ML20203N190

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Insp Repts 50-413/86-30 & 50-414/86-33 on 860726-0825. Violation Noted:Failure to Follow Operations Procedure Requiring Operator to Vent & Drain Seal Water Injection Filter Vessel 1A
ML20203N190
Person / Time
Site: Catawba  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 09/12/1986
From: Lesser M, Peebles T, Skinner P, Van Doorn P
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20203N072 List:
References
50-413-86-30, 50-414-86-33, NUDOCS 8609230192
Download: ML20203N190 (8)


See also: IR 05000413/1986030

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AR Rt2fg UNITFD STATES

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Do NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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, g .101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.

  • * ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323

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Report Nos. 50-413/86-30 and 50-414/86-33

Licensee: Duke Power Company

422 South Church Street

Charlotte, N.C. 28242

Docket Nos.: 50-413 and 50-414 License Nos.: NPF-35 and NPF-52

Facility Name: Catawba 1 and 2

Inspection Conducted: July 26_- Aug. 25, 1986

Inspector: b;[ 4crb u I / ~

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Inspector: $,b, - L44b V ~

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P. H.'Skihn

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Inspector: , //2sf/ A/ u $ /) N

M. S. 'Le s ser' //7 ~ D534 Signe6

Approved'by:

T. 'Peebre's, Section Chief

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Projects Branch 3

Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted on site inspecting in

i the areas of review of plant operations (Units I and 2); surveillance observation

(Units 1 and 2); maintenance observation (Units 1 and 2); review of licensee non-

routine event reports (Units 1 and 2); and followup of previously identified NRC

items (Units 1 and 2).

Results: Of the five (5) areas inspected,- one apparent violation was identified,

(Failure to follow operations procedure, paragraph 5.b.).

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REPORT DETAILS

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1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

H. B. Tucker, Vice President of Nuclear Production

G. Vaughn, General Manager of Nuclear Stations

J. W. Hampton, Station Manager

  • H. B. Barron, Operations Superintendent

A. S. Bhatnager, Performance Engineer

W. H. Bradley, Quality Assurance

M. J. Brady, Asst. Operating Engineer

S. Brown, Reactor Engineer

B. F. Caldwell, Station Services Superintendent

J. W. Cox, Superintendent, Technical Services

T. E. Crawford, Operations ~ Engineer

B. East, I. & E. Engineer

C. L. Hartzell, Compliance Engineer

J. A. Kammer, Performance Test Engineer

J. Knuti, Operating Engineer

P. G. LeRoy, Licensing Engineer

W. W. McCollough, Mechanical Maintenance-Supervisor

W. R. McCullum, Superintendent, Integrated Scheduling

C. E. Muse, Operating Engineer

  • F. P. Schiffley, II, Licensing Ensineer

G. T. Smith, Maintenance Superintr.ndent

J. Stackley, I. & E. Engineer

  • D. Tower, Operating Engineer

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics,

security force members, and office personnel.

  • Attended exit interview.

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 25, 1986, with

those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the

areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings. No dis-

senting comments were received from the licensee. The licensee did not

identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the

inspectors during this inspection.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (Units 1 and 2) (92701)

i (92702)

a. (CLOSED) Violation 413/84-87-04: Failure to Follow Procedure for RHR

Pump Surveillance Testing. The licensee responded to this violation in

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correspondence dated November 30, 1984; November 21, 1985, and

December 17, 1985. The inspector reviewed the Employee Training

Qualification System for performance testing personnel for Proper Use

of Procedures and Responsibility of Test Coordinators. In addition

training records were reviewed to assure that the training was received

by required personnel. Based on this review this item is closed,

b. (CLOSED) Inspector Followup Item 413/84-93-01, 414/84-42-01: Need for

Catawba Student Text. The training department has developed a four (4)

volume series of training manuals for operators. These manuals include

general topics such as reactor theory, thermocynamics, chemistry,

administrative information, etc. , and specific system related informa-

tion such as system and component descriptions, system operations, and

one line diagrams. These manuals are to be updated semiannually. The

manuals will be issued to the next hot licensing class which begins in

September 1986. The operators presently participating in requalifica-

tion training are being provided the specific sections from these

manuals that will be presented during the requalification period.

Additional controlled copies of the manuals are also available to be

checked out by any operator for self study purposes. Based on this

information, this item is closed.

c. (CLOSED) Unresolved Item 413/85-43-02, 414/85-46-01: Lack of 10 CFR 21

Evaluation Documentation for American Air Filters and Ruskin Fire

Dampers. This item was written based on the inability to find evalua-

tion documentation by Duke Power Company (DPC) for Part 21 reported

items. The first item was associated with American Air Filter Company

filters used by Transamerican Delaval Company (TD)on diesel generators.

An inspection of this item indicated that TD had not provided this

information to DPC so an evaluation had not been made. DPC and TD have

discussed this deficiency and it appears to have been corrected. In

the second example concerning Ruskin Fire Dampers in which a Form

290.1, Potentially Reportable Item was not prepared. This appears to

be an isolated case and does not appear to be a program deficiency.

Based on this review this item is closed.

d. (CLOSED) Unresolved Item 413/85-55-05: Review of the Adequacy of Post

Maintenance Retest for Valve 1FD-62. The inspector reviewed the

maintenance history of valve 1FD-62 with specific emphasis on retest

that were performed following the various corrective maintenance. This

review indicates that the functional test performed upon completion of

maintenance appear to be adequate. Based on this review this item is

closed.

e. (CLOSED) Violation 413/85-55-06: Failure to Provide Adequate Correc-

tive Action to Prevent Recurrence of TS Violations of Fire Watch

Requirements. The licensee responded to this item in correspondence

dated May 15, 1986. The inspector reviewed this response and verified

implementation of corrective actions and considers licensee action to

be acceptable.

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.f. (OPEN) Violation 414/86-18-01: Failure to Follow Procedures for

Locking of Valves. The inspector reviewed the response to this item

dated July 11, 1986, and held discussions with licensee management

relative to this item. The response indicates that documentation was

found for one valve showing that the valve was authorized to be in the

unlocked position. This documentation was not available to the

inspector prior to the violation issuance. The statement that some of

the valves were properly locked will be further reviewed. In addition,

the licensee indicated that a general review of the valve locking

program was in progress. The inspector requested that the licensee

provide an additional response for this item clarifying the statement

that some valves were locked and describing the general review of the

valve locking program. The licensee was also requested to provide .the

documentation showing that Valve No. 2BW10 was not required to be

locked. Further inspection will be conducted upon. completion of the

above actions.

g. (OPEN) Unresolved Item 413/86-27-01, 414/86-30-01: Followup of

Analysis of Bussman Type FNA Fuses for Reliability. Weekly visual

surveillances have been conducted by the licensee during this reporting

period. The licensee performs an inspection of 1118 fuses for Unit 1

and about 1175 on Unit 2. Two (2) mechanical failures have been

identified since July 11 for Unit I and one (1) failure on Unit 2. A

review of these failures indicate, each was on a control circuit for a

valve that would have caused a failure in a " failed safe" direction.

Licensee evaluation will continue.

No violations or deviations were identified.

4. Unresolved Items

None identified.

5. Plant Operations Review (Units 1 and 2) (71707 and 71710)

a. The inspectors reviewed plant operations throughout the reporting

period to verify conformance with regulatory requirements. TS, and

administrative controls. Control room logs, danger tag logs, Technical

Specification Action Item Log, and the removal and restoration log were

routinely reviewed. Shift turnovers were observed to verify that they

were conducted in accordance with approved procedures.

The inspectors verified by observation and interviews, the measures

taken to assure physical protectioif of the facility met current

requirements. Areas inspected included the security organization, the

establishment and maintenances of gates, doors, and isolation zones in

the proper condition, that access control and badging were proper and

procedures followed.

In addition to the areas discussed above, the areas toured were

observed for fire prevention and protection activities. These included

such things as combustible material control, fire protection syst' ems

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and materials, and fire protection associated with maintenance

activities.

Detailed inspections were accomplished for a Unit 2 reactor trip

occurring on August 4, 1986; a Unit I reactor coolant system leak which

occurred on August 5,1986 and a Unit I reactor coolant system leak

which occurred on August 9, 1986. In addition the inspectors witnessed

a site emergency drill on August 7,1986. Special attention was also

given to the licensees inspection and corrective actions with respect

to environmentally unqualified wiring in Limitorque valve operators.

Further inspection of this area will be conducted as part of the LER I

review.

The inspectors also conducted a detailed Engineered Safety Features

walkdown inspection of the Residual Heat Removal Systems on Unit 2.

b. On August 25, 1986, the inspectors held detailed discussions with

licensee management relative to alignment of the Nuclear Service Water

System. Due to an apparent design error sufficient flow cannot be

assured from only one pump to support an operating unit. Therefore,

special alignments must be performed when one or more of the four

available pumps are out of service. It appears to the inspectors that

the enclosures to the applicable procedure (OP/0/A/6400/06C) could be

clarified relative to which action statements are to be entered, use of

human valve operators and, further, to assure that all operability

scenarios are covered. The licensee agreed to review these enclosures

for clarification. This is Inspector Followup Item 413/86-30-01,

414/86-33-01: Followup of Clarification of Nuclear Service Water

System Procedure.

c. On August 5, 1986, a Unit I reactor coolant system leak of 40.9 gpm

occurred. Maintenance personnel were assigned to replace the 1A seal

injection filter. Operations personnel were using enclosure 4.5 ~to

l OP/1/A/6200/01 " Transferring From Seal Water Injection Filter 1A to

Seal Water Injection Filter 1B" to lineup the system to support the

maintenance. The procedure required placing the 1A filter, venting and

draining the 1A filter, then performing the maintenance. Most of the

manipulating valves were located in the seal injection filter pit with

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remotely operated reach rods having been previously disconnected due to

unreliability. The 1A filter isolation valves were not properly and

completely shut by the operator. Difficulty in operating the flush

valves and high local radiation levels contributed to a decision to

delete the flush of the filter from the procedure. A supervisor, not

having a copy of the procedure, relafed permission over the telephone

to delete the flushing operation. As individual steps for deletion had

not been specified, operators interpreted authorization to delete the

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flush to include deletion of the venting and draining steps.

Additionally one step to observe flow switch 1NVFS5820 for flow through

the drain line was deleted. Although this particular instrument might

not have been adequate to determine filter vessel depressurization, it

would have provided indication of the not fully closed isolation valves.

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Maintenance personnel, under the impression that the system was lined

up, proceeded to unbolt the filter vessel cover. Since the filter

vessel had not been vented and drained a 40.9 gpm leak occurred and

lasted for 18 minutes before the centrifugal charging pump was secured

and the filter isolation valves were completely shut.

Two isolated incidents with similar contributory errors have previously

occurred. LER's 413/85-01 (January 4,1985) and 414/86-07 (April 22,

1986) involved Instrumentation and Electrical Supervisors N/A'ing steps

in test procedures resulting in main feedwater isolation ESF signals.

The licensee has taken initial corrective action by conducting training

for shift supervisors on the necessity to have a copy of the procedure

in hand and to thoroughly understand and specify steps intended to be

deleted. Additionally, operators have been counselled on attention to

detail in ensuring valve positions. NSM 10790 will re-route piping

such that seal injection filter valves will be more accessible and is

currently scheduled on Unit I during the first refueling outage. TS 6.8.1 requires the licensee to follow procedures affecting operations.

Therefore, this is Violation 413/86-30-02: Failure to Follow Operations

Procedure.

One violation was identified, paragraph 5.c., and no deviations were iden-

tified.

6. Surveillance Observation (Units 1 and 2) (61726)

During the inspection period, the inspector verified plant operations were

in compliance with various TS requirements. Typical of these requirements

were confirmation of compliance with the TS for reactor coolant chemistry,

refueling water tank, emergency power systems, safety injection, emergency

safeguards systems, control room ventilation, and direct current electrical

power sources. The inspector verified that surveillance testing was per-

formed in accordance with the approved written procedures, test instrumen-

tation was calibrated, limiting conditions for operation were met, appro-

priate removal and restoration of the affected equipment was accomplished,

test results met requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the

individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during

the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management

personnel.

No violations or deviations were identified.

7. Maintenance Observations (Units 1 and 2) (t2703)

Station maintenance activities of selected systems and components were

observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with

requirements. The inspector verified licensee conformance to the require-

ments in the following areas of inspection: the activities were accom-

plished using approved procedures, and functional testing and/or calibra-

tions were performed prior to returning components or systems to service;

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quality control records were maintained; activities performed were accom-

plished by qualified personnel; and materials used were properly certified.

Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to

assure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance

which may effect system performance.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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8. Review of Li,censee Nonroutine Event Reports (Units 1 and 2) (92700)

- The below listed Licensee Event Reports (LER) were reviewed to determine if

the information provided met NRC requirements. The determination included:

adequacy of description, verification of compliance with TS and regulatory

requirements, corrective action taken, existence of potential generic

problems, reporting requirements satisfied, and the relative safety signi-

ficance of each event. Additional inplant reviews and discussion with plant

personnel, as appropriate, were conducted for those reports indicated by an

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(*). The following LERs are closed:

LER 413/86-17 Axial Flux Difference Requirements

RV. 1 Not Met Due to Computer Malfunction

Inoperable Due to Personnel Error

LER 413/86-19 Auxiliary Building Filtered Exhaust System

Actuation Due to Personnel Error

Inoperable Due to Blown Fuse and Loose Wire

  • LER 413/86-21 Inadvertent Start of Turbine Driven

Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Due to Defective

Procedure

Level Due to Failure of a loop Power Supply

Card

Level Due to, Personnel Error

LER 414/86-27 Containment Air Release Termination Due to

Spurious Radiation Monitor Alarm

No violations or deviations were identified.

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9. Special Management Meeting (30702)

A special m~anagement meeting was conducted on site on August 8,1986, to

conduct a detailed review of operational history of the Catawba Station.

This meeting was conducted at the request of NRC RII .and

was attended by licensee senior management, NRC management from RII and

NRR. Overall operational history was discussed by the licensee including

events, trips and performance indicators. A presentation was given by the

NRC on NRR Performance Indicator Studies. Detailed discussion was held on

specific items which included reactor coolant system leakage - Unit 1, loss

of control room test - Unit 2, steam generator level control experience -

Unit 2, Bussman fuse problems, operating experience feedback program, and

trip review process.

No violations or deviations were identified.

10. Previously Identified Inspector Findings (Units 1 and 2) (92701)

(CLOSED) Inspector Followup Item 413/85-55-09, 414/85-68-04: Evaluation of

TS Comments. The inspectors reviewed the final issuance of Unit 1 and 2

combined TS to assure that the comments identified in this item were

addressed as required. Based on this review this item is closed.

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