IR 05000400/2015001
| ML15120A076 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 04/30/2015 |
| From: | Hopper G Division Reactor Projects II |
| To: | Waldrep B Progress Energy Carolinas |
| References | |
| IR 2015001 | |
| Download: ML15120A076 (20) | |
Text
UNITED STATES ril 30, 2015
SUBJECT:
SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000400/2015001
Dear Mr. Waldrep:
On March 31, 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results which were discussed on April 17, 2015, with you and other members of your staff.
No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified during this inspection. However, one licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance is listed in this report. The NRC is treating this violation as non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest this NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Shearon Harris reactor facility. In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390 of the NRCs Agency Rules of Practice and Procedure, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs Agencywide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
George T. Hopper, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No.: 50-400 License No.: NPF-63
Enclosure:
NRC IR 05000400/2015001 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
REGION II==
Docket Nos.: 50-400 License Nos.: NPF-63 Report No.: 05000400/2015001 Licensee: Duke Energy Progress, Inc.
Facility: Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 Location: 5413 Shearon Harris Road New Hill, NC 27562 Dates: January 1, 2015 through March 31, 2015 Inspectors: J. Austin, Senior Resident Inspector P. Lessard, Resident Inspector J. Dodson, Senior Project Engineer (Section 4OA2)
Approved by: George T. Hopper, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000400/2015001; January 1, 2015, through March 31, 2015; Duke Energy Progress, Inc.,
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Integrated Inspection Report.
The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and a regional senior project engineer. No findings were identified during this inspection period. The significance of inspection findings are indicated by their color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, Red) and determined using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609,
Significance Determination Process (SDP) dated June 2, 2011. The cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0310, Aspects within the Cross-Cutting Areas, dated December 4, 2014. All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy dated January 28, 2013. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operations of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 5.
A violation of very low safety significance that was identified by the licensee has been reviewed by the NRC. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensees corrective action program (CAP). This violation and corrective action tracking numbers are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Unit 1: The plant operated at or near rated thermal power for the entire inspection period.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
a. Inspection Scope
Impending Adverse Weather Conditions The inspectors reviewed the licensees preparations to protect risk-significant systems from a severe cold weather period that started February 17, 2015. The inspectors evaluated the licensees implementation of adverse weather preparation procedures and compensatory measures, including operator staffing, before the onset of the severe cold weather. The inspectors reviewed the licensees plans to address the ramifications of potentially lasting effects that may result from the adverse weather condition. The inspectors verified that operator actions specified in the licensees adverse weather procedure maintain readiness of essential systems. The inspectors verified that required surveillances were current, or were scheduled and completed, if practical, before the onset of anticipated adverse weather conditions. The inspectors also verified that the licensee implemented periodic equipment walkdowns or other measures to ensure that the condition of plant equipment met operability requirements.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
a. Inspection Scope
Partial Walkdown The inspectors verified that critical portions of the selected systems were correctly aligned by performing partial walkdowns. The inspectors selected systems for assessment because they were a redundant or backup system or train, were important for mitigating risk for the current plant conditions, had been recently realigned, or were a single-train system. The inspectors determined the correct system lineup by reviewing plant procedures and drawings. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
The inspectors selected the following systems or trains to inspect:
- Security Diesel Generator and Switchgear System on January 15, 2015
- A Emergency Service Water (ESW) system while it was protected on January 23, 2015
- B Air Compressor and the #1 Temporary Air Compressor while they were protected on February 24, 2015
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
Quarterly Inspection The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of selected fire plans by comparing the fire plans to the defined hazards and defense-in-depth features specified in the fire protection program. The inspectors assessed the following items:
- control of transient combustibles and ignition sources
- fire detection systems
- water-based fire suppression systems
- gaseous fire suppression systems
- manual firefighting equipment and capability
- passive fire protection features
- compensatory measures and fire watches
- issues related to fire protection contained in the licensees CAP The inspectors toured the following fire areas to assess material condition and operational status of fire protection equipment. Documents reviewed are listed in the
.
- Turbine Building, 261 Elevation
- A Diesel, 261 Elevation
- B Diesel, 261 Elevation
- Fuel Handling Building, 286 Elevation
- A Train ESW Pump Room
- B Train ESW Pump Room
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
a. Inspection Scope
.1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Requalification
The inspectors observed a simulator scenario conducted for training of an operating crew for an upcoming reactor refueling outage (RFO) on January 29, 2015. The scenario challenged the operators ability to respond to events which could occur during a RFO, including residual heat removal system malfunctions and loss of the A safety related electrical bus.
The inspectors assessed the following:
- licensed operator performance
- the ability of the licensee to administer the scenario and evaluate the operators
- the quality of the post-scenario critique
- simulator performance
.2 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual
Plant/Main Control Room The inspectors observed licensed operator performance in the main control room during an entry into AOP-019, Malfunction of Reactor Coolant System Pressure Control, on March 3, 2015.
The inspectors assessed the following:
- use of plant procedures
- control board manipulations
- communications between crew members
- use and interpretation of instruments, indications, and alarms
- use of human error prevention techniques
- documentation of activities
- management and supervision
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors assessed the licensees treatment of the issues listed below to verify the licensee appropriately addressed equipment problems within the scope of the maintenance rule (10 CFR 50.65, Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants). The inspectors reviewed procedures and records to evaluate the licensees identification, assessment, and characterization of the problems as well as their corrective actions for returning the equipment to a satisfactory condition. The inspectors also interviewed system engineers and the maintenance rule coordinator to assess the accuracy of performance deficiencies and extent of condition.
- AR #725359, C Component Cooling Water Pump Seal Leak
- AR #725592, B Phase would not Trip on Breaker 1B36-SB-24 (Reactor Auxiliary Building Electrical Equipment Room Purge Inlet)
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the maintenance activities listed below to verify that the licensee assessed and managed plant risk as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and licensee procedures. The inspectors assessed the adequacy of the licensees risk assessments and implementation of risk management actions. The inspectors also verified that the licensee was identifying and resolving problems with assessing and managing maintenance-related risk using the CAP. Additionally, for maintenance resulting from unforeseen situations, the inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees planning and control of emergent work activities. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- Green risk condition due to extending the duration of the B Emergency Service Chill Water Compressor on February 4, 2015
- Elevated green risk while the B EDG was inoperable for scheduled maintenance on February 4, 2015
- Elevated green risk condition during planned Main Steam Safety Valve (MSSV)testing on March 12, 2015
- Unplanned yellow risk condition after taking manual control of the B Feed Regulating Valve to restore steam generator level following failure of the pressure input to the level controlling channel on March 20, 2015
- Green risk condition while the A EDG was inoperable when lube oil temperature was low due to a planned electrical outage on March 26, 2015
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors selected the operability determinations or functionality evaluations listed below for review based on the risk-significance of the associated components and systems. The inspectors reviewed the technical adequacy of the determinations to ensure that technical specification (TS) operability was properly justified and the components or systems remained capable of performing their design functions. To verify whether components or systems were operable, the inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the TS and UFSAR to the licensees evaluations. Where compensatory measures were required to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures in place would function as intended and were properly controlled. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of corrective action documents to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with operability evaluations. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- AR #733731, Containment Sump Narrow Range Level Transmitters Lack Sufficient Basis for Qualification
- AR #740026, Potential Margin Question with Molded Case Circuit Breaker (MCCB)
Trip Settings
- AR #735869, Pressurizer Heaters Group B Operability Evaluation following Deenergization of the Heaters.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R18 Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors verified that the plant modification listed below did not affect the safety functions of important safety systems. The inspectors confirmed the modifications did not degrade the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of risk significant structures, systems and components. The inspectors also verified modifications performed during plant configurations involving increased risk did not place the plant in an unsafe condition. Additionally, the inspectors evaluated whether system operability and availability, configuration control, post-installation test activities, and changes to documents, such as drawings, procedures, and operator training materials, complied with licensee standards and NRC requirements. In addition, the inspectors reviewed a sample of related corrective action documents to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with modifications. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- Engineering Change (EC) #99561, Temporary Modification for Security Diesel
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors either observed post-maintenance testing or reviewed the test results for the maintenance activities listed below to verify the work performed was completed correctly and the test activities were adequate to verify system operability and functional capability.
- Work Order (WO) #13477196, Security Diesel Output Breaker will not Open when Given Trip Signal
- WO #13485127, Perform CM-I0014, York Essential Services Chilled Water Chiller Temperature Controller Maintenance and WO #2068849, Replace 'B' Chiller GE CR-120B Relays with Equivalent
- Work Request (WR) #116627, B Pressurizer Backup Heaters Deenergized with Control Switch in On Position
- WO #13492689, Troubleshoot and Repair Mechanical Interlock Between 1-4A9-3B (1-4A9 Bus Feeder Breaker) and 1-4A9-3C (Security Diesel Output Breaker)
- WO #13501107, Replace Failed Power Source for B Steam Generator Pressure Loop
- WO #13474250, (1CP-3) Normal Containment Purge Exhaust Damper Failed Shut The inspectors evaluated these activities for the following:
- Acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operational readiness.
- Effects of testing on the plant were adequately addressed.
- Test instrumentation was appropriate.
- Tests were performed in accordance with approved procedures.
- Equipment was returned to its operational status following testing.
- Test documentation was properly evaluated.
Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of corrective action documents to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with post-maintenance testing. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the surveillance tests listed below and either observed the test or reviewed test results to verify testing adequately demonstrated equipment operability and met TS and licensee procedural requirements. The inspectors evaluated the test activities to assess for preconditioning of equipment, procedure adherence, and equipment alignment following completion of the surveillance. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of related corrective action documents to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with surveillance testing. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
Routine Surveillance Tests
- OST-1045, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Train B Slave Relay Test Quarterly Interval on January 9, 2015
- OST-1040, Essential Services Chilled Water Systems Operability Quarter Interval on January 18, 2015
- ORT-1408, Security Diesel Operability Run Monthly Interval on February 21, 2015 Reactor Coolant System Leak Detection
- OST-1026, Reactor Coolant System Leakage Evaluation, Computer Calculation, Daily Interval, Modes 1-4 on February 21, 2015 In-Service Tests (IST)
- EST-224, Insitu Main Steam Safety Valve (MSSV) Test using Assist Device
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed the following two emergency preparedness drills this quarter.
The first was conducted on January 13, 2015, and involved a simulated loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The second was conducted on March 3, 2015, and involved a fuel failure, Anticipated Transient without Scram (ATWS), and a steam generator tube leak.
The inspectors observed licensee activities in the simulator, technical support center and the emergency operations facility to evaluate implementation of the emergency plan, including event classification, notification, and protective action recommendations. The inspectors evaluated the licensees performance against criteria established in the licensees procedures. Additionally, the inspectors attended the post-exercise critique to assess the licensees effectiveness in identifying emergency preparedness weaknesses and verified the identified weaknesses were entered in the CAP. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed a sample of the performance indicator (PI) data, submitted by the licensee, for the Unit 1 PIs listed below. The inspectors reviewed plant records compiled between January 2014 and December 2014 to verify the accuracy and completeness of the data reported for the station. The inspectors reviewed the PI data to verify it complied with guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, and licensee procedures.
The inspectors reviewed the data to verify the accuracy of the reported data that was used to calculate the value of each PI. In addition, the inspectors reviewed a sample of related corrective action documents to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with PI data. Documents reviewed are listed in the
.
Cornerstone: Initiating Events
- Unplanned scrams per 7,000 critical hours
- Unplanned power changes per 7,000 critical hours
- Unplanned scrams with complications
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
1. Safety Conscious Work Environment
a. Inspection Scope
NRC inspectors conducted an assessment of the Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE) in the radiation protection department using both a written survey and interviews with staff, contractors, supervisors, and the Radiation Protection Manager.
During the inspection, inspectors were sensitive to areas and issues that would represent challenges to the free flow of information, such as areas where employees may be reluctant to raise concerns or report issues in the CAP. Interviewing contractors and employees allowed inspectors to assess the SCWE of the radiation protection group. The inspectors surveyed and interviewed 40 of the 55 people assigned to the radiation protection department.
b. Assessment Inspectors found that personnel stated that there was a good SCWE as it related to industrial and personnel safety. The inspectors clarified what was meant by SCWE as it related to nuclear safety concerns.
Personnel interviewed gave various responses which included that, the CAP process was cumbersome, they did not know how to use the Condition Report (CR) system, or had not used the system. Additionally, some individuals were hesitant to write CRs because the issues were sent back to them, as the originators, to resolve. Personnel stated there was also an unwillingness to raise issues that might result in further increases in an already high workload.
The inspectors identified underlying factors that would produce a chilling effect or reluctance to report safety issues. Approximately 40 percent of the people interviewed stated that they would not raise routine safety or regulatory issues for fear of direct retaliation, to either the licensee or the NRC. They further stated that if it were a significant safety or regulatory issue, they would notify the NRC anonymously or use an anonymous CR system in private.
Based on inspection insights obtained from interviews and the written survey results, the inspectors concluded that the conditions in the radiation protection department were not conducive to a healthy SCWE. The effectiveness of the corrective actions specified by the licensee in AR #740804 will be evaluated during future inspections.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
On April 17, 2015, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. B. Waldrep and other members of the licensees staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection period.
4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations
The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of the NRC Enforcement Policy, for being dispositioned as a NCV.
TS 6.8, Procedures and Programs, Section 6.8.1.a requires, in part, that written procedures be established, implemented, and maintained covering the activities recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978.
RG 1.33, Appendix A, Section 8.b.(1).(dd) requires, in part, that procedures be established for safety valve surveillance tests. Contrary to the above, on March 12, 2015, engineers used an inadequate procedure to test main steam safety valves. Specifically, engineering procedure EST-224, Insitu Main Steam Safety Valve Test using Assist Device, did not adequately direct personnel to compensate for the head differential between the pressure gauge and the seat of the main steam safety valves. This resulted in the licensee incorrectly adjusting the setpoint of MSSV MS-46 below TS 3.7.1 limits while operating in Mode 1. The licensee identified this issue after incorrectly declaring the valve operable. However, the licensee was able to restore the setpoint and operability of MS-46 within the TS 3.7.1 Limiting Condition for Operation action time. This violation was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green)because the finding did not cause a reactor trip or the loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of the trip to a stable shutdown condition. The licensee entered this issue into their CAP as AR #737961. As corrective actions, the licensee revised the procedure and restored the setpoint to within TS 3.7.1 limits and retested MS-46.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee personnel
- D. Corlett, Manager, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
- J. Dufner, Plant Manager
- L. Faulk, Director, Nuclear Plant Security
- D. Griffith, Manager, Nuclear Training
- L. Hughes, Manager, Nuclear Chemistry
- S. OConnor, General Manager, Nuclear Engineering
- M. Parker, Manager, Nuclear Radiation Protection
- T. Toler, Manager, Nuclear Oversight
- J. Warner, Manager, Work Management
- B. Waldrep, Site Vice President
NRC personnel
- G. Hopper, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 4, Division of Reactor Projects, Region II