IR 05000400/2017001
| ML17111A795 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 04/21/2017 |
| From: | Steven Rose NRC/RGN-III/DRP/RPB4 |
| To: | Hamilton T Progress Energy Carolinas |
| References | |
| IR 2017001 | |
| Download: ML17111A795 (23) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ril 21, 2017
SUBJECT:
SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000400/2017001
Dear Ms. Hamilton:
On March 29, 2017, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1. On March 29, 2017, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified during this inspection. However, inspectors documented a licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance in this report. The NRC is treating this violation as non-cited violation (NCV)
consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or significance of the NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC resident inspector at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Steven D. Rose, Branch Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No.: 05000400 License No.: NPF-63
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000400/2017001 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
REGION II==
Docket Nos.: 50-400 License Nos.: NPF-63 Report No.: 05000400/2017001 Licensee: Duke Energy Progress, Inc.
Facility: Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 Location: 5413 Shearon Harris Road New Hill, NC 27562 Dates: January 1, 2017 through March 31, 2017 Inspectors: R. Patterson, Acting Senior Resident Inspector C. Jones, Acting Senior Resident Inspector L. Wheeler, Acting Resident Inspector J. Dodson, Senior Project Engineer (Section 4OA2)
Approved by: Steven D. Rose, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY
Integrated Inspection Report 05000400/2017001; January 1, 2017, through March 31, 2017;
Duke Energy Progress, Inc., Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Integrated Inspection Report.
The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and a regional senior project engineer. The significance of inspection findings are indicated by their color (i.e.,
greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, Red) and determined using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process, dated April 29, 2015. The cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0310, Aspects within the Cross-Cutting Areas, dated December 4, 2014. All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy dated November 1, 2016. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operations of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 6.
One violation of very low safety significance that was identified by the licensee has been reviewed by the NRC. Corrective action taken or planned by the licensee has been entered into the licensees corrective action program (CAP). This violation and corrective action tracking number is listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Unit 1: The plant operated at or near 100 percent rated thermal power for the entire inspection period.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
a. Inspection Scope
Impending Adverse Weather Conditions The inspectors reviewed the licensees preparations to protect risk-significant systems due to a significant amount of snowfall and accumulation expected during January 6 to January 7, 2017. The inspectors evaluated the licensees implementation of adverse weather preparation procedures and compensatory measures, including operator staffing, before the onset of and during the adverse weather conditions. The inspectors reviewed the licensees plans to address the ramifications of potentially lasting effects that may result from snowfall accumulation. The inspectors verified that operator actions specified in the licensees adverse weather procedure maintain readiness of essential systems. The inspectors verified that required surveillances were current, or were scheduled and completed, if practical, before the onset of anticipated adverse weather conditions. The inspectors also verified that the licensee implemented periodic equipment walkdowns or other measures to ensure that the condition of plant equipment met operability requirements. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
a. Inspection Scope
Partial Walkdown The inspectors verified that critical portions of the selected systems were correctly aligned by performing partial walkdowns. The inspectors selected systems for assessment because they were a redundant or backup system or train, were important for mitigating risk for the current plant conditions, had been recently realigned, or were a single-train system. The inspectors determined the correct system lineup by reviewing plant procedures and drawings. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
The inspectors selected the following systems or trains to inspect:
- B emergency diesel generator (EDG) while the A EDG was in a maintenance outage on January 17, 2017
- C component cooling water (CCW) pump line-up while the B CCW pump was in a maintenance outage on January 26, 2017
- B residual heat removal (RHR) walkdown of pump area, B RHR heat-exchanger area, associated safety injection valves that support the B RHR train and main control room (MCR) boards for motor-operated valve (MOV) alignments on February 15, 2017
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05A/Q - 5 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
.1 Quarterly Inspection
The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of selected fire plans by comparing the fire plans to the defined hazards and defense-in-depth features specified in the fire protection program. In evaluating the fire plans the inspectors assessed the following items:
- control of transient combustibles and ignition sources
- fire detection systems
- water-based fire suppression systems
- gaseous fire suppression systems
- manual firefighting equipment and capability
- passive fire protection features
- compensatory measures and fire watches
- issues related to fire protection contained in the licensees CAP The inspectors toured the following fire areas to assess material condition and operational status of fire protection equipment. Documents reviewed are listed in the
.
- A EDG Room, 261 Elevation
- B EDG Room, 261 Elevation
- Auxiliary control panel room fire watch observation while the incipient fire detection system was out of service
.2 Annual Inspection
The inspectors evaluated the licensees fire brigade performance during a drill on January 31, 2017, and assessed the brigades capability to meet fire protection licensing basis requirements. The inspectors observed the following aspects of fire brigade performance:
- capability of fire brigade members
- leadership ability of the brigade leader
- use of turnout gear and fire-fighting equipment
- team effectiveness
- compliance with site procedures The inspectors also assessed the ability of control room operators to combat potential fires, including identifying the location of the fire, dispatching the fire brigade, and sounding alarms. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R06 Flood Protection Measures
a. Inspection Scope
Internal Flooding The inspectors reviewed related flood analysis documents and walked down the area listed below containing risk-significant structures, systems, and components susceptible to flooding. The inspectors verified that plant design features and plant procedures for flood mitigation were consistent with design requirements and internal flooding analysis assumptions. The inspectors also assessed the condition of flood protection barriers and drain systems. In addition, the inspectors verified the licensee was identifying and properly addressing issues using the CAP. Documents reviewed are listed in the
.
- A and B EDG Room, 261 Elevation
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
a. Inspection Scope
.1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Requalification
On January 27, 2017, the inspectors observed a simulator scenario conducted for training of an operating crew as part of the continuing training program for licensed operators. Evaluators identified and documented crew performance and the training was conducted in accordance with the licensees procedure. The simulator scenario focused on the crews response to a partial loss of MCR annunciators commensurate with a large break loss of coolant accident.
The inspectors assessed the following:
- licensed operator performance
- the ability of the licensee to administer the scenario and evaluate the operators
- the quality of the post-scenario critique
- simulator performance Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
.2 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual
Plant/Main Control Room The inspectors observed licensed operator performance in the MCR on February 28, 2017, during the performance of post-maintenance testing, following the identification of a malfunction of the control rod position indication on the main control board.
The inspectors assessed the following:
- use of plant procedures
- control board manipulations
- communications between crew members
- use and interpretation of instruments, indications, and alarms
- use of human error prevention techniques
- documentation of activities
- management and supervision Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors assessed the licensees treatment of the issues listed below to verify the licensee appropriately addressed equipment problems within the scope of the maintenance rule (10 CFR 50.65, Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants). The inspectors reviewed procedures and records to evaluate the licensees identification, assessment, and characterization of the problems as well as their corrective actions for returning the equipment to a satisfactory condition. The inspectors also interviewed system engineers and the maintenance rule coordinator to assess the accuracy of performance deficiencies and extent of condition.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- February 9, 2017, Inspectors observed field work and feedwater heater controller replacement following a minor secondary transient due to the malfunction of 1HD-5 flow control valve failure
- Main steam power-operated relief valve (PORV), essential service chilled water system chiller 1CH-E005 and 1CH-E-006, maintenance rule (10 CFR 50.65)evaluation review of (a)(1) monitoring to (a)(2). Reviewed engineering justification based on no functional failures of the electro-hydraulic actuators for the past two years for the PORVs and no functional failures of the chillers based on low pressure trips for the past two years.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the maintenance activities listed below to verify that the licensee assessed and managed plant risk as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and licensee procedures. The inspectors assessed the adequacy of the licensees risk assessments and implementation of risk management actions. The inspectors also verified that the licensee was identifying and resolving problems with assessing and managing maintenance-related risk using the CAP. Additionally, for maintenance resulting from unforeseen situations, the inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees planning and control of emergent work activities. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- January 6, 2017, emergent risk assessment during B EDG semi-annual run, solid state protection system relay testing and incoming winter storm (green risk)
- February 16, 2017, emergent risk assessment and work control associated with installation of heat shrink wrap on damaged insulation-wires associated with 1B-SB battery charger AC supply) (green risk)
- February 24, 2017, emergent risk assessment upon entry of AOP-001, Malfunction of Rod Control and Indication System, while a turbine trip test was planned to be conducted (green risk)
- March 22, 2017, start-up transformer out of service for implementation of open-phase monitoring modification (quantitative yellow risk)
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
a. Inspection Scope
Operability and Functionality Review The inspectors selected the operability determinations or functionality evaluations listed below for review based on the risk-significance of the associated components and systems. The inspectors reviewed the technical adequacy of the determinations to ensure that technical specification (TS) operability was properly justified and the components or systems remained capable of performing their design functions. To verify whether components or systems were operable, the inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the TS and updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR) to the licensees evaluations. Where compensatory measures were required to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures in place would function as intended and were properly controlled.
Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of corrective action documents to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with operability evaluations. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- AR (Action Request) 2093217, Reviewed functional assessment of the technical support center (TSC) tornado vulnerabilities
- AR 2083532, Reviewed operability determination of emergency service water control switch CS-2211
- AR 2096871, Reviewed immediate determination of operability (IDO) for the B EDG 86 lockout relay
- AR 2103985, Reviewed IDO for Control Rod Step Counter Indication Issue
- AR 2112000, Reviewed IDO for Engine Services, Inc. Part 21 - Diode Failures on EDG Governor
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R18 Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors verified that the plant modifications listed below did not affect the safety functions of important safety systems. The inspectors confirmed the modifications did not degrade the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of risk significant structures, systems and components. The inspectors also verified modifications performed during plant configurations involving increased risk did not place the plant in an unsafe condition. Additionally, the inspectors evaluated whether system operability and availability, configuration control, post-installation test activities, and changes to documents, such as drawings, procedures, and operator training materials, complied with licensee standards and NRC requirements. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- Engineering Change (EC) 297736, TSC HVAC Upgrade Project
- EC 295865, Revision 3 Target Rock SOVs Affecting Maintenance Rule
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors either observed post-maintenance testing or reviewed the test results for the maintenance activities listed below to verify the work performed was completed correctly and the test activities were adequate to verify system operability and functional capability.
- OST-1013, 1A-SA EDG Operability Test Monthly Interval, following the A EDG Maintenance Outage for clean and inspect, January 17, 2017
- MNT-NGGC-0010, Limitorque testing of 1CC-167 CCW MOV from RHR B Heat Exchangers, January 31, 2017
- OPT-145/OST-1815 for the B CCW return to service following extensive overhaul, February 10, 2017
- Work Order (WO) 20149190-02, MCR observations for control rod position indication retest, February 28, 2017
- MPT-I0480, Diesel Generator 1B-SB Engine Control Panel Pneumatic Pressure Instruments Calibration, March 7, 2017 The inspectors evaluated these activities for the following:
- Acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operational readiness
- Effects of testing on the plant were adequately addressed
- Test instrumentation was appropriate
- Tests were performed in accordance with approved procedures
- Equipment was returned to its operational status following testing
- Test documentation was properly evaluated Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the surveillance tests listed below and either observed the test or reviewed test results to verify testing adequately demonstrated equipment operability and met TS and licensee procedural requirements. The inspectors evaluated the test activities to assess for preconditioning of equipment, procedure adherence, and equipment alignment following completion of the surveillance. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
Routine Surveillance Tests
- MST-M-I0025, Steam Generator A Narrow Range Level (L-0476) Calibration
- OST-1122, A 6.9 KV Emergency Bus Undervoltage Trip Actuating Device Operational Test and Contact Check
- OST-1005, Control Rod and Rod Position Indicator Exercise Quarterly Interval Modes 1-3
- OST-1211, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1A-SA Operability Test - Quarterly Interval Modes 1-4
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed the emergency preparedness drill conducted on February 7, 2017. The inspectors observed licensee activities in the simulator and TSC to evaluate implementation of the emergency plan, including event classification, notification, and protective action recommendations. The inspectors evaluated the licensees performance against criteria established in the licensees procedures.
Additionally, the inspectors attended the post-exercise critique to assess the licensees effectiveness in identifying emergency preparedness weaknesses and verified the identified weaknesses were entered in the CAP. Documents reviewed are listed in the
.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed a sample of the performance indicator (PI) data, submitted by the licensee, for the Unit 1 PIs listed below. The inspectors reviewed plant records compiled between January 2016 and December 2016 to verify the accuracy and completeness of the data reported for the station. The inspectors verified that the PI data complied with guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, and licensee procedures. The inspectors verified the accuracy of reported data that were used to calculate the value of each PI.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
Cornerstone: Initiating Events
- unplanned scrams per 7000 critical hours
- unplanned power changes per 7000 critical hours
- unplanned scrams with complications
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
.1 Routine Review
The inspectors screened items entered into the licensees CAP to identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up. The inspectors reviewed condition reports, attended screening meetings, or accessed the licensees computerized corrective action database.
.2 Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted a detailed review of the following three condition reports:
- ARs 2103985 and 2102941, Control Rod Position Indication Deficiency
- AR 2097631, Continuous Duty NEMA Size 2 Contactors with NLI Coils The inspectors evaluated the following attributes of the licensees actions:
- complete and accurate identification of the problem in a timely manner
- evaluation and disposition of operability and reportability issues
- consideration of extent of condition, generic implications, common cause, and previous occurrences
- classification and prioritization of the problem
- identification of root and contributing causes of the problem
- identification of any additional condition reports
- completion of corrective actions in a timely manner Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.3 Safety Conscious Work Environment
a. Inspection Scope
NRC inspectors conducted a follow-up assessment of the Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE) for one of the onsite contract companies. During the inspection, inspectors were sensitive to areas and issues that would represent challenges to the free flow of information, such as areas where employees may be reluctant to raise concerns or report issues in the CAP. Additionally, interviews were conducted with a sampling of twenty percent of the contract companies personnel.
Inspectors also conducted a review of available nuclear condition reports (NCRs), fitness for duty (FFD) documentation, procedures, guidelines and instructions, related to the fire protection program, SCWE and FFD.
Additionally, inspectors conducted a status review of actions taken to improve the SCWE for that contract company. This included, but was not limited to, related NCRs, corrective action plant status, fire watch records, and FFD documents.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Assessment The Inspectors discussed the SCWE and FFD issues documented in inspection report 2016-003, and the related NCRs, investigations and action plans.
During interviews with contract personnel, inspectors discussed the corrective actions taken in fire watch, SCWE and FFD programs, and training received by all personnel related to the individuals jobs/tasks. Personnel were knowledgeable of the applicable procedures and requirements. Most personnel were comfortable using the CAP and all were willing to report nuclear safety and other concerns using any and all processes available.
Based on inspection insights obtained from interviews and documentation reviews, the inspectors concluded that the corrective actions taken and implemented were appropriate and effective.
Inspectors determined that at this time, there were no SCWE issues related to this contract company at this site.
c. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA3 Follow-up of Events
.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 05000400/2016-007-00 and 05000400/2016-007-01,
Containment Spray System Valve Actuation
a. Inspection Scope
On October 26, 2016, the licensee started the B containment spray pump using portions of OST-1119, Containment Spray Operability B Train Quarterly Interval Modes 1-4, to set the throttling position of 1 CT-68, containment spray pump B-SB eductor line outlet isolation valve, which had been previously isolated as part of a local leak rate test. At the start of the evolution, the refueling water storage tank (RWST) level was at 22.2 percent, which is below the RWST low-low level setpoint of 23.4 percent that automatically causes a swapover of containment spray pump suction source from the RWST to the containment sump. Upon start of the B containment spray pump, an auto-swapover occurred resulting in the containment spray suction valves associated with the containment sump (1CT-102 and 1CT-105) to open. Once 1CT-102 and 1CT-105 were full open, the containment spray suction valves associated with the RWST (1CT-71 and 1CT-26) started to stroke close. During the time 1CT-71 and 1CT-26 were in the process of closing, approximately 34,000 gallons of water was transferred from the RWST to the basement of the containment building. On February 9, 2017, the licensee revised the licensee event report to update the cause of the event as a procedural deficiency.
b. Findings
Following the review of OST-1119, the inspectors determined that procedure OST-1119 failed to require either a prerequisite or precaution and limitation, that RWST level be maintained above the RWST low-low level setpoint to prevent an inadvertent swapover upon the start of a containment spray pump. The licensees failure to prescribe adequate procedures to prevent the inadvertent swapover was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that the performance deficiency was not more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, because there was no adverse impact since the plant was in Mode 6 when the deficiency occurred.
The licensee performed an apparent cause evaluation which prompted a revision of OST-1119 to provide additional guidance to operators to prevent the inadvertent swapover from the RWST. This failure to comply with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures and Drawings, constitutes a minor violation that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy.
This issue was documented in the licensees CAP as AR 2073741.
No additional findings were identified during the review of these LERs. These LERs are closed.
4OA5 Other Activities
.1 (Closed) Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/192, Inspection of the Licensees Interim
Compensatory Measures Associated with the Open Phase Condition Design Vulnerabilities in Electric Power Systems
a. Inspection Scope
The objective of this performance based TI is to verify implementation of interim compensatory measures associated with an open phase condition design vulnerability in electric power system for operating reactors. The inspectors conducted an inspection to determine if the licensee had implemented the following interim compensatory measures. These compensatory measures are to remain in place until permanent automatic detection and protection schemes are installed and declared operable for open phase condition design vulnerability. The inspectors verified the following:
- The licensee identified and discussed with plant staff the lessons learned from the open phase condition (OPC) events at U.S. operating plants including the Byron Station OPC event and its consequences. This included conducting operator training for promptly diagnosing, recognizing consequences, and responding to an OPC event.
- The licensee updated plant operating procedures to help operators promptly diagnose and respond to OPC events on off-site power sources credited for safe shutdown of the plant. Specifically, for procedure OP-156.02, AC Electrical Distribution, a step was added that verifies the availability of the startup transformer (SUT) prior to energizing the applicable buses from the SUT. Operating annunciator procedures ALB-024 and ALB-025, such as 6.9KV EMER BUS A (B) TROUBLE and 480V EMEG BUS A (B) TROUBLE, would direct plant operators to determine the problem and perform applicable actions. In addition, AOP-025, Loss of One Emergency AC Bus (6.9kV) or one Emergency DC Bus (125V), will provide operation action in the event of a loss of one emergency AC bus.
- The licensee established and implemented periodic walkdown activities to inspect switchyard equipment such as insulators, disconnect switches, and transmission line and transformer connections associated with the offsite power circuits to detect a visible OPC. The licensee revised OST-123, Off Site Power Availability Verification Weekly Interval Modes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, to perform visual inspection (weekly) of the above ground connection points to the 230KV lines feeding the applicable transformers (SUTs). In addition, the outside auxiliary operator logs (daily) and turbine building auxiliary operator logs (weekly) have been revised to perform these same visual inspections. Plant operators were trained on these changes.
- The licensee ensured that routine maintenance and testing activities on switchyard components have been implemented and maintained. As part of the maintenance and testing activities, the licensee assessed and managed plant risk in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) requirements.
Additionally, the licensee installed an open phase protection system which monitors the startup transformer SUT-B for open phase conditions. The licensee plans to complete installation by the summer of 2017 for startup transformer SUT-A. The licensee plans to only monitor and provide alarms for detectable open phase conditions each of the startup transformers for the first year. The licensee also plans to place the open phase protection system into in active trip conditions by the end of 2018.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
On March 29, 2017, the inspectors presented the final inspection results to Ms. Tanya Hamilton, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff. The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report.
4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations
The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meet the criteria of the NRC Enforcement Policy, for being dispositioned as a NCV.
Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, required in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings.
Contrary to the above, on March 22, 2017, the licensee identified that an environmental protection feature, 1EE-E668 (FHB 261 floor hatch), was removed from service without stationing a dedicated attendant as required by licensee procedure AP-046, Control of Environmental Protective Features. The floor plug was removed for two days (March 20-22, 2017) to support maintenance activities before the condition was identified by licensee operations personnel while performing rounds. Using IMC 0609, Appendix A, Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, inspectors determined that this violation was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not impact the frequency of a fire or internal flooding initiating event and all structures, systems, and components remained capable of performing there intended safety functions. This issue was documented in the licensees CAP as AR 20110596.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee personnel
- L. Faulk, Director, Plant Security
- P. Fisk, Plant Manager
- R. Garner, Manager, Operations Training
- D. Griffith, Manager, Training
- T. Hamilton, Site Vice President
- J. Keltner, Manager, Chemistry
- S. OConnor, General Manager, Engineering
- M. Parker, Manager, Radiation Protection
- J. Robertson, Manager, Regulatory Affairs
- T. Toler, Manager, Oversight
NRC personnel
- S. Rose, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 4, Division of Reactor Projects, Region II
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Closed
- 05000400/2016-007-00 LER Containment Spray System Valve Actuation (Section 4OA3)
- 05000400/2016-007-01 LER Containment Spray System Valve Actuation (Section 4OA3)
Temporary Instruction TI Inspection of the Licensees Interim Compensatory 2515/192 Measures Associated with the Open Phase Condition Design Vulnerabilities in Electric Power Systems (Section 4OA5)