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Tech Spec Change Request 18 Re Tech Spec 4.3,jumpering Out 16 Pressure Switches Preventing Actuation of Steam Line Rupture Matrix During Surveillance
	ML19308D628
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	02/17/1978
From:	; FLORIDA POWER CORP.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML19308D624	List: ML19308D623; ML19308D628; ML19308D630; ML19308D634;
References
	NUDOCS 8003050830
	Download: ML19308D628 (3)
	v • d • e

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o- . . Technical Specification Change Requeij No. 18 (Appendix A) 1 Replace pages 3/4 3-20 and 3/4 3-21 with the attached revised pages 3/4

3-20 and 3/4 3-21. Proposed Change

In Table 4.3-2, add Table Note (5) to " Modes in Which Surveillance Required" for Item 4.6.1,. Low SG Pressure. The Note will read: "When

                        - not in MODES 1,2, or 3, surveillance shall be performed within 24 hours after entering MODE 3 and prior to entering MODE 2."

i Reason for Proposed Change When in MODE 4, there is not sufficient steam pressure to perform this surveillance so a simulated 600 psig signal must be used. ' The Steam Line Rupture Matrix does not have an integrated test module (as the Reactor Protection System does), therefore, 16 pressure switches must be jumpered out so the Steam Line Rupture Matrix does not actuate during the surveillance. This change is based on the excessive amount of work that must be performed to complete the surveillance at present and the fact that the Steam Line Rupture Matrix is bypassed until 725 psig steam pressure is exceeded to reset the pressure switches. Safety Analysis Justifying Proposed Change

The fact that there 'is not adequate steam pressure to perform this 1

surveillance in MODE 4 is, in itself, not an acceptable reason to j propose this change. However the Steam Line Rupture Matrix is bypassed 1 until steam pressure is 725 psig. This means that until the steam ) pressure exceeds this value to automatically reset the Steam Line Rupture i Matrix, it doesn't matter what the 600 psig pressure switches are set at. Once the steam pressure exceeds 600 psig, the setting of the pres-sure switches can be checked while the Steam Line Rupture Matrix is j still bypassed. In addition, the restrictions in the. Table Note ensure that the surveillance will be performed within a reasonable amount of time and prior to ascending into another MODE. Therefore, there are no 3 additional safety implications and there is no unreviewed safety question.

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( I TABLE 4.3-2(Cont'd) hl w ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATI0fl SYSTEMS INSTRUMEllTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS , il

                                                                                   "~                                                                            CHANNEL        MODES IN WHICH

CilANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE

[[ m FUtlCTI0flAL UNIT CilECK CALIBRATION TEST REQUIRED

7 3. REACTOR BLDG. SPRAY

                                                                                   !!      a. Reactor Bldg. Pressure
                                                                                  -i              liigh-liigh coincident w               with HPI Signal                   5               R              M(4)         1, 2, 3

b. Automatic Actuation Logic N/A N/A M(3) 1, 2, 3

4. OTIIER SAFETY SYSTEMS

a. Reactor Bldg. Purge Isolation on liigh Radioactivity

[[ i

1. Gaseous S R H All Modes E$ b. Steam Line Rupture Matrix

1. Low SG Pressare N/A R N/A 1, 2, 3 (5) i

2. Automatic Actuation Logic N/A N/A M(3) 1, 2, 3

1 O

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TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued)

                                           -TABLE NOTATION (1) Manual actuation switches shall be tested ct least once per 18 months during shutdown. All other circuitry associated with 4

manual safeguards actuation shall receive a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL , TEST at least once per 31 days. (2) The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall include exercising the trans-mitter by applying pressure to the appropriate side of the transmitter. (3) Each logic channel shall be tested at least every other 31 days. (4) Reactor Bldg. Pressure High-High signal only. (5) When not in MODES 1, 2 or 3, surveillance shall be performed within 24 hours after entering MODE 3 and prior to entering MODE 2. l 1

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ML19308D628

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