IR 05000483/1988007

Insp Rept 50-483/88-07 on 880403-0521.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations,Esf Sys Walkdown,Qa, Administrative Controls Affecting Quality,Surveillance, Maint,Fire Protection Radiological Controls & Security

ML20155C866
Person / Time
Site:	Callaway
Issue date:	06/07/1988
From:	Defayette R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20155C850	List: IR 05000483/1988007 ML20155C846
References
50-483-88-07, 50-483-88-7, NUDOCS 8806140360
Download: ML20155C866 (14)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-483/88007(DRP)

Docket No. 50-483 License No. NPF-30 Licensee: Union Electric Company Post Office Box 149 - Mail Code 400 St. Louis, M0 63166 Facility Name: Callaway Plant, Unit 1 Inspection At: Callaway Site, Steedman, M0 l Inspection Conducted: April 3 through May 21, 1988 Inspectors: B. H. Little I

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C. H. Brown Approved By:

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R. W. DeFayette, Chief, lg ,

Reactor Projects Section 3A Date Inspection Summary Inspection from April 3 through May 21, 1988 (Report No. 50-483/88007(DRP))

Areas Inspected: A routine unannounced safety inspection of Licensee Event

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Reports (LERs), previous identified problems, plant operations, engineered safety features (ESF) system walkdown, quality programs and administrative controls affecting quality, surveillance, maintenance, fire protection, radiological controls, outages, security, emergency preparedness, regional meeting and unresolved item Resu13: The licensee is expending significant staff time in developing and performing a safety system functional analysis (SSFA) type review of their system This area was discussed with regional managemen The procedures for startup of the plant were revised with the operator's latitude for decisions being tightened in an effort to reduce problems during startu I Painting in the turbine building and the auxiliary building has improved i housekeeping. No violation or deviations were identified. One unresolved '

item was identified in section six pertaining to the essential service water (ESW) system flow rate I 6140360 88060s Q ADOCK 05000483 DCD

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DETAILS Persons Contacted D. F. Schnell, Vice President, Nuc7 ear

• G. L. Randolph, General Manager, Nuclear Operations

• J. D. Blosser, Manager, Callaway Plant

• C. D. Naslund, Manager, Operations Support A. P. Neuhalfen, Manager, Quality Assurance J. R. Peevy, Assistant Manager, Technical Services W. R. Campbell, Assistant Manager, Nuclear Engineering M. E. Taylor, Superintendent, Operations D. E. Young, Superintendent, Maintenance

• W. R. Robinson, Assistant Manager, Operations and Maintenance R. R. Roselius, Superintendent, Health Physics T. P. Sharkey, Supervisor, Compliance G. J. Czeschin, Superintendent, Planning and Scheduling W. H. Sheppard, Superintendent, Outages

• R. Pendegraff, Superintendent, Security

• L. H. Kanuckel, Supervisor, Quality Assurance Program R. D. Affolter, Superintendent, Systems Engineering J. V. Laux, Superintendent, Technical Support, Quality Assurance G. A. Hughes, Superv isor, Independent Safety Engineer Group J. C. Gearhart, Superintendent, Operations Support, Quality Assurance

• J. J. Cassmeyer, Quality Assurance Engineer

• Denotes those present at one or more exit interview In addition, a number of equipment operators, reactor operators, senior reactor operators, and other members of the quality control, operations, maintenance, health physics, and engineering staffs were contacte . Inspection of Licensee Event Reports (LERs) (92700) '

Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and a review of records, the following licensee event report was reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, that immediate corrective action was accomplished, and that corrective action to prevent recurrence was accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications (T/Ss). The LER listed below is considered close LER 87-030-00: Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Actuation on Loss of ESF Bus NB0 The above LER describes three separate occurrences of unplanned l containment purge isolations (CPIs) and control room ventilation

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isolations (CRVIs) caused by upscale signal spikes on radiation i

monitors upon loss of ESF bus NB01. The events, causes and corrective ,

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Event 1: On October 23, 1987, the main switchyard breaker, 52-3, tripped open resulting in loss of the ESF bus NB01. The licensee's review did not determine the cause of the event. There was no associated work activities and no apparent equipment failures. The licensee is evaluating a design change which would use the relay outputs from radiation monitors to provide the actuations of the ESF system Event 2: On October 28, 1987, a loss of ESF bus NB01 occurred when utility operators attempted to energize the load shed emergency load sequencer (LSELS) Train A (NF039A). The LSELS bistables were in the

"off" position during work on a LSELS undervoltage power supply modul When the associated relay power supply was energized with the de-energized LSELS bistables, a degraded voltage signal / load shed signal was produced and sent to NB01's normal feeder breaker, NB0112. The breaker tripped open, causing a loss of NB0 Operations personnel were not aware that the local bistable switches

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were in the "off" position and 0TS-NB-00001 (Preparation for and Performance of NB01 Bus Outages) did not adequately define power-up operations for NF039 OTS-NB-00001 and the similar procedure for NB02 have been revised to include more detailed instructions, and precautions for the operator to take prior to restoring output relay power to NF039A and Event 3: On October 29, 1987, utility system reley personnel were performing MPE-ZZ-NY159, "Operational Test Sequence of 345KV Bus 'A'." Due to miscommunication, relay number 515#1-V22 in the 52-1 power circuit breaker (PCB) panel was operated instead of relay 51NS#1-V22 located in the XNB01 switchgear panel next to the 52-1 *

panel. This action caused breaker 52-3 to trip open causing loss of power to NB0 The event was reviewed by the utility system relay services field and engineering personnel with emphasis on careful reading and following of procedures. The standard relay precautionary practices to prevent trips were also emphasize The inspectors detere ned that the events posed no threat to public or plant safety. The CPI - d CRVI did not result from actual radiation levels, and safety syste functioned as designed. The activities and personnel involved in Events 2 and 3 differ but identify procedural weakness and indicate a need for increased attention to detail. The licensee has taken appropriate action to bring about improvement in this are No violations or deviations were identifie _ .-- - .. - . _ -

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l Inspection of Previous Identified Problems (92701)

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(Closed) Violation (483/87026-01(DRP)): T(cinical Specifications Violation due to inoperable safety injection pumps. This item concerns an unreviewed safety question (10 CFR 50.59(a)(1)(iii)) which resulted during closure of valve BN-HV-8813 (Safety Injection Combined Recirculation) to perform operations surveillance and maintenance retest activities. The violation was identified and documented by the

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licensee in LM. number 87017-0 The licensee's action to prevent recurrence included the following:

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The prrventive maintenance on EJ-HV-8804A and B has been rescheduled to occur dur1,1g Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) or Mode 6 (Refueling). This will preclude closure of BN-HV-8813 for retests of the two EJ valves in modes when BN-HV-8813 is required to be operabl A letter was issued to the Shift Supervisors to emphasize the necessity for adequate evaluation of all activities prior tc performanc .

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The quarterly pump surveillance procedures were changij to delete the requirement for cycling BN-HV-8813. In addition, other surveillance procedures which cycle the elves refeenced in Technical Specification 4.5.2, were reviewed to eware they are not cycled during power operations, startup, or hot standby in any other procedure. No other problems were identifie Special notations were added to the computerized Master Equipment

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List to identify the appropriate precautions and mode restraints necessary for maintenance of the valves listed in Technical Specification 4. The inspectors verified the licensee's completion of corrective actions *

in this matter. The violation and LER 87017-00 are considered close . plant Operations (71707) Operational Safety Verification Inspections were routinely performed to ensure that the licensee conducts activities at the facility safely and in conformance with regulatory requirements. The inspections focused on the implementation and overall effectiveness of the licensee's control !

of operating activities, and on the performance of licensed and non-licensed operators and shift technical advisors. The following items were considered during these inspections:

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Adequacy of plant staffing and supervisio Control room professionalism, including procedure adherence, operator attentiveness, and response to alarms, events, and off-normal condition l

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Operability of selected safety related systems, including attendant alarms, instrumentation, and control Maintenance of quality records and report The inspections included direct observation of activities, tours of the facility, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel, independent verification of safety system status and LCOs, and reviews of facility procedures, records, and report Performance of the following procedures was observe Procedure Number Activity OTG-ZZ-00003 Plant Startup (5 to 20 Percent Power)

OT0-AC-00001 Turbine Trip Off-Normal E-0/ES Emergency Procedure

. Off-shift Inspection of Control Rooms The inspectors performed routine inspections of the control room during off-shift and weekend periods; these included inspections between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and 5:00 a.m. The inspections were conducted to assess overall crew performance and, specifically, control room operator attentiveness during night shifts. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's administrative controls regarding "Conduct of Operations" and interviewed the licensee's security personnel, shift supervisors and operators to determine if shift personnel were notified of the inspectors' arrivals on site during off-shift The inspectors determined that both licensed and non-licensed -

operators were attentive to their duties, and that the inspectors'

arrivals on site were unannounced. The licensee has implemented appropriate administrative controls related to the conduct of operations. These include procedures which specify fitness for duty and operator attentiveness. Personal radios and reading materials are prohibite No violations or deviations were identifie . ESF System Walkdown (71710)

The operability of selected engineered safety features was confirmed by the inspectors during walkdowns of the accessible portions of several systems. The following items were included: verification that l

procedures match the plant drawings, equipment conditions, housekeeping, )

instrumentation, valve and electrical breaker lineup status (per '

procedure checklist), and verification that locks, tags, jumpers, et are properly attached and identifiabl The following systems were l walked down during this inspection period: l

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"A" Emergency Diesel Generator

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"B" Emergency Diesel Generator

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Component Cooling Water System

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Essential Service Water System

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Auxiliary Feed Water System

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Reactor Trip System

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125 Volt D.C. Power Source

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AC Electrical Vital Power Source No violations or deviations were identifie . Quality Programs and Administrative Controls Affecting Quality (35701)

An inspection of the licensee's quality programs was performed to assess the implementation and effectiveness of programs associated with management control, verification, and oversight activities. The inspectors considered areas indicative of overall management involvement in quality matters, including the frequency of management plant tours and control room observations, and management personnel's attendance at technical, planning / schedule, and committee meetings. The inspectors

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attended On-site Review Committee meetings and incident / event critiques and reviewed related documents, focusing on the licensee's root cause determinations and corrective actions. The inspectors accompanied licensee management on monthly plant tours, which focused on quality activities and material conditions within the plant. The inspection also included a review of quality records and selected quality assurance audit and surveillance activities. Performance in this area included the following major items:

Safety Svstem Functional Assessment (SSFA) of the Essential Service Water System (ESWS)

The licensee developed and implemented a SSFA program to obtain an l in-depth performance and technical assessment of plant safety systems -

operational readiness. The objective of the initial SSFA was to assess the operational readiness of the Essential Service Water System by determining whether: '

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The system is capable of performing the safety functions required by the design base Testing is adequate to demonstrate that the system would perform all of the safety functions require System maintenance (with emphasis on pumps and valves) is adequate

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to e,1sure system operability under postulated accident condition Operator and maintenance technician training is adequate to ensure proper operation and maintenance of the syste . 6

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Human factors considerations relating to the selected system (e.g., accessibility and labeling of valves) and the supporting I procedures for the system are adequate to ensure proper system operation under normal and accident condition Management controls including procedures are adequate to ensure that the safety system will fulfill the safety functions required by the design base The SSFA team members were comprised of personnel from several disciplines within Engineering, Operations, Instruments and Controls (I&C), and Quality Assurance (QA). The QA Division of the Quality Systems Departmant minteined coordination and oversight responsibility for this SSF The assessment was performed during January through April, 1988, and consumed approximately 150 man-weeks of effort. The assessment identified a number of weaknesses as well as needs for program enhancement in the following areas:

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Control of calculations, design bases and design input ESW system flow uncertaintie ESW system corrosion and siltatio Callaway modification package interfaces with drawings, procedures and retest Functional testing and I&C preventive maintenanc The SSFA team's finding, based on review of the entire scope of testing conducted on the ESW system showed that, although technical specification j surveillance test (includes ASME,Section XI) requirements have been met, -

system functional testing has not been sufficient to conclude that the system would supply the post-LOCA flows stated in the Final Safety ,

Analysis Report (FSAR).  !

The licensee developed and implemented an action plan in response to the flow concerns. On April 24, 1988, while the plant was in Mode-5 (Cold l Shutdown), flow verification of ESWS, Train 'A' was performed with the !

system in a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) line u I The initial flow verification (using installed flow instruments)

determined that reduced flow condition existed in cooling lines to the diesel generator (0/G) and various safety compones room cooler !

Subsequent flow measurements with a poly-seismic flow instrument showed that the reduced flow was limited to the 'A' D/G cooler. The as-found flow was 741 gpm. The FSAR Table 9.2-3 (Essential Service Water System Flow Requirements Post LOCA Operation) specifies 1200 gpm flow to the D/G cooler. During performance of prerequisites for the flow test, four i throttle valves for room coolers, were found to be out of position from '

that specified in plant procedure positions (established during preoperational tests).

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The largest position variance was 1 3/8 turns. Repositioning of the valves, to the specified position, had minimal effect on system or l component flow '

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l On April 28, 1988, flow verification was performed on ESWS, Train 'B'. !

, Flows of less that those specified in the FSAR were identified. The '

I total ESWS Train 'B' flow was approximately 3% low. Throttle valve

position variances were also identifie The 'A' D/G heat exchangers, ESW side, were opened and inspected. The i material found in the flow path was judged to have caused minimal flow blockage. The flow rates were determined to be relatively high in these heat exchangers and flow degradation from silting was probably not occurrin Through routine discussions with utility management and SSFA team members, the resident inspectors were apprised of on going SSFA activities, significant findings and the licensee's response. The inspectors reviewed the SSFA Assessment Report and associated incident reports and observed that appropriate corrective action was initiate It appears ti licensee's initial SSFA effort resulted in a comprehensive, ssional assessment of the ESWS. It was also apparent that utility nent and staff were supportive of the SSFA initiative and responsive le team's finding The licensee is performing component operability evaluations based on the

"as-found" flows. A review is also being made to determine the reason for throttle valve pos' tion change The licensee's evaluation in this matter is continuing. This matter is unresolved, pending further NRC revie (Unresolved Item (483/88007-01(DRP)).

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No violations or deviations were identifie . Surveillance (61726)

The inspectors reviewed or observed selected portions of the Technical Specifications required surveillance testing during power operation Items which were considered during the inspection included whether adequate procedures were used to perform the testing, whether test instrumentation was calibrated, whether test results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedural requirements, and whether tests were performed within the required time limits. The inspectors determined that the test results were reviewed by individuals other than the personnel involved with the performance of the tests, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were reviewe's and resolved by appropriate management personne l

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The inspectors' overview of the licensee's surveillance program showed that the licensee had developed and implemented a comprehensive and effective progra The reviewed surveillances included:

Procedure N Activity OSP-SF-0005 Estimated critical position calculation ITLs are I&C Loop Calibration Procedures ITL-AE-0F550 Loop Flow; Steam generator ' A' feedwater bypass flo ISL-GS-00A2B I&C Loop test on loop analysis; Containment hydrogen analyzer train 'B'.

ITL-AE-05540 Loop Flow; Steam generator (S/G) 'D' feedwater (FW)  !

flow contr ol .

. ITL-AE-0F530 Loop Flow; Steam generator (S/G) 'C' feedwater (FW)

regulating valv ITL-AE-0F520 Loop Flow; Steam generator (S/G) 'B' feedwater (FW)

regulating valv ITL-AE-0F510 Loop Flow; Steam generator (S/G) 'A' feedwater (FW)

regulating valv OSP-ZZ-00001 Controi room shift and daily log reading and channel check ISF-AB-0P534 I&C Functional Test: Functional pressure S/G 'C'

pressur ISF-AB-0P544 I&C Functional Test: Functional pressure S/G 'O'

pressur ITM-ZZ-00015 I&C Generic Procedure: Rod control trouble-shooting guideline ISL-AL-000F3 I&C Loop Calibration: Loop-flow auxiliary feedwater to S/G 'B'.

ISL-GN-0P935 I&C surveillance loop pressure containment pressure protectio j ISL-SE-0N44B I&C Loop Calibration: Loop-nuclear; nuclear i instrument power range N4 Surveillances were performed per procedures and on schedule during this inspection period. The licensee is proceeding with development of a computer tracking system for completed surveillance . . . , .- . - - ...-. -.

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All surveillances observed were conducted satisfactorily and no violations or deviations were identifie . Maintenance (62703)

Selected portions of the plant maintenance activities on safety-related systems and components were observed or reviewed to asce-tain that the activities were performed in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes and standards, and the Technical Specifications. The inspections included activities associated with preventive and corrective maintenance of electrical, instrumentation and control, and mechanical equipment and systems. The following items were considered during these inspections: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibration was performed prior to returning the components or systems to service; parts and materials that were used were properly certified; and appropriate fire prevention, radiological, and housekeeping conditions were maintaine .

The reviewed maintenance activities included:

Work Request N Activity PS WR 4251 Feedwater control bypass valves (valve stroke / regulator adjustment).

PW WR 4521 Troubleshooting (spiking on source range channel N-31).

TM 88-E0007 Disable throttle pressure limiter (main turbine control system).

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W106420 Thermocouple conoseal leak repai W106449 Diesel Generator 'A' (inspect and clean coolers).

WR 113960 Main feed pump (MFP) 'B' failure to trip on high discharge pressure and remote signa ETP-ZZ-ST014 Engineering test procedure for the reactor power upgrad ETP-ZZ-01322 Determination of electrical power generator capability at nuclear steam supply system thermal power output of 3579 MWT Multiple Work Inspection, "roll pin" removal and replacement Requests for with solid pin and tack weld in the plug-stem Each Feedwater connectio Regulating Valve (4 Total)

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Multiple Work Open, inspect, eddy current performed on tubes, Requests for 1-C placing stiffening rods in leaking tubes and Heater Repair pluggin The maintenance work was performed in a satisfactory manner. Rigging was used where necessary to prevent equipment damage and provide personnel protection. The procedures were found to be adequate and cleanliness was maintained when systems were open. Several pieces of the "roll pins" were found missing and an evaluation was performed to assess possible damage to steam generator tubes. It was also noted that the smaller bypass feedwater regulating valves were disassembled and solid pins installed and tack welded to prevent the stem from separating from the plu A modification was installed and tested. CMP-87-1004 and WR-C435057:

the installation of an alarm on the main control board "Turbine Run Back". This alarms when the vendor turbine run-backs occur, and not the owner installed run-back All maintenance activities inspected were satisfactory and no violations

. or deviations were identifie . Fire Protection (64704)

Implementation of the licensee's fire protection / prevention program was routinely assessed by the inspectors during plant tours. The inspection included observation of housekeeping conditions, storage and control of combustible material, operability of fire protection / suppression systems, and fire brigade staffing and trainin One announced fire brigade drill was monitored during ,the inspection interval. The response time of the brigade to assemble was satisfactor The manual fire equipment was noted to have been maintained; and at the completion of the drill, the equipment was returned to readiness statu The housekeeping and control of combustible materials and flammable liquids were found to be satisfactory. A review of selected surveillances for this area indicated that the surveillances were up to date. The operability of the fire protection / suppression equipment and systems were maintained. rire watches and patrols were utilized in areas of the plant when requi y the Technical Specification The licensee has been painting in several areas of the plant for preservation and radiological controls. The painting has improved the i housekeeping and general appearance in these areas. Tentative plans include additional painting in other areas. The painting has improved J

the lumination levels in these areas which may improve personnel safety and associated item Fire protection, equipment control and verification have been removed from the Technical Specifications and placed in the plant procedure The following Nuclear Function Administrative Procedures were issued 1 or revised: 1 i

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APA-ZZ-00700, Rev. 5, Dated 4/11/88, Fire Protection Progra APA-ZZ-00701, Rev. 3, Dated 4/11/88, Control of Impairments to Fire Protection Systems and Component APA-ZZ-00702, Rev. 2, Dated 4/11/88, Actions of Plant Personnel Upon Discovery of a Fir APA-ZZ-00703, Rev. 0, Dated 4/11/88, Fire Protection Operability Criteria and Surveillance Requirement APA-ZZ-00741, Rev. 8, Dated 4/11/88, Control and Transportation of Combustible Material APA-ZZ-00742, Rev. 7, Dated 4/11/88, Control of Ignition Source APA-ZZ-00743, Rev. 10, Dated 4/12/88, Fire Team Organization and Dutie APA-ZZ-00744, Rev. 3, Dated 4/11/88, Control of Fire Barrier Integrit Other procedures, referencing fire protection, were also revise No violations or deviations were identifie . Radiological Controls (71709)

The licensee's radiological controls and practices were routinely observed by the inspectors during plant tours and during the inspection of selected work activities. The inspection included direct observations of health physics (HP) activities relating to radiological surveys and monitoring, maintenance of radiological control signs and barriers, contamination, and radioactive waste controls. The inspection also included a routine review of the licensee's radiological and water chemistry control records and reports. Good HP housekeeping practices '

were observed. The inspectors observed that personnel entering, working in, and exiting radiological control areas generally displayed good radiological work practice During the inspection period, radiologically contaminated areas were reduced. Several areas were painted to facilitate cleanup if the area becomes contaminate No violations or deviations were identifie . Outages (71707 - 61715)

The inspectors observed or reviewed the licensee and contractor activities associated with plant outages. The inspection focused on outage management program implementation, including planning, scheduling and oversight activitie The inspection included attendance of the planning and scheduling meetings, direct observation of selected ,

modifications, repair or testing of safety systems or components, i and the review of quality record !

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During the inspection period the licensee had two outages for maintenanc On April 11, the plant output was reduced to 94*J due to tube leaks in the 1-C feedwater heater resulting in the isolation of that heater strin The plant was shutdown for two days, April 16 and 17, to repair the heater and other maintenance item The general control and performance during

'he outage was satisfactory although several items were noted. During I shutdown, at approximately 10% power, the turbine was auto-tripped

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to a high steam generator level - the feedwater regulating valve

tioner was improperly adjusted and the valve indicated closed but wcs not and the steam generator's continued level increase was not note During the restart sequence, steam generator level oscillations occurred .

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resulting in a reactor trip. During work on the 1-C heater it was found that a 17" X 34" piece of 3/4" plywood had not been removed af ter work ,

had been performed in the heater during the second refueling outage. The l licensee's actions on these items was considered satisfactory. The events are still under review by the license I On April 21, the reactor was manually tripped from about 94% when the feedwater regulating valve plug separated from the stem and shut off flow to the steam generator. The plant was taken to mode 5 later on

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when a leak was noted on the core thermo-couple conoseal. During the !

10-day outage, the four feedwater regulating valves and the similarly I constructed feedwater bypass regulating valves were modified to prevent plug-stem separation. The leak on the conoseal was seal-welde Maintenance items were performed, including the "critical" welds on the piping replacements in the feedwater systems, due to pipe wall thinnin The piping replacement was already in progress, but the work was easier to perform with the plant shutdown. Due to EQ issues, two spare containment penetration modules were removed for further evaluatio During the outage the ESW system flow verifications were performed; see section 6.a for the discussion. The startup from this outage was performed with revited procedures which provided a smooth startup. The procedures were used again to restart from a trip on May 2 with similar *

results. The revision was part of the licensee's action due to past problems during restart of the plan . Security (71881) l The licensee's security activities were observed by the inspectors during routine facility tours and during the inspectors' site arrivals and departure Observations included the security personnel's performance associated with access control, security checks, and surveillance activities, and focused on the adequacy of security  ;

staffing, the security response (compensatory measures), and the  !

security staff's attentiveness and thoroughnes l l

The security forces' performance in these areas appeared satisfactor !

An increase of monitoring doors which were not being fully closed has j helped alleviate this problem. A problem with leaving keys inside j i

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onsite cars and trucks was noted in the onsito newslette Asking everyone's cooperation appears to have helped minimize the problem's recurrenc No violations or deviations were identifie . Emergency Preparedness (82301)

An inspection of emergency preparedness activities was performed to assess the licensee's implementation of the emergency plan and implementing procedures. The inspection included mon'.hly observation of emergency facilities and equipment, interviews with licensee staff, and a review of selected emergency implementirg procedure Two emergency preparedness drills were performed during this inspection interval in preparation for the June 6 drill that will be graded. The inspectors were notified at the initial phase of the drills and plan to participate in the June 6 dril The licensee's personnel appear to be satisfactorily prepared for emergencie *

No violations or deviations were identifie . Regional Meeting On May 18, a meeting was held including Region III staff and Callaway management to discuss the increase of occurrences of reactor trips and personnel errors as compared to the previous year. The licensee also discussed their ongoing systems evaluation program. Upgrading of reactor power and results of the tests were discusse The flow anomaly, previously experienced, was stated not to have changed with the upgrad The exchange of information in this manner was considered to be beneficial to both partie '

15. Unresolved Item Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether it is an acceptable item, a violation, a failure to meet a licensee commitment, or a deviation. An unresolved item (483/88007-01 (DRP)) is contained in section . Exit Meetino (30703)

The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted under Persons Contacted) at intervals during the inspection period. The inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. The licensee representatives acknowledged the findings as reported herein. The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the ir.spection. The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietar .

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