies with nominal enrichments no greater than 1.79 2
w/o "U may be stored in all storage celllocations of the Unit 1 pool. Fuel assemblies with initial nominr1 cmichment greater than 1.79 w/o'"U must satisfy a minimum burnup requirement as shown in figure 3.7.181.
Westinghouse 17x17 fuel rasemblies with nominal enrichments no greater than 2.45 2
w/o "U may be stored in a 3-out of-4 checkerboard arrangement with empty cells in the Unit I pool. Fuel assemblics with initial nominal enrichment greater than 2.45 w/o2 "U must satisfy a mininm burnup requirement as shown in figure 4.3.1 1.
Westinghouse 17xl7 fuel assemblies with nominal enrichme..is no greater than 5.0 2
w/o "U may be stored in a 2 out of-4 checkerboard arrangement with empty cells in the Unit f or Unit 2 pool. Tnere are no minimum burnup requirements for this configuration.
Westinghouse 17x17 fuel assemblies with nominal enrichments no greater than 1.77 2
w/o "U may be stored in all storage celllocations of the Unit 2 pool. Fuel assemblies 2
with initial nominal enrichment greater than 1.77 w/o "U must satisfy a minimum burnup requirement as shown in figure 3.7.18-2.
Westinghouse 17x17 fuel assemblies with nominal enrichments no greater than 2.40 2
w/o "U may be stored in a 3 out-of-4 checkerboard arrangement with empty cells in the Unit 2 pool. Fuel assemblies with initial uominal enrichment greater than 2.40 w/o2uU must satisfy a minimum burnup requirement as shown in figure 4.3.12.
Westinghouse 17x17 fuel assemblies may be stored in the Unit 2 poolin a 3x3 array. The 2
center assembly must have an initial enrichment no greater than 3.20 w/o "U.
Alternatively, the center of the 3x3 array may be loaded with any assembly which meets a maximum infinite multiplication factor (K.) value of 1.410 at 68 F. One method of achieving this value of K. is by the use ofIFI3As. The surrounding fuel assemblies must have an initial nominal enriebment no greater than 1.48 w/o2nU or satisfy a minimum burnup requirement for higher initial enrichments as shown in figure 4.3.1-3.
rAe e,eb,.u l,o,n of ,,d.i,. / Spent Fuel Assembly Stora e bl1rith rnen h o n k b ur n tx p B 3.1 Y 0
I< are iteclfte d tas Qurts 3,7,it 1a d 3,y,ty-g fossifcell
'" # 'I ' l BASES (continued)Jde>worioito'" e
"' ",wim.:t w ,, o' e
, , -,1t au, m e rM ,1,,,2t pc.,r ,e/s e t . rei/>,./,,u /"'c 6'.
I 1
are deseos io4 on ripre s a,1,1-1 % .y n ,1,1- 9,
)
APPLICABLE The hypothettent accidents caffonly take place,during or as SAFETY ANALYSES a result of ,6Ke movement ,ef an assembly (Reff'4). Fordhese accident occurrences,,6Ke presence of so;wtile bororvin the spent f I storage ' Fuel Stor Pool Boron, pool (controlled Concentration') by400 pfevents 3.7.16(lity 11 cpHica be regions. A y closely controll,ing the vesent of enti assembly anf4y checking the,16 cation of h assemb1/after
[ Trcet k 2' movement Ahe time period for potential / ccidents be limit do a small fraction of the t til operating ime.
Duri the remainin no potential for i ac dents, the op#g41me ation may be period er the auspktes of the i companying LCD; The configuration of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool satisfies Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Statement.
LCO '/ nog'
, The refrictions on the placement of fuel assemblies within the spent fueltpool, .in-accordance-with-f4 e 3d.1Nti-in-ths-accompanyigritt, ensure / the k ,, of the .spe* fuel storage pool wi 1 always remain < 0.g5, assuming the pool to be flooded with ydborated water. JueLassembl4u-met
-aeeting-the triteria-of-Figure-[3J417-1)-eha11-be-stored-in
.accordance-wi th - Spec i f ica t t en-4. 3. irl-i n-Sect ion-4 r3 r-N-> ,
APPLICABILITY This LCO applies whenever any fuel assembly is stored in
'":;,L., 2) ef the fyel storage pool.
ACT10NS Ad [M'I ,.
Os l'7'H'2I""Ok Required Action A.1 is modified' by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply.
When the configuration of fuel assemblies stored in t;kr, ion 2)-the . spent fuel storage pool is not in accordance wit 53fi;,a 3.7.!? !. r ;r:;p " 'he necessary .1.t, the immediate
-~
act~ ion Ss to initiate action to ina.ke t fuel assembly movement (s) to brin compliance with Figurtf3.7 M 'orgSpecification the configuration 4.3.1.1.into-l*' '" ' Y
% e i c c eyha bl.O'" b ' be" #l ' '
~ -
' ~
pr.,,a,, a,ni sl.orsy con fiju raliIa3, (continued) t Ve lle % h lag $ 01
-WhG-STS-- B 3.7-8tf -itertr04/97/96-
insert 2 to 113,7.18 Most fuel storage pool accident conditions will not result in an increase in 14 Examples of such accidents are the drop of a fuel assembly on top of a rack, and the drop of a Ibel assembly between rack modules, or between sack modules and the pool wall. Ilowever, I
accidents can be postulated for each storage configuration which could increase reactivity
, beyond the analyzed condition. A discussion of these accidents is contained in !! 3.7.17.
i l
e i
1;=t Fuel Assembly Storage' f
83.7.)8' I <
BASES I
- ACTIONS Ad (continued) l i
If unable to move irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 5 l or 6, LCO 3.0.3 would not be applicable. If unable to move irradiated fuel assorbites while in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the action is independent of reactor operation. Therefore, inability to move fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.
f 3,1 18-r(u no FI) or 11.I8'-1 ( h t*)
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.N.1
,, u,jul,, abe a e rophl/t 6,r n , d or,is m of REQUIREMENTS This SR verifie f by administrative means that the initial l i
enrichment and-)>urnup of the fuel assembly is n-accordancs
-w( W Figure 5[39. rl7-1-}-in the ;;; a anying-LCO. For fuel (~2 p assemblies in the unacceptable range of Figurer 3.7.lf'-1 ,8** A le.s yn<;eti ~$ performance of this SR w111 ensure compliance with 17 4
Specification 4.3.1.1. g
~
~
/ REFERENCES 1. Callaway FJAR, Appendix 91,K, 'The M dm'um Density Rack (MDR Design to p.
- 2. Description and Evaluation for oposed Cha et to FacilityOperatJn6LicensesD -39 and DPR (Zion j Power Statio ).
3[ Double Sentingency p ipe ple of ANSI N16.1-1975, as specified in the Ap 1 14, 1978 NRC f istter f
[ *7 Syction 1.2 andj lied in the cposed revision to ulatoryGidef.13(Sectionp{,AppendixA).
t
- f. FSAR,Section'[15.7.4].
j, W(, A P -- UI HIb -NF-^> % %%* *'*%
L*N'#'"IReMr%ItYy klycia piek blogy ", NevwlaC, c / f Mr M
.aoa-sis- 8 3.7-87 a.e- 1r-e4/or/es-
Insert 3 for 113.7.18 liuel assembly movement will be in accordance with preapproved plans that are consistent with the specified fuel enrichment, burnup and storage configurations. These plans are administratively verified prior to Ibel movement. Each assembly is verified by visual inspection to be in accordance with the preapproved plan prior to storage in the fuel storage pool Storage commences following unlatching of the fuel assembly in the fuel storage pool.
4 0
a l
,. .. s . . .. ..
ENCLOSURE 4 VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORh1ATION REVISED REQUEST TO REVISE TECilNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CRi?DIT FOR 110RON AND ENRICllMENT INCREMIROILEUEL STORAGli ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESShiENT Information Supporting an Environmental Assesstnent An environmental assessment is not required for the proposed change because the requested changes to the license confo.m to the criteria for " actions eligible for categorical exclusion," as specif.ed in 10 CFR S t.22(c)(9) The changes will have no impact on the environment. The proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration as discussed in the preceding section. The proposed changes do not involve a significant change in the types or a significant increase in the amoants of any efIluents that may be released ofTsite. The increased enrichment will not allow burnups in excess of the currently allowed limits for Westinghouse fuel therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.
,, 1 Table 10. 3x3 Checkerboard 95/95 Ke rr for Vogtle Unit 2 No Soluble Soluble Boron Boron Credit Nominal KENO-Ya Reference Reactivity: 0.96863 0.90946 Calculational & Methodology Blases:
Methodology (Benchmark) Bias 0.00770 0.00770 Pool Temperature Bias (50*F - 185'F) 0.00763 0.00784 TOTAL Bias 0.01533 0.01554 Tolerances & Uncertaintles:
UO 2Enrichment Tolerance 0.01092 0.01092 UO2DensityTolerance 0.00341 0.00386 Fuel Pellet Dishing Variation 0.00199 0.00226 CellInner Dimension 0.00010 0.00000 Cell Pitch 0.00417 0.00427 Cell Wall Thickness 0.00307 0.00227 Asymmetric Assembly Position 0.00741 0.00804 Calculational Uncertainty (95/95) 0.00180 0.00168 Methodology Bias Uncertainty (95/95) 0.00300 0.00300 TOTAL Uncertainty (statistical) 0.01513 0.01S47 9
T'
_ ((tolerance s..,or... uncertainty,)2) ga]
Final KerrIncluding Uncertainties & Tolerances: 0.99911 0.94047 Vogtle Units 1 and 2 Spent Fuel Racks 60
i Table 11. Slinimum IFBA Requirement for the Center Assembly in Yogtle Unit 2 3x3 Checkerboard Storage Nominal IFBA IFBA IFRA Enrichment Requirement Requirement Requirement (w/o 235 0) 1.0X 115X 1.5X 3.20 0 0 0 3.40 11 10 8 3.60 21 18 15
-3.80 32 27 22 4.00 42 36 29 4.20 53 45 36 4.40 63 53 43 4.60 75 63 50 4.80 88 74 59 5.00 103 86 69 Vogtle Units 1 and 2 Spent Fuel Racks 61 i b
Table 12. Postulated Accident Summary for Vogtle Units 1 and 2 Reactivity Reactivity Soluble Baron increase Caused Increase Caused Required for by Loss of by Mislended Limiting Con guration Cooling Fuel Assembly Accidents Accident (AK) Accident (AK) (ppm)
Unit i All Cells 0.00430 0.07415 500 3-ou' of-4 0.00221 0.08494 600 Checkerboard 2-out of-4 0.0 0.12870 1050 Checkerboard Unit 2 All Cells 0.00416 0.07344 500 3-out-of-4 0.00158 0.08913 700 Checkerboard 2-out-of-4 0.0 0.14709 1200 Checkerboard l
3x3 0.00369 0.07890 550 Checkerboard 4
)
Vogtle Units I and 2 Spent P.lel Racks 62
Table 13. Summary of Soluble Boron Credit Requirements for Vogtle Units I and 2
'" ' '" Total Soluble Total Soluble Soluble Boron Boron Credit Soluble Boron Boron Credit Storage Required for equ red for Required Required for Required Configuration K,g 5 0,95 **** III Without Accidents 9" "I'" "E Including (ppm) Accidents (ppm) Accidents (ppm)
(pp ,) (pp ,)
Unit 1 All Cells 200 250 450 500 950 3 out of-4 200 150 350 600 950 Checkerboard 2-out-of-4 100 n/a 100 1050 Checkerboard 1150 Unit 2 All Cells 150 200 350 500 850 3-out-of-4 200 150 350 700 1050 Checkerboard 2-out-of-4 50 n/a 50 1200 1250 Checkerboard 3x3 200 300 500 550 1050 Checkerboard Vogtle Units 1 and 2 Spent Fuel Racks 63
i e ' -
' i i
1.y sennu -
I I
y , t . u-i ,
s.80*
, ]
n .
l ,
, ,,, a:u. conta to uma iso.c i ,
.090" Gap *"'" * "
0.078" Boraflex 5# # # // / % (0.020 GM-B 10/cm2) s -t is t 'l 0.020 teRAPPER i
s DETAIL "A" Figure 1. Vogtk Unit 1 Spent Fuel Storage Cell Nominal Dimensions Vogtle Units I and 2 Spent Fuel Racks 64 U
4....
! . i. - 1 s !
! (
! ^ 00000000000000000 00000000000000000 !
l ea I 00000900900900000 im m=i . 00000000000009000 t
i i
- 00000000000000000 i 00000900900900900 wTi "
i i
00000000000000000 1 00000000000000000 i ;
00900400900900900 i 1
00000000000000000 i 00000000000000000 i wmn an
- 00000900900900900 imas
! 00000000000000000 2= s a i
1 00000000000009000 i 0000u 00000000900900000 i i
,,, . .ox m >OOOO -
DOOOt,-~~~~~~JOOOO i
' \ oms sssox se3S N4mRSC110N
- is.ao E W DIRECTION
-'t-~---- - '------------_,_
' ---------~'-*-r*-~-
NOTTO SCALE * ,
Figure 2. Vogtle Unit 2 Spent Fuel Storage Cell Nominal Dimensions i
Vogtle Units 1 end 2 Spent Fuel Racks 65
I I
n 1.214" 1.182" 1.151" l
1.173" 1.162" 1.207" 1.184" 1.171" 1.233" Rack Module A-5 3x3 Array with Worst Case Average Water Gaps c-______________,
i, 10.34"(10.306)* "
i I i I i 1 0.61"i(0.593)*
l = >;
' I t
8.75" I
i-I 1 I I I I I i I I I I Reactivity Equivalent Worst Case Cell for Vogtle Unit 2
- Values used for the 3x3 configuration Figure 3. Vogtle Unit 2 Rack Module A-5 Limiting Water Gaps and Equivalent Cell Vogtle Units 1 and 2 Spent Fuel Racks 66
40000 ,
/
/
35000 "
/
j i
f f
f 30000 - /
j
/
n
/
f 5 /
-25000
/
/
- /
.g /
M 20000 ACCEPTABLE /
- dl /
/
/
/
4 15000
/
/
- u. /
/
/
.10000 /
/ jUNACCEPTABLE F -
/ I
/
5000 j
)
{
/
0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 Initial U 235 Enrichment (nominal w/o)
Figure 4. Vogtle Unit 1 Burnup Credit Requirennents for All Cell Storage Vogtle Units 1 and 2 Spent Fuel Racks 67
30000 1
25000
/
/
20000
/
8 n /
E /
9 /
m
! 15000 ACCEPTABLE /
/
$ /
? /
- /
z
.s
' /
10000 / -
/
/
/
./
l UNACCEPTABLE
/
5000
/
)
f 0 #
1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 5,0 4.5 Initial U 235 Enrichment (nominal w/o)
Figure 5. Vogtle Unit 1 Burnup Credit Requirements for 3-Out-Of-4 Checkerboard Storage
< 1 Vogtle Units I and 2 Spent Fuel Racks 68
t Z Z Z Z ZZZZ Z ZZ Z Z Z Z Z .
3-out-of-4 Checkerboard Storage Z Z Z Z Z Z 2-out-of-4 Checkerboard Storage Empty Storage Cell Fuel Assembly in Storage Cell Figure 6. Vogtle Units 1 and 2 Empty Cell Checkerboard Storage Configurations Vogtle Units 1 and 2 Spent Fuel Racks 69
. . . . _)
1 L
O O A
O -
., O 3x3 Checkerboard Storage f
Low Enrichment Fuel Illah Enrichment Fuel Assembly in Storage Cell O
Assembly in Storage Cell Figure 7. Vogtle Unit 2 3x3 Checkerboard Storage Configuration Vogtle Units 1 and 2 Spent Fuel Racks 70
Rev. 2 n
s4
~
50000' i.
j 45000 j: 40000 v
/
J 1: 35000 >"
/
n ;
,J
~
,. d 30000 / . . . _
3:
/
2
/
- /
j 25000 ACCEPTABLE ,
/
)
i >. /
.}
/ ~ ' ~
/ '
20000 r e
/
j
']-
- u. /
i J ~
j/
^
-15000
/
j: /
UNACCEPTABLE -- --
10000
/
/
l 5000 /,
/
r
/
0 i .- 1.5 ' 2.0 2.5 - ' 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 ~ 5.0 1 + -
Initia! U 235 Enrichment (nominal w/o) j Figure 8. Vogtle Unit 2 Burnup Credit Requirements for All Cell Storage
< Vogtle Units 1 and 2 Spent Fuel Racks . 71
30000 25000
/
g 20000 /
/
is /
a !
E
& /
$ 15000 ACCEPTABLE ,
/
co
_x /
il /
- a f 2 ;
To
- /
' 10000 /
[
/
/ ~~'- ~~
UNACCEPTABLE
/
5000 /
/
/
/
/
0 l 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.G Initial U-235 Enrichment (nominal w/o)
Figure 9. Vogtle Unit 2 Burnup Credit Requirements for 3-Out-Of-4 Checkerboard Storage Vogtle Units I and 2 Spent Fuel Racks 72
a
. 50000 A
/
45000 - -
/
r f
/
40000 /
/
35000 /
n ,
e f
/
3 30000 /
3 /
2, .
,/
a '
8 /
B 25000 ACCEPTABLE cn /
_x /
O )
$ /
j 20000 /
Ta /
g ,
/
15000 /
f j UNACCEPTABLE --
0000 j
/
)
5000
(
/
l
/
0 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 Initial U-235 Enrichment (nominal w/o)
Figure 10. Vogtle Unit 2 Burnup Credit Requirements for 3x3 Checkerboard Storage Vogtle Units 1 and 2 Spent Fuel Racks 13
120 1.0X IFBA
.............. 1.25X IFBA 1.5X IFBA 100
/
/
80 ' '
$E
/ ..'
8 ACCEPTABLE r
[ 'o M / ,,
/
r *' /
8 60 ) ,
/
g ,, f j / ..
/
/
R
@ f
/
)
/
/ '.. /
l 40 #
[
/ , . * * */.
> / *.. / /
[,<*' / UNACCEPTABLE 20 '
[', [ l-
,,. /
, .. /
.b'V F
0 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 U-235 Enrichment (nominal w/o)
Figure 11. Vogtle Unit 2 3x3 Checkerboard IFBA Requirement for Center Assembly Vogtle Units 1 and 2 Spent Fuel Racks 74
)
A A A A A A Note:
A A A A A A A = AH Cell
+ Enrichment interface
\ A A A A B " 3-0"'-08'4 Enrichment Empty = Empty Cell Empt) B Empty I A A A B B B A A A Empn B Empty A A A l
e Boundary Between All Cell Storage and 3-out-of-4 Storage l- A A A 'A A A Note:
A A A A A A A = AH CeH Interface Enrichment
\ A A n = 3-out-or-4 Enrichment C = 2-out-Of-4 Empty B Empty i A A A Enrichment Empty = Empty Cell C Empty B A A A Empty C Empty A A A e
Boundary Between All Cell Storage and 2-out-of-4 Storage Note:
- 1. A row of empty cells can be used at the interface to separate the configurations.
- 2. It is acceptable to replace an assembly with an empty cell.
Figure 12. Vogtle Units 1 and 2 Interface Requirements (All Cell to Checkerboard Storage)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 Spent Fuel Racks 75
-- --- J
l 1
)
i B tmpty B tmpt> B tmpt3 Note:
B B B B B B a out-or-4 Interface Enrichment
- y B tmpty B tmpty B tmpty c- 2-outm ,
Enrichment Empty = Empty Cell i Empty C Empty B B B C Empty C Empty B Empty j
tmpty C Empty B B B i
Boundary Between 2-out-of-4 Storage and 3-out-of-4 Storage Empty B tmpty B B B 1
Note:
B B B B tmpty B a out-or-Enrichment Interface c out-or-t N mpty B tmpty B B B E:irichment Empty = Empty Cell
- C Empty Ci empty B tmpty i
j ompty C Empty ' B B B m
C tmpty Cl Empty B tmpty
- 1 e
Boundary Between 2-out-of-4 Storage and 3-out-of-4 Storage Note:
- 1. A row of empty cells can be used at the interface to separate the configurations.
3
- 2. It is acceptable to replace an assembly with an empty cell.
i j Figure 13. Vogtle Units 1 and 2 Interface Requirements j (Checkerboard Storage Interface)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 Spent Fuel Racks 76
i A A A A A A Note:
i I
A A A A A A A = All Cell Enrichment
"' "*" (l.77 w/o)
N L L L L A A L = L w Enrichment of a_ ___ __ _ _ _ .
313 Checkerboard 43,4g ,f,)
L L LI L A A 11 = Illgh Enrichment of 3x3 Checkerboard L II L l L A A (328"1*)
L L L i L A A 1
s Note:
- 1. A row of empty cells can be used at the interface to separate the configurations.
- 2. It is acceptable to replace an assembly with an etcpty cell.
Figure 14. Vogtle Unit 2 Interface Requirements (3x3 Checkerboard to All Cell Storage)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 Spent Fuel Racks '
77
l l
! l B B B B B B*
Note:
] Empy- B Empn B tmpn B n out-or 4 Interface Enrictiment (2.40
% L L L L B B w/o)
, m_ _
L = Low Enrichment i
L L Ll L tmpn- B or3x3 storage (i.48
{
, w/o)
L II L L B B H = liigh Enrichment of 3x3 Storage I (3.20 w/o)
L L L L tmpn B tmpty . empty ceti
! \
a
{ Boundary Between 3x3 Sto. .tge and 3-out-of-4 Storage i
- Note
C Empn C Empn C emp:3 a out or-4 Enrichrnent (2.40 Empn B tmpty B tmpty C [*,! nrichment
- t E litterrace or3,3 sior.se(i.48 j g L L** L L** B tmpty wfo)
H = High Enrichment l L L L1 L tmpty C or 3x3 storsee (3.20 w/o)
~
j L H L L** B tmp,, c ouz or-4 j
Enrichment (5.00 L L L "' )
)
.L tmpn C Empty = Empty Cell 1
" a Boundary Between 3x3 Storage and 2-out-of-4 Storage i
j Note:
- 1. A row of empty cells can be used at the Interface to separate the configurations.
- 2. It is acceptable to replace an assembly with an empty cell.
- 3. For the 3-out-of-4 configuration, the row beyond the Low enrichment can swap empty and B assemblies, however the next outer row must change the indicated assembly (*) to an empty cell.
- 4. For the 2-out-of-4 configuration, the row beyt,nd the Low enrichment can swap empty and B assemblies, however the next outer row of empty and C assemblies must also swap locations.
- 5. If empty cells are in indicated locations (**), then the face adjacent B assemblies can be C assemblies.
Figure 15. Vogtle Unit 2 Interface Requirements (3x3 to Empty Cell Checkerboard Storage)
Summary of Criticality Results 78
?
Bibliography
- 1. Nesnyer, W.D., ll'estinghouse Spent Fuel Rack Criticalin' Analysis Methodology, WCAP 14416-NP A Revision 1, November 1996.
- 2. Davidson, S.L., et al; l'ANTAGE 3 Fuel A~sembly Reference Core Report, Addendum 1.'
WCAP 10444 P-A, March 1986.
- 3. Tumer, Stanley E., Criticalin' Safen' Evaluation ofthe lo' gtle Plant Spent Fuel Storage Racks lilth As Built Water Gaps, HI 88250, December 1988,
- 4. - Nesuyer. W.D., Fuel Rod Storage Canister Criticalin' Analysis, October l 994.
ii Summary of Criticality Results
' 79 o