ML20207J471

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Insp Rept 50-400/86-87 on 861020-1120.Violation Noted: Failure to Follow Procedure While Performing Tech Spec Verification.Unresolved Item Re Clearance Tagging of Safety Injection Sys Identified
ML20207J471
Person / Time
Site: Harris Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 12/22/1986
From: Burris S, Fredrickson P, Maxwell G
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20207J429 List:
References
50-400-86-87, NUDOCS 8701080468
Download: ML20207J471 (6)


See also: IR 05000400/1986087

Text

r

.

UNITED STATES

,[p [ figb o f4UCLEAR REGU.LATORY COMMISSION

g

[ "nj' REGION li

101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.

  • e ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323

\...../

Report No.: 50-400/86-87

Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company

P. O. Box 1551

Raleigh, NC 27602

-Docket No.: 50-400 License No.: NPF-53

Facility Name: Harris 1

Inspection C nducted: ' October 20 - November 20, 1986

Inspectors: _ .

-

jw

l,

l1 !22 %

G 3F. Maxwel

. i Date Signed

b. ek 12f22f86,

SqP.Burris - Date' Signed

Approved by: [ .

'

12f22/f6

P\ E. Fredrickson, Section Chief Date' Signed

DiNision of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

Scope: This routine,- ar.nounced inspection involved inspection in the areas of

Emergency Preparedness Drill, Technical Specification Compliance, Initial Fuel

Loading and other activities.

Results: One violation wa's identified - " Failure to Follow Procedure While

Performing Technical Specification Verification", paragraph 4. No deviations

were identified. One unresolved item was identified " Clearance Tagging of

the Safety Injection System", paragraph 4.

3 0

87010%h

PDR

G

-

.

REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

. Licensee Employees

J. M. Collins, Manager, Operations

G. L. Forehand, Director, QA/QC

J. L. Harness, Assistant Plant General Manager, Operations

C. S. Hinnant, Manager, Start-up

L. I. Loflin, Manager, Harris Plant Engineering Support

C. H. Moseley, Manager, Operations QA/QC

G. A. Myer, General Manager, Milestone Completion

M. F. Thompson, Jr., Manager, Engineering Management

D. L. Tibbitts, Director, Regulatory Compliance

R. B. Van Metre, Manager, Harris Plant Maintenance

R. A. Watson, Vice President, Harris Nuclear Project

J. L. Willis, Plant General Manager, Operations

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics,

security force members, engineering personnel and office personnel.

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on November 24, 1986, with

the Plant General Manager, Operations. No written material was provided to

the licensee by the resident inspectors during this reporting period. The

licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or

reviewed by the resident inspectors during this inspection. The violation

identified in this report have been discussed in detail with the licensee.

The licensee acknowledged the findings without exception.

3. Emergency Preparedness Drill (943008, 92719)

On October 28, 1986, the inspectors observed portions of an emergency

exercise drill conducted by the licensee. The drill was conducted to

l demonstrate the licensee's capabilities in the following areas:

-

Ability to assemble the emergency organization within the allotted

time;

-

Test the licensee's correct classification of the emergency scenarios;

-

Test the licensee's ability to communicate with state and county

authorities;

-

Test the licensee's ability to provide adequate support facilities

during the drill conditions;

l

i

-- .-_ -

- - . __- - . . _ - -

-

.

2

-

Test the capability of the radiation protection, fire protection and

rescue personnel to provide on-site aid at the drill location.

The drill started at about 3:00 p.m. , in the waste process building, and at

about 6:00 p.m., a site general emergency was declared. At about 8:00 p.m.,

the drill condition was downgraded to a site emergency and was completed at

about 9:00 p.m.

During the entire drill scenario, personnel from Region II and assigned

CP&L coordinators evaluated the licensee's performance. The results of

the Region II inspectors' findings will be documented in another report.

No violations or deviations were identified.

4. Technical Specification Compliance (71501C)

a. During the week of November 2,1986, the inspectors reviewed records

and interviewed personnel to verify that work was accomplished in

accordance with approved procedures, Technical Specifications and codes

and standards. This evaluation involved CP&L maintenance activities

during the conduct of maintenance surveillance testing (MST) on the

solid state protection system logic of the safety injection systems.

The tests were identified as MST-I-001, Train A Solid State Protection

System Actuation Logic and Master Relay Test; and MST-I-0320, Train B

Solid State Protection System Actuation Logic and Master Relay Test,

which verified proper performance of the actuation logic, master relay

test and permissive indication. These tests were performed to satisfy

the initial surveillance requirements of Technical Specifications Section 4.3.2.1, Table 4.3-2, Section 4.3.1.1, Table 4.3-1.

Upon successful completion of the Train A test, the maintenance techni-

cian completed the test sections of MST-I-0320 for Train B. During

the restoration section, 7.7, he failed to require the control operator

to verify that the B Train safety injection signals were blocb;d. The

technician informed the inspectors that since the A Train blocks had

not been affected by conducting the A Train MST, he assumed that the

B Train blocks had also not been affected when he performed the B Train

MST. However, when the technician placed the " Input Error Inhibit"

switch to the " Normal" position, a safety injection signal was initiated,

because the block signals were not isolated, causing the B sequencer to

cycle and start the aligned B Train equipment. The plant alignment was

such that no emergency core cooling systems discharged into the reactor

vessel, due to both the safety injection and the residual heat removal

pumps being tagged out of service for other maintenance activities.

The technician and operators took immediate corrective actions to

restore the emergency diesel generator sequencer and systems to their

normal state. The inspectors were informed by the licensee that this

inadvertent initiation of safety injection did not result in any damage

to plant equipment.

.

, -

3

Failure to verify that the blocks for safety injection signals were in

effect is a violation of MST-I-0320, Section 7.7.3, which requires that

the technician direct the operator to attempt to reinstate the manual

blocks by actuating the appropriate block switches on the Main Control

Board. This item is identified as a violation, " Failure to Follow

Procedure While Performing Technical Specification Verification",

50-400/86-87-01.

b. The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the conditions which resulted

in an inadvertent initiation of safety injection on November 7,1986.

The safety injection was initiated when two of the four process instru-

mentation cabinets (PICS) were simultaneously de-energized. A review of

the licensee's control wiring diagrams and drawings indicated that when

two out of four PICS are de-energized at the same time, a safety injection

signal is generated in both A and B safety actuation trains. Although

the licensee's operations personnel investigated and issued clearances

For the identified items (both inverters for the "B" train), they

assumed since the "B" train safety injection actuation system had been

defeated there would be no safety injection signal generated. However,

when a PIC is de-energized it automatically sends a signal to the

opposite train.

Since both of the PICS were de-energized on the "B" train, it met

the required signal generation requirements for a safety injeccion

initiation.

Due to the nature and extent of this item the inspectors are in the

process of obtaining additional information to determine whether or not

there is a violation of any regulatory requirements or commitments.

This item is identified as an unresolved item, " Clearance Tagging of

the Safety Injection System", 50-400/86-87-02.

Except as noted, no violations or deviations were identified.

5 Initial Fuel Loading (72524C)

7

'

On October 24, 1986, CP&L wa) issued a license for low power testing and

operation. The license authvizes CP&L to load fuel and operate at up to

five percent of reactor power?. Authorization to operate beyond five percent

power is still under consider:1 tion by NRC.

During the week of November 17, 1986, the inspectors evaluated the licensee's

implementation of procedures and activities as they related to initial fuel

loading. Portions of the evaluation included review of Start-up Procedure

9101-S01 and verifitption of its implementation in the control room, the

containment buildin[aand in the fuel handling building. Those points which

were witnessed by tM inspectors included the following:

-

Test prerequisites and initial conditions were met. >

-

There was sufficient staffing, both operators and technicians, to

properly implement the procedure.

- . - . -. - .. ..

. m

4

-

The correct revision of the procedure was being used.

-

The results and observations by the technicians and operators were

being properly recorded.

-

Water chemistry was being controlled and documented according to

procedural requirements. The primary concerns were boron concentra-

tions being measured at the appropriate intervals and satisfying the

requirements of the Technical Specifications and procedures.

-

Radiation monitoring instruments were in satisfactory working condition

and were being properly used during fuel loading.

-

Shift turnover was observed to assure compliance with administrative

procedures.

-

Control room, fuel handling building and the refueling floor personnel

maintained the refueling status board current.

The inspectors evaluated the various control room logs for a period of time ,

preceding fuel loading and routinely during the fuel loading operations.

The fuel loading was satisfactorily completed on or about 2:00 a.m., on

November 21, 1986.

.

During this period, a Region II inspection specialist (fuel / refueling

loading) conducted an inspection during new fuel loading operations. The

residents assisted the regional inspector during selected portions of his

inspection. These activities will also be documented in a Region II

inspection report 50-400/86-89.

No violations or deviations were identified.

6. Other Activities (60502C and 71501C)

a. The inspectors conducted routine tours of the facility to make an

independent assessment of equipment conditions, plant conditions,

security, and adherence to regulatory requirements. The tours included

a general observation of plant areas to determine if fire hazards

existed; observation of activities in progress (e.g., maintenance,

preoperational testing, etc.) to determine if they were being conducted

in accordance with approved procedures; and observation of activities

which could damage installed equipment or instrumentation. The tours

also included evaluation of system cleanness controls and a review of

the logs maintained by test groups to identify problems that may be

appropriate for additional follow-up.

b. During the week of November 17, 1986, a Reg'on II team inspection was

conducted at the Harris site. The areas evaluated by the team included:

electrical separation, preoperational testing of the emergency diesel

generator sequencer, design changes and modifications affecting the

-_ -

_- - -_ _ . -_

_ ___ _ _ _. _ _ . __ _ . _ . . _ __._. _

  1. . .

i l

-

i

5' l

l

l

sequencer and follow-up on previously identified enforcement items. l

The results of the team inspection will be documented in report

50-400/86-88.

During the week of November 17, 1986, the licensee commenced fuel load

as' directed by the previously issued low power license. Fuel load was

completed in under four days. Details of the actual fuel load and any

identified problems will be discussed in a regional inspection report,

50-400/86-89, which will be issued subsequent to this report.

No violations or deviations were identified.

1

I

!

l

1

l

J