05000269/LER-1982-012, Forwards LER 82-012/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 82-012/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20071K650
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	07/21/1982
From:	Parker W DUKE POWER CO.
To:	James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20071K653	List: 05000269/LER-1982-012, Forwards LER 82-012/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
References
NUDOCS 8208020160
Download: ML20071K650 (2)

LER-2082-012, Forwards LER 82-012/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
2692082012R00 - NRC Website

text

.,- - f, DUKE POWER COMPANY Powsu Dust.ntxo 422 Sourn Gnuacu STnEET. CIIAHLOTTE, N. C. 282 32

.c h WILLI AM O. PAR M E R, J R. L ~b' Vice PatsiorNT TetTe>qoNE.* And 7h Strans Paoouctioa' July 21, 1982 P arauca

@ ll0TJ

'q Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator D

• U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission j . I)

Region II 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 c

Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Re: Oconee Nuclear Station .

Docket No. 50-269

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report R0-269/82-12. This report is submitted pursuant to Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.a(2) which concerns an operation subject to a limiting condition for operation which was less conservative than the least conservative aspect of the limiting condi-tion for operation established in the Technical Specifications, and describes an incident which is considered to be of no significance with respect to its effect on the health and safety of the public. My letter of July 7, 1982 addressed the delay in preparation of this report.

Very truly yours, r /

/ l l

/  ;

%d/ . j William O. Parker, Jr JFK/php Attachment cc: Document Control Desk Mr. W. T. Orders U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRC Resident Inspector i Washington, D. C. 20555 Oconee Nuclear Station Records Center Mr. Philip C. Wagner Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation l 1820 Water Place U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atlanta, Georgia 30339 Washington, D. C. 20555 l

8208020160 820721 IDEFICIALCOM PDR ADOCK 05000269 S PDR e _&2.

_Z A_

1 1 l Duke Power Company Oconee Nuclear Station Unit 1 Report Number: R0-269/82-12 Report Date: July 21, 1982 Occurrence Date: June 23, 1982 Facility: Oconee Unit 1, Seneca, South Carolina Identification of Occurrence: Both trains of the Reactor Building Spray System inoperable.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: 100% FP Description of Occurrence: On June 23, 1982, the A Reactor Building Spray (RBS)

Pump discharge valve failed to indicate OPEN during surveillance testing of the valve. The A train of RBS was lined up with both the pump suction and discharge valves open to make the A train operable, while the redundant discharge valve on the B train was tested prior to initiating maintenance on the A train discharge valve indication. To perform the RBS pump discharge valve surveillance test the appropriate RBS train is taken out of service by racking out the RBS pump breaker for the train being tested. While the B train of RBS was out of service for the discharge valve test, the Control Roon Operator shut the A train RBS suction valve due to gravity flow from the Borated Water Storage Tank into the Reactor Building.

This placed both trains of RBS out of service.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The apparent cause of this occurrence is personnel error. Testing the redundant compo:.ent was not required in this situation; thus, performing the test on the B train with the A train in an abnormal line-up (pump suction and discharge valves open) led to the condition of having both RBS trains out of service.

Analysis of Occurrence: The Reactor Building Cooling System was operable during this incident. The Reactor Building Cooling System, acting independently from the Reactor Building Spray System, is capabic of limiting containment pressure below the design pressure in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident. Additionally, the Reactor Building Spray System could have been returned to an operable status within a short period of time. Thus, it is considered that this incident had no significant effect on the health and safety of the public.

Corrective Action: Upon discovery that both trains of RBS were out of service, the B RBS pump breaker was racked in, returning the B train to service. The A RBS pump discharge valve indication failure was corrected.

The Assistant Shift Supervisor has been counseled regarding his error, and this incident will be reviewed by all operators and included in the license requalifica-tion program.