IR 05000400/1987011
| ML20207T516 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 03/11/1987 |
| From: | Decker T, Sartor W, Tabaka A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20207T485 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-87-11, NUDOCS 8703240088 | |
| Download: ML20207T516 (14) | |
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'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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g-j 101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W)
ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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RAR 131997
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Report No.': _ 50-4'00/87-11 Licensee: Carolina Power.and Light Company P. 0.. Box 1551
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Ralcigh, NC 27602
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Docket No.: 50-400 License No.: NPF-53 Facility Name: Shearon Harris Inspection Conducted:
February 26 - March 1, 1987 Inspectors:x/
du y J///!#7-W. M. Sartor
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Date' Signed
$h lAN4, do 3lH/87 A. E. labaka
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Date Signed
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Accompanying Personnel:
C. R. VanNiel K. M. Clark J. T. Gilliland M. I. Good D.-H. Schultz G. A. Stoetzel G. Wehmann Approved by:
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t T. R. Decker, Section Chief Date Signed Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY Scope:
This routine announced inspection involved the observation and evaluation of key emergency organizational _ functions and locations during the full participation emergency-preparedness exercise.
The key locations / functions included the Control Room, Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center, Emergency Operations Facility, Corporate Emergency Operations Center, Plant Media Center, and the offsite monitoring teams.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
8703240008 B70313 PDR ADOCK 050
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REPORT DETAILS
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Persons Contacted.
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Licensee-Employees
-*E. E. Utley, Senior Vice President
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- J. M. Davis Jr., Senior Vice President
- M. A.'-McDuffie, Senior Vice President-Nuclear Generation -
- R.14. Watson,Vice President-Harris Nuclear Project
- J. :L. Willis, Plant General Manager
' *R. B..Starkey Jr., Manager. Nuclear Safety and Environmental Services
- R. G. Black Jr., Manager, Emergency. Preparedness C.' R. Gibson, Director, Programs and Procedures
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- D. lL. Tibbitts, Director, Regulatory Compliance
- E.:M. Bean, Director:of News Programs, Corporate Communications-
- W. li.1 Batts,' Maintenance Supervisor, SHNPP
- J. H.. Smith, Operations Support Supervisor-
- J..R. - Sipp, Manager, Environmental and Radiation Chemistry, SHNPP
- J. P. Thompson, Operations' Superintendent,- SHNPP
- R. Goodwin, Senior Specialist, Emergency Preparedness
- A. Garrou, Senior Specialist, Emergency Preparedness, SHNPP
- R..A. Indelicato, Senior. Specialist, Emergency Preparedness, BNP
- B. D. -McFeaters, Project 1 Scientist, Corporate Emergency Preparedness
- J. L. Floyd,' R. C. Foreman, SHNPP
- H. Lipa. : Environmental and Chemistry Supervisor
- D. A. Braund, Supervisor-SHNPP Security
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- M.' E.l Jackson, Project Engineer, Maintenance
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- W. N. Wolfe, Project Engineer, IE NRC Resident Inspectors
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- G. F. Maxwell
- S. P..Burris
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- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview
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t The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 1,1987, with those persons. indicated in Paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the
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areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.
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licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters This subject was not addressed in the inspection.
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ExerciseScenario(82301)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine that provisions had been made to test the integrated capability and a major portion-of the basic elements existing within the licensee's emergency plan and organization as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
The exercise scenario was reviewed in advance of the scheduled exercise date and discussed with the licensee.
No scenario inconsistencies were identified during the exercise that affected the progression of the simulated emergency and the expected mitigating responses.
However, it was noted at the exit interview that two exercise objectives could have been more thoroughly evaluated had scenario events required repair teams to enter into radiological controlled areas to challenge the Operations Support Center teams by necessitating a demonstration of health physics practices.
Controller guidance and available contingency messages provided for adequate exercise control.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Assignment of Responsibility (82301)
This area was observed to determine that primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee have been specifically established and that adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Sections II.A and II.B.
i The inspector verified that the licensee made specific assignments to the emergency organization.
The inspector observed the activation and
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staffing of the emergency organization in the Control Room (CR), the Technical Support Center (TSC), the Operations Support Center (OSC), the Ener0ency Operations Facility (E0F), and the Plant Media Center.
Additionally, the operation of these emergency organizations was observed i
throughout most of the exercise, along with periodic observations of the
operation of the Corporate Media Center, the Rumor Control Center, and the
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Corporate Emergency Operations Center.
An inspector also observed the i
activities of the offsite radiological monitoring teams.
The licensee's assignment of responsibilities appeared to be consistent with the
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Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures as observed during this i
exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)
l This area was observed to determine that arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources had been made and that other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response were identified
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as required by 10 'CFR 50.47(b)(3),10 CFR 50,- Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.C An inspector observed the Control Room staff's request for offsite fire assistance.
Although the Fire Brigade Leader's request for offsite assis.tance was promptly received in the Control Room, there was an unnecessary delay of approximately eight minutes before the telephone call-for. offsite assistance was initiated by the Control Room Emergency Communicator.
This delayed response in requesting offsite fire support was identified as an inspector followup item at the exit interview (50-400/87-11-01). All other aspects of the fire drill indicated that the licensee's arrangements for requesting and using assistance resources nave been effectively coordinated.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Emergency Classification System (82301)
This area was observed to determine that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by the nuclear facility licensee as required by 10CFR50.47(b)(4), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.C, and specific criteria in flVREG-0654,Section II.D.
The inspector observed that timely and correct emergency classifications were made from the classification system in effect as stated in the Radiological Emergency Plan and the Implementing Procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)
This area was observed to determine that procedures had been established for notification by the licensee of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel, and that the content of initial and followup messages to response organizations had been established; and means to provide early notification to the populace within the plume exposure pathway have been established as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5),
10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.D, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.E.
The inspector observed that notification methods and procedures had been established to provide information concerning the simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State, and local response organizations and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response organization.
The initial and followup messages provided during the exercise appeared to be consistent with licensee's procedures and gave timely notification of escalating emergency conditions.
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Emergency Communications (82301)
This area was observed to determine that provisions existed for prompt comunications among the principal response organization and emergency personnel as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.e and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.F.
The administrative and equipment provisions for comunications appeared adequate throughout the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Public Education and Information (82301)
This area was observed to determine that information concerning the simulated emergency had been made available for dissemination to the public as required by 10CFR50.47(b)(7), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.D, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.G.
Information was provided to the media and the public in advance of the exercise.
Procedures were in place to provide for the dissemination of emergency infonnation to the public.
The sirens and tone alert radios were activated prior to an Emergency Broadcast System exercise message being provided.
The inspector observed that there appeared to be excessive delay between the press conference at 11:30 a.m. and the following one at 1:50 p.m.,
particularly in consideration of a General Emergency being declared at 11:35 a.m. and the precautionary simulated evacuation which began at 12:30 p.m.
Also, it was observed that there were almost two hours between the CP&L News Release No. 3 at 10:45 a.m. and News Release No. 4 at 12:43 p.m.
The failure to aggressively pursue the coordinaticn of information prior to press conferences to insure timely information flow to the media was identified as an inspector followup item (50-400/87-11-02).
No violations or deviations were identified.
11. Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)
This area was observed to determine that adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support emergency response were provided and maintained as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.H.
The emergency response facilities were activated and staffed during the exercise.
The facilities appeared to be adequately equipped to support the emergency response.
No violations or deviations were identifie H
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12. AccidentAssess' ment'(82301)
This area. was observed to determine that adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential ~ offsite
. consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required by 10 CFR 50.48(b)(9),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.B. and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.I.
The accident assessment program included both an engineering assessment of plant status and an assessment of radiological hazards to both onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the accident.
The dose assessment methods incorporated both detailed meteorological parameters and in-plant conditions.
The primary assessment area that was exercised during this simulated emergency focused on the electrical engineering and.related areas as a result of the " station blackout" scenario.
No violations or deviations were identified.
13. Protective Responses (82301)
This area was observed to determine that guidelines for prctective actions during the emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, were developed and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of nonessential personnel, were implemented promptly as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1), and specific-crite. ' in NUREG-0654,Section II.J.
The inspector verified that the licensee had emergency procedures for formulating protective action recommendations for offsite populations within the ten-mile EPZ. The licensee's protective action recomendations were consistent with the EPA and other criteria.
The licensee-demonstrated the capability for accounting for onsite personnel by conducting an assembly and accountability of personnel after the " Alert" declaration.
Since the E0F had not yet activated at the declaration of a
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General Emergency the Site Emergency Coordinator correctly made the protective action recommendations from the TSC.
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An inspector observed that the security vehicle and guards that were i
controlling access to the owner controlled area were no longer performing this function as of 3:30 p.m. while the general emergency condition
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remained in effect.
This was identified as an inspector followup item (50-400/87-11-03).
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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14.
Exercise Critique (82301)
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The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine that deficiencies identified as a result of the exercise and weaknesses noted in the licensee's emergency response organizations were formally presented to licensee management for corrective actions as L
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required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
The licensee conducted initial player critique on February 28, 1987, and a controller / evaluator critique on March 1,1987.
Later on March 1, the consolidated findings were presented to licensee management.. The NRC inspector's preliminary findings were then presented at the exit interview. _Although the licensee's critique was considered adequate. it had not identified the three inspector followup items documented in this report.
No violations or deviations were identified.
15. Federal Evaluation Team Report The report by the Federal Evaluation Team (Regional Assistance Coninittee and Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region IV Staff) concerning the activities of offsite agencies during the exercise will be forwarded by separate correspondence.
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Inspector Followup (92701)
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(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 86-85-01: Failure to provide the necessary player guidance during the exercise by the use of
. contingency messages or controller input.
There were no player guidance issues observed during the exercise.
b.
(Closed) IFI 86-85-03:
Different interpretations of the licensee's EAL scheme were observed during the exercise.
The EAL scheme had been revised and no problems were identified.
c.
(Closed) IFI 86-85-04:
Failure to provide censistent notifications of the emergency classification to the State and counties and the NRC.
Notifications and followup messages were accurate and consistent throughout the exercise, d.
(Closed) IFI 86-85-05:
Inadequate accountability, both from a procedural and performance aspect.
The accountability procedure had been revised and there were no issues identified during the accountability drill.
Attachment:
Exercise Objectives and Scenario Timeline t
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CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY s:
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PLAN FOR SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EMERCENCY
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EXERCISE - February 28, 19867
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I.
MISSION AND PURPOSE OF EXERCISE To activate and -evaluate major portions of emergency response f
capabilities and other elements of the CP&L Shearon Marris Nuclear Power
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Plant' Plan, associated implementing procedures, and the CP&L Corporate
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_ Emergency Plans in accordance with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
Regulation 10 CFR 50.47(b).
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II.
SCOPE AND 08JECTIVES A.
Scope A simulated accident at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant (SHNPP) which could escalate to a general emergency and will involve planned response and recovery actions to include:
emergency classification; notification of off-site organizations and plant personnel; actions to correct _the emergency conditions; and initiation of accident assessment and protective actions as necessary to cope with the accident. The exercise will simulate an emergency that results in off-site radiological releases which require responses by state and local government personnel.
B.
Objectives 1.
Demonstrate the ability of the control room staf f to perform accident assessment and implement those appropriate mitigating actions necessary to place the plant in a safe and stable condition.
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Demonstrate the ability to augment the on-shif t emergency organization within the time limits specified in the l
emergency plan and implementing procedures.
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Demonstrate the ability of response personnel to analyze
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trends / potential consequences, and formulate near-term mitigating actions.
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Demonstrate the ability to identify and classify the emergency in accordance with the emergency plan.
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Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures for alerting, notifying, and mobilizing emergency response personnel.
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Demonstrate the timeliness and adequacy of the information l
provided in the initial state and county agencies.
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II.
SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES (Cont 'd )
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Demonstrate the ability. to provide follow up notifications to the state and county agencies.
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Demonstrate the ability to formulate appropriate of f-site protective action recommendations.
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Demonstrate the ability to communicate between emergency response facilities.
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Demonstrate the adequacy of the Operations Support Center in providing additional manpower support and coordination.
11.
Demonstrate the adequacy of the Technical Support Center in f
providing additional manpower support and coordination.
12.
Demonstrate the adequacy of the Technical Support Center in providing accident assessment and mitigation, dose assessment, and communication / notification activities.
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Demonstrate the adequacy of the Emergency Operations Facility in providing off-site dose assessment, environmental monitoring, protective action recommendations, and
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evaluation / coordination of off site activities.
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Demonstrate the adequacy of emergency kits and equipment in emergency response facilities.
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Demonstrate the ability to perform on-site accountability as required by the emergency plan.
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Demonstrate that adequate control measures have been established for plant access control.
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Demonstrate that emergency exposure guidelines have been established and are utilized in the decision making process for determining emergency worker activities.
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Demonstrate the capability to monitor personnel and equipment for contamination.
19.
Demonstrate proper procedures for the fire brigade response to the type of fire chosen for the exercise.
20.
Demonstrate the adequacy of the interface between of f-site fire support personnel and the plant fire brigade.
21.
Demonstrate the ability to coordinate news releases with state and county personnel.
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Demonstrate the capability to coordinate the preparation, review, ar.d release of information to the general public.
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II.
SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES (Cont'd)
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Demonstrate the adequacy of the equipment utilized for off-site radiological monitoring.
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Demonstrate the ability to coordinate off-site radiological monitoring activities.
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Demonstrate the ability of designated dose assessment personnel to determine dose to the public.
26.
Demonstrate the ability of personnel responsible for dose estimation to integrate field measurements and dose projections into protective action decision making.
27.
Demonstrate the ability to reassess plant conditions and evaluate recovery considerations as defined by the plant
III.
SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS A.
Exercise Dates 1.
Start Exercise: February 28, 1987 2.
Terminate Exercise:
February 28, 1987 3.
Critique (evaluators only): February 28, 1987
Critique (Lead Evaluators): March 1,1987 5.
Critique (players): March 1, 1987 B.
Exercise Locations / Facilities 1.
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, New Hill, North Carolina a.
Control Room:
Function is to provide plant control and initial direction of all plant related emergerry o pe ra ti on s.
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Operations Support Center (OSC). The OSC will be located in the Service Building. The function of the OSC is to provide an area for assembly and briefing of of f-shif t and other support personnel.
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Technical Support Center (TSC). The function of the TSC is to provide engineering and management support of plant activities following an accident; direction and coordination of overall plant emergency activities; direction and coordination of field, mobile, radiological monitoring teams prior to EOF activation; on-site dose projections; off-site dose projections prior to EOF activation; display of status of plant parameters; and provide an emergency reference collection of selected engineering and plant documents. The TSC is activated and emergency functions performed in accordance with the
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NPP EMERGENCY (EXERCISE TIMELINE -
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FEBRUARY ~28, 1987 S5:
0730 -- Exercise commences.
Start-up transformer
"B" goes out of service.
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-0800 -- Fire starts in
"A" diesel generator. ALERT condition.
0930 -- Approximate time of TSC/OSC activation.
1001 - -- Reactor trip.
"A" Start-up transformer does not pick up load-'and
"B" diesel generator trips.
Station blackout.
SITE EMERGENCY condition.
1016 -- Loss of AC power for-15 minutes. SITE EMERGENCY condition.
1110 -- Battery exhausted. ERFIS/RM-11 inoperable.
1130 -- Approximate time of. EOF activation.
1131 -- Reactor vessel water level goes below top of fuel.
GENERAL EMERGENCY condition.
Protective action recommendation is to evacuate 5-mile radius and 10 miles downwind.
1200 -- Off-site evacuation underway.
"B" diesel generator returned to service.
1315 --
"B" diesel generator trips off again. Off-site evacuation continues.
1400
"A" Start-up transformer returned to service.
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1546 -- A-leak develops in the
"A" Steam Generator.
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1600 -- Off-site evacuation complete.
1615 --
"A" S/G PORV opens for one minute due to a
spurious signal. Environmental monitoring teams track the release.
1730 -- Exercise secures.
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SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EMERCENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE SCENARIO NARRATIVE FEBRUARY 28, 1987
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Shearon Harris Unit 1 experienced a reactor trip during an electrical storm 132 days ago. The plant was restarted without incident two days later and has been operating at 100% power for the past 129 days.
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All systems are functioning properly with the exception of the Cross Failed Fuel Detector and the Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feeduster Pump. Boric Acid Transfer pump 1ASA is down for preventive maintenance. The monthly OST on the "A" diesel generator is in progress. Plant chemistry parameters are within their normal range and standard radiological control areas are being maintained. At 0730, Start-up Transformer "B" goes out of service due to an oil leak in its underground conduit.
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At 0800, while performing the operational test on the "A" Diesel Cenerator, a f uel oil leak occurs and a fire starts in the "A" Diesel Generator. Alarms in the Control Room and a report from the Control Operator at the scene should cause the Fire Brigade to be dispatched. Off-site assistance is required to antinguish the fire, and the Shift Foreman should declare an Alert based on fire potentially affecting a safety-related piece of equipment.
Upon declaration of the Alert, the Shif t Foreman will implement the PEPS and assume the position of Site Emergency Coordinator (SEC). Off-site notification will include the warning points for the State of North Carolina s
Chatham County, Barnett County, Lee County, and Wake County and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center. The SEC will direct the activation of the Technical Support Center (TSC) and the Operational Support Center (OSC). He may also direct activation of the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), the Plant Media Center (PMC), the Corporate Emergency Operations Center (CEOC), and the Corporate Media Center (CMC).
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As personnel begin to assemble in the TSC, transfer of the Site Emergency Coordinator and his functions from the Control Room to the TSC will
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This transfer may occur prior to the TSC being fully operational in occur.
accordance with.. PEP-102 " Site Emergency Coordinator - Control Room" and PEP-103 " Site Emergency coordinator - Technical Support Center".
At 1001 a reactor trip occurs due to a high negative flux rate. The
"A" Start up Transformer fails to pick up when the Unit Auxiliary Transformers trip and the "B" Diesel Cenerator starts but immediately trips on overspeed.
The station is " blacked out" and at 1016, the SEC should declare a Site Emergency based on a loss of all AC power for greater than 15 minutes.
Upon declaration of Site Emergency the Site Emergency Coordinator should order activation of the EOF, CEOC, PMC, and CNC if they were not previously activated. The State, all four counties and the NRC will be notified.
Damage control efforts at the plant will center on restoring electrical power while the Control Room operators try to cool the plant down and keep the core covered.
Upon activation of the Emergency Operations Facility the Emergency Response Manager (EEM) is responsible for relieving the ggC of the duties involving interfacing with the CEOC, Plant Media Center, and off-site agencies. The ERM is responsible for managing and directing all off-site activities related to the plant emergency. The SEC retains. responsibility for all on-site emergency response.
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Environmental Monitoring teams will be in place ready to locate and track any release from the plant by monitoring radiation levels and by obtaining and analyzing air samples. Controller / Evaluators will accompany these teams and will supply sample and monitoring data based on canned meteorological data.
At 1131 the water level in the reactor vessel is very low and the SEC should declare a General Emergency based on a low reactor vessel water l
1evel and loss of all AC power.
i The ERM should notify the State, all four counties and the NRC Operations Center.
The EOF will recommend to the off-site governmental authorities protective actions which should be taken by the public. This i
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l recommendation will be developed as per PEP-104 " Protective Action Recommendations". Based on indications of RCS breach (PEP-101, Attachment 3)
and fuel jeopardy (Critical Safety Function Status Tree No. 2) and using canned meteorological data it is expected that the recommendation will be to
" evacuate subsones A, B, C, D, H, I, J, K, L, and M, and shelter subsones E, F, C, and N".
By 1200 an off-site evacuation should be underway. Damage control efforts restore the "B" Diesel Generator which is started at 1201. Water is added to the primary to re-cover the core and to the steam generators to maintain a heat sink. This continues until 1315 when the "B" Diesel Generator trips off again.
From 1315 to 1400 the off-site evacuation continues while on-site damage control teams work to restore power.
At 1400 the "A" Start-up Transformer is repaired and the operators restore loads and continue plant shutdown.
At 1546 a leak develops in S/C "A".
By 1600 the of f-site evacuation should be completed.
At 1615 a spurious signal causes the PORV on S/C "A" to open. The PORV shuts one minute later. A puff release occurred. The EOF will notify all off-site agencies of the release and the environmental monitoring teams will take environmental samples and radiation readings downwind in an attempt to locate and track the release.
At 1630 conditions at the plant will have stabilized with power restored and a cooldown continuing. Based on conditions at the plant and off-site the decision may be made to implement recovery actions.
If so, appropriate notifications should be made, and a discussion of recovery actions held.
When satisfied that the players have had an opportunity to meet all exercise objectives, the Exercise Lead Controller should confer with the Exercise Director, the NRC Evaluation Team Leader, the Site Emergency Coordinator, the Emergency Response Manager, and the State Lead Controller to solicit their concurrence on termination of the exercise. This should occur at approximately 1730.
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