IR 05000454/1986041

Insp Repts 50-454/86-41 & 50-455/86-37 on 861010.No Violations or Deviations Identified.Major Areas Inspected: Plant Chemistry & Radiochemistry,Including Emergency Preparedness of Chemistry Group & Facilities & Equipment

ML20215L051
Person / Time
Site:	Byron
Issue date:	10/22/1986
From:	Holtzman R, Schumacher M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20215L043	List: IR 05000454/1986041 ML20215L042
References
50-454-86-41, 50-455-86-37, NUDOCS 8610280444
Download: ML20215L051 (5)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Reports No. 50-454/86041(DRSS); 50-455/86037(DRSS) Docket Nos. 50-454; 50-455~ Licenses No. NPF-37; CPPR-131 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Byron Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Byron Site, Byron, IL Inspection Conducted: 0-tober 10, 1986 +

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Inspector: f Holtz n

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 #h,0ftl[ /N Y Approved By: M. Schumacher, C ief   /6/*//6 Radiological Effluents and  Date Chemistry Section Inspection Summary Inspection on October 10, 1986 (Reports No. 50-454/86041(DRSS);

i 50-456/86037(DRSS)) ! Areas Inspected: Routine unannounced inspection of plant chemistry and

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radiochemistry, including water chemistry control programs, facilities and equipment, and emergency preparedness of the Chemistry Group, with emphasis on readiness for operation of Unit kesults: No violations or deviations were identified during this inspection.

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. DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted

*R. E. Querto, Byron Station Manager, CECO
*R. C. Ward, Services Superintendent, CECO
* Burkamper, Quality Assurance (QA) Supervisor (Operations), CECO
*D. Herrmann, Station Chemist, CECO
*A. J. Chernick, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor, Ceco
*T. Bardauskas, Technical Staff Engineer, CECO
*K. E. Yates, Nuclear Safety, CECO Z. Luke, U-2 Startup Test Engineer (STE), CECO
*E. M. Zittle, Regulatory Assurance Staff, CECO J. Langan, Licensing-Compliance, CECO K. Lurkins, Chemist, Ceco J. Rood, Rad / Chem Technician (RCT), CECO F. Hornbeak, Technical Staff Supervisor, "ECo
*J. Pausche, Regulatory Group Leader, CECO
*W. Kouba, ATSS, CECO    '

M. Snow, Assistant Regulatory Assurance Supervisor, CECO

*J. M. Hinds, Jr. , Senior Resident Inspector, NRC The inspector also interviewed other plant personnel during the course of the inspectio * Denotes those present at the exit intervie . Licensee Actions on Previous Inspection Findings (0 pen) Open Item (50-454/86011-02; 50-455/86009-02): Review E-Bar input values in Appendix A3 of Procedure No. BCP 230-3 and change as appropriate. The licensee changed Appendix A3 in conformanca with the recalculated values. However, there were still differences between the licensee and NRC value This item will remain open until reconciliation is completed and appropriate modifications to the station procedure are mad (0 pen) Open Item (50-454/86011-03; 50-455/86009-03): Evaluate alpha counting capabilities on the Canberra and document. The inspector reviewed the licensee's progress in assessing the alpha counter efficiencies. The Corporate Technical Center looked into, but did not resolve the problem of a suitable calibration source for air filter The inspector suggested some methods of mitigating licensee concerns about the use of a vendor-supplied filter paper alpha standard for counter calibrations. The licensee is continuing to assess this proble (0 pen) Open Item (455/83039-15): Complete installation of the Sentry High Radiation Sampling System (HRSS) primary coolant sampling capabi-lity on Unit 2. The inspector's review of the HRSS tests showed that the deficiencies appear to have been corrected. To meet the design criteria to sample from the recirculation lines, throttling valves have

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been installed in the lines of the Auxiliary Building Floor Drain Tanks (ABFDT) and the Auxiliary Building Equipment Drain Tanks (ABEDT) common to both units. The valve has not yet been installed on the A tank of the ABFDT (used mainly on Unit 1), but the Rad-Chem Technicians (RCTs) can still obtain grab samples at the recirculation pump discharge point. The valve will be installed early next yea The licensee is now able to draw samples from the Radwaste Module of the PSS under accident condition The licensee compensated for the lower-than-expected flow rates from the Demineralizer Module of the CVCS by modifying Procedure No. BZP 380-27, "CVCS Demineralizer Outlet Grab-Sample," Revision 2, , October 10, 1986, to extend the line purge time prior to sampling to one hou This appears to satisfy NRC requirement The inspector reviewed the changes made in the connections to the Chemical Analysis Panel (CAP) to address the NRC concerns that connection of the Unit 2 HRSS could result in cross flow between units via the headers to the common CAP, particularly when one unit is at system pressure and the other is not. Analysis of the flow path showed that it would require the misalignment of six valves. To further reduce the probability of such an event, the licensee installed check valves in the respective Unit 1 and Unit 2 headers supplying the CAP. Water flow is satisfactory from Unit 1 to the CAP, but it has not been tested for Unit 2. Complete operation of the CAP will be required by 5% powe (0 pen) Open Items (50-454/86011-01; 50-455/86009-01; 50-454/86032-01; 50-455/86028-01; 50-454/86032-02; 50-455/86028-02; and 50-455/86028-03) were not reviewed in this inspectio They are not required for fuel loa . Emergency Preparedness of the Chemistry Group The inspector reviewed the chemistry procedures for the collection and analysis of post-accident samples from the HRSS, operation of the Post

Accident Radionuclide Analysis Portable System (PARAPS), and the l collection of a simulated post-accident reactor coolant sample from the Unit 2 HRSS.

l ! The Post-Accident Chemistry procedures reviewed were, BCP 800-1, HRSS Operation pH, Conductivity and Dissolved Oxygen, Revision 3, December 30, 1985.

l BCP 800-2, HRSS Operation - Ion Chromatograph Chloride Determination, ' Revision 3, June 10, 1986.

BCP 800-3, HRSS Operation - Gas Chromatograph Hydrogen Determination,

! Revision 3, November 20, 1985.

l BCP 800-4, Post Accident Boron Analysis using Fluoroborate Selective Ion Electrode and Sulfuric Acid, Revision 2, May 1, 198 . BCP 800-5, Baron Determination (Back-up Method) by Curcumin using a Spectrophotometer, Revision 1, December 6, 198 BCP 800-8, Dilution Criteria - Post Accident, Isotopic, Revision 2, October 2, 198 BZP 380-10, Post Accident Sampling of Reactor Coolant, Radwaste and Containment Air-General, Revision 4, October 15, 198 BZP 380-12, Post Accident Sampling of Diluted Reactor Coolant, Revision 5, April 23, 198 The procedures appeared to be adequate except for possible problems in Procedure No. BZP 380-12, as noted belo The inspector reviewed the startup and operation of the PARAPS situated in the Secondary Sampling Panel room. The chemist satisfactorily started and operated the system, which consisted of a shielded germanium detector, a multichannel analyzer, two disk drives, and a printe The system was protected from unauthorized use by a fence and locked gat The room was dusty, due to recent construction activities, and the temperature was high, above 80 F, which could impair operation of the system. The chemist stated that to reduce the accumulation of dust on the instrument air filters, the system was started only when needed, such as for routine performance check The system, except for the room temperature, appeared to be adequat The inspector observed a chemist and an RCT simulate the collection of a post-accident sample form the Unit 2 HRSS. For this operation th'e chemist read off to the RCT the various steps of the Procedure No. BZP 380-12,

" Post Accident Sampling of Diluted Reactor Coolant." In an actual situation, the general Procedure No. BZP-380-10, requires two RCTs, one to read and one to operate the system, and a management supervisor. The sample was collected satisfactorily, but the inspector was concerned that operation went slowly because the operators' lack of adeptness in locating some of the valves. Additionally, operation of the dilution valve No. RC-DV-1, was confusing in that in switching from BYPASS to SAMPLE (Step No. C.6.d) the arrow on the valve handle pointed away from, rather than toward the sample container. These two problems could slow down the operation, especially under stress, and result in excessive exposures when radiation levels are high. The inspector also noted to a licensee representative that the graduated cylinder dilution reservoirs were at height (6 feet or so), such that shorter operators would have difficulty in reading the scales. The licensee acknowledged the inspector's concerns and agreed to consider ways to mitigate these problems, possibly by additional training or by procedure and equipment modifications. This will be examined in a subsequent inspection. (0 pen Item 50-454/86037-01)

No violations or deviations were identifie ,. 4. Open Items Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. Open items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Section . Exit Interview The inspector reviewed the scope and findings of the inspection with the licensee representatives listed in Section The inspector noted that the possible problems of cross-contamination between reactor coolant systems through interconnection of the two units through the Chemical Analysis Panel appeared to have been resolved. He noted his concerns about the slow operation of the HRSS during the simulated collection of post-accident samples. The licensee agreed to consider these concern There appear to be no items in this inspection area requiring resolution by FLO During the inspection, the inspector discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection. Licensee representatives did not identify any such documents or procedures as proprietar }}