ML18018A412

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Forwards Responses to FSAR Hydrologic Engineering Safety Review Questions.Aperture Cards Available in PDR
ML18018A412
Person / Time
Site: Harris  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 11/04/1982
From: Mcduffie M
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To: Harold Denton
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8211090128
Download: ML18018A412 (42)


Text

RESULATORQNRORNATION DISTRIBUTION STEN (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR; 8211090128 DOC DATE: 82/11/04 NOTARIZED: NO DOCK

~

FACIL:50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Planti Unit ii Carolina 50-401 Shearon Har r is Nucl ear Power Pl ant r Uni t 2i Car ol ina BYNAME 05000401 0

AUTH AUTHOR AFF ILIATION MCDUFFIEiM~ A, Carolina Power 8 Light Co ~

REC IP, NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DENTONEH+R ~ Office" of Nuclear Reactor Regulationi Director

SUBJECT:

Forwards responses to FSAR hydrologic engineering safety review questions, Aperture cards available in PDR, DISTRIBUTION CODE: 8001S COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE: ~J' TITLE: Licensing Submittal: PSAR/FSAR .Amdts 8, Related Correspondence NOTES:

RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME ID CODE/NAMIE LTTR ENCL NRR/DL/ADL LTTR ENCL 1 0 'RR L83'C 1 0 NRR LB3 LA 1 0 LICITRAEM, 01 ,1 1 INTERNAL: ELD/HDS1 IE FILE IE/DEP EPDS. 35 1

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1 IE/DEP/EPI B 36 3 1

'31 NRR/DE/AEAB 1 0 NRR/DE/CEB 11 1 1 NRR/DE/EQB 13 2' NRR/DE/GB 28 2 2 NRR/DE/HGEB 30 1 NRR/DE/MEB 18 1 1' NRR/DE/MTEB 17 1 1 NRR/DE/QAB 21 1 NRR/DE/SAB 24 1 1 NRR/DE/SEB 25 1 1 NRR/DHFS/HFEB40 1 1 NRR/DHFS/LQB 32 1 1 NRR/DHFS/OLB 34 1 1 NRR/DL/SSPB 1 0 NRR/DSI/AEB 26 1 NRR/DSI/CP8 10 1 1 NRR/DSI/CSB 09 ' NRR/DS I/ETSB 12 1 1 1

NRR/DSI/I CSB 16 1 1 NRR/DSI/PSB 19 1 1 NRR/DSI/RA 8 22 1 1 NRR/DS I/RSB 23 1 1 I- 04 1 1 RGN2 3 3 RM/ MI/MI8 1 0 EXTERNAL: ACRS DMB/DSS (AMDTS) 41 6, 1

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FEMA REP DIV 39 LPDR 03 1 1 NRC PDR 02 NSIC 05 1 1 NTIS TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRkD: LTTR 52 ENCL 45

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CÃQE Carolina Power & Light Company gy) 4. )sag Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT NOS ~ 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-400 AND 50-401 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT REVIEW QUESTION RESPONSES HYDROLOGIC ENGINEERING

Dear Mr. Denton:

Carolina Power & Light Company's responses to the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant (SHNPP) FSAR Hydrologic Engineering Safety Review Questions numbered 240.4, 240.5, 240.6, 240.7, 240.8, 240.9, 240.10, 240.11, 240.12, 240.13, 240.14, 240.15, 240.16, 240.17 and 240.18 are attached. This completes our response to the 240 series questions.

Please contact us if you have any questions.

Yours very truly, M. A. McDuffie Senior Vice President Engineering & Construction LJW/ce (4401ARQT2)

Attachments cc: Mr. Prasad Kadambi (NRC)

Mr. G. F. Maxwell (NRC-SHNPP)

Mr. J. P. O'Reilly (NRC-RII)

Mr. Daniel F. Read (CHANGE/ELP)

Mr. Travis Payne (KUDZU)

'211090128 821.104 '

.,), ttevllle Street ~ P. O. Box 1551 4 Raleigh, N. C. 27602

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FSAR estion 240.4 (Section 2.4.1.2)

The Construction Permit review was performed under the assumption that the water inventory would be augmented by pumping from the Cape Fear River.

Although the FSAR still discusses Cape Fear River pumping, it is our understanding that this pumping is no longer planned. Please. confirm this change in water sources and make the necessary documentation changes to the FSAR. Also confirm as to whether the Cape Fear River pumping system will be constructed and maintained in a back-up mode. If not describe the potential effects on safety-related water supply.

Response: The reservoir reanalysis for SHNPP Units 1 and 2 has been completed. The results show that the Cape Fear River Makeup System was not needed to support one unit operation. The most critical low flow period of record, 1980 to 1981, and the 100 year return period drought for Buckhorn Creek inflow alone were analyzed for one unit operation without makeup. The analyses indicate that the reservoir water level remains well above the shutdown level during the worst drought of record and during the 100 year drought. Supporting analyses or conservative comparisons to four unit operation have been or will be provided in the responses to SHNPP ER review questions, Amendment 4 to the Environmental Report, and in a future amendment to the SHNPP FSAR.

During severe droughts of record, analyses indicate that the water supply for two unit operation may be marginal when only Buckhorn Creek inflow is considered. Therefore, for two unit operation the Cape Fear River Makeup System will be installed.

Additional analyses have been performed to prove the adequacy of the makeup system for two unit operation. These analyses include studies of the 1951-1952 and 1980-1981 drought periods and a normal reservoir operation study for two unit operation.

Analyses, including those presently in the ER and FSAR, indicate that the reservoir water level remains well above the shutdown level during severe drought periods of record and during the 100 year drought for two unit operation with makeup. Supporting analyses or conservative comparisons to four unit operation have been provided in Amendment No. 4 to the ER and will be provided in a future amendment to the FSAR to support this conclusion.

FSAR estion 240.5 (Section 2.4.1.2)

The CPGL Brunswick Plant should be included in Table 2.4.1-5 (Downstream Industrial Water withdrawals) along with corresponding values of location, drainage area, withdrawal and discharge.

Response: Carolina Power & Light Company's Brunswick Plant, located 19 miles south of Wilmington at Southport, N. C., nominally withdraws cooling water from the Cape Fear River. However, this user is not included in FSAR Table 2.4.1-5 since the withdrawal is within the tidal reaches of the river and does not constitute a consumptive use of river flow. The outfall of the Brunswick Plant is located on the Atlantic Ocean. The drainage area at the plant is 9090 square miles, and the withdrawal and discharge are both 1900 mgd.

FSAR estion 240.6 (Section 2.4.2.2)

Provide the design bases, including references, for the riprap slope protection on the downstream face of the main dam.

Response No specific design basis exists for downstream slope protection of the Main Dam. The rockfill shell does not require special slope protection because the Cape Fear River 500-year-flood backwater effect on Buckhorn Creek near the downstream face of the Main Dam is not expected to result in wave action on the dam. This is due to protection afforded by a small downstream fetch which severely limits the size of wind-generated waves.

There is an oversize rock zone on the downstream face of the Main Dam. During construction of the Main Dam, oversize rocks were plucked from each of the rockfill lifts and placed near the downstream face in order to reduce handling of oversize material and to provide additional protection to the downstream face.

The Main Dam is designed as a Seismic Category I structure. As discussed in Section 2.5.6.5, the side slopes are designed to provide adequate factors of safety under static and dynamic loadings ~

FSAR Question 240.7 (Section 2.4.2.3)

In your discussion of the effects of local intense precipitation, the potential for ponding of water on the roofs of safety related buildings is not addressed. Describe the roofs of safety-related buildings including the heights of curbs or parapets surrounding the roofs and the dimension and locations of scuppers or other openings in the parapet walls that will limit the maximum depth of ponding during a local intense PMP event. Assuming that regular roof drains are plugged, determine the maximum depth of water that could pond on the roofs of safety related structures during a PMP event. Also state the resulting roof loads and whether the roofs are designed to accept these loads.

Response: All safety related buildings other than the emergency service water intake structure, screen structure and discharge structure have structural features surrounding their roofs that would impound rainwater on the roofs assuming that the roof drains are plugged. In general, the ponding is caused by curbing whose height varies depending on the roof but is a maximum of one (1) foot above the high point of the surrounded roof. In addition to curbing around roof edges, the portions of the Reactor Auxiliary Building roofs which wrap around the west side of the containment. buildings are partially surrounded by taller structures. Also, each tank building has two areas without roofs where walls enclose the tanks. The roof plans of all safety related buildings where ponding can occur are shown in Figure 240.7-1. Top elevation of the curbs and high points of each roof are also indicated in the figures.

No scuppers or openings have been provided in the curbs. If the regular roof drains are assumed to be plugged during a local intense PMP event the storm water will pond on the roof and overflow the curbs. For the local intense PMP event as given in Table 2.4.2-5 of the FSAR, the water level on all roofs will exceed the top of the surrounding curb by less than three (3) inches except for some areas of the Reactor Auxiliary Building roof which are surrounded by higher walls. In these areas the accumulated water depth will exceed the top elevation of the curb by a maximum of 1 /2 feet. The maximum water levels, including the cascade flow from higher roof levels, are indicated on Figure 240.7-1.

The open areas of the Tank Building which are surrounded by 25 foot high walls (See FSAR Figure 1.2.2-84) do not overflow, however rainwater will accumulate to a depth of 23.36 feet.

The floor of the unroofed areas of the Tank Building and the roofs of all safety related buildings where water accumulates are strong enough to withstand the ponding loads in addition to other dead and live loads that can reasonably be expected to occur coincident with the PMP. The varying depths of water on a given roof due to the slope of the roof were accounted for in determining the structural adequacy.

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T/C egg MAXIMOH WATER LEVEL WILL. bE 5 t7'r p5 HIEzHER THAN TOP OFGUR6 IN ALL AREAS UNI 655 OTHQRWISK NOTSE5 AND MARKED WITH ASTERISK. QE)

ROOF- l t WH N T.'+

SflEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Carolina Power Ez Light Company LIATDL LEVELS OII GOOFS OF GULLGIIE3 Fon PRP IIITII ROOF GAAIIIS CLOCOEG FIQNE 240 7 I

FSAR Question 240.8 (Section 2.4.3.1)

Explain why the time distribution for the PMP's in Tables 2.4.2-5 and 2.4.3-2 are different.

Response: As stated in FSAR Section 2.4.3.1, the one hour rainfall increments needed to compute the PMF were drived from a.six hour rainfall distribution curve given as Figure 18 in "Design of Small Dams" (Reference 2.4.3-4). These increments were then rearranged in accordance with the criteria recommended in Hydrometeorological Reports Nos. 33 (Reference 2.4.3-2) and 40 (Reference 2.4.3-5) to arrive at the PMP distribution shown on FSAR Table 2.4.3-2. Precipitation losses were accounted for by using the HEC-1 computer program,'herefore, the time distribution of the PMP was important in determining the PMF.

However, in estimating the accumulation of water on the ground in the plant island area, it was conservatively assumed that no precipitation losses occurred. Only designed drainage functioned in reducing accumulated water depth and the time distribution of the PMP increments was inconsequential. The rainfall increments determined from Reference 2.4.3-4 were therefore, not rearranged as was done in determining PMF. Thus Tables 2.4.2-5 and 2.4.3-2 show different time distributions.

Table 2.4.2-5 may be revised to conform to the distribution on Table 2.4.3-2, as shown on the attached markup of Table 2.4.2-5, however the maximum accumulated water does not change (9.68 inches).

~ ~

0 SHNPP FSAR TABLE 2 '.2-5 PLANT AREA WATER ACCUMULATION FOR AUXILIARYRESERVOIR DESIGN STORM CONDITIONS* (D.A ~ 2 43 s . mi.)

Incremental Plus Time Incremental Accumulated Design Net Accumulated (HR) Rainfall (in ) Rainfall (in.)

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36. 32

Reference:

"Seasonal Variation of the Probable Maximum Precipitation East of the 105th Meridian for Areas 10 to 1000 Square Miles and Durations of 6, 12, 24, and 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />" Hydromet. Report No. 33, U. S.

Weather Burea+ April 1956.

  • 10 sq. mi. PMP intensity without basin correction.
2. 4. 2-9

FSAR Question 240.9 (Section 2.4.3.6)

Reference No. 2.4.3-10 (and 2.4.5-3), Engineer Technical Letter No. 110-2-8 is outdated. It has been superseded by the following reference: U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, Engineer Technical Letter No. 110-2 221, November 29, 1976. Reevaluate your wave runup analyses using the current reference. In your response, please note any significant changes in wave runup values and whether or not there will be any effect on safety related structures.

Response: Wave runup analyses have been reevaluated using the Corps of Engineers ETL No. 110-2-221 and the Shore Protection Manual 1977. The first reference is used to determine the wave characteristics, while the second reference is employed in computing wave runup. The results are reflected in revised Tables 240.9-1 and 240.9-2, attached. There are no significant changes in the wave runup values which would have an effect on safety related structures. The largest increment of wave runup is 0.8 ft, which occurs along fetch 7; however, this increment does not govern the critical case of the water level in the Auxiliary Reservoir.

Since no long term wind records are available for the plant site, the maximum wind velocity charts in the Corps of Engineers ETL No. 110-2-221 were utilized to determine the design wind velocity shown in Tables 240.9-1 and 240.9-2. The PMH wind speed was taken from FSAR Section 2.4.5.1.

TAELE 240,9-1 WAVE RUNUP PARAMETERS FOR STRUCTURES PROTECTED BY RIPRAP

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Maximum Ef f ect I ve Average Sign If I cant Max lmum Sign I f I cant Max l mum Max lmum Safety St I I I Water Wl nd Fetch Water Wave Wa ve Wa ve Wa ve ~

. Wa ve Wa ve Wa ve Wa ter Related Level Speed Wind Length Depth He I ght Ke I ght Length Per I od Runup Runup Setup Level Fetch(a) Structure (f t MSL) (mmh) Direction (ft ) (ft ) (ft.) (ft.) (ft ) (sec) (ft.) (ft ) (ft.) (ft. I l

(1%F - WATER LEVEL IN THE RESERVOIR)

I Ma ln Damd 238 9(b) 50 4 ~ N - ~ - 4720 30 2,4 4,0 40.1 2,8 3 3 4,1 0,1 243 1(c) 2 Aux l I I ary Dame 256.0(b) 52.9 NW 2120 15 1,6 2,7 24 8 2.2 1.8 1.9 0,1 258.0(c)

'.0 Aux I I I ary Dame 238.9(b) 50.2 5930 30 2.7 4,5 . 46.1 3,2 3,6 0,2 242,7(c)

(NOfNAL OPERATION W,L, IN RESERVOIRS) 7 Aux I I I ary Dame 123 Nd 1285 IO 3.2 5 4 50,8 3,2 3.6 Notes:

(a) See FSAR Figure 2.4.2-38 (b) See FSAR Section 2.4 '.3.4 (c) Maximum Water Leve I ~ Maximum Stl I I Water Level + Maximum Wave Runup + Wind Setup (d) Top of Main Dam ~ 260 ft, MSL (e) Top of Auxiliary Dam 260 ft. MSL

TAELE 240,9-2 WAVE RUNUP PARAMETERS FOR PLANT ISLAND MaxImum Ef f ectIve Average S igni f leant Maximum S igni f I cant Maximum Maximum Saf ety Still Water Wind Fetch Water Wave Wave Wave Wave Wa ve Wa ve Wa ve Wa ter ~

Related Level Speed Wind Length Depth Height Height Length Period Runup Runup Setup Level Fetch(a) Structure (f t MSL) (mmh) Direction (f t. ) (f t. ) (f t. ) (f t. ) (f t. ) (sec) (ft ) (ft ) (ft ) (ft. MSL (PMF - WATER LEVEL IN THE RESERVOJRS) 4 Natura I 256,0(b) 54,0 NMf 1410 17 I~3 2,2 19 5 2,0 I 3 0,1 257 4(c) 5 Sacr If I cia I 238.9(b) 51.8 SSE 4060 29 2.2 3,7 37,3 2,7 1.0 1,2 0,1 240,2"'

Spol I FI I I Natural 256 0(b) 54,4 2000 19 I 6 2,6 23.9 2,2 I~4 I~6 0, I 257,7 (c) l 8 Sacr If I c I a I 238.9(b) 50.9 S. 3740 29 2,1 3.5 34.6 2.6 09 I~I 01 2404 Spol I Fl I I (NORMAL OPERATION W L ~ IN RESERVO IRS) 5 Sacrificial 220 123 SSE 1970 16 4 0 6,7 62,7 3 5 1,8 2,0 0,5 222,5 Spo I I Fl II 6 . Natural 252 123 710 15 2 8 4,7 401 28 2,4 ,2,7 0,2 254,9(c)

(a) FSAR Figure 2,4,2-38 (b) See FSAR Section 2.4.2.3.4 (c) hbxlmum Water Level = Maximum Still Water Level + Maximum Wave Runup + Wind Setup (d) Plant Grado ~ 260 ft MSL

FSAR estion 240.10 (Section 2.4.8)

Discuss the inspection program that will be established for safety-related water control structures such as dams, canals, intakes, etc. List the structures to be inspected, what is to be looked at, the frequency of inspection, and to what extent the guidance provided in Regulatory Guide 1.127 will be followed. Also describe the inspection program, if any, required by the State of North Carolina on the two dams on site.

Response: Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant complies with NRC Regulatory Guide 1.127 (Section 1.8) and Ebasco Specification CAR-SH-CH-24, "Reservoir, Dams and Dike Instrumentation Program (Non-Nuclear Safety)." In addition, the North Carolina Utilities Commission requires a dam inspection program involving private consultants. The corporate designated authority for dam inspections is the Fossil Plant Engineering and Construction Department (FPE&CD). As a minimum, the inspection program will include the water-control structures discussed in Section C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.127. The Nuclear Operations Department will perform periodic monitoring of embankment instrumentation.

FSAR Question 240.11 (Section 2.4.8)

It is our understanding that plant site drainage, along with overland runoff, flows into the intake and discharge canals of the essential service water system (ESWS). Sediment could therefore build up in canals and auxiliary reservoir during operation, especially if any heavy construction is still in progress. Describe your program, if any,,for monitoring sediment buildup in the FSWS canals and the auxiliary reservoir.

Responses: Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant complies with NRC Regulatory Guide 1.127. Guidance in Sections C.2.d.(2) and C.2.d.(1),

which discusses inspections for excessive sedimentation and changes leading to excessive sedimentation, and inspections of cooling water channels, is included in the on-site inspection program. Significant changes in the reservoir and channel profiles as a result of sedimentation will be evaluated with respect to hydraulic and hydrologic capacity at that time. Also note the following: The ESWS discharge is above the water level of the discharge canal; therefore, sedimentation cannot affect discharge capability. The intake and discharge canals have been designed as. Seismic Category I structures and can withstand the static and dynamic water pressures resulting from the maximum wave runup and wind setup as discussed in FSAR Section 2.5.6.

Local erosion due to wave action was considered in the design of the side slopes of the channels. Vegetation will be utilized for control of runoff. Also design and construction of the emergency service water system (ESWS) reservoir and channels were undertaken assuming that four nuclear power plant units would be constructed at this site. This results in conservative water capacity features for the 2 units presently planned.

FSAR Question 240.12 (Section 2.4.11)

You have not demonstrated that the reservoir is adequate for two unit operation without Cape Fear River makeup. Provide analyses similar to those presented in Tables 2.4.11-4 to 2.4.11-9. If the reservoir is not adequate describe the action to be taken. Also, in addition to the other three selected droughts, the worst drought period for Buckhorn Creek, February 1951 through January 1952, should be analyzed for two unit operation.

Response: The Cape Fear River Makeup System will be installed for two unit operation since the reservoir reanalysis indicates that during severe droughts of record the water supply for two unit operation may be marginal. The analyses presented in Tables 2.4.11-4 thru 2.4.11-9 are, therefore, conservative for two unit operation; since the analyses assume four unit forced evaporation rates with all other factors the same or more conservative for two unit operations. In addition to these analyses, the 1950-51 and 1980-81 drought periods were analyzed for two unit operation. See Tables 240.12-1 and 240.12-2, attached. The results of the new analyses show that the reservoir water supply is adequate for two unit operation when supported by the Cape Fear River Makeup System.

TABLE 240,12-1 RESERVOIR ANALYSIS NORMAL OPERATION - TWO UNITS CRITICAL PERIOD- FEB. 1951 - JAN. 1952 AUXILIARY RESERVOIR OPERATION MAIN RESERVOIR OPERATION CREEK CREF.K NEf RWL (s CFEEK PUMP ALLOW AVAIL. TOTAL AVE. NET ,FORCED IHC. TOTAL RWL g RE/.

INFLOW NET DIR NET INFLOW EVAP. EHD OF INFLOW Tp AUX. I'Ol'AKEUP AVAIL. SURF. EVAP.EVAP. STpR, STOR. END;OF PUMP DA~79.5 EVAP RAIN EVAP DA. RATIO MONTH DA. RES. SEEP. CAPE WATER AREA (2) USE USE MONTH CAPE RATIO FEAR FEAR YEAR Mp. CFS In. In. In. CFS hcFt FTMSL CFS CFS CFS AcFt AcFt Ac hcFr. AcFt AcFt AcFt HMSL AcFt A. Worst Honthly Evaporation Condition 1951 F 54.4 2.44 1.86 0.58 1.27 15.5 250.2 41. 9 0 5 16600 18650 4100 197 3375 0 0 220.0 1515 M 72.5 4.41 2.47 1.94 1.69 52.2 250.4 55.9 0 5 18000 21130 4100 659 3835 0 0 220.0 1365 h 90.6 6.28 4.49 1.79 2.11 48.6 250.6 69.8 0 5 17900 21756 4100 610 3874 0 -. 0 220.0 632 M 24.9 7.70 1.77 5.93 0.58 161.0 250.2 19.2 0 5 9130 10000 4100 1980 4223 0 0 220.0 '5343 J 10.2 8.21 3.43 4.78 0.24 128.0 250.0 7.9 0.80 5 7210 7335 4100 1590. 5243 0 0 220.0 6713 J 11.3 9.23 4.69 4.54 0.26 121.0 250.0 8.7 1.70 5 4240 4263 4050 -1530 5585 '2852 2852 219.2 . 4240(1)

A 13.6 8.51 4.03 4.48 0.32 119.0 250.0 10.5 1.62 5 6290 6529 3990 1490 5467 428 3280 219.1 629O(1)

S 3.4 6.30 1.38 4.92 0.08 131.0 250.0 2.6 2.12 5 0 -269 3910 1600 4177 6046 9326 217.5 p(1) 0 2.3 4.64 2.90 1.74 0. 05 46. 4 250. 0 1.8 0.70 5 0 -240 3720 540 4165 4945 14271 216. I (l(1)

H 6.8 2.99 2.71 0.28 1. 16 7.5 250.0 5.3 0 5 1390 1408 3590 83 3807 2482 16753 215. 4 1390(1)

D 19.3 1.54 3.24 -1.70 0.45 -45.5 250.3 14. 8 0 5 10700 11303 3690 -523 3662 -8168 8585 217.7 lo7oo(1) 1952 J 47.6 1.42 4.51 -3.09 1.11 -84.1 250.8 36. 7 0 5 17700 19649 3960 -1020 3625 "8585 0 220.0 9241 Normal Monthly Evaporation Condition 1951 F 54.4 2.08 1.86 0.22 1.27 5.9 250.2 41.9 0 16600 18650 4IOO 75 3097 0 0 220.0 1123'016 M 72.5 3.91 2.47 1.44 1.69 38.8 250.4 55.9 0 18000 21130 4100 490 3656 0 0 220.0 h 90.6 5.52 4.49 1.03 2.11 28.1 250.8 59.8 0 17900 21756 4100 352 3803 0 0 220.0 M 24.9 6.77 1.77 5.00 0.58 136.0 250.4 19.2 0 9130 10000 4100 1680 4106 0 0 220.0 4916 J 10.2 7.28 3.43 3.85 0.24 104.0 250.1 7.9 0 7210 7383 4100 1280 5103 0 0 220.0 6210 J 11.3 7.23 4.69 2.54 0.26 67.9 250.0 8.7 0. 12 4240 4460 4070 862 5325 1727 1727 219.5 424o(l) 13.6 6168 4.03 2.65 0.32 70.7 250.0 10.5 0.83 6290 6577 4050 894 5285 -400 1327 219.6 6290(1)

S' 3.4 5.50 1.38 4.12 0.08 110.0 250.0 2.6 1.77 0 -248 3970 1360 4024 5632 6959 218.1 p(1) 2.3 3.55 2.90 0.65 0.05 17.3 250.0 1.8 0.23 0 -211 3800 206 3897 4314 '11273 216.9 p(1)

H 6.8 2.31 2.71 <<0.4 0.16 -10.7 250.1 5.3 0 1390 1408 3690 -123 3561 2030 13303 216.3 I3go())

D 19.3 1.33 3.24 -1.91 0.45 -51.3 250.3 14.8 0 10700 11303 3810 -606 3388 -8465 4S38 218.7 I I7oo(>>

1952 J 47.6 1.19 4.51 -3.32 1.11 -90.7 250.9 36.7 0 17700 19649 4020 -1112 3388 -4838 0 220.0 5165 Kcy: (I) Limited to available makeup.

(2) Forced evaporation rates are conservatively based on four unit operation for comparability to ER TableS 2.4.2-11, 2.4.2-12, and 2.4.2-13.

TABLE 240. 12-2 RESERVOIR ANALYSIS ttORMAL OPERTATIOH - TWO UNITS CRITICAL PERIOD AUCUST 1980 - JULY 1981 AUXILIARY RESERVOIR OPERATION ttAItt RESERVOIR OPERATION CREEK CREEK NET RWL e CFEEK PUMP ALLOW AVAIL. TOTAL AVE. NET FORCED INC. TOTAL RWL e INFLOW NET DIR NET INFLOW EVAP. EHD OF INFLOW To AUX. FOR MAKEUP AVAIL. SURF. EVAP.EVAP. STOR 7 STOR. EHD OF PUMP DA"79.5 EVAP RAIN EVAP DA.RATIO MONTH DA. RES. SEEP. CAPE WATER AREA (2) USE . USE: MottTN CAPE RATIO FEAR FEAR YEAR Mo. CFS In. In. In. crs AcFt FTIISL CFS CFS CFS AcFt AcFt Ac AcFt AcFt AcFt AcFt FTMSL AcFt A. Worst Monthly Evaporation Condition 1980 A 5.2 8.51 0.76 7.75 0.12 207 250 4.09 3. 23 5 246 -9 3960 25GO 5467 8126 8126 217.8 246 S 5.5 6.30 3.62 2.68 0.13 72 250 4.34 1.07 5 849 74G 3760 839 4177 4270 12396 216.6 849(l) 0 18.9 4.64 2.19 2.45 0.45 65 250 14.80 0.61 5 2910 3475 3680 750 4165 1440 1383G 216.2 2910(1)

H 20.5 2.99 2.38 0.61 0.48 16 250 16. 00 0 5 6130 7385 3720 189 3807 -3389 10447 217.3 6730(1)

D 40.0 1.54 1.70 .-0.16 0.94 -4 250.3 31.30 0 5 6850 8467 3855 -50 3662 -4855 5592 218.5 6850(1) 1981 J 34.1 1.42 1.04 0.38 0.81 10 250.4 26.70 0 5 6620 7954 3995 127 3625 -4202 1390 219. 7 6620(1)

F 123.0 2.44 3.53 -1.09 2.91 -30 251.0 96.30 0 ~ 5 15700 20771 4100 -371 3375 1390 0 220.1 0 tl 44.4 4.41 1.33 3.08 1.05 86 251.0 34.80 0 5 15900 17732 4100 1040 3835 0 0 22O.O 3280 A 24.1 6.28 1.04 5.24 0.57 144 250.6 18.90 0 5 11800 12627 4100 1760 3874 0 0 220.0 4800 tl 11.2 7.70 2.37 5.33 0.27 144 250. 2, 8.78 0 5 4420 4652 4080 1810 4223 1381 1381 219.6 442o(1)

J 6.0 6.21 1.13 7.08 0.14 189 250 4.70 2. 13 5 8250 8105 4065 2398 5243 -464 917 219.9 8250(I)

J 4.4 9.23 2.90 6.33 0.10 169 250 3.43 2.64 5 9660 9401 4100 2162 5585 917 0 220.0 8932(1)

B. Hormal Monthly Evaporation Condition 1980 A 5.2 6.68 0.76 5.92 0.12 158 250 4.09 2.44 246 40 3970 1960 5285 7205 7205 218.0 S 5.5 5.50 3.62 1.88 0.13 50 250 4. 34 0.71 849 768 3790 594 4024 3850 1105 217.0 0 18.9 3.55 2.19 1.36 0.45 36 250 14.80 0.13 2910 3505 3740 424 3897 818 11871 216.8 2910 H 20.5 2.31 2.38 -0.07 0.48 -2 250.1 16.00 0 6730 7385 3785 -22 3561 -3846 8025 217.8 6730(13 D 40.0 1.33 1.70 -0.37 0.94 -10 250.3 31.30 0 6850 8467 3925 -121 3388 -5200 2825 219.2 GSSO("

1981 J 34.1 l. 19 1.04 0.15 0.81 4 250.5 26.70 0 6620 7954 4050 50 3388 "2825 0 220.0 4913 F 123.0 2.08 3.53 -1.45 2.91 -40 251.1 96.30 0 15700 20771 4110 -497 3097 0 0 220.2 0 M 44.4 3.91 1.33 2.58 1.05 73 251.t 34.80 0 15900 17732 4100 . 873 3656 0 0 220.0 3390 A 24.1 5. 52 1.04 4.48 0.57 125 250.8 18.90 0 IISOO 12627 4100 1500 3803 0 0 220.0 4480 M 11.2 6.17 2.37 4.40 0.27 120 250.5 8.78 0 4420 4652 4080 1496 4106 950 950 219.7 4420 J 6.0 7. 28 1.13 6.15 0.14 165 250 4.70 O.ll 8250 8226 4080 2090 5103 -950 0 220.0 8167 J 4.4 7. 23 2.90 4.33 0.10 115 250 3.43 ).77 9660 9455 4100 I440 5325 0 0 220.0 6970 Key: ( I) Limited to available makeup.

(2) Forced evaporation rates are conservatively based on four unit operation for comparability to ER TableS 2.4.2-11, 2.4.2-12, and 2.4.2-13.

FSAR estion 240.13 (Section 2.4.11.2)

In Amendment 2 of the FSAR, the 100-year return period Buckhorn Creek low flows were increased over what was presented in the original FSAR. Please explain the basis for this change.

Response: Amendment 2 of the FSAR presents Buckhorn Creek low flows at the Cape Fear River (DA=79.5 sq. mi.). The original FSAR presented flows at the Main Dam (DA 71.0 sq. mi.). Both will be included in the next FSAR Amendment.

Buckhorn Creek 100 yr. (cfs) Low Flow CFR Main Dam average 4 mo. low flow 4.1 30 7 average 7 mo. low flow 7.7 6.9 averge 12 mo. low flow 26. 0 23.2

FSAR estion 240.14 (Section 2.4.11.7)

Will Tables 2.4.11-14 and 2.4.11-15 (Main and Auxiliary Reservoir Operation) be revised as a result of your decision to ask only for a license to operate two units7 If not, provide a discussion that confirms that the analyses summarized in the tables are conservative. In Table 2.4.11-15, are values for rainfall, pumped make-up, and Buckhorn Creek inflow assumed to be zero over the four~onth period? In the top line on page 2.4.11-8, should the table referred to be Table 2.4.11-14, rather than 2.4.11-4'!

Response: Tables 2.4;11-14 and 2.4.11-15 are conservative for both one unit and two unit operation for the following reasons. The beginning low water level 205.7 ft., was the predicted low level for four unit operation during a 100 year drought. This is conservative for two unit operation. For one unit operation during a 100 year drought the predicted low water level will be 211.0 ft as indicated on Table 240.14-1. Tables 2.4.11-14 and 2.4.11-15 also assume normal shutdown loads in three units. All other factors in these analyses are the same or conservative for one or two unit operation.

Values for rainfall, pumped makeup and Buckhorn Creek inflow are assumed to be zero over the four month period analyzed in Table 2.4.i1-15.

The table referred to in the top line of page 2.4.11-9 is Table 2.4.11-14.

RESERVOIR ANALYSIS NORMAL OPERATION - ONE UNIT 100-YEAR DROUGHT AUXILIARY RESERVOIR OPERATION HAIN RESERVOIR OPERATION CREEK CREEK NET RWL'8 CREEK PUMP AI.LOW TOTAL AVERAGE NET FORCED INCR. TOTAL RWL 8 INFLOW NAT. DIR : NET INFLOW EVAP. END OF INFLOW TO AUX FOR AVAII. RES.SURF. EVAP. EVAP. STD R. STOR. END OF DA$ 79.5 EVAN RAIN EVAP. DA.RATIO HONT11 DA.RATIO RES SEEP. AREA WATER USE USE HOW Tll HO. CFS In. In. In. CFS Ac.Ft. FT. MSL CFS CFS CFS Ac.Ft Ac Ac.Ft Ac.Ft. Ac.pt Ac.Ft FT.HSL H 51.6 7. 70 2. 16 5.54 1.25 148 250 40. 8 1. 15 2131 3660 1690 1090 649 14099 216.1 J 12.5 8. 21 1.17 7.04 0.30 188 250 9.92 2.85 123 3580 2100 1090 3067 17166 215.2 J 12.5 9.23 1.72 7.51 0.30 200 250 9.95 2.95 123 3467 2170 1140 3187 20353 214. 3 A 12.5 8.51 4.88 3.63 0.30 97 250 9.97 1.27 228 3736 1020 1130 1922 22275 213.6 S 4.1 6.30 0.67 5.63 0.10 150 250 3.25 2.42 -248 3282 1540 1080 2868 25143 212.7 0 4.1 4.64 0.72 3.92 0.10 105 250 3.25 1.60 -206 3184 1040 1070 2316 27459 212.0 N 4.1 2.99 1.20 1.79 0.10 48 250 3.26 '.70

-145 3124 466 988 1599 29058 211.5 D 4.1 1.54 0.75 0.79 0.10 21 250 3.26 0.24 -122 3084 203 959 1284 30342 211.0 J 51.6 1.42 1.44 -'0. 02 1.25 -1 250.3 41.50 0 2244 3080 -5 953 -1296 29046 211.5 F 51.6 2.44 2.51 -0.07 1.25 -2 250.5 ~

41.40 0 2022 3120 -18 872 -1168 27879 211. 9 H 51.6 4.41 1.63 2.78 1.24 75 250.5 41.40 0 2238 3147 729 1000 -509 27369 212.0 A - 51.6 6.28 - 4.33 1.95 1.24 53 250.6 41.40 0 2166 3163 514 1020 -632 26737 212. 2 NOTES: (1) Worst monthly evaporation rates used (2) No makeup pumping from Cape Fear River (3) Starting level ~ 216.3 FT MSL for Main Reservoir 250.0 FT MSL for Auxiliary Reservoir (4) Creek inflou and rainfall data from ER Table 2 ~ 4,2-15

FSAR Question 240.15 (Section 2.4.12)

Your analysis of a failure of the radwaste storage tanks does not appear conservative in that you are assuming complete mixing with the volume of water in the reservoir at the time of the release. Furthermore, your analysis does not state tank volume released or provide a dilution factor or reduction in concentration at the nearest point of surface water use. Please provide these details.

Responses: Any accidental releases into the Main Reservoir are afforded dilution by the Main Reservoir, Buckhorn Creek, and the Cape Fear River before reaching Lillington, the location of the closest downstream surface water user (see SHNPP FSAR Tables 2.4.1-5 and 2.4.1-6). Any spillage from the plant island would enter the reservoir in its northern reaches and would discharge into the Cape Fear River over the main dam spillway at the reservoir's extreme southern end. Any spillage would essentially achieve complete mixing before being discharged since the flow through the reservoir is relatively slow.

Even though it is not considered likely, if the entire contents of the RWST (470,000 gals, see SHNPP FSAR Table 6.2.2-9) were released to the lake instantaneously, the dilution provided by the volume of water in the Main Reservoir, conservatively chosen to be 62,000 acre feet (volume of the Main Reservoir when two ft. below normal operating level), would be on the order of 10 5 .

Also, note that the following assumptions add to the conservatism of the analysis. The radionuclide content in the RWST was maximized by assuming the reactor coolant activity to be based on 1% failed fuel. Further, it was assumed that the Spent Fuel Pool Filtration System was not operating during refueling. The instantaneous mixing of the tank contents in the reservoir is also a conservative assumption. The RWST is located approximately 1500 ft. from the reservoir inside the Tank Building. Even assuming the failure of the Tank Building and its internal compartments, the spilled liquid would have to travel 1500 ft overland where some absorption and retention of radionuclides in the soil would take place. Instantaneous mixing removes from consideration the travel time (and consequently the radioactive decay) for the water to migrate to the reservoir and neglects the possibility that portions of the waste would be prevented from reaching the reservoir by retention in the soil. If the real case were analyzed, absorption and retention would lessen the amount of activity present in the reservoir at any given moment.

Specific concentrations at Lillington are provided in Table 240.15-1 for two cases. Case one presents the results of one unit operation with no contre/led Main Reservoir makeup (reservoir volume 2.92 x 10 ft and reservoir discharge =

43 cfs), and case two presents the results of two uni) op~ration with controlled make-up (reservoir volume 3.14 x 10 ft and reservoir discharge = 48 cfs ). The reservoir flows for each

case were diluted by the minimum annual average flow of 1350 cfs (1981) ER Table 2.4.2-1 in the Cape Fear River. Any natural runoff into Buckhorn Creek Between the Main Dam and its confluence with the Cape Fear River was conservatively assumed to be negligible. It can be seen from Table 240.15-1 that the C/MPC at Lillington for both cases of operation are well below the allowable concentrations of 10 CFR 20.

Table 240.15-1 Concentration and C/MPC in the Cape Fear River Mater at Lillington Following a Tank Rupture Case 1* 2k*

Conc Conc

(~Ci/cc) c/m c ( uCi/cc) /Unit C/m C I-131 8.79 x 10 2.93 x 10 9~ 15x 10 3.04 x 10 3 Cs-134 2.06 x 10 2.29 x 10 2.13 x 10 2.37 x 10 Cs-137 1 ~ 06x 10 5.28 x 10 1.09 x 10 5.47 x 10 Total 3.69 x 10 3.82 x 10

  • 1 unit operation with no controlled reservoir make-up
    • 2 unit operation with controlled reservoir makeup-up

FSAR Question 240.16 (Section 2.4.13.3)

In your analysis of the groundwater pathways for an accidental tank failure, you assumed an aquifer porosity of 30 percent. Provide the basis for this assumption. Furthermore, if this is total porosity, then provide values for effective porosity. It is the later parameter that should be used in calculating groundwater travel time. Also, your analysis is incomplete in that you have not provided dilution factors or reductions in concentrations at the potential points of water use. Please provide the details of such an analysis, including the bases for assumed coefficients such as bulk density and dispersion, dispersivity and distribution coefficients.

Response: The analysis of groundwater movement has been revised as follows. The value for porosity in the groundwater movement analysis is based on a measured value of permeability for the fracture system of the intrusive-rock dike between wells 13 and 15 (Figure 240.16-1) in the revised analysis. Inasmuch as hard-rock fracture systems are heteorogeneous and anisotropic, hydraulic characteristics for these systems can be grouped only in a broad category. In the system betwee~ wells 13 and 15, the measured permeability value of 2841 gpd/ft compares with the lower part of the scale of values for gravel as given in Walton, pp..33-36 (Reference 240.16-1). Values were estimated for porosity and "effective porosity" (specific yield) by using the same relative position as "permeability" on scales of these values given in that publication.

The range of values for permeability of gravel is 1,000 to 15,000 gpd/ft 2 . Proportionally, the value of total porosity is estimated at 31 percent and the value of ef fective porosity (same as specific yield in Walton, 1970) is estimated at 17 percent.

Assuming the maximum parameters, it is established that the minimum time required for the groundwater to reach the closest community downstream from the plant would be about 144 years.

This time estimate is based upon the following parameters:

Corinth is the nearest town, approximately five miles to the southwest, where residents have wells of minimal production from the Triassic, Newark Group (FSAR Figure 2.3.2-18). The maximum measured site coefficient of permeability is 520 ft./yr. (FSAR Table 2.4.13-7). The maximum measured site hydrologic gradient is 0.06 ft/ft towards the SE from the Waste Processing Building (FSAR Figure 2.4.13-2). The effective porosity is 0.17.

The effective travel time of radionuclides which may contaminate the aquifer following a tank rupture would be considerably greater due to absorption and ion exchange on the underlying rock. The distribution coefficients (Kd) for cesium and strontium, the critical radionuclides, are =assumed to be 20 and 2, respectively. These values were taken from Table VII 3-7 of Appendix VXI of HASH 1400 and are conservative when compared to values reported in the literature (Reference 240.16-2). The calculated retention factors using these values for Kd, an

effective potosdty of 0.17 and a )nlk dty weight density of 2.6 (FSAR Table 2.5.4-1; 162.8 lbs/ft ) are 307 for cesium and 32 for strontium. Using these retention factors, the travel time for Cs-137 and Sr-90 for transport to the nearest community would be:

Cs-137 (144 yrs) (307) = 4.4 x 10 yrs Sr-90 (144 yrs) (321) 4.6 x 10 yrs Assuming tritium to be in the form of water, the effective travel time for tritium would be 144 years. Based upon these effective travel times, radioactive decay would reduce the amount of tritium, CS-137 and Sr-90 which could potentially reach Corinth to negligible levels.

References; 240.16-1 Walton, W. C. 1970. Groundwater Resource Evaluation New York, McGraw Hill Book Co., Inc.;

664 pp.

240.16-2 NUREG/CR-0912 1981. Geoscience Data Base Handbook for Modeling a Nuclear Waste Repository.

FIRE LEGEND POND PIEZOMETER CR WELL 8 WATER LEVEL 257.I CONTOUR OF WATER SURFACE ELEVATION(msl)

/'

INTRUSvE DIKE FAlAT TRACE 0 UPTHROWN SIDE U

D DOWNTHROWN SIDE 2IT.I (THOMAS CREEK)

MAIN RESERVQR WATER SURFACE ELEV.= 2I5.5 ON JUNE l7, l982 O

O 0 +

LPIO 2I29 LPI6 2IM GRAPHIC SCALE lO lO I 4 5 0 FEET x IOO SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Corolino Power & Light Company Ej PIEZQKNIC NAP OF THE PuIHT

~(OFF SHT. aT S. 840. VICINITYOH JUNE I 7~ I%82 JUNE l7 l982 Figure 240.16-1

N 25iOO N

II 0 22Q3 LP2 258.l LPI I4 2R2 2ll.

/

O 200 Igo U

D

~ LP5 IT8.6 22 EXCAV TED TO ELE I80

/4

/

LPI2 l92.2 IgQ O

lA PI3 I893

/g) 2'29 CaIIaL EI.EV. 245 dp

/p PIEZOMETRIC MAP OF THE PLANT ISLAND VICINITY (

FSAR Question 240.17 (Section 2.4.13.4)

Identify which piezometers and wells will be retained during plant operation for monitoring purposes. Also, please describe the operational monitoring data that will be obtained, the methods and frequency of measurement, the methods for processing and analyzing the data, and associated reporting and quality assurance procedures.

Response: Fourteen piezometers that were installed in November, 1979, as well as two premonstruction peizometers and one new well, are available at the plant site. The piezometers and site wells provide data on water levels, hydraulic gradient, and direction of flow. Water levels in piezometers and site wells are measured periodically and analyzed to assess the effect of construction on the site groundwater regime. Mater samples from three wells were analyzed to determine baseline water quality parameters (SHNPP FSAR Table 2.4.13-8, attached).

Once the plant begins operation, the groundwater data collection program will be modified to provide data on recharge to the aquifer, movement of water and changes in chemical quality of the ground water.

Current plans are to maintain a basic network of 12 wells to provide periodic data from the aquifer. These wells are: LP-1; LP-2, LP-8; LP-12, LP-13, LP-16; PZ-2; Well 4; Hell 7-A; Mell 8; Mell 8-A and Hell 13, Wells 4, 7-A, and 8 will be sampled periodically to monitor the chemical properties of the water.

The locations of these wells are shown on Figure 240.17-1.

Water levels in all network wells will be measured monthly by hydrologists or trained technicians using electric water-level sensing tapes. At least'ne well will be equipped with a continuous water-level recorder, such as a Stevens, Type F.

Mater samples will be taken at 3~onth intervals from Wells 4, 7-A and 8 for chemical analyses. Water-level and chemical data will be sent to the company's hydrologists for synthesis and evaluation. The hydrologists will maintain up-to-date files on the data and will prepare brief periodic reports on the hydrologic condition of the aquifer. Periodic summary reports or FSAR updates as appropriate, will also be prepared and will discuss hydrologic changes in the aquifer, apparent effects of the reservoir on ground water and any potential ground-water related problems at the plant.

The operational monitoring program may be modified as the long term data base is established and as recommended by CPSL hydrologists.

TABLE 2.4. 13-8 CHEMICAL QUALITY OF SITE GROUNDWATER ANALYSIS PARAMETER WELL NO. 2 WELL NO+ 4 WELL N0.7A Color pH 7 ' 7.0 7.9 Alkalinity CaCO> 107 134 140 Total Hardness 72 106 137 Iron 0. 13 0. 35 0. 95 Manganese 0. 24 0.38 0. 29 Turbidity Si02 Acidity CacO>

(hloride 23 22 21 Sodium 35 30 19 Potassium 2.0 1.6 Fluoride <0. 10 <0. 10 <0. 10 Arsenic <0. 01 <0. 01 <0. 01 Cadmium <0.01 <0.01 <0. 01

+6 <0.'05 Chromium <0.05 <0. 05 Copper <0. 05 <0.05 <0. 05 Lead <0. 05 <0.05 <0. 05 Zinc 0.40 <0.05 <0. 05 Calcium 14.8 21. 0 26. 5 Magnesium 7.5 11.0 15.4 Note: Analyses performed during March 1973 by N. C. Board of Health, Laboratory Division, Raleigh, North Carolina. All results are expressed in parts per million except the parameters of color and pH.

IA O O NC.

OJ GRID EX PL ANATI ON FAULT U, UPTHROWN SIDE D,DOWNTHROWN SIDE DIABASE DIKE THOMAS PERMANENT MONITOR WELL CREEK 00 PZ2 LP I6 Dl MAKEUP INTAKE CANAL2I5,5 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Carolina Power 8 Light Company AMENDMENT NO. 4 PERMANENT MONITOR WELL NETWORK Figure 240.17-1

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Ql E 2sOI2,000 E 2,0I5,000

FSAR Question 240.18 (Section 2.4)

General Comment: Since the completion of Unit 2 will take place after Unit 1 is in operation, provide a discussion of all hydrologic engineering safety-related aspects of constructing Unit 2 while Unit 1 is in operation.

For example, what effects will having an open excavation at Unit 2 have on groundwater levels and drainage at Unit 1?

Response: As stated in FSAR Section 2.4.13 the subsurface portions of Seismic Category X structures on the plant island are designed for hydrostatic loading with the water table at Elevation 251 feet msl. The post-construction water table elevation at the plant is not expected to recover above the 236-ft. to 240-ft.

elevation because of the topographic and drainage alterations made during construction.

Xt has been noted that there has been no significant inflow of ground water into the plant excavation during the past or current construction operations. There are no hydrologic reasons to believe that these conditions will be significantly altered during the construction of Unit 2.

Because of the low permeability (0.2 gpd/ft or less) of the soil and saprolite at the plant island, and the absence of intrusive dikes in the immediate area of construction, no hydrologic problems are anticipated with the open excavation at Unit 2 while Unit 1 is in operation. Surficial runoff into the pit will be essentially eliminated by grading to direct surface drainage away from 'the excavation. Any water that may accumulate in the excavation will be removed by a sump pump.

Additional excavation that may be needed in conjunction with the construction of Unit 2 will intercept groundwater movement toward Unit 1 and thereby, will retard the recovery of the water table around Unit 1.

~ ~

~ i<<\

4

FIRE LlEGEND N POND I 5 8 25i00 PIEZOMETER OR WELL WATER LEVEL 5 231.l

.I CONTOUR OF WATER SURFACE ELEVATION(msl)

I O

LP2 258.l

/ INTRUSIVE DIKE LP I uT TRACE I4 2R2'll.

U D DOWNTHROWNSIDESIDE UPTHROWN I

2I7.I (THOMAS CREEK)

~O j MAIN RESERVQR WATER SURFACE ELEV.= 2I5.5 ON JUNE l7, l982 20p L9p

~ LP5 0O 178.6 0 +

EXCAV TED TO ELE l80 I .8 LPI2 LPIO l922 ~9p 2l29 20p PI3 2/p l893 LPI6 CANAL ELEV. 245 2+p 2IM GRAPHIC SCALE I 4 FEET x IOO dp 9A

/pp~ 2I20 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Carolina Pawer 8 Light Company IE'5+00 ZQ~,

S 6(

~(OFF SHT. AT S. 84O.

PIEZQKMIC NAP OF THE PUNT VICINITYON JQK 17, 1982 PIEZOMETRIC MAP OF THE PLANT ISLAND VICINITY ON JUNE l7 l982 Figure 240.16-1

OJ lO O 0 O 0 O NC.

Ol Ol OJ Ol EXPLANATI ON ul

~ l3 N 688000 FAULT U, UPTHROWN SIDE O',DOWNTHROWN SIDE DIABASE DIKE THOMAS o PERMANENT MONITOR WELL CREEK

~ LP2 N. 687,000

~ u hq 00 LP'l 0ISCHARGE L

686)000

~7A PZ2 f

N 685,000 I 5(

I'l LP I6 t 4 I

I D4 LP'l2 D5 684 000 MAKEUP ALP'Q INTAKE CANAL2I5.5 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Carolina Pawer 8 Light Company Cg AhKNDMENT N0.4

'45 PERMANENT MONITOR WEL'L NETWORK DS Figure '40.17;1

la