ML20204F183

Insp Repts 50-313/87-05 & 50-368/87-05 on 870201-28. Violations Noted:Failure to Follow Procedure Re Operation of Makeup Pump Room Coolers & Inoperable Pressurizer Code Safety Valve

ML20204F183
Person / Time
Site:	Arkansas Nuclear
Issue date:	03/13/1987
From:	Craig Harbuck, Hunter D, Johnson W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20204F054	List: ML20204F050 ML20204F086 ML20204F183
References
50-313-87-05, 50-313-87-5, 50-368-87-05, 50-368-87-5, NUDOCS 8703260149
Download: ML20204F183 (13)

See also: IR 05000313/1987005

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APPENDIX B

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Inspection Report: 50-313/87-05 Licenses: DPR-51

50-368/87-05 NPF-6

Dockets: 50-313

50-368

Licensee: Arkansas Power & Light Company

P. 0.-Box 551

Little Rock, Arkansas 72203

Facility Name: Arkansas Nuclear One (AN0), Units 1 and 2

Inspection At: AN0 Site, Russellville, Arkansas

Inspection Conducted: February 1-28, 1987

. Inspectors:

W. D. Johnson, Senior Resident Reactor Date

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Inspector

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. C. C. Harbuck, Resident Reactor Inspector Date

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Approved: 3

D. R. Hunter, Chief, Reactor Date

Project Section B, Reactor Projects

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8703260149 870320

PDR ADOCK 05000313

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Inspection Summary

Inspection Conducted February 1-28, 1987 (Report 50-313/87-05)

Areas Inspected:

verification, maintenance, surveillance, followup on previouslyRoutine, u

identified items and licensee event reports, allegation followup IE

Information Notice followup, the significant event review program,, low

terrperature overpressure mitigation,.and emergency operating procedure review .

Results:

to follow procedure in the operation of the makeup pump room cooler

paragraph 4)

pressurizer andsafety

code one potential

valve enforcement item was identified (inoperable

paragraph 3).

Inspection Conducted February 1-28, 1987 (Report 50-368/87-05)

Areas Inspected:

Routine, unannounced inspection of operational safety

verification, maintenance, and surveillance, followup on previously identified

items and licensee event reports, allegation followup, IE Information Notice

followup,

overpressure the significant

mitigation. event review program, and low temperature

Results:

identified.Within the nine areas inspected, no violations or deviations were

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

• J. Levine, Director of Site Nuclear Operations

R.-Ashcraft, Electrical Maintenance Supervisor

'*B. Baker, Operations Manager

C. ENn, QC Supervisor

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D. Bennett, Mechanical Engineer

M. Browning, Maintenance Engineer j

• P. Michalk, Licensing Engineer i

W. Converse, Operations Assessment Superintendent

A.'Cox, Unit 1 Operations Superintendent

• E. Ewing, General Manager, Technical Support ,

B.. Garrison,=0perations Technical Support

.L. Gulick, Unit 2 Operations Superintendent

'H. Hollis, Security Superintendent

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D. Horton, Quality Assurance Superintendent

• D. Howard, Special Projects Manager

• L. Humphrey, General Manager, Nuclear Quality

J. Jacks, Licensing Engineer

• H. Jones,, Plant Modifications Manager

• R. Lane, Engineering Manager

)~ *D. Lomax, Licensing Supervisor

B. McCord, Quality Control Inspection Supervisor

J. McWilliams, Maintenance Manager

J. Orlicek, Field Engineering Supervisor

G. Parks, Senior QC Inspector

V. Pettus, Mechanical Maintenance Superintendent

• D. Provencher,- Quality Assurance Supervisor

S. Quennoz, Ceneral Manager, Plant Operations

E. Rice, Electrical Maintenance Supervisor

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P. Rogers, Special Projects Coordinator

• R.'Rousse11e, Quality Control Engineering Supervisor

C. Shively, Plant Engineering Superintendent

R.. Smith, Shift Technical Adviser

M. Snow, Licensing Engineer

C. Taylor, Operations Technical Support Supervisor

• J. Taylor-Brown, Quality Control Superintendent

G. Wrightam, I&C Supervisor

S. Yancy, Maintenance Supervisor

C. Zimmerman, Operations Technical Support Supervisor

• Present at exit interview.

The NRC inspectors also contacted other plant personnel, including operators,

technicians, and administrative personnel.

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2. Followup oniP re'viously' Identified Items (Units 1 and 2)

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. ~,(Closed) Open Item-313/8429-03: Temporary ' level indication. The licensee

.has revised Procedure 1103.11 to include the desired valve alignment for

using the temporary reactor coolant-system level indication manometer.

Drawings' M-23'), sheets 1 and 2, have also been revised to include this

system.

'(Closed)'Open Item 313/8504-01; 368/8504-01: 10 CFR 50.72 reporting._ The

licensee has revised Procedure 1000.08 to require a report to the NRC1

within four hours of, "Any event or situation, for which a news release is

planned or notification to.other government agencies has been or will be

'made. Such an event may include an onsite fatality or inadvertent release

of radioactively contaminated materials, oil spills, hazardous chemical

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releases, management initiated shutdowns, etc."

(Closed) Open Item 313/8506-05; 368/8506-05: Establishment of a program

for initial, documented evaluation of. the effect of potential deficiencies

..on. continued safe plant operation. The licensee has implemented Revision

'3 of Procedure ESP-304. This procedure provides administrative

. requirements for logging, tracking, evaluation, documenting, and resolving

nuclear safety and nuclear environmental concerns.

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(0 pen). Violation 313/8517-01; 368/8528-01: Failure to establish

consistent procedures for the operation of the outside air dampers on the

control room emergency recirculation and filtration units.

Procedure 2104.34 has been revised to remove the recommendation concerning

closing the outside air damper on 2VSF-9 during a chlorine event. The

procedures for testing of the control room isolation and emergency-

ventilation systems have been coordinated and combined in

Procedures _ 2104.07, 2104.34, and 1104.'34. Procedure 1104.34 contained

unclear or inconsistent information regarding whether VS!?9 starts

automatically upon an indicatko of chlorine in the Unit'2 air intake-

duct. This item will remain open pending revision of Procedure 1104.'34.

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!. -(0 pen) Open Item'368/8528-03: Radiation' monitoring panel operability.

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In December 1985, the NRC inspector. observed that an average of 10 to,

i 15 percent (5 to 7) of the instruments or. recorders on the Unit 2

i radiation monitoring panel (2C25) were inoperable. This'was made an open

U item to track licensee action to improve the operability of- these

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instruments. On February 25, 1987, the NRC inspector observed that the

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following instruments on 2C25 were inoperable:

i~ 2RITS-8903 2RR-2330

l 2RITS-8911 2RiTS-8909

i 2RITS-8905 2RITS-8912

2RITS-1513-2 2RITS-2429

No apparent progress has been made by the licensee to improve the

operability of the radiation monitoring instruments on 2C25.

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I3. Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup (Units l'and 2)

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Through discussions with licensee personnel and review of records, the

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following five' event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability

requir~ements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished,

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and corrective action to prevent recurrence has been accomplished in

accordance with Technical Specifications

Unit 2

LER 83-035 " Potential Flooding By Fire Suppression System of Vital

Electrical.DC Buses 2001 and 2002." This LER was submitted for

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information only since its subject was related to IEN 83-41: " Actuation

of Fire Suppression System Causing Inoperability of Safety-Related

Equipment." The NRC inspector determined that an adequate response to

this IEN had been completed by the licensee. This event report is

considered closed.

LER 85-022 " Reactor Trip on High Steam Generator Level Due to Closure of

Main Feedwater Regulating Valve." The NRC inspector verified that the

following corrective actions were completed:

. Proper installation of instrument air filters

. Replacement of the pneumatic relays and readjustment of the 'B' valve

positioner

. Installation of differential pressure gages across filters

. Additional operator training on the instrument air system

. Changing preventive maintenance on the air dryer to meet

manufacturer's recommendations

. Placement of duplex filters in the air lines to the MFRVs and

changing them out monthly

Additionally a design change to install finer filters was to be completed

in the near future. This event report is considered closed.

LER 86-013 " Inoperable Containment Building Pressure Transmitter." The

NRC inspector verified that procedures were in place to ensure that

environmentally qualified equipment is installed and maintained properly.

This event report is considered closed.

Unit 1

LER 86-003 " Breaches in Control Room Isolation Integrity Capability."

Although the three breaches of the control room isolation boundary found

were all in the Unit 2 control room, this LER was reported under Unit 1,

since both control rooms are considered to be in the same habitability

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envelope. The three breaches were identified on three separate dates:

July 24, 1985, and January 3 and 20, 1986. The licensee did not determi%e

these breaches to be a reportable event until February 13, 1986. The NRC

inspector expressed concern to the licensee that this determination should

have been more_ timely. All corrective actions pertaining to this LER were

verified to have been completed. This event report is considered closed.

LER 86-007 " Pressurizer Code Safety Valves Inoperable Due to Incorrect Set-

Pressure."~ The principal subject of this report was the finding that

valve PSV-1002 had been found set approximately 500 psi above the lift set

pressure specification on December 21, 1986. Although the licensee plans

a supplemental report by October 1987, the significance of this finding

warranted an NRC review before then. The NRC inspector reviewed

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applicable documentation and interviewed maintenance personnel who were

involved with the refurbishment and testing of PSV-1002 in September of

1985 under Job Order 702359. The purpose of this review was to

independently verify the licensee's conclusions that the maintenance had

been performed properly and that probably the correct safety valve had

subsequently been tested. (No licensee record exists for work on this

valve from the conclusion of testing in September of 1985 until the set

pressure was found high on December 21,1986.) From this review the NRC

inspector noted the following documentation problems:

a. A single copy of Procedure 1402.18 (Pressurizer Relief Valve Removal

and Replacement, Revision 0, dated January 2, 1985) was used to

document the removal of one safety valve and the refurbishment and

installation of a different safety valve in its place. The fact that

two valves were involved was not clearly denoted in the job order

documentation.

b. The licensee had three code safety valves, each of which had its own

unique identification number; however, these numbers were not used to

identify particular valves during maintenance or testing activities

on site. Consequently, certain determination of which valve was

tested in September 1985 on the pressurizer was not possible using

the existing documentation in the job order package.

c. Part of the test data was missing from the documentation of the set

pressure testing performed under Procedure 1802.03 (Pressizer Code

Relief Valve Test, Revision 0, Permanent Change 1, dated December 18,

1984) on September 25-26, 1985. The first three of six test runs

were not included'in the test record and possible adjustments to the

spring tension for the first three tests, if any, were not recorded.

d. Procedure 1402.18 had the following problems:

. The releasing of the valve spring tension and the replacement of

the spindle were not clearly documented.

. Procedure Step 7.4.7, verification of the blowdown ring position

during valve reassembly was marked "not applicable," but

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apparently should have been done as indicated by related

step 7.2.20 during valve disassembly.

. Although the bellows was replaced, procedure step 7.3.1

indicated the contrary.

The NRC. inspector expressed concern to the licensee that these

documentation problems indicated an inadequate management review of the

job order package prior to closecut. The licensee acknowledged this

concern and indicated that changes rr.ade since 1985 to the code safety

valve maintenance and testing procedures and in the way job orders are

written have improved work documentation.

Despite the documentation problems noted, based on discussions with

licensee maintenance personnel, managers, and the test engineer involved

with the work, it appeared that the maintenance had been performed properly

and that the correct safety valve had been tested. Additionally, during

disassembly of the valve in question (PSV-1002) no problems were found.

However, because the September 1985 test documentation was unclear on

valve identification, due to the past practice of not recording the unique

identification number, no definite conclusion that the correct valve had

been tested could be reached from the documentation reviewed. Further,

the root cause of the out of specification setting was still considered by

the licensee to be unknown.

The NRC inspectors discussed with the licensee the possibility of

Valve PSV-1002 having been set 500 psi above lift set pressure during an

extended period of critical operation, in violation of Technical

Specification 3.1.1.3. A V ich requires two operable code safety valves

during critical operation. The licensee was informed that this issue is

being considered as a poten;ial enforcement item and will be addressed in

separate correspondence.

This event report will be reviceed further following submittal of the

supplemental report.

No violations or deviations were identified.

4. Operational Safety Verification (Units 1 and 2)

The NRC inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable

icgs, and conducted discussions with control room operators. The NRC

inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systeu:s,

reviewed tagout records, and verified proper return to service of affected

components, and ensured that maintenance requests had been initiated for

equipment in need of maintenance. The NRC inspectors made spot checks to

verify that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance

with the station security plan. The NRC inspectors verified

implementation of radiation protection controls during observation of

plant activities.

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The NRC inspectors toured accessible areas of the units to observe plant

equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and

excessive-vibration. The NRC inspectors also observed plant housekeeping

and cleanliness conditions during the tours.

The NRC inspectors observed plant housekeeping /cleaniiness conditions and

. verified implementation of radiation. protection controls. The NRC

inspectors walked down the safety-related portions of the Unit 1

electrical distribution system. The walkdown was performed using the

checklists of Procedure 1107.01. No breaker misalignments were

identified. The licensee had recently completed relabeling this system,

including'the addition of controlled breaker lists attached to the doors

of..the 120 volt AC and 125 volt.DC distribution panels. One breaker tag

L was missing and one tag differed in wording from the checklist. The

licensee was informed of these minor discrepancies, and corrective action

was initiated. During a plant tour later in the month, the NRC inspector ,

noted that another breaker tag was missing. This tag had apparently

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fallen off due to failure of its adhesive.

During plant tours, the NRC inspectors noted that plant general appearance

and cleanliness was excellent in most areas. Significant improvement has

been made recently due to the auxiliary building free release project and

the general painting project. These projects were continuing at the end

-of this inspection period. During the month, two areas needing additional

housekeeping attention were identified to the licensee. These were the

Unit 2 motor drf 7n emergency feedwater pump (2P78) room and the Unit 2

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number 1 diesel generator room around the boric acid pumps. Also during a

plant tour, the NRC inspector noted that a brass tag with the wrong valve

number on it was attached to Manual Valve 2CS-814. The licensee was

informed, and corrective action was taken.

The NRC inspector noted that the number of deficiency tags attached to

control and indication panels in the Unit 2 control room had increased.

This indicated a growing backlog of minor maintenance items affecting

control room operators. These minor deficiencies did not indicate a

failure to meet any Technical Specification requirements, and they did not

appear to have a significant negative impact on operator performance; but

the NRC inspector expressed concern that this could become a problem if

the trend were not reversed. The licensee had initiated a tracking system

to monitor this backlog.

On February 10, 1987, the NRC inspector noted that only one of the three

makeup pump room coolers in Unit I was in operation. A recent revision to

Supplements, II, III, and IV of Procedure 1104.02, " Makeup and

Purification System Operations," required that at least two makeup pump

room coolers must be in operation and that all three should be running if

available. The licensee's failure to follow this procedural requirement

is an apparent violation. (313/8705-01)

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These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility

operations were in conformance with the requirements established under

Technical Specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.

5. Monthly Surveillance Observation (Units 1 and 2)

The NRC inspector observed the Technical Specification required

surveillance testing on High Pressure Safety Injection Pump 2P89C (monthly

test, Procedure 2104.39, Supplement 3) and High Pressure Injection / Makeup

Pump P36A (quarterly test, Procedure 1104.02, Supplement IV) and verified

that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that

test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for

operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected '

components were accomplished, that test results conformed with Technical

Specifications and procedure requirements, that test results were reviewed

by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any

deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and

resolved by appropriate management personnel.

The inspector also witnessed portions of the following test activities:

. Power range linear amplifier calibration at power

(Procedure 1304.32)

. Unit 2 diesel generator number 2 biweekly test (Procedure 2104.36,

Supplement 2)

. Engineered safeguards actuation system analog channel 2 monthly test

(Procedure 1304.05)

. Unit 1 diesel generator number 1 monthly test (Procedure 1104.36,

Supplement I)

No violations or deviations were identified.

6. Monthly Maintenance Observation (Units 1 and 2)

Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components

listed below were observed to ascertain that they were conducted in

accordance with approved procedures, Regulatory Guides, and industry codes

or standards; and in conformance with Technical Specifications.

The following items were considered during this review: the limiting

conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed

from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work;

activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected

as applicable; functional testing .:nd/or calibrations were performed prior

to returning components or systems to service; quality control records

were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel;

parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls

were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemented.

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Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to

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ensure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance

which may affect system performance.

The following maintenance activities were observed:

. Altering the limit switch configuration on 2CV-1418-1 per Design

Change Package 86-2055 (Job Order 714452)

. Investigation of a ground in plant protection systems channel 3 (Job

Order 729986)

. Repair of reactor protection system channel A (Job Order 0306)

. Replacement'of tripper finger assembly on operator for 2CV-1418-1

(Job Order 711323)

No violations or deviations were identified.

7. Significant Event Review Program (Units 1 and 2)

The licensee has implemented Procedure 1000.38, "Significant Review

Program." This procedure established the Significant Event Review

Committee and provided requirements for this committee to review

significant events (including plant trip, plant transients, and engineered

safeguards actuations) to determine root and contributing causes and to

recommend corrective actions. The NRC inspector attended a meeting of

this committee on February 12, 1987. At this meeting, the Unit 1

transient of February 9, 1987, involving a main feedwater pump trip and a

plant runback was reviewed.

The committee used a structured approach to analyze the event, determine

the root cause of the event, determine possible contributing causes, and

to prepare recommended corrective actions.

No violations or deviations were identified.

8. Followup of Allegation 4-86-A-105 (Units 1 and 2)

In a letter dated October 23, 1986, Region IV of the NRC forwarded to the

licensee an allegation received by the NRC regarding drug usage at ANO.

This letter requested the licensee to perform an investigation of the

allegation and to take any necessary corrective action. The licensee's

letter of January 21, 1987, to NRC Region IV reported that the allegation

had been reviewed and appropriate corrective measure had been taken.

The NRC inspector discussed the licensee's review of the allegation and

the measures taken with licensee management.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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9. Followup on IE Information Notice 86-106 (Units 1 and 2)

This notice was entitled "Feedwater Line Break" and was issued on

December 16, 1986. It addressed feedwater pipe thinning and requested the

licensee to review the information for applicability to their facilities

and consider actions to preclude similar problems at their facilities.

At the time of this inspection, the licensee had not completed its review

of IEN 86-106. The NRC inspector discussed the issue of pipe wall

thinning with licensee personnel to learn their past actions and future

plans in dealing with pipe wall thinning. The following points are

presented as a summary:

. The licensee has had a program for monitoring secondary system piping

and fittings for thinning since 1982.

. The monitoring program as grown over the years, following each

additional incident at another plant.

. The primary focus of the program has been extraction steam piping and

high pressure turbine exhaust piping.

. After the event described in IEN 86-106, the ANO-1 condensate piping

was inspected, concentrating on areas where direction changes could

lead to erosion.

. No problems were found in the condensate piping, but some thinning

was found on smaller piping associated with the heater drain pumps.

. AP&L is working to develop an integrated piping inspection program,

combining the existing programs and using specific selection

criteria.

. Inspections are planned to be performed during each refueling outage.

The new inspection program is expected to be in place prior to the

next refueling outage.

No violations or deviations were identified.

10. Low Temperature Overpressure (LTOP) Mitigation Systems (Units 1 and 2)

The NRC inspector initiated a review to verify that both ANO units have an

effective LTOP system which is in accordance with licensee consnitments and

NRC safety evaluation reports. This review includes specific

verifications in the areas of design, administrative controls and

procedures, training and equipment modification, and surveillance.

Some aspects of system design were reviewed during this inspection period.

No violations or deviations were identified. This inspection effort will

continue during a future inspection period.

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11. Emergency Operating Procedure (E0P) Review (Unit 1)

The purpose of this part of the inspection was to determine whether the

Unit 1 E0P was prepared in accordance with the NRC-approved Procedures

Generation Package (PGP) and are adequate to control safety-related

functions in the event of system or component malfunction.

The NRC inspector reviewed the PGP which consisted of Plant-Specific

Technical Guideline (P-STG), the Plant-Specific Writer's Guide (P-SWG),

and the description of the program for verification and validation of the

E0P. Preliminary reviews of the E0P indicate that it was consistent with

the PGP.

Additionally, the NRC inspector observed a licensed operator training

session on the Unit 1 simulator and noted that the portions of the E0P

used in the scenario (loss of coolant accident) appeared to have been

adequate to guide operator actions to ensure safe shutdown of the plant.

The review of the Unit 1 E0P will be continued in a future inspection.

No violations or deviations were identified.

12. Exit Interview-

The NRC inspectors met'with Mr. J. M. Levine, Director, Site Nuclear

Operations, and other members of the AP&L staff at the end of inspection.

At these meetings, the inspectors summarized the scope of the inspection

and the findings.

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ATTACHMENT 2

, UPDATE FORM

FACILITY: A A/O-/

DOCKET: r o _4 / %

ORIGINATORS NAME: 2828EE8090@ROOOOOOOO

TYPE: @

ITEM NO.: 8505890000

REPORT: BEEOO

PARAGRAPH: 8OOO

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FUNCTIONAL AREA: 8028508BEEEB098EOOOO-

DES.CRIPTION: 88099BEO88OEEEEBBED0

898080E0E805880283D0

GB80GOREGESOOOOOOODO

STATUS CODE: @

UPDATE /CLOSE:

REPORT

OO000000O00.0000ODEDO

RESPONSIBLE

SECTION EBEWD000OO

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DE1 AILS:

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