IR 05000483/1997005
| ML20210R618 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 08/25/1997 |
| From: | Howell A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Randolph G UNION ELECTRIC CO. |
| References | |
| 50-483-97-05, 50-483-97-5, EA-97-168, NUDOCS 9709030195 | |
| Download: ML20210R618 (574) | |
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, y a REoloN iv p $ [ 611 RYAN plt ZA oRIVE SUIT E 4JO AR LINGToN, T E XAS 76011-8064 9 . . . . + ,0 August 25, 1997 1 EA 97168 I Garry L. Randolph, Vice President and l Chief Nuc' ear Officer Union Electric Company P.O. Box 620 Fulton, Missouri 65251 SUBJECT: AUGUST 15,1997 PREDECISIONAL ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE REGARDING APPARENT VIOLATIONS IN NRC INSPECTION '
REPORT 50-483/97-05
Dear Mr. Randolph:
'This refers to the predecisional enforcement conference conducted in the Region IV office on August 15,1997. This predecisional enforcement conference was convened to discuss apparent failures to perform safety evaluations in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50.59 requirements as discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-483/97-05. The predecisional enforcement conference agenda, the attendance list, the draft apparent violations, and your presentation are included as Enclosures 1-4, respectively.
You will be advised by separate conespondence of the results of our deliberations regarding the apparent violations discussed during the conference. No response regarding these apparent violations is required at th:2 time.
In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this lotter will be placed in the NRC's Public Document 4 Room.
Should you have any questions concerning this matter, we will oe pleased to discuss them with you. '
Sincerely, )
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Docket No.: 50-483 License No.: NPF-30
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0840/97 086Y97 1 08t,y97 ~ OFFICIAL RECORD COPY _
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Enclosures:
1. Agenda 2. Attendance List 3. Apparent Violations 4. Licensee Presentation
REGION IV, ARLINGTON, TEXAS ., 1. INTRODUCTIONS / OPENING REh1 ARKS - REGION ADMINISTRATOR . 2. ENFORCEMENT PROCA.63 - ENFORCEMENT OFFICER 3. APPARENT VIOLATIONS & REGULATORY CONCdRNS - DIVISION DIRECTOR
4. LICENSEE PRESENTATION - 5. BREAK (10-MINUTE NRC CAUCUS IF NECESSARY) 6. RESUMPTION OF CONFERENCE ' 7. CLOSING REMARKS - LICENSEE 8. CLOSING REMARKS - REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR - ,
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- ENCLOSURE 2 Union Electric Comoany Attendees G. Randolph, Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer C. Naslund, Manager, Nuclear Engineering -
- R. Affolter, Manager, Callaway Plant A. Passwater, Manager, Licensing and Fuels J. Laux, Manager, Quality Assurance K. Kuechenmeister, Superintendent, Design Engineering - T. Sharkey, Supesvising Engineer, Safety Related Mechanical Systems 1 M. Reidmoyer, E igineer, independent Safety Engineering Group NRC Attendees - E. Morschoff, Regional Administrator A. Howell, Director, Division of Reactor Safety G. Sanborn, Enforcement Officer C. Var Denburgh, Chief, Engineering Branch, Division of Reactor Safety T. Stetka, Senior Reactor inspector, Engineering Branch, Division of Reactor Safety K. Brockman, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects - W. Johnson, Chief, Projects Branch B, Division of Reactor Projects D. Passehl, Senior Residant inspector, Callaway Station E. Adensam, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects, Ill/IV, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation . _
_ L. Spessard, Director, Division of Reactor Controls & Human Factors, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation K. Thomas, Project Manager, Division of Reactor Projects, Ill/IV, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation - T. Hiltz, Senior Regional Coordinator, Office of the Executive Director for Operations
- M. Satorius, Deputy Director, Office of Enforcement J. Shackelford, Senior Reactor Analyst, Division of Reactor Safety D. Carter, Resident inspector, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station S. Burton, Resident inspector, Arkansas Nuclear One-
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, ENCLOSURE 3 APPARENT VIOLATIONS * PREDECISIONAL ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE UNION ELECTRIC COMPANY AUGUST 15,1997
'l * NOTE: THE APPARENT VIOLATIONS DISCUSSED AT THIS PREDECISIONAL ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE ARE SUBJECT TO FURTHER REVIEWAND MAY BE ,
REVISED PRIOR TO ANY RESULTING ENFORCEMENTACTION. l
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O APPARENT VIOLATIONS A. 10 CFR 50.59(b)(1) requ;es that records of changes in the facility and of changes in procedures be maintained to the extent that these changes constitute changes in the facility as described in the safety analysis report or changes in procedures as described in the safety analysis report. In addition,10 CFR 50.59(b)(1) requires that these records include a written safety evaluation which provides the bases for the determination that the change does not involve an unreviewed s 'oty question.
Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 9.4.7.2.3, states that the diesel generator ouilding supply fans automatically start when the room temperature exceeds 90*F and automatically shut down when room temperature falls below 8G'F.
Contrary to the above, a safety evaluation was not performed for Procedure OTN-NE-00002 and Technical Specification Interpretation 18 that allowed manual operation of the diesel generator building supply fans, Changing the automatic operation of the diesel generator building supply fans to manual operation represented a change to the procedure as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report during the period of March 1,1985 to February 27,1997. In addition, this change represented a change to the facility as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report during the period of March 1, 1985 to February 23,1990.
B. 10 CFR 50.59(b)(1) requires that records of changes in the facility and of changes in procedures be maintained to the extent that these changes constitute changes in the facility as described in the safety analysis report or changes in procedures as described in the safety analysis report. In addition,10 CFR 50,59(b)(1) requires that these records include a written safety evaluation which provides the bases for the determination that the change does not involve an unreviewed safety question.
Since October 20,1995, Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 16.9.2, specifies that the refueling machine trip set points for the load ovortoad and load reduction trips be set at 250 pounds above and below the suspended loads, respectively.
Contrary to the above, on October 20,1995, a safety evaluation was not performed for Technical Specification Interpretation 25 which provided an interpretation of Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 16.9.2, regarding the setting of refueling machine trip set points. Technical Specification Interpretation 25 permitted the trip set points to be set based cn the heaviest fuel assembly for the overload trip and the lightest fuel assembly for the load reduction trip. This allowed these trips to be set in excess of 250 pounds by approximately 150 pounds and was implemented during Refueling Outage 8 which was conducted from October 12 through November 11,1996.
Changing the set points for the overload and trip reduction trips represented a change to the facility as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report.
C. 10 CFR 50.59(b)(1) requires that records of changes in the facility and of changes in procedures be maintained to the extent that these changes constitute changes in the THESE APPARENT VIOLATIONS ARE SUBJECT TO FURTHER REVIEW AND MAY BE REVISED
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- APPARENT VIOLATIONS facility as described in the safety analysis report or changes in procedurr's as described in the safety analysis report. In addition,10 CFR 50.59(b)(1) requires that these records include a written safety evaluation which provides the bases for the '
determination that the change does not involve an unreviewed safety question.
Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 18.2.3, specified that details regarding the design of the post-accident sampling system were described in a letter to the NRC, dated February 4,1983. This letter described the post-accident sampling system as a computer controlled automated system.
Contrary to the above, on November 1,1995, a safety evaluation was not performed for a modification (RMP 94-2005A) that modified the post-accident sampling system by changing the computer controlled operation of the sample panel equipment into a manually controlled operation. Changing the computer controlled automatic ope.: tion ! of the post-accident sampling system to manually controlled operation represented a change to the facility as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report,
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E THESE APPARENT VIOLATIONS ARE SUBJECT TO FURTHER REVIEW AND MAY BE REVISED - - .
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'l ENCLOSURE 4 LICENSEE PRESENTATION
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Dear Mr. Denton:
The enclosure provides additional information regarding the post-accident sampling system design for thg S#UPPS fact'iHm. The information is . provided to resolve, in partGicense Condition 230or Callaway Unit No. I and License Condition B.17 for Wolf cren Genera 6ng Station Unit No.1.
The enclosed data supplement the information contained in Section 18.2.3 of the SNUPPS FSAR. Additional information describing the administrative _ controls and procedures to be implemented for pbst-accident sampling at the SNUPPS facilities will be provided later in accordance with the provisions of the license conditions.
Veryktruly yours, - AMM( Nicholas A. Petrick
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,g enclosure i '9 cc: D. T. McPhee KCPL J. H. Neisler USNRC/ CAL q G. L. Koester KGE T. E. Vandel USNRC/WC g D. F. Schnell UE-A )
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SLNRC 83 0007 2 ENGR.
SUBJ:- NUREG-07 ost Accident'Sampiing-Capability
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Mr. Harold R.- Denton, Director-Office of-Nuclear Reactor Regulation _ U. S.- Nuclear Regulatory Comission-Washington, D. C. 20555
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Docket Nos. . STN 50-482 and STN 50-483
Dear Mr. Denton:
- The: enclosure provides additional information regarding the post-accident
.. - sampling system design for the "HDD3 p4liH". The information is - -
provided to resolve, in part(J.icense Condition or Callaway Unit No. 1 y,
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and License Condition B.17 for Wolt cre9% Genern ng Station Unit No.1. 10 4.
Tha enclosed data supplement the information contained in Section 18.2.3- :y of the SNUPPS FSAR. Additional information describing the administrative - c ntrols and procedures to be implemented for pDst-accident sampling at the * SNUPPS facilities will-be provided later=in accordance with the provisions 4
- of. the license conditions. ,;
ay y Veryktruly yours, a _ NMC Hicholas A. Petrick
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SNUPPS POST' ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM Responses to License Condition Items for Post Accident Sampling-System (PASS) Capability:
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Demonstrate- compliance with all requirements of NUREG-0737. II.B.3 for sampling, chemical, and radiological analysi.: capability, under accidenc conditions.
.. SNUPPS Designt
- The NUPPS post accident sampling system (PASS) is an onlika system designed to provida immediate detailed analysis of liquid and~ gas
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, samples. The system-is capable of analyzing for radionuclides and various chemical species in reactor coolant. containment atmosphere and containment sump samples taken during normal and/or accident conditions.
Sample collection and analysis is possible immediately upon the de:ision , to-take's sample.- Valving and sample flow control is performed by-r computer from a control panel located in the health physics area. Thia . area ~is' considered a vital ~ area for which continuous occupancy is I assured during accidents as described in Section 18.2.2 of the PSAR.
The PASS also can be used to take grab samples by automatic or remote manual methods and handle them by semi-remote manual methods in the avant i of failure of the on-line system. Redundant sample points are provided _ with sample isolation valves (i.e. c,optainment isolation valves) powered via class IE redundant circuits to assure- sample availability.
' _ The on-line sampling capability includes analysis for:
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Liquid samples (reactor coolant and containment sump):
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Gross radioactivity 10~3 pCi/ml to 10 Ci/mi Gamma spectrum isotopic analysis Boron content 50-6500 ppa
- 'Chlorids content 0.1-20 ppa Dissolved hydrogen 0-3000 cc/kg Dissolved oxygen 0-20. ppa ph *
0-14 Conductivity 0-1000pahos
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Cas-sample (containment ateosphere)
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Bydrogen content (see below) - Oxygen content 0-39wt% 10- pCi/mi - 105 pCi/ml _.
-Gross radioactivity Gamma spectrum isotopic analysis
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i * j I Caseous' hydrogen-is monitored by- dedicated, redundant Class IE powered i hydrogen analyzers-with a range of- 0-10 volume %. The hydrogen
- anklyters_ are provided with redundant safety grade containment isolatica
. valves which are powered by Class IE power supplies.
I' Before:a radiological or chemical analyses is performed the' sample lines , are yurged to assure representative sampling. During normal operation ' the purged liquid samples are returned to the wasta holdup tank for
reprocessing before being returned to the reactor coolant inventory.
' During. accident conditions the liquid samples are returned to the reactor coolant drain tank located in the containment. Containment _ > I atmosphere- samples are returned to the containment during normal and l accident conditions.
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Provide sufficient shielding to meet the requirements CDC 19, assuming Regulatory Guide 1.4 source terms. !
l~ SNUPPS Design: !:_ ' The SNUPPS PASS 19 controlled frca a panel it:sted in the health physics ; - area which is below grade elevation in the control building. The health !I physics area is considered a vital area for which continuous occupancy is assured during -accidents and has a dose rate less than 0.015 R/hr, as described in Section 18.2.2 and figure 18.2-7 of the PSAR.
Only in the event of failure of the online system is the operator required to retrieve grab samples from the sampling cabinet for offline analysis. The grab sample system is designed so that operator doses
- vill be -as low as reasonably achievabla and within limits specified~ in GDC 19.
- The ptovisions to minimire personnel exposure while retrieving grab samples are sa followst , r
. : t 1. . The sample line sizes and component. internal volumes were ..
_ minimised to reduce the amount of radioactivity at the _ 1 sample panel location. ,
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2. The sample can be drawn automatically by operator selection at;th* remote panel, thereby minimizing operator time in the vicinity of the sample.
3. The Loample lines within the sample panel:are purged automatically af ter sampling with demineralized water, o
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or instrument air as appropriate, including the connections to:the cask and those-on the essk itself. . w.. I M o'- OE O O Nm s
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4. Diluted or undiluted _ ennpleo con be.obtained. j b 5. -The'caska can be renotely discunnected from the panel.- , l lb The cample panel is shielded with-lead.
, 7. The undiluted sample casks are heavily shielded and the l transport cart is_ electrically pouered with an 8 ft
- control cable to maximize distance between- the source
: : and the operator.
' Item f3t- . Ccumir to moet the sampling and analysis requirement of Regulatory Guide ' 1.97, Revision-2.
- SNUPPS Designt Specific sampling capabilities of the SNUPPS PASS are given in response
- to Item #1.- SNUPPS capabilities sectior exceed-the accident sampling l
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capabilities recommended in- Reg. Guide 1.97, Rev. 2 as described in j
. Appendix' 7A of the FSAR. The SNUPPS PASS -is designed to _ function
- cecurately and reliably in normal end accident environments. The j radiation detection and analysis system, inline chemical analysis 4 components, data aquisition hardware and sof tware, and sample delivery
' systems are components that_ have:been carefully selected from suppliers ' of products of. proven capability and reliability. Responses to Items #4 . and #5 below address the functioning of the system during abnormal
. occurrences.
Item f4: 4d
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Verify that all electrically powered components associated with post
: -accident sampling are capable of being supplied with power and operated ' - - within 30 minutes of an accident in_which there is core degradation, o : assuming a loss of offsite power.
a - SNUPPS Design: ! j Nse PASS- panel _is normally powered from non Class IE offsite power, but
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is provided with the capability- to be manually: transferred to a Class 1 -
. IE,. diesel backed source. In the event of a-safety. injection actuation
! ' signs 1, concurrent with a loss of of fsite power, the operator will be required to reset the safety injection actuation signal in the control , roon befora manually loading the PASS.onto the Class IE bus at the MCC.
In the _ event of safety injection- only, without loss of offsite power, j power to. the PASS would be uninterupted. This design provides the
' capability.to return powsr to PASS within 30 minutes of a loss of the * ,
normal power supply.
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" The containment isolation valves associated with the PASS are redundant-for all sample _ points and are supplied with diverse Class IE power supplies.- As such, the single failure of any one safety grade power supply <will-not preclude the PASS from obtaining liquid or gaseous samples. The return lines to the containment are also provided with rodundant safety grade isolation valves' powered by diverse, Class IE
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-ITEK f 5 ; . , ~ ' Tarify that valves which are not accessible for repair af ter an accident ore environmentally qualified for the conditions in which they must cperste.
~ SNUP[SDesigns
~ - The-containment isolation valves, both inside and outside the :
ctatainment are class IE and are qualified for all accident conditions.
~ All valves within the sample panel were selected so that they would be-cble to withstand ths' environmental conditions both during normal cperation'and accidents. Use of materials susceptible to radiation was avoided. - All valves were- selected for high reliability and low
- naintenance requirements.
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' ' Provide a procedure -for relating radionuclida gaseous and ionic species to estimate core-damage.- ,
SNUPPS Design: - Radionuclide analysia for containment atmosphere, containnent sump and 3
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rasetor coolant is performed by an-inline intrinsic germanium detector _ ccd associated multichennel' analyzer. A rotating tungsten-alloy ,
, ec111mator :is used to- select the proper sampling geometry for the wide - - range of activities possible. Isotope identification and quantification are performed automatically. The concentration of a particular rcdioactive species in used to evaluate fuel performance during steady
_ ctate operations and transients and to characterize fuel damage during
- Steident conditions. Activated: corrosion. products.-noble gases, halogens. and- casives which are normally present. in the RCS. . originate
_ _ from anticipated stants such as crud bursts. todine spikes or. fuel dafects. They are characterized by_relatively low level radioactivity concentrations. Major fuel: degradation is indicated by the presence of
' - cignificantly higher concentrations of- these species and the presence of . rsf ractory isotopes or . furl-fines. The concentrations of'esch species is related to the amount of fuel degradation-considering dilution
,~ volumes and decay times. Specific procedures and normal operating I cxperience will be used to develop detailed interpretation of l
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radionuclide analysis of the samples.
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l _ ITEM #7tz Istate the design _or operational provisions to prevent high pressure
-_ carrier gas from entering the reactor coolant system from online gas 4--
cualysis; equipment. if it is used.
-SNUPPS Design -
Bigh pressure carrier gases are not used in the SNUPPS design.
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Provide' a method for verifying that reactor coolant dissolved oxygen is ct less than 0.1 ppa if reactor coolant chlorides are determined to be greatier than 0.15 ppa.. _ SNUPPS Desigut
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The-ranges specified for the online equipment are 0.1-20 ppa for the L~ chloride anelyser- and- 0-20 ppa for the oxygen analyser. Therefore the requirement can be met.
ITDI #9: Provide information on (a) testing fL'equency and type of testing to ensure long term operability of the post accident sampling system and (b) operator training requirements for post accident sampling.
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gNUPPS Design: c. The SNUPPS PASS _was designed for d'se during both normal and post
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l accident conditions. The long . term operability of the PASS is 4
;.s assured by performing system operational checka and system - } ,
functional checks intermittently. ,. y
- - . .. . 4 : An operational check shall-verify the ability of the PASS to -f- ! -i --
analyse routine samples. . i _ g A functional check shell verify the ability of the PASS to analyse - c, known-sample concentrations. j
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b. The PASS vendor will provida-initial training of plant personnel
'to indoctrinate.them in the design-and operation of the PASS.- - This training will cover as a minimum.
- System function, requirement, and layout- _
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- Operating procedures, control, and alsras - Maintenance. ,
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Th2_ utility vill provide training of. plant personnel to instruct them in the design and operation of the PASS. This training vill
: cover as a minimum: ' - System function. requircuent, and layout-
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- Operating proceduren. control. and alarms - - Maintenance- *
All personnel using; the PASS will be _ qualified by the utility ia the
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task being performed. - Requalification will occur every two years.
' . . Identif'iention of -online Instrumentation
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The PASS components are designed to function under the expected I
~ enviroamental conditions during an accident. The following is a list of the ppacific components planned for use along with nodal number, but
- equivalent- equipment may be used-in the future.
. - . COMPONENT MAKE AND MODEL i 4 a
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Radioisotopic
[_ Bigh Purity Germanium Jetector Canberra High voltage supply Canberra 3105 -
_, Preamps Canberra 2001 Low LN 9_alara sensor Canberra 1786 <
~ Log Ratematar Tennelec TC595 Analyser ,
Canberra Jupiter-a- Series 80 MCA '
.. Series 60 Chassis 8683A 3 amplifiers /ADC 8623 PEA /LTC
_ - Chemical Analysers '.'.' * Dissolved oxygen Beckman 7002 ,{
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Dissolved hydrogen Teledyne Basings' 225 t Chloride * Orion
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Boron- SAI ; ph _ Beckman 9605 Li Conductivity Beckman RA6X8-
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Oxygen.- Beckman 7002' ,
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Tne safety grada containment atmosphere hydrogen analyzers belong to a
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'diffarent system. They are Consip-Delphi K- H I's.
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SNUPPS sunderoined Nuclese Unit Powse Plant System } 5 Chok e Chef tY Ho.g U 2I* l9 4 Nicholas A. Patrick Rockwille, Maryland 20850 (301) 809401tl - Emecutive Director
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_ ' 3r$HtroidR.Denter, Director ~ l T~~ 7 ~ - " ' Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation I_
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References: 1. SLNRC 84-0074, dated April 24 ~ilps4t u? i N6ub3ect I- ' 2. Safety Evaluatiun Report Relala (o tne bperauon
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_ of Callaway No. a, May 1984Plant Unit No.1, NUREG-0830, SygpgtEIVE
Dear Mr. Denton:
JUL 91984 Reference i provided information to the NRC Staff regardingNMG4AR ENG' lity of the SNUPPS plants - Callaway Plant Unit No.1 and Wolf Creek Generating Station Unit No. 1 - to perform post-accident sampling in accordance with NUREG-0737, Item II.B.3. This issue is a License
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Condition for both SNUPPS plants. Based on the description of the subject review in Reference 2 and on additional discussions with the NRC staff, the need for further information has been identified in order to resolve this issue. Therefore, enclosed are 1) a revised Callaway Plant core damage assessment procedure which is based on a generic Westing-house methodology previously approved by the NRC and 2) additional in-formation regarding the capability of the ShUPPS Post Accident Sampling
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Sg.tum (PASS) to perform in a postulated post-accident environment.
Reference 1 previously addressed related issues regarding operational
; -status of tha PASS and training of personnel for PASS operation.
- The enclosed information, together with the information proviced in Referer.ce ), forms the basis for resolution of the License Condition for
~ Callaway Plant and also for Wolf Creek - pending submittal of a Wolf Creek core damage assessment procedure.
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~ cc: G. L. Koester KGE D. T. McPhee KCPL D. F. Schnell UE J. Neisler/B. Little - USNRC/ CAL H. Bundy-- USNRC/WC-8. t. Forney- USNRC/RIi1 E. H. Johnson USNRC/RIV
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- bec: -F. D.:Crawford KCPL 0. W. Capone UE M. L. Johnson- KGE1 J. A. Bailey KGE/WC
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M. A. Hannah KGE 0.'E. Shafer UE A. C. Passwater- UE S. E. Miltenberger UE/ CAL F. T. Rhodes- KGE/WC J. H. Smith B L. R. Benson U J. O. Cermak liaff _
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Enclosure _1_
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Core Damage Assessment Procedure-Attached is the Callaway Plant procedure for assessing core damage, EDP-II-00005, Rev.-1 _ (The Wolf Creek Generating Station procedure will be submitted at a later date). This procedure is used in conjunction with the plant procedure for obtaining post-accident samples. Guidance
.
for selection of sample locations is provided in the sampling procedure.
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_ _ __ Additional Information Regarding Post Accioent Sampling System (PA$5) Capability
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automated' The system SNUPPS designed topost accident provide immediatesampling system detailed analysis (PASS) is an online(dTn'd ga of liqui samples. The system is capable of analyzing for radionuclides and various chemical species in reactor coolant, containment atmosphere and containment sump samples taken during normal and/or accident conditions.
Sample collection and analysis is possible upon the decision to take a sample. Valving and sample flow control is performed by computer from a control panel located in the health physics area. This area is consider-ed a vital area for which continuous occupancy is assured during acci-dents as described in Section 18.2.2 cf the FSAR.
_ The PASS also can be used to take grab samples by auto ic)or remote manual methods and handle them by semi-remote mahual~iiIethods in the event of f ailure of the on-line system. Redundant sample points are ^ provided with sample isolation valves (i.e., containment isolation valves) powered via class IE redundant circuits to assure sample avail-ab ility.
The on-line sampling capability includas analysis for:
, Liquid Samples (reactor coolant and containment sump):
ANALYSIS RANGE SPECl?lE0 ACCURACY Gross Radioactivity 10-3A Ci/cc to 10Ci/cc Gamma Spectrum Better than a factor of two Isotopic Analysis Boron Contr:nt 0-6500 ppm +2% at 6500 ppm
+5% at 500 ppm T40% at 50 ppm Chloride Content 0.1 to 20 ppm 110%to1 ppm,+0.15below 1 ppm Conductivity 0.1 to 1000 # mhos +1% of full scale -
pH 0-14 70.1 Dissolved Oxygen 0-20 ppm T1% of full scale Dinvlved Hydrogen 0-3000 cc/kg [5% of measured value Gas Samples (containment atmosphere):
,_ ANALYSIS RANGE SPECIFIED ACCURACY Gross Radioactivity 10-7 A Ci/cc to 105 A Ci/cc Better than a factor of two Gamma Spectrum Isotopic Analysis Hydrogen 0-10 Volume Percent Oxygen
+2.5% full scale 0-30 wt % 11% full scale
.
- 2
@
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Page:2.--
The results L of the f actory and _ site . acceptance tests --demonstrate-that specifi_ed. accuracy requirements .are met.
-The methods of analysis f_or samples are:-
- t ANALY SIS--- METHOD Radioisotopic- Gamma Isotopic Analysis : Dissolved Oxygen- Amperometric--(Current flow Proportional
_ to oxygen conc.)
Dissolved Hydrogen Thermal _ conductivity of degassed sample-Chloride- Specific ion-l
~
Boron Neutron absorption-pH Specific ion '~
-Conductivity- . Electrical conductance of the solution -
Gaseous Oxygen Amperometric L~' Radionuclide analysis for containment atmosphere, containment sump and I reactor coolant is performed by an inline intrinsic germanium detector-and associated multichannei analyzer. A rotating tungsten. alloy colli-
"
mator_ is- used to select the proper sampling geometry for the wide range of activities. possibia. Isotope identification and quantification are performed automatically. The concentration of a particular radioactive > species is used to evaluate fuel performance during steady- state opera-tions -and transients and _to characterize fuel damage during accident conditions. The SNUPPS PASS. was manuf actured by Science Applications ;
' , Incorporated-and is comprised of the following analyzers.
' COMPONENT MAKE~AND MODEL #
:
Radioisotopic High Purity Germanium Detector Canberra High Voltage supply Canberra 3105 Preamps Canberra 2001
,-
Low-LN2 _ alarm sensor = Canberra :1786 Log-Ratemeter Tennelec TC595-
:.; Analyzer Canberra Jupiter; Series 80 MCA- '
Se. ries.80 Chassis 8683A 3 amplifiers /ADC 8623 PHA/LTC
~
Chemical Analyzers Dissolved oxygen Beckman 7002
.
Dissolved hydrogen Teledyne -Analytical - 225
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Chloride Orion Model 1617 Boron SAI .Model 804 - pH-. Foxboro ~9 -
'
Conductivity Beckman KA6X8 0xygen Beckman 7003
'- The safety grade' containment atmosphere hydrogen analyzers belong to -a different system. They are Comsip-Delphi K lll's.
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Page 3.
The SNUPPS_ PASS has t een designed to function in both normal and post-accident environments. The radiation detection and analysis system,
-inline chemical analysis components, data aquisition hardware and software, and sample delivery systems are componente that have been -
carefully selected frorn suppliers of products of proven tapability and reliability.
The Orion chloride analyzer was tested with the standard NRC test matrix a:, identified in NRC Post Accident Sampling System NUREG 0737, ll.B.3 Evaluation Criteria Guidelines. The boronmeter employed in the SNUPPS PASS is a fission counter which functions on the principle of neutron absorption and will not be affected by chemical interferences. The
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remaining inline analyzers are of f-the-shelf analyzers widely used in
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the chemical and power i r.d u s t r i e s . Their wide use and acceptance coupled with successful completion of the f actory acceptance testing with the below listed chemical matrixes demonstrates the ability to perform their specific analysis. The SNUPPS PASS was tested during the f actory acceptance tests with the following chemical matrixes:
~
PASS TEST MATRIXEd(l) MATRIX CONSTITUENTS
.
Analysis Matrix #1 Matrix #2, Matrix #1 Matrix #2 Boron 1200 ppm 600 ppm 6.890 gm H 3B03 3.433 gm H 3B03 Chloride 10 ppm 5 ppm 0.0166 gm NACL 8.25x10-3gm NACL pH(2) 4.9 4.4 3.987x10 5gm Na0H , Conductivity 33 umhos 17 umhos In one liter at In one liter at 25'C l 25*C > D02 8 ppm 8 ppm a DH2 5 ppm 5 ppm NOTES: (I) The above sample matrixes possess chemical species (inter-fering ions)- typical of the containment spray additives.
(2) Post-accident liquid samples will typically possess a pH
~
greater than 7. The pH analyzer was tested during the factory acceptance test with buffered solutions of pH 10 with acceptable results.
Based .on the test of the chloride analyzer with the NRC Standerd Test Matrix, it was determincd that the silver chleride (AgCl) sensing element on the chloride electrode can become fouled by extended exposure to traces of iodide ion, l', iodate ion, 103 and possibly other trace constituents of the sample, reagent, and standard solutions. The progress of the fouling is indicated by gradual decrease in the Nernst
- " slope" value. When this occres the analysis is terminated and the system goes into the etch mode. This results in the pumping of etch solution, 1 M ammonium hydroxide and 10 ppm chloride to the Sensor
__ Panel. When the ammonium hydroxide, NH 4 0H contacts the chloride elecrode, the impurities, as well as some silver chloride, are removed
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Page 4.
from the surf ace, resulting in a new electrode surf ace. An electrode
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can be restored over 50 times before actual replacement is recessary.
The SNUPPS PASS is controlled from a panel located in the health physics area which is below grade elevation in the control building. The health physics area is considered a vital area for which continuous occupancy is essured during accidents and has a dose rate less than 0.015 R/hr, as
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described in Section 18.2.2 and figure 18.2-7 of the FSAR. Only in the event of failure of the online system is the operator required to retrieve grab samples from the sampling cabinet for of fline analysis.
The grab sample system is designed so that operator doses will be as low as reasonably achievable and within limits specified in GDC 19. The provisions to minimire personnel exposure while retrieving grab samples are as follows:
-
1. The sample line sizes and component internal volumes were minimized to reduce the amount of radioactivity at the sample l, oanel location.
2. T.e sample can be drewn(automatically by operator selection at the remote panel, thereby_ minimizing" operator time in the
' -
vicinity of the sample.
I l 3. The sample, lines within the sample panel are purged (auto- ) matica11y af ter sampling with demineralized water, or-instru-ment _ air as appropriate, including the connections to the cask and those on the cask itself.
4. Diluted or undiluted samples can be obtained.
5. The casks can be remotely disconnected from the panel.
6. The sample panel is shielded with lead.
7. The undiluted sample casks are heavily shielded and the trans-port cart is electrically powered with an 8 f t control cable to _ maximize distance between the source and the operator.
The design of the PASS is such that radiation sensitive components are removed from the sample panel where feasible and located in a lower radiation environment. Sample lines and holdup volumes were minimized to reduce the activity in the panel. Detailed dose calculations were performed for the sample panel using the high activity sources postu-lated post accident. As a result of these calculations worst case
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integrated doses were calculated for the elec,trical components in the sample panel. In all cases, the total dose to any electrical component was below its damage threshold. All wetted materials in the system were also reviewed in light of the high activity and care was taken to select only those materials suitable for this service.
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Page S. ] The_boronmeter and its associated electronics were included in the dose
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calculation analysis cited above. The large energy release per reaction -
(Neutron in U235) makes it-possible to discriminate the neutron flux in large gamma fields. The boronmeter vendor has determined that the maximum g'amma dose rate (sample and background) to the fission counter -
to be 10 R/hr. This is well within the operational range of the detector. Additionally, the PASS boronmeter was placed in a hot cell to l determine the effect of high gamma fields on the detector. Results ' ' showed thct the dose rates anticipated will not adversely affect the boronmeter's ability to analyze a liquid sample post accident. As a i
- _ result of this analysis and test the boronmeter is considered acceptable for operation in the high gamma fields post accident, i
^
Based on the above mentioned design features, testing and anal / sis, the SNVPPS PASS ha<. demonstrated its ability to adequately provide an , accurate analysis of liquid and gaseous samples under post-accident conditions.
' '
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, _ . The SNUPPS PASS was designed for use during bot;1 normal plant operation and following postulated accidents. The procedures for sample analysis m in a post-accident environment are identical to those used to obtain a PASS sample during normal operation with the exception of the need for additional emphasis on health physics requirements resulting from
~
increased post-accident radiation levels. As discussed above, the PASS instrument accuracies will be maintained within required limits in the post-accident environment. Procedures for sampling in the post-accident
. environment, inwiuding obtaining grab samples, are practiced in conjunc-tion with periodic emergency planning drills. The PASS sampling preced-ures were evaluated and found acceptable during the March 21, 1984 emergency planning drill at Callaway Plant.
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_ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ . - the location of two meters will be accomplished before 5% of power oper-
,
ation is exceeded.
An environmental survey to be conducted in Spring 1984 will complete the un-reviewed items identified in the TER. A report of this survey will be submitted to the NRC before exceeding 5% power. The resolutions to any HEDs found in the environmental survey and a schedule for implementing satisfactory corrective actions will be submitted to the NRC before 5% of power operation is exceeded.
' The staff concludes that satisfactory implementation of accepted control room improvements will minimize the potential for operator error leading to serious
, consequences. These control room modifications will improve the ability of ! "-
nuclear power plant control room operators to prevent accidents, or to cope with accidents if they occur, by improving the information provided to them in the control room of the Callaway Plant. The license will be conditioned to ensure satisfactory resolution of any HEDs found during the environmental survey.
II.B.3 Post-AcciJent Sampling Capability i f Af ter the TMI-2 incident , the need was recognized for an improved post-accident sampling system (PASS) to determine the extent of core degradation following a
^
severe reactor accident. Criteria for an acceptable sampling and analysis system are specified in NUREG-0737, Item II.B.3. The system should have the capability to obtain and quantatively analyze reactor coolant and containment atmosphere samples without radiation exposure to any individual exceeding 5 rem to the whole body or 75 rem to the extremities (GDC 19)-during and following an accident in which there is core degradation. Materials to be , analyzed and quantified include certain radionuclides that are indicators of severity of core damage (e.g. noble gases, isotopes of iodine and cesium, and , nonvolatile isotopes), hydrogen in the containment atmosphere, and total dissolved gases or hydrogen, boron, and chloride in reactor coolant samples.
To comply with NUREG-0737, Item II.B.3, the applicant should (1) review and
-
modify sampling, chemical analysis, and radionuclide determination capabilities as necessary and (2) provide the staff with information pertaining to system design, analytical capabilities, and procedures in sufficient detail to demon-strate that the criteria are met.
By letter dated February 4,1983 the applicant provided additional information i _ on systems, equipment, and procedures to be used for sampling the reactor coolant and the containment at.nosphere following an accident resulting in core , degradation, The PASS provides the capability to obtain and analyze samples
~
within 3 hours of the time a decision is made to sample. Samples can be obtained from the reactor coolant system, containment sumps, and containment atmosphere under accident conditions. The applicant also provided a descrip-tion of radiochemical analysis capabilities including provisions to identify
-
and quantify radioactive isotopes (noble gases, iodine, and cesium isotopes and nonvolatile isotopes). Analysis capabilities are also incorporated for dissolved gases, chloride, and boron concentrations in liquid samples. The PASS also p.'ovides the capability to measure hydrogen concentration in the containment' atmosphere. Sample lines are routed to an accessible area and shielded to protect operators. An isolated auxiliary system is not required
.. to be operational for the PASS to be used. Furthermore, all valves in the high ~ '
Callaway SSER 3 22-5 T
- __ - _ _ _ - _-__ __ - ____--____-____.
I ' radiation sampling system are designed for the environment in which they need to operate. Provisions will also be made to purge the sample lines for reducing plateout, , for minimizing sample loss or distortion, for preventing blockage of i sample lines for disposal of sampies, and for passive flow restrictions, Sufficient shielding will be provided to meet the requirements of GDC 19.
' Radionuclide analysis for containment atmosphere, containment sump, and reactor coolant is performed by an inline intrinsic germanium detector and associated multichannel analyzer. The concentration of a particular radioactive species is used to characterize core damage during accident conditions. However, the
, applicant has not provided core damage estimating procedure to include radiohuclides concentrations and other plant physical parameters as indicators
, , of core damage. Furthermore, the applicant has not provided information to demonstrate procedures and instrumentation of the PASS are applicable in the post-accident water chemistry and radiation environment, and retraining of m
operators on semi-annual basis, The staf f concludes st the PASS partially meets the criteria of Item II.B.3 of NUREG-0737. S n' plicant's proposed methods to meet nine of the criteria are acceptable. T. two criteria that have not been fully resolved are:
" !
Criterion (6) Provide a core damage estimate procedure to include radionuclide
.
concentrations and other physical parameters as indicators of core damage.
Criterion (9) Provide information demonstrating applicability of procedures and instrumentation in the post-accident water chemistry and radiation environment, and retraining of operators on a semi-
annual basis.
Before the plant exceeds 5% power operation, the applicant shall have the PASS installed and operational, and the applicant shall
' ~ (1) shall submit for H30 approval a core damage assessment procedure that incorporates, as a minimum, hydrcgen levels, reactor coolant system pressure, core exit thermocouple temperatures, and containment radiation levels in addition to radionuclide data -
(2) shall demonstrate the applicability of procedures and instrumentation in
" the post-accident water chemistry and radiation environment, and retraining
-
of operatsrs on semi-annual basis i II.D.1 Performance Testing of Boiling Water Reactor and Pressurized Water
,. Reactor Relief and Safety Valves As required by NUREG-0737, Item II.D.1, all PWR licensees and applicants are .,
required to demonstrate that their pressurizer safety valves, power operated relief valves (PORVs), PORV block valves, and all associated discharge piping.
will function adequately under conditions predicted for design-basis transients
.. '"
and accidents. In response to this requirement, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), on behcif of the PWR Owners Group, has completed a full-scale valve testing program, and the Owners Group has submitted these test results
-
to the NRC. Additionally, each PWR plant applicant for an OL was required to 4*
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4. Is this change covered by a CMP RMP, RTR, etc? l[l Yes [[/ No If "yes" provide reference (CMP, RPR, etc.)
5. Is this change evaluated under an existing l /No
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Licensing Impact RevicW (LIR) (APA-ZZ-00140)? l_l Yes , If "yes" provide reference (cmp, RPR, etc.)
If "no" LIR should be completed and attached.
' 6. Description of Change _k_ cMO6 (81Mlfe%eA.Y y bI h8SS Ch(DF'de.
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CALLAwAY - SF . TABLE 7A-3. DATA SFCET 13.1 1 arc'MATORT Cff3DE 1.97 TABLE 2 etcorem8DAT10ws CATECOSY FimFOSC VAAIAsti ' RANCE gecs T. asO.. VARIAPt.E 3s,sa Release assessment. verification seatysis Primary Coolant Crab Sample . E.6.1 Cross Activity 10 yC1/m1 to 10 Ci/e1 E.6.1.1 Camma spectrum (Isotopic Analysis) E.6.2.2 0 to 5,000 ppe E.6.3.3 Baron Cont M Chloride content & 3 to 20 pra E.6.1.4 Dissolved Nydrogen 0 to 2.000 cc(STF)/kg E.6.1.5 or Total Cas8 ' Dissolved Osygen'* O to 20 pra E.6.3.6 pit 1 to 13 E.6.1.7 verification 0 - 6,000 ppe 3 3.1.3 RCS Soluble Doron Concentration 3* Detail analysis, accoetlistement of Analysis of Frimary 10 pcl/gm to 10 C1/gm or mitigatien. verification, long-tete C.1.3 Coolant (Casma Spectrum) TfD-14844 source term in surveillance coolant volume selease essessment. verificatien maatysis Crab Sample Contairseent Air
.
E.6.3 selease assesssent, verification analreas 0 to 30 percent E.6.3.2 Ozygen content Release assesseent. verificataon analysts R. Caussa spectrtan (Isotopic Analysis) E.6.3.3 e" .4 a. . h;
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COffract. 900st CCmfUTER 4 it1NT. NO. VARIAtt.E INDICATOR RECsesiR , IDDIT. iso. CL. IE- FAMER. CL IE FDWEL CL #E
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W sJ-os2 N - - Y Dissolved o=rgen sJ-145 E.6.1.6 I, - SJ-145 W SJ-OS2 N 4
- Y-i { E.6.1.7 78
ufyh thE Ettepht of- CMoride, ggg, pgyggars Ceht t 1.
The Callaway desip includes en inline post-accident sampling system which meets the stated regelrementeT peter to -
Section 18.2.3.2 for details en the system deolyn prtwisione. Samp;es are otrtained from redundant andsemple pointo the reacter with coetent. 4
* ,.
Claes IE isolation velves for the containment atmosphere, the costeirunent recirculatiest suspe, f.
l kD $b* CO Q. Qg-g (pvdeoi- 36 t\0 ' }O$I h c%s - L I y b pearmal on-Ge., c>r g ctn cEsh Scilagtswa w proo' A M5 0
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cat.LAwAY Sr TABLE 7A-3, UATA $!!EET 13.2 3. FECULATORY CUfDE 1.97 TAtt.E 2 FECOPe*ENDATf 0ers . . WARIAf.tE CATECORY tvarosE VARIA81.E RANCE turWT. NO.
Release aseess=ect. eerificatloa emanyete
._-
Crab semple 3'. E.6.2 Samp 10 pC1/m3 to 10 C1/m1 3 E.6.2.1 o Cross Activity (isotopic aalysis) 3 E.6.2.2 o Ceama Spectree 0-4,000 ppe 3 c Soren . at E.6.2.3
L.6.2.4 e Cl.loride Conterit 1 0-20 ppe D e ps 1 to 13 3 E.6.2.5 33, cat.1.AwaY ft. ANT 18I51CN FROWI5 TOMS Emrts CCWT205, ROOM Curu v s s.R VAm1ABLE SANCE SEftSOR/TRANSM1TTER IDENT. NO. VARIABLE INDICATOR BECORDER FANEL Ct IE FAMEt, CL. IE ICENT. 90. CL. IE E.6.2 Sump Crab Seeple
, Centalmeent Recir- See date sheet 13.1 ' - c=1stless ;' .
ECCS Famp Room Samps Wet regoired I?
** Assiliary su11 ding sempe Wot re sired y - ..
b - 338. REMAFES d in Sect 6en Y: Tlee containment recircolation sumpe are sempled by the inline sampling system described en data sheet 13.1 en r.' 'T 3 d operate es described in
** 3e.J.3.2. i 2, 11** 1.CCS Pump reens and aus111ery beilding ommys are provided with Claes 1E level indicat es anProcees [1 Section 9.3.3. to the easiliary buildiseg neraal enhovet systee.
b '. t directly eented seep sempling for the ECCS peep rooms and ess111ery building le come18ered unneceeeery.
The Claes EEblevel indicattee will ilding. sheeld the tI' . , . ..u11 ,r . ~
.~b;! *s 3,
v ,e.and ire.l.ue ,n .efeel,etlee
. t e gm d..ete.ctm re. e any
.. =-n-- . e. t .t coo,ccamelstmd t.ine 12 14
- m e ..erce,le,.akage, the -
valves wlal p r-4. C % % ooraea is no kwyr perG<mect i^~ % " Y & % % *' Ei w swa se. pe<<-wecL m-sn oc bs m we. kl;b -com -w ee.n I. '
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pM6Ma winM g da.9s,
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________ _ ___- _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ dal f 4/. as-CALLAWAy . sp
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The analyses to be pe' ormed by *.he system are listed in the tal;e below, TABLE I1.B.3-1 ANALYSES FOR THE POSTACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM II k_LqRLets Renoea Radioisotopic identification 10*' - 10' uCi/cc eBoron 0 - 6,500 ppm pil 0 - 14 Olydrogen 0 - 2,000 cc/kg l 0xygen 0 - 20 ppm
'4hloride 0.1 - 20 ppm -.
_ Conductivity 0.1 - 1,000 umhos Ganes Ranoen adioiaotopic identification 10*' - 10' pCi/cc Oxygen 0 - 30 wt%
'
difydrogen(2) 0 - 10 volume % l NOTE: (1) Accuracies of the online chemical analyzers will be comparable to those available from commercial grade analyzers.
~
(2) The Containment hydrogen monitor is not part of the SJ-145 Post-Accident Sampling System as are all of the other online analyzers listed in Table 11.B.3-1.
The provisions described below for shielded diluted and undiluted grab sampling and accessibility are
#
- N e at S 62 .
<
The in-line monitoring system is normally isolated however,
~~
it could be manually initiated and operated after an accident.
tJlf *;f.rffy Due to the use of remote in-line monitoring equipment, person- , _ nel exposures are minimized. The expected dose is calcui.ted '
'
to be 450 mrem (whole body) for taking a liquid sample. Thts -
'
dose meets the requirements of NUREG-0737, Section II.B.3 and R.O. 1.97. Provisions have been included for providing both
,
diluted and undiluted grab samples of the reactor coolant, j q containment atmosphere, and the recirculation sump. The grab I ( Q r G C il**'**0e er u le / d ell be p % d ip a * M Ye As.h $ +f,4 it 8
, a u. A ne w A mw. Sa e r/.h # ewadaerr ^*4 W N * "'* M ]
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CALLWAy - SP l l car ples are shielded and the system designed to minimite 10 personnel expesure while obtaining grab carnples. If they are l requared. -
The lanes :,n the sample panci are flushed or purged after each l anslyssa, and all the sarnpled fluida are returned to the , containment. Since the earnple panel is located in the , auxiliary building, any leakage from the system is filtered l through the charcoal adsorber and HEPA filters of the auxiliary building emergency exhaust system (see Section 9.4.3).
The system includes a sarnple control panel, CRT, and The printer, PalD for N These items are located in the counting room.
I the s arnpl e system is included as Figure 10.2-15 (M-22sJ04).
Accessibility of the auxiliary building to obtain a grab sample and start the postaccident sampling system was addressed in a secti detailed shi
.
A ditional details on the postaccident sarnpling system design were submitted to the 11RC by letters dated February 4, 1903 7 (SLNRC 03-07), April 24, 1904 (SLliRC 84-74), and June 21, 1984 (SLNRC 04-94). Chlor ide 60eni ib ne loger, perfor enceL 63 * b e. .r fer { e et r 4t ,o r n.rt I^'l % 10.2.3.3 UJLgunio% con h.
eqc n oct, h, -fw c sue. will lig co,s ada 9 ps:do tew 3
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The postaccid tsahl g Iets t.nI recomme$da- ;
-
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- tions of Item !!.D.3 of HUREG-0737.
.
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Rev. OL-$ 18.2-2$ 6/91
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NUCLEAR SAFETY EVALUATION FOR FSAR SP CN# 94 05 EVALUATION APPLICABLE TO: . This safety evaluation is npplicable to FSAR SP Change Notice #94 05.
. INTRODUCTION This Nuclear Safety Evaluation is being completed to address FSAR CN #94 05 which
,
removes the requirement to perform an in line PASS chloride analysis within 24 hours.
Instead, Callaway will be committed to have a RCS sample be analyzed for chloride by an offsite laboratory within four days.
Chloride analysis is not critically important to ,he mitigation of an accident at Callaway 1-~ Plant per guidance in NUREG 0737, Item II.D.3, Clarification #5, which states:
"The time for a chloride analysis to be performed is dependent upon two factors: (a)if the plants coolant water is seawater or brackish water and (b) if there is only a single barrier between primary containment systems and the cooling water.
Under both of the above conditions the licensee shall provide for a chloride analysis within 24 hours of the sample being taken. For all other cases, the licensee shall provide for the analysis to be completed within 4 days. The chloride analysis does not have to be done onsite."
Callaway does not meet the conditions for the 24 hour sample. Therefore, there is no
'
need to maintain the capability for immediate and remote RCS chloride analysis. The analysis of the RCS for chloride is considered a recovery action to ensure long term system integrity. Elevated concentrations of chloride in the RCS will not cause immediate
: failure of the RCS piping. Procedures are in place to ensure the RCS chloride analysis will be completed by an ofl' site laboratory within 4 days as required by this regulation.
- EFFECTS ON THE ACCIDENTS EVALUATED AS THE DESIGN BASIS
. , .
The change in PASS RCS chloride analysis mentioned above will not cause Callaway Plant to exceed the analyzed accidents presented in FSAR 15.7.2 and the consequences or
-
probability of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased. Since the Post Accident Samp!ing Systemis not a safety related system,it will not compromise any safety related equipment and the probability or consequence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased.
. _ __ _-__
'
l
.
!
,
POTENTI AL FOR CREATION OF A NEW TYPE OF UNANALY?.ED EVENT The change in PASS RCS chloride analysis mentioned above wi;l not create the possibility of an accident different than previously evaluated in the ?SAR Section 15,7.2. The Post Accident Sampling System is not safety related nor willit compromise any safety related equipment. Elevated chloride :oncentrations in the hCS will not cause an immediate failure of the primary system piping. Therefore, the possibility of a malfunction of equipment impor1 ant to safety of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be created IMPACT ON Tile MARGIN OF SAFETY No acceptance limits will be affected by the change in PASS RCS chloride analysis.
SAFETY EVALUATION CONCLUSION No unreviewed safety question exists as a result of this change in sampling.
10 CFR 50.59 REPORT SUMMARY The change in PASS RCS chloride analysis to be completed by an ofTsite laboratory within 4 days as allowed by NURE0 0737 will not adversely affect the environment or the public because elevated RCS chloride is considered a recovery action to ensure long term system integrity and the analysis is not immediately necessary to mitigate the consequence of an accident.
.
* ** %
4
- - -- - - . - -- - -
'
.. l ' *. , ' f(?k h , Document FSAR SP / e 94-23 i $ 9AI,1.AWAY PLAf1I k j ERLMARY LICEt3ST11G DOCUMEtlT
-
gnArict roR3 1.I
' / b C 1L_bC_ Da t e _(, 94 2. Document and section(s) FSA R ~T~ab le., ~7 A - l .
_$ hic 7A-% G.ocl Sedion 1%,3.3.D[ Table,,
._,IE,G.3-1 -
3. References WQQEG O~la7 REG, Guice 1.91
_lgttee % G L 9arvto. inh \ L% LF-%-W \ ckde-et., i
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l 4. In this chango covered by a CMP, RMP, RFR, ete? ][l Yes
~
lgno If "yes" provide referenco (CMP, RFR, etc.)
5. Is this change evaluated under an existing ~ Licensing Impact Review (LIR) (APA-ZZ-00140)? l_l Yes lMio If "yes" provido reference (CMP, RFR, etc.)
If "no" LIR should be completed and attached.
6. Description of Change ,$gGQ()e5 thC, 9 A% in-(l A6 tr1&rneAt er k% pH : ('oAhfidig atnd OS'$of>') cincL CeMatrwne wt cL+ntosphere omgen . " 7. Justification see_., %e, clitoeked borew<11 Cp bCLheJk Etkd.tACL4ibn .
. .
_(attach extra page _ necessary) W i8.
, Originating Department Head Approval bkdL~ /
-
j 9. Concurrence with Need for Change Approved # Rejected Ah Y l$ Responsible'Depa#rtment Head Dato __7 -
.
__
._.
Page 1 of 1 CA-#667 11-29-93 _ APA-ZZ-00020 APA-ZZ-0010B
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roRMAL SATETY EVALUAT70N COVER SHEET 1. Evaluation applicable to: F8 A A SP G.N* 9' -23 2. U OUTSIDE AGENCY SATETY CVALUAT10N ATTACHED Y, VNION ELECTRIC SAFETY EVALUAT!oN 2.1 May the proposed activity increase the consequences of an accident evaluated previously in the r$AR7 _ Yes No L /' j 2.2 May the proposed activity increase the probability of occurrence of an accident evaluated previously in the TSAR 7
. . .
Yes No b '# 2.3 May the proposed activity increase the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated previously in the TSAR 7
-,
Y e '. No L'# 2.4 May the proposed activity increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated previously in the TSAR 7 Yes No.ldI 2.5 May the proposed activity create the possibility of an accident of a different type than any evaluated previously in the r$AR7 .j Yes No V_ 2.6 May the proposed activity create the possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety of a
,
different type than any evaluated previously in the TSAR 7 , f Yes No V 2.7 Does the proposed activity reduce the margin of safety as determined in the basis for any Technical specification? / Yes No */_ 3.0 SAFETY EVALUATION CONCLUSION
^
Based upon the results of this Formal Safety Evaluation, the change L/$DoesnotinvolveanUnreviewedsafetyQuestion.
Involves an Unteviewed Safety Question.
-.
4.0 APPROVALS 4.1 Responsible Engineer , -
* W Date_7,/[#!W.
-
,
4.2 Qualifled Reviewer 8.t-f8*- M " - ., Date 07/d//f 4/ 4.3 Approved By: _A . .' _/ - /- Date _7/7/)V
.. ( ' '
Deparcment' Head As defined in-APA-Et-00140
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Page 3 of 1 CA-81340 ' . 08-21-92 APA-tE-00140
.-
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NUCLEAR SAFETY EVALUA*IlON FOR FSAR SP CN# 94 23 EVALUATION APPLICADLE TO: This safety evaluation is applicable to FSAR SP Change Notlec# 94 23.
INTRODUCTION l This Nuclear Safety Evaluation is being completed to address FSAR CN# 94 23 which _ removes the requirement to have the in line capability to perform reactor coolant pli, ' conductivity, dissolved oxygen and gross activity, containment sump pH and gross activity and containment atmosphere oxygen during accident conditions. The requirement to have
'
these in line instruments as part of the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS)is being removed from FSAR, Sections 7A and 18, since they are not required by NUREO 0737
,
and since they are difficult to maintain. The capability for in line gross activity will remain although the requirement will be removed from the FSAR. Orab sample capability will exist for each of the sample points and if dose rates allow it, esch of the ana'yses can be perfonned in the Callaway llot Lab.
These analyses are not critically important to the mitigation of an accident at Callaway.
. Conductivity, pli, oxygen and gross activity are not required by the EOP's or the EAL's.
i Reactor engineering does not require these specific parameters to determine the degree of core damage nor are they required to ensure system lntegrity.
EFFECTS ON TIIE ACCIDENTS EVALUATED AS TIIB DESIGN DASIS The removal of the requirement for the in line instrumentation discussed above will not cause Callaway Plant to exceed the analyzed accidents previously presented in FSAR
-
Section 15.7.2 and the consequences or probability of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased. Since the Post Accident Sampling System is not a safety q related system, it will not compromise any safety related equipment and the probability or
-
consequence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the
' FS AR will not be increased. These instnaments are not required by Callaway Plant for mitigation of a design basis accident as evaluated in the FSAR.
~ POTENTIAL FOR CREATION OF A NEW TYPE OF UNANALYZED EVENT r The removal of the capability for in line analysis as described above will not create the possibility of an accident difTerent than previously evaluated in the FSAR Section 15.7.2.
The Post Accident Sampling System is not safety related nor willit compromise any safety
'
related equipment. A change in pit, conductivity, oxygen or gross radioactivity will not cause an immediate failure of the primary system piping. Therefore, the possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety of a different type than previou:ly evaluated _
..
en-e O
_. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ in the FSAR will not be created. As mentioned above, these instruments are not used for detection or mitigation of any abnormal event at Callaway Plant.
. IMPACT ON TiiE MARGIN OF SAFETY No acceptance limits will be aEccted by the change in the capability for performing these in line PASS analyses.
SAFETY EVALUATION CONCLUSION
^
No unreviewed safety question exists as a result of the change to remove the requirement to perform in line PASS pli, conductivity, oxygen and cross activity.
10 Ct. 30.59 REPORT SUbiMARY The change in the capability of the Callaway Post Accident Sampling System to remove the requirements for in line analysis of pli, conductivity, oxygen and gross activity will not adversely afect the erwironment or the public because they are not necessary to ensure system integrity and the analyses are not necessary to mitigate the consequences of an accident. None of these analyses are required by NUREO 0737, Section 18.2.3.1, which addresses the guidance for Post Accident Sampling Systems.
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CALLAwAy ,. 3p bMN QNe f gw TAB!J 7A-1 (Sheet 6)
!
DATA VARIABLE SUMMARY IDENT. NO. VARIABLE SMEET NO.
E.3.2.1 o All Identified Plant Release Points 12.5 (except steam generator safety relief valves or atmospheric steam dump valves and condsnser air removal l system exhaust). Sampling with Onsite Analysis Capability E.4 Environs Radiation and Radioactivity ., s Radiation Expcaure Meters (continuous
'
E.4.1 17.1 indication at fixed locations)
'
E.4.2 Airborne Radiohalogens and Particulates 17.2
. (portable sampling with onsite analysis capability)
E.4.3 Plant and Envirens Radiation (portable 17.3 instrumentation) E.4.4 Plant and Environs Radioactivity 17.4 (portable instrumentation) .
)
E.5 Meteorology
+
E.5.1 Wind Direction 17.5 E.5.2 Wind Speed 17.5 ;
'
E.5.3 Estimation of Atmospheric Stability 17.5 : f
*
E.6 Accident sampling capability (Analysis ,.
,,
capability on Site) p E.6.1 P imary Coolant _ 13.1 g
' - S 6.1.1 0 ha = = teti"4+y -
10.1-E.6.1.2 o- Gamma Spectrum 13.1
[
13.1
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f E.6.1.3 o Boron Content
'
E.6.1.4 o Chloride Content 13.1
'
E.6.1.5 o Dissolved Hydrogen or Total Gas 13.1
.
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o w e~ wev , g v .y . . CALLAWAY - $P
i TABLE 7A-1 (3heet 7) DATA
*
VARIABLE SUI 9%RY < I DE1!T . NA
-
4- ~ w YARJABL ,E
--
f W{EET No,,, $1 ;
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~ E.6.2 Sump 13.2 w;; . ',, . 2 .1 s 'J r e n .".c t iv i t y 15 ' E.6.2.2 o camma Spectrum 13.2
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E.6.2.3 o Boron Content 13.2 E.6.2.4 o Chloride Content 13.2
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E.6.3 Containment Air E.6.3.1 o Hydrogen content 6.4 ; 2.5,;.; . ^ y;r- "--ted 1?_' C.6.3.3 o camma Spectrum 13.1
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TABLE 7A-3. DATA ssEET 13.1 i 1. 1sGtitATORY CUIDE 1.97 TABE 2 RECarWEhmmTitnes i .,. e$ ,_ , i k- vnai AftLE.
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/; roerr. wo. vam AeLE mamoE Ceomr rCaras 4 e- yV
'35.**
v WNRelease r We j. E.6.) ' crieery Coolant Crab sample- esA3ement. wetification analysio [ 2.0.;.; w Activity In pufwa -- ZM" * E.6.1.2 Camme SpectJNm (Isotopic Amelysia) , ! E.6.1.3 - Borsa Contee*. O to 6.000 pre
.
E.6.1.4 Chloride Content 0 to 20 pro E.6.1.5 Dissolved nydrogen 0 to 2.000 ce(sTF)/kg 1 , or Total cas**
**
2.5.: i ; . ^. l , . v w... , ,,,, -- t *- .- g --
.-
I 3.3.3 RCE Soluble Boron 0 - 6,000 ppm 3 verificatics.
Concentration j *
' l C.1.3 Analysis of Primary le pCi/p to 10 Ci/p or 38 Detail analysis, accomplishment of Coelant (Gamma spectruis) T1D-14044 source term in sitigation, verification. Icag-term coolant volume surveillance t l E.6.3 containment Air Crab Sample selease x _n _ t. werification analyste
_i.??' __
" *""_- -
' ' - - ca __ _....--8"--*'- '-'-
l- f I E.6.3.3 Camme Spectrum (footapic Analyele) caleese eseeemment, verification analysie l h) u, A A A A A- ^_ _A A % , a m v1j f $N
- hin t-
-
v6.
g;5 - , r ur,. t s37 -- i hy y,. i ' b. We ,' NOS Dev. CL-@ bw: .x; wag
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T w+ ,w w r-w w- W D A-+ m . - , - - , , * t--1- c' - - -e M+
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, car r maat? - cr TABf2 7A-3, DATA SMEET 13.1 (Contissed)
+ II. CA1.tAndnY PLAstr DESIGN PROVISIONS
-
I i l { g VARIABLE 3 DENT. 300. VARIABtX EDFIS i RAIItX SENSw W SMITTER CCETROL ROOP! C0mFUTER i
:D I '
INDICATOR RECORDER . IDENT. NO. Ct. IE PAffEL CL. IE FAf8EL CL. I E.
q ^ v =
~ r x f
g ' ut t es=== Ae* < 4 * -- g _. _ a-. --
;;; r e T-os ? w
_ rm-*
- ' .....s.4 ,
E.6.1.2 Camme Spect.rms . l E.6.3.3 t
l l E.6.1.3 Boron Content A
. * i.0.2 e 11--
- ^ ^
-
'
i Chloride Content f,: , E.6.1.4 SJ-145 N SJ-042 s - - Y [ E.6.1.5 Dissolved spydrogen SJ-145 N SJ-082 N - - Y
. M .;.- ..==o4*.ad Osyges ;. ^=; a - ' * * -
- - * i
.
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-
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'
!!1. RERARKS A A.. A t
1.
T,he e.tio.Callowey 1. 2.2. de,sigra1., e i.nclah u m enm i>'ine m - ipost-accident c ,r sampling isi . system wtnich 1- .re meets et.- tro. the re stated.regairements.
Class E isolation valves for tu ca.:. stain- c atmosphere. the containment recirculation susps, and the reactor cuotant.
--at . 1. ,oints m e, Refer to A r. ! . i k ' 1 . , e I ! *
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b f V-r- i 1 4.!
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-- _ . _ _ _ _ ____ - - _ _ - - _ _ _ - _ _ _ . _ _
.
' '
g j j , I { ! l L 1- I I # '
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CALLAWAY - SF
, TABLE 77.-3. DATA SHEET 13.2 3. RECUT.ATVRY CUIDE 1.97 TABt.E 2 RECCOW43 OAT 10NS k VARIABLE IDENT. NO. VARIABLE Q RANCE CATECORY FtTRPOSE E.6.2 Sump .
38.88 Release aseessment. serificatnon an=tysis e t ,, . , - - m-.a r._ ;; g;jg g ;; ;;fg , O k E.6.2.2 o Cassee Spectrium (isotopic analysis) 3 E.6.2.3 o Boron content 0-6,000 ppe 3 E.6.2.4 o Chloride Content 0-20 ppm 3 5"O' : ;T !^: !? - g 31. CALLAWAY PLAltT DEsiCW PRovistostS VARIABLE Earls IDENT. 380. VARIABLE RJ 4CE SENSOR /TRAllSMITTER COOFFROf. M N INDICATOR RECORDER IDENT. NO. Cf.. IE FAMEL Ct.. IE FAMEL CL. IE
.
E.6.2 Sump crab Sample contairusent Recir- See data sheet 13.1 colation ECCS Fump Room Sumps Not required Auxiliary Building Sumpe Not required I1I. REMARKS 3. The containment recirculation sumps are sampled by the inline sampling systeur described ca data sheet 13.1 and in Section 38.2.3.2.
2. The ECCS peg roe:s and auxiliary build sumpe are provided with Claes IE level indication and operate ao described in
; Section 9.3.3. Process and effluent mon tors provide indication of any airborne activity in these eumpe since they are L directly vented to the auxiliary building mornnel enhemet system.
c+ 3. Sump sampling for the ECCS pump rooms and ammiliary building is considered unnecessary. " The Claes 1E level indication will i . detect any accumulated leakage, and the isolation volves will prevent its discharge from the auxiliary building. Should the leakage be from a 11oe that contains fluid from the recirculation sump, the recirculation og sample will provide the
'
i. rew ___f;d analyses, since the fluid is from the sanne source.
(1.
y. , f .e n 5, * p . .,
~ . . -.
I ,1 :' Rev. OL-0 L,([, ,. 6/96
*
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_
,
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CALLAWAY - SP The analyses to be performed by the system are listed in the table below.
TABLE 11.D.3-1 III ANALYSES FOR THE POSTACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM Mguide Rancee Radioisotopic identification 10*' - 10' uC1/cc Boron 0 - 6,500 ppm )b -
!
(# -
-P" Hydrogen 0 - 2,000 cc/kg l
.. N y;en ^ - 20-pp- , l Chloride 0.1 - 20 ppm c r.Setivity A1 1 000 ;c.;: Gases Ranoes Radioisotopic identification i 10~' - 10' WCi/cc ' ')
'
\ n _ s n u t v.,
,
'
i * - - - Hydrogen (2) 0 - 10 volume % l HOTE: (1) Accuracies of the online che91 cal analyzers will be comparable to those available L.om commercial grade analyzers. ,
. (2) The Containment hydrogen monitor is not part of the -
SJ-145 Post-Accident Sampling. System as are all of ' the other online analyzers listed in Table II.B.3-1. I The provisions described below for shielded diluted and undiluted grab sampling and accessibility are
'
not applicable to this monitor however, redundant monitors exist as described in Section 6.2.5.2.2.3.
The in-line monitoring system is normally isolated: however, _ it could be manually initiated and operated after an accident.
Due to the use of remote in-line monitoring equipment, person-
- nel exposures are minimized. The taxpecte.d dose is calculated to be 450 mrem (whole body) for taking a liquid sample. This dose meets the requirements of NUREG-0737, Section II.B.3 and R.G. 3.97. Ptsvibions have been included for providing both diluted and undiluted grab samples of the reactor coolant, [
containment atmosphere, and the recirculation sump. The grab
-
Rev. OL-5 18.2-24 6/91 ..A
!
,
. ,.d
' : .u;'- t * , j;jh]:;d
_ O M
. .
CALLAWAy - SP l J-samples are shielded and the system designed to minimizeIf they are personnel ex ocure while obtaining grab samples.
' T
- --4gi. ed .
W M N C- W C @ A loi k$ M & b M ' D
# b pblW % hthe,6%d., th; d:pir pr*1 are flushed or purged after each Te $4=--
l
" sampled fluids are returned to the AQ "an a l y s i s ,;iuwd ' 'Since containment. the sample panel is located in the auxiliary building, any leakage from 3e system is filtered l through the charcoal adsorber and HEPA filters of the auxiliary building emergency exhaust system (see Section 9.4.3).@NdM ad The system includes a sample control panel, WLhic.h]4
., _._ 7.ir.tcr.
- n located in the counting room. The P&lD for
]e- =
Th e; iter: the^ sample system is included as+ Figure 18.2-15 A (M-22SJ04).
D; 1 Accessibility of the auxiliary building to obtain a grab sample
-
and start the postaccident sampling system van addressed in a ~ detailed shielding study (See section 18.2.2).
Additional details on the postaccident sampling system design were submitted to the NRC by letters dated February 4, 1983 (SLNRC B3-07), April 24, 1984 (SLNRC 84-74), and June 21, 1984 (SLNRC 84-94), 18.2.3.3 Conclusion
.
The postactident sampling system design meets the recommenda-tions of Item II.B.3 of HUREG-0737.
c s J.
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. M-18.2-25
.. .a G/91
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-
MW
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ,, ,, , O.ill. AWAY Pl. ANT M 'O PRIMARY LICENSING DOCUMENT CHANGEFORM 1. Originator: John D. Blevins 2. Document and section(s): FSAR Sections 18.3.2.2 & 18.2.3.2 3. References: RMP 94 2005A. SOS 97 271. SLNRC S3 07, SLNRC 84 74
- SLNRC 84 94, NRC 197005.
,
,
_ 4. Is this change covered by a CMP, RMr, RFR, ete? Oyes @ No l- If"yes provide reference (CMP, RFR, etc.) , 5. Is this change evaluated under an existing Licensing impact Review '
(LIR)(APA ZZ-00140)? Oyes @ No -
If"yes" provide reference (CMP, RFR, ete.)
If"no" LIR should be completed and attached.
> 6. Description of Change: Add wording to FSAR SP Section 18.2.3.2 stating that the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) in no longer computer controlled. The system is now manually controlled by a push button control panel located in the Count Room.
Delete wording "and the Post Sampling System (PASS)" from FSAR SP Section 18.3.2.2.
.-
.
7. Justification: RMP 94-2005A removed the computer control of the PASS. The system is now controlled using a manual control panel. This FSAR change notice upd ite* Ine ' FS AR to state the system is now manually controlled.
e4
-
(attach extra pages as necessary)
'
8. Originating Department Head Approval b U.) . MwA, gVS//y/1'/ ' ' _ 9. Concurrence with Need for Change Approved # Rejected d- Date l97 Responsible Department Head
-
CA-#667 02/05/96 _ APA-ZZ-00020 Pace 1of1 APA-ZZ-00108
,
FSAR CN d h7"O)O SR - NSR y C ALLAWAY PLANT PRIMARY LICENSING DOCUMENI CHANGE FORM ES W Review of Proposed Chances
'
Review Due Date 4 4[17
'
Reviewed by Date
'
Regulatory Operations Engineer J /[ [4J/ 4/ /y/17 Supv. Eng., Regulatory Operations bf d yffy/97
,
UENO
'
Quality Assurance , a
"
UENE avkk e J -/d -97 Others . _ _ , , . _ , , CTS engineer review CTS Display Report attached.
Approval of Proposed Chances Approval Date - Supv. Eng., Regulatory Operations DM /= _ Y/2 9/f 7
'
Manager, Licensing and Fuels 84M ue /2h/f7 Manager, Quality Assurance
' (Safety Related changes only) >
ORC Chairman (Manager Callaway Plant) f cul/c1 '
,, (FPP Changes, Unreviewed Questions) /
NSRB Chainnan (Manager, Licensing and Fuels) ,
(FPP Changes, Unre.iewed Questions) .- Others (specified by Manager, Licensing and Fuels)
Manager, Nuclear Engineering
. (Table 3.2-1 changes)
Regulatory Operatic,s Engineer signoff: k, [ - d f [97 _. Review of final package for completeness.
CRIDRs (CA-#1571) submitted.
.-
- CA-#667A
__ 11/01/95 m. i nr i FDP.ZZ 00100
CALLAWAY PLANT ORC REVEW TRANSMITTAL FORM ' TO ORC Clerk Date: .f[Js /17 WOM E4 NA HL Depa ment: ,.ffGlA t.n?M e/E/Anw1 (Print Name) , it is hereby requested that ORC resiew and recommend approval of.
Document Name: _ $# Acc4/<# Cempdy_ f g en Document ID: I'f/M dAl M 'I7- d2 O Rev. No:
-
COMMITMENT DAT]E mIB/97 /~fA - e e4p 4 /c _ NOTE: This is the last date that ORC can review and still meet a license or - administrative cornmitment. - RECORD OF ORC REVEW 14 3D 4 I
~
Meeting Number: 15043 Date: Recommended Disposition: Approve as submitted h Closed
"
Approve as modified 0 ' _.
Reviewed 0 Reviewed not reportable ~ Disapprove as submitted 0 (Return to Responsible Individual with comments) Conunents: c
. . .
.. . sp ORC Clerk: Date: '3b " - Distribution:
Requesting Individual w/o attachment
-
CAJ92
. Pageiof1 02/03/95
_ APA ZZ-00091
. . - - ,.- - - - .-_---
. _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _
FSAR CN # h7'O2O SR - NSR y Call. AWAY PL Ab_"[ PRIMARY LICENSING DOCUMENT CHANGE F0J1M FSAR Review of Proposed Changes Review Due Date 4,[g[<y7 Reviewed by Date Regulatory Operations Engineer _f/[ $ J/ ///f/f7 Supv. Eng., Regulatory Operations bd yff7/97 UENO Quality Assurance , n
:, ..
UENE figtlY)$_me 3 -lN ~97
,,
Others
.
CTS engineer resiew CTS Display Report attached.
6pproval of Proposed Chance.1 _ Approval Date M idgm ~ Supv. Eng., Regulatory Operations l
=Y/2 9/f 7 Manager, Licensing and Fuels gdMbea dh/f 7 i Manager, Quality Assurance ~ , (SafetpRelated changes only)
ORC Chairman (Manager Callaway Plant) ,_
(FPP Changes, Unreviewed Questions)
NSRB Chairman (Manager, Licensing and Fuels)
(FPP Changes, Unreviewed Questions) ~ -
Others (specified by Manager, Licensing and Fuels) Manager, Nuclear Engineering -
- (Tat 3.21 changes)
Regulatory Operaticas Engineer signofE
~ -
Review of final package for completeness.
CRIDRs (CA-#1571) subnutted.
_
-
CA-#667A
-'
11/01/95 _ , _ , - ....,
FSAR CN d h 7'OdO SR- - NSR y CALLAWAY PLANT PRIMARY LICENSING DOCUMENT CHANGE FORM FSAR Review of Proposed Changes
. '
Review Due Date 97 ! _ Reviewed by Date . Regulatory Operations Engineer ! '
,,
Supv. Eng., Regulatory Operatiens ! UENO 8OdN. N/J v-/ M 7 ' _ Quality Assurance , fr7 UENE ~bu!hf m+ J -/d -97 Others _ CTS engineer review _ CTS Display Report attached. _
Acoroval of Proposed Changes Approval Date Supv. Eng., Regulatory Operations
.
Manager, Licensing and Fuels
'
Manager Quality Assurance
,, (Safety-Related changes only) '
ORC Chairman (Manager Callaway Plant)
'
s (FPP Changes, Unreviewed Questions) NSRB Chairman (Manager, Licensing and Fuels)
(FPP Changes, Unreviewed Questions) ~
Others (specified by Manager, Licensing and Fuels) Manager, Nuclear Engineering
- (Table 3.2-1 changes) ,
Regulatory Operations Engineer signcff:
-
Review of final package for completeness.
CRIDRs (CA-#1571) submitted.
_
~
_ CA-#667A 11/01/95
-
- + w
FSAR CN # h7'O20 SR - NSR y I CALLAWAY PLANT PRIM ARY LICENSING DOCUMENT C_HANGE FORM FSAR Review of Proposed Chances
'
Review Due Date '/ V /9 7
,.
_ Reviewed by Date Regulatory Operations Engineer
. , ,
Supv. Eng., Regulatory Operations UENO ,w I/M/7
,
Q5ality Assurance .cI[ziow Nod [ 4/N/f7
; UENE ,taa h m n 3 ~/4 ~97 Others
-, CTS engineer review
- CTS Display Report attached __ M/A Nb ' MM # 8% b
[*4l2417 n :
Approval of Proposed Chanees M $ 4[24/[#7 .
. Approval _
Date l
- . Supv. Eng., Regu!atory Operations
Manager, Licensing and Fuels l
'j.
Manager, Quality Assurance i
, (Safety-Related changes only)
,
'
ORC Chairman (Manager Callaway Plant) ;
-- (FPP Changes, Unreviewed Questions)
NSRB Chairman (Manager, Licensing and Fuels) '
(FPP Changes, Unreviewed Questions)
_ Others (specided by Manager, Licensing and Fuels) Manager, Nuclear Engineering
- (Table 3.2-1 changes) , ,
Regulatory Operations Engineer signoff:
-
Review of final package for completeness.
, CRIDRs (CA-#1571) submitted. ! _
~ ~
CA-#667A 11/01/95
. - . . . , u. ,, a CALLAWAY - SP 8,3.12 samples are shielded and the system designed to minimize ,. personnel exposure while obtaining grab samples, if they are - requircd.
~ Sample lines in the system have the capability of being flushed or purged after each analysis. All sampled fluids are returned
-
to the containment. Since the sample panel is located in the auxiliary building, any leakage from the system is filtered through the charccal adsorber and HEPA filters of the auxiliary building emergency exhaust system (see Section 9.4.3). . The system includes a sample control panel, which is operated from and located in the counting room. The P&ID for the sample
, ,
system is included as Figure 18.2-15 (M-22SJ04).
Accessibility of the auxiliary building to obtain a grab sample _ and start the postaccident sampling system was addressed in a detailed shielding study (See Section 18.2.2) . Additional details on the postaccident sampling system design were submitted to the NRC by letters dated February 4, 1983
, (S LNRC 8 3 - 07 ) , April 24, 1984 (SLNRC 84-74), and June 21, 1984 (SLNRC 84-94) AChloride content is no longer performed by In-une analysi5. The analysis will be performed on-site or by an offsite facility contracted to prov-de results within 4 days.
Primary coolant dissolved oxygen conductivity and ph; and containment atmosphere oxygen content are no longer performed by in-line analyses. These analyses are not required to be monitored by NUREG-0737.
Analysis of containment sump pH is not required by NUREG-0737.
Gross activity measurements by direct count or calculated groes
- activity based on gamma isotopic analysis of sump grab samples-are both acceptable means of determining gross activity.
.
$ 18.2.3.3 Conclusion n The postaccident sampling system design meets the .
,
_
; recommendations of Item II.B.3 of NUREG-0737. , . $nSeN
pc
._
The automated computer control of the post accident sampling system
~
has been replaced with a mamtal push-button control panel located in the counting room. - W
. - -. _, - - Rev. OL-8 . - - - - < , /o c
# '#' ' ' ~^~
CALLAWAY - SP s e. 3. 2. 2
-
The EOF working space is sufficient for at least 35 persons,
^
consisting of 25 persons designated by the licensee including state and local officials, 9 persons from the NRC and one person from FEMA. The structural design of the EOF is in conformance to the Uniform Building Code. Walls are concrete, approximately 10 inches thick and the roof consists of double-T pre-cast concrete sections with a minimum concrete thickness of approximately 6 inches. The structure provides radiation shielding equivalent tb a protection factor greater than 5.
The HVAC system for the EOF is similar to that of the TSC, except it contains only HEPA and no charcoal filters.
Radiation monitoring in the EOF is the same as described for the TSC.
Electric power for the EOF is normally provided by a transformer from offsite power. In addition there is a dedicated standby diesel-generator to operate the EOF in the event of loss of offsite power. The standby diesel generator is started manually, utilizing dedicated standby power. As in the TSC, the computer and communications systems are each provided with a Uninterruptible Power Supply. Emergency lighting consisting of self-contained battery units is also provided in the EOF.
In the event the EOF becomes uninhabi table, a backup EOF will be established in the offices of the Union Electric Region West Headquarters Building at 101 Madison St., Jefferson City, MO.
Jefferson City is located approximately 25 miles southwest of the plant site.
Technical Data
~ ,
T e Emergency Resoonse Facil_ity Informati_on Sy_ stem (ERFIS f receives data f rom th7 Balance of Plant 'Co3ptite'r (BOP)g.nd th:4 Pos ?~v dcnt Sam-1.ng /oter (PASS}7R System displa s,
,,,
in in splays, trYncs a. a 1storical values are
-
0; available for all major plant systems. ERFIS displays and g printers are available in the TSC and EOF.
The Radiological Release Information System (RRIS) provides radiological and meteorological data as well as trending, plume tracking and dose assessment capabilities. CRT Displays are located in the Control Room, TSC, Health Physics Access Area, EOF
..
and BOP Computer Room.
The Safety Parameter Display System is available to aid operators in the rapid detection of abnormal operating events. SPDS displays are available in the Control Room and TSC.
.
Task Functions for the TSC and EOF _ Refer to Section 18.3.1.2
.
- M
-- .-. - - - _ - - . .- - _ . _.- .
LICENSING IMPACT REVIEW (1) TH!S REVIEW IS APPLICABLE YO FSA R CN 97-020 in Ansu rring the Following Questions. Rejbr to Attachment 4 ofAPA-ZZ-00140, (2) 10CFR 50,59 APPLICABILITY (2.1) O No Safety Evaluation Screening Required, (Refer to Attachment 4 of APA ZZ-00140, justh your findings in Section 7, and proceed to Section 3)-
(2.2) O Outside Safety Evaluation (Attach CA-#1340 and proceed to Section 5) (2.3) SAFETY EVALUA TION SCREENING
'
(2.3.1) Yes Q No O A proposed change to the facility as described in the FSAR? (2.32) Yes O No Q A change to procedures as described in the FSAR? (2.3.3) Yes O No e A test or experiment not described in the FSAR? (2.3.4) Yes O No O An Operabihty Evaluation performed per procedure EDP ZZ-04015 which concluded that the affected systems, structures, or components were or are operable as defined by the Technical Specifications? (2.3.5) Yes O No O A change to the T 3chnical Specifications?
J If any question 2.3.1 through 2.3.4 is marked *Yes', complete a Formal Safety Evaluation per APA ZZ-00140. Ifquestion 2.; answered 'Yes', then an amendment request SilALL be prepared per 10CFR50 92 and NRC approval SilALL be obtained pric .o implementing the change. If all questions in this section are answered 'No', then use Section 7 to provide a written evaluation why an , Unreviewed Safety Question does not exist.
NOTE Changes to the FSAR or Technical Specifications Question require additionalprocessing in accordance with APA-ZZ 00108.
'
(3) EQUIPMENT QU ALIFIC ATION IMP ACT REVIEW Does this modification / change / review involve: (3.1) Yes O No O An activity which involves any safety-related structure, system, equipment, or component?
If no, then mark questions 3.2 through 3.9 "N/A" and proceed to question 3.10.
(3.2) Yes O No O N/A B An addition / change / deletion to the accident category fields (LOCA, MSLB, HELB) or the HOT & COLD Shutdown fields on the EQ Screen in the
, Callaway Equipment Lists (CEL).
If yes, a Formal Safety Evaluation is required.
- (3,3) Yes O No O N/A S Installation of a new or modification to an existing system, subsystem,
equipment or component involving the issuance of a new design specification arJor the assignment of new equipment tag' numbers? If yes, then mark question 3.4 "N/A" and proceed to question 3.5.
' (3.4) Yes O Ne O N/A g An activity which will modify or change any system, equipment or
, compoaent which must function in a harsh post accident environment?
. (LOCA, MSLB or HELB Category A or B in CFL), if no, then mark questions 3.5 through 3.7 "N/A" and proceed to question 3.8.
-
(3.5) Yes O No O N/A O For equipment or component changes to items identified as being required to function in a harsh post accident environment (i.e., LOCA, MSLB, ~
or HELB Category A or B in CEL), a change in organic (soft) parts from those specified for the existing equipment or component (e.g.,0-rings, packing, gaskets, active or pressure boundary rubber / plastic parts, insulation, etc.)?
~
CA-#1339 02/04/97
. . - . _
This review is applicabb 10; FSAR CN 97-020
. - (3 6) Yes O No O N/n a Relocation of existing equipment or instanation of new equipment such that submergence after an accident is an issue (compare intended location against FSAR Table 3.6-6)? (3 7) Yes O No O N/A G For equipment or component changes, a change in performance charactenstics that could impact safety functions (e g , changes in instrurnent accuracy)? (3 8) Yes Q No O N/A 3 For equipment or component changes, a significant change in size, mass ,,'ientaten, mounting, or center of gravity from that of the existing configurat:en (e g , a valve mass change of more than 20% or 20 lbs., per the guidance of EPP1-NP 563g)? . (3 9) . Yes O No O N/A 3 For equipment or component changes. a change to internal parts that may impact Seismic Quahfication?
_
- (3.10) Yes O No a A change such that the containment spray system could cause the pH of the dehvered spray to be outside the range of 4.0 to 11.07 - (3.11) Yes O No O An activity which will cause any safety-related system, equipment or cr mponent to be moved from its currently installed location to another room? , (3.12) Yes O No G The possibihty of environmental changes to rooms or areas .
containing safety-related structures, systems, equipment or components (i.e., changes in radiation level, or source terms, temperature profiles, pressure i - profiles, humidity profiles, flood levels or relocalica of a high energy kne)? [ (3.13) Yes O No 3 An activity which will modify of change any system, equipment or component listed as LOCA, MSLB, or HELB Category C or D in CEL such that Seismic Ouahficatiott may be impacted?
(3.14) Yes O No Q Does the modification, change, or review involve a possible Seismic 11/1 question or affect Seismic Category I Stress Problems?
2933 (3.15) Yes O No O The possibihty of adding an unquahfied coating (paint) to the Reactor Building or on items capable of blocking the containment sump?
(3.16) Yes O No 3 A change to the safety classification of pumps and/or valves? . (3 17) Yes Q No G Does the change affect ASME Section XI pressure boundaries (i.e., welds, bolted connections, etc.)? , , - - ;s (3.18) Yes Q No S Does this activity require an addition, deletion, or change to system .a classificat:ons as described in Appendix 1 of procedure APA ZZ-00303 (i.e.,
system safety classifications, NRC Maintenance Rule applicability, etc.)? F
.-? 43209 If question 3.2 is marked 'Yes', then c Formal Safety Evaluation SHALL be completed.
~ 40922 If any questions 3.2 through 3.13 are ma ked "Yes', then the Responsible Engineer shalt verify the environmental and/or seismic
-
quahfication impact per APA-ZZ-00390 and document the venfication in Section 8. Any qualification documentation changes shall be performed by EQ quahfied personnel and coordinated with Design Enginevring pnor to the affected equipment being released to service.
40922 Requests for Resolution (RFRs) that deal with material equivalency and affect Category A and B equipment (see question 3.4) must be considered for inclusion into the EQ files. If the files are im acted, an EQ Change Notice shall be generated IAW APA ZZ-00390.
- If question 3.14 is marked "Yes", address the notes / questions listed in Attachment 4 Para. 3.14. Appropriate records (Example - Formal Safety Evaluation, DIR, etc.) will be generated by the Evaluating Engineer to document the evaluation. If a Seismic 11/1 question is involved, then complete CA-a1077," Seismic 1t/1 Hazards Analysis Review". The original CA-#1077 is to be attached to the "LIR* and a copy forwarded to the Supervising Engineer . Civil / Structural.
~ If Question 3,14 is marked "NO", a Seismic illi question does not exist due to the nature of the modification, change, or review,
'
If 3.15 is marked "YES", the Civil / Structural group should be contacted for assistance on reviews.
If Question 3.16 is marked "YES", tne inservice Test (IST) Engineer should be contacted to determine impact on the IST program.
~ If Question 3.17 is marked "YES" the Inservice inspection (ISI) Engineer should be contacted to determine impact on the ISl Program and Section XI examination requirements.
If Question 3.18 is marked "YES*, fill out forrn CA.1481 and process as desenbed in procedure APA-ZZ-00303.
~ h _ CA-#1339 02/04/97
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This review is applicable to: FSAR CN 97-030
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4497 (4) ENVIRONMENTAL EV ALU ATION 4595 This modificattorAhange/ review involves; v
(41) Yes O No O An increase in thermal power above the currently licensed level? (42) Yes O No 3 An increase in noise,tevel?
42625 .-(4 3) Yes O No 3 A physical change to site grounds or plant layout 7 (4 4) Yes O No O An adverse impact on area wildlife and/or vegetation? *
" (45) Yes O No G A change in the rate. Quantry, concentration, or composition, or temperature of liqu4 effluents or any NPDES permitted outfall? (4.6) Yes O No G A change in the rate, quantry, cent.entration, or composition of gaseous et'luents? . (47) Yes O No O A change in particulate emissions rate, concentration, or composition? ,
42916 (4 8) Yes O No G Any excavation on U.E. preperty outside of the owner Controlled Area fence or 42625 any excavation disturbing five acres or more on U E property? 42427 (49)
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Yes O No O A possible change to the facility's potential for the discharge of oilinto or
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upon the navigable waters of the U.S.7 (4.10) Yes O No 3 A significant increase in any adverse environmentalimpact previous!v evaluated in NUREG 0813 (FES-OL)?
(4.11) Yes O No 2 A matter which has col been previously evaluated in NUREO 0813 (FES-OL) which may have a significant adverse environmentallmpact?
If the answer to any of the above questions h 'Yes*, a Final Environmental Evaluation must be performed by Safety Analysis and Radiological Engineering Department. If all of the questions in this section are marked *No", an unreviewed environmental question does not exist and a Final Environmental Evaluation is not required.
(5) 10 CFR 50.54 APPLIC ABILITY DETERMIN ATION This modification / change / review involves:
(5.1) Yes S No. O A change to the Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP7) ,
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($ 2) If yes, forward to the Supervisor, Emergency Preparedness to answer the following question:
J is RERP effectiveness reduced?. -O Yes
% No l (Provide basufor thu response in Section 8 of thuform and sign below) '
V Y L b i -ll I _._ 'pervisor, Emergency Preparedness
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J) Yes O No 3 A change to the Physical Secunty or Contingency Plan?
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_ (5 4) If yes, forward to the Superintendent, Secunty to answer the following question:
. Is Secunty effectiveness reduced? O Yes O No . (Provide basufor thu response in Section 8 of thuform and sign below) '
NIR I I Supenntendent, Secunty
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a CA-#1339 02/04/97
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-.ThiS T@ View iS cpplicabb to: FSAR CN 97-020
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($5) Yss O No O A change to the Operating Quality Assurance Manual (OOAM) including the Supplemental QA Programs?
($ 6) If yes, forward to the Supervising Engineer, Quality Assurance for completion of a Quahty Assurance evaluation.
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; is Quahty Assurance reduced? O Yes O No IPronde basufor this regerue m Sechon 8 ofthaform and sign'below N!R / /
Supervising Engineer, Quahty Assurance
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(6) C E RTIFIC ATION S (6.1) FIRE PROTECTION REVIEW
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(61,1) Yes O No a This modification / change / review may !nvolve a change to one or more aspects of the approved Fire Protection Program as defined in the checklists of EDP-ZZ-04044, Fire Protection Reviews.
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.(6.1,2) Yes O No a This modification / change / review involves an addition of combustible or
, flammable matenal, if either (6.1.1) or (6.1,2) is answered "YES", document areas of concern and resolution in Section 8 of the LIR or on a Design Input Report
- - (DIR) and have a Fire Protection Engineer (FPE) perform a cross-disciplinary review of the LIR or DIR per EDP ZZ 04044. Update the
Combustible Loading Information Program (CLIP) as required.
, . 621 (62) A L A R A R EVIEW (compiete gns section: EITHER Sect. 6.2.193 6.2.2)
(6.2.1) Modification . Specific (applicable for CMPs, RMPs, EMPs and Minor Modifications)
Yes O No O Will this modification require work within the Radiological Controlled Area (RCA)?
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Yes O No O Will this modification require work on a system containing or potentially
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containing radioactive matenal?
Yes O No O Will this mod:fication involve work on a system which connects to or Interfaces with a system or component storing, transfemng, or handling radioactive material? Yes O No O Will this modification or associated implementation or operation involve modification, removal, or installation of shielding?
a Yes O No O Will this modification involve radioactive waste generation? ,, if the answer to any of the questions above is "yes', an ALARA design review is required per Nuclear Engineering Design Guide ZZ-003. If ZZ 003 requirements cannot be met, an ALARA review must be performed by Safety Analysis and Radiological Engineering.
O Documentation detailing the results of this review is included in Section 8 of the LlR.
O All answers to the above questions are *No* and it is certified that the proposed change does not increase potential
-. radiation exposures beyond the exposures that already exist.
(6.2.2) GENERIC G I hereby certify that the proposed change / review does not increase potential radiation exposures beyond the exposures that already exist.
.- O This change / review required further evaluation by a qualified ALARA reviewer per Nuclear Engineering Design Guide ZZ 003. Documentation of this review is included in Section 8 of the LIR.
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This review is opplicable to; FSAR CN 97-020 (6 3) PCPlODCMlR ADIOLOGIC AL EFFLUENT CONTROLS PROGR AM REVIEW (63.1) ' Yes O No S This modification / change / review may impact the Process Control Program (PCP) as detaded in APA ZZ 01011.
(63.1,1) If yes, forward to the Supenntendent. Chemistry & Radwaste to answer the following two questions in acCordance with Admin 4stratwe Techn cal Specification 613-ts the overall conformance of the sohd:fied waste product to existing entena for solid wastes reduced? Yes O No O 2814 Does this rnodificationichange/ review require a change to the PCP7 Yes. O No O (ProsIde tmis for this response in Section 8 of thn form and sign below) N!R I I Supenntendent, Chemistry and Radwaste (632) /es O No O This modification / change / review may impact the Callaway Plant Off-site Dose Calculation Manual as detailed in APA ZZ-01003 or the Radiological Effluent Control Prograrn as described in FSAR Section 1611.
(63.2.1) If yes, forward to the Superintendent, Health Physics to answer the following three questions in accordance with Administrative Technical Specification 614: 2815 Does this modifiution/ change / review maintain the levels of radioactive effluent control required by 10CFR20.1302,40CFR190, 10CFR50.36a, and 10CFR50, Appendix 1, and not adversely impact the accuracy or reliabihty of effluent, dose or setpoint calcutations? Yes O No O 2815 Does this mod 4fication/ change / review provide sufficient information to support the change (s) together with the appropriate analyses or evaluations justifying the change (s)? Yes O No O 2815 Does this modification / change / review require a change to the ODCM7 Yes O No O _ (Provide basis for this response in Section 8 of this form and sign below)
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Supenntendent, Health Physics (6.4) HUMAN F ACTOR EVALU ATION l -. This Modification / Change / Review involves:
(6 4.1) -Yes O No O A change to the Main Control Board (RL001 through RLO28) or Auxiliary Shutdown Panel (RP118)?
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(64.2)- Yes O No e A change to the Plant Annunciator Window location, engraving, etc.? (6.4.3) Yes O No 3 A change to the Control Room temperature, air velocity, lighting, ambient sound level, .- etc.?
i (64.4) Yes O No G A change to the Auxiliary Shutdown Panet Room lighting? If the answer to any of the above is "YES", prepare a brief description of the modification / change and forward to the Human Factors Design Review 4 Engineer. If all of the above are "NO", a iluman Factor Review is not required. Ilowever, if controls, Instrumentation, etc. change to other locations, a 4 Iluman Factor Review should be requested:
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Human Factors Design Review Engineer
] CA-#1339 02/04/97 n...r.e, .-. ,,.n...
This reviet!15 applicable to: IJSAR CN 97 020 (65) STATION BL ACKOUV (SBO) EVALUAVION This Modification / Change / Review invoNes; (6.51) Yes O No O Placing additional electncalicad on the Station Battenes.
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(652) Yes O No a Adding sources of heat in the Control Room (3601) or Equipment Caoinet Area (3605).
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(6.53) Yes O No G A change in the source taf supplied power for any Containment isolation Valve or its position indicators (654) Yes O No O A change in the source of supphed power for any safety related or Station Blackcut instrumentation or contro!s, . (65.5) Yes O' No O A change that willincrease the rate of Reactor Coofant Inventory lesses.
(656) Yes O No 3 A reduction in the required Condensate Storage Tank volume.
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(6.57) Yes O No O A reduction in the volume of backup nitrogen for the Auxiliary Feedwater Control or Steam Generator Atmospheric Rehef valves. .
- .- (658) Yes O No 3 The addition of heat generating sources, that will be present after a loss of AC power, to any of the following rooms.
" 1202 Access Area B & Chdier Surge Tank Area 1508 Main Feedwater/ Steam Tunnet 1304 Auxiliary Feedwater Pipe Chase 1509 Main Feedwater/ Steam Tunnel
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1305 Auxiliary Feed 9ter Pipe Chase 1512 Control Room A/C & Filtration Units Room A 1322 Piping Penetration Room B 3302 Engineered Safety Features Switchgear Room No. 2 1323 Piping Penetration Room A 3404 Switchboard Room No. 4 1327 Auxthary Feedwater Pump Valve Compartment No. 2 3405 Battery Room No. 4 1330 Auxdiary Feedwater Pump Valve Compartment No. 4 3407 Battery Room No.1 1331 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room 3408 Switchboard Room No.1 1408 Comdor No. 2 3410 Switchboard Room No. 2 1409 Electrical Penetration Room B 3411 Battery Room No. 2 1411 Main Feedwater/ Steam Tunnel 3413 Battery Room No. 3
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1412 Main Feedwater/ Steam Tunnel 3414 Switchboard Room No. 3 1501 Control Room A/C & Filtration Units Room B 4201 Condenser Pit
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Condensate Storage Tank Valve House if the answer to any of the above is "YES* prepare a bricf description of the modification / change and forward to the Station Blackout Review Engineer if all of the above are "NO*, then no Station Blackout Review is required.
N!R I I - Station Blackout Review Engineer (6.6) PROB ABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT f PRA) REVIEW This Modification / Change! Review invoNes:
(6.6.1) Yes O No O A potentially PRA significant change to a plant system.
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(66.2) Yes O No e A change to plant Technical Specifications.
(6.6.3) Yes O No S A change to emergency operating procedures,
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If the answer to any of the above is "Yes", prepare a PRA Evaluation Request (PRAER) Form (CA-#2237; ref. FDP ZZ-04004), and forward to the Supervising Engineer, Regulatory Operations. If all of the above are "No*, a probabilistic risk assessment is not required.
- NIR I I PRA Engineer
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IblS rey eW $S apphCable to: FSAR C597-020 (7) JUSTlFICATION FOR NO UNREVIEWED S AFETY QUESTION Briefly state s.hy tha modr/icatwwchange/reuew dxs not requ. ce a FormalSa! cry Esaluation; use guidelmes in Attachment 4 of APA.ZZ 00140. attach extra sheets ofnecessarr)
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See Attached Formal Safety Evaluat:en.
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(8) COMMENTS List any special conditions or comments pertaining to these evaluations and certr'ications 7$h cI e ks u l~ fu + o ., rLe up s, tit:n d tk fB5( sysh -b fe <$r- ,h '
Speificcl & n e.ft . n .
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Sys4e- oj%hs. fu - 12Jtala;l
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hjervi;o<, Ema.7,vcy Prepuedn<s, has ay,eed to ,c u,s e 41,q llgfij)' (Ad. CAT 3 53982) L;Akj 3/ip!97
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2 e le'< ~ <l C n i Trae h1 a e).m h remm cuo<k I, fMt'i%~l
- +kV Sbdo F44 / A H O h s's lintej +o fLe Pla.J Co o fer, (9) APPROVALS - [d !N Responsible Engineer _
Date 3/W'7[ Qualified Reviewer gff / fjjt1A Date
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CA-#1339
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FORMAL SAFETY CV LUATION COVER SHEET
.1. Evaluation applicable to: FSAR Change Notice 97-020 ._ _
2. [] OUTSIDE AGENCY SAFETY EVALUATION ATTACHED G UNION ELEURIC SAFETY EVALUATION 41 - May the prs, Jsed activity increase the consequences of an accident evaluated previously in the FSAR?
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Yes No X : 2.2 May the proposed activity increase the probability of
: - -- occurrence of an accident evaluated previously in the FSAR?-
Yes No _X_ ' 2.3 . May the proposed activity increase the probability of l- occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety j evaluated previously in the FSAR? l ! Yes _ No X l 2.4 - May the proposed activity increase the consequences of a l malfunction of equipment important to safety evnluated p previously in the FSAR? Y' es No X 2.5 May the proposed activiri create the possibility of an
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accident of a different type than sly evaluated previously in . the FSAR?
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Yes - No 7, '
-2.6' May the proposed activity create the possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR? .
.Yes- No- X
- 2.7 _ Does the proposed activity reduce the margin of safety'as
; determined in the basis for any Technical Specification?
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Yes No X
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3.0 __ SAFETY EVALUATION CONCLUSION -
. ' Based upon the results of this Formal Safety Evaluation, the Change X Does not involve an unreviewed safety question.- -- - Involves an unreviewed safety question.
14.0- APPROVALS _4.1 Responsible Engineer: ' Date: D 4.2 ' Qualified Reviewer: sa /l a id / Date: 4.3 Approved By: g superv
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L.' Date: 3~!bf
Engineer As define n APA-ZZ-00140
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CA41340 _ - 10/12/96
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Formal Safety Evaluation 1.0 fpplicable to: FSAR Chance Notice 97-020 2.0 Introduction
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2.1 This Formal Safety Evaluation covers the elimination of the computer control of the Post Accident Sampling S) stem (PASS). Control of the system is now performed manually by utilizing a push-button control panel in the Count Room. Communication of PASS analysis results will be relayed to the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and Technical Support Center (TSC) by phone instead of through the Emergency Response Facility Information System (ERFIS). A PASS operator continues to have the capability to draw grab samples using a remote panel located in the Count Room.
2.2 References: FSAR Sect I8.2.3.2, FSAR Sect. I8.3.2.2, NUREG 0737, Reg. Guide 1.97, 3LNRC 83-07, SLNRC 84 74, SLNRC 84-94, RMP 94 2005
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3.0 Effects on the Accidents Evaluated as the Desien Basjs 3.1 May the proposed activity increase the consequences of an accident evaluated peviously in the
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FSAR? Answer: The removal of the computer control of the PASS will no' increase the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR. The ability of the PASS to obtain in-line chemical and radiological analysis post accident within the time requirements specified in the FSAR are not effected by the replacement of the computer with a manual push button , control panel. The possibility of a computer failure or computer malfunction is eliminated i with the removal of the PASS computer and therefore the reliability of the sys.em has
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increased. The accuracy of the in-line chemical analysis instrumentation remains
- unchanged. The accuracy of the radiological analysis has increased due to utilizir.g the
' health physics computer for spectrum analysis. - PASS analysis results are no longer relayed , to the EOF & TSC by ERFIS Instead, the PASS analysis information is provided to the TSC and EOF over the phone system. Past Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP) I drills have verified PASS analysis data can be effectively communicated to the TSC and
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EOF via the phone system. Therefore, the removal of the PASS computer will not increase the consequences of an accident.
i 3.2 May the proposed activity increase the probability of occurrence of an accident evaluated previously in
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the FSAR7
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Answer: The probability of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased by the
- removal of the computer from the PASS. The PASS is required to function only after an accident. The system is classified as non-safety related and can be isolated from safety related systems by isolation valves. Failure of the PASS will not cause an accident since it . can be isolated from other systems. The elimination of the computer will not effect the ability to isolate PASS from other systems and therefoce cannot increase the probability of occurrence of an accident.
'~ 3.3 May the proposed activity increase the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated previously in the FSAR7
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Answer: As stated in Question 3.2, the PASS provides no safety related functions and can be isolated from safety related systems. Therefore, the elimination of the computer from the PASS can not increase the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to st.fety.
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re w v<~ Formal Safety Evaluation 3.4 May the proposed activity increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety es aluated previously in the FSAR?
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Answer Since the elimination of the computer controj of the PASS system willincrease the I reliability of the system without reducing the accuracy of any of the in-line analyzers, the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety will not be increased by this chan p i e 4 0 Potential for Creation of a New Twe of Unanalvred Event-
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4.1 May the proposed activity create the possibility of an accident of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR? 7- - l Answer: The possibility of an accident not previously evaluated in the FSAR is not created by the
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l ' removal of the computer from the PASS. The PASS is required to function only after an accident. The system is :lassified as non safety related and can be isolated from safety related systems by isolation valves. Failure of the PASS will not cause an accident since it
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can be isolated from other systems. The elimination of the computer will not effect the
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ability to isolate PASS from other systems and therefere cannot increase the probability of occurrence of an accident.
4.2 May the proposed activity create the possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety of a , ditTerent type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR?
- Answer: As stated in Question 3.2, the PASS provides no safety related functions and can be isolated from safety related systems by isolation valves, Therefore, the elimination of the computer from the PASS can not increase the possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR.
- 5.0 Imoact on the Marcin of Safety
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5.1 Does the proposed activity reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical
,, Specification?
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Answer: The Technical Specifications do not address a margin of safety for tha PASS. However, Technical Specification Section 6.8.4 does require a Post Accident Sampling program to ensure the capability to obtain and analyze reactor coolant, radioactive iodines and _ particulates in plant gaseous effluents, and containment atmosphere samples under accident conditions. The program is required to include 1) training of personnel,2) procedures for sampling and analysis, and 3) provision for maintenance of sampling and analysis _ equipment. All of these requirements continue to be met with the elimination of the computer control of the PASS. Therefore, the margin of safety is not reduced by this change.
- 6.0 Safetv Evaluation Conclusion
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6.1 Based on the responses to the above questions, the elimination of the computer control of the PASS will have no impact on any safety related aspect of the plant. Therefore, this change does not present an unreviewed safety question.
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t- w< en u y e us - Forrual Safety Evaluation 7 0' 10CF R50 $0 Report Summary
' 1 T his change eliminates the automated computer contro! af the Post Accident Sampling System - (PASS). Control of the sy stem is performed by a manual push button control panel located in the Count Room. The ability of the PASS to obtain in line chemical and radiological analysis post accident within the time requirernents specified in the FSAR continue to be met. A PASS operator continues to ha$e the capability to draw grab samples usmg a remote panellocated in the Count Room.
~1 he possibility of a computer failure or computer malfunction is climinated with the removal of the PASS computer and therefore the reliability of the system has increased. This change does not reduce the level of plant safety and an unresiewed safety question does not exist due to this change.
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% % , SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION , FOR TSI25 . i8 M
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y s_.- e8rmc no~so. o.1 o at v 3.o~ so, ont6o on,o,~,,.33v su,,,,,og, F-S- 05/16/72 8 - 10/12/84- O_. 'styttioN
" v ' ' 's r(x,,,, (.. ATTACHMENTS
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"b fi INSTRUCTIONS, PRECAUTIONSs' AND LIMITATIONS FOR HANDLING NEW AND PARTIALL,Y SPENT FUEL ASSEMBLIES
, ' NOV 231984
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p BANE DOCUW.NT CONTROL
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PROJECT 7186
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WESTit'CHOUSE PROPRIETARY OATA This document es the property of and contains proprietary inf orma tion oweed by the Westegnouse Electric Corporation, Nucteer Energy Systems, and is transmmed to you in conficence and trust and is to be returned upon request. No permession as granted to own-Ush. reproduce, transmet or disefose to anotner any informaten containea in this cocument, in whote or en part, without the prior wemen perrnession. in each case, of an autnerited s ,,
"Nieve of said corporation.
+ .y WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPCRATION Nwetear Energy !vstems P.O. Bos 355 Pittsburgn Pennsylvama .15:30
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g . APenOvAL 0,.jn ORGANIZATION REY. 8 REV. REV.
NFD-PECS SEE ECN # 80000 D. R. Trevet 1 l PED-FUEL HOLG' SEE ECN # 80000 J. R, Marshall EOUIPMENT 310-FUELING
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SERVICES- SEE ECN # S0000 C. R. Gerstberger Jr.
' NFO-ENGR * PROD * ASSURANC SEE ECN # 80000 H. F. Menke
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CONTENTS,-
!. Purpose I I .- Description of Fuel Assembly --
III. Equipment
! A.' Equipment Checkout-
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' 8.; Designated Equipment C. Refueling Machine Trip Limits '
D.' Load Monitoring Equipment-
-IV. Fuel. Handling Conditions and Precautions W A. Prottetive Cover ,
8. Fuel Assembly.-Storage and Handling Position-
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C. Handling Tool Storage D. Fuel Assembly in Suspended Position '
, E.- Free Standing Fuel Assembly F. Acceptable Fuel Assembly Load Points-G. Fuel Assembly Load and Deflection Limits 1. Fuel _ Assembly Ax1al Loads- -
A 2. - - Fuel Assembly Lateral Deflections
' -H. Fuel Assembly Contact with Adjacent Surfaces I. Surface Leve1 ness J. Debris -
K. -Visibility
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1. Water Clarity 2. Lighting- ,
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-3. .TV Viewing V.- Fuel Handling Instructions and P' rocedures
, -A. General T ;v 1. Communications -
2. Fuel Handling Crew a . -
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r-k- WESTINGHOUSE PROPRIETARY.- F-5, Rev. 8 1482F:6- Page 2 of 25-
. , y ..,y .,%44 , F $ s m t--m1-**u' A+ , = w-- r-- aw * s+w+= ' - ' ' * ' - - wut--- -er -- 1- ++** *
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4 r y, B. Fuel Handling - Fuel Building a 1. Shipping Container 2. Fuel Assembly and ibndling Tool Positioning in the X-Y Plane 3. Hoist Speed - Fuel Butiding
, 4 Hoist Cabie Tensioning ., 5. Fuel Assembly Drag - with no load monitoring device on hoist 6. .Fual Assembly Drag - with load monitoring device on hoist 7. Procedure in Case of Damage .- r - C. Fuel Handling - Containment Building 1. Fuel Assembly and Refueling Machine Positioning in the X-Y Plane PS 2. Refteling Machine Hoist Speed 3. Hoist Cable Tensioning 4 Operator Load Limits core, transfer system, and RCC change fixture ., 5. Lateral Movements of Fuel Assembly 6. Procedures for Special Handling Viewing and Inspection i
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8. Procedure in Case of Damage -
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APPENDIX A APPENDIX B . U Ej,
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WESTINGHOUSE PROPRIETARY F-5, Rev. 8 1482F:6 , Page 3 of 25 .
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{i} INSTRUCTIONS, PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITA.10NS FOR
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HANDLING NEW AND PARTIALLY SPENT FUEL ASSEMBLIES I.- PURP05E
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, The purpose of this document is to prevent damage to new or
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partially spent fuel assemblies by identifying general procedures ~, precautions and limitations to be observed during the , p handling of those assemblies. Westinghouse recommends that NFD V Fuel Projects be contacted before handling any fuel to determine
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if any additional specific handling instructions P.ay apply. Fuel
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assemblier involved in a deviation from or violation of these instructions may incur damage.
., f II. DESCRIPTION OF FUEL ASSEMBLY The construction of the RCC type fuel assembly results from design efforts to obtain a homogeneous control material
.. I' distribution, to minimi:e poison effects from structural ' ' ~
materials, and to promote flow mixing within and betwe n fuel
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assemblies in the reactor core. To obtain the desired effects, the fuel assembly is built around an internal skeleton consisting of the RCC absorber guide thimbles and the fuel rod support grids. Thus, the structural integrity of the fuel assembly is maintained by functional' parts within the cssembly and utilizes ! no extra structural materials which would act as additional ! po;=on or ir.pede mixing of coolant within the core.
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*k gl=7 The skeleton is formed by attaching the guide thimbles to the fuel assembly top and bottom no::les and to the grids at each grid locatitn. The grids, which are spaced strategically along the length of the fuel assembly, ccitrol the lateral spacing of the guide thimbles and fuel rods and provide both lateral and s.
. WESTINGHOUSE PROPRIETARY F-5, Rev. 8 1482F:6 Page 4 of 25 - , e,
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axial support for the fuel rods by means of small leaf springs e 4? fonned as integral parts cf the grid straps in each grid cell location. The resulting assembly is of more than sufficient strength and integrity to withstand any operating loads. Because
, of the assembly flexibility and the exposed condition of the fuel ,.
rods, care must be exercised in working with and around the fuel assemblies during handling and storage, and the limitations and precautions defined in this document must be observed et all A times.
U M III. EQUIPMENT A. Equipment Checkout The utility should contact Westinghouse or the equipment supplier to have a complete checkout of the cranes and refueling equipment prior to initiating core loading or > refueling. . i
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B. Designated Equipment l Fuel assemblies shall be handled only by tools and eouipment specifically designed and provided for that purpose.
Equipment such as slings or cables shall not be attached directly to fuel assemblies for handling purposes.
. C. Refueling Machine Trip Limits '
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.Because of the large variation in weight between various fuel assembly / core component combinations, the refueling machine atrip-limits as set below cannot, by themselves,-prevent
, detrimental loads from being applied to fuel assemblies. ~ In
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WESTINGHOUSE PROPRIETARY F-5, Rev. 8 1482r:6 Page 5 of 25 a
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s order > to' reduce %hFpos sYbl ily- o f ' adyersell oads"during fuel
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tV.C,4.b) must beistrictly/ observed?
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y - The refueling machine trip limits must be set prior to fuel-handling operations. The limits selected depend upon whether the fuel assen.blies being handled are all of the same type and whether the handling conditions are wet or dry, as defined. Once set, the trip limits remain unchanged for the
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duration of the fuel handling operations.
The fuel assembly types, core types, and handling conditions
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are defined below: n Standard fuel assembly - uses Inconel grids at each grid location.
, Optimized fuel assembly _uses Zircaloy grids for all except f the 'end grids, which are Inconel.
Mixed-core - The fuel being handled is a mixture of standard i and optimized fuel- assemblies. -(Typically wet condition only)
-i Unifonn-core _The fuel being t.andled is-all of the same .
type, either all standard or all optimized fuel assemblies.
Ory conditions - those sicuations where the fuel assembly is O p .: not submerged in water while moving between the transfer system and the core (typically this condition exists during first. core loading where the water level in the vessel is at-the vessel nor:les, the transfer canal is flooded to a. level ' a. just above the tracks, and the remainder of the reactor - ___h-- cavity and storage areas are dry), s
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Wet conditions - those situations where the fuel assembly is w -
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always submerged in water while moving between the transfer
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system and the core (typically this condition exists during a refueling where the water level in the reactor cavity is just
, below the operating deck).
kOTE: The pre-operational checkout of ~ refueling equipment in a plant t.nder construction is a special condition. In this circumstance the equipment is completely dry and only a dummy s fuel assembly is used. Because buoyancy is not a factor the % trip limits for wet conditions should arbitrarily be used for this case.
( The refueling machine trip limits are' set as follows: lo I 1. The refueling machine load cell s'hould be calibrated and
, adjusted to minimum operational damping to obtain the most sensitive operation. -
2. rutilizing either a ' dummy ~ fuel assembly and- RCC or a standard fuel- assembly and RCC, set the automatic lifting trip per a or b'below:as appropriate.- (If the core is completely made up of optimized fuel assemblies, use an optimized fuel assembly and 'RCC rather"than a' standards ifuel assembly 7and'RCC. ) ' I Note: Because of the similai , ties in weight, the 15x15
. gif standard and optimized fuel assemblies are considereo to i be of the same type, and unifom-core limits should be used.
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a. Fuel assemblies being handled are all of same type.
m -D (Uni form-core)
1. Latch the fuel assembly and RCC. Carefully g position the assembly so that it is - ., completely submerged and the bottom nozzle is approximately 6 inches from either the lower
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coreplate or the transfer system upender baseplate.
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ii. Record the suspended weight indicated by the load cell.
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. iii. Set the primary lifting trip point at 250 pounds maximum above the indicated suspended weight-for wet conditions or at 350 pounds maximum above the indicated suspended weight
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for dry conditions.
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' -b. Fuel assemblies being hand 1'ed-are not all of same ' type. - (Mixed-core)
1. Latch 3the ? fuel' as sembly'andRCCV Carefully 1 position 4theiassemblycsolthatiitifs A -
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complete 1yrsubmerged fand'theMtt'oM nozzleTis sapproximatelff 6tische's' 'from4I'tWUi lower rcoreplate or the transfercsystem upendera s ,.#, . n abaseplateD
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11. P? cord the suspended weight indicated by the load cell.
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111. Set' the primaryllifting trip point at 175
' : pounds maximum above the indicated suspended weignt.
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. . ) 3,- If the' refueling machine has' a load reduction trip , '
provision other than the slack cable automatic trip, set the automatic lowering trip per a or b below as f appropriate.
. i i a.- Fuel assemblies being handled are all of same type.
(Unifom-core) 1. Set the automatic lowering trip at 250 pounds l3 muimum below the suspended weight (Step 2) , for wet or dry conditions.
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b. Fuel dsfeli$ffE TEi 5[Niid1EdTrFhotYill' o f ; same
, type. (Mixed-core) + . 1. Set:the?automaticiloweringitrip>att325 pounds + , . maximum iil bw" t6e fi ddi cate'd7 suspended i wei ght . ( (Step'2). - .
4. If a dummy fuel assembly and RCC are used to set the trip.
limits (Steps 2 & 3), the weight of the first standard fuel-assembly containing an RCC must be compared with the weight noted above and the trip setpoints adjusted as necessary. - -(If-the ' core is completely made up of optimized fuel assemblies, use an optimized fuel assembly , > and.RCC rather than a r.tandard fuel assembly and RCC. )
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5. To minimize the possibilities of damaging fuel ' assemblies, lower 7alues than the described trip limits-can be used. - Adjust the lower limits as necessary to preclude spurious overload / underload alams.
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D. l. cad tionitoring Equipment It is recommended that any hoists used for handling fuel s assemblies be equipped with a lead sensing system to allow the operator to-monisor axial loads to which the fuel .
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assembly may be subjected.
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) 1Y. FUEL HANDLING CONDITIONS AND PRECAUTIONS A. Protective Cover ( Polyethylene inner liners are provided for use during
- shipment and all dry handling and storage operations.
These inner liners'are long enough to be closed around the O V fuel assembly top and bottom, and are folded back flush with bottom nozzle and slightly above the top ~ nozzle. They are,
thus, open at the top and bottom nozzle for drainage . purposes. These liners may be used to cover each fuel
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assembly in dry storage. The liner must be fitted to aci.. eve , the required drainage characteristics (i.e., the liner must either remain open at the bottom nozzle as received or if it is closed under the bottom nozzle, a one-inch slit should be
'made on each side near the bottom nozzle). Also these covers j , must be pulled taut and should be secured to the fuel ' '
assembly by taping at both the top and bottom nozzles when movements are made past support or storage structures. This will pret..ude bunching and gathering of the cover which may subsequently result in fuel assembly damage.
, S. Fuel Assembly Storage and Handling Position The fuel assemblies must always be stored in the vertical position, except when temporarily stored in a shipping
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p. 3 container. Fuel assembly handling shall be perfomed only while the fuel assembly is in the vertical position, unless it is secured to a shipping container si.pport frame.
Exceptions to this are most unusual and must be agreed to by ( the customer and Westinghouse.
C. Handling Tool Storage Handling tools shall not be stored ir a fuel assembly or on a core component.
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D. Fuel Assembly in Suspended Position
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A fuel assembly shall not be left unattended while in a
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suspended position. '
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i ^ E. Free Standing Fuel Assembly
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A free standing fuel assembly is defined as one that does not have at least one side adjat.ent to another fuel assembly, v , fixture or core structure.
Free standing fuel assemblies shall not be pemitted in the core. Under controlled conditions, such as required for - irradiated fuel examination, a free standing fuel assembly is pemissible outside the core.
, F. Acceptable Fuel Assembly Load Points
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Any lateril loads applied to a fuel assembly for purposes of.
guidance, support, or clamping shall be applied only at the grid or nor:le locations with limitations as described.
Any axial loads applied to a fuel assembiv for purposes of lifting, support, guidance or tool operation shall be applied only at no::le locations and shall not be applied to the fuel
, assembly holddown springs mounted on the top no::le.
"' O $- G. Fuel Assembly Load and Deflection Limits 1. Axial loads applied to a fuel assembly Texcept for support or lifting) shall be less than 1200 pounds.
' 2. Lateral deflection (as caused by a lateral load) of the fuel assembly at the top no::le shall be less than 2 inches.
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H. Fuel Assembly Contact with Adjacent Surfaces
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A fuel assembly will come into contact with adjacent fuel assemblies and specific fixtures (such as storage racks) that g.
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are part of normal fuel handling. Fuel handling sequences
', that generate only side-to-side contact between adjacent fuel as'semblies are preferable to those that may include ' corner-to-corner contact. Contact with hardware that is not part of nomal fuel handling (such as light standards) is not n
U pemitted; should this occur, proceed per section V.B.7 or V.C.8.
I. Surface Levelness
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Any surface on which a free standing fuel assembly (See IV.E) is set shall be sufficiently flat and level so that the top of the assembly will be aligned vertic'lly a with the bottom of the assembly within 1/4 inch.
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J. Debris
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Loose debris observed on or around a fuel assembly shall be removed.
K. Visibility . 1. Water Clarity ' d?Q
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Water in the fuel storage pool and core should be clear enough during periods of fuel movemnt to view the top of the fuel assemblies with supplemeral lighting.
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. 2. Lighting ,
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Adequate lighting should be provided to establish clear 1
visibility in the fuel storage pool and core as required.
A , 3. TV Viewing
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Consideration should be given to having a TV camera available to pemit clear viewing in the event of di f ficul ty. '
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Y. FUEL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS AND PROCEDURES
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A. General
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.. 1. Comunications
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Clear methods and channels of comunication should be
[. established. Westinghouse recomends thct el?
instructions and recomendatiMs to :perators should be through the responsible supervisor.
2. Fuel Handling Crew In staffing the fuel handling crew, considerathn should be given to assigning the most experienced refueling machine operators to the in-core operations.
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B. Fuel Handling - Fuel Building (',7 . <.,
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1 Shipping Container - See W Field Specification F-4 for Specific Instructions
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s a. Rotation of a fuel assembly between horizontal and vertical positions and lifting or handling of a fuel
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assembly in the horizontal position shall be
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performed only when the fuel assembly is clamped to n O- the support frame,
, b. Lifting loads necessary for rotation of a fuel *
assembly between horizontal and vertical positions
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and lifting or handling 'in the horizontal position
, shall be applied to the container support frame or container shell as applicable.
' c. Lifting of a fuel assembly out of the container shall ( only be by means of appropriate tools attached to the , fuel assembly top nozzle (per section !Y.F) and only when the assembly is in a vertical position with clamps released and clear of the fuel assembly.
~ 2. Fuel Assembly and Handling Tool Position in the X-Y Plane
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The fuel assembly handling tool shall be centered above the fuel assembly prior to the insertion of the handling
- .C tool into the fuel assembly, m.9. .
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WESTINGHOUSE PROPRIETARY F-5. Rev. 8 1482F:6 Ptge 14 of 25 v ni
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; .. The fuel assembly shall be centered above the cell of the s
storage racks, transfer system, or elevator before insertion of the fuel assembly.
' Lateral movement of the fuel handling hoist is prohibited ;
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while any part of the latched fuel assembly is inserted
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into the storage cells, transfer system or elevator.
q 3. Hoist Speed in Fuel Building k.J h Zones Hoist Speed a. guiding and seating of 7 ft/ min maximum handling tool onto fuel assembly b. fuel assembly' bottom nozzle 7 ft/ min maximum appmximately 10" above to 10" below tog of cell funnel or within .10 of full down c. outside tones aab 21 f t/ min maximum
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~. High hoist speeds'should be obtained only af ter initiating motion with low hoist speeds.
In the event of indication of large load variations or other difficulties, movement should cease (See section V.B.5 or Y.B.6).
4 Hoist Cable Tensioning M Tha hqiSt cable slack should be taken up gradually 50 that the cable is not snapped taut.
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Fuel Assembly Drag - with .to load monitoring device on
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hoist
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When it becomes apparent that fuel assembly drag is excessive, movement should stop and action taken to
.,' detect and correct the problem.
Suggested actions are:
. 's a. If inserting a fuel assembly into a fixture (storage rack, transfer system, or elevator)', reverse direction, lift the fuel assembly until it is clear *
of the fixture, check alignment of the fuel assembly with the fixture and reposition the fuel assembly if
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necessary. Upon reinsertion, if excessive drag reoccurs, withdraw the fuel assembly, store it in another suitable location and determine the cause of
, excessive drag.
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b. If withdrawing a fuel assembly, reseat it in fixture, unlatch lifting tool, check alignment of the tool with the fixture and reposition if necessary.
Re-engage tool and proceed with withdrawal of fuel assembly. If excessive drag recurs, resent fuel assembly, unlatch tool and dettmine cause of exceslive drag.
Q., c. Lateral positioning of the hoit.t to which the fuel assembly is attached is prohibited while any part of the fuel assembly is inserted in the fixtures.
If it is believed that the fuel assembly has sustained h excessive loads, the assembly should be examined and dispositioned per section V.B.7.
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WESTINGHOUSE PROPRIETARY F-5. Rev. 8 1482F:6 Page 16 of 25
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4 6. Fuel Assembly Drag - with load monitoring device on hoist x g:--),
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The operator should monitor the load cell or scale on the hoist at all times during the process of lifting or
,s lowering of fuel as described below.
, a. The combined suspended weight of the fuel assembly,
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core component and handling tool should be noted when an assembly is picked up.
, , b. The load cell or scale reading during fuel assembly - movement should not fall outside the range of the suspended weight + 200 pounds (except when the fuel
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assembly is properly positioned and resting on its bottom nozzle). If these limits are exceeded movement should stop and action taken to correct the
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problem before proceeding. Suggested actions te , correct problem are: . I.
' i. If inserting a fuel assembly into a fixture (storage rack, transfer system, or elevator) reverse direction, lif t the fuel assembly until it is clear of the fixture, check
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alignment of the fuel assembly with the fixture and reposition the fuel assembly if necessa ry. Upon reinsertion, if the load readings again fall outside of the acceptable w q range, withdraw the fuel assembly, store it
.in another suitable location and determine the cause of excessive drag.
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the fixture, unlatch lifting tool, check alignment of tool with fixture and reposition if necessary. Re engage tool and proceed
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with withdrawal of fuel assembly. If the s load readings again fall outside the acceptable range, reseat fuel assembly,
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unlatch tool and detemine cause of excessive drag.
iii. Lateral positioning of the hoist while any part of the fuel assembly is inserted in the
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fixtures is prohibited. .
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If the load change during fuel movement exceeds 400* pound: for new fuel or 250* pounds for irradiated fuel, the assembly should be examined and dispositioned per Section V.B.7.
l ' 7. Procedure 'in Case of Damage
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In case of damage or suspicion of damage to a fuel
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assembly, that assembly is to be set aside and either the Westinghouse NFD/NSID on-site representative or NFD Fuel Projects contacted for instructions on further actions of disposition.
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* ine presence of-debris can cause grid damage at lower loads than nomal fuel assembly interactions, thus the different limits for "new" and "used" fuel. '
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l ( ) C. . Fuel Handling - Containment Building
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1. Fuel Assembly and Refueling Machine Positioning in the X-Y Plano t' < s Unless it is necessary to employ " Procedures for Special
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Handling" (section V.C.6) the following apply.
The refueling machine gripper shall be centered above the fuel assembly prior to insertion of the gripper into the fuel assembly.
The fuel assembly should be centered above the reference core position or cell before insertion'of the fuel assembly.
. 2. Refueling Machine Hoist Speed
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Hoist speeds when inserting or, withdrawing a fuel assembly in the RCC change fixture or tratisfer system are as defined in Y.B.3.
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Holst speeds when inserting or withdrawing a fi,31 assembly in the core or seating gripper mast onto fuel as defined belows
;- Zones )bist Speed
a.- seating of gripper mast lowest available hoist speed onto fuel assembly (3 ft/ min maximum) b. inserting lowest available hoist speed O Q 10" above to 10" below top (3 ft/ min maximum) of seated fuel assemblies D inserting or withdrawing " within 10"7f full down position
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c. adjacent to a fuel assembly 7 ft/ min maximum , or core support surface but outside of zones a and b l ,
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l ' * d. at least one-half core pitch 21 ft/ min maximum away from all adjacent fuel I. assen61y or core support i '
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surfaces and outside zones a&b
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' with fuel assembly bottom 21 ft/ min maximum nozzle above top of seated fuel assemblies and outside of zones a & b High hoist speeds should be used only after initiating motion r.
' with low hoist speeds.
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In the event of bowed or twisted fuel assemblies, indication l- of large load variations or other difficulties, the lowest - m available hoist speed shall be used unless " Procedures for i' Special Handling" (Section V.C.6) are used.
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{, 3. lioist Cable Tensioning The refueling machine hoist cable slack should be taken up gradually so that the cable is not snapped taut.
,T - 4 Operator Load Limits - core, transfer system, and RCC change fixture These load limits are not refueling machine automatic trip , points. These are limits the operator is required to observe regardless of what the refueling machine trip limits (Section
!!!.C) are set at.
The operator should monitor the load c611 readoLt on the 2' refueling machine at all times during the process of lifting
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or lowering of fuel as described below.
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,- a. The combined suspended weight of the fuel assembly, core I: component and gripper mast should be noted when an '
assembly is picked up, b. The allowable load range is defined in the following tabulation using the combined suspended weight from Step a.
fuel picked up fuel picked up under - fuel always wet dry and set down water and set down or always dry under water dry
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weight3[I$hs. , weight 3[3$$38' weight 2 200 lbs, c. The load during fuel assembly movement shall not fall outside the range defined in Step b (except when the - -
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i fuel assembly is properly positioned and resting on d M its bottom nottle). If these limits are exceeded, movement should stop and action taken to correct the [ problem before proceeding. Suggested actions to (.y- correct the problem are:
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1. Reverse the direction of movement 2 inches.
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11. Adjust the lateral crane position manually or by the separate electric inching circuit to n recenter the suspend,ed fuel assembly relative
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to the surrounding assemblies, the reference
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core position, transfer system upender or RCC change fixture as applicable.
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111. If i and 11 produced load correction, proceed with movement. If not, repeat Steps i and 11.
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, If the load change during fuel movement exceeds 400* *
pounds for initial core loading or 250* pounds for core reloads, the assembly shall be examined and dispositioned per section V.C.8 unless it is determined that the load change was caused by the ' fuel assembly coming to rest on the lower core plate or its guide pins (typically extending approximately 2 inches above the lower coreplate). In the case where overload occurs on lif ting of a fuel assembly s 3 in the core, this may require setting the asse'nbly i~ back in position and removal of surrounding assemblies. The surrounding assemblies shall also be
- examined, and dispositioned per section Y.C.S.
I T ine presence of debris can cause grid damage at lower loads than
- normal fuel assembly' interactions, thus the different load limits for first cores and reload cores.
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5. Lateral Movements of Fuel Assembly Lateral movements of a fuel assembly that is not fully withdrawn inside the refueling machine mast should only
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be done at the direction of the responsible fuel handling n operations supervisor using " Procedures for Special Handling" (Section V.C.6) and " Fuel Assembly lateral , Deflections" (Section IV.G.2).
Any such fuel assembly movement should be visually monitored to prevent accidental damage to the fuel assembly, core component or-refueling machine gripper
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mast.
" 6. Procedures for Special Handling
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4. When certain types of core openings cannot be avoided during fuel handling operations, a specific procedure i to minimize the potential for grid corner interaction
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damage should be utilized depending upon the type of fuel assembly. The core openings, procedure 'and its application are defined in Appendix ' A, " Supplementary
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Fuel Handling Instructions for Standard 16 x 16 and 17 x 17 fuel Assemblies."
b. Manual manipulation of refueling machine hoist. cables l is pemissible to properly align the gripper assembly b : -t , with the fuel assembly top nozzle or to align the * fuel assembly bottom noz:le with the lower core plate guide pins; however, a sudden release of this guidance shall not be permitted.
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c. When the refueling machine.is located on-index, the 4 )
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condition af interacting fuel assemblies may require their extensive manipulation to avoid possible ! damage, or to permit a fuel assembly to enter the 1. desired core location. An alternate procedure ^ T pemitting off-index location of the refueling machine during insertion / withdrawal of fuel assemblies in the core is contained in Appendix B
" Instructions for Off-Index Fuel Assembly Core 2 Insertion / Withdrawal".
d. If guidance of adjacent fuel assemblies is necessary '
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to achieve engagement between a lowered fuel assembly and the lower core pinsi the assembly should be moved into suitable temporary storage and a " box" built around the position of interest by inserting assemblies at adjacent locations to provide restraint.
k. , e. If the nomal,on-index or alternate off-index
' (Appendix B) fuel handling methods cannot seat a fuel assembly (1) when its core space is partially occupied by an adjacent assembly (2), the handling sequence of those assemblies should be revised.
Place those two interacting assemblies into suitable temporary storage locations. Then, using assembly (1) and any others as needed, complete a " box" (per _ Y.C.6.d above) eround the core position that will
{[4 receive assembly (2). Lower assembly (2) into the completed box.
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f. If *the top of an assembly to be removed from the core is out of position such that the refueling machine gripper fingers cannot latch on the top nozzle, the , crsne position should be adjusted laterally as j
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necessary to permit the guide pins in the tool head
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to enter the top nozzle core pin holes. Fv11owing , engagement, the crane should be moved back to index ' manually or by use of electric inching device before G latching and lifting is attempted. Fuel assembly e, O lateral deflection limits (Section IV.G.2) must be observed.
, 7. Viewing and Inspection During axial movement's of fuel assemblies into or out of the core, observers should be positioned to pemit-
; unobstructed viewing and inspection. For new cores, , '
observers should be positioned at the reactor vessel.
! flange on diagonally opposite sides of the core such that e each observer can monitor two sides of an assembly. For refueling operations, the observers should be positioned on the ocerating deck and equipped with binoculars for closer viewing.
8. Procedure in Case of Camage - . In case of damage or suspicion of damage to a fuel V .p. assembly, that assembly is to be set aside and either the Westinghouse NFD/NSID on-site representative or NFO Fuel Projects contacted for instruction on further actions or disposition.
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APPENDIX A
Supplementary fuel Handling Instructions for Standard 16x16 and 17x17 Fuel Assemblies
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I. Purpose
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(' The purpose of this document is to define recornended fuel handling instructions that minimize the potential for damage from grid corner interaction.
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!!. Application ,
n O 1" <oiio <# i#str#ctio#s >re reco ae 4 ror i#cor. <# i-handling optrations involving standard Inconel grid 16x16 and 17x17 fuel assemblies not having the improved anti-snag grids whenever adjacent double vacancies ("L" shaped) and adjacent vacancies (Figure 1 & 2) cannot be avoided. Figure 3 illustrates
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the features which distinguish the anti-snag grid from the standard grid. .
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These instructions are optional for all other feal assembly designs, including 14x14 and 15x15. .
. !!!. Closing Vacancies in the Core A. Closing "L" Shaped Yacancies (See Figure 1).
{ Doth end vacancies ("EY") should be loaded first; the corner
. vacancy ("CV") ;hould be loaded last.
Note Maximum refueling machine hoist speed is 7 f t/ min (Section V.C.2.c of F-5).
1. Position the refueling machine such that the fuel assembly being loaded into the end vacancy is 1/4 to 1/2 core pitch off position into the vacant corner core location ("CV") (See Figure 4). . 2. Lower the fuel assembly into the core until the bottom nozzle of the fuel assembly is approximately 6 inches
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above the lower core plate.
n.* 3. Move the refueling machine laterally by the inching
*
device or manually until the fuel assembly is in its proper core location.
4 Lower the fuel assembl m core plate guide pins.y until it is seated on the lower ,
.
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.
WESTINGHOUSE PROPRIETARY F-S. Rev. 8 1482F:6 Page Al of All-v l i- _
n
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-
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r- 5. The remaining end vacancy ("Ev") should be loaded per s ( steps A.) through A.4 above. (see Figure 5).
- 6. Center the fuel assembly being loaded into the corner vacancy ("CV") over the vacant corner location.
7. Lower the fuel assembly into "CY" until the fuel assemoly~ i is seated on the lower core plate guide pins.
.. B. Closing Adjacent Vacancies (See Figure 2).
Adjacent vacancies represent a partially filled "L" shaped vacancy.
' C~' 1. One vacancy should be considered an end vacancy "Ev" and the other a corner vacancy "CY" for the following
, instructions (See Figure 4. " Step 4").
2. Load fuel assemblies into the adjacent vacancies per steps A.5, 6 & 7 above.
IV. Creating Yacancies in the Core
'
A. Creating "L" Shaped Vacancies (See Figure 6).
The corner fuel assembly ("CA") should be removed from the core first; the end fuel assemblies ("EA") should be removed
.
last.
4 Note: Maximumrefuelingmachinehoistspeedis7ft/mkn
,, (Section V.C.2.c of F-5).
1. Position the refueling machine above the carner fuel assembly ("CA"). 2. Lif t the corner fuel assembly out of the core.
. 3. Position the refuel ng machine atiove an end assembly (See Figure B).
4 Lift the fuel assemt.ly approximately 6 inches above the lower core plate.
' *
*
. 5. Move the refueling machine laterally by inching device or manually until the fuel assembly is 1/4 to 1/2 core pitch off position into the vacant corner location ("CY").
6. Lif t the fuel assembly 'out of the core.
.. 7. Remove the ramaining end assembly ("EA") from the core
{']
_ per steps A.3 thru A.6 above (See Figure 9).
. %s
.
WESTINGHOUSE PRCPRIETARY F-5. Rev. S 1482F:6 Page A2 of All v
n ,
,
B. Creating Adjacent Vacancies (See Figure 7).
, Adjacent fuel assemblies represent a partially opened "L"
=> k; c. -
shaped vacancy.
1. One fuel assembly should be considered an end fuel assem-bly "EA" and the other a corner fuel assembly ("CA") for the following instructions.
("
., 1 ,, 2. Remove the adjacent fuel assemblies from the core per steps A.1 thru A.6 above.
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, t- WESTINGHOUSE PROPRIETARY F-5. Rev, 8 1482F:6 Page A3 of All
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\ \ ' \.s ! l Stationary Fuel
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FIGURE 1. "L" $HAPED VACAtiCY TO BE CLOSED .
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.\ Stationary Fuel
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s yr--v- , xg "' -
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. Direction of _ Filled Core g g Location I ,gFuel Movunent Location LEY- - J LIV _ __ j ,\-
Steps 1 & 2 Step 3 Step 4
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FIGilRE 5 - PROCEDURE III.A.5 A7 of All
.
_ _ _ __ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ . _ . . . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ - _ . _ _
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U FIGURE 6 "L" SHAPED VACANCY TO 3E CREATED
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' FIGURE 7 - ADJACENT VACANCIES TO BE CREATED
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iVx - F - - ~I I l Being liaridled I l l
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Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 . ,. FIGURE 8 - CRFATING AN "L" $11 APED VACANCY (STEP IV.A.3 TilR00Gi A.6)
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I- 7 I l I I I i I s l ' LEV j {V~~ Direction of EV Fuel Movement b - _ _.I , 5tep 1 step 2 , Step 3
.
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FIGURE 9 - CRE, TING AN "L" $HAPED VACANCY (STEP IV.A.7) All of AII
. -
B .
.
-
APPENDlX B ^ ~' INSTRUCTIONS FOR OFF-INDEX FUEL ASSEMBLY CORE !NSERTION/WITHORAWAL 1. Purpose
. . The purpose of this document is to define recomended alternate ,
m fuel handling instructions for the insertion / withdrawal of fuel ! assemblies in core. The procedure pemits off.index location cf l the refueling machine during part of the aperation when i sufficiently large core vacancies pemit :nuauvering of the fuel assembly being handled.
r The condition of the fuel assemblies (for example bow, tilt, E t twist or out-of-plumb) may make them more susceptible to damage l or difficult to place in the proper core location if the refueling machine remains on index during the entire insertion / withdrawal operation. This alternate procedure provides a recomended method to avoid those problems.
- II. Application '
This procedure may be used for any Westinghouse fuel assembly design when in the judgement of the responsible fuel handling
,
operation supervisor, considering the possibility of inadvertent lateral fuel assembly movements incore, use of the procedure will g reduce matipulation and possible damage of fuel assemblies during
; fuel assembly core insertion / withdrawal operations.
This procedure cannot be used in those situatienc where the procedure of Appendix A applies.
III. Withdrawing / Inserting fuel Assemblies The quantity and location of core vacancies relative to the fuel assembly being handled detemine the maximum pemissible refueling machine hoist speed between the required slow :enes (section V.C.2.b of Westinghouse Specification F-5). Figures 1 s 2 depict typical situations and the corresponding maximum hoist
. speeds.
w ,, a
'
Y A. Withdrawing Fuel Assemblies from Core Refueling machine assumed initicily on index and gripper latched.
3 1. Lift the' fuel assembly from the core pins until the fuel g assembly bottom nozzle is approximately 6" above the lower coreplate, w
. !
WESTINCiHOUSE PROPRIETARY F-5, Rev. 8 1482F:6 Page B1 of B3 v
- . . , . - . .,- , ,_ ._. - _ . . , _ . . _ _ _ _ . - ,
m. .. _ .,, _ . _ __.. .
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2. Move the refueling machine laterally by inching device or a (, , ' manually until the fuel assembly is a minimum of 1/4 core pitch off index into the vacant core location (s).
3. Lif t the fuel assembly from the core using the appropriate refueling machine hoist speed (see Figures i g and 2).
B. - Inserting Fuel Assemblies into the Core
,
Refueling machine assumed initially off index such that fuel assembi position corresponds to typical configurations of
.
Figure or 2.
m 1. Lower the fuel assembly into the core until the fuel assembly bottom nozzle is approximately 6" above the lower coreplate.
- 2. Move the refueling machine luerally by inching device or
,
manually until the fuel as embly is in its proper core location. ,. C' , 3. Lower the fuel assembly onto the lower coreplate guide pins.
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E WESTINGHOUSE PROPRIETARY F-5. Rev. B 1482F:6 Page B2 of B3 v ' _ - - ,,, -- , -- -,-
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g-1/4 to 1/2 Core Pitch 'o Vacant L l jj ll l Core Location L _. J L_ _1 L_ _ J Maximum refueling machine hoist speed 7 f t/ min between slow zones when anyone ,..
'
side of fuel assembly being handled < 1/2 core pitch away from adjacent fuel assembly / core support surface FIGURE 1 EEPRESENTATIVE CONFIGURATION - ONE OR MORE FUEL ASSEMBLY / CORE SUPPORT SURFACES CLOSER THAN 1/2 CORE o!TCH
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i Maximum refueling mchine hoist speed 21 f t/ min between slow :enes when all sides of fuel assembly being handled 11 /2 core piten away fr:: adjacent
,
fuel assembly / core support structure
. .
FIGURE 2 - REPRESENTATIVE CDNFIGURATION . ALL FUEL ASSEMBLY / CORE , SUPPORT SURFACES MORE THAN 1/2 CORE PITCH AWAY B3 of 33 u .
- , . , . _ _ . _
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NTD F-SPECIFICATION P.EV1510N RECORD
< '
F-$FECITICATION pt T-$
.
g g o ifEW AND PARTIALLY $ PENT TUEL ASSEMBLIES
.
REVISION RECORD .f* REY. # ECN # ISSUE DATI _ PREPARED BYt _ APPR_0VED BY1 , a soooo wnues QtQ Ngjp ^ , - . c. - t
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IDENTIFICATION E'ISION ORIGDIAL SUTERS OES NUMBER CA 3 IEW CATED IESUE FREVIOUS RFV
- F-5 05/16/72 9 12/02/06 X TITM I ATIACME7IS
~
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A h I I
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l INSITUCTIONS, PRECALTIONS, AND LIMIT 7d"ONSl [ FOR HANDLIm NEW AND PAPTIAllX SFnTT FUEL i ASSnmTm l l
,, I u I i l i *
l- WEsTnorESE FFCPRE?rARY CATA Ihis decrent is the propen of and contairs infornation ownal by the Westing.,mse Electric Corporation, Itaclear Energy Systes, ard is transmitted to you in confidence ard trust ard is to be returned upon reqacst. Ni %.9ssion is gr:mttd to pablish, repmtace, tra.wJ.t, er disclose t:. w/ ..r any infomation centained in this dec=ent, in stole or in gud, w2hout the prior written permissio 1, in each case, of an authori::ed c:ployee of said corporatic.. hTSIDGICUSE E2CIRIC CCFICFATICN ltaclear Energy Sys*m - _
;3 FC Bcx 355 Pittsbu~,h, PA 15230 i
_ AFrPOVAL ORGANIZATION I Fr4 9 (ECT 80011) i Frl i Fr/ NFD F"n SUPICRI o
~ ,
ON(ONS M] I5dpSe l l 4 1 l
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' F% EMm" W#^d4Me1 NSID-FL" 9G l
.( g 'fg/ @ d , y e). 3tI I -
i STR/ ICES r ,v hNI j L i
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ASSUPANCE } I7~ I
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- 1 cf 23
~
- . , . . .
.
B: ~ ,_ y OP-F- 5 R .4 ' ' nr f.. . TMi1E OF CCUIDTIS
' ^
1.0 Purpose
. -2.0 Description of W el Ass % 1y '
3.0 Definitions
%' -
3.1 Standard Fuel , 3.2' optimized Nel
'
3.3 Uniform core- , 3.4 Mixed Core 3.5 Dry Conditions 3.6 Wet Canditions 4.0 - Equiptet
- 4.l' E511pment Checkout
, -4.2 Hardling Tcols l 4.3 Petualirg Machine Trip-Limits l 5.0 Wal Handling Corditions ard Precautions
! 5.1 Protective Ccner 5.2 Nel Assembly Storage ard Handlirg (General) O 5.3 Frue Standing Nel Assembly - > 5.4 Nel Assembly Imad Points 5.5 W al Assembly Contact with Structures and Hartere 5.6 Debris F 5.7. Visibility 6.0 Wal Hedling Instructions aM Procedures
%- 6.1 General .
k,; 6.2 Fuel Hardling '- Fuel Buildirq 6.3 Fuel Handlirq - Cantairraent Btildhg-6.4 Procatm for Special Wel Handling 7.0 Procedure in Case of Enmage g - Attac.5ents: - Table 1 - Befueling Machine Trip Limits a Table 2 - Pafueling Blilding Hoist Speedt
--
w Table 3 - Refuelirg Machine Hoist Speeds AeW l - Schematics ard Guidelines for Fuel Hanilirg
-: t -
c, .
\ ,
4.
,
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i 9- -2 cf 23-
*
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.
g, c 0P-F- 5 R.O DISTIUCTIONS, PRECAUTIONS AND LDGTATIONS IDR HANDLDC NEW AND PARTIAILY SPDir R*EL ASSDNM
,
l ANY Pf0 BIDS DiCDUNTERED Di MEETDC OR DirERPRETDG THE LIMITS AND
- 00NDITIONS OR ANY ONER PART OF THIS SPECIFICATION ARE TO BE BROUGHT 70 THE AITDTTION OF THE NFD PRO 7. ECT DGDEER 1.0 RTRIOSE n The purpose of this document is to prevent darage to new or partially spent fuel assemblies by identifyLN general _
instructions, precautions ard limitations to be observed during the handling of those assemblies. Westinghouse rheds that NED B.lel Projects be contacted before handling any fuel to determine if any additional specific handlire instructions ray apply.
2.0 DESCRIPTION CF RTL ASSDELY Rod cluster C uavl (RC.C) type fuel assembly design results from efforts te (a) obtain a horogerecus centrol material
^ "_
distribution, (b) minimize neutron absorbirg structural raterials, and (c) promote flow mixirg within and between fuel s ===hlies in the reactor core. The struct:.nl integrity of the fuel asse21y is msintained by functional parts within the a % 1y called a skaleton. The skeleton is formed by attachi m the RCC guide thi& les to the fuel asse21y top and bottcm nozzles and to the fael red support grids at each grid loca* den. 4 The grids, which are spaced strategically alorg the lemth of the fuel assembly, uxhul the lateral spacing of the guide thi21es
' and fuel reds. Grids provide both lateral and axial support for the fuel rods by mears of sprims and dirples formed-as in*@
pa.rt.s of the grid straps in each grid cell location. The resulting assc21y has been tes*ad aM confirmed to be of g sufficient strength ard' integrity to withstand any norral shippirg, handlirg and cptirq loads;
-t Because of the asse21y' flexibility _ aM the exposed cordition of the. fuel reds, care must be exercised in scrkirg with ard arcuM the fuel asse211es during hardlirg ard stcrage. For this reason the limitations and precautions defined in this document must be '- observed to preclude fuel dr. age.
M s- 3.0. DEFDTITICriS The fuel asse21y types, cero types, and hardling ceniitions are defined telev. tm XIR de;ig ation applies *w " extra-1crg" fuel v asse211es. These have wtive fuel lengths of appredrately 14
, #eet as ccwM to 12 feet which applies to nest fuel designs.
a 3 cf 23 i
.
-1 f4 is
"
,
s
- OP-F- 5 R.0 ('
, --
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3.1 Stardard - (STD) Fuel Asschly - conta3Jting Inconel grids at each grid location.
.- ! 3.2 Optimized (CFA) Fuel Assetly .- containirq all Zircaloy
!: **
grids except for the eM grids, kttich are Inconel. For the m purposes of this procedure, this includes Vantage !; fuel
- which is similar to 0FA fuel but has an intermiinte flow mixer (IIM) grid between the structural grids of the three uppermost spans.
M ' 3.3 Uniform-core - 2e fuel beirs handled is all of the same type, either all standard (STD) or all optimized fuel (OFA).
- f assemblies. .
3.4 Mixed-cere - ne fuel beiry handled is a mixture of staniard and optimized fuel assemblies. (Typically wet ceniition , cnly) l 3.5 Dry ceniitier_a - those situations sters the fuel assemblies are not submerged in water while scvirg between the trarsfer system and the core (typically this cordition exists during first core inaM ng where the water level in the vessel is at the v w al nozzles, the transfer canal is flocded to a level '
.
just above the tracks, and the reminfer of the reac*wr -
.
cavity and stcrage areas are dry) . .
.
3.6 Wet conditions - those situatiers stere the fuel asserblies are submerged in water khile revig between the transfer system aM the ccre (typically this cordition exists during a refueling stere the water level in the reacter cavity is
; just below the operating deck).
NCTE: - The p:u-garational checkout of refueling eqaipment is a special ccndition. In this cire.mance the
- agaipnent may be expletely dry aM cnly a deny fuel assembly is used. Because bucrfancy is not a facecr,
- .(
the tdp limits for wet conditions should be used for
-
this case. After flooiirg the trip limits should be
.
rechecked.
1-3.7 Modified Grid Corners - grids which for all configaratiers (14x14 thirugh 17x17) have steeper corner charfers to reduce their pc*antial for corner grid interaction. L7 the case of-C, ' 17x17 ard 16x16 a gaide tab (bottcm) ard short vane (top) have been a+ini between t% first two grid' cells f:tra cach :
: 'Q"." ,., , . corner to further avoid grid interaction and darage, j
- 4.0 EQUIF.DTI l
;
W 4.1 F4 1pmenc C:ecka.:t i i The utility shculd centact Westingboase er the eqaipw:t - supplier to have a ec=plete checkout of the cranes ard j 4 of 23
.
,
n c 03-F- 5 R.0
. .
- refuelirq eqaipment prior to initiatim core loading er refaelirg in acconiance with F-8 (Ital Assembly Stcrage aM Pafuelig Equipmnt Design Interface Specification) . It is re:o= ended that any hoists used for handlig fuel asserblics be equipped with a load sensirg system to allow the operator to monitor axial leads to which the fuel
~ asserbly may be subjected.
4.2 Handlirq Tools A Fuel asserblies shall be haMled only by tools and eqaipment specifically designed ard provided for that purpose, n. Equipment such as siirgs or cables shall not be attached directly to fuel assemblies for handlig pu w.. Handlirg tools shall not be stcred in a fuel asserbly or ccre camponent.
4.3 Refuelirg Mac. hine Trip Limits
-
M use of the la m e variatien in weight between various fuel asserbly/ core component c=rbinations, speed of movements and relative response time of equipment and operators,5the. refuelig machine trip limits alone cannot prevent detrimental loads frt:st being applied to fuel anamblies. L'Ihe Operator Ioad Limits (Section.6.3.3) musti-(, -be strictly r+=aamd, in order to Im+n the possibility of k adverse loads during fuel handli g operations.
h Pafuellrq Machine Trip Limits ~ast be set prior to fuel handling operaticns. D.e limits selected depeni upon stether the fuel asserblies bedre haniled are all of the same type ard stether the hanilirs ccnditions are wet or dry, as defined. Once set, the trip limits snould nc = ally retain unchag ed for the h tien of the taal ha.M1irq operations.
' he refueling machine trip limits per Table 1 are set as ,_ follows:
'
4.3.1 2.e refaelirg rachine load cell should be calibrated and adjusted to rutimize cperational carpirg and cbtain the most sersitive cperation.
4.3.2 Utilizing either a dummy fuel assembly and red 1 cluster control assembly .(Paa) cor a standard fuel
/M aummhly anl PCCA,- set the autanatic liftig trip limits and lowerirg trip limits (if available) per Table 1 as appropriate. In the case of mixed cores, the STD fuel assembly should be used to set limits.
" If a du:=y fuel asserbly and RCCA are used to set the trip limits, the weight cf the first S D fael . asscrbly (OFA if uniform Optimized cere) contai .irg 5 of 23 %
@ ~
03 :- 5 R.0
,~ () 9 9'
an RCCA must be ccr# with the veights Mr Table 1 aM the trip limits adjusted as neamn to correct
-
for differe:ces.
'
(~ 4.0.2.1 latch the fuel assembly and RCCA. Carefully - . position the assembly so that it is empletely submerged with the bottm no::le apprt:xirately 6 inches fIun the transfer system upMer baseplate for wet conditions and 6 inches frun the reactor lower % coreplate for dry canditions.
'r% ~ 4.3.2.2 Pecord the suspeMed weight iniicated by the load cell.
4.3.3.3 Setjthe1 Lifting 1 Trip lLimitysf atiTMkiof the isuspended weight,>plus valbasilista8 Vin i6 Table'lt , To minimize the possibilities of damgig l fuel asseoblies, it is recommended that lower values than the da e ibed trip limits be used, if practical. 'Ihis is a-vlished
~ -
by adjusting the limits as low as possible while precluding spurious overload /uMerload alm.
5.0 IUEL IMDIING CCNDITIONS AND FRECN1IIONS 5.1 New niel Protective Liners
.
niel asse-blies are shipped enclecod in thin polyethylene liners) Liners are lcng enough to be closed arou d the fuel assembly tcp and bottm, and are folded back flush with bottom no::le g aM slightly aheve the top no::le. 'Ihey are, thus, open at the top and bottm no::le for drairage purposes. It is re + - - eMed that fuel liners be rencved prior to fuel a ' stcrage to prevent their gatheri g and potentially damagig the feel..
. If the asserblies are stored in the liners, the liner =ast either rerain cpen at the bottcra rc::le as received or if IQ clcsed urder the bottm no::le, a slit (cpening) shou'd be made en each side near tne bcttam nc::le. S e liners =ust be pulled taut, and shculd be sec.:ured to the fuel assembly by taping a* both the tcp and bottm no::les to preclude ' bun:hing ard gathering which ray result in fuel assebly darage during revements.
Sterage areas m.:st be reascrably clean ard free of airtorne debris and contamirants when fuel assemblies are being V 6 of 23
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N \
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03-F- 5 RM j z g W - hardled ard particularly if fuel is stored without protective . liners as rh.azded.
~' f-. 5.2 Fuel Assably Storage 'ard Hardling (General)
L - New fuel assenblies zust always be hardled and stored in the vertical position, except when in a shippire con *ainer.
A fuel assembly 'shall not be left unat*wded while in a 4 suspe.Med position.
g. 5.3 Tree Standity Ibel Assembly Fuel ===amblies shall not be left free standing, ie: not ergaged by hardliry tool or nanipulator or not having at ~ least one side adjacent'to another fuel webly, fixture or core st m. .
,
5.4 Fuel M=ambly load Points, Limits, a.d Deflections Any lateral loads applied to a fuel assembly for pt w. of guidance, support, or clampire shall be applied cnly at the grid.or= nozzle locations. Iateral deflection caused by a 1 r ,.. lateral load at the top nozzle shall be less-than 2 inches.
( 2he XIR fuel assembly top nozzle mounted guide pins, u.
although part of the top nozzle, are an exception and shall
. net be subjected to lateral Irw% beyond those nor: ally -
encountered in ergaging and unlatchirg hardlirg tools or - !
'
refueling machine gripper.
~ Any axial loads shall be applied only at nozzle locations and shall rot be applied to the fuel-assembly holddown-
. sprirns ucunted on the tcp nozzle. Axial loads applied to a fuel "-bly (except for support or liftirg) shall be less than 1200 pourds. Any event e>m"ive loads or deflections cr loads are applied to unacceptable load reints, _ shall:be - ,
"3 reported per Section 7.0. 1 5.5 Fuel Asse=bly C::ntact with Structures and Har tm l Centact with hart! ware that is not part of ncrmal fuel hardling (such as light standards) -is net pe=Jtted ard
shall be reported per Sectica 7.0.
' R i
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5.6 Debris Debris, particularly metal turnirgs or chips, cbserved on cr arord -a fuel assembly cculd result in fuel rod fruttirq and ultirately failures and must be rencved. Debris ;
' + obse:vations en a fuel assembly shall be repcrted per ~ Section 7.0.
, 7 of 23
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5. 7. Visibility
' . 5.7.1 Lighting and Water Clarity 'f ? Mequate lightig should be provided to establish
clear visibility in the fuel storage pool and core as rW. Supplemental lightig should be provided as required.
g Watar in the fuel storage pool and core should be-clear enough during periods of fuel movement to view o: the top of the fuel assemblies with supplemental lightig. Durig a core unload / reload, in addition
'
to the abcva require.m nts lower core support plate and pins must be visible with supplemen*al-lighting - in order to verify proper emagement of the bottan
, nozzle with icur coreplate pirs.
-, 5.7.2 Video Equip.nent video equipment should be available to permit clear or close-up vievig in the event of difficulties or-suspected ancmalies, f 6.0 FUEL HANDLIlG INSTRUCIICNS AND FFCCEDCRES 6.1 Ge. Tral Hoist sp u a, load limits ard trip set-poin*a as wil as other fuel handlig gaidelines are provided since operater s and equipment resperse ti:nes alone ray not be sufficio.nt *w preclude impe. Mig fuel darage.
6.1.1 Fuel Haniling CmW a In staffing the fuel hardlim cre% corsideration
*
shculd be given to assigniq the rest experierced
'
refuelig machine cpera*wrs to the in-core operations.
6.1.2 ~ Cw cicatiers
^
.
Clear methods ard channels of L .m ication should be
;$hh- established. All instructions and recommeniatiers *w fuel hardlers should be th:uagh the desigrated respersible superviser.
, 6.2 Fuel Handlig - Fuel Building
-
6.2.1 Shippig container Unicadim shall he per _ I Specification 7-4 (Site Fareval of Fuel Asse-blies v 8 of 23
.
OP-F- 5 R.0 x [\f-
- ,
frun Shippirg Containers & HaMliq of Shippirg Containers).
' II 6.2.2 Fuel Asse:rbly Haniliry Tool-Ergagement ^ Y. ' me fuel assebly handling tool shall be centered above the fuel assembly prior to the irsertion of the handling tool into the fuel assembly. Holst cable q should have no incre slack than ne*<sary for hardling - tool engagement. Slack should be taken up gradually a until some tersion is observed, f . O -6.2.3 Fuel Storage and/cr Transfer The fuel asser.bly shall be centered above the cell of . i the storage racks, trarsfer system, or elevater before insertion of the fuel assembly,
] *
I.ateral mvenent of the fuel hanilira hoist is strictly crohibited while any cart of the latched fuel assembly is irserted into the stcrace cells, transfer system or elevator. Any revements in excess of lir.its per Section 5.4 shall be reported per- ' Section 7.0.
6.2.4 Holst Speed in Fuel Building Holst speeds for fuel movement.s are as defined in Table 2. As nh a trarsition as possible should be exercised in changing hoist speeds.
6.2.5 Hoist Cable Tensionig The hoist cable slack should always be taken up gradaally so that at no time is the cable " snapped" taut, s 6.2.6 niel Asse:rbly Ioad Li:rdts - with Ioad Monitoring Device on Holst
.. -
The' opstor should closely renitor the load renitoring device durirg the process of lifting or IcNeriry of fuel as described below: a 6.2.6.-l. The c:rbirw:d suspenied wight of the fael M.A .. asse=bly, core carpenent ard handlig tcol should be noted W.en an asschly is picked up. i _ g. 6.2.6.2 Durity fuel asschly movement, the load renitori:q device readirg should -nor:nlly
>
not fall outside the rarge of the suspended - weight i 200 pcurds (except Wen the fael asschly is preperly positiened ard restirs U 9 of 23
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i
. ,m -
0?-F- 5 R.0 P S on its bottam noz le) . If these limits are.
ereeded reve:nent should step and the _, followirg actions taken to assess the _'
, problem before prWLrg.
6.2.6.3 If irscrting a fuel assembly into a fixture (storage rack, transfer system, or elevator) reverse direction, lift the fuel assably until it is clear of the fixture, check 4 alignment of the fuel assably with the fixture and reposition the fuel assebly if .n mury. . Upon reirsertion, if the lead readings again fall outside of the acceptable range, withdraw the fuel assembly, store it in another saltable location and determine the cause of excessive drag.
~ 6.2.6.4 If withdravirg a fuel -bly, reseat it in the fixe, unlatch liftirg tool, . check alignment of tool with fixture and repositien if necessary. Re-e. mage tool aM pra with withdrawal of fuel assembly.
If the lead readings again fall cutside the acceptable range, reseat fael assably,
-( . .
unlatch tcol and deteratine cause of excessive drag.- 6.2.6.5 If the load change durity fuel revement awe 400 pounds for new fael er'250
.
pounds for 1.%ted fael, _ the assebly should be examined for evide.Te of darage-ardireported per Section 7.O.
6.2.7 Wel Asse:-bly Icad Limits Withcx:t a Irad MoniterLg Device '
' operatiers withcut a Icad renitorirg device is not rr, n .; iaMed. If-cpen tions without a load renitoring device are neso?'y, aM there is-any irxiication ef excessive fuel assably drag, reve:nent should step aM the followirg actiers taken to assess the proble=. /IN Actions are as described in Section 6.2.6.3 ard *
6 2.6.4 above, erept ccerater will need to be
. -
especially alert for detecticn of excessive drag.
~ 6.3. Nel Handling - Cer: tai::ncr:t Buildirg s 6.3.1 Fuel Asse:tly ard Refae1Lg Machine PositienLg in , the X-Y Plane c 10 cf 23 . - - . .-. ._ .- ._. ...
. - - - . , . - - -.~ ~ - . - , - .- -..- .-.. - - . -.
-
.
O, i OP-F- 5 R.0 >
-Q :
n During fuel move::vmts of fuel asschlies into or out - of the core, observer (s) should be positioned to pe.mit unobstructed viewirg. For new cores, it is re? - erded at least 2 cbservers be positioned at the ,
(7._ -
reactor vessel flarge on diagonally opposite sides of
* '- -the core such that each observer can monitor two sides of an assably. For refuelirq .'perations, the cbservers should be positioned on the operatiry deck
' and equipped with binoculars fer closer viewirg.
'Ihe refueling machine gripper shall be centered above
;W the_ fuel assembly prior to irsertion of the gripper into the fuel assembly. *
6.3.2 Holst Cable Tersioning m 'Ihe re.foeling machine hoist cable slack should be taken up gra^ mily so that the cable is not " snapped" taut.
6.3.3 operator I.oad Li::dts-- cere, trarafer system, and , RCCA change fixture
:n #,
tese load limits are not refuelirg machine auta:natic - '
(v trip points. 'Ihese are limits the operator is requirtd to tenitor irdependent of the :sfuelirg machine trip limits.
'Iha operator should closely reniter the load cell irdicating device an the refuelig macnine during the
- pma of lift.ing or lowering of fuel as described l below.
l 'Ihe cambined suspended seight (SW) cf the fuel assembly, core went and gripper rart should-be
- O_ noted when an assebly_ is picked up.
' Se load durity fuel asse=bly revement should not , fall cutside the range tabulated belcw, except when the fuel assembly is rusting en its bottan no:::le.
'3 Fuel trarsfer f:un dry - Luight + 100 its to wet ceniitiers - 300 lbs v<h ' I Fuel trarsfer frun wet - weight - 300-lbs to dry conditiens - 100 lbs Fuel trarsfer in either - buight + 200 lbs fy -wet or d"f - 200 lbs
,
1 V 11 of 23
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y OP-F- 5 R.O IL i ,Md)- , If these limits are exceeded, reve:nent should stop and the following actions taken to assess the situation before pr W 4M.
f-
-!.' ~
6.3.3.1 Paverse the direction of reve:nent 4' apprcximately 2 inches.
r Adjust the lateral crane position ranually ; or by the separata electric inching circuit to recenter the suspended fuel asse:nbly, oi If these options. produce lead correction, proceed with revemnt. If not,' repeat.
6.3.3.2 If the load charge durim fuel reve:nent a*= 400 pounds for initial core loadig or 250 pounis for ccre reloads, the asse::bly
-- chall be examin=4 ard evidence of damage reported per Secticn 7.0.-
In the case where overload cccurs upon liftig of a fuel assembly, it may necessary to reseat the asse=bly and :m ove
, _ su M.g asse=blies to rake room for i
off-index removal of the asse:nbly. Ihe k. - surrounding asseoblies should be examined for evidence of damage.
6.3.4 Refueling Machine Hoist Speed r Holst spaar% when seating gripper mast onto fuel,
-insert. irs or withdrawing a fuel .bly from the RCCA charge fixture, transfer system or core are as defined in Table 3.
In the event of Ecued er _tvisted fuel asseblies,
& dixiication of_ lame lead variations er o+her handlira difficulties; the 1cuest avai.lable hoist steed should be used.
6.3.5 Ital Storage' and Trarsfer -
~~
De fuel asseobly should be centered '(en-irdex) above
.
the. reference ccre position er cell before irsertien APN of the fuel' asserbly eg for cases as described in secticn 6.4 belcu, interdad to mir" ire pcte.ntial for
- grid darage.
6.3.6 !ateral Mcyc:ents of Fuel Asschly v- .
, Any lateral reve:nent of the fuel asserbly sten net fully withdrawn shculd cnly he perferred with V 12 cf 23
_
,
r' M
== -
I s CP
-
5 R.v r. ; 2*% concurrence of the fuel handling supervisor and %dth obse: vers stationed to ::cnitor fuel novennnt.
'
.-
6.4 P:ocedure for Special Handliry
!
n 'Ihe operations described belcv together with Appeniix 1 (Guidelines for Adjacent Fuel Asserbly Novet) serve to facilitate the fuel hardlirg prccess stile minimi:irg the potential for fuel damge.
A 6.4.1. Cpen Water ?bverent - fuel revemnts should he r, planned and executed to minimi:e grid to grid interaction stenever possible. 'Ihis is effectively done by revirg fuel to open water, where open water is defined as having 2 or rcre irch space fram any adjacent fuel assembly face or corner.
., ' 6.4.2. Initial Coru Tmdirg - an exception to 6.4.1 above may be mvb durirq the initial core loadirs of all new fuel havirq "redificd" grid cerners. In tbla case fael ray be loaded on-index, since new feel is typically very straight ard the ::cdified corners rutre the potential for adjacent corner to corner
,_
interaction and damge. Alternatively or in the
'[ .
event difficulties are encountered the guidelines per Appendix 1 and "bcxirg" recc=eniations der.cribed telcw in 6.4.5 should be followed.
6.4.3 Refuelings - coru unloads and reloads necessita*a same adjacent fuel asserbly reverent to create open water a:tas during unloads er in closim cpen water areas during reloadirg. L7 these cases the guidelines as contained in Appendix 1 are to ce followed toward minimizing the potential for grid interaction and da:nge. Figures 1-3 of A;pndix 1 are suggested unloadirg segaences for 2, 3, and 4
* locp plants to facilitate reverents to cren wa*ar khile raintainig core couplirg.
6.4.4 Manual mnipulation of hoist cables is pemissible to (1) p:cperly align the gripper assc-bly with the tcp rc: '.le , (2) allcw engagenent of the bettcn no::le
'
witn lcwer cc:e pins, and (3) er facilita*2 fael i
#h ::cve:nent when difficulties in fael hardlig are errountered. A sthn release (s .appirg) of the cables is not per..lssible.
.
*
6.4.5 "Scxirg" cf Fuel - Ibel r.ay be "texed" as neuerf, ie: position fael asse- lies a:U.rd the desired location when difficulties are enemuntered in . alignirq the bottaa rc::le with the Icwer cereplaa pins.
- 13 of 23
. . - - - - - ----- . ,
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OP-F- 5 R,0
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.e 6.4.6 Off-irdex latchirq - A-fuel asse:rbly nay have its top i nozzle positioned too far off-index to latch. In
- this case the ranipulater crane position should be
.i- /^ adjusted so gripper asse::bly crgages the top nozzle,
!
'
then nove back on-index ranually or by electronic inchi q device and completa latchirq and liftirg.
6.4.7 Off-Index Insertion - Dimensional changes to , , irradiated fuel (bcW, twist & hangirg verticality)
- may prevent insertion. In this case raise the' fuel
.
assembly apptuximately 2 feet to allow for better 4 visability and reposition manually or by elechde inchirg device as required such that the assembly
- when lowered enters the interdad location, typically
, 1/4 off-index. Once insertion is initiated, return 2-to the pIuper index position again usirg manual or i inchirg device and slowly couplete insertien. :
s
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7.0 Procedure in Case of Inmage or Suspected Damage ,
In case of an ancanaly or suspicion of damage to a fuel asse:rbly, it should be set aside ard either the Westirr; house }ED or NSID ' on-site representative or }UD Fuel Projects contac"4 for i. instruction on further actions or dis;ceition.
3 , y
.-
!i ! ID ! _, I
- Q
" ;A %
J fv' 4 j l
v 14 of 23 i
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c . m I 02-F- 5 R.0 o TABIE 1
^
REnELDG 1%Q1INE 'IRIP ID!IIS r 1; (See Notes 1 & 2 below) n . M ing IlftinJ (Ioad Reduction) Reactor Core Makeuo M 2;y .W et or Drv All fuel but XIR fuel
,"
Unifom Core 250 350 250
' Mixed n " t175 -
1325) > t(yfDifuel%=manMy'- totbe:usedito? set'11mit) c. i XLR Riel Unifom 300 350 250 *
-{L IUIE 1 Tabulated limits are mxhn values above the suspended-weight of fuel ambly and RCCA in pcxrris. Values within these ranges are r=O- = adai so lcrs as they do not result
, in e2=ess spurious alarms.
. . I ICIE 2 In the event a' Masted n:el Handlirq Machine is used in the - , niel Bindirq then Trip Limits for Wet-Coniitions apply.
NCTE 3.. In the event of difficulties in meeting the abcve load , limitations because of site specific bouancy' effects of
- . , haniling equipment, the limits my be redified-accorMdly
'" so long as the same relative r.L71n to limits is raintained. ~
.
. !
- 1:
l , .M % - je
...
.
.
- .-
- u 15 of 23
' w - - , ... ++- ,-,' ,. - , . ,
~
.__-_____ - -_ __-__- - - - ,
C?
:- 5 R.0
- !
TTaII 2 1
, IUEL DJIIIDG HOIST SPEEDS t . .
Zones Hoist \ Speed A. Guiding ard scatirg of hanilirg *ml 7 f*M raxinum onto fuel assembly B. Fuel assembly bottan nozzle approxirately 7 ft/ min raxira 0 10" above to 10" belcu top of cell funrel er within 10" of full d 4n C. Outside :enes above 21 ft/ min raxima
- -
. ( , ~. -
_ 4R%
, . 16 cf 23
',
.l
% .. Q4 m QF-F- 5 R,0 l
,
R:'
'
_ TABE 3 , PDVELDG MACElNE ICIST SPEECS
,..~
l" . . s ,. As smooth a transition as possible shculd be exercised in chargirg hoist speeis.
Zones Hoist \ Speed A. Seatirg of gripper mast onto lowest available hoist 3 fuel asse21y speed (3 ft/ min raxbm.)
B. Insertirq fuel sten 10" lowest available hoist above to 10" below the speed (3 ft/ min raxi=rn) top of seated fuel assemblies or within 10" of fit 11 down position C. Ebel move::ents sten adjacent 3 ft/ min or as slow es to a fuel asse21y, core practical based upon support surface but outside @ pment limitations of limitatiens above but not to exceed 7 ft/rdn ^ '~
< D. Ibel movements when away-from 21 ft/ min maximum (;, all adjacent fuel or core support surfaces and outside limitations abcrm
- or-
~
When fuel a - kly clearly 21 ft/ min = v4= 7 above the tcp of seated fuel assemblies and outside of limitaticra above D.
r-
..
J
,Mk g.
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s 17 of 23
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7,
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==* y i
*
i AFFDDIX 1 GJIDElrE IVR ADTACOTT It"iL ASSD'.BLY FDVDE2fIS
,- ,
s
.- General Guidelines:
1. Maxirl:e incverents to or frcan open water to rdnirize relative grid to gdd interaction.
^ 2. Lifts and insertion to be at as slw a specd as possible wttile
' - clcsely ::eniterlig lead indica *wr.
Specific Guidelines: 1. 'Ihe fellwirg guidelines are primrily intended for fuel with
'%Mied" grid ccrners and for 17x17 and 16x16 fuel exhibiting envelope ceniitions (bcw, tvist, etc) which increase the risk of grid interaction and damge curirg adjacent *uel asse bly reve:ments.
'Ihese guidelines are optional for 15x15 and 14x14 with ":nodified" cerners but could be used if ha.Mii.7 difficulties are g encounte.M.
\
'~
2. If fuel envelope conditions such is lxM shcw directiend teniencies duri.7 unload or 1rv -'im, then the core leadirq sequence should be planned er altered so the cbserved terde:rf
:nay assist in the positioni.N cf the b-ttam nozzle ento the lower ceroplate pins.
3. Particular cautica needs to be exercised sten closing (irserting the last asserbly) er opening (re::cvig the first asse.bly) fnn a rw.
~ Case 1 - Asserbly enclosed en four sides (bcxed) by fuel asse.ctlies er baffle surfaces 1 I I l a lXlXlXl l l l l 1. Irsertien - en index at sicv speed m l l l l lXl lXl 2. Withdrawal - en-irdex at s1cv speed I l l I I I I I IXlXlXi i l l I
'
13 of 23
.. . . . . .
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. ..
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-- - . ~ . - - . - -. . -.- - - .-.-.. - .-
6-- .. . 4- ,
, . 3P-F- 5 Re,0 .a:
'( ,
a e W _
,
Case 2 - Asse21y enclosed on three sides by fuel asse lies er baffles
, [ ~
l j -l
+.
XlXl l 1 1. Insertion - locate so that center within 2" 1 -ll l or 1/4 grid width of true center then lower l X ll 2 l at slw speed 1 II I A j. l l 2. Withdraw - lift approximately 6" to clear ' g' l X_l X l lower ocreplate pins then: . l l l a. -if clear to move to open water then do so at slow speed usirg manual or electronic inchirq b. if no a- to. cpen water, rove slowly off-center 2"'or apprcximately 1/4 grid
, width ard lift at slow speed Case 3 - Mehly enclosed on 2 right argle sides 1 I I l
> ,( k" i X l X l X-l l l l l 1. Insertion - lower until clear ofl lower l l ' coreplate pins (6 frc:n bottam) . Usirr _
-
l X _l manual er electronic incidrg mcVe in one - l l l l direction to irdex then the other to iMex l. l l 3. l ard then lower at _ slow speed IXl -l I-
-l l- 2. Withdrawal - straight lift until clear of pins at slow speed then using ranual or electronic inchirg rcve to clear wa*a.r Case 4 - Asse21y adjace.nt to one other fuel asse2 1y 1- ; I l X l_ X l -'
l 1- l 1. Insertion - an irdax in ene dim: tion .ut l- l l l l clear of asse ly lower until clear of lower-gx l X-l X j l'4 l cereplate pins (6" frun bottom) . ' LMex +w l l_l - l true center and lower at slow specd
. I i l~l lXlXl _2. ' WitMrawal - Lift en irdex at slow speed l l l until clear of pins (6") then jeg *w clear d water ard withdraw w 19 of 23
. e, n , pr~ - ,ev... ,-. - - , , , - , - - -n e,<~-, , -- w , -- -
.
I , .W .
'
OP-F- 5 R.0 ayep -
.
Case 5 - Double Opening
'- =
.
l l- l l
' l- - 4 +. :
1 X l X l X-l
'O l 1- l- l 1. Withirawal l i l l lXl lXl -a. Lift either assebly at slow speed
l- i l' I b. Lift adjacent assembly to clear lower
, l l- 5 l l coreplate pins, index 2" (1/4 width IX1 lXl of grid) into vacant oore location.
- !-, l l ard continue lifting at slow speed l l
. .
i- '2. Irsertion - perfor:n sequence of oW7tions { in reverse of above to insert fuel i
!
f w.
~ l- case s "La shape ope. ting .
-
t, -: I I I I 1 4 _ lXlXIXl ! /- l l l l 1. Withdrawal ' i ~ i l I 11
- -I X l l 6 ll a.- Lift center a - kly at slow speed l l_,] ll b.-- Lift assembly cne leg of L to clear.
i l l -l _1 lower cereplate pirs - index 2" . (1/4 - _lXl_ l :: l widtn of grid) into vacant core location l, l- l l l -- ard lift at slow speed 3 - F v at b for assembly on'seccnd leg of-L- _ 2. - Irsertion _ perfcrm segaence of operations in reverse of above to insert fuel
ib
- ,,.
,
, s t .t.
- 1
e s j- . i-i-- . f
*#
20 of 23
~. .-
_ - . . . . - _ . , -, , . . - , _ _ _ , . _ . . . -
x p-F-
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'
5 R.C
=_ >
SRD d';;},l. , N- M L K J -H G F E D C -B A
.
. 117 120 119 _ _y
* ~' 115- 114 113 112 111 110 109 -
-2
-- - . .
108 107 106 104 102-105 103 101 100 _ _)
.-
55 56 57 58 79 80 75 27 26 25 24 _ _4 m +. . . 47 48 49 50: 73 74 72 19 18 17 16 -
-- 5 33 35 39 42 45 68 -70 64 14 11 8 4 2
1 32 . 34 - - 34 41 64 66 67 63 13 - 10 7 3 1 y C-36 - 37 ' 40 - 43 46 69 - 71 65 15 12 9 6 5
51' 52 53 . 54 74 77. 75 23 22 21 20 g
-
59 60 61 62 82 83 81 31 30 29 28
, ,-.. 10
_( ' M- *
'92 91 90 89 88 87- 86 85 84
,
99 98 97. 96 95 94 93
- 'j 118 121 -116 y)
-
{C1 . < d . SRD.
t 9 SRD-_- Source Range Detector . 2 LOOP CORE
1 . NOTE: - Letter and number sequencing associated with core locations' are-- - ..#- - arbitrary. The fuel nssembly withdrawal sequence should be based
- on detector location as indicated on-the map. The unload sequence should start 90' from: source range detector.
- -
%i
.
FIGURE 1 1
21 ef 23
___ ____ _-_____ ___ _ __ _ ___ _ . _. . .
... . . . . . . . .
.
.
..
. .ne a
'
...,
'
OP-F- 5 R0
.. Jd ~SRD.
R'- P- -N M L K J H G F E. -D C B A __ 154 156- 152-- ,, _y k 151 150' 149 148 - 147 146 4 ,, -- -2' 144
'
143 -142 141 140 139 134 137 136 -
-3 O 135 '134 133 132- 131- 130 129 128. 127 126 125 ;
_ _4 Q: _ . [= 67 68 69 70 71 93 94 92 33 32 31 30 29 _ _$ l ! 57 54 59 60 61 87 88 86 23 22 21 20 19 -
-6 40 42 46 49 52 55 82 M 75 18 15 12 9 4 2
o 39- 41 49 44 51 54 80 al 77 16 13 -to 7 3 1 g
.___
43 44 47 50 53 56 83 85 79 17 14 11 8 6 5
,g 62 63 64 65 66 90 91 89 28 27 26 25 24 10-(-
,
_- r2 73 74 75 76 96- 97 95 34 37 36 35 34
.u 108 107 106 105 104 103 102 101 100' 99 98
CK 117 116 115 114 113 112 111 110 109
__ 124 123 122- 121 120 119: 118
153 157 155
J :.
::- p SRD SRD - Source Range Detector
[D 3 LOOP CORE ~ NOTE: -Letter and number sequencing associatad-with core locations are 9 arbitrary. The fuel assembly withdrawal sequence should be based-on detector location as indicated on the map. The unload secuence should start-90* from source range detector.
~ FIGURE'2 Y.
22 of 23l
,A
_ . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ . . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ - . - . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ . . . _ . _ _ _
,
-
. ee N- C ..
OP-F- R.0
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j: SRD R P -N M L K- J H G F E D C B A 180 181 182 193 185 184 183 - _ _y m-169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 _ _g
-
156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 1M 167 168 _ _3 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 111 152 153 154 155 _ _4
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58 ~ 59 60 70 TT 84 , 104 105 103 42 35 28 18 17 16
52 53 54 68 75 82 98 99 97 40 33 26 12 11 10
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47 48 5i 66 73 80 92 . 93 87 38 31 24 9 6 5
_ 43 45 49 64 71 78 88 89 85 36 29 22 7 3 1 g i 44 44 50 65 72 79 90 91 86 37 30 23 8 4 2
* $5 56 57 67 74 81 95 % 94 39 32 25 15 14 13
(' 61 62 63 69 76 83 101 tc2 100 41 34 27 21
_ 20 19 )
106 107. 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118
E 119 920 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 123 129 130 131 _ 13
.132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139- 140 141 142
186 187 1s8 192 191 190 189
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, SRD SRD - Source Range Detector u. .
/^ 4 LOOP CORE
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NOTE: Letter and number sequencing associated with core locations are
- arbitrary. The fuel assembly withdrawal sequence should be based on detector location as indicated on the map. The unload sequence *
should, start 90 *from source range detector.
FIGURE 3 V 23 e
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CNFD F SPECIFICATION y. IDENTIFICATION- REVISION- ORIGINAL - SUPERSEDES
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NUMBER DATED- NUMBER DATED ISSUE PREVIOUS REV. , F5 05/16/72 l'1 03 / ?n'69 X l
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TITLE I ATTACHMENTS 1
$ INSTRUCTIONS, PRECAUTIONS, AND l
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' LIMITATIONS FOR HANDLING NEW AND l PARTIALLY SPENT FUEL ASSEMBLIES l kb
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.- WESTINGHOUSE PROPRIETARY DATA This document is the property of and contains information owned by the
,, ' Westinghouse Electric Corporation, and is transmitted'to you in ' confidence and trust-and is to be returned upon request. No permission Lis--;; ranted to publish, reproctuce, transmit,-or disclose to another any ,_ informat. ion contained in this document, in whole or in part without the ' prior written permLssion. in each case, of an authorized employee o'f said corporation.
? WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION P. O. Box.355-Pittsbur5 ,- h PA 15230 _ id APPROVAL p IREV 11 (ECN 8001611 -l t
' QRCANIZATION l - -
CNFD PRODUCT
' PERFORMANCE b
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I l I Et PM NT f l- - L "' Mat 4Wo&4sw I !
. -CNFD* QUALITY ' ASSURANCE'
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c n ,::) 4.57 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 Purpose ._" 2.0 Description of Fuel Assembly 3.0 Definitions 3.1 Standard Fuel 3.2 Optimized Fuel 3.3 Uniform core 3.4 liixed Core 3.5 Dry Conditions .* 3.6 Wet Conditions 3.7 Inconel Grid Types 3.8 Open Water 3.9 On*Index 3,10 Off-Index 3.11 Boxing I 4.0 Equipment 4.1 Equipment Checkout 4.2 Handling Tools 4.3 Refueling Machine Trip Limits 5.0 Fuel handling Conditions and Precautions 5,1 New Fuel Protective Liners 5.2 Fuel Assembly Storage & Handling (General) 5.3 Free Standing Fuel Assembly 5.4 Fuel Assembly Load Points, Limits, & Deflections 5.5 Fuel Assembly Contact with Structures & Hardware 5.6 Debris 5.7 Visibility
, 6.0 Fuel Handling Instructions & Procedures 6.1 General 6.2 Fuel Handling - Fuel Building 6.3 Fuel handling - Containment Building 6.4 Frocedures for Special Fuel Handling 7.0 Procedure in Case of Damage a
Attachments:
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Table 1 Refueling Building Hoist Speeds Table 2 - Refueling Machine Holst Speeds g Appendix 1 Guide'!nes for Close Contact Fuel Assembly Movements.
Includes schematics of typical movements for fuel with
. r.- modified grid corners and anti snag grids (Attachment A)
hin 4 and fuel without modified grid corners (Attachment B).
Figures 1-3 Suggested Unloading Sequences for 2. 3, and 4 Loop Plants a ET
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. Summary of Revision 11 Changes t F 5 Fuel Handling Specification Procedure changes by section, S , Throu6h out text NFD.was changed-to CNFD and NSID changed to NSD.
3,6 Deleted rentence referencing use of trip limits _for u t conditions-during pre operational check out.- Not reautred with revised' trip limit setting. instructions per section 4'.3.2 D. O below, ' 3.7 Redesignated section as Grid Configuration. Original text included-in sub section 3,7.2, Sub sections 3.7.1 (Standard ji .Crida) and 3,7,3 (Anti Snag Grids) were added including Figure-
:4, '
4.2= Added "without specific approval of CNTD" to first sentence, 1 4.3~ Deleted second sentence in paragraph:1 which made reference to
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wet or_ dry handling conditions and reference to Table 1.-
+ 4,3.2 -Revised entire section and reformatted slightly. . Trip set--
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.i limits established by heaviest and. lightest. assembly / component 3 combination for overload ani underload respectively,--
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i5.1 Changed-" polyethylene" to " protective" to make more generic.
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6,2;4,2 : Deleted discussion relative to t 50 pounds being normal
' fluctuations and inserted text as to rapid load changes taken-from and still retained in Section 6.3.3.
6. 2. 7 - Table 2 made' Table i since original Table 1' deleted.
- 6,3.4 - Table 3 made Table 2 since original Table 1: deleted.
(Tables redesignated accordingly.
-6;4.8 Added this section recommending the avoidance of-diagonal corner to corner moves for emphasis,
-. -Table-2 (Was Table.3) Changed lowest available speed to lowest b " practical" speed to allow flexibility in protecting equipment.
AdStd; Zone C and redesignated zones D and E. j
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' \S3) s INSTRUCTION , PRECAUTIONS, AND LIMITATIONS FOR HANDLING NEV 6 PARTIALLY SPENT FUEL ASSEMBLIES ANY PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN MEETING OR INTERPRETING THE LIMITS AND COMDITIONS OR ANY OTHER PART OF THIS SPECIFICATION ARE TO BE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE CNFD PROJECT ENGINEER, 1.0 PURPOSE ^d I The purpose of this document is to identify general instructions, -
precautions and limitations to be observed during the handlin6 of those assemblies to prevent damage to new or partially spent fuel araemblies.
Westinghouse recommends that CNFD Fuel Projects be contacted before handling any fuel co determine if any additional specific handling
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instructions may apply.
, 2.0 DESCRIPTION OF FUEL ASSEMBLY Rod Cluster Control (RCC) type fuel assembly design results from efforts to (a) obtain a homogeneous control material distribution, (b) minimize neutron absorbing structural materials, and (c) promote flow mixing , within and between fuel assemblies in the reactor core. The structural integrity of the fuel assembly is maintained by functional parts within the assembly called a skeleton. The skeleton is formed by attaching the RCC guide thimbles to the fuel assembly top and bottom nos:les and to the
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fuel rod support grid at each grid location. The grids, which are spaced strategically along the length of the fuel assembly, control the lateral spacing of the guide chimbles and fuel rods. Grids provide both lateral and axial support for the fuel rods by means of spritgs and dimples formed as integral parts of the grid straps in each grid cell location.
The resulting assembly has been tested and confirmed to be of sufficient strength and integrity to withstand any normal shipping, handling, and operating loads.
Because of the assembly flexibility and the exposed condition of the fuel rods, care must be exercised in workin5 with and around the fuel assemblies during handling and storage. For this reason, the limitations and precautions defined in this document must be observed to preclude fuel damage.
? 3.0 DEFINITIONS
'f k The fuel assembly types, core types, and handling conditions are defined below. The XLR designation applies to " extra long" fuel assemblies.
TFase have active fuel lengths of approximately 14 feet as compared to 12
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feet which applies to most fuel desi 5ns-3.1 Standard (STDT Fuel Assembly containing Inconel grids at each grid location.
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a.m pf i) Q '- 3.2 Ontimired (OFA) Fuel Assembiv containing all Zircaloy grids except for the end grids, which are Inconel. For the purposes of this procedure, this includes vantage 5 fuel which is similar to 0FA fuel
, but has an intermediate flow mixer (IFM) grid between the structural grids of the three uppermost spans.
3.3 Uniform core - the fuel being handled is all of the same type, either all standard (STD) or all optimized fuel (OFA) assemblies.
3.4 Mixed .t9.r.g the fuel being handled is a mixture of standard and
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, optimized fuel assemblies.
3.5 Dry conditions - those situations where the fuel assemblies are not submerged in water while moving between the transfer system and the core (typically this condition exists during first core loading , '" where the water level in the vessel is at the vessel nozzles, the transfer canal is flooded to a level just above the tracks, and the remainder of the reactor cavity and storage areas are dry).
3.6 Vet conditions - those situations where the fuel assemblies are submerged in water while moving between the transfer system and the
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core (typically this condition exists duri"b a refueling where the water level in the reactor cavity is just below the operating deck).
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NOTE: The pre operational checkout of refueling equipment is a special condi.'. ion. In this circumstance, the equipment may be completely dry and only a dummy fuel assembly is used. After flooding, the trip limits should be rechecked.
3.7 Inconel Grid Tvres 3.7.1 Standard Crids older inconel grid design witbr.a modified cocners as described below.
2 3.7.2 Modified crid corner cri d - grids, which for all configurations (14x14 thrcugh 17x17), have steeper corner chamfers to reduce their potential for corner grid interaction. In the case of 17x17 and 16x16 a guide tab (bottom) and short vane (cop) have been added between corner grid cells to further avoid grid interaction and g damage.
3.7.3 Anti-snar crids - 17x17 Inconel grid with features on ! outside strap.to further resist grid interaction and damage (see Figure 4). ,l y 3.8 Oran-water - areas in the core where axial movements are possible while maintaining a nominal (approximately 2") space from any adj acent fuel assembly or core baffle surface.
3.9 On-index - fuel assembly position indican ated at approximately the true centerline for that core position. i
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3.10 Off.index fuel assembly position indicator located slightly displaced in X and/or Y direction from the true centerlinr for that core position.
' 3.11 Ming . positionir.g of one or more adjacent assemblies to provide vidance and facilitate loading a fuel assembly onto tha lower core pins in its intended core position.
4.0 EQUIPMENT
* 4.1 Eautomont Checkout . The utility should contact Westinghouse or the equipment supplier to have a complete checkout of the cranes and refueling equipment prior to initiating core loading or refueling in accordance with F.8 (Tuol Assembly Storage and Refueling Equipment Design Interface Specification). It is recommended that "
any hoists used'for handling fuel assemblies be equipped with a load sensing system to allow the operator to monitor axial loads to which the tuel assembly may be subjected.
4 Handline Toolt . Fuel assembliss shall be handled only by tools and equipment specifically design 3d and provided for that purpose.
Equipment such as slings or cables shall not be attached directly to fuel assemblies for handling purposes without specific approval of CNFD. Handling tools shall not be stored in a fuel assembly or core component.
4.3 Refueline Machine Trio limits . The Refueling Machina Trip Limits must be set prior to fuel handling operations Once set,.the trip
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limits-abould normally: remain unchanged for the duration of the fuel
: handling l operations..
Because of the large variation in weight between various fuel assembly / core component combinations, speed of movements and relative response time of equipment and operators, the refueling
,, machine trip limits alone cannot prevent detrimental loads from ,
being cpplied to fuel assemblies. The Operator Load Limits (Section 6.3.3) must be strictly observed, in order to reduce the possibility
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of adverse loads during fuel handling operations.
The Refueling Machine Trip Limits ara set as follows: 4.3.1 The refueling machine lead cell should be calibrated and adjusted to minimize operational damping and c btain the most W. sensitive operation.
4.3.2 Fuel-assembly weights vary depending upon which, if any, core component they may contain. Load limies should be set auch that overload is 150 pounds -ebove the. combined weight of the
: fuel assembly and the heavient component (normally RCCA).
i Similarly 'the-underload, if available, should be set 150' rounds below the combined ~ weight of the fuel assembly and . lightest core component (thimble plug) or empty fuel assembly.
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&f-The 150 pound limits may bi increased up to 200 pounds in the
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' event;there"is~ evidence of spurious trips resulting from load variations dve to directional changes and/ar cable and hose-reel tensions.'
In the case refueling equipment includ6s a programmable instantaneous trip, this shou 1d be set as low as practical consistent with avoiding obvious spurious trips. Values in the order of 100 to 150 pounds are normally adequate to allow jgg protection of fuel.
To minimize the possibilities of damaging fuel assemblies, it is recommended that lower instantaneous trip limits he used, if practical. This is accomplished by adjusting the limits as low as possible while precluding spurious overload / underload alarms.
If a dummy fuel assembly and component (s) are used to set the trip limits, the weight of the first fuel assembly and dummy component (s) must be compared with their counterpart weights and the trip limits adjusted as necessary to correct for differences per steps below.
4.3.2.1 Latch the fuel assembly and component. Carefully position the assembly so that it is completely submerged with the bottom nor.zle approximately inches from the transfer system upender baseplate for " Wet conditions" and 6 inches from the reactor lower core plate for " Dry conditions."
4.3.2.2 Record the suspended weight indicated by the load cell and set the Lifting Trip Limits as indicated above.
5.0 FUEL HANDLING CONDITIONS AND PRECAUTIONS 5.1 New Fuel Protective Liners Fuel assemblies may be shipped enclosed in protective liners.
Liners if used are folded around the fuel assembly top and bottom, and are folded flush with the bottom no::le and slightly above the top nozzle. They are, thus, open at the top and bottom for drainage purposes, It is recommended that fuel liners be removed prior to fuel storare to erevent their ratherinc and rotentially damagine the gy f ue l ... bel If the assemblies are stored in the liners, the liner must either l remain cpen at the bottom as received or if closed under the bottom i' nozzle, a slit (opening) should be made on each side near the bottom nozzle. The liners must be pulled taut and should be secured to the fuel assembly by taping at both the top and bottom nozzles to preclude bunching and gathering which may result in fuel assembly damage during movements.
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I i l 3 , y,, Y[*[I Storage areas must be reasonably clean and free of airborne debris and contaminants when fuel assemblies are being handled and particularly if fuel is stored without protective liners as recommended. ' 5.2 Fuel Assembiv Storace & Handline (Generali . New fuel assemblies must always be handled and stored in the vertical position, except wh*,n in a shippin6 container.
A fuel assembly shall not be lef t unattended while in a suspended RO position.
5.3 Free Standine Fuel Assembiv Fuel assemblies shall not be left free standing, i.e., not engaged by handling tool or eanipulator or not having at least one side adjacent to another fuel assembly, fixture, or core structure, n 5.4 Fuel Assembiv Load Points. Limits. & Deflections . Any lateral loads applied to a fuel assembly for purposes of guidance, support, or clamping shall be applied only at the grid or nozzle locations.
1.ateral deflection caused by a lateral '.c,ad at the top nozzle shall be less than 2 inches.
The XLR fuel assembly top nozzle mounted guide pins, although part of the top nozzle, are an e.xception and shall not be subjected to lateral loads beyond those normally encountered in engaging and unlatching handling tools or refueling machine gripper.
. Any axial loads shall be applied only as nozzle locations and shall tot be applied to the fuel assembly holddown springs mounted on the top nozzle. Axial loads applied to a fuel assembly (except for support or lifting) shall be less than 1200 pounds. Any unusual event, excessive loads, deflections or loads applied to unacceptable load points, shall be reported per Section 7.0.
5.5 Fuel Assembiv Contact with Structures and Hardware Contact with hardware that is not part of normal fuel handling (such as light standards) is not permitted and shall be reported per Section 7.0.
5.6 Debris . Debris, particularly metal turnings or chips, observed on or around a fuel assembly could result in fuel rod fretting and _ .,
ultimately failures and must be removed. Debris observations on a l fuel assembly shall be reported per Section 7.0.
! 5.7 Visibility 5.7.1 Vater Clarity & Lichtine Vater in the fuel storage pool and core should be cicar enough during periods of fuel movement to view the top of the fuel assemblies. Adequate lighting should be provided to establish clear visibi'.ity in the fuel storage l pool and core.
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h 4(R Q' i During a core unload / reload, in addition to the above requirements, the lower core support plate. and pins must be visible in order to verify proper en6sgement of the bottom nozzle with lower core plate pins. Supplemental lighting (drop
lights or equivalent) should be provided as required.
5.7.2 Observers (sootters) . During. fuel movements of fuel assemblies into or out of the core, observer (s) (spotters) should be positioned to permit unobstructed viewing. For new cores, it is recommended at least 2 observers be positioned at the 7M reactor vessel flange on dia6onally opposite sides of the core such that each observer can monitor two sides of an assembly.
For refueling operations, the observer (s) should be positioned on the operating deck and equipped with binoculars for closer viewing.
% 5.7.3 Video Eouiement . Video equipment should be available to permit clear or close up viewing in the event of difficulties or suspected anomalies.
6.0 FUEL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS AND PROCEDURES 6.1 Etne.rJd
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Hoist speeds, load limits, and trip set points, as well as other fuel handling guidelines, are provided since operator and equipment response times alone may not be sufficient to preclude impending fuel damsge, Although specific guicelines are provided in this document with regard to situations requiring fuel to be examined, an assembly (or core component) should be inspected any time damage is suspected to have occurred.
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. 6.1.1 Fuel Handline crew . In staffing the fuel handling crew, consideration should be given to assigning the most experienced refueling machine opera. tors to the in core operations.
' Operators should have reasonable experience in fuel handling operations and knowledge of fuel handling equipment. Trainees may operate equipment under direct supervision of qualified operators.
, , . 6.1.2 comunications . Clear methods and channels of communication (MA should be established and include operators, spotters. and control room as required. All instructions and recommendations to fuel handlers should be through the designated responsible supervisor.
6.2 }' gel Handline - Fuel Buildint 6.2.1 Shipping Container Unioading shall be per Specification F 4 (Site Removal of Fuel Assemblies from Shipping Containers & Handling of Shipping Containers).
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'l 6.2.2 Fuel Assembly Handling Tool Engagement . The fuel assembly handling tool shall be centered above the fuel assembly prior to the insertion of the handling tool into the fuel assembly.
Hoist cable should have no more alack than necessary for
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~ handling tool engagement.
6.2.3 Holst Cable Tensioning The hoist cable slack should always be taken up gradually so that the cable is not asnapped" taut.
6,2.4 Fuel Assembly Load Limits with Load Monitoring Device on Qk Hoist . The operator should closely monitor the load monitoring device during the process of lifting or lowering of fuel as described below 6.2.4.1 The combined suspended wei&ht of the fuel assembly, core component and handling tool should be noted when an assembly is picked up,
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6,2.4.2 Aside from gradual changes due to buoyancy, the operator should be alert to load changes of 100 pounds or more. (See Section 6.3.3) 6.2.4.3 If inserting a fuel assembly into a fixture (storage rack, transfer system, or elevator) reverse direction, lift the fuel '( assembly until it is clear of the fixture, check alignment of the fuel assembly with the fixture and reposition the fuel assembly if necessary. Upon reinsertion, if the load readings again fall outside of the acceptable range, withdraw the fuel
, assembly, store it in another suitable location and determine the cause of excessive drag, 6,2,4,4 If withdrawing a fuel assembly, reseat it in the fixture, unlatch lifting tool, check alignment of tool with fixture and reposition if necessary, Re engage tool and proceed with ', withdrawal of fuel assembly. If the load readings again fall outside the acceptable range, rescat fuel assembly, unlatch tool and determine cause of excessive drag, 6.2.4.5 If a rapid load change in excoas of 250 pounds should occur, during fuel movement, the assembly being moved should be examined for evidence of damage and reported per Section 7.0.
p 6.2,5 Fuel Assembly Load Limits Without a Load Monitoring Device . , _ [a .D Operations without a load monitoring device is not recommended. ,
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If operations without a load monitoring device are necessary, and there is any indication of excessive fuel assembly drag, movement should stop and the following actions as described in , ' Section 6.2.4.3 and 6.2.4.4 above, taken to assess the problem.
The operator will need to be especially alert for detection of excessive drag.
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9 .. / 6.2,6 Fuel Storage and/or Transfer + The fuel assembly shall be centersd above the cell of.the storage racks, transfer system, , or elevator before insertion of the fuel assembly.
Lateral movement of the fuel handline hoist is strictiv erohibited while any eart of the latched fuel assembiv is inserted into the storate cells. transfer system. or elevator.
Any movements in excess of limits per Section 5.4 shall be reported per Sects n e O
'ANIb 6.2.7 Hoist Speed in Fue; . alDi ag Hoist speeds for fuel movements are defined in Table 1. as smooth a transition as possible should be exercised in changing speeds.
6.3 Fuel Handline . Containment Buildine 6.3.1 Fuel Assembly & Refuelin6 Machine Positioning in the X Y tlane
. The refuelins machine gripper shall be centered above the fuel assembly priot- to insertion of the gripper into the fuel assembly.
6.3.2 Hoist Cable Tensioning The refueling machine hoist cable slack should be taken up Bradually so that the cable is not
" snapped" taut.
6.3.3' Operator Load Limits Core, Transfer System, & RCCA Change Fixture There lead limits are not refueline machine automatic trio reints. These are limits the coerator is to monitor inderendent of the refueline machine trin limits.
The operator should closely monitor the load cell indicating device on the refueling machine during the process of lifting or lowering of fuel as described below. The combined suspended weight (SV) of the fuel assembly, core component and gripper mast should be noted when an assembly is picked up.
Aside from gradual changes due to buoyancy, the operator should be alert to load changes of 100 pounds or more. If a rapid load in the range of 100 to 200 pounds is observed, the following action should be taken: 6,3.3.1 Reverse the direction of movement approximately 2 inches.
($hb Adj us t the lateral crane position manually or by the separate
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electric inching circuit to recenter the suspended fuel assembly, if these operations produce load correction, proceed with movement. If not, repeat.
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ti' 6.3.3.2 If a rapid load change durin6 fuel movement exceeds 250 pounds for either the initial core loading or core reloads, the assembly being moved and as applicable adjacent fuel assembly faces should be examined.
In the case where overload occurs upon lifting of a fuel assembly, it may be necessary.to ressat the assembly and remove some of the adjacent assemblies to allow for removal of the assembly. Any evidence of damage should reported per Section 7.0, 6.3.4 Refueling Machine Holst Speed . Hoist speeds when seating gripper mast onto fuel, inserting or withdrawing a fuel assembly from the RCCA change fixture, transfer system, or core are as defined in Table 2.
In the event of bowed or tvisted fuel assemblies. indication of large load varistions or other handline difficulties. the lowest available hoist speed should be used.
6 5 Fuel Storage and Transfer The fuel assembly chould be centered (on index) above the reference core position or cell before insertion of the fuel assembly except for cases as described in Section 6.4 below, intended to minimize potential for grid damage.
6.3 6 Lateral Movements of fuel Assembly Any lateral movement of the fuel assembly when not fully withdrawn should only be performed with concurrence of the funi handling supervisor and with observers stationed to monitor fuel movement.
Particular care should be exercised when laterally moving fuel assemblies in close contact with adjacent fuel assemblies.
Observers should provide visual confirmation the assembly moves freely. The bottom nozzle should move simultaneously with the top nozzle with no indications of hang ups or excessive movement of assemblies in close contact with the one being
, moved.
6.4 Procedure for Special Handlinc * The operations described below . together with Appendix 1 (Guidelines for Close Contact fuel Assembly Movement) serve to facilitate the fuel handling process while , _ minimizing the potential for grid damage.
i ( W, l 6.4.1 Open Vater Movament . fuel movements should be planned and executad to minimize grid to grid interaction whenever possible. This is effectively done by moving fuel to open
Vater.
6,4.2 Initial Core Leading , an exception to 6.4.1 above may be made during the initial core loading. In this case, fuel may be l' Page 9 of 22 __
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loaded on.index, since new fuel is typically very straight and the modified corners reduce the potential for adjacent corner to corner interaction and damage. Alternatively or in the , event difficulties are encountered the guidelines per Appendix 1 and " boxing" recommendations described below in 6.4.5 may be followed.
6.4.3 Refuelinen . full core unloads and reloads necessitate some close contact fuel assembly movement to create Open Water areas during unloads or in closing Open Vater areas during reloading.
4M In these cases the guidelines as contained in Appendix 1 are provided toward minimizing the potential for adverse grid interaction and damage. Figures 1 3 of .ippendix 1 are suggested unloading sequences for 2, 3, and 4 loop plants to facilitate movements to open water while maintaining core coupling.
6.4.4 Manual manieulation of hoist cables . hoist cables if accessible, may be pulled to (1) allow engagement of the bottom nozzle with lower core pins, and (2) facilitate fuel movement when " hang ups" or problems with gripper engagement / disengagement are encountered. A sudden release (snapping) of the cables should be avoided.
. Cables should be pulled in a direction such that the displacement transmitted to the top nozzle results in movement of the bottom nozzle in the direction to facilitate seating.
It is therefore necessary to judge visually the direction a fuel assembly is hoved and contacts assemblies in place.
6.4.5 "Boxine" of fuel . Fuel location may be " boxed" when difficulties are encountered in aligning the bottom nozzle with the lower core plate pins. In some cases, it may be advisable to use a new or dummy fuel assembly to guide a bowed or tvisted 3 assembly into position.
. 6.4.6 QfLfndex Latchine . A fuel assembly may have its top nozzle
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positioned too far off.index to latch. In this case, the manipulator crane position should be adjusted off.index so
: ripper assembly engages the top nozzle. then move back ,
on index manually or by electronic inching device and complete latching and lifting.
j h 6.4.7 QIf index Insertion . Dimensional changes to irradiated fuel (bow, twist & handing verticality) may prevent insertion. In this case, raise the fuel assembly approximately 2 feet to allow for better visibility and reposition manually or by , electronic inching device as required such that the assembly when lowered entern the intended location. Once insertion is , ' initiated, return to the proper index position either dinctly or in increments and slowly complete insertion.
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f65 1t Yk] 6.4.8 Disconal corner to corner contact . Tuel movements should be planned and executed to avoid axial movement of a fuel assembly when only diagonal grid corners contact and share no side ,, baffle or grid surface contact with another assembly.
7.0 PROCEDURE IN CASE OF DAMAGE OR SUSPECTED DAMAGE If an anomaly is observed or there is suspicion of damage, the fuel assembly should be set aside and either the Westin6 ouse h CNFD or NSD on site representative or CNFD Fuel Projects contacted for instruction as ^ AIENN to further actions or disposition.
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TABLE 1 FUEL BUILDING HOIST SPEEDS m 12Hti Holst/Soeed A. Guiding and seating of handling 3 ft/ min maximum * tool onto fuel assembly
* dIIIb B. Fuel assembly bottom nozzle 3 ft/ min maximun*
approximately 10" above to 10"
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below top of cell funnel or within 10" of full down - C. Outside zones above 21 ft/ min maximum
*May require jo5ging of hoist if minimum speed cannot be met because of equipment design.
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, ,. . (i S
TABLE 2 REFUELING MACHINE HOIST SPEEDS ., As smooth a transition as possible should be exercised in changin5 hoist speeds.
Zones Heist /soeed C) A b A. Seating of gripper mast onto lowest practical hoist fuel assembly speed (3 ft/ min maximum)* B. Inserting fuel when the bottom lowest practical hoist nozzle is within axial zone 10" spesd (3 ft/ min maximum)* above and below top of seated 9 fuel assemblies and 10" from lower core plate Between zones per B above, speed
'
C. 7 ft/ min maximum may be increased, particularly for 14x14, 15x15, 17x17 OFA, and 17x17 fuel with anti snag
,
outer grid straps D. Fuel movements when in contact lowest practical hoist with a fuel assembly or core speed (3 ft/ min maximum)* support surface
'
E. Fuel movements when away from 21 ft/ min maximum all adjacent fuel or core support surfaces and outside limitations above or
,.r. When fuel assembly clearly 21 ft/ min maximum i above the top of seated fuel assemblies and outside of limitations above
@ l f.$dA * Practical is intended to recognize that due consideration needs to be I given to effective, extended operation of the equipment during the refueling. If equipment design allows, speeds of 1.5 to 2.0 ft/ min is preferred.
59 Page 13 of 22
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.h APPENDIX 1 CUIDELINES FOR CLOSE CONTACT TUEL ASSEMBLY MOVEMENTS The following guidelines are primarily intended for off load / reload handling of 17x17 and 16x16 irradiated fuel exhibiting envelope conditions (bow, twist, etc.) which increase the risk of grid interaction and damage during close contact fuel assembly movements. These guidelines are options 1 for 15415 and 14x14 but could be used if handling 6 M difficulties are encountered.
General Guidelines: 1. In the case of full off loading of fuel and reloading, maximize movements to or from open water to minimize relative grid to grid interaction and the potential for grid damage.
2. k' hen in close contact with adjacent assemblies. lifts and insertions to be at as slow a speed as practical (1.5 to 2.0 ft/ min is preferred b'at not to exceed 3 f t/ min) while closely monitoring load indicator.
3. If fuel envelope conditions such as bow.show directional tendencies
- during unload or loading, then the core loading sequence should be planned or altered so the observed tendency may assist in the positioning of the bottom nozzle onto the lower core plate pins, It is typically more difficult to seat a bottom nozzle on core pins when the bow (mid point outward projection) faces another assembly or baffle face surface adjacent to core location to be loaded.
4 Particular caution needs to be a ercised when closing (inserting the last assembly) or opening (removing the first assembly) a row. Side loads on assemblies are the greatest during these moves increasing
,
the potential for excess grid interaction and damage.
5. In the case of Optimized (OFA) Fuel, the greatest care needs to be exercised when the bottom inconel grid passes the top inconel grid.
OFA fuel handling has demonstrated the intermediate Zircaloy grids to be more resistant to grid interaction and damage.
Typical Close Contact movement cases are illustrated and described in Attachments to this Appendix.
Attachment A Tuel with modified grid corners.
Attachment B Fuel without modified grid corners.
s
- Page 14 of 22
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ATTACHMENT A TO APPEN0!X 1
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i TYPICAL CLOSE CONTACT HOVEMENT Of FUEL W1IB H0DIFIED GRIO CORNERS !
(AS DEFINED IN SECTION 3,7 ; . 1 + i Case 1 - Assembly enclosed on four sides (boxed) by fuel assemblies i or baffle surfaces !
i
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X X X l. Insertion lower on index at slow speed ; X 1 X 2. Withdrawal - lift on index at slow speed ! X X X
, 1 Case 2 - Assembly enclosed on three sides by fuel assemblies or l baffles !
:
X 1. Insertion lower on index at slow speed-X X 2. Withdraw lift approximately 6' to clear I lower coreplate pins then:
. X 2b ! 2a a. If clear to move to open water then do so at rlow speed using manual or
_
,
electronic inching
.- X- X X .b. if no access to open water lift on index at slow speed !
i
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Case 3 Assembly enclosed on 2 right angle sides
> -
1. Insertion . lower until clear of lower
.
s coreplate pins (6' from bottom). Using X X x manual or electronic inching move in one.
direction to on index then the other , until on index and-then lower at slow speed. ;
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J'. 2. Withdrawal lift on index at slow speed
- JPp[ -
until clear of pins (6' from. bottom), then X using manual or electronic inching, move to clear water
,
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i Page 15 of 22
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s- ' _ . _ _ . _ __ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . _ .
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" Case 4 Assembly adjacent to one other fuel assembly 1. Insertion lower off.index in one direction 1 untti clear of lower core plate pins (6' l
. frombottom). Using manual or electronic ' .
X X inching move to on index and lower at slow ^ speed x x t. 2. Withdrawal Lift on index at slow speed untti clear of pins (6' from bottom), then using manual or electronic inching move to
M X X open water and withdraw ,
:
i Case 5=. Double _ Opening l
.
1. Insertion s - a. Lower center assembly on index at slow ! X X X speed b. Lower adjacent assembly on index at slow i
, , speed X Sa ' l $b l 2. Withdrawal - a. Lift center assembly on index at slow >
s' speed X X X b. Lift adjacent assembly on index at slow speed ; 3 Case 6 "L' shape opening 1. Withdrawal a. _ Lift center' assembly on index at slow speed (this is the same as Case 1) X 6e X b. Lift the assembly adjacent to the center
,
_ _ _ _ on index at slow speed (this is._the same +s ' as Case 5)
':. X 6a l 6b c. Repeat b for second assembly adjacent to I .the center opening X- X X 2. Insertion perform sequence of operations in reverse of above to insert fuel ($
- Page 16 of 22 J _ _ . _ _
. _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ t ATTACHMENT B TO APPENDIX 1 a(<',): TYPICAL CLOSE CONTACT MOVEMENT SITUATIONS FOR FUEL WITHOUT HODIFIED GRIO CORNERS (AS DEFINED IN SECTION 3.7) Case 1 - Assembly enclosed on four sides (boxed) by fuel assemblies or baffle surfaces x x x
., m 1. Insertion lower on index at slow speed X 1 X 2. Withdrawal . lift on index at slow speed X X X ,.
Case 2 Assembly enclosed on three sides by fuel assemblies or baffles 1. Insertion locate assembly 2" or 1/4 grid width off index in open direction, then lower at slow speed until clear of core pins (6" from bottom).
Using manual or electronic inching, move to on index and lower at slow speed.
X X X 2. Withdraw - lift approximately 6" to clear lower
, ,
coreplate pins then: i i , a. if clear to move to open water, then do so X 2b 4a at slow speed using manual or electronic
, ,
i ' inching b. if no access to open water, move slowly off-X X X index 2" or approximately 1/4 grid width and lift at slow speed
.
Case 3 - Assembly enclosed on 2 right angle sides 1. insertion lower until clear of lower coreplate I pins (6" from bottom). Using manual or l
+ X X X electronic inching move in one direction to
! ' NM on-index then the other to on-index and then lower at slow speed.
X 3 2. Withdrawal - straight lift at slow speed until clear of pins (6") then using manual or electronic inching move to open water X -
- Pao. 17 of 22
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Case 4 Assembly adjacent to one other fuel assembly n(^v.d "' l. Insertion lower off-index in one direction X X until clear of lower coreplate pins (6' from bottom). Using manual or electronic inching, move to on index and lower at slow speed.
X X 4 2. Withdrawal lift on index at slow speed until + clear of pins (6* from bottom) then using manual or electronic inching, move to Open Water and x x withdraw ' ,& Case 5 Double Opening 1. Withdrawal
. a. Lift assembly to clear lower-coreplate pins, index 2" or 1/4 width of grid into vacant core location and continue lifting at slow speed 9 x x x b.. Repeat for second assembly.
2. Insertion i , a. Locate assembly 2" or 1/4 width of grid X. li 5a i
$b off index in open direction then lower , '
at slow speed until clear of coreplate pins
' (6" from bottom). Using manual or electronic inching, move to on-index and X X X lower at slow speed b. Repeat for second assembly.
- - Case 6 "L" Shape Opening
-
1. Withdrawal a. Lift center assembly at slow speed b. Lift assembly adjacent to center opening to x 6e X clear lower coreplate pins (6' from bottom).
1 Index 2' or 1/4 width of grid into vacant I core location and lift at slow speed " x 6a + 6b c.. Repeat b for second assembly adjacent to center opening 2. Insertion - perform sequence of operations-in x x x reverse of above to insert. fuel.
. Page 18 of 22 e
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Its 121 116 13 SRD SRD - Source Range Detector 2 LOOP CORE NOTE: Letter and number sequencing associated with core locations are freg,
' - arbitrary. The fuel assembly withdrawal sequence should be based on detector location as indicated on the map. The unload sequence should start 90' from source range detector.
- FIGURE 1 Page 19 of 22-r
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SRD SRD - Source Range Detector V j]]g 3 IcoP CORE NOTE: Letter and number sequencing associated with core locations are arbitrary. The fuel assembly withdrawal sequence should be based on detector location as indicated on the map. The unload sequence i should start 90' from source range detector.
FIGURE 2
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SRD l t SRD Source Range Detector
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L NOTE: Letter and number sequencing associated with core locations are v arbritrary. The fuel assembly' withdrawal' sequence should be based on detector location as indicated on the map. The unload sequence
assumes the secondary sources are located in core positions H3 and ! H13 and should start 90 *from source range detector. For those cores
.
that have. secondary sources-in-locations other than H3 and H13, the Stent is to have only six F/A's remaining after removal of the
*
source on that side.
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F.lGURE-3
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4 . EQUIPMENT SPECIFICATION COVER FHf ET wasTIN Houst tLECTRic coRPORAlloN' weeTINGHouse PORM eseoso Nuotest Enogy Syeiene P.O. k s 3s4
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Pisubvegh,Peeveylvene t$230
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v . Lo uirunwi sP Cit s C AT ION DATED RE Vl&lON NO. D AT ED OMIOINyA1&&VE SVPIM$tDL$ 4 677055 10/12/70 6 4/25/75 LJ E"vInfo"A 5,b ! ATTACHMENTS
^1P"0 JECT 8 General Specification h..
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PWR 597755
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Refueling. System
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ANS Sefety Class - NHS.
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FOR SUPPLif H'S CONVf Nif NCf j mt V. M8 VibtON 4 NT4 84tte No, SYabDATL
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- i This Document Contains Proprietary information of Westinghouse Electric Corporation (PWR Systems Division) and is to be veturned upon teauest. Its contents may not be dis-Closed to others or used for other than the empressed purpose tot which loaned without the written consent of Westmghouse.
f- APPROV A LS j _ oRiciN AL issut . Rev.1 REV. 2 REV.3' REV.4 P EV. t. ALV,6 AuTuoR
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J. R. Huston SHOP ORDER of
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HOLDER J. R. Marshall // , . uANAGER. k
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I UUIPMENT SPEciflCATION DETAILS WESilNGHOUSE Pfl0PidETARY WEntNGHoust LLt cistic coRW)n Aino
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V REVISION PIVISIONS REVISED BY ls 0 original Issue
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! V 1 l J. P.. Iluston 2 Sections 6.3.2, 6.3.7. 6.3.8 3 ,) 6.4.7, 6.4.9, 6.7.6.2, v 6.7.6.3, 5.1'.3, 6.7.2 J. P. Iluston 3 5.3.4, 6.3.4. 6.3.6 6.3.7, 6.6.7, 8.1, 8.4, 5.1.3, 7.2.1 J. P. }{uston
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4 5.1, 5.2.2. 5.3.2, 6.2.3 6.3.4, 6.4.9, 6.7.6, 8.2 5.1.6, 5.2.12, 6.1.12, 8.4 J. R.11uston 5 5.1.3, 5.1.1, 5.2.2, 5.3.4, 6.3.10, 6.4.7, 7.2.3, 6.6.7, 7.2.2,
'r 6.3.6, 6.7.6.2, 6.7.6.3, zf 6.4.9 J. R. Iluston 6 Coteplete Rewrite J. R. Iluston . Title Changed to Refueling Machine < . ' , * ..m, Js .'.._'-.
RL V85'ON 40 L bPI C 6 zu 677055 vu.s 2 v. 27 em.
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LOUIPMENT SPECIFICATION DET AILS geg iscHogeJ MOPR;ETAhY' \EMINGMOUSE Ll ti;IH C CORPORAllOf ; i nu t r..a wa i ^H mma mitus % i l
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This specification covers the design, manuf acturing tests, in-
*, ,
spection and delivery of a refueling machine to be used for
,* refueling a pressurized water reactor. This specification L is to be used with an addendum specification covering requirements for an individual plant.
2.0 REFERENCES,
.
.
3 ) _ Attached v 2.1 Refueling Canal Drawings * 2.2 Refueling Machine Outline Drawing * 2.3 Fuel Assembly Outline Drawing *
'S 2.4 Refueling Machine Rail Layout *
2.5 E PS 292722-1 Cleaning and Pa biging of Equipment for use in the Nuclear Ste.m Supply System *
, 2.6 P'IR 597755 rinis,h Specifiertion*
L
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Not Attached 2.7 National Electric Code (ANSI-CI-W71) 2.8 ASnf Specs A564 A36, B-138 and B-147 2.9 29CTR1910-OSHA Act 2.10 IEEE Standard 279-1971: Criteria for Protection Systems fr r Nuclear Generating Stations a 2.11 CMAA Spec (70: Specification for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes u 2.12 ASME Code Section 111 Appendix XVII
*See addendum specification for drawing numbera and applicable
. revision.
1 3.0 GENERAL DESCRIPTION AND OPERATING CONDITIONS
%*
The Refueling Machine described in this specification will be used to refuel a pressurized water reactor. The bridge will span a water filled refueling canal over the reactor, Fuel g? bTv.s.o~ o i are c. ~ 6 67705$ to "'""3 '" 27 _'*'
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EDVIPMENT SPECIFICATION OETAILS Y/ISI D N MIE*Y WLSTINGHOUSE E LECT RIC CORPOR ATIOf , , o+qusasata Nuctran thinov systrus -
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I will be handled underwater by a gripper mechanism on the end of ; I
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a vertical-telescoping mast extending down into the water. from '
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the crane structure. The water containing 1.27, boric acid, % - serves as' radiation protection for the operators and cooling i v medium for the fuel. ' t-
-
The function of the b' ridge vill be to position the vertical mast ,
[; s . '
accurately over any core position and to transport the fuel l
.) assemblies between core positions and to the fuel transfer
'y
*
system or control rod changing fixture (see Ref. 2.1). lloi sting
, .v of the fuel assemblies is done by the vertteal mast which ,
telescopes to lift'the fuel assembly over the rea'ctor vessel * I - flange.- At the maximum lift the inner mast section and fuel r assembly are drawn completely up into the stationary outer -l l !
. mast section.-
.
O: ' The basic design philosophy of the refueling machine can be described as follows. The removal and insertion of fuel assemblies in the i core is a precision operation requiring that the lift point of the hoist be accurately located above.the center line of the
. fuel assembly and that the lift be made in a true vertical direction. It is intended that this he accomplished by providing
*
.a rigid and true crane structure positioned by an electrical repeat t
~
back system with sufficient accuracy that the inner mast tube ! I and gripper can be lovered on the end of the hoist rope unguided, except for keying to prevent rotation, depending on the natural
+
plumb bob tendency to maintain true vertical travel. The o, uter : mast tube and rollers are intended only to restrain and damp L
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out the sving of the inncr tube and fuel assembly.
4.0 RESP 0NSI B11.1W l
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4.1 Equipment and Servicco Furnished pyv,, Supplier i P . '4 1.1 4 One (1) refueling machine with all appurtenances as outlined (w }, * ' in these specifications consisting of the following main components:
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l~ 1 Bridge with motor, drive mechanism. brakes, position indicator system, sheck absorber, trolley rails, viring, f J limit switches s _ s . *'
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-6 To' 677055'
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LOUIPMENT SPECIFICATION DETAILS "/;*. M Glio u i % h ild. I *di . WESTINGHOUSE ELt.CTRIC CORPOR ATIOl t o n,A be643 A NUCLt Att (NtRGY SYSTE MS
a' V 1 Trolley with motor, drive mechanism, brakes, position indicator system, shock absorbers, viring, limit switches
"
V 1 Hoist with integral motot and brake, vire rope, limit switches,
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veight indicator, sheaves and miscellaneous hardware 1 Monorail hoist with trolley, wire rope, hook, control pendant and miscellaneous hardware
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p , 1. Telescoping mast with support bearings, guide rollers l ' 1 Compressed air piping system with valves, filters, hose and hose reels
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1 Control console with control switches, valves, interlocks,
,,
meters and instruments as required for operation of tr.achine l
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1 Cripper device for handling fuel elements 2 Bridge rails with end stops, and rail clips 1 Power cable, interlock vire, and air hose to building connection point 1 Set travel limit switches with prewired conduit 4.1.2 Pield engineering assistance if requested by k'estinghouse.
4.1.3 Instruction manuals as specifted in the addendum.
4.2 Equipment and Services to be Furnished by Others 4.2.1 Foundations, anchor bolts, and field installation of bridge rails.
J 4.2.2 power and interlock circuits and compressed air supply up to point of wall connection to bridge trailing cable and hose.
4.2.3 Radiation monitoring instrumentation.
4.2.4 Field erection labor and supervision.
%... V] ., BE vl5 TON NO ~ '-'-' E $PE C.
6 To 67705s tact 5 or 27 cA m
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EOVit* MENT SPECIFICATION DET Alt,$ Y *I Ms* A h4 4.bdal WESTINGHOUSE El.ECYRIC CORPORATIOf NM 6443a NucLtaM tivtHGY $YST(M$ 4 . 5.0 CENERAL DESIGN _ INSTRUCTIONS , I
. 5.1 .
Materials 1 i n ./ 5.1.1 The basic structural material for use below the water line shall be 300 series austenitic stainless stesi. Parts requiring hardenability shall be stainless steel ASW A564, Crade 630 H1100.
Machining of parts af ter hardening is acceptable providing machining l
,
does not reduce hardness below specified value. Charry impact j
]-
testing is not required. Martensitic 400 series stainless steci, i 3 . or carbon steel.shall not be used. .
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5.1.2 Structural steel shall be ASTM A36. Other materials used in , bridge and trolley structure above the water line shall be accepted materials of good quality industrial crane design. :
. . -$.1.3 Aluminum, tin, lead, or their alloys shall not be used without '
specific approval by Westinghouse. Use of mercury in any com-l ! ponent is not permiscible. Manufacturing and assembly shkil be in a controlled area to prevent aontamination from tools, scrap or dirt containing these materials.
5.1.4 Manganese Bronze AS W B-138-58, Alloy B, or AS m B-147. Alloys 862 * _
.
3 or 863, may be used for submerged bushings or other wearing parts _ _s where nectasary to prevent galling of stainless steel.
m. , 5.1.5 Organic materials sha11'not be used below the vare line unless : otherwise-specified. Lubrication for submerged parts shall be Dov Corning Silicon Compound ell.
l 5.1.6 Type 300 stainless steels shall be 'velded by the shielded metal--
'
arc (SMA), gas tungsten-arc (CTA), or the gas metal-arc (GMA) welding processes. Tiller metal shall be selected from American Welding Society (AWS) Specifications A5.4. or A5.9. A564 parts i shall not be joined by velding.
[ 5.1.7 ASTM A36 steel shall be velded in accordance with AWS D14.1
)
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" Specification for Welding Industrial and Mill Crance".
.j $.2 Electrical
. $.2.1 Electrical design and manuf acturing shall be in accordance with A-National Electric Code (ANSI Cl-1971).
I
'q 5.2.2 All. exposed viring shall be run in eetal conduit or waterproof l plastic' flexible conduit with steel reinforcement. All conduit
!- joints shall be dust-tight.
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6- To 6 g 27 ma g _ 677nu ! i
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* I " '" '"' '*b EQUlPMENT LPECIFICATION DET AILS WLSTINGHOUSE ELECT AIC CORPOR ATION an?us464:a NUCL( an (Ng HGY $Y5T f ML i
Q s_, $.2.3 Vire running through conduit shall be rated for 75C service in vet or dry locations and shall be AWG 12 minimum site regardless of load rating. Insulation shall be flame resistant thermo- ,
) <
set'ing t plastic. ' 5.2.4 Wires enclosed in control console or other panels shall be AWC
\,-
14 ninimum sits and shall have type SIS insulation. Internal wiring in W Thyristor Control Cabinet shall be excepted.
5.2.5 All vires shall be identified at terminals with marked plastic j sleeve or with continuous insulation marking. humbering system
*
s_, shall be consistent throughout machine and shall relate to connection diagrams and circuit diagrama. Ring tongue lugs shall be used for connection to terminal points.
. 5.2.6 Control system for bridge, trolley, and hoist motors chall ! be a W $00 line AC Thyristor crane control system. A single
'S control system shall be provided to control all three motors.
A ceparate control switch stall be provided for each drive.
5.2.7 All electrical equipment sh. ,1 operate from 460 VAC, 3pH, 60 Hz supply unless otherwise specified in addendum specification.
120 VAC single phase shall be supplied for control and receptacle circuits by transformer sized to run all circuits simultaneously.
1 If supply voltage is other than 460 VAC supplier shall provide
,5 a suitable transformer for Thyristor control system.
5.2.B Motors connected across the main power shall have NEMA ctandard ratings for voltap.e and frequency variation. The bridge, trolley and hoist motors shall be matched to the requirements of Thyristor control system. All motors shall have totally enclosed f rames and shall 19 protected with thermal overload devices.
Bridge, trolley and hoist motors sha11'have insulation rated for high humidity service and shall have a 120V heater embedded in the vindings.
' 5.2.9 All electrical enclosures shall be NEHA Class 12, except for control console and W Thyristor control panel which shall
) have 120V heaters to prevent moisture condensation. All %. ) enclosures without exception shall be grounded.
b.2.10 Enclosure and motor heaters shall be vited in a separate circuit a to a receptacle at the end of the bridge. During idle periods heater circuit will be plugged into building lighting receptacle 3 with an extension cord. (Supplied by others).
% _.
5.2.11 Power shell be supplied to machine through flexible cable. Cable shall be suspended in one loop from end of menorail hoist s t ruc tu re to plant connection point (see Reference 2.1). Cable shall have
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separate ground conductor for connection to plant system ground.
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% EQUIPMENT gPECIFICATION DETAIL.S WESTINGHOUSE EtLClklC CORPORATIOh equuma Nucot An iNency svsiius u s_, 5.2.12 All electrical equipment shall be E products, if available. unless otherwise specified. Motors, contactors, avitches, etc., purchased f rom other manuf acturers as component parts of assembled standard catalog equipment shall be accepted.
"
. $.2.13 Supplier shall submit for y approval an electrical schematic diagram s,
and e point to point vite connection diagram of the entire electric system.
_ 5.2.14 Interlock and limit switch circuits designated as requiring redundant j protection shall be designed to meet the single failure criteria 3 . of IEEE 279. Such circuits to be acceptable must,be completely s.
Andependant with no shared components. For example, two redundant.
limit switches may both have contacts vited directly into the control circuit, however, if relays muet be used, each limit switch shall actuate a separate relay with contacts in the interlocked circuit. Two switches vired to the coil of the same interlocking relay or two avitches vired to the coil of the same main line contactor are not acceptable.
5.3 Structural
$.3.1 The primary design requirement of the machine shall be reliability.
A conservative design approach shall be used for all load bearing i parts. Where possible, components will be used that have a proved
'"'
I record of reliable service. Throughout the design consideration shall be given to the f act that the machine vill spend long idle periods stored in an atmosphere of 100'p and high humidity.
5.3.2 Except as otherwise specified the crane structure shall be designed and constructed .in accordance with Ref. 2.11, CMAA Spec 70.
5.3.3 Design load for crane structure shall be normal dead and live loads plus hoist load of Section 6.3.3.
5.3.4 The allevable stresses for the crane structure, and structures supporting the weight of the fuel, shall be as specified in Subarticic XVII-2200 of Appendix XVII of the ASME Code Section III,
, (1974).
L Hoisting components loaoed in simple tension shall have an allowable stress of .20 ultimate stress.
5.3.5
'
All components critical to the operation of the machine or located i so that parts can fall into the reactor shall be assembled with s../ the fasteners positively restrained from loosening under vibration.
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. $
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EQUIPMENT SPECIFICATION OETAILS WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPOR ATION - g u byw. ~WES11NGtl0VSE PROPR'.ETARY NUCLE AR INE HGY SYbff MS i
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. .s-i Spring or tooth type lock washerc are not considered as positive
[ _ restraint. Fasteners on purchased components above the water l
* *T line that cannot be wired or tackwelded shall be backed out, im ,/ - coated with locking compound and retightened.
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, 5.3.6 The-machine shall be designed to withstrud, without-derailing.~the i combined effects of all normal operating loads acting simul 6,neously
- with seismic motion arising from the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSF.). .
3 JThe seiscic analysis'shall be performed using a dynamic normal-
,g , ' (, ) mode analysis along with a response spectrum analysis. Design i \'
horizontal response spectra and design vertical response spectio are giver. in the addendum specification. The response-spectra for 4% equipment ~ damping shall be used for the SSE. The equipment , shall be subjected to three orthogonal components of seismic motion.
- , one vertical and two horizontal. The combined total seismic
* response for.each orthogonal component of motion is obtained by adding.the individual modal responses ut.ilizing the square root of the sum of the e,uares method. The effects of a three dimensional earthquake shall be determined by combining the three orthogonal earthquake responses by the square root of the_ sum of the squares method.. .g For seismic design the normal operating load shall be the weight ,J of a fuel assembly at the top stop_ position.
5.3.7 For normal conditions plus_SSE loading the stress in any load bearing component sha.11 not exceed the allowable values for the faulted condition as-given by Subarticle XVII-2110 of-Appendix - 3 XVII of the ASKE Section III Code,1974 eidition.
In addition (a) The machaie must not drop a fuel assembly in the gripper,
,
(b) The bridge and trolley must-stay on their rails.
,j (c) No component part of the machine shall become dislodged _w,J.
and drop into the canal.
5.4 Occupational Health & Safety Act
? 15 . 4 . 1 - The requirements of paragrcph .1910.179 of 29CFR1910 shall apply ' -
except as soecified in the following sections.
'"} 5.4.2 -paragraph 1910.179-C. Fire. extinguisher shall be supp1ted by
-- owner.
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.G' $.4.3. Paragraph 1910.179-E2. Pridge bumpers shall be designed for ^'. full rated speed.
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* < 5.4.4 Paragraph 1910.179-E6. Hoist and hoist ropes do not-require guards v if located outside the normal operating area handrails.
5.4.5 A permanent load rating plate shall be attached in plain view of the operator with the following information on the maia holst:
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i Maximum load-motor operation
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3 3250 lba.
v
: Maximum load-manual o .er stion 4800 lbs.
Test load 6000 lbs.
a Letters on plate shall be at least 3/4 inches high.-
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6.0 SPECIAL DESIGN INSTRUCTIONS 6.1 Bridge and Trolley Structure 6.1.1 The drawings included in this specification shall be considered
'_, } ,
illustrative only and not definitive with respe" to details of-the structural design. Orientation and limits or travel v2th respect to mast center line shall be as shown in-Ref. 2.1.
6.1.2 The bridge and trolley shall run on machined wheels and-rails. One rail for both bridge and trolley shall be used as a guide rail and shall be machinad on sides and top.--Base of rails shall be machined I if required to provide a. flat surface parallel to tha top. Cuide
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rollers on the wheel trucks shall run on the sides of the rail to maintain straight line travel. The other rail shall be machined on top only for a flangeless wheel. The guide rail for the trolley
# shall be straight within 1 030 in. when in place on the bridge - -
girder. The campanion rail on the other girder shall be level A with respect to.the guide rail within 1 030 in. If the bridge girders are cambered, the camber curves in the trolley rails shall
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match within 1 030 in. Bridge rails vill be mounted with top surface elvation and length as shown on Ref. 2.4. Supplier shall provide a field installation .rawing that specifies rail joints
> and other information neceswary to install rails.
.\ s. 6.1.3 Bridge and trolley wheels shall be true within 1010 inch on the df.ameter. Bearings shall be ball or roller bearings.
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EQUIPMENT SPECIFICATION DET AILS t opiu ba647 A
'2c.3,M..*' . M .%kl WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPOR ATIOf ,
NUCLL AH 1 NLlueY SYETILS !
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- . . .. - - l g .i V 6.1.4' The bridge _ span shall be as shown on Ref. 2.2 with clearance Jimension beyond rail centers less than 12 inches. Clearance under bridge shall be 5 inches over floor elevation. Trolley ._g span shall.be B feet maximum between rail centers. Other i
J clearance dimensions for bridge and trolley-shall be as shown on Ref. 2.2.
6.1.5 Maximum deflection of bridge girders shall be .001 inch per inch
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of span under combined weight of trolley, bridge dead weight and
, fuel assembly. Deflection below horizontal shall be limited ) to .060 inches by cambering girders if necessary.
N .
*- 6.1.6 Bridge girders shall be set on machined seats on trucks and fastened with fitted bolts. Adequate gussets shall be_provided to maintain a firm rigid bridge scructure.
6.1.7 The trolley deck shall be steel deck plate with 42 inch handrail and 4 inch toe plate:around edge. As shown in Ref. 2,2, deck plate shall be omitted from areas, adjacent to the control console for visibility of mast and gripper operation.
6.1.8 Mast support tube shall be mounted off center on trolley as shown
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in Ref. 2.2._ Structural clearances and trolley travel shall be designed to allow mast center line to be positioned relative to bridge rail center line and end stops shown in Ref.' 2.2.
w f 6.1.9 The trolley and bridEe.shall be equipped with spring bumpers to engage solid stops at extreme limits of travel.- The , bumpers shal1~be designed to stop machine from full speed.
.,3 6.1.10 The bridge shall have-a valkway mounted on one girder running the entire length of the bridge. See Ref. 2.2. Walkway underside
- shall be even with lowest clearance elevation of bridge structure.
Standard 42 inch handrail shall be provided for full length of walkway.on outboard = side. - Inboard side of walkway _shall be
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enclosed by short handrail on top of bridge girder. Access to - 3 walkway shall be from either end of bridge and from trolley-deck.
(
).. Walkvay floor shall be checkered deck plate with 4 inch toe -
plate. Design load shall be 100 lb./sq. f t.- uniformly distributed.
'6.1.11 An electric monorail hoist shall be mounted above the bridge-walkway 0 . _,. for use with long handled manual tools. The hoist shall be sus-q -* J . pended from a beam running the length of the bridge and supported by columns on the bridge trucks. Capacity of hoist shall be 3000 lbs. and total lift shall be as shown in Ref. 2.2. Hook < vh IE%ou so ier
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. - EQUIPMENT SPECIFICATION DET AILS WESTINGHOUSF f f iCIHtC CORPOHAI(Oh WESTLNGHOUSE PROPRlt1ARY Nucii An i m m.v .vu t w. -
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Q shall pat.n 12 inch outboard of the va h ny hundrail. Itoint shall be mounted to provide coverage across refueling canal, a6 shown in Reference 2.2.
6.1.12 The monorail-hoist shall be a 2-speed, motor driven unit with s s,,
) integral motor brake and load brake, up and down travel limit switches, and pendant control box. Hoist shall be heavy-duty rated for continuous duty at required horsepower. Hoisting speeds
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shall be approximately 22 and 7 fpm. Hoist shall be suspended from a manual chain driven trolley for traversing the 1 beam.
- Hook shall be f ree turning and shall have saf ety latch. Hook
)- shall be large enough to accept a one inch diameter bail with l9
the safety latch closed. Wire rope shall be 7-x 19 stainless ' ~ steel flexible _ aircraf t - cable reeved two part single.
6.1.13 Electrical receptacle boxes for single phase 120 volt 15 amp-service shall be provided at both ends of bridge walkway . and two locations on trolley. Receptacles shall be three prong 3 plug (2 wire with ground) and shall have screw type cover.
Electrical receptacle circuits shall have ground fault circuit interupters that meet Underwriters Laboratories Standard 943-for Class A group 1 devices.
6.2 Bridge and Trolley Drives e:'
) 6.2.1 The bridge and trolley drives shall consist of motor with gear reducer, drive _ shafts, magnetic brakes, motor controllers, miscellaneous limit and control-switches, wiring conduit and support structures. Drives shall be. designed for minimum er.rvice of 5000 hours without failure. An inching drive shall also be d
provided_for the bridge and trolley consisting of a inching motor, coupling devices and' controls.
6.2.2 Bridge and trolley drive motors shall be NEMA Class D, induction motors with Class H insulation. DC tachometer shall be provided as required for control system of Section 5.2.11. End of motor shaft shall be adapted for_ emergency drive with a handwheel.
3 Suppliers shall provide suitable lathe type handwheel with loosely
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keyed or splined hub. Handwheel shall be removed when not ir.
-y . . use. _ Access platform for bridge emergency drive shall la provided if necessary.
Bridge and trolley inching motors shall be reversible magnetic-p . stepper motors capable of moving the bridge or trolley in 1/16
~, inch increments. Stepper motor shall be rated for continuous s ;) full speed rpm of main motor or magnetic clutch shall be provided to disconnect stepper motor during main motor drive, e
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g-CCIFICATION DET AILS - WCMINGHOUSE (L 6i;1 Hic C RPORAllOf WESTINGil0VSE PAOPRIETARY b
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6.2.3 Brakes shall be spring set.-solenoid release, mo'unted on motor-shaft. Torque setting of brake shall be adjustable up to maximum torque of motor. provision shall be made for emergency manus 1
release of brake. Brakes shall have dripproof cover.
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6.2.4 Gear reducers shall be totally enclosed with shaft seals to prevent leakage of-lubricant. Drip pans shall be provided-under all reducers to catch lubricant in the event of seal failure.
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6.2.5 Trolley drive shall have stepless variable speed up to 20 fpm.
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,, Bridge drive shall have stepless' variable speed up to 40 fpm.
6. 2. 6. Track type limit switches shall be mounted on the bridge and trolley to contact set cams on the rails to interlock the bridge and trolley drives per Section 6.7.7 and to limit bridge travel per Ref. 2.1. . All switch trip points shall be adjustable + 1 inch.
b 6.2.7 The bridge and trolley shall be positioned in relation to a grid pattern reference to the core. Grid lines shall be spaced and identified as shown in.Ref. 2.1. Coordinates for pickup of fuel-assemblies shall be determined by trial and error at the site.
. 6.2.8 Bridge position shall be indicated by electric position' repeat back system. Transmitter on bridge truck shall be-driven by
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sprocket engaged in taut stainless steel roller chain laid in channel adjacent to the track.- Readout dial shall be mounted on the console.
a Trolley position shall be indicated by visual. target'and pointer system. An adjustable target scale, marked for each trolley post-tion shall-be located on the inside of the-bridge girder. Pointer
.shall be located in the cutout area o' trolley deck and shall be readable by operator standing at console. A shaded and screen- .
enclosed lamp shall-be mounted above the pointer for local illumination-s Both trolley and bridge positioning systems shall be repeatable within 1/16 inch.
6.2.9 Bridge and trolley main drive controls shall be lever or rotary type switches with spring loaded neutral position at center of switch where drive signal shall be de-energir.ed and brake circuit g shall be open to set brakes.
s-) - Bridge and trolley inching drive controls shall be a single joy stick switch with mechanical restriction to prevent operation in more than one direction.
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h b V 6.3 Main Hoist Equipment 6.3.1 The mair hoist system including the hoist, ropes, sheaves and
* j} mounting hardware shall be designed with redundant components such that the failure of any one item cannot cause a f ree f all s_, of the fuel assembly. Two ropes will be used each ree'ved one part single. The ropes will be attached to opposite ends of the hoist drum, carried over a double sheave block and attached ,
to the top of the gripper tube.
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4 > 6.3.2 The hoist shall be an electric motor driven drum hoist with mctor,
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gear reducer, brakes and drum enclosed in a single frame. The hoist motor shall be a NEKA Class D, induction motor, with Clacs E insulation. Internal thermostat shall be provided to signal temperature approaching rat'ing of insulation. DC tachometer shall be provided as required for control system of Section 5.2.6.
End of motor chaft shall be adapted for emergency manual operation f* by hand wheel similar to Section 6.2.2.
The hoist shall have a mechanically actuated load brake to prevent the load from overhauling hoist and a separate solenoid actuated motorbrake. Either brake to be capable of holding the rated load.
Solenoid brake shall be adapted for manual release.
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J Integral lic.it switches geared to the hoist drum shall be provided as required for interlocking purposes.
6.3.3 Static design load f or hoist, and all components supporting the load, shall be 4800 lbs. (applied with handwheel) plus gripper tube weight. Dynamic load for hoist motor rating shall be 1600 lbs. plus gripper tube. Hoisting speed shall be variable up to 20 fpm with total Aift as shown in Reference 2.2.
6.3.4 Hoist rope shall be stainless steel 6 x 37 IVRC or 18 x 7 IWRC.
Rope load rating shall be sufficient to support five times the design load of Section 6.3.3 when reeved as specified in Section 6.3.1. Ropes shall be considered to share the load such that each supports half the design load. Rope shall be thoroughly cleaned ( of oil or lubricants.
6.3.5 The hoist drum shall be constructed of stainless steel with cut W grooves for winding the ropes attached at either end of the drum toward the center. The drum shall be long enough to take the x,g hoisting ropes, anchor turns and one extra turn in a single layer.
The drum shall have guarded flanges to keep ropes from slipping between drum and frame.
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6.3.6 Sheaves shall be hardened A 564 stainless steel and shall have.a-pitch diameter at least 18 times the rope-diameter for 6 x 37 rope or 21 for 1B x 7 rope.- Guards shall be provided around the sheaves-
, ' *) to keep the rope from' coming off and a accondary support shall be provided to catch the sheaves in the event of failure of the sheave support. -Sheaves shall have sealed ba11' bearings or bushint.s capable of running dry.
', )' The rop's shall be attached to the-gripper tube through an equaljetrig
". . . mechanism that will egaalize the load in the two ropes-during normal ~~
_ operation and yet support the gripper _ tube by one rope'in_the event-
' of-failure of the other. -Attachment device shall also contain a swivel to prevent wind up of ropes when mast is rotated .
6.3.7 The sheaves shall be hung from the support structure through.an
+ electric'locd cell which shall be connected to a readout meter on'
the console calibrated to read total suspended load. The readout meterfshall have digital display from 0 to 6000 lbs with tare
. adjustment of at least 3000 lbs. Tare adjustment knob.'shall-he-located in the locked section of the console or otherwise ' pro-tected against unauthorized use.
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Three. integral control switches shall.be provided in the weight l
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indication system to function as follows.
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(a) One switch shall open the hoist up-circuit 1st 110% to 115% (and'above) of the fuel assembly 1and gripper tube weight. 4 The switch shall also control an-overload indicating light ~l '
on-the console.
,
(b) One 'evitch shall;be tatuto ' discriminate between- the loaded-andzunloaded condition of the gripper,'with the set point :Lto close at:110% -(and below) of 'the weight of 'the_ gripper-tube'. The switch shall open-the gripper interlock solenoid i
valve -Section 6.6.5..and-complete the circuit for the lower 1
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stop_ position of Section 6.3.9.- i.
4; (c)- One switch shall- open the hoist , lower circuit at a weight just sufficient to release the mechanical-lock of 6.6.6.
The, switch shall also turn on a low load indicating light on the console.
W- 1
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Switch settings shall be adjustable over the full O to 6000 4 '"- ' lbs. range.. The system shall be accurate to 0.5% with sensitivity of 20 lbs.
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'_._ _ _ - .. -~
' #rI'/ISION NO
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_ b EOulPMENT SPECIFICATION OETAILS "W ' n '
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6.3.8 -s backup load cell device or deflection type load limit switch 5' shall be provided to open the hoist up drive circuit at _ o weight E of 125% to 135% (and above) of the fuel assembly _and gripper tube-weight. The primary and back up overload monitoring devices and i, -circuits shall be redundant as defined in Section-5.2.14.- Readout '
* from the back up system is not required and no bypass circuit shall be provided.
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v 6.3.9 The' hoist shall be provided'with top limit switches at two elevations that shall function-to stop this-hoist and close the bridge trolley-interlock circuit (6.7.6.3b). The upper stop position shall bec set where a fuel assembly has been withdrawn completely inte the _M, outer mast. The lower stop position shall be set vnerc the empty
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3 gripper has been withdrawn completely into the outer mast.
The upper stop position shall be controlled by a trip type switch in the hoist control circuit. One set of contacts shall open-when tripped to stop the hoist. A second set of contacts shall close to complete the interlock circuit of Section 6.7.7(b). i A back up trip type switch shall be mounted above the primary switch to open the-power circuit to-the hoist motor if che primary switch fails.
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' 'A' geared'11mit switch shall be provided below the primary to close the interlock circuit. This switch shall be redundant
i- to the primary switch per Section 5.2.14 so that both switches _F must be closed to complete the interlock circuit of Section 6. 7. 7 (b) . - Trip type switches shall be effective at-any' rotational position-of the mast.
The lower stop position shall be a singic switch that will stop-the hoist and complete the bridge-trolley interlock circuit when tripped. To prevent _this stop from functioning when there is a fuel assembly in-the gripper, redundant circuits-(see 5.2.14)- shall be provided'auch that the stop is effective and the bridge-trolley interlock released only when both; (a) gripper disengaged position switch is actuated,
' (b) the weight indicator shows there is no fuel ass.cmb3y suspended
_ from the gripper (Section 6.3.7.b).
u A bypass switch shall be provided to cancel the lower stop.
' I 6.3.10 s- Geared limit switches shall a.so be used to provide two automatic slow tones at the elevations shown in Reference 2.2. Slow :one switch shall open main drive circuit and transfer control to jog a
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LOUIPMENT SPECIFICATION DET AU.S .. . * . . WCf.IINGHOt tsr ( t t .1 Hit: r:Ont>r)n Ai u n
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\-- switch of Section 6.3.11. Switches shall also operate nn indicating light to indicate when gripper is in slow zone elevation.
, Upper slow tone shall be wired so that it is effective only when the bridge is over core area and the gripper is engaged to a fuel
- -) assembly.
L., 6.3.11 Heist control shall be lever or rotary type with spring loaded neutral position at center of travel where drive circuit shall be open and brake circuit shall be open to set brake, ir. addition
) to main control switch a jog switch shall be provided en a pcod;nt - cord attached to the console so that hoist may be controlled '-"
from an operatir.g position at openings in trolley deck. Jag circuit shall be wired through main control contractors to opeu jog circuit when main control switch is in use. Jeg circuit shall control hoist at a constant speed of 2 fpm.
6.4 Mast 6.4.1 The mast shall be constructed in two telescoping sections, the outer tube and the inner or gripper tube. The outer tube is mounted on the trolley in a bearing support and provides guidance of the gripper tube. The gripper tube is raised and lowered by the hoist and carries the gripper mechanism. During transport of 6 fuel assemblies the fuel assembly is withdrawn up into the outer
> tube.
6.4.2 The bearing support for the outer tube shall support the weight of the outer tube on a thrust bearing and maintain.it in vertical alignment with radial bearings. The outer tube shall be able to rotate from a normal operating position to positions at 90', 180', and 270'. A removable pin or latch shall be provided to lock the tube in each of the four positions and a stop shall prevent continuous rotation of the tube. Rotation shall be manual either directly or through a gear reduction unit.
6.4.3 The outer tube shall be heavy wall pipe approximately 26 in, diameter. Length shall be as shown in F.ef. 2.2.
QJ 6.4.4 The gripper tube shall be pipe or tubing approximately 10 inch diameter. Total weight of gripper tube, operating tube (Section 6.6.5) and gripper shall be less than 1000 lbs. The tube shall
"
be'long enough to reach the full down position with the upper end
.
of the tube engaged in two sets of guide rollers in the outer i mast tube.
6.4.5 The gripper tube outer diameter shall be held to 1 030 inch at any point on the tube. Straightness of the tube shall be held
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s--' within .060 in, camber over the length of the tube. A key har shall be attached the full length of the gripper tube an.d shall be straight within 1 030 in. The bottom end of the gripper tube shall be a mounting plate for attachment of the gripper i
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mechanism. '
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.s- 6.4.6 'The gripper' tube shall be restrained within the outer tube by rollers mounted on the outer tube at approximately 4 feet intervals. One set of rollers shall-be contoured to enrage the , -
key bar on the gripper tube to prevent rotation. Radial t)earance
-) -betweel the rollera and gripper tube shall be nominal J/16 inch ai but roller-mountings shall be adjustable for field setting of - ^~- clearance. -- Rollers and mountings shall be keptivithin a cicarance.
envelope of 28 inch diameter about'the mast center line. Foller mounting brackets and matching seats on outer mast shall be-machined to hold roller axis perpendicular to radius of resu g 6;4.7- Guide bars shall- be provided in the lower end of the outer t ube to limit the lateral' swing of the fuel assembly-and prevent it-
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from touching the guide rollers. The guide bars shall be 3ccated at the four corners of the fuel assembly and shall be at 3 cast-60 inches long. . Material shall be hardened A564 stainless steel.
Surface contacting fuel shall have finish of 64-micro inches or Clearance between bars and corners of fuel assembly ; better.
's norzle shall be1.050 to .080 inches at each corner.
6.4.6 An elevation.in d icatorlshall be provided to indicate elevation of the gripper The indicator may be(dial or digital-read out in decimal parts of a-foot or direct reading stainless steel tape in' feet and inches. Indicator shall be accurate within
. i'1/16 inch. - Readout instrument may be located on1 mast support structure if visible to operator at the control console, 6.4.9 The structure above the mast, supporting.the sheave, weight
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indicator and take-up reels, shall be designed for easy removal to allow the gripper tube to be. pulled out the top of the3 outer tube with the overhead plant. crane. Design load shall be as
specified in:Section 6.3.3.
-A $ 6.4.10; The gripper tube travel .shall be repeatable within. the following.
limits. With the-gripper tube extended and positioned over a-target point:
#' -(a) The: gripper tube end'shall be displaced 1/4 inch by.a ^1* 1ateral' force, released, and shall: then return to the NL._)1 original position within i 1/32 inch.
(b) The gripper shall return to the original position within i 1/16 inch after being raised and lowered.
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EOutr 'NT SPECIFICATION DETAILS WESTINGHOUSE E LL CT RIC CORPOH ATION '
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NUCI 1 AR k NT %Y 1,Y!,Tt M1, s aqM 64643 A -
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g-G- . _6. 5 compressed-Air supply system _ _ 6.5.1 Comprenned air at 70 to-100 psig shall be nupplied to the refueling T_ machine from the instrument air system through a trailing rubber n ; .) - hose. Hose shall be suspended.similar to power cable and attached to plant' system as shown in Ref. 2.1.
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(, L 6.5.2' The compressed air shall be ' delivered through a shut of f valve mounted in a convenient manner en the trolley.
I 6.5.3 An air outlet shall be provided on the bridge walkvay outboard T-
.. _ handrail. Outlet shall cionsist of 1/2 inch noeinal quick dis-connect coupling and shut off valve. Supplier ~shall oupply b.oth halves of quick disconnect with hose-nipple on one half for connection of air hose.
6.5.4 Air shall-be delivered to the gripper cylinder (Section 6.6.5) -O by a neoprene or rubber hone wound on a constant-tension hone reel mounted on the' support structure. Hose shall be double, welding type for air delivery to both sides of cylinder f rom one hose reel.
6. 6 Gripper-
. ,, '"j 6.6.1 The gripper shall be pneumatically' operated mechanism to grip and hold fuel assemblies. _ The gripper fingers shall attach to the fuel by engaging under the inside edge of the fuel-assembly top plate-(Ref._2.3). The gripper mechanism shall be mounted on a base plate for attachment to matching plate on-the end "
of the gripper tube. Design. load for the gripper shall be as specified in Section 6.3.3 with-allowable stress as specified ! in Section 5.3.4.
6.6.2 Fuc1 assemblies vill be handled with the-control rod cluster-or thimble plug device in the top of the_ fuel (Pef. 2.3)- . The i gripper mechanism shall be designed to clear these items. Detail-A ._ -dimensional drawings will be provided after order placement.
6.6.3 The entire gripper mechanism shall be contained within a space-envelope equal' to the si::e of the fuel assembly crose section for a distance of 5 inches above mating surface between the gripper and fuel assembly. This shall apply to both engaged and-disengaged-
?; condition.
- I- '6.6.4 The three holes in the top of the fuel assembly shall be engaged.
- by guide pins on the' gripper to maintain alignment-between the gripper and fuel assembly. -The-two larger holes on opposite corners of the fuel top plate shall be engaged by guide pins REVl560N No . E $PE C.
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E TAIS WESTINGHOUSE ELLCTRIC CORPORATIOt. , EOulPMENT SPECIFICATION D L .. NUCt( AR f;4(RGY SYM(M$ F..oKW 54641 A
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with tapered ends to lead the gripper into the fuel assembly.
-The smaller hole shall be used to ensurc correct orientation of the gripper and fuel. A corresponding pin on the gripper will
. allow the gripper ta enter and engage the fuel only when the pin s f is. aligned with and can enter the hole. -If the gripper is 180' _,
g,3 out-of orientation the pin shall seat on the solid corner of the-fusa top plate and prevent the gripper from entering and latching ' to the fuel. The orientation pin shall have a blunt end and shall be shorter than the guide pins. All three pins shall be hardened A564 stainless-steel.
? The gripper shall be designed to feed'into and engage e fuel
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assembly vith a 1/4 ; inch Misalignment between gripper and fuel assembly and with fuel nozzle sloped at an angle of 1/2 degree
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with horizohtal.
6.6.5 The gripper shall be operated by an air cylinder located at the
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top of the gripper tube and connected to the gripper mechanism by an operating tube running down the inside of the gripper. tube.
The cylinder shall be double acting type with double end pirton rod utilizing air to disengage gripper and air plus a spring for engaging . Gripper control shall be through a manual valve on the console. A solenoid valve shall be provided in air ~ supply line to the control valve for electric interlocking of gripper operation.
A bypass valve shall be provided around the solenoid valve (see er
) Section 6.7.7).
6.6.6 The gripper mechanism shall be designed with an intert.al, mechanical locking device that will lock the mechanism.and prevent operation of the gripper unicas the gripper is resting on a fue1 ~ assembly
#
withi the gripper tube pressing down on it. -In addition, the fingers shall be locked-in the engaged position so that the-fingers cannot open under shock or eccentric loading. The lock shall release at 250 lbs or less compression.
6.6.7 Gripper fingers shall be made of hardened A564' stainless steel.
_
>. Finger design shall be proven by making a test finger from approved 4. .
material and tensile testing. Finger shall pull 6000 lbs. to
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meet requirements of Section 6.3.3 and 5.3.4.
s 6.6.8 'b'aterproof hermetically sealed micro-rwitches or proximity switches
. shall be provided to'close a control circuit when the gripper ) nechanism is fully engaged and fully disengaged. The switches ** shall be mounted to register against a trip cam on the rear piston rod of the gripper operating cylinder.
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REVISION NO. E SPEC-
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R , WESTINGHOUSE PROPRIETARY - EQUIPMENT SPECIFICATION DETAILS WESTINGHOUS E ELECTRIC CORPORATION ' NUCLE AR ENERGY SYSTEMS en(M se643A
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2. . 6.6.9 The control circuits shall be connected to the gripper switches by neoprene covered type 50 electric cable. Connection to switch
- . vires shall be through a waterproof connector or othervise sealed
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to insure a waterproof junction. The wire shall be wound on a constant tension sprits takeup reel mounted on the lifting structure.- 1 5.7 Control Station 6.7.1 The control station shall consist of a control console containing .
". } all the necessary control valves, switches, pushbutton. ind!cating 4 *
lights, gages and interlocking relays, required for operation
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of the machine. The console shall be located.on the trolley as shown in Reference 2.2.
6.7.2 The control console shall have controls and related indicating lights or instrumente logically grouped according t'o function.
O All controls and lights shall be identified by engraved pjagtir tags attached directly below the subject item or with manufacturer'n standard identifying plate. Indicating lights shall be " push to test" type.
6.7.3 A circuit breaker shall be provided within reach of the operator
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at the console to disconnect-the main power supply. No connections
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except monorail hoist shall be made to line side of breaker. A
; circuit breaker shall also be provided for the monorail hoist and shall be mounted at one end of bridge walkway. Both circuit breakere shall have provisions for positive locking in the open position.
6.7.4 All external electrical circuite entering console shall connect to internal console circuits through terminal blocks. External pneumatic lines shall connect to internal console lines through unions.
6.7.5 .The console shall be a sheet metal enclosure with sloped operating 0 surface designed for an operator in standing position. Interlocking.
, relays and valves shall be located in bottom section of console.
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By-pass switches and valves shall be grouped together-on.a panel
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in the bottom section of console and f acing the f ront. The console
.encionure shall have a hinged door with key lock on the front.
and maintenance access panels as required.
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.. The pane.1 containing the controls and indicating lamps shall be I stainless steel with a dull matte finish.
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' MEVIS40N No ESPEC.
6 To "" " y 677055 - -- - - _"' _'
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WWINGHOUSE TRCPritTARY EQUIPMENT SPECIFICATION DETAILS WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATIOb t oRM 64642A NUCLE AR ENERGY $YSTEM5
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.N 6.7.6 The following controls and instruments vill be located on the console. Indicating lights shall be on the console or adjacent to the console in clear view of the operator. This lict shall .
not be considered exclusive; other items may be added as design s- proceeds.
6.7.6.1 Controls
) a. Bridge drive control b. Trolley drive control ~~ c. Hoist drive control d. Gripper control valve e. Bridge-Trolley inching control 6.7.6.2 Indicating Lights and Instrument e
a. Cripper tube up position light (upper stop Sec. 6.3.9) b. Hoist low-load indicating light c. Gripper engaged indicating light d. Gripper disengaged indicating light e. Excessive weight indicating light f. Bridge position indicator g. Cripper slow zone indicating lights
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h. Air pressure gage 1. Interlock bypassed indicating lights (bridge, trolley, hoist and gripper) j. Gripper interlock failure alarm and indicating light k. Gripper up-disengaged indicating light. (lower stop. Sec. 6.3.9) 6.7.7 The following interlocks shall be provided, in addition to travel limit switches, to prevent hazardous operation. Bridge and trolicy inching controls shall not be interlocked except for paragraph (a). lioist jog control shall be interlocked the same as the main.
control.
(a) Bridge, trolley and hoist drives shall be mutually inter-f locked to prevent simultaneous operation of any two drives.
(b) Bridge and trolley drive operation shall be prevented except when both gripper tube up position switches of
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Section 6.3.9 are actuated, or when the lower stop switch (gripper up disengaged) is actuated.
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' / (c) Solenoid valve in air line to gripper shall be de-energized (closed) except when load cell switch indicates gripper is empty.
. RE VISION No ELFEC 6 677055 ^ u 2 2 o, 27 ..n or c-To _ , _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ . . _ . . _ _ l b
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n EQUIPMENT SPE;IFICATION DET AILS W[,,Th y;p,p,'; 7 *M 7,g,a,,g* WEMINGMOUSE LL b.1 HIC CORPORAllO
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_ _ . - - - - --. a (d) lloist drive circuit in up direction shall be opened when s,, either excessive suspended weiF ht switch of Section 6.3.7 or 6.3.8 is actuated.
(c) 11oist drive circuit in up direction shall be operable only T when either the engaged or disenFaged indicating switch on 3 ,) gripper is actuated. 'A monitoring circuit shall be provided s,, to actuate a visible and audible alarr if both enpnged and disengaged circuits are in the permissive (cinaed) condition at the same time.
(f) Bridge and trolley drives shall be interlocked seen that I ' travel beyond the edge of the core is restricted tr. path
, [ or zones shown on Reference 2.1. Over the cere, bridge and trolley drive shall be interlocked to prevent co1]ision between mast and guide studs in vessel flange.
(g) The canipulator cranc shall be interlocked with the fuc3 transfer system. Wiring shall be provided to close a qa circuit when either of two conditions i's satisfied; (1) the gripper tube up position switch is actuated, or (2) the crane is over the core. Interlock circuit shall be carried to transfer system by trailing wire attached similar to the power cable.
6.7.8 Interlocks (a), (b), (d) and (g) shall have redundant electrical
,f -
circuits per Section 5.2.14. Interlock (c) shall have rechanictl redundancy per section 6.6.6. Each of the interlocks of Section 6.7.7 except (a) shall be individually bypassed through toggle switches located per section 6.7.5. Gripper air solenoid valve shall be bypassed by manual valve that feeds air directly to gripper. Eypass toggle switches shall also light red indicating lamp on console.
7.0 ACCEPTANCE 7.1 Perforeance 7.1.1 The equipment shall be free from defects in design, workmanship
' and c.aterial and shall give satisf actory service under the conditions specified herein without shock, vibration or other '
objectionable characteristics for continuous service and after periods of idleness, b 7.1.2 The perf ormance requirements shall cover the complett unit,
' ) including items not manufacturedd by the supplier, but sub- . centracted to other suppliers.
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EQUIPMENT SPEctFICATION DET AILS WL.'U M " t .M ' J 6. e i WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION NUCLEAR ENERGY SYSTEMS
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s;- . 7.2 Test and Inspection
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7.2.1 Quality assurance program,shall be as specified in W QCS-2'
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' including Section 7,_ Design Control, except as noted below.
7.2.1.1 MaterialLtraceability shall be required for.A564 and stainless steel used for load bearing parts supporting the fuel such as gripper parts, inner mast tube, sheaves, sheave supports and axles. Documentation for A564 steel shall include heat-treatment
' )' records.
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^- 7.2.1.? Chemical and physical test reports-for~ bronze parts shall be required to show that material meets ASTM specifications.
Traceability to individual parts is not required.
7.2.1.3 Mill reports shall be obtained for all structural steel purchased 9 to establish minimum yield strength used for seismic calculations.
Traceability to individual parts shall not be required.
' 7.2.1.4 A test sample shall be taken from each lot of stainless vire rope.
The sample shall be fitted with svaged fittings identical to those used for finished rope assemblies and tensile tested to , '
. : establish, breaking strength. Each. rope assembly shall be traceable P to__the corresponding tensile test.
7.2.1.5 Load bearing stainless steel castings.shall be radiographed per ASTM Specification E94-Level 2-2T. Inspection standard shall be ASTM E446. . U 7.2.1.6 Material traceability shall not'be required for. standard fasteners.
7.2.2 Prior to final acceptance by Westinghouse the refueling machine shall be demonstrated to: perform all requirements of the speci-fication. This test shall be carried outlat the supplier's site
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to the maximum extent _ possible with available _ f acilities. The >- minimum' acceptable test at supplier's site shall include the
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_ f ollowing:
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(a) A running test of bridge and trolley structures shall be made to check operation of drive gear. ; Trolley structure,-
without mast, shall be mounted on bridge for test and , bridge shall be mounted on temporary rails. Drives may-
. be run with temporary controllers at single speed.
.)
.,- '- (b) The trolley-shall.be completely assemblied with controls, hoist.and mast. Sufficient headroom shall be available to permit full travel of gripper tube. Operation of s
m] GEVIStoN No _ E SPEC .
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PAGL 20 FAGES= g oF27
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t. .~ .7 :% .:._,: . n l. : EQUIPMENT SPECIFICATION OETAILS , WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION
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NUCtE aR tNERGY SYSTEMS POQW 64H2A
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p
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N hoist and gripper shall be completely tested including limit switches,-indicating lights, load cell, and inter-
- :g locks. Load test at 6000 lbs. sha~11 be performed with
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gripper attached to fuel. nozzle prototype.
(c) Af ter load test, the part of the gripper finger that enters and grips the fuel shall-be dye penetrant tested. fAcceptanc.e
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standard shall he zero indications.
p- ,j ,- ' (d) Auxiliary hoist structure shall be erected, the hoist
,, _ mounted. and load tested.
7.2.3 Westinghouse NES will supply a metal prototype of the top nozzle assembly..RCC spider and thimble plug for checking gripper fit up and load testing.
6 8.0 CLEANING, PAINTING AND PACKING 8.1 Stainless steel surfaces shall be cleaned to remove rust, scale, dirt, lubricants, cutting oils and identifying Anks or paints per
}[ PS 292722 with the following eceptions.
a. Section 8, proof flushing shall not be required.
b. Section 6.3, acid cleaning shall not be _ used. _ c. Section 5.1, grade C water in acceptable for all cleaning procedures.
-8. 2 All components except for bare structural steel shall be crated in rain tight crates. Uncrated steel shall be bundled on skids, packing shall be planned for minimum number of- packages. Items requiring inside storage.shall be clearly identified on outside of - package .
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8.3 Any equipment containing shipping bolts, braces, locking pins,
,1 desiccant, etc., shall have a temporary sign attached in a ' - -prominent manner _ calling for removal'of-such items. Gear reducers or similar equipment shipped dry shall have signs callinE for addition of proper type lubricant.
y 8.4 Carbon steel surfaces shall be painted in accordance with }[ Finish Specification PWR 597755-1.
, .,...'-j ; W
.V O[f - - HE VISION No. t SPEC.
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PAGE 25 or 27 eacts e e
O. . EQUIPMENT SPECIFICATION DETAILS ' WESTINGHOUSE PROPRIETARY WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATIC-onuwooA NUCLE AR ENERGY $Y$7(M$ g. t
. %. ', T 8.5 Capacity of auxiliary monorail hoist shall be conspicuously lettered on beam and hook.
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9.0 DOCUME! TIS TO BE SUBMITTED BY SUPPLIER 9.1 Within sixty (60) days after receipt of order, the supplier shall submit drawings and specifications containing sufficient 'information
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to permit the architect-engineer to proceed with plant design.
' Such information shall includct outline dimensions of machine, estimated weight of machine, and supports, compressed air and electrical power requirements.
9.2 Prior to any fabrication, the supplier shall submit one ro3)ed black on white print of general arrangement or assembly drawings,
% electrical and pneumatic schematic diagrams as listed $ n purchase order document for appr. oval by Vestinghouse. Material specifi-
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cations shall be noted on drawings submitted. Upon delivery of equipment, one copy of all final "as-built" assembly drawings-shall be sent to Westinghouse.
' 9.3 Supplier shall submit calculations-showing that equipment meets requirements of Section 5.3.4 . Calculations shall be submitted J showing that stresses in the gripper parts, sheave mountings, rope ; anchors and any other' critical parts involved in lifting the fuel ' meet requirements of Section 5.3.2. Physical test report shall be submitted for A-564 steel used in any load bearing part.
+ 9.4 Process and test procedures as listed in paragraph 4a of W QCS-2,
, shall be submitted for approval. The supplier shall submit a report of test performed even when witnessed by Westinghouse representative.
W Quality Assurance sign off of completed test procedure shall constitute acceptance.
/ 9.5 Report of test of Section 6.6.7 shall be submitted on a generic basis for each finger design. A report for each unit ordered is
[f not required.
9.6 Supplier shall supply specified number of copies of an operations and' maintenance manual. Manual shall include routine maintenance e . procedures, spare parts list, complete drawing list and a trouble
.. shooting procedure to aid in rapid location -of trouble. Standard ,] -
instruction and data sheets shall be'obtained from suppliers of purchase components and included in manual. A rough draft of the manual shall be submitted for approval at least three months prior to shipment. Detailed erection instructions for use of a g (*
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QE V15}oN No. E SPEC.
6 677055 .Aos 26 o. 27 rActs-
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EOUIPMENT SPECIFICATION DETAILS WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPOR ATit NUCLE AR ENERGY SYSTgus
t omu H643 A b :
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i Westinghouse field engineers shall be included in manual or
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provided as separate documents.
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'U - -9.7 Approval of drawings by Westinghouse shall constitute acceptance i '
of general design and interface dimensions only and shall not- ! ' relieve the supplier from the entire responsibility for correctness
. of design details or dimensions.
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REVestoN No t .5 P E C,
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REFUELING OPERATIONS d,i,
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BASES
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3/4.9.6 REFUELING MACHINE - The OPERABILITY requirements for the refueling machine and auxiliary hoist ensure that: (1) manipulator cranes will be used for movement of drive rods and fuel assemblies,-(2) each crane has sufficient load capacity to lift a-drive rod or fuel assembly, and (3) the core internals and reactor vessel are protected from excessive lifting force in the event they are inadvertently engaged during lifting operations.
3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL - SPENT FUEL STORAGE FACILITY The restriction on movement of loads in excess of the nominal weight of a fuel and control rod assembly and associated handling tool over other fuel assemblies in the storage pool areas ensures that in the event this load is dropped: (1) the activity release will be limited to that contained in a single fuel assembly, and (2) any possible distortion of fuel in the storage racks will not result in a critical array. This assumption is consistent with the activity release assumed in the safety analyses.
' The spent fuel pool transfer gates are excluded from this restriction because with a limited gate lift height, the spent fuel pool racks will absorb the impact of a dropped gate without damage to fuel assemblies. In addition, redundant trolleys and supports are used when moving the gates to preclude dropping a gate on_the spent fuel racks, the time and distance the gates are moved over fuel is minimized as much as practical, and gate travel over fuel assemblies containing RCCAs is prohibited. The spent-fuel pool transfer gates are only moved for refueling activities, fuel handling system maintenance, and to change gate seals.
- 3/4.9.8 RESIOUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND COOLANT CIRCULATION The requirement that at least one residual heat removal (RHR) loop be in operation ensures that: (1) sufficient cocling capacity is available to remove decay heat-and maintain the water in the reactor vessel below 140F as required during the REFUEllNG MODE, and (2) sufficient coolant circulation is maintained through the core to minimize the effect of a boron dilution
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incident and prevent boron stratification.
The requirement to maintain a 1000 gpm flowrate ensures that there is , adequate flow to prevent boron stratification. The RHR flow to the RCS will provide adequate cooling to prevent exceeding 140F and to allow flowrates l which provide additional margin against vortexing at the RHR pump suction while in partial drain operation.
' 4; The-requirement to.have two RHR loops OPERABLE when there is less than 23 feet of water above the reactor vessel flange ensures that a single failure of the operating RHR loop will not result in a complete loss of residual heat I
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CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 9-2 Amendment No. 47,81 l
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CALLAWAY PLANT ORC REVIEW TRANSMITTAL FORM 2 TO: Superintendent, Administration - Services Date: // AC
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' FRot;; . .%Jnts s 54.] /Yna w Departwent: / % nNahre- , (Print Name) / /
It is hereby requested that ORC review and recommend approval of: Document Name: 'Nc%cm. SMancArnN & b.;Me1% Hon 2 Document ID: M 25' Rev. No: 6 - CO!'J :ITMENT D ATE : A//M
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t . NOTE: This is the last date that ORC can review and still y meet a license or administrative commitment.
1 RECORD OF ORC REVIEW
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! Meeting Number: d 90 Date: / d-J4
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Recommended Disposition: Approve as submitted l)[( l Disspprove as submitted l[l (Return to Responsible Individual with comments) Comments: ORC Secretary: / d '+'-f 'd Date: /-d-3C
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' Distribution: -Requesting Individual w/o attachment CA-492 10/02/85 AFL- Z-00050 - ._ _
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~218 TSr .
Tot REQUEST FOR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION INTERPRETATION 1. STATEMENT OF REQUEST
%L%*Spk2w 3 9.6.a 1) a) + M )l.<. i & GJ & M A- p aw& Jff s A % % on b 1= co r-4 ~n A q u ,y S . w a g > . 4 x ,
T&AA QufA 3 9. 6,er 3) ,aM l< ly AA Y'*-
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M G3 S a rL4 EM f M , 2. LCO/ SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS AFFECTEDt i 3+ 9 b . A 2) cs) Q 3.#/. 6 . a 3)
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k n L <lu a f2 /3/ lRb ORIGINATOR DEPARTMENT DATE 3. INTERPRETATION REQUIRED: YES X NO lA /2b/kT DEPARTMENT HEAD DATE
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CA-#1060
- 05/08/85 APA-ZZ-00746
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T/S Interpretation No. 25 Rev. 0
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t For the purpose of satisfying Specification 3.9.6.a.3), the automatic load reduction trip shall be set at less than or equal to 250 pounds below the suspended weight of the lightest fuel assembly to be moved.
See Attachment 1 for justification.
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ORC CHAIRMAN [ [
!. ORC MEETING No. ' 6(9 tg
. WRR/drs ! cc: ALL TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION HOLDERS 's a s n.
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Page 2 of 2
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* TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION INTERPRETATION *~ ****************x *** *
No. 25 T/S REVISION 1 Rev. 0 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.6 REFUELING MACHINE LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION _ 3.9.6 The refueling machine shall be used for movement of drive rods
, or fuel assemblies and shall be-OPERABLE with: ' d,.
a. The refueling machine used for movement of fuel assemblies having: 1) A minimum capacity of 4800 pounds.
2). Automatic overload cutoffs with the following Setpoints: , a) Primary - less than or equal to 250 pounds above the indicated suspended weight for wet conditiora and less than or equal to 350 pounds above the indicated suspended weight for dry conditions, and b) Secondary - less than or equal to 150 pounds above the primary overload cutoff.
3) An automatic load reduction trip with a Setpoint of less than or equal to 250 pounds below the suspended weight for vet or dry conditions.- b. The auxiliary hoist used for latching and unlatching drive rods and. thimble plug handling operations having:-
.1) A minimum capacity of 3000 pounds, and 2) - A 1000-pound load indicator which shall be used to monitor lifting loads for these operation.
. For the purpose of satisfying Specification 3.9.6.a.2)a), the primary automatic overload cutoff shall be set at less than or equal to 250
,.
pounds above the indicated suspended weight of the heaviest fuel assembly to be moved.
Page 1 of 2
.
,
REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.6 REFUELING MACHINE LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.6- - The refueling machine shall be used for movement of drive rods- or fuel assemblies and shall be OPERABLE with: a. The_ refueling machine used for movement of fuel assemblies having:
-1) -A minimum capacity of 4800 pounds, 2) Automatic overload cutoffs with the following Setpoints:
a) Primary - less than or equal to 250 pounds above the indicated l suspended weight for wet conditions and less than or equal- ! to 350 pounds above the indicated suspended weight for dry l- conditions, and b) Secondar'y - less than or equal to 150 pounds above the
, , primary overload cutoff, u.** y 3) An automatic load reduction trip with a Setpoint of less than or equal to 250 pounds below the suspended weight for wet or dry conditions.
During a refueling in which both standard and optimized fuel assembles are hand' led, a substantial dif f erence'in weight will exist between the heaviest fuel assembly and the lightest fuel assembly.
The heaviest fuel assembly will be a standard fuel assembly containing an RCCA.
The weight of the standard assembly is approximately 1467 lbs and the weight of
~
an RCCA is approximately 180 lbs., for a total of 1647 lbs. In water this would weigh .88 x 1647 = 1449 lbs, The lightest assembly is an optimized fuel assembly containing a thimble plug. The optimized fuel assembly weighs approximately 1365 lbs. , and a thimble Lplug weighs approximately 131bs, for a total of 1378 lbs. In water this would be .88 x-1378 = 1213 lbs.
If the primary automatic overload cutoff were set'less than or equal to 250 pounds above the wet suspended weight of the lightest assembly, then it would be less than or equal to 14 pounds above the wet suspended weight of the heaviest fuel assembly.
This is not an adequate margin to lif t the heaviest fuel assembly, ,because whenever the hoist was activated to lift it, the resulting surge would trip the primary over-load cutoff.
The purpose of the overload cutof f and the load reduction trip is to minimize the possiblilty of damaging a fuel assembly by shutting of the hoist if the fuel assembly hangs up on another component. If the overload cutoff is set less than or equal to 250 pounds above.the heaviest fuel assembly, damage cannot occur which would release fission products from a fuel assembly. Similarly, if the loadLreduction trip is set less than or equal to 250 pounds below the weight of the lighest fuel assembly, damage cannot occur which would release fission products f rom a fuel assembly. This was confirmed by telecon with D. R. Trevett of Westinghouse Nuclear Fuels Division on 12/31/85.
Therefore, in Technical Specification 3.9.6.a 2)a) the primary automatic overload' cutof f shall be set less than or equal to 250 pounds above the indicated suspended weight of the heaviest fuel assembly to be handled. In Technical Specification 3.9.6.a3), the automatic load reduction trip setpoint shall be less than or equal to 250 pounds below-the suspended weight of the lightest fuel assembly
,
to be handled.
_
.- - . .
.
.. .
.
.. . . .
. .
. .
, CALLAMAY - SP
;)p., : shielding; depth should.the limit switch fail. In an~ emergency,
- '# # ;the bridge, trolleyi and. winch can be operated-manually, using a handwheel on the motor-shaft. Suitable restraints are provided between the bridge and trolley structures and their respective rails to prevent derailing.
A-conservative design approach is used for all load-bearing-parts. The. static design-load for the crane structure and all
- lifting components is normal-dead and live loads plus three times the fuel weight with-a RCC assembly inserted. 'The design load on the wire rope hoisting cables does-not exceed 0.20 times the average breaking strength. Where two-cables are used, each is assumed to carry one-half the load, e a'= .
A~ single finger on the fuel gripper can support the weight of a fuel assembly and RCC assembly without exceeding the require-ments given in Table 9.1-7.. All components critical to the operation of the equipment or-located so that parts can fall-into the reactor are assembled.
with the fasteners positively restrained from loosening under f vibration'. I The refueling machine design includes the following provisions to ensure safe handling of fuel assemblies: l a. Safety interlocks
-
Operations which could endanger the operator or damage the fuel are prohibited by mechanical ~or fail-safe electrical interlocks,-or by-redundant electrical
.interlo' c ks .- All other interlocks are intended'to-provide equipment-protection and.may-be-implemented either mechanically or by electrical interlock, not necessarily fail-safe. The following interlocks are provided on the refueling machine:
1. When the gripper is engaged, the machine-
* cannot traverse unless the guide tube is in g
fp/c-9c its full up position.
- 2. When the gripper is' disengaged,.the machine cannot traverse unless the gripper is withdrawn-into the mast.
3. -Vertical motion of the guide tube is permitted-only in a controlled area over the reactor (avoiding the vessel guide studs), fuel transfer system, or rod cluster control-change fixture.
- 4. Traverse of the trolley and bridge is limited to the areas of item 3 and a clear path con-necting those areas.
Rev. OL-0 4/ 9.1-29- 6/86
- __ - ______ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
_ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - -_ - __ t '> CALLAWAY - SP
#fWU}.4 4-Y'I 2N ' " '
5. A key-operated interlock bypass switch is provided to defeat interlocks 1 through 4 to '
. allow operation of_an inspection camera on.-the gripper. That switch also operates a flashing red light to indicate that the interlocks are
, bypassed.
, 6. The gripper is menitored'by limit switches to confirm operation to the fully engaged or fully disengaged position. An audible and a visual alarm are actuated if both engaged and disengaged switches are actuated at the same time or if
*
4 neither is actuated. A time delay may be used to allow for recycle time-of normal operation.
7. The loaded fuel gripper will not release unless it is in its down position in the core, or in
- the fuel transfer system or rod cluster control
- ph'.- I change fixture, and the weight of the fuel is
- - m off the mast.
3.,, 7 4 :1 8. Raising of the guide tube is not permitted if 1 the gripper is disengaged and the load monitor ' indicates that it is still attached to the fuel assembly.
. 21'fE/
~
9. Rai'ain7g 6fMheUguideEtuberiso the^hoiistiloadingfexceede3110 COEthey total %weighE6f?gtiid4T tWiipplus't fueldaddumbly! yplust.codEc32netaalises*VeP neWuhWS A backup l interlock limits _this. load to 135 percent.
10. Lowering-of,theSguids %sBsli'sVnoEp'sfsittudtif/ the#hois C16Eding21s Ee'esTtthanR85EpercenttofAthe" weightlyfLthetauideT tube /
.- 11. The guide tu ae is prevented from rising to a . p.-c.W, ,c7F'T .,
height where thern is less than 10 feet of nominal water co'.orage over the fuel.
"/j Yi? JU 12. The guide tu'ae is prevented from lowering completely ott of the mast.
' 13. The guide tube travels only at a controlled
- - ' j speed of about 2 fpm when: a) the bottom of the fuel begins to enter the core, and b) the gripper approaches the top of the core. In addition, just above those points, the guide tube automatically stops lowering, and requires
-
acknowledgement from the operator before proceeding.
.
Rev. OL-0
, '
s.M)
^ ,1 -
23 ! 9.1-30 6/86
__
-
. .- . . . - ._ . .
, .
,a .
' '
-
.
' -
g.g gn g g a mues a Amman n SupyRSEDEO f.,s .
,
..
SRD-R= P N M L K J H G r I D C 3 A
._ l l l 172 173 191 192 193 175 174 _1 1 l_ y 169 16s -2 164' . ta$ tu 167 tas tat 190 1 71 179 - ..
154 157 154 185 137 184 163 162 tot 160 15 9 _ _3 154 155 .
-
t&t 142 143 1&& 145 164 147 144 149 150 151 152 153 _ _4
--
, tc3 41 35 2s is 17 to 5 53 59 60 70 77 ' se -104 105 11 10 52 53 $4 64 75 . 82 96 99 97 40 13 26 12 ~ 6 93 af. 34 31- 26 - 9 6 5
47 44 51 66 73 80 92
~~
36 29 22 7 3 1 g 43 45 49 64 71 fa as 39 a5 , a 4- 2 64 && 10 65 72 79 90 91 se 37 30 23 9 55 54 57 67 74 at 95 N 96 39 32 25 15 14 13 - gg
61 62 63 69 74 83 - 101 102 100 41 34 27 21 20 11 ito - 113 114 1t5 116 117 tis - 12
'to6 107 tos 109 - tit 112 119 12n 121 122 123 tr6 m in t2s 127 126 125 124
132 179 1s0 tat 134 135 134 - -t33 14 129 130' 131 137 na 182 1s3 ts' t'o 13' 15
-
'
SRD
. SRD - Source Range Detector 4 LOOP CORE
'
NOTE: Letter and number sequencing associated with core locations are arbritrary. The fuel assembly withdrawal sequence should be based
' on detector _ location as indicated on the map. The unload secuence assumes the secondary sources are located in core positions H3 and H13 and should start 90 'from source range detector. For those cores *
that have secondary sources in locations other than H3 and H13, the
-
,
intent is to have only six F/A's remaining after removal of the source on that side.
-s ,
- !
k i l
- , W( -
)
i !
i , AGENDA - I i _ ! 1. Introduction G. l
:
i ' - 2. Refuel Machine C. D. Naslund l
:
,
3. Jpdate of the FSAR l for the PASS System K. W. Kucchenmeister l
;
- .. 4. Diesel Generator i
.
Pull to Lock Switch T. P. Sharkey ,
: ! !
5. Conclusion G. ! t
.
t !
!
l_ -
!
j i
; !~ . .. ; - I
- !
..
__ ___
-
, P l i REFUEL u MACHINE L o OVERLOAD / !, SETPOINTS , _ J _
.:
! ! ,
. -
C. D. Nas:nnc _
- .
! !N i
.
.w-ve. - er,-e.rew.,-,rw-%,..,-,.-,_-.,-...e... . - - - . - - - - . - . . - , - - . . . . - . - . - - - - . - - - . - , . . - - . - - - . - , . - .
-
....
i.'
.
REFUEL MACHINE OVERLOAD SETPOINT ~
..
ISSUE
. . FAILURE TO PERFORM A SA.FETY EVALUATION WHEN A PLANT -
MODIFICATION CHANGED THE PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN THE
.
FSAR.
. VIOLATION OF TECHNICAL
$ SPECIFICATION 3.9.6 DURING
_ REFUEL OUTAGES 1 THROUGH 7.
.. 8 mA.
, v.
! t l l !
,
l i SITUATIONIN1986 l \ < , I ~ l . MIXED CORE-STANDARD AND ! l~ OPTIMIZED FUEL (OFA) ! ! , '
. .~ 236 LB WEIGHT DIFFERENCE -
HEAVIEST (STANDARD W/RCCA) , TO LIGHTEST
.
'
- . WESTINGHOUSE DESIGNED ~
REFUEL MACHINE / l- WESTINGHOUSE DESIGNED l j LOAD MONITORING SYSTEM i !
!
!~ N 3
- -
,
l-I l-l SITUATIONIN1986
~
l (CONT.)
l l l . TECH SPEC 3.9.6 BASED ON I l WESTINGHOUSE STANDARD l T;FsCH SPEC. T.S. 3.9.6 RFsQUIRED l l OVERLOAD AND UNDERLOAD l SETPOINTS AT +/- 250.LBS
. WORDING SUBJECT TO INTERPRETATION SINCE IT WAS NOT STATED WHETHER -
SETPOINTS SHOULD BE ; BASED
.
ON EACH ASSEMBLY, HEAVIEST, LIGHTEST, AVERAGE, OR OTHER
'
_ NUMBER.
. _- _
.. . . , . -
TECH SPEC 3.9.6 . WORDING
"The refueling machine"... "shall be OPERABLE with"...
2) Atitoniatic overload etitoffs with the I following setpoints: a) Primary -less than or equal to 250 pounds above the indicated suspended weight for wet conditions and less than or equal to 350 pounds above the indicated suspended weight for dry conditions, and
;; b) Secondary -less than or equal to 150 . pounds above the primary overload -
cutoff c) An automatic load reduction trip with
.
a setpoint ofless than or equal to 250 pounds below the suspended weight
-
x for wet or dry conditions
, - -
, !. !. ! l l ! THE PROBLEM l l
. RF MAC; HINE DESIGN DOES
'~ NOT SUPPORT MULTIPLE SETPOINTS l
- . MOST RESTRICTIVE
' INTERPRETATION WOULD NOT ALLOW FUEL MOVEMENT ! l . SPURIOUS LOAD / UNDERLOAD l TRIPS DUE TO SURGES WHEN
'~
LIFTING AND MINOR WEIGHT VARIATIONS BETWEEN I . ASSEMBLIES , j . AN INTERPRETATION BASED l ON ACTUAL DESIGN BASES FOR ! THE SETPOINTS WAS NEEDED !- 's e \-
f C -.- ._. -- --_ ~ -. _ __ _ - _ . _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
, .
.. l SETPOINTDESIGN BASES l
. BASES FROM WEST. STS RELATE TO PROTECTING VESSEL / INTERNALS FROM . EXCESSIVE . LIFTING ~ FORCE B3/4.9.6 Manipulator Crane The OPERABILITY requirements for the refueling machine and auxiliary hoist ensure that: (1)
manipulator cranes will be used for movement of drive rods and fuel assemblies, (2) each crane has sufficient load capacity to lift a drive rod or fuel assembly, and (3) j the core internals and reactor vessel are protected from excessive lifting force in the event they are
-
inadvertently engaged during lifting operations.
_ m
-
- -- - .
l \- l l i SETPOINTDESIGN ' i BASES (CONT.)
' l . WESTINGHOUSE DESIGN SPEC ; l ALLOWS BROADER LIMITS l
' . OVERLOAD 15% ABOVE WEIGHT l OF MAST AND FUEL ASSEMBLY (~400 l LBS OVER) - ;
!
. UNDERLOAD AT 110% OF MAST
! ., WEIGHT (~800 LBS BELOW COMBINED
'
' _ WEIGHT) l1 l . FSAR SECT. 9.1.4 RESTATES I~ ABOVE LINIITS
, -
; '
y * i
. . .
SETPOINTDESIGN BASES (CONT.)
~ ,
. WESTINGHOUSE FUEL HANDLING SPEC - (F-5, REV 8 DATED 10/12/84) . OVERLOAD REQUIRED TO BE 175 LBS OVER HEAVIEST, UNDER~ LOAD AT 325 LBS BELOW LIGHTEST . STATED THAT LIMITS ALONE CAN NOT PREVENT DAMAGE TO A FUEL ASSF;MB'L'Y - OPFaRATOR MONITO' RING -
REQUIRED. PER WESTINGHOUSE FUEL DESIGNERS, THE CONERN IS WITH
'
DAMAGE TO GRID SPACERS - A _ COMMERCIAL ISSUE _
~~ \
_ _
i l !-
'
i l l ' TSI25 JUSTIFICATION ,
. TECH SPEC WORDING SUBJECT TO INTERPRETATION ~
l
.
. NO EXPLICIT REQUIREMENT FOR SETPOINTS . BASED ON EACH ASSEMBLY
!
! TECH SPEC BASES NOT '
.
l CHALLENGED BY THIS TSI i l l! . MAX LIFTING FORCE <500 LBS CANNOT LIFT OR DAMAGE VESSEL OR l ! INTERNALS i
i-i i N
ks
- - . - - ~ . . ~ _ - . . _ _ . - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ - . . _ . . . _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ . . . . _ _ _ _ _ - . _ - - _ . _ . - _ , . _ _ _ _ , . - - _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . . .
- -_
. .
TSI25 JUSTIFICATION (CONT.)
. WESTINGHOUSE DESIGN SPECS GIVE B. ROADER LIMITS
. THIS TSI CANNOT RES' ULT IN l
FUEL ASSEMBLY DAMAGE RELEASE OF FISSION ! PRODUCTS
. SETPOINTS FROM WESTINGHOUSE DESIGN SPEC F-5. BASED ON ,
OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE AND ARE ONLY INTENDED TO MINIMlZE COMMERCIAL RISK OF GRID SP ACER DAMAGE _
. NO CHALLENGE TO STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF FUEL ASSEMBLY SKELETON (DESIGN AXIAL LOAD OF -
5600 LBS) OR INTEGRITY OF HOISTING SYSTEM (4800 LB CAPACITY)
'\ ~
gi
-
x _ _.-
. : .
TSI25 JUSTIFICATION (CONT.)
-
. REV 11 TO F-5 DATED 3/20/89
. INCORPORATED THE SAME METHODOLOGY AS TSI 25 4.3.2 Fuel assembly weights vary depending upon which,if any, core component they may contain. Load limits should be set such that overload is 150 pounds above the combined weight of the fuel assembly and the heaviest component (normally RCCA). Similarly the underload,if available should be set 150
~
e pounds below the combined weight of the fuel assembly and lightest core component (thimble plug) or empty fuel assembly.
4.3.3 The 150 pound limit may be increased up to 200 pounds in the event there is evidence
~
of spurious trip resulting from load variations
, due to directional changes and/or cable and '
hose reel tensions. 12 _ _
.
. . . . . ,
l
.
CONCLUSION l
. TSI 25 WAS VALID DURING ITS PERIOD OF USE . NO TECH SPEC VIOLATION OCCURRED . NO CHANGE TO THE PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR OCCURRED . BASED ON MEETING THE T ORIGINAL DESIGN AND LICENSING BASIS ~
DOCUMENTS, NO SAFETY _ SIGNIFICANCE
..
_ __:
-
_ _ _ _-
, l- .
-
. POSTACCIDENT l
1 SAMPLING
SYSTEM l. -
(P.A.S.S.)
_
T
2
~
K. W. Kuechenmeister
, .. , - -
_
_
.
NRCISSUES 1 Ta %
~ . Failure to perform a safety evaluation for a change in the method of operation of the
! P.A.S.S. by RMP 94-2005A. -
. FSAR Section 18.2.3.2 and SER ~ ~
Supplement 3 reference SLNRC 83-007 for details of the P.A.S.S. design.
, ;
-. "%
a W
'N ~
N 2
. - - - .. .
- -- --
_
.
- aw SLNRC 83-007
.
WORDING
.. . " Valving and samp e flow control is performec by computer from a control pane located in the healt i physics L area."
FSAR WORDING
; AFTER .- ,
FSAR CN 97-20:
. . "The automatec computer control of the Post Accic.ent Samp ing System has 3een rep.acec. with a manua pus:1- ^ ~
button contro pane in the Counting
~
Room." l N
~ \
_
""
.-____.
_ _-
.
e REASONS FOR CHANGE TO MANUAL } CONTROL OFP.A.S.S.
. Decline of System Relia]ility due to
-
aging computer equipment and ' software pro a ems.
'
. P.A.S.S. had samp..e analysis capabi:ity not rec uired by NUREG .. 0737 or Reg. Guic e 1.97.
_.
-w f ~ \ -
x _
. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _,
!' I l- * l l ! ! l ' HISTORY OF CHANGES l TO P.A.S.S.
, l-2/28/94 7/7/94 11/9/95 - l (FSAR CN 94 05) - *(F SAR CN 94 23) *(issued RMP 94 2005 Desig) l
, * Ehmmated whne CNorde * Ehminated pH Conductivity. * Elemmated CNonde, pH Conductrvity.
Analysis and Orygen Anahses Oirygen, aw Computer Contrd of P.A S $
* FSE by LKeram0 * f**ted CRT and Preter from * L IR documentea! credited changes from FSAR P.A $ 5 descretion F SAR CN D446 & 54 M
? * FSE by Lest. eg * No FSE performed
.
!
t
$/1/96 2/28/97 W27S7 od. 94-2005 installationh
_
.i '
Completed j =[NRC ( Eng. Inspect:onj [FSAR CN 97 20)
* Requested another FSE u discuss elenmate of P.A $ $ *FSEhEvem
* No unremed satey qwse
*e ' * '^ '
a ed additm2nal F$AR
-
wording cranges . W m FSAR weg desding the manual contrd panel for P A.$ S.
_
*
. . .
HISTORY OF CHANGES TO P.A.S.S.
..
. RFR 14750 A was initiated on 2/10/94 l~ requesting a modification to remove the in-line Chloride Analysis and the Computer Control of P.A.S.S.
. FSAR CN 94-05 was initiated on 2/15/94 to change the FSAR to eliminate the description of P.A.S.S. in-line chloride analysis capability.
~f . FSAR CN 94-23 was initiated on 6/14/94 _ to change the FSAR to eliminate the description of P.A.S.S. analysis of pH, conductivity, and oxygen.
. _ e
'
0 6
-
,
_-
. .
FSAR SECTION18.2.3.2 WORDING
- . "The lines in the sample panel are flushed or purged after each analysis and all the sampled fluids are returned to l Containment."
l WORDINGAFTER FSAR CN 94-23 j . " Sample lines in the system have the capability of being flushed or purged after
-
each analysis. All sampled fluids are returned to the containment."
_
-
545[
- _-- ,
\- i
.
a FSAR SECTION18.2.3.2 WORDING
'
! , l
"
,
. The system includes a sample control j panel, CRT, and Printer. These items are
! located in the counting room."
! ,
,
l.
I WORDINGAFTER l~ i FSAR CN 94-23 ! ! l . "The system includes a sample control j panel which is operated from and located
.
in the counting room."
.
$
'
I- ! 8
- \ - - ____
---
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
- .
i l >- REASONS NO FSE WAS ' PERFORMED FOR RMP 94-2005 l i . FSAR CNs 9L-05 and 94-23 were
'
approved prior to approval of the '
-
Licensing Impact Reviesv (LIR) for . RMP 94-2005 on 11/9/95.
1-j.. . Engineering believed the previous l' FSAR CNs w 1ich containec FSEs l addressed the removal of the !- computer. Since the FSA;R words !j concerning the computer were
- -( changed, no additiona FSAR changes
"
were performed.
_.
s 9
' . . - . - - - - _ . - _ - . . . - . . . . _ . _ _ . _ - . . _ _ _ . _ . . _ - - - . _ _ . , - _ - , _ _ . _ , . _
* . . .
This reviewis applicable to: RMP 94 2005 A (T) JUSTIFICATION FOR NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIOtt Bese:1y state why this mbd:j1catwn dwr nyt reqwe a Formal:afety Evaluenon: sse ydelenes un Anachment 4 ofAPA.ZZ 00H0; attach extre - tkrets {necessary).
Fjy4* t'la119DO h2005 A redesiens Callaway's PM Areider110mt/.ine Sute n (PASS) to reelgt,the ccmputer/PLQ, - Atntrol of the spmelo tsanel cavirment yith a man.yg1 cenel reet es] led the PASS Suitcase. The oricinal l dtsien of the mtem provided some chemical analysis cacabilities that are not recuired by NUREO 0737 and !- EggMe 1.97 and therefore these functions will be eliminated from the PASS by this modiDestion. The
=. shun!;al measurementLthat are not recujrtito be performed are atmorcheric omen. dissolved 2XYfan. pit conductivity endin-line chl2 tide anahvis. Chloride mearutements are still reaufred bu.1 will be accomolished by sending samtles off 31t;,fgLaulvsis. The above PASS chemical analysis
,
chances have already beta accroved and incornorated into the FS AR by FS AR Chante Notices 94 0$
,,and 94-23. Thusfore. no chances to the FSAR are teattired by this modification. The system will ggntinue to meet the reqW.It,m,JLnts of NUBE0 0737 and Ree. Oulde 1.97 asymmitted to in Callaway's FS AR . The Enuloment involved in this modification is classified as non safety related This modification - - -
can not impagigelear safety and therefore. a formal safety evalustiertis not reautred.
.
'
.
.
. . rw
.
_
. Page 7 of 8 CA-# 1339 - - - - = ----------- - 04/15/94 APA ZZ 00140
) ,. a
.
e NRCENGINEERING INSPECTION TEAM (2/28/97) '
. Requested another FSE be performed to further discuss the elimination of the P.A.S.S. computer.
. Requested additional wording changes to the FSAR.
.
- . FSAR CN 97-20 was approved on 3/27/97 .
and contained FSAR wording changes and another FSE which concluded that no 2 unreviewed safety question existed with
; the removal of the PASS computer.
.
+-
-
. _ . _ . . .
CONCLUSIONS _
. Engineering believed that previously performed FSAR CN 94-05 & 94-23 adequately addressed all necessary changes
' to the FSAR.
l . Missed opportunity to add new wording to the FSAR to take exception to referenced letters which described the P.A.S.S. design.
. The fact that an additional FSE was not
-
performed by RMP 94-2005 does not j reflect a practice of knowingly changing the facility as described in the FSAR without the proper 50.59 evaluations.
..
. The changes made by RMP 94-2005 had
_ no safety significance.
~ x ,,
.- - -
- _ _ - - _ .
l
~.
ORRECTIVE ACTIONS i ! I- I j_ . FSAR CN 97-20 added new worc.s to the l FSA.R anc performec an FSE evaluating the e imination of the P.A.S.S. computer.
. Revised Procedure APA-ZZ-00140, l
" Safety, Environmental anc Other l Licensing Eva uations", to provic e
! detailed guidance requiring a Formal Safety Evaluation to be performed when changing the facility as described in a ! document referenced in the FSAR.
1-l Completed June 24,1997.
> . Training was provided to Engineering l- Departments concerning the changes !._ made to APA-ZZ-00140. Completed
- July 2,1997.
i ! 12
\
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-
_ _ _ _ L - l ' Pull-To-Lock of , Emergency DieselSupply 1
Fans ! Union Electric Company Callaway Plant TechnicalSpecification l Interpretation #18 ! , .
, ,
, _ f T. P. Sharkey ! E i s N 1 _ _ _ _ __ - _ _
,_ _ _ _ _ _ _- - __ _ _ _ _ _ . - __ i
- .
!' j._ ?
- _
INTRODUCTION l ! l l H . The purpose of t ie ciscussion is to
~
provic.e ac.citiona facts to the , February 1997 KRC Inspection [ concern wit:1 a Technica. Specification l- Interpretation waic a permittec. the use j~ of Pull-To-Loci (PTL) for the
- -
!_ ernergency c.iese: generator l'
- .
(D/G) supply fans.
t
'
I-l ! ! ! !
~
.- !- ! _ _ .
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
__ . . STATEMENT OFNRC CONCERNS
.
1. Eai ute to c.o a Forma: Sa 'ety Evaaiation (FSE) on Oaeration's arocecure cou c. aave resu tec. in a
~Unreviewec. Safety Question (USQ).
2. Pol:en:ia. T/S Vio ation - Eaca fan is a su3 system ofits J/G.
3. 3vic ence of PT~ use a1: Ca away.
P
-
N '
.
_ e . OPERATIONS NORMAL - PROCEDURE
.. - . T1e 10/31/9510CFR 50.59 Licensing .
Impact Review for t 3e operating procec ure, OTN-NE-00002, was correct since t:1e section for an inoperale supp.y fan .aac a Note with t:3e 65 c egree limit
-
statec , even t'aoub.1 Precaution 2.2.7 c ic.
"
. not c iscuss t aat Limit. T ae Precaution
~
ciscussec using PTL wita fan unc.er tota: contro: by t'ae RO anc ac min contro s to
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maintain t'ae room be:.ow 119 c egrees F.
- T:ae Note was consistent wit:1FSAR 9.4.7.2.3 revised in 1990. T:aerefore, no
~
USQ existec .
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____.___________.__.___.____________________________ ________ _ _ ___ ___ __.____._ __ _ _ _ _ _ ___.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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TSIHISTORY l
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i ! L.
. In February,1987, TSI #35 was issued . l and TSI #18 added a reference to RFR 1 i l 02852A but not the 65 degree F limit stated in the RFR. However, TSI #35 i revision 0 discussed this limit in detail.
TSI #35 was referenced to T/S 3.7.12.
The loss of the supply fan would lead to TSI #35 with a concern with the ; potential for the room temperature to rise. This point was not conveyed to the l 1997 inspection team. In December, l
~
1988, the TSI revisions transferred the i 65 degree F limit from TSI #35 to TSI l
#18. ! .
, a
\ 5
- _ - - - - - ________. _ _ _ _ - -
, I-i- ! ! !
' TSI35 BASIS l l i l-l. . 11/19/86, A Union E ectric ; j engineering eva uation, RFR 2852A, j anc its 10CFR50.59 Formal Safety Eva.uation al;. owed PTL aut wit 1a l l conservative ambient .imit of .ess tlan j or equa to 65 degrees F. Bec ate.
l ca culations were provic.ec in support ! of t;3is eva.uation. Tais 3ecame tle
l 3 asis for TSI 35.
!
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l l . '
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. . T/S 3.7.12 AREA 1 TEMPERATURE MONITORING
. Between t: 1e creation of TSI #18 in Fe]ruary 1985 anc tae venti.ation moc ification imp .ernentation in 1990, t:1e app icare Tec 1nica. Specification for tae D/G supp y fan was 3.7.12, Area Temperature Monitoring. Wit aout t:ae supp y fan coo.ing tae room, tae ~
operaai:ity concern is tae room temperature. It was not anc is not T/S 3.8.1.1 Emergency D/G un ess the T/S 3.7.12 action (b) statement is enterec-with the room at 149 c.egrees F (119 + 30).
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,
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l T/S 3. 7.12 ACTION (b) l l ! l . T 1e 3.7.12 action (b) rec uirec t ae i components in t:1e room to 3e ceclarec.
inoperab;e after four aours. Since we l never aac. enterec t:1e 3.7.12 action (3) j statement for t:ae D/G rooms, t:aen l compliance wit:a T/S 3.8.~ .1 was not in j question w 1en t:ae supp.y fan was in PTL.
l l ! . ! i ! i i
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i_______________.__.____ _ -- _ - . _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ . . - . _ , . - _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . . . . _ _ _
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SUPPORTFUNCTION OF FANS
.. . With t'.le supply fan in PTL, by design, t ie D/G tur 30c iargers will c. raw in combustion air from outside through
- the fan.
. Tie D/G supply fans c o not receive an . ESFAS or other safety-related start signal upon a UV or SIS start signal of-K tLie D/Gs.
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PTL EVIDENCE 1
. On L/7/88, t ie ' A' D/G supply fan was in PTL wita an ambient temperature of 68 c egrees F. This was contrary to the
, . TSI #35 guic.ance. However, a June, l 1986, Bec ate. ca.culation evaluatec t: 1e ' limit to be 69 degrees F. UE ac.dec.
margin to t ae 69 degree .imit to create a more conservative imit at 65 c.egrees. T/S 3.7.12 was satisfiec.
h
+
10 x
.
.. --_
_ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
.
CONCLUSIONS A potential unreviewed safety question (USQ) cic not exist.
_
. OTN-NE-00002 had the proper temperature .
limits stated, therefore the 50.59 screening was correct.
1986 RFR-02852A 10CFR50.59 and associated FSAR change LIR concluded no USQ.
. T/S 3.7.12 limits were not changed or challenged.
. In February,1987, TSI #35, Rev. O, limited - PTL use to less than 65 degrees F ambient; based on the 10CFR50.59 evaluation. Thus, TSIs #18 and #35 were consistent with the FSAR change LIR on the D/G supply fan _ since 1987.
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_ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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POTENTIAL T/S VIOLATION _ _ A. vio ation of T/S requirements c.id not occur.
_
. T/S 3.7.12 first applies for an inoperaale supply fan. Room l- temperature then may eac. to entry into a T/S 3.8.1.1 action statement.
~ Never exceec ec. T/S 3.7.12 .imit.
. a
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w'- MW w f
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CONCLUSION
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SUVYATRY OF ALL T-13 E ESSUES: 1. No Unreviewed Safety Questions
- 2. No Tec anica. Specification Violations 3. No Safety Significance
_
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L. We have an iso atec example of
-
inac equate 50.59 imp..ementation _ a
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g , . . , _ _ . . . _ . _ _
_ . _ _ _ . _ _ . . , . , _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ . , , , , _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ , . - - - _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . - . , . , _ , _ _ _ _ , . _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ . , _ _ _ _ - , . _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ , _ , _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ _
$
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SUPPORTING
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DOCUMENTATION FOR DIESEL = GENERATOR FANS l , PTL h
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L =i - J13N-26-97 THU 08I27- DRS Mall. R00H FAX N0. 8608212 P.02
'* -- UNITED STATES j,a ma49 - NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Q C. M" - -
f. [ REGloN LV
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M4 %,
. U /[L e 8 s11 MY AN PLAZA oRIVE.SVITE 400 ARUNcToN, T E XAs 760H.am,4
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JUN 2 61997 EA 97168-Garry L. Randolph, Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Union Electric Company P.O. Box 620 ~
- Fulton, Missouri 65251 SUBJECT: NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50 483/97 05 AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION Oear Mr. Randolph:
i
' An NRC inspection was conducted February 1014 and 24-28,1997, at your Callaway Plant reactor f acility. The enclosed report presents the scope and results of that
inspection. The overall conclusions of this inspection were discussed with Mr. C. Naslund and others of your staff during a final exit meeting held on June 24,1997.
l The inspection identified two violations involving the failure to make a 10 CFR 50.73 report and to report 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluations for temporary modifications.
-Specifically, your staff failed to report that 14 main steam safety valves in Refueling Outage 7 drifted beyond their Technical Specification setpoint tolerances. With respect to the 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation reporting, your staff failed to recognize that any safety evaluation, regardless of duration, was required to be reported. These reporting falfures
- -Indicate a lack of understanding of the NRC reporting requirements.
The violations are cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice) and the circumstances surrounding these violations are described in detallin the enclosed report. Please note that you are required to respond to this letter and should follow the Instructions specified in the enclosed Notice'when preparing your response. The NRC will use your response, In part,
" to determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requ!rements.
Based on the results of this inspection, three apparent vlotations were also identified and
- are being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy),
NUREG 1600. These apparent violations involved the f ailure to oerform safety evaluations in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59.Me first two apparent violations C involved the sampling of the post accident failuresystem to perform and a change a tosafety evaluation the'setpoints of the refuelingfor a change in th i machine. -The third apparent violation involved the substitution of manual operation for the
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automatic actuation of the, diesel generator building supply fans. This substitution may have increased the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report and increased the possibility for a malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Fin *! Safety j l
} .26-97 THU 08:27 DRS Mall ROOM FAX No. 8608212 P.03 Union Electric Company -2-Analysis Report. Therefore, this substitution potentially constitutes an unreviewed safety question.
In addition, substituting manual actions for automatic operation of the diesel generator.
building supply f ans made the f ans' automatic start function inoperable. Since the fans were a subsystem of the diesel generators, it appeared that your diesel generators were rendored inoperable during the times that the fans were in the " pull to-lock" condition.
Depending on the duration that the supply fan switches were in the " pull to-lock" position and the ambient temperature cond!! ions, a violation of Technical Specification requirements may have occurred. ThorofoPe, in your response to this inspection report, we request that you provide details regarding the specific circumstances in which the diesel generator i building supply fan control switches were n the " pull-te-lock" position.
The circumstances surrounding these apparent violations and the significance of the issues were discussed with members of your staff at the finalinspection exit meeting on June 24, 1997. As a result,it may not be necessary to conduct a predecisional enforcement conference in order to enable the NRC to make an enforcement decision. However, a Notice of Violation is not presently being issued for these inspection findings. Before the NRC makes its enforcement decision, we are providing you an opportunity to either (1) respond to the apperent violations addressed in this ins.pection report within 30 days of the date of this letter or (2) request a predecisional enforcement conference. Please contact Mr. Chris A. VanDenburgh at (817) 860-8161 within 7 days of the date of this letter to notify the NRC of your intended response.
Your response should be clearly marked as a " Response to Apparent Violations in NRC Inspection Report 50-483/97 05" and should include for each apparent violation: (1) the reason for the apparent violation, or, if contested, the basis for disputing the apparent violation, (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Your response should be submitted under oath or affirmation , and may reference or include previous docketed correspondence if the correspondence adequately addresses the required response if an adequate response is not received within the time specified or an extension of time has not been granted by the NRC, the NRC will proceed with its enforcement decision or schodule a predecisional enforcement conference.
In addition, please be advised that the number and characterization of apparent violations described in the enclosed inspection report may change as a result of further NRC review.
You will be advised by separate correspondence of the results of our deliberations on this matter.
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l H ORS Mll R00ti F/d NO. 8605212 p,11 JUN-26-97 THU 08:30
. * The majority of the suggestion-occurrenco-solution reports had resolutions with proper eng neering justifications and preposed corrective actions. Ono violation was identified for the f ailure to issue a licensee event report when main steam safety
' valves had as-found setpoints in excess of the Technical Specification setpoint tolerances (Section E1.3.b.11
* While some discrepancies between the actual plant configuration and procedures and the Final Safety Analysis Report were noted, an action plan existed to correct such deficiencies (Section E2.1).
- Effoctive controls were implemented to ensure that design basis documents were available, were beir.g adequately maintained, and were easily retrievable (Section E2.2).
- The backlog of engine $ ring work was properly managed (Section E2.3).
- Overall, procedural guidance for implementation of 10 CFR 50.59 was appropriate. 4 However, the inspection identified two examples in which the guidance won not in j'
accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59. Specifically, the licensee did not report safety evsluations for temporary modifications and did not require safety I evaluations when a change was considered to be a plant improvement. The team identified the first example as a violation of 10 CFR 50.59(b)(2) (Sections E2.4.16.2 and E2.4.1.b.3(1)). .
* The implementation of the 10 CFR 50.59 program was adequate; however, the licensee failed to perform a safety evaluation for a modification to the post accident sampling system. This modification changed the method of operation of the system described in the Final Safety Analysis Report. This was considered to be an apparent violation (Section E2.4.16.3(2)). * The implementation of the Technical Specification Interpretation program was adequate; however, the team identified two interpretations that provided guidance that was contrary to the Technical Specification requirements and the Final Safety Analysis Report. In the first examplo, the interpretation effect:.ely changed the setting of the trip setpoints for the refueling machine without performing a 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation, in the second example, the interpretation changed the operation of the diesel generator building supply fans from automatic to manual operation. This change may have increased the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report and increased the possibility for a malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Final Safety Analysis Report. This change was considered to potentially constitute an unreviewed safety question. Both examples were cited as apparent violations of 10 CFR 50.59 (Sections E2.4.26.1 and E2.4.2b2). ,, * The plant material condition and housekeeping were good and some improvements in material condition was noted. The boron control program was considered to be ) effective in improving the plant's material condition (Section E2.5).
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JUlF26-97 THU 08:36 DP.S Mall P00M FAX N0. 8608212 P. 25
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was changed by the modification, and a safr v evaluation was not performed.
10 CFR 50.59(b)(1) requires the performance of a safety evaluation when plant modifications change the plant as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report. The f ailure to perform this safety evaluation is considered to be an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.59 (50 483/9705 05).
c. Conclusions , While the team concluded that the licensees procedural guidance for implementation
* of 10 CFR 50.59 was adequate, the team identified two areas where this guidance was not in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59. These involved the failure to report safety evaluations foremporary modifications and not performing a safety evaluation when a change was considered to be a plant improvement. The team '
also concluded thet the implementation of the 10 CFR 50.59 requirements was ! adequate; however, the team Identified an apparent violation involving the failure to perform a safety evaluation for the change in the automatic operatio.n of the post-l- I accident sampling system.
E2.4.2 Techntea_LSggcJflaglion interoretations e, insoection Scoce As a result of a concern identified in October 1996 at another facility regarding Technical Specification interpretations that were found to be in conflict with Technical Specification requirements, the team reviewed 41 of the licensee's ' Technical Specification interpretations to ensure that these interpretations did not conflict with Technical Specification requirements. , b. Observations and Findinas .
.
The team found that the Technical Specification Interpretation Program was controlled by Procedure APA-ZZ 00104, " Technical Specification interpretations and Notice of Enforcement Discretion." Procedure APA-ZZ-00104 defined a Technical Specification interpretation as a formalinterpretation that provided guidance for both the Technical Specifications and Section-16 of the Final Safety Analysis Report. This procedure also specified that all Technical Specification interpretations were reviewed by the onsite review committee and approved by the plant manager.
The licensee informed the team that, as a result of the concern identified in October 1998, the onsito review committee performed an additional review of the Technical Specification interpretations to ensure that the interpretations did not confilet with Technical Specification requirements. Nevertheless, the team identified an example in which an interpretation provided guidance _that potentially violated the
'
requirements of the Technical Speelfications, in addition, the team also identified an example in which an interpretation provided guidance that was inconsistent with the Final Safety Analysis Report.
_ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - - JUN-26-97 THU 08137 DRS Mall. ROOM FAX NO. 8608212 P. 26
b.1 Technical Snecificotton Interoretation 25 Section 16.9.2 of the Final Safety Analysis Report described the limits for setting the overload and load reduction trip setpoints for the refueling machine at 250 pounds above and below the weight of the suspended loads, respectively.
Technical Specification interpretation 25 interpreted Section 16.9.2 to mean that these trip setpoints could be set to 250 pounds above the heaviest fuel assembly load for the overload trip and 250 pounds below the lightest fuel assembly load for the load reduction trip.
The team was concerned that this interpretation allowed these trip setpoir.ts to be set in excess of 250 pounds by approximately 150 pounds (the estimated weight of a rodded assembly). This meant that, while the overload trip would be correct for a rodded fuel assembly, Jt would be excessive for the unrodded fuel assembly and would not trip until th5' weight of the suspended load was 400 pounds above the suspended load weight. It also meant that, while the load reduction trip would be correct for the unrodded fuel assembly, it would be excessive for the rodded fuel , assembly and wou;d not occur until the insertion force was 400 pounds less than the suspended load weight.
Through discussions with licensee personnel, the team determined that these were the trip setpoints used during Refueling Outage 8. Additional review by the team l Indicated that on October 20,1995, Technical Specification 3.9.6, which provided l ' the same trip setpoint setting requirements, was deleted and the requirements incorporated into Final Safety Analysis Report 16.9.2. Therefore, during the period of October 18,1984, through October 20,1995, Technical Specification 3.9.6 was violated during seven refueling outages (Refueling Outages 1 through 7).
10 CFR 50.59 (b)(1) requires the performance of a safety evaluation when plant modifications change the plant as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report.
The f ailure to perform this safety evaluation is considered to be an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.59 (50-483/9705 06).
b.2 Technical Soecification Interotetation 18
.
Technical Speelfication Interpretation 18 provided an interpretation regarding the operation of the diesel generator building supply fans. Technical Specification 3.8.1.1b required the diesel generators to be operable. In addition, Technical Speelfication 1.19 required that for a system to be operable, all supporting subsystems must also be operable. The diesel generator building supply fans are a subsystem of the diesel generators'that the licensee determined are required to be operable when outside ambient temperature is greater than 65'F.
Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 9.4.7.2.3, stated that the diesel generator building supply fans automatically start when the room temperature exceeds 90'F and automatically shut down when room temperature falls below 86*F. If the
,
building temperature exceeded 90*F, Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 16.7.4, allowed the temperature to rise to a maximum of 119*F. At 119'F, Section 16.7.4 required the temperature to be lowered below 119'F within 8 hours or to perform
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JUN-26-97 TliU 08:37 DP.S MAIL ROOM FAX NO, 8608212 p,27
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an analysis to demonstrate that equipment was not affected by the elevated temperatures, in addition, Section 16.7.4 also required that if the temperature exceeded the 119'F limit by 30*F (149'F) for roore than 4 hours, the affected equipment (i.e., tho diesel generators) were to be considered inoperable.
The licensee developed Technical Specification Interpretation 18 to allow the diesel generator building supply f ans to be placed in manual operation (i.e., defeating the automatic starting function by placing the supply fan control switches in a " pull to-lock" position), without declaring the diesel generators inoperable when the outside ambient temperature s s greater than 66*F. The purpose for this Interpretation was to eliminate excessive cooling of the diesel generator jacket water system-that-was.cousing systern alarms. In addition, the licenses revised Proceddfe OTN-NE-00002dStandby Diesel Generator Auxiliary Systems," to add a precautikand IlmitaW(Step 2.6), which stated that each diesel generator building supply fan was considered capable of performing its intended safety function (i.e., the ability to supply air to the building if temperatures rise above the f an start setpoint) If the fan was placed in pull-to-lock and was under ' the control of the operator. The procedure also directed the operator to assign the room temperature point to annunciate on Window 65F, " Optional Parameter Setpoint," at or below 110'F. However, the licensee concluded, through the 10 CFR 50.69 screening for the procedure change, that a safety evaluation for.the change was not required. Therefore. a safety evaluation for the procedure change - 3 w .Jb was no,t_pejormed._ f the diesel Since i diesel generator building supply fans were a ' generators and these fans were considered to be inoperable when they were in a w r,r o F " pull to-lock" condition, the team concluded that the diesel generators were also inoperabladerefore, in effect, Technical Specification Interpretation 18 changed theM1 generator Technical Specificationfby allowing the diesel generators to be declared operable while the diesel generator building supply fans were inoperable.
Based on this finding, the team requested that the licensee review the operations logs to determine when the Technical Specification Interpretation / procedure
% J- guidance was implemented. Although licensee representatives stated that the interpretation was used to place the fans in manual operation durina the F=ft =ad g g 3 y Sorino eventnas from 1987 to 1990,jhe licensee's review of the operator logs from uM 1987 to 1990, revealed that there were no oocumented instances in the operator
_ logs in which the f ans were placed in pull-to-lock. In addition, since a plant wo L6W modification in 1990 eliminated the need to place the f ans in manual operation, the licensee interviewed five operators to determine if they recalled any instances of placing the f ans in manual operation since 1990. As a result of these Interviews, the licensee informed the team that no operator interviewed recalled placing the
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f ans in manual operation.
s . ~Deg MoL ' Since the system was described in the Final Safety Analysis Report as operating automatically, it appeared that a safety evaluat ion was required to substitute _the
,* manual onerator action for this automatle function. This substitution may have M i incieased the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to
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____- - JUN-26-97 THU 08:38 DRS Mall. ROOM FAX NO. 8608212 P.28 safety previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report and increased the possibility for a malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Final Safety Analysis Report, and therefore, potentially constitutes an unreviewed safety question.
10 CFR 50.59 (b)(1) requires the performance of a safety evaluation when plant modifications change the plant as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report.
The f ailure to perform this safety evaluation is considered to be an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.59 (50-483/9705-07).
c. Conclusions Overall, the team concluded that the implementation of the Technical Specification interpretation program svas adequate. However, the team identified two examples in which interpretationiprovided guidance that was inconsistent with the Final Safety Analysis Report and potentially violated the requirements of the Technical Specifications. One example involved on apparent violation for the failure to perform a safety evaluation for a change to the refueling machine load setpoints.
The second example involved an apparent violation for the substitution of manual t operator action for the automatic operation of the diesel generator building supply fans.
E2.5 System Walkdowns a. Inseeetion Scoce At different times during the inspection, the team performed walkdowns of selected plant areas to determine the overall material condition of equipment and the maintenance of housekeeping, b. Observations and Findines During the walkdovins, the team noted a number of tags on pumps and valves that were called " boric acid" tags. The licensee stated that they started a boron control program in January 1997. The purpose of the program was to hang such tags on components to identify that there was some leakage that required occasional cleaning, but the affected valves were not in need of immediate repair. The licenses stated that the purpose of the program was to differentiate between acceptable periodic residue removal on components and those components that needed to be repaired. For components that needed repair, work request tags were hung. The team noted that these boric acid tags were not limited to boric acid problems and extended to other leakage problems as well. This explained the existence of such tags on such systems as the component cooling water system, which was not a borated water system. Based on these observations, the team considered the boron control program to be innovative and effective toward maintaining the material condition of the plant.
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TSIHISTORY 2-6-85
* Because of nuisance alarms, a general engineering evaluation was performed per
. EDP ZZ-04004.
l l e The review detennined the diesel generator need not be declared inoperable svhen the associated supply fan is taken out of service provided the room temperature is monitored and less than or equal to 122 degrees F per FSAR Table 3.11(B)- 1. With a 3 degree tolerance, the T/S 3.7.12 limit , is 119 degrees F.
. This was not a formal 10CFR50.59 review but the evaluation concluded "no unreviewed safety question is involved".
s
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TSIHISTORY(cont.)
3-1-85
. TSI 18, Rev. O issued.
. The diesel generator need not be declared inoperable when the associated supply fan is taken out of service provided the room temperature is capable of being maintained within the limits (119 l degrees F) of Technical Specification 3.7.12.
l . Operating procedure, OTN-NE-00001, Rev. 4 allowed fans to be in PTL. Upon a D/G start, operators were to place switches in AUTO. Rev.
5 deleted. Rev. 4 existed from 6/21/85 to 7/24/85.
3/86
. A special test was performed to evaluate diesel room temperature relative to ambient temperature, with the diesel fully loaded and supply fan secured.
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TSIHISTORY(cont.)
4/86
. TSI 18, Rev.1 issued. The D/G is considered operable with the supply fan in pull-to-lock provided it is still under the total control of the Reactor Operator. The fan MUST be operable in all other aspects. This is based on administrative controls that allow the operator to maintain the room temperature below its Technical Specification 3.7.12 limit (119 degrees F). Since additional testing and evaluation of the diesel generator supply fans is required, there presently is not an acceptable outside air temperature limit that allows taking the supply fan out of service, other than as described above, and still maintaining the diesel generator operable.
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TSIHISTORY(cont.)
6-2-86
. Bechtel revised calculation for D/G room temperature \vith the supply fan secured. The Bechtel calculation (GM-2-C) provides an ambient temperature limit of 69 degrees F and maintain the D/G room at 119 degrees F with the
' l supply fan secured. UE added a conservative i margin and limit established at 65 degrees F.
11-19-86
. RFR 2852A evaluation supports 65 degree upper limit for fans in pull to lock, addresses freezing temperature concems, and initiated FSAR change notice (435).
. An FSE was performed.
. This RFR triggered TSI 18, Rev. 2 and TSI 35, Rev. O.
x
TSIHISTORY(cont.)
2-18-87
. TSI 18, Rev. 2 issued. Similar to Rev.1,just added reference to RFR-2852A.
. TSI 35, Rev. O issued. The diesel generators may s be considered operable with their associated l ventilation supply fans inoperable, as long as the outside ambient temperature is less than or equal to 65 degrees F.
12-12-88
. TSI 18, Rev. 3 issued. Same as TSI 35, Rev. 0-3 (for D/G portion).
. TSI 35, Rev. 4 issued. Transfer D/G statement and 65 limit to TSI 18, Rev. 3.
. TSIHISTORY(cont.) . 2-23-90
. CMP 88-1022A changed the air flow distribution inside the D/G room to allow the fans to be returned to automatic mode and not cause nuisance temperature alarms from the keep wann systems, 4-6-90 l ' .
FSAR C/N 435 issued to allow PTL when less than 65 degrees F ambient.
11-1-95 o OTN-~NE-00002 nonnal operating procedure for the standby diesel generators issued to add the 65 degree F limitation on having the supply fans inoperable.
2-26-97
.
SOS 97-0265 was written to address the lack of guidance in TSI 18, Rev. 2 through 8, to prevent the supply fans from being in pull to lock at temperatures above 65 degrees F.
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.
February 27,1997 REVIEW PERFORMED TO DETERMINE IF AND WilEN Tile MCH SWITCilES GM-Ills -01 A/lI A WERE TAKEN TO Ptil.I,-TO-1.OCK . The following reviews were perfonned today to detennine when the diesel generator supply fan switches were taken to pull-to-lock, specifically when ambient temperature was greater than 65 degrees F.
1. Five experienced licensed operators were interviewed. Three are SROs and two are ROs. None recalled an occasion in the last several years when the diesel supply fans were taken to PTL above 65 degrees F without also declaring the diesel generator inoperable, s 2. On 2/23/90, modification MP 88-1022 changed the air distribution to i reduce the direct air flow over the diesel. This modification was initiated / to resolve lowjacket water keep wann system temperature alanus from occurring when the supply fan automatically started when the room reached 85 degrees F. If this occurred in the spring or fall, colder outside air flowing directly over the diesel and keep wann subsystem would lead. - to the low temperature alanns. This condition originally prompted the TSI 18 guidance to allow PTL under the control of the operator.
3. A review of the electronic Equipment Out of Service Log entries for these fims resulted in four EOSLs with the last dated in 1992. Three were for the
' A' train and one for the 'B' train. Each was due to maintenance work .
Each EOSL had notes to the operators that the D/G was operable with the fan inoperable as long as the outside ambient air was less than or equal to 65 degrees F.
4. The electronic WPA data base was reviewed back to February 1990. No evidence was found to show the fans in PTL without also declaring the diesel generator inoperable when above 65 degrees F.
5. The Reactor Operator narrative log sheets were reviewed between February 1987, the month following completion of RFR 02852A to limit
.- .. -. .. - . . - . .- . -. . .-. - -. .. .. . . .
PTL, and February 1990, the month the ventilation modification was completed. The search looked for key words such as "PTL" and " diesel generator supply fans." On 6/11/87, an log entry showed the 'A' fan was inoperable but the associated diesel generator was also inoperable. No other^concems were found.
CONCLUSION Based on the above reviews , no finn evidence has been found to show specific times when the diesel generator supply fan control switch had - been taken to PTL when above 65 degrees F ambient and the affected diesel generator was not also declared inoperable.
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Mener oepar.:aent: Si4c Lic.ensinn (Print'Name) . It is hereby requested that ORC review and recommend approval of Docume ic Name: 'TEhniCrd 8Deci-kca+iCM lhler prC4tthOn Document ID: N C'. (3# Rev. No: 3 COMMITMENT DATE: - _ - - - - - = .q NOTE: This is the last date that ORC can review and still h/ meet a license or administrative commitment. RECORD OF ORC REVIEW - a-- -- --------- , ygg Meeting Numbers f/[ Date: Recommended Disposition: Approve as submitted l l Disapprove as submitted l[[ (Return to Responsible Individual . with comments) Comments: ;* . . . . . * n 1/ -N % 3J'- ORC Secretary: " - 2 Date d ~ O Distribution: Requesting Individual w/o attachment . * ~Ihis in4erprek+ ion is being revised . -to ivr.hacle_ T/s in4er pecta hbn No. 5D , QMc.h is d- 4 T/5 ink"(PRM.W No. 5 - being acte.4ea og P g , a/7 CA-#92 09/18/86 APA-ZZ-OOO91 _ . .- l , . . ' ******************** * * IEL '!ICAL SPECIFICATION INTERPRETATION * _ e ***************** * No. 18 T/S REVISION 1 Rev. 3 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POVER SY.TEMS 3/4.8.1 A.C. SOURCES Each diesel generator supply fan is considered capable of performing its intended safety ftr.ction (the supply fan is OPERABLE) if the fan is in pull-to-lock and provided it is still under the total control of the .g Reactor Operator. The fan must be operable in all other respects. This J is based on administrative controls that allow the operator to maintain the room temperature below its Technical Specification 3.7.12 limit (119' F. ) . The diesel generators may be considered OPERABLE with their associated ventilation supply fans (CGM 014/B) inoperable, as long as the outside ambient temperature is less than or equal to 65'F. When the missile cover is recoved from the Emergency Diesel Fuel Oil storage tank, the diesel need not be declared inoperable so long as appropriate administrative controls are followed to ensure adequate missile protection. These controls include: limiting the time the cover may be removed to 36 consecutive hours, maintaining the cover rigged to the crane with personnel stationed to facilitate immediate replacement, and monitoring l, f7:. weather forecasts and local conditions to allow immediate replacement of - the cover if necessary. _ ! l Reference:_ RFR 01983A ! RFR 02852A ! ! ! I . ; ORC CHAIRMAN ORC ltEETING NO. / 8 fly [_m//d' J!M ' i i TPS/ LAM:jlh l cc: ALL TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION HOLDERS , . . , . \ . CALLAWAY PLANT , ORC REVIEW TRANSMITTAL FORM TO: Sup intendent, Administwation - Services Date: 12./ t /SR , FROM: bih GN er Department: Si4e Licensing -' ~ (Print'Name) . -It is hereby requested that ORC review and recommend approval of: Document Name: Ta31nicod 8peci4kc.c+icn Inderpfc-IttHon Document ID: NO 36 * Rev. No: d ~ , COMMITMENT DATE: - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ l . NOTE: This is the last date that ORC can review and still ') ' meet a license or administrative commitment. .> RECORD.0F ORC REVIEW * l = - = = = = - _ = . - -s Meeting Number: Date: Recommended Disposition: Approve as submitted l[l Disapprove as submitted l[[ (Return to Responsible Individual . with comments) Comments: ,. '1 . - ORC Secretary: __, Date Chech RFR pew Distribution: Requesting Individual w/o attachment 4/ y apt, wd , gg , g * L Remcvc d <c A.cence. -to dc.tchJ T/s 33. io. 3 R F2. 2SS2. A ofP ar , v r c uo 40 S Memo /cd sta4trnent ' Spent kt PCC I PwPS E6W W-Sho3A k deelortd hJCPe.,RAe>tE if associcJcd rocm ' Cooler is inoperc% Pcvc 3cey8 concc.enin3 cu a1 c3cmcccaors cA_,,, WGo rcwtovcd m d added 4o T/$ 09/18/86 in 4cepre+cacy tJo . 18 . * * * . - - - - - - . < , ) ' =********-*********** * ., * TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION INTERPRETATION * - ******************** * No. 35 Rev. -4 T/S REVISION 1_ PLANT SYSTEMS ( 3/4.7.12 AREA TEMPERATURE MONITORING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.12 The temperature limit of each area given in Table-3.7-4 shall not be exceeded for more than 8 hours or by more th'an 30*F. ) APPLICABILITY: Whenever the equipment in an affected area is required to be OPEKABLE. l' ACTION: a. With one or more areas exceeding the temperature limit (s) shown in Table 3.7-4 for more than 8 hours, prepare and submit to the Commission within 30 days, pursuant to Specification 6.9.2, a Special Report that provides a record of the cumulative time and the amount by which the temperature in the affected area (s) exceeded the limit (s) and an analysis to demonstrate the continued OPERABILITY of'the affected equipment. The provisions of Speci~1 cations 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable, b. With one or more areas-exceeding the temperature limit (s) shown in Table 3.7-4 by more than 30*F. prepare and submit a Special Report ' ., as required by ACTION a. above and within 4 hours either restore the area (s) to within the temperature-limit (s) or declare the , equipment in the affected area (s) inoperab7e. . With the CCW pump room cooler (SGLilA/B) inoperable, the CCW pumps may. be considered OPERABLE as long as the temperature in the vicinity of thesa pumps does not exceed its T/S limit of Il9'F. The ESF switchgear and vitel batteries / chargers may be considered OPERABLE for up to 72 hours with their associated Class IE A/C Units (SCK05A/B) inoperable, provided the following conditions are ner: 1. At least one of the Class IE A/C Units (SGK05A/B) is operable. 2. All doors'between both trains of vital batteries / chargers (2016') and ESF switchgear (2000') are open. The vital battery / charger . doors are. 34041, 34042. 34051, 34052, 34101, 34111, 34081, 34082, 34072, 34141, 34071, and 34131. The ESF switchgear doors are 33023 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .. . . , , 'I T/S Interpretation No. 35 - Rev. 4 ana-33011. NOTE - Ensure appropriate firewatches are established when these doors are open. Open fire doors render the Halon system inoperable and reouire firewatches. Open ESF'switchgear doors require a continuous firewatch. Open vital battery / charger doors require an hourly firewatch. 3. Transformers KNN05 and'XNN06 are de-energized. 4. The thermostat on the operating Class IE A/C Unit is set below l 80' F. 5. The operating Class IE A/C Unit is capablelof operating at full capacity. (That is, there are no known defects in the unit which would limit its capacity, such as broken or frayed belts, inadequate freon charge, ESW unavailability, heat exchanger / g compressor unavailability, and other work requests which night j limit capacity.) l -The SI, RHR, CCP's, and thc MD Aux Feed Pumps shall be declared INOPERABLE if their associated room cooler is inopraable. An ESW pump ~ shall be declared INOPERABLE if its associated supply fan is inoperable. I The basis for this interpretation is substantiated by RFR-552B/552A/2852A/3334A, and ELO-516, ELO-533, and NEM-1227. ^ MANAGER, CALLAWAY PLANT . ORC MEETING NO. _ TPS/ LAM:jlh cc: AI.L TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION HOLDERS . Page 2 of 2 Jen c _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . ******************** * ' * TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION INTERPRETATION * ******************** * No. 18 T/S REVISION 1 Rev. 2 gS.8 ELECTRICAL POL'ER SYSTEMS = Each diesel generator supply fan is considered capable of performing its intended safety function (the supply f an is OPERA 3LE) if the f an is in pull-to-lock and pYovided it is still under the total control of the Reactor Operator. The fan must be operable in all other respects. This is based on administrative controls that allow the operator to maintain the room temperature below its Technical Specification 3.7.12 limit (119' F.). This ORC position supersedes the previous Technical Specification Interpretation No. 18, Rev. 1. , Reference: RFR 02852A ORC CHAIRMAN / ' ORC MEETING NO. (p 4 6 TPS/drs ! cc: ALL TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION HOLDERS $ / e issus FEBSO N ' segna" _ ial:u ~ , , e.- / v, ,s t , . CALLAWAY PLANT ORC REVIEW TRANSMITTAL FORM TO: Superintendent, Administration - Services Date: .2//y/9 7 FROM: 8/966 NONhdhh Department: (0/f /4 //1 Ade i (Print Name) It is hereby requested that ORC review and recommend approval of: Document Name: r/5 /k ?G' A* ff E T t4 7/V4 N 33" Document ID: J/4t . 7. / 2 Rev. Not O COMMITMENT DATE: =============== r *A i ) NOTE: This is the last date that ORC can review and still meet a license or administrative commitment. i RECORD OF ORC REVIEW ======_-:=========== Meeting Number: l.,45 Date: 2 - 18 - e 7 Recommended Disposition: [Q ' Approve as submitted Disapprove as submitted l[[ (Return to Responsible Individual with comments) Comments: . ORC Secretary: 8. L4 + / ud. - Date: 4-/8-87 ! g Distribution: Requesting Individual w/o attachment CA-#92 09/18/86 APA-ZZ-00091 - - _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - '. . ******************** * * TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION INTERPRETATION * *******-************* * No. 35 T/S REVISION 1 Rev. O PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.12 AREA TEMPERATURE MONITORING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION l 3.7.12 The temperature limit of each area given in Table 3.7-4 shall ! not be exceeded for more than 8 hours or by more than 30*F. ! ,4 g ,# APPLICABILITY: Whenever the equipment in an affected area is required to be OPERAELE. ACTION: a. With one or more areas exceeding the temperature limit (s) shown in f Table 3.7-4 for more than 8 hours, prepare and submit to the Commission within'30 days, pursuant to Specification 6.9.2, a Special Report that provides a record of the cumulative time and the amount by which the temperature in the affected area (s) exceeded the limit (s) and an analysis to demonstrate the continued OPERABILITY Of the affected equipment. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable, b. With one or more areas exceeding the temperature limit (s) shown in Table 3.7-4 by more than 30*F, prepare and submit a Special Report .(*) '~ as required by ACTION a. above and within 4 hours either restore the area (s) to,within the temperature limit (s) or declare the equipment in the affected area (s) inoperable. With the CCW pump. room cooler (SGL11A/B) inoperable, the CCW pumps may be considered OPERABLE as long as the temperature in the vicinity of these pumps does not exceed its T/S limit of 119'F. The ESF switchgear and vital batteries / chargers nay be considered OPERABLE with their associated Class IE A/C Units (SGK01A/B) inoperable, provided the Class IE A/C Units were declared inoperable for corrective or preventive maintenance that will allow the units to be restored to service within two hours. The SI, RHR, CCP's, MD Aux Feed Pumps and the Spent Fuel Pool Pumps shall be declared INOPERABLE if their associated room cooler is inoperable. An ESV pump shall be declared INOPERABLE if its associated supply fen is inoperable. ) .........3
- .
T/S Interpretation No. 35 Rev. O The diesel generators may be concidered OPERABLE with their associated < ventilation supply fans (CGM 01A/B) inoperable, as long as the outside ambient temperature is less than or equal to 65'F. The basis for this interpretation is substantiated by RFR-552B/552A/2852A/3304A, and ELO-516 and 533. . h MANAGER, CALLAW4Y PLANT ORC MEETING NO. bMI TPS/dra cc: ALL TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION HOLDERS . Page 2 of 2 . . . . . s..- - .ur b,- ) . . J l l February 5,1987 I ELO - 533 i Mr. G. L. Randolph: ROOM COOLER OPERABILITY EVALUATIONS Ref.: RFR 00552A&B, RFR 02852A, RFR 03334, FSAR 9.4, VIT-202, and ELO-532 { ') l- ~ The purpose of this letter is to provide guidance to Operations regarding the operability of various safety-related equipment with the associated safety-related l room cooler / air conditioning unit inoperable. Attachment 1 lists safety-related I room coolers and the actions necessary if the room coolers are inoperable. Attach-ment 2 provides a matrix which summarizes some of the considerations used in developing this guidance and also provides additional administrative controls which should be provided to Planning and Scheduling for incorporation into work packages. If a room cooler or air conditioning unit is found malfunctioning, the equipment that it cools must be declared inoperable at that time, except as noted - on the attachment. Engineering should then be advised of the situation in order to evaluate its operability. tW W. R. Campbell @ WRC/ cad Attachments - cc: M. E. Taylor J. J. Massmann D. E.,Shafer D. D. Smith D. S. Hollabaugh E-02000 R. C. Wink NEDF K. G. Schweiss WRC Chrono '. . ATTACHMENT 1 COMPONENT NAME/10 DESCRIPTION 1. CCW Pump Room Cooler The CCW pumps may be considered OPERABLE as (SGL11A/B) long as the temperature in the vicinity of these pumps on the 2026' level of the Auxi-liary Cuilding does not exceed 1190F, (RFR00552B) 2. Safety Injection Pumo Room The SI pumps must be declared inoperable if Coolers (SLG09A/B) the associated room cooler is inoperable. (RFR 00552A) 3. RHR Pump Room Coolers The RHR pumps must be declared inoperable if < (SGL10A/B) the associated room cooler is inoperable. (RFR 00552A) G' - 4. Centrifugal Charging Pump The CCPs must be declared inoperable if the Room Coolers (SLG12A/B) associated room cooler is inoperable. (RFR 00552A) 5. ESW Pump Room Supply Fan The ESW Pumps must be declared inoperable if (CGD01A/B) the associated supply fan is inoperable. (RFR00552A,RFR02852A) 6 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps The MD Aux. Feed Pumps must be declared inop-Motor Driven Room erable if the associated room cooler is in-(SGF02A/B) operable. (RFR 00552A) 7. Diesel Generator Ventilation The diesel generators must be declared inop-Supply Fan (CGM 01A/B) erable if the associated supply fan is inop-erable and the ambient temperature is greater than 650F, (RFR02862A) 9 8. Class 1E Air Conditioning The ESF switchgear and vital batteries must Units (SGK05A/B) be daclared inoperable if the associated air - conditioning unit is found inoperable. Sche-duled preventive or corrective maintenance may be= performed on Class 1E air conditioning units on one train provided it is capable of being returned to service within two hours. (ELO-532,RFR03334) . + ' , , , . Q.ifi t; u.. 4 g,-y 9jg;,!telphis i p;g : 0 Djil;!!, 4 5, ' t v.,15 d ti< y-t t- : i Nq){ _fj{{{l{i t- .i 1 jijjj A; @tm{$,{i';0.jii"l[ " [2' - <g .! I $ 3 D iS- f w$e le , , , - , jDv { u,b$ f 'k ' ~9 'N N. $ I I A I( .g}{ ej , C,' d11 , . c jk - > p3 7i- ,l , , 1 5 i i i E i :t $ - '"9lEf2 2,g1A1e i i t ! : : g; e._d,3 1 3 g i 3-( s j- 1 1 g ( t 4 5 W l4'ik C < 41 k-( , Ij :g k-d n, g. k $ k -$ $ h q{a - ~ j h, : - i ! - )111 H4 t' ;- 3 ; a ; - e. ; . Mt t i h-e gi, w' ,5 - . v<t,nyt lf- -}'u'{ N : s *I t w! hjd: -lpto$!hlI . I I Akk ikij ivik , , i , - ,% i k k 1 e i: t M t R]c 1 44' h}- M 'i , d {, k' I h s' M s }I i 34 s U j jjjl s, , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _.
IfC< * N . , mi . Foru N-144 (4/30/66) ,, . UENE RFR TR ANMITTAL/ RECEIPT FORM g ' - DATE _.///.2./87 - RTR NO. N N Y8A E'TM/.WBt .fM'/(s -- Descriptions b/6 h/D 65Ml O &se M /t/~7-V To: @ Superintendent,SystemsEngineering Cath.c . . FtR Orvatuation/nt=9e=itie= [ Complete Section III of the RFR and return to NEDC. @ResolutionofthesubjectRTRisbeingtransmittedforyouraction,as appropriate. Oother (see Romerw=) RemarlLS: ! . j. ' . .__ r * iO0h&LA perintendent ll/Ll<?] -- ec: 3456-0171 3 w/a - RTR FUP w/cc (BJK) j ' E-0166 w/a N. Date * ' ' u-'~'-ad " ' - - - PCE.w/a D.E. Shafer w/a (RFR's requiring safety NE Resp. Engr. (ZO!I) w/o evaluatien) R.P. 'dendling w/o W.R. Campbell w/a . j% .- . . . i -~.d'. . . . . , * * 11 . * _ . - _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ .. , *. , . g.. . . - % ~ REQUEST FOR RESOLUTION s NEED DATE 9 b REV. A SYSTEM DESIONATOR Gff\/Gb "TED COMPONENTS h /G a,1 E%3 oacher \y Yam , :chcck one) o Engineering Evaluation c Request for a plant modification , o Design Document Clarification / Correction ,, , a Other . !r ' IY CI.A0SIFICATION: . * i !0 SAFETY c SEISMIC II/I o OROUP D(A) c NON SAFETY = , b PROT. t.ATURY COMMITMENT tso (attach document of commitment) (yes or no) RIPTION Su h to,sne,<,n.v bs ben %.h h.,h dds uL o G - .D and CSON M w reem JA b s o y kie s ce a c el 'i a aw A A wr.<, L. am h \ k m9, A L:,b bt,1.t h,Cm u, 6 d mou, .a.A a#A A eeunaau,v.t L dich na tsa % . )OSED RESOI.UTION L.hde b mask b lekm, it a, bw.4 1,.e.,<.L b caw ke edabb\.4d A',ck J\\ b a(,a as i bsk E, dut. Am b 's awa Etw Lp orce nht JAk Ah rne.ch e. us,ob b . A-.I- wke, - ER"NCE AND REI.ATED DOCUMENTS E7P-n- ma ; r,A %ee 3. 7 . a Th ' 4, vsag. %4 . P f:R /4f 74 l \ : .:: ' ' CI R au O b n ,(name) / 9-/P-K (date) 2 HONE PV9? (ext) l w_ / 9-24-36 DEPT, WUE I78 ERVISOR '/86 * / Y M ."C / h e~,4-.~C '- Page 1 of 2 APA-ZZ-00604 09/12/86 CA-#778 o , - n7nw m ,- - - . . < #~4rwc:5. _(Coa r. ) rc>,e wegngits w IfMd- ESN PvHPS - Newe evaLunruo 72'sr D,+rn ANO THe coouac, psyg to crexgriou. Wincur "3fC. U '/ G' 'A ' LU~~tte iMa rfL - C,+t.c C D- l ~ C WE V O <<Wo P) 0"L C U LA TE Densva A Fo<M u t *4 7t> $ D - o f - Rev. O (fppg . pg count rycwg. it'cor-t *re nteR A ruc ES. UNDex g/Ang cv5 - AM sieur- : 7tneremyce cf MP ANO A Desen 0-a no Aro R /~CWM 1/oLTA4ej V/ CLOS F9 % y AUC -7b . fFFt ctewcV . OF 7~c HpcA'tvrtwE Of U2 "Y YS* Ul Sypay gg .7g &M Tech. SNcs, facMe Mr MMY '" O# # # TD O' #E# #" .. fore 17t M UMP - , -f . v - - _ . - I. l (Form N-79, 4/85) Attachm9nt A-QE-332, Rev. 4 Page 1 of 1 - CALLAWAY PLANT NUCLEAR SAFETY EVALUATION CHECKLIST CHECKLIST APPLICABLE TO: ,ff/f O2 Ff2. Rev. 4 1) . 2) 10CFR 50.59 APPLICABILITY DETERMINATION The procedure, procedure revision or change, or modification to which this evaluation-is applicable represents: (2.1) Yes No A change to the f acility as described it. FSAR including the RERP and Security Plat (2.2) Yes No A change to procedures as described in the FSAR including the RERP and Security Plan? (2.3) Yes No g test or experiment not described in the FSAR including the RERP and Security Plan? (2.4) Yes No V A change to the Technical Specifications? (2.5) YesL ! No A change to safety-related or special scope structure system or components; a change which adversely affects a design b, asis calcu-lations or a change which interacts adversely with another system. l If any question above is answered "Yes", perform a written safety - evaluation per QE-332 by completing Form N-lli, Nuclear Safety If the answers are all "No"; an unreviewed safety 3 Evaluation. question does not exist and the change may be implemented without notifying the NRC and a written safety evaluation per 10 CFR 50.59 is not required. (2.6) Basis for the answers provided above. (Also include a brief description of the proposed change or refer to the appropriate design change document which fully describes the change.) F3 M scc r 9 y, UG Of.c GMol E'c v. a . &msc Fsn toera C. ta . 4 3 T ro use As m e TSHMurvA'S &c 1ths) 7~ER d65 /6AJ CD/vDi 770s).s* C=c e fH6 DtESEL- WM&/YTW 0U / LD/M6 . coms 3) [N reviewed Safety Question Potential Unreviewed Saf ety Question Date //- Y .i. ' - Prepared by: - 4) 5) Reviewed by: 0/ Atu \'d~ 4 Date // - E -f b __ 6) Approved by: f_ Date Manager, Nuclear Engineering l (Form N-111,.4/85) Attachmont a * QE-332, Rov. 4 Pcg2 1 of K Q 005 " A ,h . .s ' CALLAWAY PLANT NUCLEAR SAFETY EVALUATION NE (1) EVALUATION APPLICABLE TO: [FR O2 75'2 REV.N (2) SAFETY EVALUATION (2.1) Yes No L/ Will the probability of an l accident previously evaluated in the FSAR be increased? i (2.2) Yes No L/' Will the consequences of an ' accident previously evaluated in the FSAR be increased? (2.3) Yes No " May the possibility of an accident which is .different than any already evaluated in the FSAR be created? (2.4) Yes No v Will the probability of a malfunction of equipment important +3 to a safety previously evaluated j in the FSAR be increased? (2. 5) Yes No " Will the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important , to safety different than any already evaluated in the FSAR be - - increased? (2.6) Yes No L/' May the possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety different than any already evaluated in the FSAR be created?" (2.7) Yes No t/ Will the margin of safety as defined in the basis to any Technical Specification be reduced? (3) REASONS / JUSTIFICATION (3.1) Provide narrative description of the proposed change, and-provide bases and rationale for responses to questions 2.1 through 2.7. Use questions'on Attachments D and E of QE-332 for guidance in completing this section. (Continue on - Page 3 of this form if required) W sed PAG CS 2cP4 mb %f Y _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . .. . . - l (FCrm N-111, 8/84) Attechmont B QE-332, Rov. 4 - Pago 2 of gu g en y *4 - ':ALLAWAY PLANT NUCLEAR SAFETY EVALUATION CONTINUATION /ALUATION APPLICABLE TO: OIrf O2 7 f2. REV. N TCN (3.1) - Continued fHis RFi< H A*S N Go r Af"Wereo rHC f3W PUMP *+WO Si/PPL Y /;"AN cf\*x A rioov. '7?fC" dICJCL G fNCRA704 St'DLY FAUS C&N Be our of seirvice Aiv D 77ec Diesel Gearoroc c;na .srit t BG Orcsstef0 OffRA6tp 1%VtD /NG '7~HAf Thf s4HS/fH r rSHo*eseenMF ECM* caS LOS rHeN (> S' * F f~sne 17tr ftwooO c1~ YtMe ruser rise l l'seN a.s o u r- of Sr/ Voc r. ., RE t', FsA et. 9. 4e 1. le l ORFe TY DCZ*U '0***S .5Are rY D (Se< M GAsis l : hjo creans r, cosw%so enrs exc srtt.t- Nore c rr.O tw creecrs cf asrvita t. An es.ic u e w a. l, Sarerr Des,su Basa 2. : sse caua,c, r>c bae veuntanea systre is h Desosuco r., een. eau func rio M*L A frCW $5C ~~J on Posrvt greo n n see h Snrery Dess..a Bas es 3:aoenna Tnc Savery funcnsas c,e nie age . VeMTs t Arnou 5 vs ren cha <3c R=, pre.eueo, A SSvarnei A ssuuc &crwa ccamneur FA os. user corn e s cour W e rH rue Lc15 cF or*Fsore Pc.Jee. k reTY S$t & N B nsis 4: No cu ase , Trre DG6 Vearenca sisreH 's ik'*"c=0 so nier rrte acner ecueca curs siec cernosa or de N G TesTc=O Datesu6 PLhwr oft *otArtou. n SArtrY kstsa 8pt:5 O h.lo Ceirls>&c 6 *- 17tes cunus c woeu nor 4c upsety pp.,,,,. Ssrerv Desssu Bases THe DS8 fearturacia sisrm z'e nee * 24,vs Aee in putt to t.o:x,1916M M Atidiesir Fae TGNPCsenTwC Mus7 BE Less' Twy (A *F-7H6 DIEteL C4ewmnivses 7v de DecLMeb .. T ov Trr 6 PULL ro Lock Posiricio, creTActC. TitG FAtJ3 odlLL hJor ~STMT GU TOMA' MAL L y' seeinAr^ > sqr TSF, Howevea T?tG* Roo M *J * ' t-d) I 1% TEcot Spec Lia or AS Lc M 6 6 5 A s coent TEMP os g i s** F THE Posstosttity e l (Fctm N-111, B/84) ^ * * * * * " " " " - " CE-332, RGv. 4 ' PEgo 1 of 1 - 3 or y Ops ci-v ?t. , ' CALLAWAY PLANT NUCLEAR SAFETY EVALUATION CONTINUATION /ALUATION APPLICABLE TO: #F O2 75~2 REv. ,4 TcN (3.1) - Continued bs'tFC TY 5Vss s.n IbAsis b: Ce vr. OF Pt(CtEINn 7& M k K*trLtcC'S ts.t 7?rc' &CsPL & CN C4' #Tr2 (,1)/LOthip OUR/ AJ dir COL D trl & W e"K ccw O. ric ou s w ss ,4poge r.sseo. Z~r- wp.5 De rz:enweo ririw rire src.wY s ran= I Rt1kkervof'E (4 LILO OC Ar$oVE Fsfl*ETw Gr. . % i . . .IP - i . . .. . . . . . . . . . _ . _ _ - _ - _ _ . _ - _ _ . , } (Form N-111, 4/25) j ffr,(> O Z F F 2 A Attachmsnt B QE-332, Rov. 4 PEgo 1 of 1 H a e M ops % .~. (3.2) Remarks fM/.S /7/ X G/fES A ODi nca.in t. f2Ex t sit try 7b ;fh'd Pt n ovr~ BY ALLOWINr, THE SUPPLY FS%'] ro Ba= Qur~ of sckvat.e' k)HerJ rne AHsieur YPr-tso ex aruer is ib sfenera B ELok) CT"F AivD TNr OtFSem tCFueueorce 7 o Be=pc<wc0 cm-r&new a t. Duie,a + ruese cous, r,wr nm n A A.rD cal evt omcD5 ChosJ TM" 19 o 0*-* ~rVNs*m*Wurf Tb Or LCS5 THau // 9 Y 7~sy6~ TEC.W SPEC l1Ntn l Citan.MC A)Cf7& C too LL & f MCPMPO 8'r' C/E=AJC 'f*O CHntt/CE se r f,C e rec D , See nou s cP TH c'* F5 &M. (3.3) Reference documents reviewed to form bases for responses: FSwe -rnsue 9. y- / , 9. '/. 7. /. / , 9. 't' 7 2. 2 , , 9. 4. 7. 2. 3 , 9.4.7.5~ $ ~7au- '?. 4-/ s //.E. 6t c , G MO / , PE V. O ! - &cHtt=L Osc, C ff-2d, ) de v. 0 - ASH Re E~ /+,9 0 0 B o o t , f 977 furiD8HfairnLS (4) Unreviewed Safe Question exists? Yes No N (5) Prepared by: Date //-%-85 (6) Reviewed by: ih N ' (Nihd., Date //~5-2b ( T, Review by: Nd kliy [ - * /s L L,'8/'s Date I/~ N b v' 'ISR - (8) Approved by: 76[C- Date // 6 ' Mgr., Ndclear p Engineering / / ' p, t e te l a ,, w.'H ui a asa..- n ukm /> e ap e c s. - , tA . -I lo ,~> Sa fNy Evaluaf<an e ,, e f,fEff Ed , _ _ _ - - - - - - -~ -- F _:_ _ _ _ - ,. Form N-184(l;/83)- ifFg o2- et F5':2 4 Attacheent c-CE-333, p y, ::o . 7 . Page 1 og 3 % , CMP EO Checklist The purpoce ofcthirichecklist is to evaluate all des'gn-changes for potential-impact-on the EQ program. The scope of this checklist does not-cover those work request cr-repeating work requests that de not involve a_ design. change (i.e., like Nind replacements do not 1; pact-euslification and are nct covered by thic checklirt) . determine the potential for impact on the EQ program, the CMP To originator requested actions: shall answer the following questions and perform the-l- .' . Oces thic AF2 eM? cover the modification "es (go to #2) of a safety-related component as l listed in the Callaway Systems >( No (so to #7) and Components Q-List or FSAR Table 3.'l(B)-3 or the addition of new safety-related components as determined by QE-0427 - . 2. Does th's C"P involve a new design ' .les (go to 44)l specification and/or the assignment of new equipment tag numbers? No (so 'to #3) f3 3. Does this CMP invo.lve a ccmponent , change (dif f erent vendor or mode! Yes (so to #3A) ,,,P nurber) from the ext: ting design. All component changes must be brought ..o (so to f 5) to the attention of'U "E-Licensing such that the- EQ files re flect as-installed vendor mode'. numbers. A. For componet changes, does Yes (so to.43B the Bill of Materials (BOM) and 64) for the new componer.t lirt different materials-for the - No . (go to - 4 33) organ!c (sof t) parts-than - those in the existir. .nent (e .g. , 0-r ings ,g compo-garkets, packings, grommets, insulation, etc.)? E. or component changes, does the '*e . s (go to #3C component have dif ferent size (mass, or'entation, counting, and 14) or center of gravity than the No (go to $3C) existing component? C. -For component changes, does the Yes (go to 4 4) . new component have dif ferent -- ,., performance characteristics? "o (go to 45) .. .- . . .. - .. - - - - - -- ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' - . . . . . . * . ,;- Attach:Qnt G * - Torm N-104 ('60/0 5) - QE-3 23,-- nov , . 7 - ,_ - jfr# 03752# - ? age ; og 3 7ecre -::o. 4. If the anrwer to e'.ther f 2,= # 3 A,- 8 32, or #3C above_is es, environmental and seismic qua:1 'catien me:t. be verified to assure compliance with regulatory r equir ecer.t: . As such, the CMr originator shall obtain-qualification documentation purruantito Section 9-of both IEEC 323-1974. and IEEE 344-1975 (e .g . , - te s t plan,_ tert report, vendor drawing:, insta?- 1ation details, specifications, BOM, etc.) ! and tran:mit-sare-to U ME-Licensing. o References to vendor prints in the Docurent Centrol syrtem are adequate, j_ (See Note 1) 5. Does this 01:7 invel'.*e relocatien of existing equipment'or installation of new equipment such that submergence after.an accident is an * isrue (corpare 8.ntended ? ocation againsc FSAR. Table 3. 6-6).7 ' v Yes (Provide basis for. submergence qualification, i.e. test -- results for submergence or analysis demonstrating acceptable ~consequencer, er locate equipment above flood level.) (Go to 86)- t'ci (so -to 46) 6. Oces this CMP involve-a; change in the containment spray-(EN) system that would cause the pH of the delivered spray to be outside the range of 4.0 1.07 ~ Yes. (Previde details to U:U - Licensing.) (Go -to $7) Mo (so to l7) 7. Coe.- thi: hM create the pos ibility of environment changes (e .g . , change -- involving the reuting of high- energy =(>200 F) lines. lines with - recirculating fluids f rom the centainment sumps, or Group-D augmented lines through rooms witn safety-related % , . equipment; change involv'ns EVAC operation b;e2#di such-that the original heat removal or hum'dity contro". capabil.'ty is decreased; _ * . .ittachment G Torr. "-184 (l;'/C 5) QE-323, Rev. 7 ', . ( F # O Z 35 2,4 ' Page 3 of 3 ~ EMF ::o. - ch:nge 'nvolving the removal of structural shielding change creating a seismic II/I concern; etc.) ? "ec (Prov!de detalis to UE: 0-Licensing.) involves no 20 != pact.) Sec ceum mr set.~ Y "o ( EQS Il $~-% Cend all rec.uested qual' f 8 cation inferration and cocFleted CMF FC checklists to UENE-Licensing.thisIfchecklist any of Section 2 through 7.of thin and acconpanying checklist are tarked "yes", docu=entation must be sent directly to UENE-Licensing. (W D Sc.-/ Originator /l-5-84 L%JJ * L ft L a // -f~% . s, Originating Department Head - .. A;'k Superintendent, UENE-Licensing l (See Note 2) l Notes: ' ' 1. Shou:d Sectica 4 of this checki'st be appl! cab'.e, irplerentatier of this CMP may proceed as specified in the design documents to-the point where the installation would become irreversible (i.e., require extensive demolition and rework) . Approval of j the talificatien documentation shall be complete prior to release of the affected component, system, or structure for j serv!ce. (Cee NEEP-0) 2. If Sections through 7 of this checklint are marked "no", the signature of the Superintendent-Licensing is not required. UA/DEt' CCMTPtA) ccwDt rictus , Ou7 stod 72=rtpri:w rv,eE' 5 45'F/ 77 6 b lM SENVKM bulLDi^4 s,$dPPL Y Pna) coucD BE 007 of Scar,cr n a W 1~trE D ifs et genes +ros Opere ,+rnw at.. W gry 7pesc eworrieus, rw ,Suppc.y ** @ TM Rocrt kIcvLa r3c Less m beps,v, ncw eye,e vwrs,+,,o Decerrei cirt<.. am-2-e f it.r. ca<c. a n et- erv.o. s/ps O(esi e Vn Lv Area ,sroof a(Law VALufs Lostroy FSM rncies 3 y g y f 3,,,g g-ne 7cremsea70ea vatr - . -- i l Foro N-114 (8/84) Attr,ch2cnt G DE-332, Rav. 3 Pago 1 of 1 . - CALLAWAY PLANT ENVIR_ONMENTAL EVALUATION CHECKLIST (1) Checklist Applicable To 8FFO275~Z Rev. A (2) ENVIRONMENTAL EVALUATION , (2.1) Yes No v ' 1n Increase in thermal power above the currently licensed level? (2.2) Yes No L' An increase in noise level? (2.3) Yes ___ No t 'A physical change to site grounds? (2.4) Yes No ' En adverse impact on area wildlife and vegetation? (2.5) Yes No L 'A change in the rate, quantity, concentration composition, or temperature of liquid-effluents? (2.6) Yes No L'$ change in the rate, quantity, concentration, or composition of gaseous effluents? (2.7) Yes No L '1( change in particulate emissions rate, . concentration, or composition? ,, , If the answers to all of the above are "No", no Unreviewed Environmental Question exists and no Final Environmental Evaluation is required.
If the answer to any of the above questions is "Yes", this > Environmental Evaluation Checklist shall be forwarded to the l Superintendent, Licensing, for performance of the Final Environmental Evaluation per Attachment H. (3) Prepared By: - ' Date M9 l (4) Supervising Engineer: An, / "2hM.. _o Date //-$-85 $ . J 4 E , l . , l l -_-___________ -_____-___ - _ - _ -_ -- 1 Attccha:nt A . QE-338, rov, 2 Pago 1 of 1 i - FIRE PROTECTION REVIEW CERTIFICATION **MM No . kff OZ W2 b Part A-Preliminary Fire Protection Review l I hereby certify that this design change does not impact the fire protection program or there is reasonable assurance that the proposed design change can be developed so that fire protection requirements will be met. It is recognized that a change to any feature of the approved fire protection program, which is consistent with the level of detail described in the FSAR, and which would decrease the level of . fire protection in the plant requires NRC approval prior to implementation. The changes herein digr/do not constitute a modification of features of the approved program which es/do not decrease the level of fire protection in the plant. < Signed a Y //- T-SS Responsible Engineer Date . Reviewed . A final. fire protection review t ' j $157 (is not) required, b%Y Lt. /Jk. Supervisipg Engineer /fs-R Date Part B-Final Fire Protection Review I hereby certify that the documentation prepared in support of the design change incorporates design provisions to assure compliance with } fire protection requirements and the changes herein do/do not constitute a modification of features of the approved program wnich do/do not decrease the level of fire protection in the plant. Signed Fire Protection Date Engineer (if applicable) Responsible Engineer Date . % Part C - Approval Approved . -nfa# S.p.r i.t.y.nt b "A -. . - _. _ _ - F0ra N-78 - (7/84)- Attechmont A-l- QE-330, Rov. 2 , Pcgo 1 of 1 ... " . ALARA REVIEW - CERTIFICATION x;;, ^": No.$f$ O2SSAA . - Part A - ALARA Review Not Recuired 'k-I_hereby'certitythat the proposco change does not increase potential ~ /
- (, rcdiation exposures beyond the exposures that already exist.
Si ned _. , ' - b hd Responsible Engineer /Y- S'- N Date ' '.j - %. ' Reviewed , GxNGl' 1i.0 - ll- C- % Supervising / Engineer Dace ! -Port B - Preliminarv ALARA Review I hereby certi*y_thic there is reasonablo assurance that the proposed .dosign-change can be developed such that radiation exposures to plant psrsonnel will be ALARA.
, f Signed -. . Responsicie Engineer- Date . Reviewed ' . . ~ , A final ALARA review (is) (is not) required . . . , Supervising Engineer Date Part C - Final ALARA Review I hereby certiry that tne documentation prepared in- support of the design change incorporates-design provisions to assure that radiation Oxposures to plant personnel Will be ALARA. ' Signed , ,, , . . . ALARA Engineer Date ,. Part D - Approval ' ' A N?h . vj - Approv c . . .' , ' - gf f 'l// 5.c, * . - ,Superintencent , Date .. , D ~ :. - arr- 2q?> - . .. ~I')fs UENE/BECHTEL INFORMATION . TRANSMITTAL $ TO: OBECHTEL-GPD EDBECHTEL- SITE QUENE- G.O. QUENE-SLE RESPONSE FZQUIRED BY: ATTACHMENTS: DESCRIPTION: a17-27y ADDusses rwe okes wo ry- of her Dieset ceaanroc wirn rm . sum v rso o u r- of mi c e. 7b arrnia 7Re &sv rewennrune Louir, 782 oxistun e Mc Qfp4 aiece e w c.u nreo Auo neouceo. gp Acnos ^ 1&S RECOMMENDED ACTION: Jo4j 'chp ysc o m '4; 4 o . Ribvioc THe Mcnr zo10 c'nt cc.itn L errows '- i.i n < r . osrein rue 6s ~ F 7^w e ce,nw e ~ h e L U M Yr74Y RESPONSIBLE ENGINEERIDATE ' BECHTEL APPROVALS UENE APPROVALS T '}a ' (N/A IF UENE-ORIGINATED) (N/A IF BECHTEl.- ORIGINATED) - D AT E # dots-oM SOPERVI$lt4G v//7/74 DATE GROUP SUPERVISOR-71$ %{b.~ENG /kr/sc t- NEER D' ATE PROJECT APPROVAL - DATE SUPERINThDENT RESPONSE: See Attachment "A" . "Under no circumstances een this UIT be construed to crodify, chWe, or supersede controlled doou:nente used for sonstructon." (0. Dhb eNac - RESPON118LE ENGINEER /DATE BECHTEL APPROVALS UENE APPROVALS '.. (N/A IF UENE -ORIGINATED) BECHTEL- ORIGIN ATE ) ./ . fif&E w. oROU,SuP 4 4 v,6-2-8C De SU,ERvi5iNo ENepte NDe tw fu & PROJECT [* *' /AL u-nDATE / _ DATE N SUPJAfffTENDENT , cc: 'mr ' DD5 ,1 / ~ .pc n oc uif g __ r . .. . .. , . . . . . -. Attach:ent "A" UIT-297 Page 1 of 1 EESP0;SE: PER-1946A establishcd hoperability of the diesel generator 8b# with the supply fan out of service. Bechtel's disposition was3 based on D.G. roam time-terperature cuIves frcm calc. no. G4-1-C Rev. O. These curves were developed bastd on the heat load information supplied by the diesel generator. supplier. The attached cale. G4-2-C, Rev. 0 (Supersedes calc. G4-1-C, Rev. 0) uses heat information supplied by U.E. This calculation establishes the revised outside ambient air ternperature limit of 690F and is the basis for the 650F limit reccm ended in UIT-284. It should be noted that this tarperature limit nay require revision pending U.E.'s 'I'I response to BIT M-00072 dated May 12, 1986. Please refer to the attached precautionary note regarding utili-l zation of this calculation by other than authorized Bechtel personnel. < w .- J . bY y,Y n.. . .f ws i _-_ _ _. . . _ . - _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . - - - , ,, .. , a ' , * . . %
4 * . . i 4 1 . 0 . i ' Utilization of calculations Please be advised that engineering calculations performed by . Bechtti were made for a variety of purposes during the course of design development. Many assumptions and judgements were made in them based on criteria peculiar to a specific condition during their progress from preliminary to final form, and during this . . period, many design concepts were evaluated and discarded. Utilization of these calculations by persons, without access to the pertinent factors and without proper regard for their ' - purpose, could-lead to erroneous conclusions by misapplication of - the results. Prior to any utilization, the calculations should c ' ?1 he reviewed with authorized Bechtel personnel, to ensure that the t purposes, assumptions, judgements and limitations are thoroughly understood. Bechtel shall not assume responsibility for the use , -/ Additionally, we 4 of calculations-not under direct control. ' reqcest that all calculations, transmitted by Bechtel, be . ! considered PROPRIETARY and not be released to e third party withsat the explicit written consent of.Bechtel Power Corporation. Bechtel Power Corporation , , 15740 Shady Grove Road Gaithersburg, Maryland 20877 . @ e > . s- . M - _ + - 6 e - * ,,-, e . . . - - - , . - . . . - - - . - - . , - - --- ..iem- ., - . , . . - - ~ , ~ - , - - . . , . . - - - - , - - , - _ _ . . _ . _ _ - - _ _ . . - ____ _ _ _ _-_.__- . -._-_._. - _... ..__. __.- _.._ _ _. __ _ __ - ' - - CALCULATION COVER SHEET Calc. No.GM 'l-c 14894 DISCIPLINE #0M/C4 L No. of Shuts _ (> l Nb No. I O / NonO TITLE SNUPPS PROJECT ALL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 a UNITS V SUBJECT i b/d Roon 7~se. (V/7~ .7 84 ) STATEMENT OF PROBLEM , . * $lt $pt d Vgg y*/cN , . . , '.) P ' ' AR CHECKED I SAR CH ANGE REO'O O SAR CHANGE g NOTICE INITI ATED SOURCES OF DATA $!C det t VL A T/ 0 N . l . : I ' SOURCES OF FORMULAE & REFERENCES $dd 0At 0 04 AT70N PRELIMINARY CALC. O FINAL CALC. [ SUPERSEDES CALC. NO. Nu up - - - - . D YAY $$ * Y0Afk/! " & ,/ k' AYW ' CHECKED BY DATE APPROVED BY DATE NO* DATE (/ CALCULATION BY . ... e . ' , ' - . MD ItC CALCULATION SHEET n ey. uo. o m uno, /Y /Yll11 / oen J/2/l/4 cate.no. cseenso I'n NG / M 2- clout +h2/BC \ voiner dmtASy son 80. M suestci- Ol$ Ad*M k! 5"EM NO l > 1 - . . . . . . . ... . i ._.. _ _. l _ _ _ . _ . _ _ . . _ _ _ . . . .. ' - - _ _ . . . .._ . ... .. -. _....._. - _ _ ~ l 08ZSCnya.2.-._lR. Ofrepp/Ns. THE cur.:IDE dia .getatg_Nr_* . -. l * ._. f f M P E R A 7 0 9 C f 0 ....l/ M //* THE D/rsf.L..$f/VAgo8 s _..._.-.........-.....R00M JY.M'rMMUME 79 //9. *6.. Lv.k{N.Zdf... ... 6 _ , hl5J fi _ b[WfRA Q A , /s AU N/Yf Q, __40/Q@* '/f~~ /rs . , _ .__. ...-.-_ - .._ ..-.... 00eL/d'.. d EA N.;. Ii'E. 0.ut3 /DK. <.d!/_ .dMMEL.'E_- . '. .. . . . . . _ 7tm.Pran ruMe. N/t1. ss.Jfe'Et 0 etb S1.. u.sl.d G .. - * ._ _ . . _ . . . . . . . . . . . Acrus& D/cstt deuren ran .r. .a.s._r. . ' n u. a . .. .o_n. _... . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3lC(lR d. Nf47 l.0Abe $450./*O...Di.f.'fRM/N..d THE - ---- . _ . _ . . . ..Ofd AeoM TEMPERArufE WMfM Qurs])E. A/R AMBIENr' , ; . . . _ . . . . . . . . . . . . rfMPERATURE /.$ -~ 25 ,/* , . . . . - _ - . . ; f . 3 : ! * . "f fRfMC S /. $AldutA7*/0M .J. C. 44 d M. .... - 4..~..f.v. 6 .. . _ . . . 'j's . . . J. Qu euca rt'ow /o4.K - HV - 4L9 h v. o 'a . . 3 d A t e uterlo d /0 4 66 -Gd .- 2 2.1-,_G. V .l. - - .. . _- _ _ . . _ . _ . . . _ .. ..... _ . ... . .. . . _ . _ . . . _ . . _ . _ . . _ . . . . . . - _ . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . _ . _ _ . . . 00Mei US /0W i..,f//f.0u.rsIbt s/g AnstrNr 7 rMarga.Eyrgt t.t -. 6 9. */* ./MORbfR 70 t'?A/NTAIN N/$_ .20dM . . . . .. . . ... .. . . . . . . _ - . _ . TEMPERATVRL r0 // 9 * F tv H/l.E... & C blG ** . /J AVNN/NG to/ TN 0 v 7 /71 C0alldd...LAN* .. . NS .bfG E00M #TEMP!/A TURE td/tt E.E U! .N . fpfEE/Nd (/6 f) ldMfM ,dlG /5 RONN/N$ 6NQ _ _ f . CUT 5/bE A/R AM8/ENI~ TEMP!MerufE I k ~~ J G 'F Fy 21 , . . ~ . . . . (; ..- . . . - . . . . .. * - - . . .. . . . . ,, =- - == _ _ .____ ... . t . - , CALCULATION SHEET , cate.so. dM 2 -c gy uo, o on,a,nsson 5 i$H /$ orre 3 l2/lEl cstcuto isl s,e 4-/22/ec ' peoseer O stt Au s $ sce no. N804 ,v,a c, plG soon rm. s8urno 2 ' ... ...- . ; ' ]fG,RVMNikd@dortrlNuoustoAbo/ /No XY s 60rsise. he ,4nsar rew. c r.< ) - s s ' s $ ; s r s u a o ,i * . J/ll1i M TA ' Sra Bil.i2 Eb D/G it'a on 7~cni'. (i~ a) = 94 * r . . , . . , . . n '.'., $rAr ftMcvAt af dottsu}rted AtA (Gnig ) . ._ _ _ .._. . . .. ... ... ' - 13 E /N Og N[ ' Rp.~ T" ; ,s . ' ~ 's s /64340 (o 24)(94 -5 5 ) ' " s 974,6 22 a/NR 19 'o Assuns ,%n 7:w .cunouwbind D/G 80en is 6iF " .'. // tn r i o s s rxRei supeousDina (ihtF. 2 ) ' Noern Wsit = 0 3 (33 sXnX94 -S o ) = /ge> g o a/gg " n Sourx Iditt , o.s (33.sx47X94 - 35) . /2421 s/ye " Essr /us' t L 4/J.2 8 s 0 3 ( 86 x 47 )l94 - So ) - B/MM a '* ,,- 13 3i Wtsr /4' sit u o s(26 x49 )(94 ss) = 4719/ afn' 0dilING c C.14 (?f X33<S){ 94 -55 ) : .24944 B/st -- -" ficoR - = 0 09 (t& X33,5)(94 L-4o) s 88/6 B,lHP " . i > /62783 S/HB. . .. . ... , . . - 190 CALCULATION SHEET A f9 8!' / CMC. NO. dN * 2 * O _. REV. NO. _ on a nsson _) b llbf/ /b onre 3/2ll1G Cutcuto.baw.Ah$osrs 4/22/s<; ' o no,n c, On t40A Y son no. /4294 suoster.- .Wd 900n RMP smeer uo. 3 ___ ' . . . . - . . .. . . . . . . . ... ... ... . .... . * &I.~/ kin .Ya n . 5 7A8/4 /EE.b. ., Th'fAfAdfE, N/$ 7 Gh/N (Qg,' . .. .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . l * . . fW.di Nd r L o s s . . . . . .- . . . . . . ' - - - . . . . 04 * $$ta f As . l . .' . , . . . . . . * . .n . 0764J1k/SEf83 . . .. . .. . 4 . j .. . - . " . . . . . . . . . .-. * h!d A.10 .8/HA ' / ,n ..... .fon egN3fR VA rt3 m , Abu .fo }'I 70 rk/3 //rs r dd/N l 14 'j . . . ~ . . . . . . . . . .. .. . g . .. ( _ . . . * * [Hf f~0 l'Al MSA7 dA/N /N 70 .b. f6 $00 M__s, /* Nll0 . X / *,( , . . . . . . . -. ..g..7.. . " , > f.37X/9 8/NR.. 1e . . . . . . ** ll3 /MG Mu.b/G oa.O. Z{MP- of //9*F A n.b Nfsrdrpt rip 21 . /NTo dfd Roon a/~ /:3(Xf0'.9lHR, bETtRtwNL . . . THf dyrh2 ' ** JIR AGBLE.L .I E M. k r e rs'n e & ), ? . .', . . " . - - . . . . S'^ 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x ~ '" 2' a IQ = F U A ( "i .. - T< ) + M c p (Tg - Tx ). . . . - . . " }J 7X /5 ^= 0 3 (33.5 x 4 9 f Il4-104)f d.3(33 5x4th/9_ Q ) '* ~ ' .o ph 'i + 0 5(86 . 7X//9-//9) f 0 3(f(x4 h/ //9.k,) t gf u ., v.24(f 6x 33 5)[//9- T.:) t o 09(fM 33 5)(Il9 - 60 ) __- 34 " _ ". t lod 340 (o 24X II9 - Tw. ), _ _ _ . _ _ . _ . _ . _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ - l g .. .. i . . " I ' " 6* gik '1 CALCULATION SHEET CALC. NO. [2N * 2 " d REY. NO, O ! on ,yiron / N/N oare_I//M4 Cstexto [aw M o4Te 4/e44 rnostcT DilAw$r Joe No. .NEM susstcT - /36 ##vW IEMA $HEtT NO M ' . . . . . - . . . ; .. . . . . . . .g. . 3 . , ,,, /*3 f g 10 = f0 8 + 562/0 - 472 & f //h.291 = /,f/S Ig~ s .. . + 222 el ~ 49/ G + /Sz92 + 14f19so -tso42 Ts . < - - . . .. 27418 lx = l9/ S/2 3 , S , . d . ' # e(, l ._l 'o l " __ _. . ,, af + j" . , .2 is 16 ,, 17 , l 18 l l l 20 - 21 , 23 l 24 . . . l-26 . 28
- 29 l 30
' . - .g...G a. , ,, . ' * l J l i 34 !-. l 35 w _ .-_ ,- . -__ . . .. . . . - -. CALCULATION SHEET o$ - calc. No. dM * 2 - C. v uo. O onscsunton n* .L _. onT E . 3 l2 7lE4 cutento fi n Y sis +/82 /84 rnostcT $$ll% son No. 14 E90 l suestcT /)/d /ooM Il*M F , SHEET NO. b . . . . 1 ! i -_ -. . __- _ . _ _ -. .......__i . _ . . 3 ' INC.EERMINE rar- R.p.m. ..J'EM P!R A ryg_e. - f_e e.._ . 0. y. 7.. .s._/D_L .. . __ .. . M_ a/L W r E d M /*._.. 0..F...-. ... 2 h _*/.... . ._ _ _ _ . . . _ . . . . . . . . . . _ . . ._ _ _ _ _ . . . . . _ . _ _ . . . - _ -. .. _-_ ..._._.-..-.. .. s A.gwme D.f.r'a //rA T de Ap LQg-) /3 J./.M./4A Nt TN_. 7/ME_._f e.d. . T.M. L . - * _ . . nes r_._/.g miavre s. . [ fig v! A.. 9 ]_)._.__ ._ _ . . . . . . 7 , _ _ _ . .___ _ . . . _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ Or (9 ) .f__[w. ._ . ~ * _ ____. . . _. . . 4 _7 . 9 . . _ . . .= . __ Etr. 5 e . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . .. i . . .. . . ._ _ _n. .eA__+zus e , u .. y_ _ _ z u _ to .kv. t _.. . _ . . . .. __ ._ .._ - . . ._ . _ , . . . - n /04340 . HA ' In__ = ! \ ! .i 2 e ! , ' ' . , 13 _ d_ y .. . = . 0 2 3.9. .. . - 6 ../. 6 ,,, &.... - ..._._ _ _ .. - _ . _ ! ! . < r 14 ' _ _ _ . . . . _ . . . _ . . . . . . _ . ' . . _ . . . .. U. wu .r 0 361 ? .yR .F...r .'_'f. .. , ..... .. A m u ._-= M 90_...F.T" " _. -- - _ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _ . . n Us, ,,. - . . - , . 0 3 3 . . .s. . .x..x. .- Fr.'. . .*. .,r. _. .. ifp , _. . . s._ tar __._Fr ** __ is . . _ . . . . . . . . _ _ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _ _ _ . . _ _ . . . -~ - . . . . . . . . . == , .. ..'. % = . dece) .(/04.540X 0.<239) + (0 361X.5490) f (d.3 3 x 295 7 ). . _ .e s ,, -. .. . . _ . . . - . fxp) = de O ) J.s . _ . _ - . 24 Jf888 4 as . . . ,. ,,p g a . 9 . 27 ~ . . . . . . ** . . . .... . g. . . . _ _ * . _....._2... ... ,J.3.X.1.0 - /7 _S -g .- . ... . . . 4. .. . . 4. f X to-(di ..t. .. . . . . . . 6._ . . . S.9. 7 lc ',. _ o M.v 32 g . . . . . . 3. . .y j .a__m , g .. . ~ ^ , ... . . . . . . . ... _ . _. . -, . . . ... . . . i.c.. . . . . . _ / . /4. X.- t.o..' .- . - .. _ I 6. .. ._ - . . . . - . . . . .. . -.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _ .... .. ..._ - .. _ _ . . . . . . _.. . . . . . . . = _ - . . . . . . . _ _ - _ . . . . - .. . - .._ _ _., _. -- . l . "'_ , a CALCULATION SHEET 3, . cAtc.No. M 2-C ev. No. d on59,ron /< M/ oaTe _J N/I4 w .// o4Ts catexto . 4/e2/st enosnci 0^U SbnY sce No. NM suestcT ) ! O S* C M SMP SHt ti Ho. $ .i. i e i ._ _ ' . . _ _ . _ _ . . . . . _ . _ _ _ - _ 1 __ , 3 \. \ ! f.../..d_u R_ E. . _.l.._ _ ..- . ._. _ . _ .. _ .._.. . . _ ' ' b _ . _ _ . .. g _ _.- D G . f_r.a..r.._to A.h.. 6..s D n.t. .. . . . . . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ ._._ _ _ . ._ ... - . . . . . . ' & ._.._..__..__-.... ._ g. _ _ . . . . . . . . . . _ _ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _ . . . _ . . . _ _ . _ . . . _ . _ . . . . . . . . . . . _ . . . . _ . . . . ._ . _ - - . . _ _ . . . s . % I ___ ___._...__.._-..-._............~.......___._ _ . _ . _ _ . . . _ e % . . . . . . . _ . . . . . . . . _ . . . 9 % . . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . . _ . . _ _ . io Q b _p. _ .. . _ _ _ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _ _ _ . _ . . . . _ _ . . . . . . . . . . . . . _ _ _ . _ g._. . . _ . . . . - . _ _ . . . . . . . . . . . _ . . - - - _ _. w% _ p.. ____ .. __ _ _._ _.. ._..___ __. - . .i . . .- -. , . . . _ . _ . . . . - . _ . _ . . . . ._ . . . . _ . . . . . _ . . - . ._. t3 80 -- . . ~ a t , X .o4 . _ ... - _.._ .. . ... .. _ .. . . . . ........._ = . . . . _ . . ,3 14 _ . . _ . - _ _ _ . . . . . _ . . . . . . . . . . _ _ . . _ _ . . _ . * 15 Q = . . . _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ . . _ _ .. _ . s. _ o,6 . . _ . . . o . . . .. . . _ . _ _ . _ . _ . . . . . _ _ . _ . _..t .- . . . . . . . _ . . . _ .. . . . . . . . . . n u . . . . . . _ . _ _ __.___ is . .. 3 ..o.3 _. . . . . . _ . _ . . .. . ... -......._. . .... . g% . . . . . .. .. . . _ _ . . . . . . _ _ . . i. . . o.4 . . . _ . .. _ _ . . . _ . . . __s. _ . _... .. . . . ~ . . . . . _ . _ . . . gp. . . . .. . 22 .- . . . .._ . . _ _ . . . . . . . . - - . . . . - . _. oa _ _ _ _ . - .. .. ... 25 - _ . _ [ . . _ . _ . . . . .. _ . . - . . _ _ _ ~ . . . . _ . . . . .. ... c.g . l- .. .. .. a - . . . ._._.'__ / i _ _ _ _ .. . . . _ . . . . . . . _ _ _ . . . . . . . _ - . . . . . / .. .. . ._...__ . - 2s o 1 2 J 4 5 6 g , y*. . . _ _ . . . . _ . . _ _ . . . . , . . . . _ . . . 7 % . ... .. to ll 29 ._. . . . . . . . . - . _ . . . . . * . _ - . _ . _ . . _ _._.. ._ . . . . . .~ ._ ._.. . . . . . . I~/.ME (M/"U73 3 b .p.9- si ,4: . . . . . _ _ . .. _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . . . . . .._ _ ... ._. .. . . vl,f,-22 ._ . . _ . . _ . _. . . . . _ . , _ . . . . . . _ . _ . . . . _ . _ . . ' .A3 .._. . .___. . _. - - _ _ . . . . . . . . _ . . _ . _ . . . _ . . . . . . . . . _ . . . . . . . _ . . .. .. .. .. _ _ __ ..... ..._.....__.m. -as . . . - ,. _ _ . _ . . . . . _ - _ . _ _ - . . _ . . _ _ . _ . _ . _ . - . . , :- L50.og ******************** * , . ' * TECHNICAL SPECIFIC /. TION INTERPRETATION * ******************** * No. 18 T/S REVISION 1 Rev. 1 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTDiS 3/4.7.12 AREA TEMPERATURE MONITORING Each diesel generator supply fan is considered capable of performing its intended safety function if the fan is in pull-to-lock and provided it is still under the total control of the Reactor Operator. The fan must be operable in all other respects or the applicable diesel generator must be declared inoperable. This is based on admit.istrative controls that allow the operator to maintain the room temperature below its Technical Specification 3.7.12 limit (119' F.). This ORC position supersedes the previous Technical Specification Interpretation No. 18. Since additional testing and evaluation of the diesel generator supply fans is required, there presently is not an acceptable outside air temperature limit that allows taking the supply fan out of service, other than as de9eribed above, and still maintaining the diesel generator operable. OD' 'HAIP. MAN . I Oh' MEETING NO. s- 1 7 5 4 M /4 793 TPS/dra a cet ALL TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION HOLDERS & n .s Q {a ' { ....saSAO(r-)a1.@ . " .u - q' qsn % se, 7 . s. , ;P ; ~ t ,, t.. . - 0 \ x\h , a _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ . _ . . . . . _ _ _ . . . . . . Y
, e' V l 6r) . hb1 Y 6accuiby 8 gA .bl- . [# 'Y ' flebok . $,W ,/ jf , sa g aa g ,g [ ,n ~e g f d , ,a, A m W <~4c,~e:2e f L d v p p4 u s ss . u .p~ .4 s* .:,at & - een. , .~s ana W 7 I ^sWm. + a Am,,8.-~ . m c,, ,sj gie g, gsp'^*f"P ar *** f~. n Qwkp, ;j fpf,jf - - 3, l19 o: , -1 h MfNQ . a . s .rs '"t %efg%W2L e; ~ 4 e ~.e w'^ * rf~% w ) t sp . .. m /:., -pr& ca n. w av ., vvw uw- ~ . . p * ~ ", y* - h .. ns v w gnl, w..v. - -ku. . s.y G n n g ' c uNLU .m [Iy' gu f o M.JLo+&s. ,.S s.n ca.~ +v J "6' *y g .. . L qq)y fygm. A a,a. AyJ; y n , u.ws . ! - . . .. , CALLAWAY PLANT ORC REVIEW TRANSMITTAL FORM TO: Superintendent, Administration - Services Date: .2 //y/r/ FROM: 8tvet M VHMituu Department: C 0 /1Pt M 4 Cr (Print Name) It is hereby requested that ORC review and recommend approval of: Document Name 7/s /976 f M C 7o47/tr y # /9 f o V. ,2 Document ID: 3/9.9 _ Rev. No: COMMITMEMT DATE: , l =============== l l NOTE: This is the last date that ORC can review and still { meet a license or administrative commitment. l ! RECORD OF ORC REVIEW I ==================== Meeting Numbers b$$ Date: A - l 8 - 8 'l Recommended Disposition: Approve as submitted l8l ~ Disapprove as submitted l_l (Return to Responsible' Individual with comments) Comments: 1 ORC Secretary: .k o'A J Date: A*I8"E7 Distribution: Requesting Individual w/o attachment - CA-#92 * 09/18/86 APA-ZZ-00091 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _ . . . . .. . ******************** * * TECilNICAL SPECIFICATION INTERPRETATION * ******************** * No. 18 T/S REVISION 1 Rev. 2 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL-p0WER SYSTEMS-Each diesel generator supply fan is considered capabic of performing its intend' i safety function (the supply f an is OPERABLE) if the f an is in pull -lock and provided it is still under the total control of the Reactor Operator. The fan must be-operable in all other respects. This-is based on administrative controls that allow the operator to maintain the room temperature below its Technical Specification 3.7.12 limit (119'RF.). This URC position supersedes the previous Technical Specification Interpretation No. 18, Rev. 1. . Reference RFR 02852A ORC CilAIRMAN C ' ORC MEETING NO. (s 4 cs TPS/drs cc ALL TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION HOI.DERS . . _= . ~ = ._ . . . . . . , , . . . . ' ' UOTE 86-166 l i April 11, 1986 M. E. Taylor: TECHNICAL SPEt!FICATION , INTERPRETATION #18 ; . Based on the evaluation performed as requested by RFR-01946 Rev. A,. the interpretation provided by Technical Specification Interpretation #18 needs to be revised. Because the interpretation is less conservative than desired, Operations should not utilize this interpretation until it has been reissued by ORC. Until this Technical Specification Interpretation #18 is ' revised, the applicable diesel generator must be declared inoperable when the associated diesel generator supply fan is taking out of service. See attached VIT-284 for the results of the evaluation. - R. D. Affolter c Superintendent, Engineering RDA/WHSt/sp cc: J. D. Blesser J. E. Davis J. C. Gearhart W. H. Stahl-Shift Supervisors RDA Chrono G57.41 . _ - =- = . . .. . 00TE 86 164 i April 11, 1986 J. C. Gearhart: ' ' ENGINEERINGEYALUAT10tl0FDIESELGENERATORSUPPLYFAN ( ef: RCA p8602-016 Rev. 0) Evaluation performed to support the technical specification interpretat that the and B), Diesel is out Generator of service.is operable even though the supply fan (CGM-Ol A L. plant had seen during normalThis evaluation plant was operations and based on conditions that the startup. No indication of l any testingoutorof normal sptcification plant temperature operation. condition were observed during startup Based on QA's~ concern as expressed in RCA p8602-016, Rev. O another Engineering Evaluation was performed (reference RFR-01946). Based on the results of this evaluation, a request to revise Technical Specification In-terpretation Number 18 has been initiated. To assure that we are in Com-pliance, a letter has been written to Operations directing them to declare the associated Diesel Generator inoperable when the applicable supply fan is out of service until Technical Specification Interpretation Number 18 is revised. - . , R. D. Af olter . Superintendent, Engineering RDA/bHSt/sp cc , RDA Chrono G57.41 . . . . . . . _ . ' (fd d (7, L t m%( ' % mu . , VOTE 86-165 , April 11, 1986 d. E. Davis: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION INTERPRETATION 418 Based on an evaluation provided by Bechtel in VIT 284. Technical Specification Interpretation #18 needs to be revised. Until the revision of th interpretation is complete Technical Specification #18 should be e with drawn. , W R. D. Affolter Superintendent Engineering 4,h RDA/WHSt/sp Attachment cc: J. D. Blosser W. R. Campbell l R. D. Affolter ' .M. E. Taylor J. C. Gearhart : ; W. H. Stahl RDA Chrono _ . . .- -- G57.41 ~i . . _ y -o , ..sim . - 1, y ,,e e ** . _ - i . . _ . . . a , , , - . b i J , 00 86-116 j i April 7, 1986 i Mr. R. D. Affolter ! RCA P8602-016, Rev. O TEC11 SPEC INTERPRETATION #18 , Please previde me a copy of your response to the above RCA. I would , also request a recommendation as to your opinion of retaining Tech Spec Interpretation #18. ( Also, se were previously discussing testing to determine equipment operability as a function of room cooling (e.g. ESW pumps, CCW pumps, etc.). Please provide an outline of' testing you plan by June 1, 1986. If you deem input or support is-needed. I will be glad to provide. :, , l i; h G. L. Rand ph ? - GLRikac Attachment ". cc: W. R. Campbell A J. D. Blesser 9 M. E. Taylor " GLR Chrono , G57.27 , . ' i e ' . i. Y f-o * = , lorm N-144 (3/7/86) 7fb , UE!IE R Q TRANSMITTAL /PECEIPT_FOPfi DATE [/M96 RFA NO. .[/ 7 ETM/EMstttEM . jog 1 Descripticns hlq'jn $GAJrr'H 73A' $/tt.OrMG _//f ( Tor g Superintendent, Systens Er.gineering ' ~ Bechtel ' Other FORT [ Evaluatten/ Disposition O complete section tri of tne arR ane return to NtDc. Q Pesolution of the subject PFR is teing trans:nitted for your action, as appropriate. COther(seeRemarks) . Rc: narks t . ~ / // filh. k c. k uperintenfnt cet 32156-0171 3 w/a RFR FUP w/o (BJK) E-0166 w/a N. Date PCE w/a ".'!. - ".Jerland /^ D E. Shefw wia (.wr te s requiring sare;y NE Resp. Engr. (DD9 w/a. v> 1u tion)- R.P. Wendling w/o . _ _ _ _ _-- _ _ _ _ . _ - _ _ _ _ _ _.~... _ _ . _ _ .. _ _ _ _ _ . ._ _ _ _ _ ._. _ _. ._ _ _ _ _ . _ ._.
+ FEB 141986 M REQUEST FOR RESOLUTION CALLAWAY PLANT j ' ' ' U3l 8 AEV. $YSTE,9 G1 SECHCN ! , , ; Systra NArt Diesel Generator Bldg. HVAC C:ve:NENT 1.3. CG101A,8 * # C4tQlNATC4 Rod Huber . 4tutt3 :C:'.ettf(s) Ouslh(Oftb FSAR Tcble 3.11(B) so Otpr. Enar, gat: 2/12/E6 pseug 8648 -1, Sheet 5 ,, a pf g g atttatMCUs) OP-M02GM01(0) 'd SFR 2NF-033A g,g, W. we :n, :n 4 cg cl} $H _ i ere m m en. u Attached is a CA#514/ General Engineering Evaluation that was per-formed by UErlE Systems Engineering on 2/6/85. It addressed the - question of whether the operability of the standby diesel genera- * tors is impacted by the operability or inoperability of the HVAC. system that is built into each D/G room. ' ; ' REGULATORY COMMMMENT _ YES/NO COMUZENT DATE DOCUMENT AGENCY ' stNets atmutttwnutttttutttes L UENE Systems Engineering requests further evaluations / reviews be performed on this subject because of recent GA questions. Test data was collected during S/U regarding rocker arm lube , oil temperatures under loaded engine condition (see SFR 2HF-f 033A). .. U SECTION 11 the situation sescritted above recuiru :esign Agency evalwation sea casolution. * hts roovest is fort Q nysical cnante to (Q Plant tout mont, Q son Plant tautomat) -Q .teoutres cocument revision to reflut As 8utit conettien l C Incorverstion of fosoorary Modification l -Q :oncurnnce w1th NMt aisaos1tton L 0 nuotution of anien auntion ; Ctner l l To be completed 'o y s UENo D UENE g , .....- .. ,j _' i lW$l . ... m .se, i C.A-#778 fage 1 of 2 12/03/85 APA-ZZ-00140 __ .__ . . . _ _ _ . _ . . _ . . ._ _ . _ . . ~ . _ . . . . _ . . = _ . . _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . , - - , _ . i ...- I f$a REQUEST FOR RESOLUTION #F/C /9(/g ,4 (continued) . fJ $ECT!CN !!! ! usom-::v e Q Appreved as receanended. . C Rejectode , @ Rosetution revised C Design Change required 00 .YlT ~ 2 8 4) dCCe4TC L LUesar BAcn To 7ote * t Ve uDce nno odrnoveo Revaco Me er Loso yag,ves, , Art *3C /rf t.VC$ sdchY LISVO IN coa)JyNCTeotU NIT & Ttf2 CON 6/J T/O A/ A le* CbMthe it IN TU THe JTOOM 7~o DC TeMHrAtc 9t4 7" */~MC D/fSCL G EAWMJro A Cr110 ifa ccios.t wes:0 ckk&dt C . UP TO A Ho4YtHuH 19Hdte/U T* . TCHfL**R'A Tut *C OF 6 5 * f~ W t TH THC Room CooLtuto FAM O t.!T~ O !~ S V K VIt C , 9 /5 TC/Wt'otA T7)d t" WAs Surft>nre'D 8Y A TC*ST th kt'oeM fD 3 S -yl c 49 *($ ' Tte A t/J. _. i Mfected docueents/dr.vings t to be revisedt e N MC Prepared my * , - - - t sate Y- 3" ' , . , , - , , 1 w n L ..t.Ahlm i 76 base N - - ..- n .s,c_rutr.:c. re.,m_rr . g _- un, cvu. WIII-Page 2 of.2 .g2/03/33 ---. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- _ _ _ _ APA-ZZ-00ld _ ____ - _ _ _ _ -- . . . . . . . . _ - ' . , , ,h 0 */ter..:w/ i @ UENE/BECHTEL INFORMATION TRANSMITTAL f[ff 70: OBECHTEL-GPD OBECHTEL- SITE QUENE- G.O. QUENE-SLE RESPONSE REQUIRED BY: 3-22-N ATTACHMENTS: Ah &# /9'M rye-DESCRIPTl0N: RFK I(?cfg,y ,9fsoi.e,77o,v s,,4reo .smco ,ee wetnro numace wuRECEIVE Die. set C-evew<rrae ! Cootin 4 Feu t.s 77 pct-a cur of Setet/tc e. MAR 1 1190 t *' Be:htel hit' lI"I RECOMMENDED ACTIO N:' .Ta '4/<,g r o p- y cmt-eg fuer.r vpA '8 < * W' '3-8 - 8 G tarTH Dir. set. stlinaiaci, sfruse n'esot.v rro%ro - ac&aw . .D/d.scL GENE &Tose 1% #ft*M/U OM?st'4dL c' satrH TNC* Goo &M 4 l $$$ NVN, ,, f~tu i our oF SentcE f*o*C A ft*stLe 'T <- *4t**fG/CNT RESPON184LE ENGtNitR/DATE *75'NtWMuf 6, Such gs 70 *[~ . UENE APPROVALS- 7' BECHTEL APPROVALS-( UENE- ORIGINATED) (N/A IF BECHTEL-OR INATED) ' ' SMal'$@AD W/7/YS onour suPlavison oat t suri iy4o tNoiatti fAr ~ , ' . d d )-J 3//9 ke G , ' ' DAtt . PROJECT APPROVAL DATE '$UPERINTLdDINT .__ UENE SITE E!!GUC.iG ,' ' RESPONSE: s t ES:C.N C -l.i.UL . '. See Attachment "A" MAR 2 0 Ei3 . . : 34., .trou t6i e nw.I.' RECEIVED - - - ,s.m.tnatoe c ' TLas. < @ er M c .n tr . ) ror eenstn oten." ' f,Afg;b7l2 - Jh.r/tt, , itsPeyysti (NoiNetniDAin c . _ BECHTEL APPROVALS UENE APPROVAL 5_ (N/A BECHTEL- ORIGIN ATED) N/A I . E E -ORIGINATED) .i n w J )j 3/m/x DATE DAi1 * SUPitVl51No (NotNttR cacyF $UP I Y - V 4 SUPERINitNDENT DATE ' PROJECT jdPPROVAL / DATE 'C: A JPh p E"td M l ._ . . O o . . ' Attachment "A" to UIT-284 . Page 1 of 1 From the actual data of Diocol Generator Test run of 3/8/86, the Diocol did not generate as much heat as told to Dochtel by the diosol vendor. Thoroforo, RFR-1946-A will be revised to allow the Diosol to romain oporable with its cooling fan takog out F. of service ' and a maximum outsido air ambient temperature of 65 , * . ' i NOTDs Bechtel has determined that a discrepancy exists betwoon the ' calculations supporting FSAR Section 9.4.7.2.3 (minimum room temperature) and the test temperaturo data provided by UE in , this UIT. This discropancy is still under review but from our initial investigation it appears that it will not affect diosol generator operability and comprise a u toty hazard, at this time. Curront elovated outside air temperatures relative to the design conditions provido us the timo necessary for a thorough review. Dochtal will advise UE of our conclusions , . . . < ' upon completion of our investigation. . . O k p . 9 e a l 8 * p# # b d ' I r REQUEST FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION . 6/I f k A) , Form N 67(4 84) 1.. IDE N TIFIC ATION 3ber and Revision: N ')2-016 R"v- 0 Level:- ' Issue Date: 2 /10 / % P a g e 1 o f .L. R. D. Affolter Enei m ring Org: DE Tot Organl2ation! Description of Condition: (44 characters) Nresolvml tm- Encin - rine tval u tion 2. OETAILED DESCRIPTION OF CONDITION; (Requirement VS. DellCI0ncyl include Originator Recommended Action if appropriate.) o L. ',, This level 3 RCA is being issued for an unresolved item concerning the engineering evaluation (dated 2/6/85) which was used as the basis for Technical Specification Interpretation #18. Technical Specification Interpretation fl8 states in part that based on an engineering evaluation acted February 6, 1985, the diesel generator need not be declared in% era-ble when the supply fan is taken out of service ... . QA has reviewed this s..ineer- . ing evaluation and concluded that the conclusions / recommendations of part (c) could l not be substantiated for all design environmental envelops from the source or refer-ence documentation listed in part 2.1 of the evaluation. 0A has reviewed Bechtel calculation GM-320 for sizing the DG supply fan during summer conditions and has performed a preliminary theoretical calculation (using design input data) for the temperature profile in the diesel generator room. This calculation assumed the following conditions; 1) ambient temperature, 70*F outside, 75'F inside, 2) D/G running at rated load, 3) supply fan off, exhaust damper open 4) 24,000 cfm outside air (combustion air) is the only cooling medium. This preliminary theoretical calculation re>ealed that the supply fan would be required to maintain a suitable environment for diesel generator operation. QA recommends that Technical Specification Interpretation #18 be withdrawn until a more complete and thorough engineerint evaluation can be performed. This evaluation should be able to determine if there exist suitable temperature envelops for which the diesel generator supply fan can be removed from service without affecting the opera-bili:y of the diesel generator (i.e. declaring the D/G inoperable when the associated supply f an is removed f rom service). The concern (s) identitled by this RC A was discussed with R. D. Affolter on February 10, 19P6 , N/A Condition Noted in: . Response Due Date: March 12. 19R6 / m RCA l#tlator. Date' ?[c[Q[r2w)[bf ' ' Suoervising Engineer. //o /f4 Date 3. EVALU ATION OF CORR. ACT.: 4, VERIFIC ATION O.~ CORR. ACT. 5. RCA CLOSED: N[d Ashhg M Erigt. bdte Response: QD Accepted implementation: (d Complete C] Incomplete SuoervisMg Relected , hff, h/h N (kJ/ , RC A initdtor 'O'a t e '9C A initiator fa'te iTA/14/A9/lT1/E - ")lST R(BUTION: AD5RCA"(File) 8. REMARKS: 15RCA"(QA Record) A"N.' JCC", / " s' / *b" ' .;VL " Jnv " J Fil7 TWS " Jr.s"(in f o) , 8 ' MET,' WRC" GLR" JDB", LilSt' A L - - :. ' .
i ' ' . I f March 19, 1986 tw-o " RECE:VED MMI 2 01936 Mr. Rich McCann CALLM/AY PLANT ECA_)'8602-016 QA OPERAi!0NS Per today's telecon, we are requesting an extension until March 28, 1986, for the response to RCA P8602-016, which was addressed to R. D. Affolter. This extension is necessary to allow adequace time for Bechtel to reevaluate all the paramsters on the D/G operability with the supply fan out of service. This , evala tion is necessary in light of recent test data obtained on 'B' Diesel. t *A Dan J. Maxwell DJM/ / cad b w'.* , ;4/ ' cet E0506 RDA Ih'/pfEI f pl ' DJM - NEDF - _= - ' ' see - Of RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION bM Form N 87(184) F mber and Revision: PP602-016, Rev. O Level: 3 Page._.of _ ino response to the referenced 'Roquest f or Correctivo Action' is provided below for your evaluation and verification. The response includes three parts in the following order: A. Cause of Condition; D. Action Taken to Resolve Problem; and C Action Taken to Provent Recurrence. The RCA addressed an engineering evaluation perforced on the operability of the diesel generator with the applicable supply fan out of service. The evaluation performed was based on the conditions the plant had experienced during Startup and initial Plant Operation. However, the evaluation did not address the worst case condition and therefore was not as conservative as the assumption made by Bechtel in the original evaluation. Another evaluation was requested via RFR-01946 and based on the results of the evaluation the following actions were taken. A) Operation's was requested to disregard Technical Specification Interpretation #18 until it was revised. (See VOTE E6-166, attached) l B) Compliance was requested to withdraw Technical Specification In-terpretation *18. (See UOTE 86-165, attached) C) The evaluation provided by Bechtel states that a discrepancy exists between calculations supporting FSAR Section 9.4.7.2.3 and test temperature data provided by NE. The data was taken during diesel generator operations at load and showed that no adverse temperature conditions occurred during the test. (See UOTE 86-164, attached). RECEIVED - m t t vs CALLW/M i'L?.N1 QA C? ERAT!CNS I l l . f Elfoctive Date: - ' # N'//U -- -- //ddressee. Date _ - _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ , __ n ' . ? * , Attachment "A" to RCA P8602-016, Rev. 0 . REMARKSt 4 T. S. Interpretation #18 has been revised and issued which resolves the concerns of this RCA. Per conversation with D. Maxwell - U 1E, Engi-neering planu on obtaining more empirical data for the D/G r oms during the summer months. This data vill be used to supplement the analysis done for RFR-1946A. Attached to this Attachment "A" is the original T. S. Interpretation #18, the Engineering Evaluation dated 2/6/85, and the revised T. S. Interpretation #18. , The following information is provided to clarify the responses to s RFR-1946A. The original response to RFR-1946A from Bechtel resulted in similar temp vs. time profiles (see Bechtel calculation GM-1-C) as was calculated by QA. UENE requested Bechtel via UIT-284 to re-evaluate ; ' those calculations and resultant temp vs. time profiles given some empirical data obtained from D/G operations on 3/8/86 which seemed to : contradict Dechtel's response to RFR-1946A. In Bechtel's re-evaluation, Colt Industries was contacted and-questioned on how they derived the original-heat loading data i.upplied to Bechtel. Colt responded that the heat loading data for the diesel engine was derived on energy conversions from chemical analysis and was not based on actual performance data. Bechtel then took the empirical data from 3/8/86 and worked backwards through their calculations to determine a revised (i.e. more realistic) heat loading data for the diesel. With , this revised heat loading data, Bechtel generated new temp vs. time profiles (see Bechtel calculation GM-2-C) for the diesel generator rooms and responded to UENE (via response to UIT-284) that RFR-1946A would be revised. l R J. McCann , I' l , .__ . . _ _ . . _ . -_ __ .._ . _ - . _ - . _ _ . - - _ , _, _ . _ _ - - - _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ . , s..,,s ... '. ,;;.;. i ; , . . . v .a y.. .- ... ~ 4.s 3 . y . %.ya, m.mr._3,c,,v ,q, ,vg. .ncw. ,, ,,w . .e .. .-;.. , _ ' 2 2 T~'S .L ' ' - . . . . .. r- * ' .s CAL l.A*dAT TLA!C D@.' u crc ?.r.*:r.: :7.An:y.: :A:. Tor.H , ' * 70s turerintenenent, Ar 'mistratica - Services Date: 2 22 GI it Ms er) $HAbbt1Cd Depart:ent t f wPLinhWA~ at:.:: ss.:e > :t is herety requested that CRt i-eview an: reic=ent approvai'~of A% t.tt.frf g Document Ha. met ~I[ctf $ PFC [OrFAP0.FTATC0 ., Document IDI ND. Ib Rev. 'Not_ Y r ' COMP.1 !CIC O A*"I t N/A assessassassess / . NC t '":13 is the inst et,te that CR can review as still - nest a license er ar-% stra-tve co -ittent. . . ~ ECO?O CT OP.: 75."."4 4 33333333333888E88888 . *v,g + ' .. Meeting Nu:bert df[ Datesd-/~8b Reco=enced Dispestion Approve as sue:itted INI Disappr ve as suttitted l~l ~ (Return to ?.espensible Individital ' vitt cements) ' . Cc=enta t . < ,s . CRC Secetary: 2 Cr cz / (' Datet 8 1-d I ' . .Distributien ORC Tile (OA record) Re'questi t 1 dividual w/o attach:ect , NS?.B w/ attachment . - ;$to w/ attach:<.mt - . CA092 AT:ACT.)C!C 1 - Page 1 cf 1 02/11/B4 APA- Z-00030 ./ * . % - - - - .m-- _- , , - , ,- . , . .- ,, . * p, .. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION INTERPRETATION * No. 18 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL P0k'ER SYSTD45 , : ' 3/4.7.12 AREA TDiPERATURE MONITORING ; , Based on an engineering evaluation dated 2/6/85, the diesel generator. 1 need not be declared inoperable when the associated supply fan is taken out of service provided the room temperature is capable of being main-tained within the limits (119'F) of Technical Specification 3.7.12. It is recominended that any time the supply f an is taken out of service, the fan be repaired as quickly as possible. It should,be repaired on an emergency basis if the outside air temperature exceeda 77'F. . .. ~ .~ ORC CHAIRMAN ,, 6 MfL ORC HEETING NO. 31f _/ id' 8 ' WRR/gj t ., cc ALL TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 110LDERS
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i j p a ' * _ ._ _ - -_ _ . _ . . . . _ . _ , . . . _ _ - - - . ._. _ , _ . . _ _ . _ - - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _-__ _ _ _ __--_- -___-_____ ______ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ . .. . * ' - . . . . .~<m*- 1. y ,,. .;.- p o-v~ ~~.< ~-a ~* .- .s : 1 sw 4~n:wa dw.m~.m** u'a m nMM!***s " > s . ggj..y : p .. .w.s-.y ;' ' ' _ . . - W2rsr . . . .e < f hsN2 CALLA *n'A! PLANT CRC PR;I'a' TRAK.N.*77AL TCR.4 , ' * 70s Superintendnent Adr.inistratics - Services Date: 2 I TROMs cA/ #4WCd Depart =ent fMPL/4tJcf _ ~ ^ trr::: n.= e > It is hereby requested that CRD .'eview r.ng reco: send approvaf~of ty %rt tt W Document Ha.me s_7[ed b Fi"C. [ d r e p P M M ' rid 0 . ./.l{*J3 Doct: ment IDI ho, lb Rev. 'No Y ef} N4 * COMKIT!CN7 DA7E: ::::::::::::::: / . NOTE: Tais is the itst date that ORC can review e.nd stiil . cest a licer.se er a*- 51strative cc= it:ent. . . , * '~^ KICC RD OF OR : RIV II'd - . f-* :::::::::::::::::::: * .,He'eting Numbers b{ Date1 0"l 'S ( Rece= ended Dispostion Approve as sub itted I[l Disapprove as sut=itted l[l (7.eturn to Responsitie Individual 4. . * With cc::sents) .~ . Cc==ents: . _ __ ep ORC 5ecetz.yt. h) ' r~u_q & d Dates 3 . I-et (~ * Distributient , . . Requesti. 3 Individual v/o attach =ent ORC Tile (CA ree' erd) ES?.3 w/ attach =ent . - ISEG w/attachmest . " cad 92 A77ACDENT 1 - Page 1 of 1 02/11/B4 APA-ZZ-00030 . . o . . - . . . - _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ . . . . ., l' * s ' . * * * * * * * * * * * * *** * TECFli1 CAL SPECIFICATION INTEF.PRETATION * No. 18 * * * * * * * * * * * * *** \ - 2/'. 8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTDiS T 3/4.7.12 AREA TDiPEPATURE MONITORING , , Based on an engineering evaluation dated 2/6/85, the diesel generator < need not be declared inoperable when the associsted supply fan is taken out of service provided the room tenperature is enpable of being main- * - #) " tained within the limits (119'F) of Technical Specification 3.7.12. is recommended that any time _he supply fan is taken out of service, the It - f p aired _as quickly as possible. It shcu'd.be repaired on an emergency basis if the outside air temperature exceeds 77'F. r . . *9 + . ' ORC CHAIRMAN ORC MEETING NO. ,&6 F l 37f L NO / 7 "/- 8 ... WRR/gj t g , cc: ALL TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION HOLDERS . + B i O _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _- u q.. - , - .n . ' ' ./ GENERAL ENGINEERING EVALUATION GUIDELINES-CALLAh*AY PLANT PART A INITIAL ASSIGNMENT Statement of Problem W [e Y)e 0r u r/' Gew e A*af'w ao $*<fal h when Hs et t.ro e s &7 <./ .f v1. s /, /= a u ( c' G m 0 / A A 0 ) .'s h l ,. ~ ssr ./ r + /t a .' e 'e' / / { gr Assigned Evaluating Ecgineer [o/) //JlfR ' ' 4 , Assigned Reviewer (if required) 7/- la p -e [ Documentation to be Retained as a / M'[M Quality Assurance Record? Ye> . Us 7' g/p[ PART B - EVALUATION 1.0 APPLICABILITY This evaluation guideline applies to all Engineer- "l ing Evaluations which are not governed by a spe-p cific Engineering Evalum. tion Guideline as identi- .ied by Attachment 1, Documentation, Review, and ., -- Approval Requirements for Engineering Evaluations. Since this guideline addresses reviews and evalua-tions covering a very wide range of topics this guideline functions to: s - document all determinations and recommenda-tions made. - - - provide a set of guidelines which 'may be used to ensure that the evaluation or review and associated recommendations are consistent with major requirements. plant programs and regul cory/ license g g { { [ y { D Bv LO INFTRUCTIONS/ EVALUATION . fen 131985 . 2.3 Reference Documentation - ( List below all reference dncumentat ion or source %, . A i va ' material used or reviewed during the conduct of the evaluation. This documentation should include ' any design drawings or calculations used in per-forming the evaluation. References should include {P revision numbers and/or revision dates. In com- .f pleting this portion of the evaluation ensure that: CA-0514 'Page 1 of 4 3/9/6' EDP-ZZ-0400- _ _ _ . . . . .. I _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ [ ' *. . ... . . .. i I (- a . -- A1. reference or source documentation listed is the latest current revision. . b. For component or equipment-related evaluations the appropriate vendor manual (s) have been reviewed. c. For changes to plant configuratien or changes to procedural controls, the facility operating License and the FSAR have been reviewed and evaluated. , d. Af fected plant administrative procedures have been identified and listed, e. The operational Quality Assurance P.anual has been identified as a reference document. Documentation Revision No./Date Aoplicable Paces / Sections Ol' /VI-0.2Spw / (*Gn Rev 7 i v.Z.D O}. O/' E - 03 Gn ott~e) s e v .2 s c 4 - ~ f . c. Se ec mag Sel,.,. , f. e .- CP - E -03 Cho l A CQ) Rev .2 -Fw _ Nmo ta - ' Of- E 0 3 G+t op (0) Rw 3 [ c 4J. e _jz>- Ik /0 *l - , otA *//. OP- 5 03 Gh o + (O) peu i te h ~J. e de Hr 9 67-lE 03 6 #10 9-A 0))d?ev i ~ fcka b c. Fu Ut / 't ' Fff)(? /?e J l[ M/e .7. //(B)- l Sheekf Deh Ca< e . - F& for 5,,-.1.R /. sLJ > Te J. er u-f . . w' rA-6514 Page 2 of 4 $ -04004 , . _- - - _ _ - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - . ,t ' , - . . - ,. . . . .. ' . .- '( , -i 2.2 Conduct of the Evaluation List below, as concisely as pocsible, all specific determinations made which support the recorsenda-tions and/or conclusions associatLd with this evaluation. In the evaluation, ensure that the d subject of the evaluation and any recommendations and/or conclusionst ;h a. f. Do not corstitute an Unreviewed f.;afety Question. . - g - b. Are consistent with all applicable require- , -- ments of the OQAM. Specific determinations made in this regard should be listed. , Ill c. Are consistent with all applicable require-j 9 , ments of plant administrative procedures, ' -] Each specific procedure or program which con-i tains provisions applicable to the acceptabil-i ity or unacceptability of this evaluation ; f .b y. should be lasted below. - ?' s '( 1 d. Are consistent with the requirements of Tech-nical Specifications and the facility operat-l ' , , ing.Lacense, c. Are consistent with accepted engineering '? _ practice. (1 i ! f. Are consistent with requirements or recommen-dations of applicable vendo manuals. Spe-cific determinations made based on vendor- , ., imposed requirements should be listed below. m % A K Ja L ca ri.~ 1, is s . t v n !. 7/^- / eo~eL.~ * . e.o ,r.1 L : -:1L tte miorr> eL A L.. m oe.c da acc Tec L E m _ , - ec.e,/J eAracN., i - abe) . .. - * , , _f Ut *Hlw- R e co= c u ddo se~ 3" . 1. ) ne L osL f e4<b-m 7;w ke w ,J S bY ~$ s>,amel Sh A) ) <=l/s -l N ~ b e a se e~ . Yes,, peg e fu,r , if j e/w X Y. M 2] 7~be a as' n) fAe b4 h~4 Yb5 Y*h p e g h /c f b-sn & oa6l i (' ' ase o. W c o dko/ r.] [ b r est a f u A' s 0" [<< CorDM/.A M c4I- /a;s. 7 A CA-0514 Page 3 of 4 3/9/84 EDP-ZZ-040: j,,y -- .., . , i. __. - .. , , Es, . ,< u .r~; . s n t., f m h .T.) ~T$e el,N cAa y e d pen eyers ou D.crel CeNeneta s Shar fa r.g/y a an to e eu.4 fb fje fan a ,is.r scuse,.7 .w- - % ihaz A . c/creh ~y f a c fp % c, rec.s.r a.x affjef y a. ,a ca eaa,n : ./. y o y F r,1x .M * n!", - a s, i.~. y b y.c & T&h 3.1!(s)-1 SL4s). . c) 76 Espriy/.cfJ'n Ecsm -ca a u ~r 7e ct+o] - - y<e </a//, .c,, < c., ~} fcx f%i ,cr&f 9. + 7 ~< b) A .t:e z J ,p..,t-pnpss./1,- _ 9. v .- uprQ Js s's. . .,, cyr w - i f p o s . J-<- c c o .-, J r,fi k a.< u ,>, ) e s ,- g d c. & a. ~ e Sa'x osn J Sco fi,)/< _ Sea 7'*b % f%e ./ies A yea e a d w r ,' 74.s - op,<s J . u , e e . .y (1. a J u J n ,, a ~.c e o ~J. +. a y of<Hs*Wf., jfls e ' .lJ'r t-l>c otp .:la *~,yc g (//2 -1' > llb ~lT) .. $c fc M c o~ < oe o &l-v o8 -7'~c kp cA efwx *, . < ' h ' d - . ;% . ' (sa 3 a b o a e. ) _ . $ ee %. \t * . % k m _ - _ _ - - - _ - _ _ _ - ; . .. . . - . .. ,. . o .. . ^ . k, PART C CONCLUSIONS / RECOMMENDATIONS 7 h _ D.cs J G ce cut ~- ,, J ,, ,r be c,4 c 6J ,D nexa A /c ,w tA c . ,cc c ,11 < u,,6 L /' / A $2 b e Al o"l ) f~eR v /c e= n/t O at t$ Aco~ %xa Jue c b mn O. 7L..p.i1 Ge><~L. wea C de c ky & ,%s o p,y a l /c j p a ,,,, fe m,g,,, , - 2 /M *f. f <- e < th e Ea /, , \.f uj a a v to J. c ch ar ,,:,, t 6, flie Diesc/ Cen~i%. Sb'tdi s'7" 4 i, o t n'y .n < < J J~: 2, es el Gcp en ere.< a t 9 PART D ADDITIONAL REMARKS Alo$ .' ff N A c c c o->r m e)Y f~b c; ~ y bmA I j 1 the f : d : W ' D . e.1c 1 G e ~ < < J ~- %, t- f &~ .N E h ker' Y r ? ? n vr*e < fbL $'d" b< A c/c I* Y ~ Af syv/ell~ M obs3 ll<- ' / enc.heeY n e j f / . e m - /,r e~ e, y h sib iS ko.,-a ' fen.s e76eel1 /60"P . -- ' PART E RWIEW AND APPROVAL // M [gr y-- Evaluating Engineer Datt 74k$~ Reviewer (if required) M Date b/OC . Approved by 4/-[ M Date J- / [ M T * PART F RETENTION / ROUTING Indicate the appropriate retention and routing requirements for this evaluation: ' , E S3. o'7 P c. Pe -Sc Q,, s ,) aa w CA-#514 3/9/84 Page 4 of 4 EDP-II-04004 l . ; . , . ..- CALLAWAY - SP . ' rNIT HEATERS Heating of the diesel-generator building is providedLby electric unit heaters. Each unit heater consists iSS of a coil-and a fan with an electric motor driver. ' = ISOLATION-DAMPERS - Where a means of system-isolation is required, parallel-blade-type dampers are utilized. The type of operator s. ployed is dependent upon the apecific design . and/or usage requirements. 3-FLOW CONTROL DAMPERS,- Opposed-blade-type dampers are utilized, . as necessary, to provide a means of system balancing. In general,-these are manually operated. However, some utilize power operators to-allow compensation for changes occurring during system operation. l I~ * ; TORNADO DAMPERS - Tornado dampers are employed where isolation from the effects:of extreme wind or. tornado conditions is required. These dampers close with the flow produced by the differential - pressure _ associated with the tornado or high winds and are considered passive since they do not have actuation devices. 9.4.7.2.3 System Operation The DGB ventilation system is automatically activated when the room temperature exceeds 90 F* and automatically shuts down ^ when room-temperature falls below 86 F. The ventilation tystem can be manually activated, if necessary,_ to provide cooling-during occupation of the building.. Operation of-the - diesel bui'iding-HVAC is not interlocked with the diesel' engine . controls. A failure of, or spurious signal from, the HVAC will not prevent starting of the diesel engine or shutdown of the' engine once it11s operating. When the ventilation system is'in operation,_the' supply fans take suction from the outside - air.and. supply air directly to theirLrespective diesel ; generator room for maximum cooling requ' aments. .'However, each system is -provided with: a recircui cion mode, whereby a-portion of the roomLair may be mixed with the outaide air. This recirculation mode is primarily for winter operation to - . prevent. freezing. The recirculated room air is utilized for ._ o tempering the outside air. Outside air intake and exhaust. - / 'sG ! louvers are selected on the basis of adverse environmental '.' conditions. Louver blades are fixed and, hence, cannot become inoperable due.to freezing or icing. They are designed to-reduce cascading ~and reentrainment of water into the airstream. Design of the louvers is for air inlet velocities below.500 fpm to prevent moisture carryover. Electrical unit heaters'are provided in each room to limit the minimum room temperature to 60 E when the diesols are not operating. These - unit heaters operate automatically and independently from the < ventilation system.
- ,=
< Unless ambient temperature is < 65*F and hand indicating - ; switch for the ventilation fan is in the pull to lock position. 'm Rev. OL-4 9.4-76 6/90 . - - _ - - '.1OPM Nr121 . p g frM. [~ g ~ 5ago 2 of.~3 ' p , c ,,s c. r a U g 4 b5 ~ 7# hf SR 7 NSR 'CALLAWAY PLANT PRIMARY LICENSING DOCUMENT $7 , , CHANGE FORM ! ' (FSAR AND RELATED DOCUMENTS) 9,9y - Review of Proposed Changes Review Due Date ~ 1-1I" 07 <- Reviewed bv Date 1. - Responsible Licensi,ng Engineer (.M C W .b 2I,- 87 2.- Assigned'Supv. Engineer, Licensing 3. UENO ' 4. Quality Assurance l' 5. Others , , Note: Chanyts evaluated as involving an unreviewed safety question-require a Significant Hazards Analysis per 10CFR50.32 , Significant Hazards Analysis Performedi YES .NO Aporoval of Procosed Chances Approval Date- ; 1. Responsible Licensing Engineer k. M'. Che 2- W-81 ' - 2i ' Assign. Supv. Engr. , Licensing UDb 2.//f /// ' 3. ~ Manager, Callaway Plant N M6/O .4. Others (specified by Supt., Licensing) ' 5. Manager, Quality Assurance a . , 6. Superintendent, Licensing - if 6 N 7. Manager , Nuclear Engineering ( 6 1/dlf7 / / . - _ _ _ - _ . . _ _ _ _ _ . . - _ - _ . - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ -. YN . ' , --s SR / NSR .. CALLAWAY PLAIC PRIMARY LICENSING DOCUME!C. . CHANGE FORM ~ (FSAR AND RELAL.D DOCUME!CS) Review of Procesed Changes _ . a Review Due Date 1-II 87 ; - Reviewed bv Date .;f-[j .. p.,z.a [ (f) (W J- u, 9K.;, ' , . .i.s;3) 1. Responsible Licensing Engineer i - . - p w; m ( %jf q +cj 2 . 2. Assigned Supv. Engineer, Licensing 4 u)R.;A,. v. ~ ! 4 3. UENO * 's < /MJ 5 T4 . ;[wyr~a L . 4t 4. Quality Assurance . ':..w:. #y;@at 4 . AA m 5. Others . npw e ' . . - - , . .an . ?br+@rPyd Wl} 8 ! . s Changes- evaluated as involving.anunrevieyed3s.afetyjjguest;icydQp ! - fote: require a Significant Hazards Analysis perc40CFR5.. 0 j92lp e '"gn'q?!!yd; 'h F '- hignificant Hazards Analysis *Performe'd7 a ;Y559 - - .. - , -'y w,p h- >.r c- .s.-y t' - Aeproval ofSPic. eosed ChangescOU ? V~ . . ' . - . J;. . . . ;..yx < . e dQ @%c.m.4,0. m. c. . 7,e/92% ,, .. -- . AccrovaD M6p/J!.DateU.%m& W " d d: ? ai(@&O ' E (t. 1. Responsible Licensing Engineer Assign. Supv. Engr. , Licensing "kkbh. M,Ab.TfR Ch hfiYffkhhl D N M11Cd 3 2. >1s:iy:sWM3iyA c R.1. 4%9?bk e. u .dy?-% 3. - Manager, Callaway Plant- mevwwv , m 3-e - 9.c$,j e . ' <- 4. Others (specified by Supt., Licensing) .. , . rg3 - r . ~ . $. . - - R$. c/. f:. v.i 2fLi 7Qyg&q)h,h ' .,a . 4 '-- 'l p w - :.;4;;M+4,g=?n'O h j yd $ y 5. . Manager, Quality-Assurance- * Jg,' a J"8bOFhl w jf@<M}% * n * tnsae.g e y-Og_ latendent, Licensing,(Fvds an ;vu-o ,f g$4A:, w e }A $ p7 Q c gl; d d . .O. Manager, Nuclear Engine.eging. pl&bhis9:W M 3Ni?lO,\0h$y Sk p w.MAes& m *W AM( ww $f e. 7. ' N, N I f , ,k]s.k.lV.+m- , . . ^.,.,.,n.;,:,, y, %. :,~y s hmEli,) n . ,f. ,95V w.. ghi} n &. a& f h~? ' * . $^$ 'b p x- ; ; - - - - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ e * D Procod. N3. APA-rZ-UUSSU * gCRV W $ $ ' Rev. L Qk TOT. PGS* f e J L*W % O C CQ IES - NO- X Y** k F -( '..C. 4, C, . t ' s- ., '! - "; s. ** D f P,R.IMARY s +' I + * }. ,, [8Xfe.LICENSING DOCUMEC CALLAWAY PLANT . ' CHANGE FORM N ' . 1. Originator /VAJIS N / rF 2. Date //- YN k ' 3 m 3-4 -E1 } 3. Document and section(s) i Y,T/./,-7.I.[.2.-y k.Y. 78. 3 hh i 9. 4. 7 5~ i r; w e d 9. 4 -/. , - A$ ' ,;q'M1 .,*^ , $b?l * 4. Atferences YtV O2 UE A o bM0 l , /96 V O r . . d.] . .J2h - l 5lh~ .,h, .? . b s 5. Description of Change 0hSC f5 Arf UT7 L / ?cMJ$ Ok t AWA .. ~ , ADHwisra-privr 256$~ $$..h. hh h NrfA*en 12/ef3 V3 Wtseo0D J usra su res- J,t/up4fdDSit$iS?$$$$50f i$1 fiwAs.wraes 6. Jttstification JA/(/A#5 DES /44). NAhfh. hh$ibbbbbhfk l'c^JSEPp'Anite' //J ScHC Md' ENS :Yh h k h Y k h bb $ ( $ . uses. oc sunt wedschnuw3M+%%W savoeo; usrs n wwrm WM%%@$M@Mi$ .?. ,n-~ A aw" ci- (-M *i'* :tth,dO%cye!@fbGy we:ww<;;<n.% nib 3:- - PA COLvHAHA / t'o . ,- ., - :. ; , . , yg [' k/ t AJ T2'e DFJ IC A) 7~B'i4per a-vr &c 6N(--Y2,$'W,;, rre,,t4M&ggy , . ' T ( i C e a 8 a c. U Id.uk h.4 d.W ed. 44Ut - vtM[ld. ,- ,!;MGVR$$ * r N Vt@! ,; . .. .? < =4: . Ji . (, e . 4 Un sI dL 4 / se. .u I L- _. (y T.attacut extr ahpagen asinecessa ,, - ' .;)pg y. 7. . Concurrence ith Pteed for/Cha gea ,. " #h a ggg [ ' * M.hd u g A 31. - Qgtgj . . . h j . . - - , w sponspy g g eseg gggya c.parm nyaea .,y4 1.wf vu.1 : .a , m v h tbt K Sh-%.h f , .. f .- wa., a e :i . u s$@;g$ w~ 5 * .C.wsQpih ) Q ff W % m .w.3.um&n ' - . , , %s.$Ne swapn W 'Q: QY2?? '. w'RSf m . ; .. n * w~m %@ . . . " ' ~ .. . w n- : .. .&. rs ciW n uh. c.. w w.p:.aKgu' n'en;GQ . . - svy - - y g.ut.x}MjM's.~:swyy i!'IddN8A) h(/j,I,hfh_ khh s J _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ . . .. .. . ~l :*- p . , . -. - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ . . . -...-..- EmR c/ + + s 3_s - _ . . . . -._ - 5 r - Do e c .,1.k d G.,, g l.ied.l. -._.
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Il/.scor)D t x) ADefistis rgu n ye Col >E 1 1Y /Mf'Afttf93 USED /Aj 7?tf c S'A./UP/?T /NS/60 D .. n d sht) -6. - Juatification JA/(/8M DESM /U 888/5' /S OVF#4Y : coa) SEA =vA nt/E - ^/Al SOHC AA'EtfS FOR SfYCiF/ C Ortses. 1~/(C A'M'RM A%vD BcaK, 7)w /A/l2/.57R)' Sn7dDMD, 4/g7T A' 'W/N 72^2 97 % 7~FHMx nfZrf foe CDLvH6/a, sWo, of ( --Y *i Vs 17tc .5 Aj u 100 r-hlt an~6K DFJ ICAJ 7EMPe x*4n>rc ~ o f (-) Z 5 "E Tet4s ' cen61chA-eJit.k &.4- EAWed. 4% vedl.5.gr knr j d a l - ( M (## ' 4 e lm a vallo kk 4b a tac extra pages as necessary) 7. Concurrency ith Need for Cha ge -- ' f2 Date / 7 10 M/4 x t-v. M Date Depar t:nent/ Head Responsible Manager , x Af'c% Date / 3D ' . , Manager,-Nucl. ear - / Engineering l 5W m - - - - , _ , . - - - - , . - - - - - ------- . . . ... . . . 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N mes>-se W-empgA_hh-Are...esn.4_ %gu em, ,., fulium=* -we =em w-umi- *-ma-m e r - a at 'd"h""" 4M"*"""8"""9'"""'*N ,- - .- dr+ ,4p ee S -em- - NWWa*-944Be*-* www Si eu$ hump h 9 *4 s ein e swe W = + *'*W " -w e- we a s a. h *dP 889*#i* -*W- 4Mh .make04 - u.- . u-omeem-am -*ssiem b +=4-elere -neMe-, we.a,w.wg,,..,g,m.. ,p ,,- , g, T =*-4 e -< -aw e m* ="w* +-' *-*****e* , .., , - - .,w +--w..., W * * *f-8'4*e4 m.g. mfe *Warme*=ut @ mas - m -Jumes.p M @4 M MA-m- ge,g -- _m et- - ' F0FJ4 .Nel21' ' ' Pago 2 of.'3 ^ t 435 ' SR / NSR CALLAWAY PLAMT PRIMARY LICENSING DOCUMENT CHANGE FORM (FSAR AND RELATED DOCUMENTSL Review of Procesed Changes Review Due Date A-I L 67 Reviewed by Date 1. Responsible Licensing Engineer 0 .cn C6m J-26-97 Assigned Supv. Engineer, Licensing ( 2. 3. 0T30 ' 4. Quality Assurance 5. Others - t .. Note: Changes evaluated as involving an unreviewed safety question require a Significant Hazards Analysis per 10CFR50.92 hignificantHazardsAnalysisPerformed? YES NO Approval of Proposed Changes Approval Date 1. Responsible Licensing Engineer ..(f\. C b e 2-19-87 2. Assign. Supv. Engr. , Licensina kb b z//f /// 3. Manager, Callaway PlanL N MAND 4. Others (specified by Supt., Licensing) , 5. Manager, Quality Assurance a 6. Superintendent, Licensing / kW L~~ !f7 7. Manager, Nuclear Engineering \. k l!M !f7 , , i , - - _ _ _ _ - _ - _ . - _____ e , . < . . . . _ . .. . . . , . . _ . . . . . .. ... ,m....m . -, ..... ,.. . . . . roRit IGl$1 fago 2 of.'3 * - . ' 8 435 SR 7 * NSR * CALLAWAY PLANT PRIMARY LICENSING COCUMENT . CHANGE FORM i (FSAR AND RELATED COCUMENTS) Review of Procesed Chances ' gh M (Q l G ;L- t I 97 aq nd. ' A Review Due Date . 4 .._-t L A J J 1 Reviewed bv Date 1. Respokb sing ng bar 0..rn C W - J-zG-97 2. Assigned Supv. Engineer, Licensing Md 2/#7 ( 3. UENO i ^ ' 4. Quality Assurance _ l ' 5. Others _ . Note: Changes evaluated as involving an unreviewed safety question require a Significant Ea:ards Analysis per 10CFRSO.92 ' hignificantHazardsAnalysisPerformed? YES NO Aeproval of Preposed Changes . Approval Date . 1. Responsible Licensing Engineer Assign. Supv. Engr., Licensing ' ' ' 2. 3. Manager, Callaway Plant 4. Others (specified by Supt. , Licensing) 5. Manager, Quality Assurance s 6. Superintendent, Licensing 7. Manager, Nuclear Engineering __ - - _ ---_ h0RM t 121' PagG 2 of.'3"' ' # 43s i SR 5' ' ' NSR , ' CALLAWAY PLANT PRIMARY LICENSING DOCUMENT , ~ CHANGE FORM . (FSAR AND RELATED DOCUMENTS)_ . Review of Procesed Chances * Review Due Date 2 -l b OI . Reviewed by Date , , 1. Responsible Licensing Engineer O (O lCW .)-21e 97 . (- 2. Assigned Supv. Engineer, Licensing 3. UENO Mh_% L /-29-47 . i , , 4. Quality Assurance ' , .. 5. Others ' : : Note: Changes evaluaf:ad as involving an unreviewed safety question requir.e a Significant Hazards Analysis per 10CFRSO.92 YES NO Y , Significant Hazards Analysis Performed? '. Approval of Proposed Chances . a Approval Date ; 2. 1. Responsible Licensing Engineer , ^' ?: - , 2. Assign. Supv. Engr., Licensing 3. Manager, Callaway Plant - 4. Others (specified by Supt., Licensing) . , 5. Manager, Quality Assurance , 6. Superintendent, Licensing 7. Manager, Nuclear Engineering __ ! m . . - . _ . ;, ..#...... .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . , , . . . . . . . . y . 2. _ .....%..... .. ....... ....-...........c... . . . . .. . . . .. _. .. ... ,. ,. ,. ,. ., ,, ,.,., . , , ., ,., ., _ .. .. . . . , ,., , , Pcgo 2 Of.'3**" , , ..... V, J*oax u,121 * * ; . , i . # 4 'S S i. SR - 7 ! NSR 1. . * . . ( '\ ' CALLAtfAY PLANT ' PRIMARY LICEN3ING COctnENT ,, CHANGE FORM I* 1* (?SAR AND FILATED DOCt%ENTS) .y s Review of Procesed Chances 1.!' ya ji- Review Due Data A-1l 87 j.l - Reviewed bv Dare ' ., } 'ie- J- 26- 97 1. Responsible Licensing Engineer d..M C h ' ' ' k]' I 2. Assigned Supv.-Engineer, Licensing i 3. UENO 3 h9/f 7 . ' 4. -Quality Assurance ,,r o*A85 e.-cm "3 " O %jyC/ ,- f ;, N A " ' ' ' // '. 5. Others . q; t . . . , - . evaluated as involving an unreviewed safety questica ly " Note: Changes require a Significant Hazards Analysis per 10CFRSO.92 IES NO' Significant Ea:ards Analysis Perfor:ned? Amoroval of Proeosed Chances _ . Auereval Date , .) '; r. - 1. Responsible Licensing Engineer * ' ' ' ' ,: 2. Assign. Supv. Engr., Licensing - {a ; 3. Manager, Callaway Plant :- 4. Others (specified by Supt., Licensing) . ' [ . - i , a , ;- - - 5. Manager, cuality Assurance . '!., . 6. Superintendent, Licensing 7. Manager, Nuclear Engineertng . _ _ - _ - _ _ - _ _ _ - _ -____ _ __ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -_ _ ___ _ _ _ _ __. _ _ _ _ _ _ ' , ., . .. CALLAWAY - SP . .of each containment cooler intake. Control room indication is provided for both the leaving air and inlet air temperatures. Each containment. cooler fan is operable from the control room. Each hydrogen mixing fan is operable from the control room and is monitored for fan vibration via the plant computer. 9.4.7 DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING VENTILATION .The function of the diesel generator building (DGB) ventila- . tion system is to provide a combustion air makeup rate and an environment- suitable for the operation of the diesel generators. 9.4.7.1 Design Bases 9.4.7.1.1 Safety D6 sign Bases The DGB HVAC system, exc g nit heaters, is safety related aad is required to functi6n*f lowing a DBA and to achieve and maintain the plant in a saY shutdown condition. SAFETY DESIGN BASIS ONE - The DGB ventilation system is protected from the effects of-natural phenomena,. such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, and external missiles. . SAFETY DESIGN BASIS TWO - The DGB ventilation system is designed to remain functional after a SSE and to perform its intended *q function following a postulated hazard, such as a fire, internal missiles, or pipe break (GDC-3 and 4), SAFETY DESIGN BASIS THREE - The safety functions of the DGB ventilation system can be performed, assuming a single active component failure coincident with the loss of offsite power (GDC-44). SAFETY DESIGN BASIS FOUR - The DGB ventilation system is designed so that the active components are capable of being ' . tested during plant operation. SAFETY DESIGN BASIS FIVE - The DGB ventilation system uses th design and fabrication codes consistent with the quality grou s classification assigned by Regulatory Guide 1.26 and the The power seismic-category assigned by Regulatory Guide 1.29. - supply and control functions must be in accordance with Regu- -latory Guide 1.32. SAFETY DESIGN BASIS SIX - The DGB ventilation system maintains a suitable atmosphere in the DGB while the diesel is operating. Cooling is accomplished by the outside air. .. - W . - - GM * M TA M' If AM6sENT T6Hi% fMU26 a - - w ) Rev. OL-0 9.4-74 6/86 - . _ * . . . . CALLAWAY - SP UNIT HEATERS - Heating of the diesel generator building is provided by_ electric unit heaters. Each unit heater consists of a coil and a fan with an electric motor driver. ISOLATION DAMPERS - Where a means of system isolationThe is type required, parallel-blade-type dampers are utilized. of operator employed is dependent upon the specific design and/or usage requirements. FLOW CONTROL DAMPERS - Opposed-blade-type dampers are utilized, as necessary, to provide a means of system balancing. In However, some utilize general, these are manually operated. power operators to allow compensation for changes occurring during system operation. ~ TORNADO DAMPERS - Torna'do dampers are employed where isolation from the effects Theseofdampers extremeclose windwith or tornado the flow conditions produced byisthe required. differential pressure associated with the tornado or high winds and are considered passive since they do not nave actuation devices. 9.4.7.2.3 System Operation .r% r, .% The DGB ventilation syst m is. automat cally activated when the room temperature exceeds 82 F*and automatically shuts down when room temperature fal betbW 76'F. The ventilation system can be manually activated, if necessary, to provide cooling during occupation of the building. Operation of the diesel building HVAC is not interlocked with the diesel engine controls. A failure of, or spurious signal from, the HVA0 vill not prevent starting of the diesel engine or shutdown of the engine once it is operating. When the ventilation system is_in operation, the supply fans take suction from the outside air and supply air directly to their respective diesel However, generator room for maximum cooling requirements. whereby a each system is provided with a recirculation mode, portion of the room air may be mixed with the outside air. , This recirculation mode is prinarily for winter operation to-prevent freezing. The recirc:. lated room air is utilized for Outside air intake and exhaust tempering the outside air. louvers are selected-on the basis of adverse environmental-conditions. . Louver blades arc fixed and, hence, cannot become inoperable due to freezing or icing. They are designed to reduce cascading and reentrainment of water into the airstream. Design of'.the louvers is for air inlet velocities Electrical unit below 500 fpm to prevent moisture carryover. heaters are provided in each room to limit the minimum room These temperature to 60 F when the diesels are not operating. , unit heaters operate automatically and independently from the ventilation'systemr % d ale 55 nmbled +tmpu A rc is 6 G5F ad hani indies 4;g web b N. mMt f c.n Ln 14 in m pa a tem Pog gy- u s. w Rev. OL-1 9.4-76 6/87 . , . , CALLAWAY - SP The fire protection system provided for the diesel generators is a preaction sprinkler system. Carbon dioxide is not utilized as the extinguishing medium. Hence, there is no possibility of CO 2 being drawn into the combustion air. The exhaust stack is located approximately 65 feet herizontally from the air intake - and discharges-approximately 35 feet above the air intake. The distances between the diesel intake and exhaust, the exit velocity of the gases from the exhaust stack, and the buoyancy of the hot exhaust gases are aufficient to reduce the possi-bility of exhaust gases being drawn into the combustion air stream to insignificant levels. -The probability of inducing exhaust gases into the intake air stream, due to the loss of the stacks, is slight since the dictance between the intake and exhaust (65 feet) is sufficient to prevent a short-circuiting of the exhaust gases. Discussed below are the emergency operations of the DGB venti-lation system. Except for operation of the unit heaters, the power generation operations and shutdown operations are identical to the emergency operations. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS - The DGB ventilation syst.m is*autopati-cally activated when the room temperature excee s 82 F dd l automatically shuts down when room temperature f -Fe-be ' low 78 F. The ventilation system can be manually activated, if l necessary, to provide cooling during occupation of the building. _ For maximum cooling, the supply fans take suction from the outside and supply directly to their respective rooms. All cooling is accomplished by the outside air. When Each fan is maximum cooling provided with a mixing box arrangement. is not required, a portion of the room air is mixed with the outside air. The proportion of outside air and room air is controlled by a room thermostat to maintain the ambient temper- , ature within its specified range, when outside temperatures permit. This mixing mode is primarily for winter operation to The room prevent freezing and to minimize cycling of the fans. - air is utilized for tempering the outside air. The supply air system serves as a source of makeup for combus- . tion air to be used by the diesel generators and-introduces a minimum of 30,000 cfm of outside air during the recirculation mode. (The maximum quantity of al required by the diesel for combustion is 24,000 cfm.) The . aust air flowpath has-pro-visions for serving as the backu, tource of combustion air. The exhaust flowpath La provided with aThe damper which is de-exhaust damper is signed to fail-in the open position. - normally closed when the ventilation system is not operating, to prevent cold outside air from entering the building. This ' exhaust damper opens automatically upon a diesel start to assure a source of combustion air, regardless of the mode of N u e st o.e[e d, h qe rJnirt is 6 c5 e aa bd i& dig sJih.hRev. br OL-1 A Pol l b (.oc p%, 6/87 ( S mp d a- & e7 .n 6 h Win 4-77 - e - - v - . . . . , dury 5fedy . sfA Cen 6 mom. '~ CALLAWAY - SP
- _ d Wnj .n
* t. 4,ow d m d co,% Uon air . t M1F operation of the supply air system. With the diesel operating at full load,'fi*h +hn-centilatier cyrte~ prcciding the minimum. -cAAtcide 24r rm neo-efm at ( )35 M and excluding the unit km heaters as a source of heat, the room temperature will= rem 21m 6c above freezing} The size of the intake and exhaust louvers is based on the maximum required quantity of cooling air, 120,000 Ofm.
- M he maximum amount of combustion airTherefore, recuired bvthe thelouvers diesel engine is approximately 24,000 cfm.
could be as much as 80 percent restricted and still have ' sufficient open area to allow operation of the diesel without , affecting its performance. ~The diesel room is pressurized slightly by the air supply system and relieved through the exhaust louver. The exhaust damper, located upstream of the exhaust louver and tornado damper, will provide building isolation against outside air infiltration during system shutdown. . The diesel generators building supply air system intake and the exhaust system ductwork contain dampers capable of withstanding '
the effects of extreme wind or tornado conditions These (3 psi dampers in one and one-half seconds per Regulatory Guide 1.76). close with the flow produced by the differential pressure associated with the high winds or tornado. The damper located l in the exhaust system ductwork is spring loaded to prevent closure during normal systta operation, a Missile barriers are provided externally to the isolation system to prevent damage by a tornado missile. Both the supply air intake and the recirculation ductwork are provided with modulating dampers operated by electrohydraulic actuators. These d2mpers modulate, as required, to provide the required mixing of the supply and recirculation airModulation to maintain the room. temperature within the specified limits. , ' of the dampers is controlled by a Class IE' control circuit the dampers which senses the room temperature andf opera a accordingly. This control circuit serves,to s art the fan should the room temperature rise a ve 82 K as well as ini- l tiate opening of the exhaust dampe .TNfs c,ophrol circuit via h'e plant computer, - also serves to alarm the control ro ~ ; of low room temperature'(40 F) and h'igh room temp 5rature (130 F). The ventilation system wit a encirculation mode of opera-tion, whenever the di.esel argno peratl , can maintain room-ambient temperatures betw en M and 122 when the outside ambient temperatures are aetween (-)>41aqd 97 F. When the diesel,s are in standby, h ating is provided by strategically m t. w et / , located unit heaters. _.
- un\e n cm 6*%t h q u d ure. is 6 a p and h n6 inE d g S M A for N mbla bim f a.n r i4 'o +'u- pu b l oW poONA . -
i w% A _ 0 m-91 Rev. OL-1 9.4-78 6/87 - - - . _ - . - . ' . . , , CALLAWAY - SP 9.4.7.4 Tests'and Inspections Preoperational testing is described in Chapter 14.0. One of the two redundant DGB fans is tested in accordance with standards of the Air Moving and Conditioning Association (AMCA) to assure fan characteristic performance curves, i Major components are accessible during normal plant operation for inspection, maintenance, and periodic testing. 9.4.7.5 Instrumentation Applications Indication of the DGB fan operational status is provided in the control room. AllDGBfansareoperAblefromthecontrolromf" An indication of the position of all exhaust dampers is provided , in the control room. Thermostats control the room temperatures. -The DGB room temperature is available in the control room. High and low DGB room temperature is alarmed in the control room. J Exhaust dampers are operable from the control room. t 9.4.8 ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER PUMPHOUSE VENTILATION : The functicn of the essential service water (ESW) pumphouse ventilation system is to provide an environment suitable for - operation of the essential service water pump motors and , ! associated electrical equipment. A ventilation subsystem, physically independent from the ESW pumphouse ventilation system, is provided for the ultimate heat sink (UHS) electrical equipment rooms. This system junctions e to protide an environment suitable for operation of the elec-trical equipment associated with the UHS cooling tower fans. 9.4.8.1 Design Bases 9.4.8.1.1 Safety Design Bases The ESW pumphouse ventilation system and the UHS electrical equipment room ventilation system, excluding unit heaters, and are. safety related, are required to function following a DBA, , are required to achieve and maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condili e -- s ,,, . s -et g , f g.g , rakurt is 6 (o S F M h an $ M d b a Ng N V o ke n M . 6. m hteni b.% fro c N Mh la.b o Q h b W pa h Is(k- p . OL-0 ' - 9.4-80 6/86 ' 9y; 7l- , : ;ff ' ,' ' . , CALLAWAY - SP . TABLE 9.4-1 OUTSILE ENVIRONMENT DESIGN CONDITIONS Summer Winter Dry Wet Dry Wind Bulb Bulb Bulb Velocity (F) (F) (F) (mph) Normal Design Conditions 97 79 (->: f 15 (See Note 1) Extreme Design Conditions 120 ~ (-)60 ~ (See Note 2) NOTES: 1. The outdoor ambient summer temperatures are taken from the 1972 ASHRAE Handbook of Fundamentals, Weather , Data and Design Conditions, Chapter 33, Table 1. Summer 97-1/2 percent (worst site; and 99 percent (all others) values are used. The outdoor ambient winter temperature is cased on the requirements of the Wisconsin Administrative Code. The winter wind velocity was assumed for conservatism. .. All safety-related HVAC systems and components which are exposed to the outside environment are capable of sustaining the SNUPPS extreme temperature conditions However, without loss of function (see Section 3.11). f no HVAC system (safety-related or nonsafety-related) is designed to maintain space design temperatures while operating during the SNUPPS extreme temperature conditions, ^ v f __. . G r.,M e A M o R 4(~ %) I T'H THE ExCC97 TOM oP THE Dt tie t. Rooms . rnese tom s Were E v 4v are b ussos 7"pttr TfMfreerver D ETA # w c o Pro M 63Neg g H e u ogoog, 191 'l VutJ DA M c MTA L S , f** R Cot-u H e* A, H o , y ~/*fo A , Rev. OL-0 6/86 -. -- . . . . . , l (Form N-lli, 4/85) Attachmont B QE-332, Rey, 4 Page 1 of 4 y 005 '% it-CALLAWAY PLANT . NUCLEAR SAFETY EVALUATION NE (1) EVALUATION APPLICABLE TO: /fFM O27$'2 REV.N (2) SAFETY EVALUATION (2.1) Yes No L/ Will the probability of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR '. e increased? , (2.2) Yes No c/' Will the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR be increased? (2.3) Yes No u# May the possibility of an accident which is different than any already evaluated in the FSAR be created? Yes No # Will the probability of a (2.4) malfunction of equipment important 35- -J Ltj to a safety previously evaluated AEI C/) in the FSAR be increased? O ) . Yes No ' Will the consequences of a g (2.5) malfunction of equipment important C:3 CZ) --- -J to safety different than any already evaluated in the FSAR be []} LL- bd increased? 3g-C1 L/ May the oossibility of a CMI (2.6) Yes No malfunction of' equipment-important [[f g; {{} to safety different than any -- p, already evaluated in the FSAR be created? Ct: C2) O E (2.7) Yes No t/ Will the margin of safety as LA, defined in the basis to any Technical Specification be reduced? (3) REASONS / JUSTIFICATION ( 3 .1) Provide narrative description of the proposed change, and provide bases and rationale for responses to questions 2.1 through 2.7. Use questions'on Attachments D and E of QE- < 332 for guidance in completing this section. (Continue on Page 3 of this form if required) sed PM C.S 2 cf 4 pnD 3cf Y . . * .. At'.cchmont B ' l (rcem N-111, 8/84) QE-332, Rev. 4 Page 2 of gu g ,,. v 8 g CALLAWAY PLANT NUCLEAR SAFETY EVALUATION CONTINUATION /ALUATION APPLICABLE TO: Or2 08 3 $~2- REV. M TCN (3.1) - Continued fHis RFi< Hks w r- pracreo rue f4W PUMP nua Suprz y fnt) cet*ieA nov, 779'f dIf.$CL G d' N C'1's r v e Ss'onLt' ,-H us cAv' ANO nee Diesel Grato rpe cAa ,5 7sg. g., SE Cur ~ cP .s'envece Of OfhAff0 Crepptyg.y f%gsgoj,yp 7ap7 yyg pyg,pg 7 7"fMpest Arver AfM * '"5 l-C35 nmiv (S * f fw' e rye m,og (, 7,,,, , ,_n m , ,,, ,. /"eiv .s out of rr/ A c e. ., hr. FS A A 't. 't. 7. I. ! Sa ve ry De.st s.a QAses . .$ArcrY D ffis M Ga so.r / : tJo Cenu s c, cont %iv eivrs arc $ rtLt- Morecrrp ft%~t C"!FCt.TJ cf *t+rWotAL Ptrgavc M e M A. $ A ftl'T1 Of S *64 Basa 2. ne uane, 7,e gg gen ,, u ,_. w m a Ddso nnro To secMorov fuuc roc u*L Affene 53c CA MDL 4 TED M 4 Est/c U. Savery Desa.a 6A.s a s 3 : no canuw, rw s.very nmacus er rue DGe Veuvearso~ s ys rtw CAH <3d WpfcnHeu, A 55VH'N4 A c rse's Cc H A;M a u i" fh t L V.tc~ CGIN C I O&a.o r h SsMGsd k e t~n T.<C scss cF te=psotv- Pc ice. M4 WD k =ery SSs G N Onsgs 4: No Cn AU66 s 7t+ f DG6 MMAncM S hw os 30 MtMf T?te' t%C n Vf CcM Pc A) eN TS Ate d CMfA'$Li o 4' g dstu b TC57v0 Os/ 48 A,6 PLAur ot % g n eu. 5'" NO CHtW&c .$ Arc 7Y kstsia des ts THis CH AN6.C k)t L L Mor 40yef3fty' pppggy. bnSt s b *. bArdTV Dr ue n re tw r,o,os TW D66 fcan t ar,ca r a ren Age nu pu t t- ro Lcck , Ti'icsv ft16 At~fdieNT a~ rnn, a ~, a -c r- - 0,1 M, .O,RWO N oy_y se~ anno n ec occana ne niael r~ ~ ~ a r ~ u cs' ~ ~t, ,0.. - 03 ,cE.3 USE o ~ae. ~ ricnw a ras ,- w,a v , r7tG* .sr-ofoo M 4 ' ' '- < et-! A r ^.' I4 7- T SF, How G VE,e Lia or es lcm 6 65 d 1 114' T'ece Spec 7~}h? /%SSoefig., q ~""# t5 d d5"Y _ _ ._ . __ .- _ * - l , ., ) !l (Form N-lli, 8/84) Attachmont B J QE-332, Rev. 4 Page 1 of s ; 5 or y Opt u-v rL CALLAWAY PLANT NUCLEAR SAFETY EVALUATION CONTINUATION EbE O2 7b~2 REV. / 4 TCN _ /ALUATION APPLICABLE TO! (3.1) - Continued bdFc rv [ksu w ljpya ? Cc w r, Of fliCC f/N h YEW A""*W1/c05 iU *Th & Orf3PL . c, cun- in, c, , :w~s c xo a_ ' C O AJ O< r ic tv s w as p$pggg 3SfD, L~~y- ,p3 Off W '"WO W H~ W P' STCMOY S rs9-y;x: , N"'1/~t*k *rud's ta:lti O 13d Mrgop c rit>rg:~ gray 6, ' FOR FORMEON OLY X0~i 703 FE_9 US~ .- . . . _ _ . . _ _ . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . . _ . - . ~ _ . _ . _ - - - _ . _ . _ _ . _ . . , , . , . . * ij'(Form N-111, 4/25)- ff g OZ F62 4 Attachment B QE-332, Rev. 4-Page A of i
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, 1- wIu. & <= McPnero BY ueUC 7"o canwce a rrecre=c l' seenous cc cocumentsmf F5 reviewed f+C. to form bases for responses: (3.3) Refecence ' FSA-re rate 9. 4- / , 9. </. 7. t. / , 9.1' 7. 2. 2 , ' 9. 4' 7. 2. 3 ,- 9. 4. 7. 5' $ nme 57. Y -/ U.F. faic , G Mol, fi=v 0 g & carn. Occ. Gtf-2fI b v. O - ASHRnE HnonBcot I'l7~7 Funos t-tensrats L (4) Unreviewed Safe Question exists? Yes No N (5) Prepared by - ' - - Date /4Y-[d' -(6) Reviewed byt h(M< , ^bu ' Date //-5-2b ~(7) Review by: 'a/M.u bb$ISR-[ - It L t,'/$/k ' Date- // ~b 5 v' 7# C' ~ Date // f 6 (8)' Approved-by: / /_ " ' Mgr., N,4 clear Engineering p, p (g ,,, , , ,4 ' to t% '.,, ,, , c, ,, u/c/ft /se apees.AfA-111:., Sa t%y Evo la f.e, , .bj' , ,~ i d g* *i'l . 70R MFORMOROM %07 FOR RELD U _ _ . . . _ . . . . ' ' - ' - , . . . , - . CALLA' DAY PLANT ENVIRONMENTAL EVALUATION CHECKLIST (1) Checklist Applicable To: Fsm clu * +3 5 Rev. WA (2) ENVIRCNMENTAL EVALUATION (2.1) Yes No P' n Increase in thermal over above the ~ licensed leve ? (2.2) Yes An increase in noise level? No v/'currentiv (2.3) Yes No v/ h physical change to site grounds? - (2.4) Yes No b# An adverse impact on area wildlife and - vegetation? . (2.5) Yes No A change in the rate, quantity, concentration , composition, or temperature of liquid . l effluents? (.2 . 6 ) Yes No ' A change in the rate, quantity, concentration, 'or composition of gaseous ef fluents? (2.7)' Yes No A change in particulate emissions rate, , concentration, or composition? If the answers to all of the above are "No", no Unreviewed " . - EnvLeonmental Quention exista and no Final Environmental Evaluation is required; If 'the answer to anv 'o f the above questions is "Yes", this ' ' Environmental Evaluation checklist shall be forwarded to the , Superintendent, Licensing, for performance of the Final Environmental Evaluation per Attachment H. . (3) Prepared By: h A'/. [[ Date I-21-9 7 (4) Supervising Eng eer: * Q . dh 0 ._ _ i oate f,/23,/ ! 7 . . 6 d , N-ll4 8/84 . _ - . - - _ - - - - - - - - - -_ _- . - . s ' 0 c/u .435"Wg Doc.aHenr 0HHeur Sue r %1 re CGe 17-ore ; & : kCTloM & KEd ( l 2-) . f. _ (f(C 7t*$7S lf4fo<MfO ofl1, Y Z 2 ll1$ ANO , ? 2. fid WEK 6 of'MA) W(TN nMd(CM r T h' M t*t' f n 7 W f f ?_pd,0 v f See %<u r ,ca s .:e, arearea rna c c v. 3.Oq;b i AoT Of TMCSd THgte rC$T1, YCfY T/f6 -+$:k . L.,
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PARTICIPANTS (NAME/ COMPANY): bw# 3 du,-ra [ MANN [s~ a.s-fr ' Ehao (=~rm ' q. A, - Gh]W,.. M , . c. N. *vw Q3c . G~mr Seer. ~Ih, .g ., I SUBJECT: Fs M ., _ g.. w-:w q O C R - 9 0 - Oo*7 Y DI% 4 8%t EXPtrts eQ THer NEED To ADD AlL 'rWf ,5$f':l$U kVMMARYs ?. :nen PsM* Af, gV$'S~ IA)FocA-tA 7 c d 5tm H>rrED 7n t~ . < la}{r r?k e '~ % A C tcW owr #rwl -rHF Ft eX1 A/L / 7Y 12id.' .& f.~~T U tY K oM A .Cu HL Y frM) ANO NOT ,CA I . m(; q - . WW D lhlO?f$88Lf ?$VlNU$> < 0 k :n sh %.+} . , 17/f < lc'f vnwn crim m wA-s t krn F~ieD.e s$w'T~. . m f%'>gi K ( oe ho 'ews c n-<o az ,Unv+sh . "$k@N 4^ N'6l.y - T' wouLb Cr frtT 'rHf Su&L Y FA A) Tb Nd= JAI -:4 . Ni * e 77f6. A80/f %} 9Wf Auro HArrte A/ ode ~ UA) LeM u. - ,. R $ HNU7eav 4Nw A em J r TY E Mi.s r e D. ~fN/.S ^ h)NC bh 436 SAT /sFA CTbn Y J lL L F#An)K EGCfXT. . . .uc , Q . 4.'T . bhCh - W.wM,m,ep ~ - 4.ORIGINATORFar:Mi@ - m,waw e ~~- . , , . lI . . s;. : . . w .- ., . . ; a - 8 g@ip;r.gW .,e;. - ,v I . $M ' , d ;j- ** - , - : ,7 S is F :,7. E'I&E$[E h% NJif*;* / % ,.. :',e , . r QFa .," - . M . * f . e :. Mh Y',# w .0 ,<NGIN,Iik. f:'s!iy$'g n mpMedtJC i U .$2 E;. w y- %u m R/)_.,.id.4YJJ : w .- w d itc$, - - Mnwe-h.- - ___ _ - . - - - _ - _ - . . .. .. . . . .. .. ' .# . C/A/ 43s . DOCUMENT COMMENT SHEET C G /t 8 ~7- 0 8 8 (4) PACE / # or 3 (1) (DEPT TRACKING NUMBER) . ( 2 ) To : ' "f. /72 CuA#sA A) - ' (5) DATE is/ X /'87 {3) TROMs. f,A.donttH O
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