IR 05000400/1986055
| ML20205H171 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 08/07/1986 |
| From: | Burris S, Fredrickson P, Maxwell G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20205H164 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-1.G.1, TASK-2.K.3.05, TASK-TM 50-400-86-55, GL-83-01, GL-83-1, IEB-83-05, IEB-83-5, NUDOCS 8608190739 | |
| Download: ML20205H171 (11) | |
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p tiro UNITE'D STATES
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o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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Report No.: 50-400/86-55 Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company P. O. Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket No.:
50-400 License No.:
CPPR-158 Facility Name: Harris 1
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Inspection Conducted: Jtpie 20 - July 20, 1986 Inspectors:
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(mqGh1F. Maxwely l5%LA sk/sz Date Signed Q S. P. Burris Date Signed The inspectors
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assisted during this reporting period by P. G. Humphrey and D, C. Ford
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P. E. Fredrickson, Section Chi (f D' ate Signed Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY
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Scope: This routine, announced inspection involved inspection in the areas of Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters and Inspector Follow-up Items and Status of TMI Action Items; Safety Evaluation Report Review and Follow-up; Emergency Service Water System Status; Preoperational Testing and Other Activities.
Results: No violations or deviations were identified.
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8608190739 860807 PDR ADOCK 05000400 G
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees N. J. Chiangi, Manager QA/QC Harris Plant J. M. Collins, Manager, Operations G. L. Forehand, Director, QA/QC J. L. Harness, Assistant Plant General Manager, Operations C. S. Hinnant, Manager, Start-up L. I. Loflin, Manager, Harris Plant Engineering Support C. L. McKenzie, Acting Director, Operations QA/QC G. A. Myer, General Manager, Milestone Completion M. Thompson, Jr., Manager, Engineering Management D. L. Tibbitts, Director, Regulatory Compliance B. Van Metre, Manager, Harris Plant Maintenance R. A. Watson, Vice President, Harris Nuclear Project J. L. Willis, Plant General Manager, Operations Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, engineering personnel and office personnel.
2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 23, 1986, with the Plant General Manager, Operations. No written material was provided to the licensee by the inspectors during this reporting period. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection. The licensee provided no dissenting information at the exit meeting.
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3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters, Inspector Follow-up Items and Status of TMI Action Items (92701, 254018).
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a.
(Closed) Inspector Follow-up Item 400/85-16-24, "TMI Action Item II.K.3.5, Automatic Trip of Reactor Coolant Pumps During LOCA". This item is Confirmatory Item 33 and is the subject of Generic Letter 83-10C, dated February 3,1983.
The inspectors reviewed responses to Item II.K.3.5, dated April 22, 1983, September 3, 1985 and May 1, 1986.
In June 1986 the office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) issued a Safety Evaluation Report (SER) in which the staff found the licensee treatment of the reactor coolant pump (RCP) trip to be acceptable. The
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licensee chose reactor coolant system pressure 1360 psig (normal containment conditions) and 1600 psig (adverse containment conditions)
as trip criteria. The instrument designated as primary indication is wide range PT-440 with PT-441 considered redundant. Other instruments available are P-0402 and P-0403.
These instruments are calibrated by procedures MST-IO249, MST-IO248, MST-I0080 and MST-10081.
The inspectors verified by field inspection that no creditable event could
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cause all the instruments to be damaged simultaneously. The inspectors verified that appropriate procedures had been revised to incorporate the trip criterion; these included OP-100, Reactor Coolant System and Emergency Operating Flow Path Procedure, PATH-1.
The licensee conducted classroom and simulator RCP trip criterion training for licensed operators. The inspectors reviewed selected lesson plans and simulator scenarios to verify that the trip criterion was part of the material and that discrimination between when to leave the pumps running and when to trip them were discussed and demonstrated as applicable.
Documents reviewed were cold licensee class lesson plan, CLC-5-5-2, Steam Generator Tube Leak Procedures, CLC-5-2-2, Load Rejection / Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve PORV Failure / Pressurized Thermal Shock and CLC-6-1-1, Dropped Rod /LOCA.
Simulator scenarios reviewed for the November candidates included SS6141H, Dropped Rod / Steam Space LOCA and SS6142H, Stuck Rod / Steam Generator Tube Rupture.
Simulator scenarios reviewed for the May candidates included SS7232H, Steam Space LOCA, SS7222H, Stuck Rods / Steam Generator Tube Rupture, SS7322H, Letdown Problems /LOCA/ Steam Generator Tube Rupture and SS7331H, Instrument Failure / Pressurizer Heater / Steam Generator Safety Failed / Steam Generator Tube Rupture.
All licensed operators were either November 1985 or May 1986 candidates.
The inspectors determined that the licensee has provided operable instrumentation as required, has incorporated the RCP trip criterion into procedures and provided training as committed to in responses to Generic Letter 83-10C and Item II.K.3.5.
This item is closed.
b.
(0 pen) Inspector Follow-up Item 400/85-16-07 "TMI Action Item I.G.1 Special Low-Power Testing and Training".
The item required licensed personnel to be trained in the initiation, maintenance and recovery from natural circulation. On June 27, 1986, the inspectors observed simulator training of licensed operators for the initiation, maintenance and recovery from natural circulation.
The inspectors verified that expected responses were demonstrated, the instructor discussed plant response and meaning of strip chart recordings as appropriate and the proposed Start-up Manual procedure No. 1-9103-S-23, Natural Circulation, was utilized. The simulation appeared to provide adequate training on plant response during all phases of natural circulation. The licensee plans to validate the simulator response
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with the results obtained during actual testing. The inspectors will observe portions of the training during low power testing and review the validation process. This item remains open pending this additional inspection.
c.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 400/85.-33-01 " Installation of Safety-related Equipment". The inspectors previo0 sly identified a gasket missing from the termination junction box cover on the side of the "B" emergency service water pump.
The licensee has ordered a new qualified replacement gasket, and in the interim has installed a temporary gasket. The inspectors reviewed the technical manual provided by the manufacturer of the motor and noted that the manual lists the gasket as an integral part of the motor junction box, which is a typical industry practice for sealing electrical terminal boxes.
The gasket was identified as part number 51 on the parts list for this particular model motor (model 5K6356XC21A).
The inspectors discussed the above conditions with management and engineering personnel.
The inspectors were informed that the environmental qualification testing for this motor had been performed in accordance with EBASCO
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specification M-67H.
The test results indicated that the motor was successfully tested for a mild environment condition. The results were documented on " Equipment Qualification Status Sheet" package 4.8 sheet 1, volume I of I, for purchase order NY 435182.
These tests were conducted to assure the motor would perform under the prescribed conditions of IEEE 384-1974 and Regulatory Guide 1.75 Revision 1.
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inspectors were shown sketches of the conditions under which the qualification test was performed.
These sketches did not show the motor's main lead terminal box and gasket as a necessary part of the motor during its environmental test.
The licensee provided the inspectors with the final room and area turnover procedure (PS0-86-001). Checkpoint 17 of the attachment 2 to the procedure requires that all cover plates and gaskets must be checked to be properly fastened and tightened prior to the final room and area turnover being accepted.
The room and area which contained the emergency service water motors had not been turned over as a final room and area turnover. This item is closed.
d.
(Closed)
Unresolved Item 400/85-37-02 " Resolution of Concerns Associated with IE Bulletin 83-05".
The inspectors have reviewed comments associated with Unresolved Item 400/85-37-02.
The item addressed the licensee's actions taken in response to IE Bulletin 83-05, "ASME Nuclear Code Pumps and Spare Parts Manufactured by the Hayward Tyler Pump Company",-and concluded that the licensee's test procedures 1-4065-M-01, Rev.
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" Emergency Service Water Pump
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Operational Test" and 1-4065-M-02, Rev. 2, " Emergency Service Water Pump Endurance Test", were not sufficient to meet the requirements of the Bulletin.
The inspectors later reviewed Revision 2 of the licensee's test procedures. This revision also failed to address all the issues of the unresolved item or to satisfy the requirements of the IE Bulletin.
During this reporting period the inspectors again have reviewed the licensee's revised test procedures, Revision 3, and have concluded that these procedures will meet the requirements of the IE Bulletin. All issues referenced in the unresolved item have been satisfactorily addressed in the latest revision of the procedures. Followup of the IE Bulletin will be conducted during subsequent inspections after performance of endurance run and analysis of data.
This item is closed.
4.
Safety Evaluation Report Review and Follow-up (92719)
a.
PGI-Anchor Darling Check Valve Problems The inspectors reviewed CP&L's evaluation to determine applicability of Region II Potential Generic Item 85-24 concerning the issue titled
" Missing Lock Welds on Anchor Darling Valves at V.C. Summer Nuclear Station". After numerous discussions with the licensee, the inspectors found that of the original 30 identified valves, 28 valves have been inspected and corrected, as necessary, in accordance w'ith Anchor-Darling instructions outlined in a letter dated December 10, 1985. Two valves were reviewed by the licensee and. determined to be satisfactory without the required changes. The inspectors questioned i
the licensee's interpretation of the Anchor-Darling letter with respect to valve usage.
Based on this concern, the licensee is currently reviewing the reasoning behind their evaluation. This interpretation concern is identified as an Inspector Follow-up Item 400/86-55-02
" Anchor-Darling Check Valves".
b.
D.C. Emergency Lighting The inspectors -reviewed the licensee's resolution to the SER item concerning whether the d.c. emergency lighting transformers have been seismically qualified or not. Discussions with the on-site engineering staff have identified that the transformers in questions have been tested at Wyle Laboratory and are documented in Wyle Test Report
- 47241-1 Rev. A, dated August 25, 1984.
During this inspection period the inspectors questioned licensee personnel on the status of illumination requirements for the control room.
This item is identified because the installation of the ceiling
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material was only recently completed.
The illumination test was performed during Hot Functional Testing and without the ceiling tile installed. The licensee has commenced a review of the test results and will evaluate these results under control of a Field Change Request SE-758.
c.
Steam Generator The inspectors reviewed the status of ongoing work to meet, the commitments identified in SER 7-17 paragraph 7.3.3.5, in that the licensee would insulate the steam generator reference line which might give erroneous level indication during an accident condition.
The licensee has commenced the insulation of these identified lines, however, due to interference problems, the licensee cannot provide the original amount of insulation.
This reduction in the amount of insulation requires that the licensee perform additional evaluations to assure that the amount of insulation installed will meet the minimum required to prevent false levels in the steam generators.
The inspectors will continue to monitor the licensee progress in resolving this issue.
Steam generator PORV's are required to be qualified with respect to a postulated steam line break in the steam tunnel as required in the SER.
The inspectors discussed this item with licensing personnel and have identified that the issue is still unresolved, as NRR is still reviewing the licensee's submitted response to this outstanding item.
The inspectors will follow-up on this item during future inspection periods.
d.
Pressurizer Pressure Instruments The inspectors interviewed CP&L engineering staff personnel in reference to pressurizer pressure transmitters #PT-444 and PT-445, which were required to be qualified for a harsh environment as identified in the licensee's SER.
The inspectors reviewed Equipment
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Qualification Data Package (EQDP) #811 to insure that certifications for these two newly installed pressure transmitters were complete and available for review.
This EQDP was verified complete with the following exception: the licensee has performed a visual walkdown of the two pts to verify that they were located in accordance with the print and were completely installed (e.g. terminations complete, plugs installed).
The licensee is in the process of documenting this walkdown in the EQDP.
No violations or deviations were identified in the areas inspected.
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5.
Energency Service Water System Status (943008)
The inspectors obtained information concerning the status of the emergency service water (ESW) system to determine the current status of the ESW system; the resolutions to past identified problems; any significant outstanding system or equipment problems; and the licensee's past, present and future testing requirements.
Since the end of 1983, various ESW system parts and components have been rned over to the start-up organization under different turnover packages, examples of these are.
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Screen, Structure, Pump "A" and Strainer, December 15, 1983;
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Screen, Structure, Pump "B" and Strainer, March 27, 1984;
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ESW Header "A" and Emergency Equipment, February 15, 1984;
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ESW Header "B" and Emergency Equipment, May 24, 1984;
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Containment Fan Coolers, May 1, 1985;
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ESW Pump Seal Water Supply, May 30, 1985.
In addition, the following tests have been performed satisfactorily on the
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date indicated:
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1-4065-C-01 ESW Train "A" Hydro, April 24, 1984; 1-4065-F-01 ESW Train "A" Flush, May 14, 1985;
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1-4065-C-05 ESW Train "B" Hydro, May 2, 1985;
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1-4065-F-02 ESW Train "B" Flush, August 14, 1984;
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1-4065-C-02 Containment Fan Coolers, July 15, 1985;
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1-4065-C-03 HVAC Chillers ESW Hydro, June 18, 1985;
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1-4065-C-04 Emergency Diesel Generator ESW Hydro, May 23, 1985;
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1-4065-C-06 Containment Cooling Water Heat Exchanger ESW Hydro, May 15, 1985.
The following are some of the major problems encountered while trying to
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perform various Start-up test requirements:
"A" ESW Pump Shaft failure in September 1985 due to inadequate cooling i
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water to the bearing. CP&L's investigation revealed that the shaft's j
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original tolerances were too restrictive and the pump shaft cooling water supply was inadequate. The licensee conducted a surveillance on the "B" pump and found similar conditions. The licensee is continuing to perform and evaluate the test results to meet the requirements of IE Bulletin 83-05.
"A" ESW Butterfly Valve (ISW-3) failure.
The licensee originally
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identified this problem in March 1984 when the valve disc had been forced approximately ten percent past the closed stops. At that time it was determined to be the result of a personnel error. The valve motor had apparently been wired in reverse.
Subsequently with the failure of the
"B" valve (1SW-4) in June 1986, the licensee has evaluated the failures and has determined that they resulted from a differential pressure across the valves in question. This differential pressure is created by the difference in water levels between the
auxiliary reservoir and the main reservoir (approximately 30 feet). At the present time CP&L personnel are meeting with the manufacturer to identify all potential resolutions to this problem.
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"A" ESW Pump Bay Penetration Seal (Bellows Type) failure in May 1986,
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causing the pump to seize.
Evaluation by the engineering staff at Harris has found that the original seal (altered by an approved Field Change Request) did not appear to be adequate.
Investigation of the
"B" train bay penetration seal revealed similar failure mechanisms in J
process. Engineering proposes to replace this seal with a rigid type
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which should meet all necessary requirements.
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The operator for the ESW outlet valve to the containment fan cooler AH-4 (ISW-110) was binding, causing a thermal overload device to be damaged if energized.
The licensee's incident report identified that this problem was a result of not issuing a deficiency tag or clearance.
The licensee has taken corrective action to prevent recurrence of this problem.
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Valve 1SW-40 Normal Service Water to ESW Supply Header "B" Cross Connect and valve 1SW-271 Return Flow from ESW Header "B" to the Auxiliary Reservoir failure during testing.
These failures were apparently caused by an improperly designed current.
These failures only affect the "B" Safety Train and then only when control is shifted to the Alternate Control Panel.
CP&L is evaluating this item to identify the proper corrective actions required.
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The licensee continues to work on resolution of IE Bulletin 83-05,
"ASME Nuclear Code Pumps and Spare Parts Manufactured by the Hayward
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i Tyler Pump Company (HTPC)". Currently the licensee is in preparations to perform the required endurance run and evaluate this dat.
T It should be noted that this system was one of the first to be turned over to the Start-up group for testing. However, it has not successfully passed any of the designated preoperational tests to date. A review of the past history of the ESW system indicates that CP&L has identified numerous equipment and design discrepancies which have hindered the successful testing of this system.
The resolution to some of the ESW problems encountered could possibly impact one or more of the major milestones to be completed.
The inspectors will continue to monitor the progress of the ESW system testing in future inspection periods.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Preoperational Testing (71302)
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During this inspection period the inspectors witnessed selected portions of the Low Head Safety Injection Test 1-2085-P-03 to verify that the licensee has met all the applicable requirements and that:
An approved procedure was available and in use by appropriate test
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Appropriate test equipment was being used and was in calibration;
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The authorized test personnel were taking the required data;
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Identified test exceptions were being logged and tracked in accordance with the appropriate procedures.
During the conduct of the test, the start-up engineer noted that valve 1-RH-25 was not in the required test position. The start-up engineer generated a Test Exception as required by the appropriate start-up control procedure.
In addition, the start-up engineer took immediate steps to isolate and correct this identified discrepancy.
The inspectors witnessed portions of the preoperational test on the diesel generator, procedure 1-5095-0-04, Rev. O,
" Emergency Diesel Engine Generator Pre-Service Testing".
This test was performed to verify the operation of two D.C. field current meters, EI-6950A and EI-5950B, which were suspected of having the incorrect face plates installed. This item is still open and will be resolved with the
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replacement of the face plates. Also, the start-up group identified that the main control room panel EI-6958B mega-var meter's needle indicator had detached and was defective; the meter was promptly
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replaced.
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During the evaluation of the diesel generator testing the inspectors also observed the following:
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The start-up engineers were using an approved test;
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Test equipment used was calibrated;
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Identified discrepancies were documented for resolution;
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Operations personnel were utilized to operate the necessary diesel generator equipment;
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Test prerequisites and initial conditions had been met.
b.
The inspectors evaluated the completed documentatien and turnover package for the fuel handling building (operating floor, 286'
elevation). The fuel handling building was turned over to operations l
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in accordance with Administrative Procedure AP-X-03 on April 30, 1986.
The inspectors interviewed construction and operations personnel concerning the " final accepted" condition of the building.
The inspectors asked if all of the fuel handling building's electrical separation problems had been identified and documented.
On July 11, 1986 CP&L provided the inspectors with a list of all exceptions which had been identified concerning the turnover.
On July 11 and 12, 1986 the inspectors conducted an inspection of the east wall of the fuel handling building (operating floor).
During the inspection the inspectors identified approximately 100 instances where the electrical separation criteria of the design specification CAR-2166-B-060 " Miscellaneous Electrical Details and Notes" had been violated.
The inspectors informed CP&L about these separation violations.
CP&L conducted a review of the documentation associated with the electrical raceway for the fuel handling building.
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stated that all but 12 of the approximately 100 instances had been identified and documented to assure resolution. On July 15,1986 CP&L construction inspection personnel documented these 12 instances on a Nonconformance Report numbered NCR-86-0424.
CP&L management stated that these 12 instances resulted from one raceway inspector not following the inspection requirements outlined in the applicable Technical Procedure, TP-42, Rev. 11, paragraph 4.4.2.17.
Followup inspections in this potential problem area will be conducted by regional electrical specialist inspectors and documented in subsequent inspection reports.
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No violations or deviations were identified in the areas inspected.
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7.
Other Activities (943008)
On July 17, 1986, the Region II Acting Director for the Division of Reactor Projects and the Chief of Reactor Projects Branch 2 visited the. Harris
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Plant.
Their agenda included a briefing by CP&L concerning the status of the project overview, construction, start-up (status of systems, buildings, preoperational testing and procedures), and readiness for plant operations
(staffing, training, and procedures).
Following the briefing there was a comprehensive tour.
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