ML20092F621
| ML20092F621 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 05/04/1989 |
| From: | GEORGIA POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20092F288 | List:
|
| References | |
| CON-IIT05-002-072-90, CON-IIT05-002-074-90, CON-IIT5-2-72-90, CON-IIT5-2-74-90, RTR-NUREG-1410 10003-C, NUDOCS 9202190440 | |
| Download: ML20092F621 (15) | |
Text
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A;4f ot al Procedure No
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p-P " h4 ' N, Vogtla Eloctric G:nerating Plant 10003-C NUCLEAR OPERATIONS
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- r. o. s r. s Re"5'on No-COMMON Georgia Power e.s. 9,f 3 3.s. n unn No'hh/'{ SET MANNING THE SHIFT A
'0 PURPOSE This procedure defines normal and minimurn shif t staffing to operate Plant Vogtle.
2.0 DEFINITIONS 2.1 AT THE CONTROLS The designated area, as shown in Figure 1, 3.0 REQUIREMENTS Table 1 lists the minimum and normal shift manning for various operating modes.
3.1 At least one operator licensed on the applicable unit shall be in the Control Room when fuel is in either reactor.
He shall remain in the "at the controls" area until relieved by another qualified Reactor Operator, except that in an emergency affecting the safety of operations the operator at the controls may momentarily be absent to verify an annunciator alarm or to initiate corrective action provided he remains in the Control
- Room, i
3.2 A Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) licensed on the applicable unit (si shall be in the Control Room whenever either unit is in Mode 1, 2, 3 or 4.
(If a single SRO coes not hold an SRO License on both units, an SRO for each unit taay fulfill this requirement.)
i i
3.3 Core alterations shall be observed and directly supervised by a licensed SRO or SRO limited to fuel handling.
He shall be in the Containment Building on the Fuel Handling Floor of the affected unit and have no other concurrent responsibilities.
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i'RoCEDURE No.
Aly:SioN PAGE No.
VEGP 10003-C 11 2 of 5 I
3.4 A Fire Team consisting of at least 5 members (including a team leader) shall
">e maintained on site at all times.
The OSOS shall designate the Fire Team leader and members at the beginning of each shif t.
The team leader and at least two of the other four team members will know plant safety related systems well enough to understand the effects of a fire and fire suppressants on the plant's safe shutdosm capability.
The Fire Team shall not include the OSOS, one USS, either RO, or either BOP who are the minimum or.-shift operating staff for remote shutdown.
The A0 and the OAO should yi normally not make up the Fire Team, however, they may supplement the Fire Team when necessary.
3.5 The shift crew minimum requirements of Table 1 and the Fire Team may be reduced by one person for a period of time not to exceed 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
This is to accommodate the unexpected absence of on-duty shift personnel.
Immediate action shall be taken to restore manning to the minimum requirements.
This provision does not permit any shif t position to be unmanned upon shift change due to tardiness or absence of on-coming personnel.
3.6 During any absence of the USS from the Control Room I
(
while either unit is in Mode 1, 2, 3 or 4, an 4
individual with a valid SRO license shall be designated to assume the Unit 's Control Room command function.
During any absence of the USS from the Control Room
[
while either unit is in Mode 5 or 6, an individual with j
a valid SRO or R0 license shall be designated to assume the Unit's Control Room command function.
3.7 The balance of plant (BOP) oaerator will normally remain in the Control Room wien not needed elsewhere in the plant.
l-i-
3.3 Ar. c'erator shall be assigned to the Auxiliary Boiler intbeMaintenance Building whenever it is in operation.
He shall have no other concurrent l
responsibilities.
t 3.9 The OSOS shall designate a qualified person to aerform the Shif t Technical Advisor-(STA) function at t:1e -
i beginning of each shift.
Any STA who has not performed shift functions for 30 days or longer shall be briefed i
in accordance with 00715-C " Licensed Operator Requalification Program".
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PaOCEDURE NO.
Aty SioN
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pagt go.
VEGP 10003-C 11 3 of 5 l
4.0 REFERENCES
4.1 Vogtle Technical S)ecifications Section 6.0 4.2 PROCEDURES 4.2.1 10000-C,
" Conduct 0.' Opera tions" 4.2.2 00715-C, " Licensed Operarcr Requalification Progratn".
1p END OF PROCEDURE TEXT i
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WOCEDURE No HEvl51oN PAGE Mo l
VEGP 10003-C 11 4 of 5 b
TABLE 1 MINIMUM SHIFT MANNING
[03TTTON NLHBER~ 07 TNUIVGUAIT REQUIRED TO FILL PUSITION" BOTH UNITS IN BOTH UNITS IN ONE UNIT IN MODE 1, 2, MODE 1, 2, 3, MODE 5 or 6 3, or 4 AND ONE UNIT IN l
or 4 _
OR DEFUELED MODE 5 or 6 or DEFUELED O_ SOS 1
1 1
SRO 1
none**
1 RO 3
2 3
NLO 3
3 3
STA 1*
none 1*
N_0RMAL SHIFT MANNING UNIT 1 COMMON UNIT 2 OSOS USS STA*
USS
(
_R0 SSS RO BOP 30P A0 A0 TO TO OAO OAO CB0 CB0 RWO F.WO Extra Operators OSOS
- On-Shift Operations Supervisor with a valid Senior Reactor Operator's (SRO) license.
SRO - USS
- Unit Shift Supervisor with a valid SRO license.
- Support Shift Supervisor.
- RO
- Reactor Operator with a valid RO license.
- Balance of Plant Operator with a valid RO license.
NLO - A0, TO, OAO, CBO, RWO - Non Licensed Operators.
('
qualification requirements for an STA.
- At lease one licensed SRO or SRO limited to Fuel Handling who has no other concurrent responsibilities cust be present during CORE ALTERATIONS on either unit, a
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I NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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- 3 101 M ARit TT A $ f N W, ATLANT A GEORGIA 30323
,,g AUG 0 71969 ya usus Docket Nos. 50-424, 50-425 Ns*
Licerse Nos. NPF-68, NPF-81 Morg Etc D
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unsw y g glrn f[e y,C Nuclear Operations P. O. Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35201 g
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Gentlemen:
UN actl0N DUE
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SUBJECT:
NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-424/89-21 AND 50-425/89-25 This refers to the Nuclear Regulatory Conunission (NRC) inspection conducted by W. M. Sartor, Jr. on July 25-27, 1989.
The inspection included a review of activities authorized for your Vogtle facility.
At the conclusion of the inspection, the findings were discussed with those members of your staff identified in the enclosed inspection report.
Areas examined during the inspection are identifled in the report.
Within these areas, the inspection censisted of sclective examinations of procedures and representative records, interviews with personnel, and observation of activities in progress.
Within the scope of the inspection, no violations or deviations were identified.
Your attention is directed toward the resolution of the exercise weakness identified in Paragraph 3 of the enclosed inspection report.
In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Docurrent Room.
Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact us.
Sir.cerely, Douglas M. Collins Chief Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
Enclosure:
(Seepage 2) f N
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}l Georgia Power Cofhpany 2
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Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report cc w/ encl:
R. P. Mcdonald, Executive Vice President-Nuclear Operations C. K. McCoy, Vice President. Nuclear G. R. Fredrick, Quality Assurance Site Manager G. Bockhold, Jr., General Manager Nuclear Operations J. A. Bailey, Manager-Licensing B. W. Churchill, Esquire, Shaw, l
Pittman, Potts, and Trowbridge J. E. Joiner, Esquire, Troutman, Sanders, Lockertnan, and Ashrnore D. Kirkland, !!!, Counsel, Office of the Consumer's Utility 1
Council State of Georgia l
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. - ~ - - - - -
[p* *' %g UNITED STATES j
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMILSION
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f REGION ll
%.....g 101 WamitTTA ST., O w.
,9 arLANtA, cronoia um M607 2 Report Nos.:
50-424/09-21 and 50-425/89-25 Licensee: Georgia Power Company P. O. Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35201 Cccket Nos.:
50-424 and 50-425 License Nos.:
NPF-68 and NPF-81 Facility Name:
Vogtle 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: July 25-27, 1989 Inspector:
N) h Y/3/f ')
W. M. 5artor Jr.
J Date 51gnev Accompanying Personnel:
B.Haagensen(PNL) o F. Kantor (NRR)
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Approved by: Nu 8 MA f'/9/ F7 W. H. Rankin. Chief V
Da te '51gned Emergency Preparedness Section Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMKARY Scope:
l This routine, announced inspection was the observation and evaluation of the annual ernergency exercise.
Offsite participation consisted of the States and counties participating for cocununications only, with the exception of Burke County which participated fully for training purposes only.
Three NRC insp*ctors observed selected pertions cf the staffing and response of emergency organizatien personnel in the simulator, Technical Support Center Operational Support Center and the Emergency Operations Facility.
Results:
Based upon the scenario used and the response observed thereto, the licensee successfully demonstrated the capability of the staff to perfor1n in accordance with the Emergency Preparedness Plans and Procedures to adequately provide for the health and safety of the public. - An. exercise weakness was identified for failure to make timely General Emergency classification and Protective Action Recommendations.
Additional shortcomings addressed inaccurate and incomplete.
notifications and the failure of the exercise staff to conduct a sufficiently criU. cal critique of licensee performance during the exercise.
l
e REPORT DETAlt.5 1.
Persons Contacted Licenset Employees
- V. Agro, Plant Administration Supervisor
- J. Aufdankampe, Manager, Technical Support
- J. Badgett, Emergency Planning Coordinator
- G, Bockhold, General Manager
- H. Butterworth, Operations Supervisor
- G. Frederick, Quality Assurance Site Manager
- H. Handfinger, Maintenance Manager
- K. Holmen Manager, Training and Emergency Preparedness
- C, Kitchens, Security Department Supervisor
- I Kochery, Health Physics Superintendent
- R. LeGrand, Manager, Health Physics / Chemistry
- L. Mayo, Senior Emeroency Preparedness
- A. Mosbaugh, Assistant General Manager Plant Support
- R.-Odom, Plant Engineering Supervisor I
- J. Petro, Senior Quality Assurance Field P.epresentative
- J. Roberts, Emergency Preparedness Supervisor
- J. Swartzwelder, Manager, Operations
- D. Warren, Security Specialist Other licensee employies contacted-during this inspection included ~
engineers, operators, mechanics, security force members, technicians, and administrative personnel.
Oglethorpe Power Corporatiot
- I. Toupin, Superintendent. Nuclear Operations-NRC Resident inspectors R. Aialic J. Rcgge
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exercise Scenario (83202)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to detennine that-provisions had been made to -test the licensee *s intergrated emergency response capability as well' as to test 'a maj6r portion of the basic:
elements within the. licensee's Emergency Plan as required by 10CFR50.54(t), 50.47(b)(14), and Section -lV,f of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50.
4 The scenario was reviewed in advance of the scheduled exercise date and discussed briefly with licensee representatives at the Controller Briefing on July 25
'989.
There were no major problems identified with the scenario. A few inconsistencies were noted during the exercise because of minor simulator problems, but these did not detract from the overall exercise performance.
The use of the simulator for the Control Room emergency organization was an asset to the emergency exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)
The licensee's organization was observed during the simulated emergency to ensure the requirements of Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50 were implemented addressing the descriptions, responsibilities, and assignments of the onsite emergency response organization.
The voector observed that the initial onsite emergency organization was ad5 m re v defined and that staff was available to fill key functional within the emergency organization.
The On-Shif t Operations po 4 : s-L m M ro-promptly assumed the duties as the Emergency Director upon iH < uaiv of the simulated earthquake and directed the response until re' e 'd L - the General Manager.
The onsite Technical Support Center (TS.. W sperations Support Center (OSC) were promptly staffed and assuw * ;ergency responsibilities in accordance with the Emergency Plan l
and Implementing Procedures.
The inspector observed a problem that occurred addressing the responsibilities of emergency classification and coordinating offsite eaargency measures when the loss of three fission product barriers necessitated a General Emergency declaration.
Specifically, Implementing Procedure No. 91102-C, Duties of the Emergency Director, lists the i
folicwing general responsibilities of the Emergency Director which cannot be delegated:
Classifying and declaring the emergency including upgrading,
.<ngrading, and termination.
l Rerceending protective actions to cffsite authorities and content of l
messages.
During the exercise, the events that warranted upgrading to a General Emergency occurred during the time (approximately 15 minutes) that the Emergency Director was enroute from the TSC to the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).
As a result, both the General Emergency classification and the recomended protective actions were delayed until the Emergency Director t.rrived at the EOF and was briefed regarding the degrading events.
The above finding was identified as an exercise weakness as follows:
the General Emergency classification and protective action recommendations
=
3 (PARS) were unnecessarily delayed because the Emergency Director did not turn over his emergency authority when he proceeced to the EOF from the TSC.
Corrective action will be tracked as an Inspector Followup Item
(!FI) 50-424/89-21-01 and 50-425/89-25-01.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4 Emergency Classification System (82301)
This area was observed to verify that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by the lir.ensee as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Paragraph IV.C of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50.
The licensee's Procedure No. 91t>01-C. Emergency Classification and Implementing Instructions, provided instructions in the classification of off-nonnal events into one of the four emergency classification levels.
The procedure was effectively used by the Emergency Director and his staff to correctly classify the simulated emergency situations during the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)
This area was observed to assure tha. procedures were established for notification of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel by the licensee, and that the content cf initial and followup messages to response organizations were established.
This area was further observed to assure that means to provide early notification to the population within the plura exposure pathway were established pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5). Paragraph IV.0 of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section li.E of NUREG-0654.
The inspectcr observed that notification methods and procedures were established and available for use in providing infonnation regarding the simulated emergency conditions to Federal. State, and local response organizations, and to alert the licensee's emergen:y respense organizatien.
Several inaccuracies that had the potential to cause confusion and an omission were noted in the offsite notifications.
These incluoed:
Message #003 at 0751:
The Alert had just been declared.
The notification message had block #8 (Plant Condition:) left blank.
The offsite authorities noted the omission and questioned the shift clerk.
The Operations Supervisor then filled in this block stating that plant conditions were " stable."
This was not an accurate description because plant radiation levels were increasing and operators were still assessing the damage caused by the earthquake.
i
The plant was still being brought into a stable condition and safety injection termination was in progress.
Message #005 at 0858:
The Site Area Emergency had just be.n declared.
As in message #003, block #8 was reported as " stable "
Again, this was not necessarily an accurate cescription as operators were still conducting walkdowns to make a daNge assessment as a result of the severe aftershock which was greater than design basis.
Message #010 at 1127:
Although the message provided information that containment integrity had been re-established, block #9 (Emergency involves:) still indicated a release was occurring with expected duration of six hours.
Also, block #13 (Estimate of projected Offsite Dose) remained unchanged even though the primary release pathway had been blocked.
The omission was the failure to make an emergency notification of the transportation offsite of a contaminated injured victim.
The above observations were identified as an IF: 50-424/89-21-02 and 50-425/89-25-02.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Emergency Comunications (82301)
This area was observed to assure that provisions existed for prompt comunications among principal response organizations and emergency personnel pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6), Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance in Section II.F of NUREG-0654 The inspector observed comunications within and between the licensee's emergency facilities, the licensee and offsite -agencies, and the offsite environmental monitoring teams and the EOF.
The inspector also observed information flew among the various groups within the licensee's emergency organization.
Emergency comunications involving notification of the State, local egencies and the NRC cf all Emergency classifications discussed abcVe, appeared adequate and consistent _with the Radiological Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures except as noted in Paragraph 5.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
AccidentAssessment(82301)
This area was observed to detemine whether adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required l
by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9),10 CFR 50, Appendix E. Paragraph IV.B. and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section 11.1 1
5 The accident assessment program included an engir.eering assessment for plant status and an assessment of radiolcgical hazards to both onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the accident.
The Dose Assessment Manager assumed the responsibility for offsite dose calculations when the EOF was activated. The inspector noted that the 0:se Assessment staff did not refine the offsite dose projections with more -realistic release parameters when the information was readily available nor did they track actual radiation exposure to the general public as the accident progressed.
This was not identified as an NRC firding since the licensee had self-identified the dose assessment area as a roblem when noting the failure of the Dose Assessment staff to aggressively detemine the Noble Gas to lodine ratio and therefore used a conservative default value. The inspector also noted that the field moriitoring team, dose, and meteorological data postings in the EOF could be improved.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
ExerciseCritique(82301)
The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine that shortcomings identified as part of the exercise, were brought to the attention of management and documented for corrective actior pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section 11.N of NUREG-0654 The licensee conducted effective player critiques following exercise termination.
On July 27, 1989, just prior to the NRC exit, the Emergency Preparedness Supervisor provided a listing of the graded exercise critique findings to licensee management.
Based on the substance of these findings, the inspector identified IFl 50-424/89-2;-03 and 50-425/89-25-03 for an inadequate critique.
Specifically, the significant NRC exercise findings focused on some of the essentials of emergency; preparedness such as the responsibilities for emergency classification and PARS, and the notifications to offsite authorities, whereas the licensee's findings were less significant and failed to critically address clayer perfomance.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 27, 1989, with-those persons indicated in Paragraph 1.
The. inspector described the areas 1
inspected and discussed in detail the inspecticn results listed below.
No:
dissenting cumments were received from the lir:ensee.
e' 6
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.
Item Number Description and Reference 50-424/89-21-01 IFl - Exercise Weakness for delayed General 50-425/89-25-01 Emergency Classification and PARS while Emergency Director was enreute from the TSC to the EOF (Paragraph 3).
50-424/89-21-02 IFI - Notifications to offsite authorities 50-425/89-25-02 were not always complete and accurate (Paragraph 5).
50-424/89-21-03 IFI - Inadequate critique in that licensee 50-425/89-25-03 exercise staff failed to identify findings basic to an effective emergency preparedness program (Paragraph 8).
Attachment:
Exercise Scope and Objectives and Scenario Time Line
.a.
[j** *%
UNITED STATES j.
j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION e
REGION 11
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/
101 W ARiETTA sT. N W.
ATL ANT A. GEORGIA 30323 NOVi8IWR Docket Nos. 50-424, 50-425 License Nos. NPF-68, CPPR-109 Georgia Power Company ATTN: Mr. W. G. Hairston, Ill Senior Vice President -
Nuclear Operations P. O. Box 4545 Atlanta, GA 30302 Gentlemen:
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION (NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-424/88-38 AND 50-425/88-)y16)
This refers to the Nuclear Regulatory Comission (NRC) inspection conducted by A. L. Cunningham on August 15-19, 1988.
The inspection included a review of activities authorized for your Vogtle Electric Generating plant.
At the conclusion of the inspection, the findings were discussed with those members of your staff identified in the enclosed inspection report.
Areas examined during the inspection are identified in the report.
Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selective examinations of procedures and representative records, interviews with personnel, and observation of activities in progress.
The inspection findings indicate that certain activities appeared to violate NRC requirements.
The violation, references to pertinent requirements, and elements to be included in your response are described in the enclosed Notice of Violation.
This inspection also indicated that there are areas that should be evaluated and considereo for improvement in your emergency preparedness program.
These are identified in Enclosure 2 to this letter as Improvement items, and are discussed in the enclosed Inspection Report.
Improvement items will be tracked as Inspector followup Items.
The enclosed Inspection Rcport. documents oral comitments made by licensee representatives and, discussed in the exit interview.
If your understanding-of these commitments differs from the report statements -please inform this office promptly.
During the inspection, several of your program areas were found to be incomplete and could not be fully _ evaluated.
These areas are identified in-to this 1etter and designated as I_ncomplete items. These items are discussed in the enclosed Inspection Report and are tracked as Inspector Followup Items.
QM[h-
e 3
Georgia Power Company 2
In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules c' Practice," Part 2, l
Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
The responses directed by this letter and its enclosures are not subject to the clearance procedures of the Office of Management and Bue;et as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.96-511.
Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact us.
Sincerely, h
k' Doug as M. Collins, Acting Director Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
Enclosures:
1.
Emergency Preparedness improvement Items 3.
Emergency Preparedness Inccmplete Items j
4.
NRC Inspection Report cc w/encls:
R. P. Mcdonald, Executive Vice President, Nuclear Operations P. D. Rice, Vice President, Project Director C. W. Hayes, Vogtle Quality i
Assurance Manager i
G. Bockhold, Jr., General Manager, Nuclear Operations J. P. Aane, Manager Licensing and Engira ring J. A. Bailey, Froject Licensing Manager B. W. Churchill, Esq., Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge D. Kirkland, III, Counsel, Office of the Consumer's Utility Council D. Feig, Georgians Against Nuclear Energy State of Georgia l
J*,.
.. -. - - _ ~.. -
g,k ENCLOSURE 1 NOTICE OF VIOLATION Gec*gia Power Company Docket No. 50-424 Voctie Electric Generating Plant License No NPF-68 1
During the Nuclear - Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection conducted on August 15-19, 1988, a violation of NRC requirements was-identified.
In acc rdance with the " General Statement of Policy and Frocedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C (1988), the violation is listed belew:
Unit 1 Appendix A Technical Specification 6.7.1 states, in part, that written procedures shall be impl_emented.
The requirement for written procedures ensurino implementation of the Emergency Plan -is defined in item d of the subject Technical Specification.
Contrary to the above the site Emergency Preparedness Supervisor failed to submit to the Plant General Manager a written report, including critique comments and corrective actions, as required by Section 4.'18 of Emergency Procedure EPIP-91602-C (Emergency Drills and Exercises) following Unit -1 unannounced full activation drill conducted on March 9, i
1988.
This is a Severity Level V violation-(Supplement V).
l Pursuant to _the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Georgia Power Company'is hereby l
required to submit a_ written statement or explanation to the Nuclear Regulatory Corrission ATTN:
Document Control' Desk, Washington, DC 20555 with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region II, and a copy to tne NRC Resident Inspector, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, within'30_ days of the-date of the letter transmitting this Notice.
This reply should be clearly marked as a "Re:1y to a Notice.of Violation" and should include:
(1) admission or denial l
of the violation, (2) the reason for the. violation i f_ admitted. (3)_the corrective steps which have ' been taken and the results achieved, (4) the.
corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further violations, and-(5) the date when full compliance will be achieved.
Where good cause i_s - shown,
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consideration will be given to extending' the response time.
If an_ adequate 1
reply is not received within the time specified in_this Nctice, an' order may be 4
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Georgia Power Company 2
Docket No. 50-424 Vogtle Electric Generating Plant License No. NPF-68 issued to show cause why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken.
FOR THE NUCLEAR PEGULATORY COMMISSION h
Douglas M. Collir.s, Acting Director Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards Dated at Atlanta, Georgia l
this /j% day of ApmA1988 l
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ENCLOSURE 2 l
EMERGENCY PREPARE 0 NESS IMPROVEMENT ITEMS l
Reviewing Corporate Emergency Organization staf fing to ensure that personnel assignments are correct, and that an adequate number of personnel are available to fill key primary and alternate positions (50-425/88-42-01).
Ensuring that Emergency Vehicle No. 6 is included in the monthly checklist and that routine test be conducted as required (50-425/88-42-05).
Ensuring that comunication test forms are properly completed as required by the respective procedure, and that resolution of any and all problems and retests related thereto are fully documented (50-425/88-42-06).
Ensuring that personnel trained in offsite dose assessment are cognizant of use of default isotopic release rate data defined in EPIP-91304-C (50-425/88-42-09).
Ensuring that personnel trained in offsite dose assessment are fully cognizant of interpretation of wind direction reading greater than 360 degrees (50-425/88-42-10).
Ensuring that reference ID Nos, for radiciodines listed in Vibrant and Worksheet 1 of EPIP-91304-C are consistent (50-425/88-42-11).
Providing guidance on the use of POPDOSE defined in EPIP-91304-C l
(50-425/88-42-12).
Reviewing recomanded protective actions for whole bcdy doses greater than five rem, and thyroid doses greater than 25 rem promulgated in Table 1, Item 5 of EPIP-91305-C (50-425/88-42-13).
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ENCLOSURE 3 EMERGENCY PREPARE 0 NESS INCOMPLETE ITEwS Completion of installation and testing of Unit 2 Pest Accident Sampling System (50 425/88-42-02).
Completion of installation and operation of instranents, systems and equipment required to conduct sampling 'and analysis of liquid, gas, and particulate effluents (50-424/88-42-03).
Completion of installation, calibration, and testir; of Unit 2 area and process monitors (50-4f4/88-42-04).
Completion of revision of Section H-1 of the REP tc define the correct procedures requiring actuation of the TSC immediately upon activation of that facility '50-424/88-42-07).
Incorporation of Unit 2 specific cffluents monitor information into the VIBRANT program code (50-425/88-42-08).
Completion of revision of Chemistry Procedures 35611-C and 35614-C to reflect Unit 2 PASS valve numbers (50-425/88-42-14).
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. UNITED STATES E
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Y
kk R E G IO N 11 101 M ARIE TTA $7.. N w.
ATL ANT A. GEORGIA 30323 NOV181988 F+ port Nos. :
50-424/88-38 and 50-425/88-42 Lf:ensee: Georgia Power Company P. O. Box 4545 Atlanta, GA 30302 Oc:ket Nos.:
50-424 and 50-425 License Nos.: NPF-61 and CPPR.'"9 Fa:ility Name: Vogtle 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: August 15-19, 1988 In spector: N d' i 4 d
/ /k87 A. L. Cunningham Date Signed Accompanying Personnel:
S. E. Merwin G. A. Stoetzel E. F/ Williams, Jr.
//!/f Ap; roved by:
1,
/& A T. R. Decker, Section Chief Da'te Signed Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
SUMMARY
Scrpe: This special, announced inspection was an eme gency preparedness imclementation appraisal (EPI A) of Vogtle Electric _ Generating Plant (VEGP)
Un + t 2.
The purpose of the appraisal was a comprehensive review of the status of tne site and corporate emergency preparedness prograns and-identification of-pr:grammatic differences and/or changes specific to Unit 2.
An EPIA of VEGP Un t I was performed in March 1986- (Inspection Report No. 50-424/86-12) to sa-isfy the preoperational requirements for that unit.'
Unit 2 was also inciuoed in that aporalsal, and assigned Inspection-Retort No. ~ 50-425/86-18, based upcn the generic relationship of the ' Emergency Plan, respective pr::edures, and emergency response facilities -(ERFs) previced for the two unit pl a n t.
Inspection Report - Nos. 50-424/86-12 and -.50-425/86-18 should be-ccr.sulted as a reference for details applicable to Unit 2.
.To facilitate crcssreference, VEGP Unit 2 appraisal -areas ~and _ respective titles defined in the subject report are identical to those areas treated in the Unit 1 1986
. Inspection Report.
Acc::rdingly, the-VEGP Unit 2 appraisal included review and assessment of the following basic. areas: emergency preparedness program administration and Eme rgency. Response Organization (ER0); training / retraining; ERF's, and respective equipment; emergency implementing and supplementary procedures and directives; coordination with offsite groups -and agencies; cnd walkthroughs of selected ERO personnel to evaluate their cognizance of emergency detection / classification, notification, and protective a: tion decision making, i Q \\~ 3 D D 5 k ^ h
2 The status of emergency preparedness open items, including previous outstanding enforcement matters were reviewed (Paragraph 9).
Results:
The Unit 2 EPIA disclosed no violations or deviations. The appraisal indicated, however, that several areas specific to Unit 2 should be evaluated and considered for improvement.
Additionally, several program areas involving Unit 2 were determined to be incomplete and could not be fully evaluated.
These items are listed in Enclosures 2 and 3, respectively, to the letter, and are fully discussed in the subject report.
Review and evaluation of Emergency Plan implementing Procedure 91602-C-Rev. 5
(" Emergency Drills and Exercises") disclosed a violation involving the licensee's failure to implement Section 4.18 of that procedure (Paragraph 7.1).
The referenced procedure required the submission of a written report of emergency drills and exercises to the Plant General Manager defining specific critique findings and required corrective actions.
This finding was fully discussed with cognizant licensee representatives prior to and during the appraisal exit interview (Paragraph 10).
The identified violation was applicable solely to VEGP Unit 1, since it is based upon Appendix A Technical Specifications to the Unit's Operating License NPF-68.
Unit 1 Inspection Report No. 50-424/88-38 was provided to accommodate tracking of the subject violation and documentation of the status of previously identified emergency preparedness open items assigned to that unit.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS i
1%iR00UCTION DETAILS 1.D ADMINISTRATION 1.1 Responsibility Assigned 1.2 Authority 1.3 Coordination 1.4 Selection and Qualification
- l 2.0 EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION 2.1 Onsite Organization 2.2 Offsite Augmentation 3.0 TRAINING / RETRAINING 3.1 Program Established 3.2 Program implemented 4.; EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND EQUIPriENT i
l 4.1 Emergency Facilities 4.1.1 Assessment Facilities 4.1.2 Protective Facilities 4.1.3 Expanded Support Facilities 4.1.4 Emergency News Center i
4.2 Emergency Equipment
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4.2.1 Assessment Equipment 4.2.2 Protective Eouipment 4.2.3 Emergency Coc.nunications 4.2.4 Damage Control / Corrective Actions anc Maintenance Equipment and Supplies 4.2.5 Reserve Emergency Supplies and Equipeent 4.2.6 Transportation
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2 5.0 EMERGENCY IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES-5.1 General Content and Format 5.2 Emergency, Alarm, and Abnormal Occurrence Procetures 5.3 Implementing Instructions 5.4 Implementing Procedures 5.4.1 Notification 5.4.2 Assessment Actions 5.4.3 Protective Actions 5.4.4 Security During Emergencies 5.4.5 Repair / Corrective Actions 5.4.6 Recovery 5.4.7 Public Information 5.5 Supplementary Procedures 5.5.1 Inventory, Operational Check and Calibration of Emergency Equipment, Facilities and Supplies 5.5.2 Drills and Exercises 5.5.3 Review, Revision, and Distribution of Emergency Plan and Procedures 5.5.4 Audits 6.0 COORDINATION WITH OFF-SITE GROUPS 6.1 Off-site Agencies 6.2 General Public 6.3 News Media l
7.0 DRILLS, EXERCISES, AND WALK-THROUGHS l
7.1 Program Implementation 8.0 PERSONS CONTACTED 9.0 LICENSEE AClIOh5 AND PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED FINDINGS l
10.
EXIT INTERVIEW l
11.
ACRONYMS AND INITIALISMS l
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EMERGENCY PREPARE 0 NESS IMPLEMENTATION APPRA' SAL FOR V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING Pl. ANT, UNIT 2 1.:
ADMINISTRATION 1.;-1.4 Responsibility Assigned, Authority, Coordination, Selection and Qualification This area was reviewed pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1)and (15); Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50; guidance promulgated in Section ll. A ano P of NUREG-0654, Rev.1.
Inspection disc'esed that three employees on the staff of the Vogtle Electric Ger.erating Plant (VEGP) were engaged on a full-time basis in the development and implementation d the site emergency preparedness program and_ respective procedures. This group consisted of the Emergency Preparedness Supervisor, an Errergency Preparedness Specialist, and an administrative clerk.
The Emergency Preparedness Supervisor reports to the Plant Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager.
The latter principal reports directly 'to _the_ VEGP General Manager.
The Plant Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager, is assigned the general responsibility for site emergency _ preparedness and interaction with State and local offsite support groups.:
The Emergency Preparedness Supervisor and his staff implement the VEGP Emergency Plan. These responsibilities are described in the VEGP Administrative Procedures - and i
The Senior Vice President for Nuclear Operations is assigned overall responsibility and authority for all nuclear activities including emergency preparedness programs for the: Georgia Power Company.
The Corporate Manager, Nuclear Training and Emergency Preparedness has responsibility for corporate emergency preparedness programs, and reports to the Ser<ior Vice President
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Nuclear Operations through the - Manager of General Suppcrt.
The Nuclear Eme*gency Preparedness Organization, which is composed of the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Manager and three full-time professionals, reports to the Nuclear =
Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager. This organization coordinates the-de,elopment and maintenance of the corporate emergency preparedness program.
The-Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Manager is the counterpart of the Emergency Preparedness Supervisor at VEGP.
These responsibilities are described i_n. the Corporate Emergency Plan, the VEGP Emergency Plan and the Corporate Emergency
- Plan implementing Instructions (EPIIs).
Personnel assigned to the positions cited above_ fully' met. the required qualifications established in' the -(FSAR) ' and/or formal job' descriptions.
Prcfessional development _ and formal training programs were made available to -
all professional emergency preparedness personnel to - assure that their emergency planning expertise and skills are maintained as required.
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Tre opportunity for all site personnel to provide input to the VEGP Emergency Plan and EPIPs is formalized and described in EPIPs 91602-C and 91701-C. and Accinistrative Procedures 00050-C and 99951-C which direct all requests for re,isions to the plan and respective procedures to the Energency Preparedness S c ervisor.
Administrative Procedure 00001 directs all managers to assign pe-sonnel to the Emergency Response Organization as requested by the Emergency Preparedness Supervisor.
Adrinistrative Procedures 00001 and 00002 assign emer;ency preparedness responsibilities to the various VEGP managers and superintendents, and the Plant Review Board.
These and other VEGP procedures clearly delineate the ret pensibilities for emergency preparedness onsite.
The eferenced procedures also provide for the direct coordination of budget input and other management responsibilities for Managers and Superintendents including the Plant Training anc Emergency Preparedness Manager.
The Division of Administration of the Georgia Power Company (GPC) Emergency Preparedness Program as stipulated in the VEGP Emergency Plan and respective EP:Ps, and the Corporate Eniargency Plan and EPIIs, require that the corporate organization manage the corporate emergency response, and assures proper cocrdination between the emergency programs of the corporation and the nuclear plant sites, as well as interaction with Federal, State, and local governments, anc private contractors.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee s program appeared to be adequate.
2.C EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION 2.1-2.2 Onsite Organization and Offsite Augmentation This area was reviewed pursuant to the requirements of 1: CFR 50.47(b)(1) and (2); Paragraph IV. A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50 and guicance promulgated in Sec-ions 11. A and B of NUREG-0654, Rev.1.
The VEGD Emergarcy Response Organizatien was described ir. Section B of the VEGP Eme gency Plan and in EPIP 91101-C.
The descriptio*s provide the organizational structure and a listing of assigned persorrel, by job title, for the key emergency positions assigned during response te an emergency event initiated with the Notification of an Unusual Event, and escalated through the General Emergency classification.
Appropriate tables sunnarized the key emergency organization positions, with the job title of tne primary designees, and respective alternates who will serve as backups for each emergency position assigned.
Discussions with VEGP emergency personnel, and a review of the VEGP Eme gency Plans EPIPs and associated plant procedures indicated that the licensee appeared to have considered and included all reo.; ired onsite emergency functions.
The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> onshif t coverage exceeded the criteria for minimum staffing prenulgated in Table B-1 of NUREG-0654, and provided for the Onshif t Operatiens Supervisor (0505) to assume the position of Emergency Di ector until relieved
3 by crie of the following, namely:
Manager of Operations, Operations Super,ntendent, Plant Manager, Plant Support Manager, VEGP ieneral Manager or the C.:rporate Senior Vice President of Nuclear Operations, if the 0505 is intactcitated, the Shif t Supervisor assumes the position o' Emergency Director until relieved.
The VEGP Cmergency Plan and EPIPs providec a primary designee and at least two alternates for all key positions in the VEGP Emergency Respcese Organization and the lines of succession for these :csitions.
Corpc ste headquarters personnel augmented the VEGP emergen:j organization with a Corocrate Emergency Center (CEC) based in Atlanta, Georgie. The CEC provided the f:llowing:
public information functions; emergency suptcrt coordination of offsite agencies and contractors; communications; operatier.21 and radiological accident assessment; manpower and logistics support; and a backup dose as ses s. ment capability.
The corporate emergency organization, position assig 1ments, and interaction with VEGP were described in Section B of the Corpc-ate Emergency Plan, Appentiix 7 of the VEGP Emergency :lan, and Corporate Emergency Plan procedure EPII-01.
The Corporate Emergency Center was managed by the Director of Corporate Response.
The pcsition of Director of Corporate Response were normally assigned to the Senice Vice President for Nuclear Operations.
His alter 9ates were the Corpc-ate Manager Nuclear Safety and Licensing, Manager of nuclear Performance and b diological Safety, or the Plant Performance Manager. Depending upon the progression of an accident at the plant, the Senior Vice President for Nuclear Operations and the Corporate Manager of Radiological Safety may travel to the plant site as primary designees for the positions of Emer;ency Director and Compas y Spokesperson, respectively.
Additionally, the Director of Corporate Commu-ication and the Corporate News Service Manager also ray travel to the l
plant site as primary designees for the emergency posit :ns of Public l
Infor%5 tion Panager in the plant E0F and Emergency News : enter Director, l
respectively.
The functions and responsibilities of the ;orporate public information staff were described in the VEGP Emergency Communications I
(Appercix 8 of the VEGP Emergency Plan) and in the EPils.
Review of assignments to the Corporate Emergency Organizarcn disclosed that tne Cc eporate Manager of Radiological Safety was citeo as t*e primary designee for te Cam;;any Spckesperson end thE Radiclogical and Ra:ioactive Waste Manager.
The dual assignment was documented in the site Energency Plan, and the Cc eporate Emergency Plan and procedures.
This finding was brought. to the attention of the Corporate Nuclear Emergency Preparedness 'anager who stated that :ne Radiological Safety Supervisor was primary designee for the position of Raciological and Radioactive Waste Manager.
It was furt9er stated that the observed error in primary assignments would -be corrected.
The error was traceable to recent changes in Corporate Personnel.
The assignment of personnel to the VEGP and Corporate Emer;ency Organizations was based primarily on their normal job assignments whic* relate to job experience, education, and special skills.
Review of the IEGP and Corporate Emergemcy Plans and procedures indicated that personnel assigned to various functional areas and emergency positions had the appropriate expertise and job experience to perfonn their designated emergency functions.
4 The VEGP emergency response organization was supported by lccal ambulance and emergency medical services, and primary and alternate hospitals for treatment of certaminated and non-contaminated injured personnel.
Fire control support was p ovided by the local fire departments.
Local radic and television stati:ns supported the warning and public notification program.
Additional offsite support was provided by Westinghouse and other vencors, contractors, INPO, and Southern Company Services _ as stated in the agreenent letters and descriptions of assistance provided in the VEGP and Corporate Emergency Plans.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licersee's program appeared to be adequate; however, the following item should be considered for program imprevement; Review Corporate Emergency Organization staffing to ensure that personnel assignments are correct, and that an adequate number of personnel are available to fill key primary and alternate positions (50-425/88-42-01) 3.0 TRAINING 3.1 Program Established This area was reviewed pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 19; 10 CFF 50.47(b)(15) and (16); Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50; guidar:e promulgated in Sections 11.0 and P of NUREG-0654, Fev.1; and criteria defined in ANSI /ANS 3.7.3.
The licensee training program for emergency planning was presented in Section 0 of the Vogtle Facility Radiological Emergency Plan (REP) an:! detailed in EPIP 91601 ~.
The program evaluation disclosed no significant changes since the review conducted during the Unit 1 emergency preparedness implementation appraisal and subsequent followup inspections.
The training program remained adequate in scope and content, and continued to ensure required initial, remedial, and annual training of Emergency Response Organization (ER0) personnel. Note, that the subject program, as initially established, was based on twc operating Units; therefore, adequate training of ERO personnel responding to an emergency at Unit 2 was also provided.
Based en the above findings, tnis portion of the licensee's program appeared to be adec:uate.
3.2 Program Implemented This area was reviewed pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(15)and (16); Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50; and guidance promulgated in Secticns 11.0 and P to NUREG-0654, Rev.1.
The licensee's training program was fully implemented.
'A review of records indicated that VEGP emergency response organization personr.el were adequately trained in each required training category, and that each position in the emergency response organization was adequately staffed.
Personnel who did not successfully complete the required courses were excluded from the list of
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5 pe sonnel assigned to the emergency response organizatice and periodic update of same. The training status of all emergency response :ersonnel was tracked te ensure that each person received required training or an annual basis (plus or rinus one calendar quarter).
Ccvse materials, including lesson plans and respective course examinattuns, we e reviewed. Course and training content were consistent with the content as des:ribed in the licensee's records.
Examination resul;s were compared with training records.
Personnel who failed an examination were required to retake the applicable training course and pass the course examiration as a requirement for entry into the ERO and in the listing on the ERO roster as updated.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appeared to be adequate.
4.C EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT 4.1 Emergency Facilities 4.1.1 Assessment Facilities This area was reviewed pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8);
Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50; guidance prcmigated in Regulatory Gu :e 1.97, and Section ll.H of NUREG-0654 Rev.1; anc criteria defined in i
4.1.1.1 Control Room The updated REP and EPIPs were available.
Emergency equipment and decisional aics specified in the REP were in place and operable.
When the temporary partition separating Units 1 and 2 Control Rooms is remcved, the Control Rooms wi
share a common area, connon monitor readouts, and communications eat. i pment.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appeared to be tdequate.
4.1.1.2 Technical Support Centet (TSC)
This area was reviewed pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8);
Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50; orders defited in Supple'nent 1 to NUREG-0737; and guidance promulgated in Sections ll.H and I of NUREG-0654, Rev.
1.
Inspection and discussions with cognizant licensee representatives disclosed that the TSC ventilation system will be manually switched to the emergency mode when the TSC is activated as required by facility activation procedures. As a cor. sequence, the emergency filtration system processes all outside makeup air anc 25% of the recirculated air through a standard HEPA train. The ventilation system was tested in the emergency mode.
A TSC - positive pressure of 0.25 inches of water was maintained during emergency recirculation.
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6-Inspection of facility comunication systems and equipment disclosed the -
follewing:
dedicated individual voice links between the TSC and the Control l g Roor were in place and operational; designated comercial telephones were l
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provided for NRC use in addition to the operable Emergency Notification System l
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(ENS L and Health Physics Network (HPN) extensions;-dedicated tele primary State and local government response agencies (ring-dow" phone -links to were in place and Operational; and a radio system for communication between the TSC and radi: logical field monitoring teams was in _ place and fully cperational.
Review and evaluation of ~the TSC confirmed that all emergency equipment and decisional aids were consistent with the requireme_nts specified in the REP aA EPIPs.
No essential changes were noted for this facility with respect to the findings documented in the previously cited VEGP Unit 1-Appraisal Report (50 424/86-12, 50-425/86-18).
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appeared to be ad, equate.
4.1.1.3 Operations Support Center (OSC)
This area was reviewed pursuant to the requirements.of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8);
Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50; guidance promulgated in section ll.H of NGEG-0654, Rev.1; and criteria defined in NUREG-0578.
The location of the OSC was consistent with the Emergency Plan and ' findings of the - referenced Unit I appraisal.
Consistent with previous findings, this i
facility was not environmentally protected; however,.the OSC was provided-with an Eberline AMS-3 continuous air monitor equipped with alanrs and radiciodine monit: ring capability. In the event of-required OSC relocation, the TSC was dasignated as the secondary locus, with the EOF as an 'additicnal alternate.
Primary and bat up voice comunicat.
links were provided between the OSC, TSC, and Control Room.
The OSC contained all'. required emergency equipment, decisional aids, and comunication _ equipment specified by the Emergency Plan and censistent with the findings documented in the Reference Unit--I Appraisal-Report.
The OSC layout plan and the-VEGP 10 mile and 50 mile EPZ ; maps were pos te<: in tne OSC Nanager's c,ffice.
- Based on the above findings. this portion of the licensee's program appeared to be adequate..
4.1.1 4 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)-
This area was reviewed pursuant to the requirements of.10 CFR 50.47(b)(8);
Parag aph IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50; guidance promulgated in Section ll.H of NU.EG-0654, Rev.1; and. criteria-defined in NUREG-0578.
The EOF contained all of the emergency equipment and decisional aids specified in the. REP and respective EPIPs.
The EOF was equipped with dedicated voice.
commur.ications with the TSC, OSC, and Control Room.
Dedicated commercial l
telepaones were provided for NRC use, including ENS and HPN extensions at the
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NRC assigned work location.
Adequate non-dedicated backup voice comunication links to the NRC, other Federal, State, and local agencies, and emergency suppert organizations were also provided.
Radios were provided for comuaication with field monitoring teams, and inter-emergency facilities in the e,ent of power failure.
All findings were consistent with those reported in the Unit 1 EPI A report.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appeared to be adequate.
4.1.1. 5, 4.1.1. 6 Post-Accident Sampling and Analysis This area was reviewed pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9);
Paragraph IV.B and E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50; and guidance promulgated in Secticn 11.1 of NUREG-0654, Rev.1.
The Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) utilized both a primary remote panel and a baciup local panel for comprehensive sampling and analysis of liquid coolant samples and containment air samples.
At the time of the appraisal, installation and testing of the Unit 2 PASS was incomplete.
The expected completion time was dependent on the availability of essential equipment; however, the licensee planned to begin initial testing on or about Septeroer 20, 1988. Once completed, the system will be idea.tical to the Unit 1 system, which was determined to be adequate during the Ur.it 1 appraisal and respective followup inspections.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was detennined to be incomplete as defined below.
Completion of installation and testing of Unit 2 Post Accicent Sampling System (50-425/88-42-02).
4.1.1. 7, 4.1.1.8 Post-Accident Liquid Effluent and Gas anc Particulate Effluent Sampling ano Analysis This area was reviewed pursuant to the 'equirements of it CFR 50.47(b)(9);
Paragraphs IV.B and E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50; and guicance promulgated in-Section 11.1 of NUREG-0654, Rt -
1.
Instru:nents and systems for post-accident liquid effluent sampling, gas and particulate effluent sampling were not yet--in place in Unit 2.
The licensee estimated that this equipment would be in place and operati:nal by mid-January, 1989.
The equipment will be identical to that used in Unit 1, which was found t
to be adequate during the Unit 1 EPIA and followup inspecti:ns.
Based en the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was found to be incomplete as defined below.
Completion of installation and operation of instruments, systems and equipment required to conduct sampling and analysis of liquid, gas, and particulate effluents (50-425/88-42-03).
8 4.;.2 Protective Facilities 4.1.2.1 Assembly / Reassembly Areas Tr's area was reviewed pursuant to the requirements of it CFR 50.47(b)(10); and gu-dance promulgated in Section II.J of NUREG-0654. Rev.1.
Tre inspector reviewed Section J of the Emergency Plan, EPIP 91401-C " Assembly -
Accountability", EPIP 91403-C " Site Evacuation", Section Vll of the General ar:
Emcloyee Badge Training Handbook, and the respective Section of the referenced VE P Unit 1 Appraisal Report.
Areas for assembly and relocation of plant pe sonnel were identical to those identified and discussed in the Unit 1 Ap;raisal Report.
Procedures for site assembly evacuatien and relocation were essentially unchanged as well.
The Vogtle Electric Generating Plant recreation area served as the primary relocation center.
The Georgia Power Wilson Plant site was assigned for use as the backup relocation center as determined by the Emergency Director who could also elect to send nonessential personnel home, if conditions warranted.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appeared to be adequate.
4.'. 2.2 Medical Treatment Facilities This area was reviewed pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(12);
Paragraph IV,E of Appendix E to 10 CFR S0; guidance promulgated in Sections ll.K and L of NUREG-06SA, Rev.1; and criteria defined in ANSI /ANS 3.'.1.
The inspector reviewed Section L of the Emergency Plan, and EPIP 91307-C "Certaminated injury."
The onsite first-aid station was located near the health physics station in the control building.
The facility was fully pre ared for use.
first-aid room and adjacent decontamination room. Required supplies and equipment w amt. lance Ht was available in the decontamination room.An inventoried and sea Hospital kits were ava'ioble at the Burke County ano the Humana Hospitals.
The hospital kits were ins enteried and properly sealed.
An ambulance is stationed onsite, and is used primarily by construction con ractors.
Following completion of the Unit 2 construction phase, the licensee plans to assume management and use of the on site ambulance during ope-ation of Units 1 and 2.
If the ambulance is not in service, or several persons are injured occur during an emergency, transportation to designated local hospitals would be provided by off site support groups consistent with app-oved agreements.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appeared to be adequate and consistent with findings of Unit 1 EPIA and respective followup inspections.
9 4.1.2.3 Decontamination Facilities This area was reviewed pursuant to the requirements of 10 CR 50.47(b)(8),(10),
and (11); Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50; and gedance promulgated in Sections 11.J and K of NUREG-0654, Rev.1.
The inspector reviewed Section K.3 of the Emergency Plan, EPIP 91306-C.
"Conta,ination Monitoring and Decontamination", and respecthe sections of the Unit 1 Appraisal Report.
The decontamination facility was lccated in the first aid f acility adjacent to the first aid room, 'and was conrnon to both Units 1 and 2.
Decontamination kits were available at that location, the 050. EOF, and the two relocation centers, namel.r. the VEGP recreation area, and Plant Wilson.
The cecontamination facility, supplies, equipment, and procedures were consistent with those available during the Unit 1 Appraisal.
Based on the above findings and consistent with the findings of Unit 1 EPIA, this portion of the licensee's program appeared to be adequate.
4.1.3 Expanded Support Facilities This area was reviewed pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47 (b)(3) and (S); Paragraph IV.E of Apcendix E to 10 CFR 50; and guidance promulgated in Sections II.C and H of NUREG-0654, Rev. 1.
Available work facilities and resources for expanded support personnel such as I
corporate, contractor, and non-licensee augmentation personnel were identical to these determined to be adequate during the Unit 1 EPIA.
No additions or modifications to the subject facilities and resources were irplemented.
Based cn the above findings, and consistent with the Unit 1 EPIA, this portion of the licensee's program appeared to be adequate.
4.1.4 Emergency News Center The Emergency News Center (ENC) was determined to be fully adequate curing Unit 1 EPlA and respective followup inspecticns. No signficant chang::s wcra identified.
4.2 Emergency Equipment 4.2.1 Assessment Equipment 4.2.1.1 Emergency Kits and Emergency Survey Instrumentation This area was reviewed pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8) and (9); Paragraphs IV.B and E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50; and guidance promulgated in Sections ll.H and I of NUREG-0654, Rev.1.
Section H.6 of the Emergency Plan, EPIP 91702-C, Rev. 6 (Emergency Equipment and Supplies), and respective Sections of the Unit 1 EPIA report and respective followup inspections were reviewed.
Emergency kits were lccated in the TSC,
10 OSC, E ') F, at the health physics control point, ambulance, Burke County and Humar.a hospitals, and relocation centers, inspection confirmed that kits were invertoried quarterly.
Inventory checks were performed on the health physics decortamination kit, EOF kit, and a field monitoring kit.
All findings disci sed were consistent with those defined in the Unit 1 EPI A report and respe:tive follow-up inspections.
No essential changes were made nor required for N EGP Unit 2.
Basec cn the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appeared to be ace:;uate.
u 4. 2.1..'.' Area and Process Radiation Monitors This area was reviewed pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9);
Parag-aphs IV.B and E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50; guidance promulgated in Secti:n !!.H and 1 of NUREG-0654; and criteria defined in NUREG-0737.
Special emphasis was placed on reviewing the status of Unit 2 radiation monit:rs required to provide information critical to the emergency class'fication process and protective action recomendations.
The status of the f ellowing monitoring systems was reviewed, namely:
Control Room; conta'nment low-range monitor; fuel handling building; sampling room; seal table instrumentation; containment access hatch; containment high-range; TSC disp 1ay room; TSC work area; radiochemistry laboratory; steamline monitors; and decon amination station monitors.
4 Descr'otions of the monitors could be found in Section 11.5 (Process and Effluent Radiological Monitoring and Sampling Systems) and Section 12.3.4 (Area Radiation Monitoring System) of the FSAR.
Monitors in Unit 2 will be identicil in tpe and respective placement to those in Unit 1, as discussed in the Unit 1 EPI A ;eport.
Readouts will be available locally and in the Unit 2 Control Room.
Unit 2 monitors were currently being installed and calibrated.
Discus sions with licensee staff indicated that the monitors will be operational by mic-January 1989.
Based en the obo - findings, tnis portion of tne licensee's program was found l
to be ncomplett, as defined belcw.
Completion of installation, calibration and testing of Unit 2 area and
- ocess radiation monitors (50-425/88-42-04).
I
- 4. 2.1. 3 Non-Radiation Process Monitors This area was reviewed pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9);
t t
Paragraphs IV.B and E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50; guidance promulgated in-Sectices ll.H and i of NUREG-0654, Rev.1; and criteria defined in NUREG-0737.
The irspector reviewed the availability and status of non-radiation process monitcrs which are used in emergency detection, classification, and protective actior recomendations.
Examples of these instruments include:
reactor l
coolar; system (RCS) temperatures, pressures,and flow; steam generator levels,
i l
l 11 tenperatures, and pressures; and tank levels.
Table 7.5.2-1 of the FSAR, listed all such " Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation" of Regulatory Gu ' de 1.97.
Irmection disclosed that Unit 2 respective non-radiat cn process monitors ap;iicable to accident assessment were identical to those provided in Unit 1, as discussed in the Unit 1 EPI A Report.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appeared to be edequate.
4,2.14 Meteorological Instrumentation The site Meteorological Program was fully defined and treated in the Unit 1 EP: A Report and respective followup inspection reports. No further discussion of this area is required.
4.2.2 Protective Equipment 4.2.2.1 Respiratory Protection This area was reviewed pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47 (b)(8);
Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50; guidance promulgated in Sections ll.H and J of NUREG-0654, Rev.1, and guidance in NUREG-0041.
l Table J-1 of the REP and Health Physics Procedure 47C13-C describe the inspection, maintenance, and storage of self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBAs).
Inspection and discussions with cognizant licensee reprtsentatives disclosed that respiratory protection needs (full-faced respirat:rs and SCBAs) for emeegencies involving Unit 2 would be obtained from corren supplies established l
for Units 1 and 2.
The subject supplies were located ir the Control Room TSC, l
OSC, HP control point, and E0F.
This finding was corsistent with those l
dis:ussed in Unit 1 EPIA Report and respective follewup inspection reports.
Bassa on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appeared to be acequate, l
4.2.2.2 Protective Clothing This area was reviewed pursuant to the requirements of
- .0 CFR 50.47(b)(8) and (11); Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50; and guidance promulgated in Section ll.H, J and K of NUREG-0654, Rev. 1.
Dis:ussions with licensee staff indicated that protective clothing needs during emergencies involving Unit 2 would be obtained from cormen supplies located in the Control Room, TSC, OSC, HP control point, E0F, and relocation centers.
The supply inventory was based upon the projected requirements for two operating units.
Protective clothing supplies-and the adequacy _ thereof is fully discussed in the Unit 1 EPI A Report.
.- -. -. -~
12 Based en the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appeared to be adequate.
4.2.3 Emergency Communications 4.2.3.1 Emergency Communications-Equipment This area was reviewed pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6);
Paragraphs IV.E and G of Appendix E to 10 CFR-50; and guidance promulgated in Sectic4ns II,E and F of NUREG-0654, Rev.1.
In accordance with Section F of the VEGP Emergency Plan, the onsite emergency commurications consisted of the following:
Emergency - Notification-Network -
(ENN) connecting the Control Room, TSC, EOF, and. back-up E0F; GPC General Office Hotline between the Control Room, TSC, and EOF; dedicated dial between the Centrol Room, TSC, 05C, EOF and back-up EOF; GPC General Office Dial-between the Control -Room. TSC, EOF and back-up EOF; Bell Dial between the Control Room, TSC, OSC, EOF and back-up EOF; inplant radio between the TSC and OSC; and Plant Page System between the Control -Room, TSC, and OSC.
Provisions were also in place for routinely checking - operability of emergency commurications devices and equipment on a monthly and quarterly basis. Review of the communications test records required by EPIP 91204-C, " Emergency.
Resporse Communications" disclosed the following findings:
Recently acquired emergency -vehicle No. 6 was not listed on the Monthly Radio Checklist defined by EPIP 91204-C. As a result, the vehicle's radio was-not tested during July or August,-1988, as required.
T e radio in emergency vehicle No. 4 was out of service during-the monthly-tests conducted on-December 1, 1987.
A new data sheet was not completed te. document the repair and retest as required by-the above referenced c
p*ocedure.
The monthly test of the. ENS and the Health Physics Network (HPN) conducted c-January 22, 1988, contained four test items marked' "NA" and 'a statement i
it tne remarks section stating that the " Emergency Preparedness-Supervisor cetermined that intra VEGP ENS. testing was1not required." This resulted in l-f ailure to test some portions of the system during' January 1988. A full-s stem test was subsequently conducted on February 12, 1988.
Tne quarterly facility telephone test conducted on July 28, 1988, for the i
Backup EOF did not indicate if the test was satisfactory.-
The date a'd time of the TSC-remote radio checks were not. indicated for-tre monthly check conducted on August 10, 1988.
t l
e. - -... _, -. - _.. - - _ _... _. _ -
13 Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's $*0 gram appeared to be adequate; however, the following items should be consideed for program improvement:
Ensuring that emergency vehicle No. 6 is included in t*e monthly radio checklist and that routine tests are Conducted as required (50 425/88-12 05).
Ensuring that communication test forms are properly com;leted as required by the respective procedur?, e9d that resolution of any and all problems and retests related thereto.re fully documented (50 42f'B8-42 06).
4.2.4 Damage Control / Corrective Action and Maintenance Equi: ment and Supplies This area was reviewed pursuant to the requirements of 10 C:R 50.47(b)(8);
Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50; and guidance promwigated in SecHon ll.H of NUREG-0654 Rev.1.
Damage control / corrective action,1nd maintenance equipment and supplies were found to be consistent with the deteiled findings documented in the Unit 1 EPI A Report.
Based upon the general relation of the subject requirements to the two I
unit plant, the supplies and equipment were determined to be adequate.
Based en the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was determined to be adequate.
4.2.5 Reserve Emergency Supplies and Equipment Thi's a-en was reviewed pursuant to the requirements of 10 ::R 50.47(b)(B);
Paragrapns IV.E and G of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50; and guidar.:e promulgated in Section ll.H of NUREG-0654. Rev. 1.
Reserve emergency supplies and equipment were found to be cc*sistent with the detailed findings dor.umented in the Unit 1 EPl A Report and elated followup inspections.
Based upon the generic relation to Unit 2, no 'arther review of this area was required.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee 5 program was f
determined to te adequate.
4.2.6 Transportation This area was reviewed pursuant to the recairements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8);
Paragraph IV.E and G of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50; and guidan:e promulgated in Section ll.H of NUREG-0654. Rev. 1.
Transportation wos fully discussed in the VEGP Unit 1 EP: A Report and respective followup inspection reports.
The licensee her' in ambulance permanently assigned to the plant site.
Additionally, two vehicles were located at the Training Center and four other emergency vehi:les were located onsite.
All vehicles were equipped with emergency radios.
14 Based. i the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appeared to be adequate.
5.:
EMERGENCY IMPLEMENTING PROCEDUliES 5. '. General Content and Fomg Thf s area was reviewed pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)t Ar:endix E to 10 CFR 50; guidance promulgated in section ll.B of NUREG 0654, Rev. 1; and criteria defined in Regulatory Guide 1.33.
Eac' procedure da vibed and highlighted the prerequisites and conditions that must exist befort he specified emergency preparedness actions are performed, and the precautions and limitations to be observed during performance of such actions.
Each procedure provided required approval docurentation, checklists anc data sheets to verify that the actions described therein were completed as required.
it was noted that one reference in the REP was incorrect.
Section H.1 of the REP stated that "the filtration system will be placed in Emergency Mode when the TSC is activated based on procedure EPIP 91201.C " Activation and Operation of the Technical Support Center."
Switching the TSC ventilation system to the filtration mode, attending activation of the TSC, however, is defined in EPIP 91110-C, " Duties of Health Physics Supervisor".
Accordingly, the Health Physics Supervisor is designated to manually actuate the subject system.
The licensee promptly submitted a manual change request to correct th REF.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's pregram appeared to be edequate; however, the incerrplete item defined below was identified.
Completion of revision of Section H-1 of the REP te define the correct procedure requiring actuation of the TSC ventilation system innediately upon activation of that facility (50-425/88-42-07).
5.2 Emergency, Alarm and Abnormal Occurrence Procedures This area was reviewed pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9);
Paragraph IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50; and guidance promulgated in Sections 11.:, H, ano 1 of NUREG-0654, Rev. 1.
In 6ddition to plant normal operating procedures, the licensee used three types of procedures for off-normal conditions namely:
Alann Response Procedures (ARP 17000 series), Abnonnal Operating Procedures (AOP 18000 series) and Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP 19000 series).
Nore of the ARPs reviewed required evaluation of the initiating conditions relative to emergency action levels. It was noted, bewever, that ARPs applicable to events requiring implementation of the Emergency Plan referred reactor operators to A0Ps and/or E0Ps and the respective Emergency Plan implementing Procedures. A0Ps included event-oriented abnonnal conditions that were not included in the E0Ps, such as seismic events, reactor coolant high activity, and fuel handling events.
All A0Ps, ARPs, and E0Ps were reviewed for l
4 15 corpleteness.
The inter-relationship of ARPs to AOPs and E0Ps were clearly defined and determined to be adequate, i
Based on the above observations this portion of the liceasee's program appeared te be adequate.
5.3 Implementina Instructions This ares was reviewed pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9);
Paragraphs IV.C and D of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50; and guidance promulgated in Sections ll.C. D. H, and I and Appendix 1 of NUREG-0654, Rev.1.
The inspector reviewed the EPIPs to determine if the procedures adequately implemented the REP in accordance with the above requirements.
A procedure was established and maintained for each class of omergency specified in the Emergency Plan.
Implementing instructions were written for use by the Emergency Directcr (ED).
The functional responsibilities of the ED were clearly specified, including those responsibilities which cannot be delegated.
This area was discussed in detail in the Unit 1 EPlA Report and respective fellowup inspection reports.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appeared to be adequate.
1 5.4 Implementing Procedures 5.a.1 Notification Th4s a-ea was reviewed pursuant to the requirements of '.0 CFR 50.47(b)(5) and (6. ; Paragraphs IV.C and D of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50; and guidance promulgated in Sections ll.E. F. H and J of NUREG-0654, Rev.1.
l This area was reviesed in detail and fully discussed in the Unit 1 EPlA Report.
Ne changes were identified.
The sequence of notificatiens to alert, mobilize, and/or augment the onsite emergency organization and scoporting agencies was specifiec for eacn class of emergency.
The notificatior, procedures contained a listing cf all perscas and agencies included in the response scheme, and de'ined the means to be used to implenent the initial contact and required fellowups.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appeared to be adequate.
5.4.2 Assessment Actions This area was reviewed pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9) and (10); Paragraph IV.B of Appendix E t.
10 CFR 50; guicance promulgated in Sections 11.1, J, and M c.' NUREG-0654, Rev.1, and guidance promulgated in IE Information Notice No. 83-28.
9 16 The following items, including training lesson plans for off-site dose assessment, were reviewed:
(1)Section I of the Emergency Plan; (1, EPIP 91304-C " Computerized and Manual Back-Up Methods for Release Rate and Dese Calculations;"
(3) EPip 9130*i C
" Protective Action Guidelices;"
(a EP!P 91001 C " Emergency Classification and Implementing Instructions;"
(5; training lesson plans for offsite dose assessment.
Additionally, wa'* throughs on dose assessment were conducted with two Health Physics foremen.
A *eview of V1BRANT (the licensee's computerized dose assessment program) ir.cicated that parameters specific to Unit 2 (e.g., Unit 2 effluent monitors and ef fluent path flow rates) were not yet incorporated into the program.
The dose assessment walkthroaghs revealed several items of concern regarding EPl*v 91304-C.
One Health Physics Foreman did not know how to use the default ise;opic release rates in Worksheet 1 of the subject procedure for calculating offsite doses.
In addition, a second Health Physics Foreman did not know how to interpret wind direction i sadings greater than 360'.
Finall walk-through using the isotops, release input option of V!BRANT.y, during a it was noted that the reference identification number *, (10#5) for radiciodine isotopes in V1ERANT were not consistent with the 10#2 listed in EPIP 91304-C Worksheet 1.
Reference 10#5 in V1BRANT were 18-22, while Worksheet 1 defined values of 16-20.
It was further noted that EPIP 91304-C did not describe the use of 9000SE.
POP 00$E is a computer model run on an HP-110 computer to determine population doses.
A review of the training lesson plan for Offsi'e Dose Assessment indicated that training was provided on the use of P0P00SE.
Table 1,
item 5 cf EPIP 91305-C did not address protective action recomendations for whole body doses greater than 5 rem, and thyroid doses gretter than 25 rem.
The current procedure reads: "a. whole body:
1 rem to 5 ree ' ; ano "b, thyroid:
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appeared to be edequate; hcwever, the folicwing incomplete item defined below was ider ti fied.
Inccrocration of Unit 2 sbecific ef fluent monitor information into the V!BRANT prc;ren, code (50-4 5/88-42 08).
Additionally, the items listed below which relate to accident assessment should be censidered for program improvement.
Ensuring that personnel trained in offsite dose assessment are cognizont of use of default isotopic release rate data defined in EPIP 91304-C (50-425/88-42-09).
Ensuring that personnel trained in offsite dose assessment are fully cognizant of interpretation of wind direction readings greater than 360 degrees (50-425/88-42-10).
Ensuring that reference ID#s for radioicdines listed in VIBRANT and Worksheet 1 of EPIP 91304-C are consistent (50-425/88-42-11).
l
t 17 Providing guidance on the Use of POP 00$E defined in EP!P 91304-C (50-425/BB 42-12).
Reviewing recommended protective actions for whole tedy doses greater than 5 rem, and thyroid doses greater than 25 rem prcAlgated in Table 1, item 5, of EPlP 91305-C (50-425/88-42-13).
5.4.2.1 - 5.4.2.3 Offsite, Onsite, and in-Plant Radioloeical Surveys These areas were reviewed pursuant to the requirements c' 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9);
Paragraphs IV.B and E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50; and guidance promulgated in Sections ll.H.1, and K of NUREG-0654, Rev.1.
EPIP 91303-C " Field Sampling and Surveys" and EPIP 91302-C "In Plant Sampling and Surveys" were reviewed.
The Unit 1 EPl A Report and respective followup inspections disclosed that the subject procedures were determined to be adequate.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appeared to be adequate.
5.4. 2.4 - 5.4.2.7 Procedures for Primary Coolant and Cortainment Air Sampline and Analysis This area was reviewed pursuant to the ree;irements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9);
l Appendix VI.B and E of 10 CFR 50; and guidance promulgated in Section 11.1 of HUREG-0654, Rev. 1.
Precedures relevant to the PASS system included the f:llowing chemistry l
30180-C, " Post Accident Sampling System Pro; ram;" 33065-C, " Gamma precedures:
Spectroscopy Under Post Accident Conditions;" 35611-C 35614-C, 35615-C, and 35620-C. describing procedures for operation of the PASS system; and 35623-C through 35640-C, describing procedures for calibration, troubleshooting, and quality centrol addressing PASS system components.
The subject chemistry i
precedures were corrnon to Units 1 and 2 PASS, and were determined to be aceouate curing the Unit 1 EPI A and respective followup inspections.
Note.
hc ever, that peccedures 35611-C and 35615-C, should be revised to reflect bnit 2 salve numbers.
The licensee was aware that these revisions were required as indicated by notations made in these procecares.
The licensee indicated that the revisions would be completed followirt hot testing of the Unit 2 PASS system.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appeared to be adequate; however, the incomplete item defined below us identified.
Revision of Chemistry Procedures 35611-C and 35615 C to Reflect Unit 2 PASS valve numbers (50-425/88-42-14).
18 5.4.2.8 5.4.2.11 Procedures for Stack and Liquid Effluent Sampling and Arilysis TM s area was reviewed pursuant to the requirements of
- .0 CFR 50.47(b)(9);
Pa egraphs V1.B and E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50; and guidance promulgated in Section 11.1 of NUREG-0654, Rev.1.
Prc':edures relevant to this area include-th,
!ng Nmistry Procedures:
33:16-C " Obtaining Ventilation Systems sa 'A6s Mr Aie:..;vity Analysis Under Post-Accident Conditions;" 33017 C "Monitos Mar.agement System During Recovery Operations % P e Rd!*ctive Liquid %ste M swin0 an Accident;" 36011 C
" Radiation Effluent Off Normal Conditions;" and 13065 C "Gama Spectroscopy Analysis Under Post Accident Conditions."
The su.sjsct crocedres were comon to both units, and were determined to be adequate during followup inspections tc the Unit 1 EPl A.
Bas-ed on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appeared to be adequate.
5. 4. 2.1 's Radiological and Environmental Monitoring Progrt.m Thd s area was reviewed pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9);
Pa-graphs IV.B and E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50; guidance promulgated in Section 11.1 of NUREG 0654, Rev.1; and criteria definec in Supplement I to NU"EG 0737.
The routine radiological and environmental monitoring program also provided the ca: ability for post accident monitoring.
During and following the accident moce, the subject program would be implemented by the Ma ager of Radiological SHety.
This program was comon to Units 1 and 2 and was determined to be adecuate during the Unit 1 EPlA.
No significant program changes were made.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appeared to be adequate.
5.4.3 Frotective Actions 5.'.3.1 Radiation Protection During Emergencies This area was reviewed pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(11);
Paragraph IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50; and guidan:e promulgated in section li.K of HUREG-0654, Rev.1.
Emeegency Procedure EPIP 91305-C " Protective Action Guidelines," and EPIP 913;1-C " Emergency Exposure Guidelines" were reviewed.
These procedures were determined to be adequate during the Unit 1 EPI A and the respective followup ins:ections.
The subject procedures were applicable to YEGP Units 1 and 2.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appeared to be adequate.
J
~.
p 19 5.4.3.2 Evacuation of Owner Controlled Areas This area was reviewed pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10);
Paragraph IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50; and guidance promulgated in Section ll.J of NUREG 0654. Rev.1.
Erergency Procedure EPlP 91403-C " Site Evacuation" was reviewed in detail, this procedure was determined to be adequate during the Unit 1 EP! A.
No significant changes or revisions to the site evacuation procedure were made.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appeared to be adequate.
5.4.3.3 Personnel Accountability This area was reviewed pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10);
Paragraph IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50; and guidance promulgated in Section !!.J of NUREG-0654. Rev. 1.
Emergency Procedures EPIP 91401-C " Assembly and Accountability," EPIP 91402-C
" Search and Rescue," and EPIP 91704-C Actions for Security During a Radiological Emergency" were reviewed in detail and discussed with cognizant licensee representatives.
These procedures were determined to be adequate during the Unit 1 EPl A and respective followup inspections.
No significant changes to any of the subject procedures were made.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appeared to be adequate.
5.4.3.4 Personnel Monitoring and_ Decontamination This area was reviewed pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10);
Paragraphs IV.B and E of Appendix E to 10 CFh 50; and guidance promulgated in s
Section ll.K of NUREG-0654. Rev. 1.
Eme rgency Procecures EPIP 91306-C
" Contamination ronitoring and Oeccntam1 nation" and EPIP 91307-C " Contaminated Injury" were reviewed.
These precedures were found to be adequate during the Unit 1 EPIA and respective felicwup inspections.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appeared to be adequate.
5.4.3.5 QnsiteFirst-Aid / Rescue This area was reviewed pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(12);
Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E 'to 10 CFR 50; guidance promulgated in Sections II.K and L of NUREG-0654, Rev. 1; and criteria defined in ANSI /ANS 3.7.1.
20 T e inspector reviewed Sections L.1 and L.2 of the Emer;ency Plan, and EPIPs 91301 C " Emergency Exposure Guidelines," 91306-C "Contan' nation Monitoring and Ce:entamination," 91307 C " Contamination Injury," and P.402 0 " Search and Fescue."
The subject p*ocedures were determined to be sdequate during the Urit 1 EP1 A and respective followup inspections.
The s cject references are a:plicable to postulated accidents involving either Units 1 or 2.
Irspection disclosed that 33 health physics technicians received current Red Cr:ss Multi-media First Aid training, and the licensee's medical radiological emergency training course.
Some of the cited personnel received additional first-aid training as well.
Fifteen persons assi weee qualified emergency medical technicians (EMTs)gned t: the ambulance crew Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appeared to be adequate.
5.4.4 Security During Emergencies This area was reviewed pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10);
Pa-agraph IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50; guidance prom.lgated in Section !!.J of NUREG-0654, Rev.1; and requirements defined in Appencix C to 10 CFR 73.
TF+ security measures implemented during plant site emer;encies were specified in Emergency Procedure EPlP 91704-C " Actions for Security During a Radiological Erergency."
This procedure was reviewed in detail aad discussed with cegnizant licensee representatives.
The procedure was cetermined to meet the recuirements of the above regulatory criteria and guidance.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licenset's program appeared to be adequate.
5.4.5 Repair / Corrective Actions Th's area was reviewed pursuant to the requirements of 1: CFR 50.47(b)(11) and (13); Paragraph IV.E cf Appendix E to 10 CFR 50; and gu' dance promulgated in Se:ticns 11.K and M of NUFEG-0654. Rev.1.
The REP and EP!Ps provided a detailed description of the operations perfonned by the TSC, OSC, and Radiological Emergency Teams (RETs. for investigation, re: air, and/or corrective action activities during emergency events.
This area was reviewed in detail during the Unit 1 EPIA, and was determined to be adeauate.
No significant changes were identified.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appeared to be adequate.
5.4.6.
Recovery This area was reviewed pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(13);
Paragraph IV H of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50; and guidan:e promulgated in Section ll.M of NUREG-0654 Rev.1.
1
i 21 i
Tre Emergency Plan and the EPIPs specified the authority for declaring that a re:overy phase has been entered. Provisions for evaluating plant operating cceditions, and in-plant and of f-site radiological ccnditions were identified.
Tre plan and procedures defined the requirements for d'scussion with other ir:ividuals and agencies prior to initiation and declaration of the recovery mC00.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appeared to be adequate.
5.4.7 Public information This area was reviewed pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7);
Paragraph IV.D of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50; and guidar,ce promulgated in Section ll.G of NUREG 0654. Rev. 1.
This area was reviewed in detail during the VEGP Unit 1 EP!A and respective i
followup inspections.
Current review of the Public Information Program and facilities disclosed no significant changes.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appeared to be adequate.
5.5 Supplementary Procedures I
S.E.1 Inventory, Operational Check and Calibration of Emergency Equipment, Facilities and Supplies Th4 s area was reviewed pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8);
Paragraph IV.G. of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50; and guidarce promulgated in Section ll H. of NUREG-0654. Rev. 1.
EP: P 5;702-C required the Health Physics Superintendent to bt respontible for ensuring quarterly inventory of emergency instrumentatice and supply kits.
The kits were also to be inventoried af ter each use.
This procedure called for each kit to be inspected for the exact amount of supplies available, and verification of operability checks of all instrumentatice. and equipment.
Forms
.e-s pr vided for the ten different types of kits, listing the type and amount of each item that should be available.
A review of the records in the VEGP emergency prepared,.:s organization for the last three quarters indicated that all kits were inventoried as required.
These records were also maintained in document control and the health physics organization.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appeared to be adequate.
l 1
22 5.i.2 Orills and Exercises Th's area was reviewed pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14);
Pa egraph IV.F. of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50; and guidar:e preev1 gated in Se:iion ll.N of NUREG-0654, Rev.1.
EP:t 91602-C placed primary responsibility for the conduct of emergency drills on the VEGP Emergency Preparedness Supervisor, while the Corporate Manager of Nu:iear Training and Emergency Preparedness retained overall responsibility for the annual exercise.
The annual exercise was to be planned and implemented thr~ough the Corporate Exercise Coordinator in conjunction with the VEGP Ere*gency Preparedness Supervisor.
The Corporate Exercise Coordinator was to be appointed by the Corporate Manager of Nuclear Training and Emergency Preparedness.
The referenced procedure provided data sheets and foms for development of scenarios, simulated messages, and forms to document observations and evaluations.
Additionally, the procedure required the Emergency Preparedness Supervisor to prepare a report for he VEGP General Manager through the Plant Tratning and Emergency Preparedness %eger.
A critique of each drill and exemise was required by this procedure, and a written report, incluoing v.g-ificant comments and corrective actions, was to be prepared by the Eme gency Preparedness Supervisor for the VEGP General Manager through the Pla-t Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager.
Under Administrative Prc:edure 00104, the corrective actions required outside the VEGP Emergency Pre:aredness Organization were tracked and closed out using the VEGP Action Trad ing Program.
Program improvements within the Emergency Preparedness Organization were tracked on an informal Action item System rnaintained by the Eme gency Preparedness Supervisor.
The records and repcrts on drills were mai-tained for two years, while those on exercises were maintained for five yea *s as stipulated in EPlP 91602-C, and the VEGP Emergency Plan.
1.np'ementation of drills and exercises is discussed under Section 7.1, below.
Base: on the above findings this portion of the licensee's program appeared to be a dequate.
E.E.3 review, Revision and Distribution of the Emergency Plan end Procedures i
This area was reviewed pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10);
Paragraph Ill.G. cf Appendix E of 10 CFR 50; and guidance promulgated in Section 11.P of NUREG-0654, Rev.1.
The review and revision of the VEGP Emergency Plan and EPIPs was described in the VEGP Administrative Procedures 00402-C and 00051-C, and Section P of the l
VEGF Emergency Plan.
The Emergency Preparedness Supervisor had the resensibility for the VEGP Emergency Plan and EPIPs, as shared by the Plant l
Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager.
Tne respcnsibility for the Corcorate Emergency Plan, EPils, and coordination of the VEGP Emergency Plan with State, local and Corporate plans lied with the Corporate Manager Nuclear t
Training and Emergency Preparedness.
The VEGP Emergency Preparedness Supe visor and Corporate Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Panager was to review
23 all plans and procedures, at least on an annual basis, including letters of agreement with offsite agencies and contractors.
In addition, the Emergency Preparedness Supervisor was to review all telephone numbers given in the EPIPs Quarterly listings and update same when required.
Cersistent with Administrative Procedures, the Emergency Preparedness Su:ervisor maintained files and records of Emergency Plar.s and respective EPIPs te document the following actions addressing the plan and procedures:
required validation; tracking of changes; draf t revisions; concurrences from other departments; resolving coments; and obtaining approval of the Plant Review Board.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appeared to be adequate.
5.5.4 Audit This area was reviewed pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(t);
Paragraph IV.G. of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50; and guidance promulgated in Section ll.P of NUREG-0654, Rev.1 In addition to reviews described in subsection 5.3.3 abeve, separate reviews were performed by the VEGP Quality Assurance Department as required by the plant Technical Specifications.
The audit system used to implement these l
reviews was described in Quality Assurance Procedure-05-01, Rev.18.
Audits were required annually using either contractors, corporate office personnel, or personnel from Plant Hatch to perform technical reviews of the program, Th's area was previously reviewed in detail and is documented in the Unit 1 EP: A Report and respective followup inspections.
Based on the above finoings, this portion of the licensee's program appeared to be adequate.
6.C Coordination With Offsite Grouos 6.1 Offsite Agencies This area was reviewed pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2) and (3} ; Pmgraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50; and guidance promulgated in Sections ll B and C of NUREG-0654, Rev.1.
Offsite agencies including the States of Georgia and South Carolina, Burke and Richmond Counties of Georgia, Aiken, Allendale and Barnwell Counties of South Carolina, the U.S. Department of Energy - Savannah River Plant (SRP), and'their signed letters of agreement were' appended to the VEGP Emergency Plan.
The letters of agreement were current and valid.
This area was reviewe
- n detail and summarized in the Unit 1 EPIA Report.
The current review disciosed no significant changes in offsite support agency facilities, support capabilities, i
training programs, and interaction with the licensee.
I e-
= - - - -
,+
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24 Based on the above findings, this portion of the licenset's program appeared to be adequate.
6.2 General Public 6.3 News Media These areas were reviewed pursuant to the requirements cf 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7);
Paeagraphs IV.D and F of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50; and gLidance promulgated in Section ll.G of NUREG-0654 Rev.1.
Tr+ subject areas were reviewed in detail during the VIGP Unit 1 EPI A and determined to be adequate.
Current review of dissemination of public brochures, distribution of Emergency Radios, Operatioral Status of the Emergency Siren System, and interaction of licensee with the News Media disclosed no significant changes subsequent to Unit 1 EPIA.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program appeared to be adequate.
7.0 Drills, Exercises, and Walkthroughs 7. *.
Program implementation This area was reviewed pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14);
Paragraph IV.F of Appendir E to 10 CFR 50; and guidance promulgated in Section ll.N of NUREG-0654 Rev.1.
Drills and exercises required by the Emergency Plan and 'espective implementing precedures were routinely performed.
The drills and practice exercises were cccrdinated with the licensee's emergency response orgtnization, State and Iccal support groups, and the SRP, depending on the emergency program area
- tested, inspection involved a detailed review of recorcs and report files on drills and exercises performed by the licensee to inclemet. training re0uirements and demonstrate compliance of such activities with the REP and respective implementing procedures discussed in Section 5.5.2, above.
Irspection disclosed that following completion of an unannounced full activation crill perfonned by the licensee on March 9,1988, the Emergency Preparedness Supervisor failed to submit a Jitten rep;rt of the results thereof to the VEGP General Manager as required by Energency Procedure EP! P-91602C. Section 4.18 of the subject procedure required that the Emergency Preparedness Supervisor shall submit a written report of emergency preparedness drills to the VEGP General Manager defining significant drill critique coments and respective corrective actions using Data Sheet 5 of Revision 4 of the referenced procedure.
The above finding was discussed in detail with cognizant licensee representa-tives prior to and during the appraisal exit interview. The inspector informed the licensee that failure to implement the reporting req;irements of Emergency Precedure EPIP 91602-0 was inconsistent with requirenents of Unit 1, Appendix A, Technical Specification 6.7.1. The subject s;ecification stated, in a
o 25 pa M. that written procedures shall be implemented.
The 'icensee acknowledged the finding, and comitted to review administrative cortrols required to pre-:lude its recurrence.
Licensee representatives disc'.ssed other methods cu-ently used to document and track drill and practice esercise findings which inc'ude entering such findings into an Action item Syster dedicated to items rec, iring corrective action.
Viciation:
Failure to implement emergency procedure EPP 91602-C requiring sutntission of a written report to the VEGP General Mana;er detailing drill critique findings and respective corrective actions (50-424/88-36 01).
This itent will be reviewed during future inspections.
8.C Site Personnel Contacted
- J. Badgett Manager, Training and Emergency Preparedness D. Bloemendaal Corporate Emergency Prepareeness Specialist
- G. Buckhold VEGP General Manager H. Butterworth Operations Superintendent J. Carswell Health Physics Foreman R. Cislo Supervisor Startup Unit 2 M. Covey PASS Test Supervisor A. Cure Plant Health Physicist
- R. Folker Quality Assurance Engineering Support Supervisor M. Garg Electrical Engineer J. Gasser Shift Supervisor D. Haile Shift Supervisor S. Hargis On-Shif t Operations Supervisor (0505)
- R. Harris Public Information Superviser B. Hennessey Shift Supervisor J. Hopins 0505 T. Journey PASS Test Superviser S. Khera Health Physics Technician
- l.
Kochery Health Physics Superintendent M. Kurtzman Health Physics-and Chemistry Training Supervisor R. Lee Chemistry Supervisor J. Lucot lisalth Physics Supervisor
- L.
Mayo Senior Emergency Preparedness Specialist
- J. PcKnight Health Physics / Chemistry Te:hnical T. Neufang Methods and Training Specialist
'L.
Nickun Regulatory Compliance Supervisor M. Odom PASS Specialist C. Peters Health Physics Foreman
- K. Pointer Senior Plant Engineer
'J.
Roberts Emergency Preparedness Supervisor
'P. Rushton Training & Emergency Preparedness Manager l
J. Sills Chemistry Supervisor l
- D. Smith Construction Engineer S. Waldrup HVAC Engineer J. Williams 0505
26 NRC Resident inspector
- R. Aiello
- Attended Exit Interview 9.
Action On Previous Inspection Findings a.
(Rescinded) Apparent Violation 50-424/87-32 01, 50-425/87-23 01:
EPIP-N091001-C is inadequate for implementing REP due to inconsistency between the Plan and Procedure addressing EAL.
Based upon a detailed review of the EAls, the subject procedure, and Tables D-1 and D-2 of the VEGP REP, the apparent violation was-withdrawn, b.
(Closed) Violation 50-424/87-32-02, 50-425/87-23-03:
Failure to Classify a Security Event in Accordance with the VEGP REP.
Inspection confirmed that all corrective actions comitted to by the licensee were implemented as required, namely:
initi: tion of management training regarding recognition and handling of suspected explosive devices; and evaluation of emergency classification of security events regarding suspected explosive devices.
c.
(Closed)
Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-424/87-32-03, 50-425/87-23-03:
/erify Audibility of Alarms in High Noise Areas (See Also: 87-EP-01 and 79-BU-18).
Inspection confirned that the volume and clarity of the plant public address system (PA) was adequate to assure audibility of emergency alarms, announcements, and routine personnel caging in high noise areas.
' e inspector, accompanied by a ce;nizant licensee representative, assessed the effective audibility of the PA system on the plant turbine decks and areas immediately below the turbines.
Consistent with industrial hygiene practices and plant safety requirements, the assessment was conducted usir; approved ear plugs, d.
(Closed) Violation 50 424/87. N, 50-425/87-23-06:
Failure to Provide Training to Emergency Response Personrel in Accordance with the REP.
A detailed inspection of plant training records, course materials, and respective course examination results confirmed that personnel identified as lacking specified training were trained as required, (Closed) Bulletin 87-EP-01 (78-BU-18):
Verify Audibility of Alanns e.
in High Noise Areas.
The inspector evaluated and verified the audibility of emergency alarms in designated high noise areas in Unit 1 as discussed above.
A
- ~ _. _ _ - - _ _-_. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _.
27 IC.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 19, 1988 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 8 above.
The inspector described the areas evaluated and discussed in detail each itee listed below.
These specific findings are characterized as Improvement and Incomplete
- items, incomplete items are findings for which action is not completed but the need for required completion is recognized and agreed upon by the licensee.
Improvement items are those findings identified by the inspectors which require review and consideration by the licensee to improve the effectiveness of the Emergency Preparedness program and its implementation.
The licensee has agreed to evaluate these items and will take followup actions as determined to. be appropriate.
One violation specific to Unit I was identified regarding the licensee's failure to implement an EPlP which requires submission of a written report to the VEGP General Manager regarding exercise and drill critique findings and required corrective actions related thereto.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this appraisal.
No dissenting comments were expressed by the licensee, item No.
M Description 2
50-425/88-42-01 Improvement Reviewing Corporate Emergency Organization staffing ensure that personnel assignments are correct, and that on adequate number of personnel are available to fill key primary and alternate positions.
50-425/88-42-02 Incomplete Completion of installation and testing af Unit 2 Post Accident Sampling System, 50-425/88-42-03 Incomplete Completion of installation and operation of instruments, systems and equipment required to conduct sampling and analysis of liquid, gas, and particulate effluents.
50-425/88-42-04 Incomplete Completion of installation, calibration, and testing of Unit 2 area and process monitors.
28 50-425/88 42 05 Improvement Ensuring that Emergency Vehicle No. 6 is included in the meethly checklist and that rcutine test be conducted as required.
50-425/88-42-06 Improvement Ensuring that communication test fcrms are properly completed as required by the respective procedure, and that resolution of any and all prcblems and retests related thereto are fully documented.
50-425/88-42-07 incomplete Completion of revision of Section H-1 of the REP to define the correct procedures requiring actuation of the I.
TSC irmediately upon activation of that facility.
50-425/88-42-08 Incomplete incorpcration of Unit 2 specific effluents monitor inforr.ation into the VIBRANT prograr code.
50-425/88-42-09 Improvement Ensuring that personnel trained in offsite dose assessrent are cognizant of use of default isotopic release rate data defined in EPIP-9'304-C.
50-425/BB-42-10 Improvement Ensurir.g that personnel trained in offsite dose assessrant are fully cognizant of interpretation of wind direction reading greater than 360 degrees.
50-425/88-42-11 Improvement Ensuring that reference 10 Nos. for radiciodines listed in Vibrant Worksheet 1 of EPIP-91304-C are consistent.
50-425/88-42-12 Improvement Providing guidance on the use of POPDOSE defined in EPIP-91304-C.
i
29 50-425/88-4?-13 Improvement Reviewing recomended i
protective actions for whole body deses greater than five rem, ard thyroid doses greater than 25 rem promulgated in Table 1 Item 5 of EPIP-91305-C.
50-425/88-42-14 Incomplete Completion of revision of Chemistry Procedures 35611-C and 35614-C to reflect Unit 2 PASS valve numbers, 50-424/88-38-01 Violation Failure to implement Emergency Procedure EPIP 91602-C requiring submission of a written report to the VEGP Gene al Manager detailing drill critique findings and respective corrective actions.
1 *..
Acronyms and Initialisms ALARA As Low As Reasonably Achievable ACD Abnormal Operating Procedure A:W Area Radiation Monitor A::
Alarm Response Procedure CE:
Corporate Emergency Centar CF Code of Federal Regulations C:
Control Room EA.
Emergency Action Level E:
Emergency Director EST Emergency' Medical Technician EN:
Emergency News Center ESI Emergency Notificaticn System E::
Emergency Cperations Center EC :
Emergency Operations Facility EC D Emergency Operation Procedure EP:A Emergency Preparedness Implementation Appraisal EPIP Emergency Plan implementation Procedure EP Emergency Preparedness EF:
Emergency Planning Zone EF F Emergency Response Facilities ERD Emergency Response Organization FS AR Final Safety Analysis Report GFC Georgia Power Company HEPA High Efficiency Particulate Air HP Health Physics
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I-99 - s Interoffice Correspondence GeorgiaPower A August 4, 1987 Ret Activities for Veek Ending August 2, 1987 Log OQA-87-292 from:
C. E. Belflower QA Site Manager-Operations To R. H. Bellamy General Manager Quality Assurance The major plant accomplishment this week was the annual Emergency Exercise.
We passed all of the portions of the exercise with no prob-lems.
The portions of the exercise observed by QA vent very well.
We did identify some problems not picked up by NRC.
The plant tripped on Tuesday due to personnel error (s).
A test of the Generator current transformers was in progress when an 16C techni-cian inadvertently jumpered across 2 phases.
The plant operated as designed.
The reactor tripped, and safety systems responded correct-ly.
George Bockhold issued an order that no testing in the plant, Primary or Secondary, would be allowed during the day without plant management approval.
Startup vent fairly smooth except for a delay to allow xenon to decay.
l The Design Control and Plant Modification a dit exit interview had u
George Bockhold.
Tom Greene, Skip Kitchens, and A11sn Mosbaugh attending.
The occasion was three Category I items.
We committed to review some last minute information that was presented, however, at least two of the three Category 1 items will remain.
The NRC conducted three exit interviews during the week in the o'
area of Security, Emergency Planning, and the Energency Exercise.
Security (Aubry Tillman) issued a
self-identified violation for two openings in the vital area barrier between Units 1 and 2.
One of these openings was the Fuel Transfer Canal. The other exits were clean.
Ed C. E. Belflower QA Site Manager-Operations Attachment CEB/bep xc C. W. Hayes Q. A. Fila l
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