IR 05000400/1987006

Insp Rept 50-400/87-06 on 870120-0220.Violation Noted: Failure to Analyze Pump Test Data within Required Time Period

ML20207T555
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	03/10/1987
From:	Burris S, Fredrickson P, Maxwell G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20207T546	List: IR 05000400/1987006 ML20207T545 ML20207T548
References
50-400-87-06, 50-400-87-6, IEB-86-003, IEB-86-3, NUDOCS 8703240125
Download: ML20207T555 (8)

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I UNITED STATES 4'pA R80)

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION d

o REGION il g'

,, j 01 MARIETTA STRE ET, e \TLANTA. GEORGI A 30323 k*.v ,/...

Report No.: 50-400/87-06 Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company P. O. Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket No.: 50-400 License No.: NPF-53 Facility Name: Harris 1 Inspection Conducted: 3dnuary20-February 20, 1987 8 fl0 lb 7

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Inspectors:

D . Maxwelli: , Date Signed

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(, 3 l10 IC7 Date Signed SfP.Burris Accompanying Per el: 1. Latta Approved by: b ] O S*!$1 P. E. F%drickson, Section Chief Date ' Signed Divistoh of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope: This routine, announced inspection involved inspection in the areas of Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Items and Unresolved Items, Transient Test Witnessing, Organization and Administration, Plant Tour and IE Bulletin Revie Results: One violation was identified " Failure to Analyze Pump Test Data Within the Required Time Period" - Paragraoh $[h3 NO D go O

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REPORT DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted Licensee Employees l J. M. Collins, Manager, Operations G. L. Forehand, Director, QA/QC J. L. Harness, Assistant Plant General Manager, Operations C. S. Hinnant, Manager, Start-up L. I. Loflin, Manager, Harris Plant Engineering Support C. L. Moseley, Jr. , Manager, Operations OA/QC G. A. Myer, General Manager, Milestone Completion M. F. Thompson, Jr., Manager, Engineering Management D. L. Tibbitts, Director, Regulatory Compliance R. B. Van Metre, Manager, Harris Plant Technical Support R. A. Watson, Vice President, Harris Nuclear Project J. L. Willis, Plant General Manager, Operations Other licensee employees contacted included construction craf tsmen, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, engineering 1

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personnel and office personne . Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 24, 1987, with the Plant General Manager, Operations. No written material was provided to the licensee by the resident inspectors during this reporting period. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials j provided to or reviewed by the resident inspectors during this inspection, i The violation identified in this report has been discussed in detail with the licensee, and during the exit meeting the Plant General Manager expressed the licensee's exception to the violatio l 3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Items and Unresolved Items (92701, 92702) (Closed) Violation 400/86-66-01 " Failure of the Quality Assurance Program to Identify all Electrical Separation Deficiencies". During the week of November 17 - 21, 1986 Region !! inspectors evaluated the licensee's corrective steps, results achieved and corrective steps taken to avoid further noncompliance, as related to this violatio The results of the evaluation are documented in Region II report 50-400/86-88. Based on a Region II letter to CP&L dated January 27, 1987, it was determined that this item had received the required evaluations by Region II inspection personne This item is closed, (Closed) Violation 400/86-68-01 " Failure to Implement QA/QC Related Procedures". The inspectors reviewed CP&L's letters to Region II concerning this item, dated November 15, 1986 and December 10, 198 *

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The letters discussed acceptable methods of addressing the conditions identified in this violatio The inspectors evaluated CP&L's implementation of the proposed corrective action to prevent similar further noncompliances. These actions included the following:

- Verification of QC personnel training on NRC policy and the following procedures: Operations Quality Assurance-202, Maintenance Management Manual-001 (MMM), and MMM-01 Verification of maintenance personnel training on MMM-012 (vendor assist tickets).

- Review of the changes to MMM-012 which were implemented to l

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improve the method of issuing and controlling vendor assistance work ticket Verification of the QA department's review of 200 additional Work Requests and Authorizations (WR&As) to insure that similar problems did not exist or had been identifie Review of the original WR&A to insure that the response was adequate and that the corrective actions had been implemente The inspectors have concluded that the necessary corrective actions have been implemented to resolve this open item. This item is close c. (Closed) Violation 400/86-80-01 " Failure to Provide Approved Procedures to Control Incorporation of Design Changes". The inspectors evaluated the licensee's letter to Region 11 dated December 16, 1986 concerning the violation. The inspectors evaluated the current copies of the Westinghouse drawings for the main control board (Drawings 1364-2217, 1364-2317 and 1364-2280). The drawings were found to reflect the as-built conditions as shown on the site generateo drawing The inspectors were shown copies of a Harris Flant Engineering Section instruction identified as 3.26 " Maintenance Criteria for Updating 00 sign Drawings". The instruction was evaluated and found to contain instructions which clarified and supplemented the existing procedures for controlling design drawing revisions. This item is closed, (Closed) Violation 400/86-8/-01 " Failure to Follow Procedure while

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Performing Technical . Specification Verification". The inspectors evaluated the licensee's letter to Region II dated January 19, 1987, relative to this violation. The corrective steps taken and results achieved were found to be acceptable. The action to prevent further noncompliance required that the applicable Operations Maintenance

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procedure (MMM-007) be revised. The inspectors evaluated the revision to MMM-007 and found it to contain requirements for direct communications to be established with the control room during testing of the solid state circuit The revision also requires a prerequisite to verify the status of associated protective channels prior to placing a channel in the trip conditio This item is closed, e. (Closed) Unresolved Item 400/86-94-01 " Operability of "A" AFW Pump". l During this reporting period the inspectors reviewed the supplemental i information provided by the licensee regarding this unresolved ite !

On January 12, 1987 the licensee determined that the "A" Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) pump was not operable, based on the review of the test dita obtained from performance of the Operational Surveillance Test OST-1087 (" Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Full Flow Test") conducted on December 31, 1986. The licensee subsequently .

placed the plant in Mode 4 and initiated corrective actions and I restored the pump to an operable condition on January 17, 198 After an evaluation of all available information, the inspectors are closing this as an unresolved item and are upgrading it to a violation, based on the observations which follo Operational Surveillance Test OST-1087 was performed on December 31, 1986 and was subsequently signed off by the shift foreman as being satisfactory on that da Inservice Inspection (ISI) group received the December 31 test results on January 5,1987, completed its review of the test data on January 12, 1987, and concluded that the data indicated unacceptable performance for the "A" AFW pum The time from test completion until the engineering evaluation was performed was twelve day As stated in Licensee Event Report (LER)87-003 which addresses this issue, OST-1087 was performed per the Inservice Inspection program (TS 4.0.5.) which required that the pump performance be verified under full flow conditions. This LER also stated that OST-1087 was run in December 1986 to establish inservice inspection baseline data for the AFW pump ASME Code Section XI, Division 1 Article IWP-3000, Subsection 3220 states that "All test data shall be analyzed within 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br /> af ter completion of a test". Also subsection IVP-3110 states that reference values may be determined during either preoperational testing or the first inservice test run at power operatio The inspectors informed the licensee that allowing twelve days to rass prior to performing analysis of the test results on the "A" AFW i

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pump is a violation, " Failure to Analyze Pump Test Data Within the Required Time Period" 50-400/87-06-01, 4. Transient Test Witnessing (72530C) On January 25, 1987 the inspectors witnessed and evaluated the Remote Shutdown Test which was scheduled to be conducted in accordance with CP&L Procedure 9104-519. The purpose of the test was to determine whether the plant could be remotely shutdown from a level of greater than ten percent power and placed in hot standby mode within a prescribed time period. The plant would then be cooled down to a point of residual heat removal (RHR) initially and then be cooled down an additional 50 degrees F. further by the RHR syste The following sections of Procedure 9104-519 were witnessed and evaluated as the test was conducted:

- Section 2.1, which required the reactor power to be increased greater than ten percent;

- Sections 2.2 and 2.3, which required satisfactory communications between the equipment operators and those supervising the test;

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- Section 2.8, which was establishment of the engineered required

display groups;

- Section 2.10, which required that allotted manpower be established at the various test station During the test, one of the charging / safety injection pumps was left aligned for seal injection to the reactor coolant pumps. Also, the steam generator level was required to be maintained at approximately 50 percent and at a pressure between 1082 and 1102 psi. Pressurizer level was required to be maintained between 25 and 60 percent at a pressure between 1850 and 1950 psi.

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Section 6.1.18 of the Remote Shutdown Procedure allowed for only a crew of seven to conduct the test. This was to insure that a normal 4 operating crew would be able to remotely shut the plant down from

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outside the control room should the need arise. Throughout the test the inspectors observed that data was being collected and analyzed to 1 assure that proper plant responses were achieved. Those personnel involved in the tests were thoroughly familiar with the test procedure and with the equipment they were operating.

1 On January 29, 1987, the inspectors witnessed the Loss of Offsite Power (LOP) test conducted in accordance with Procedure 9104-5-15, Rev. O, " Station Electrical Blackout". The inspectors witnessed the pro-test briefing of the plant operations personnel in the control room and determined that all prerequisites and precautions were delineated and that limiting conditions of operation for the LOP test

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were adequately addressed in the briefing. The inspectors determined the following: the strip chart recorders and other special test i equipment required by the procedure were operational, the controlling procedure was the latest revision and it had provided adequate centrol of the test activity, the operational staff's actions were 1 timely and well coordinated, and the required plant status summary l analysis was performed to assure proper plant response to the LOP l tes l The inspectors reviewed applicable portions of the preliminary test results including the tripping of the required start-up transformer ;

feeder breakers, the opening of the reactor trip breaker, and the l emergency start of both emergency diesel generators, and determined i that they appeared to be consistent with procedural requirement The inspectors noted that during the conduct of the LOP test the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump trippe The licensee conducted further tests and evaluations and determined that the steam driven pump was tripping due to problems in the turbine's electrical overspeed circuit. Operations maintenance rettorked the circuitry, the trip functions were tested again and were found to perform as

, designe . OrganizationandAdministration(71501C)

i The inspectors reviewed the onsite licensee organization to ascertain whether changes made to the licensee's onsite organization are in conformance with the requirements of the Technical Specifications (TS) by verifying the following:

- The estabitshed organization is functioning as described in the T Personnel qualification levels are in conformance with applicable codes and standards.

4 - The lines of authority and responsibility are in conformance with TS l and applicable codes and standards.

The inspectors also reviewed appropriato licensee records to ascertain whether the licensee's use of overtime is in conformance with regulatory '

requirements and that any deviations from maximum overtime limits are  ;

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authorized in accordance with TS and/or plant administrative procedures, i inspectors conducted comprehensive discussions of current

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safety-related activities with plant management and technical personnel 1 during this reporting period, including in particular Quality Assurance, Regulatory Compliance and Onsite Nuclear Safety organizations. Topics

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discussed included Itcensee activities associated with plant operations activities, plant modifications, including the security system upgrade,

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the fire protection system, ongoing construction activities, and i communications interfaces, i -

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No violations or deviations were identifie . Plant Tour (72522C) , The inspectors conducted plant tours periodically during this inspection interval to verify that monitoring equipment was recording as required, equipment was properly tagged, operations personnel were aware of plant conditions, and maintenance activities and plant housekeeping efforts were adequat The inspectors determined that appropriate radiation controls were properly established, excess equipment or material was stored properly, and combustible material was disposed of expeditiously. During tours the inspectors looked for the existence of unusual fluid leaks, piping vibrations, pipe  ;

4 hanger and seismic restraint abnormal settings, various valve and i

' breaker positions, equipment clearance tags and component status, adequacy of fire fighting equipment, and instrument calibration date Some tours were conducted on backshifts. Plant housekeeping was observed to be satisfactory, During the week of February 9, 1987 the inspectors observed .

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in process repairs being made to a main feedwater piping spool piec The repairs required that the entire feedwater line be replaced, 4 which is an in-line reducer located on the main condenser side of the

"B" main feedwater pump recirculation control valve 1FW-39. The replacement reducer was manufactured to a wall thickness of Schedule 120; the original reducer was manufactured to a wall thickness of Schedule 3 Schedule 120 is approximately four times the thickness of Schedule 3 The reducer was replaced because a leak had been observed near the vendor weld which joined the reducer to valve

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1FW-39. The leak permeated from a hole in the reducer wall which

measured about one inch in diameter. The inspectors noted that both the reducer and the valve are classified by design engineering as being non-ASME and non "Q".

The licensee is conducting an evaluation of the piping configuration i and design to determine why the hole in the pipe occurre No violations or deviations were identifie ,

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IE Bulletin Review

" (Closed) 400/86-0U-03, Potential Failure of Multiple ECCS Pumps Due to Single Failure of Air Operated Valve in Minimum Flow Recirculation Lin The Itcensee responded to IED 86-03 in a letter dated November 13, 198 In their response the licensee stated that a review was conducted of the Chemical Volume Control System (CVCS) and the Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

System which comprise the ECCS. The results of the review indicated that the CVCS uses a common recirculation line during normal plant operatio However, on receipt of a Safety Injection Actuation Signal the common recirculation line isolates and redundant recirculation line open for pump protection. The RHR System has no common recirculation line and no common

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mode logic fault CP&L, therefore, concluded that Harris is not susceptible to the disablement of multiple ECCS punos due to a single failure of a minimum flow recirculation line valve. This item is closed. l l

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