IR 05000482/2007006

IR 05000482-07-006, on 06/11/2007 - 07/20/2007, Wolf Creek Generating Station, Baseline Inspection, NRC Inspection Procedure 71111.21, Component Design Basis Inspection

ML072880678
Person / Time
Site:	Wolf Creek
Issue date:	10/15/2007
From:	Jones W B Division of Reactor Safety IV
To:	Muench R A Wolf Creek
References
IR-07-006
Download: ML072880678 (52)

Text

October 15, 2007

Rick A. Muench, President and Chief Executive OfficerWolf Creek Nuclear Operating CorporationP.O. Box 411Burlington, KS 66839

SUBJECT: WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION - NRC COMPONENT DESIGN BASESINSPECTION REPORT 05000482/2007006

Dear Mr. Muench:

On July 20, 2007, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a componentdesign bases inspection at your Wolf Creek Generating Station. The enclosed reportdocuments our inspection findings. The preliminary findings were discussed on July 20, 2007,and again on August 31, 2007, with you and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety andcompliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The team reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewedcognizant plant personnel.Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has identified eight findings that wereevaluated under the risk significance determination process. Violations were associated withsix of the findings. All eight of the findings were found to have very low safety significance(Green) and the violations associated with these findings are being treated as noncitedviolations, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest any of the noncited violations, or the significance of the violations you shouldprovide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for yourdenial, to the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk,Washington, DC 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, U.S. NuclearRegulatory Commission, Region IV, 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400, Arlington, Texas 76011;the Director, Office of Enforcement, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Wolf Creek Generating Station.

Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation-2-In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's Rules of Practice, a copy of this letterand its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC PublicDocument Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's documentsystem (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,/RA/

William B. Jones, ChiefEngineering Branch 1Division of Reactor SafetyDockets: 50-482License: NPF-42

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000482/2007006

w/Attachments:

Supplemental Information Initial Information Request Second Information Requestcc w/

Enclosure:

Vice President Operations/Plant ManagerWolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp.P.O. Box 411Burlington, KS 66839Jay Silberg, Esq.Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP2300 N Street, NWWashington, DC 20037Supervisor LicensingWolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp.P.O. Box 411Burlington, KS 66839Chief EngineerUtilities DivisionKansas Corporation Commission1500 SW Arrowhead RoadTopeka, KS 66604-4027 Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation-3-Office of the GovernorState of KansasTopeka, KS 66612Attorney General120 S.W. 10th Avenue, 2nd FloorTopeka, KS 66612-1597County ClerkCoffey County Courthouse110 South 6th StreetBurlington, KS 66839-1798Chief, Radiation and Asbestos Control SectionKansas Department of Health and EnvironmentBureau of Air and Radiation1000 SW Jackson, Suite 310Topeka, KS 66612-1366 Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation-4-Electronic distribution by RIV:Regional Administrator (EEC)DRP Director (ATH)DRS Director (DDC)DRS Deputy Director (RJC1)Senior Resident Inspector (SDC)SRI, Callaway (DED)Branch Chief, DRP/B (VGG)Senior Project Engineer, (RWD)Team Leader, DRP/TSS (CJP)RITS Coordinator (MSH3)DRS STA (DAP)D. Pelton, OEDO RIV Coordinator (DLP)ROPreportsWC Site Secretary (SLA2)SUNSI Review Completed: ADAMS: X Yes G No Initials: WBJ X Publicly Available G Non-Publicly Available G Sensitive X Non-SensitiveR:\_REACTORS\_WC\2007\WC2007-06RP-RWD.wpd MLSRI:DRP/ESOE:OBRI:EB1C:EB1C:PBBC:EB1RDeeseMMurphySRutenkrogerWBJonesVGGaddyWBJones/RA//RA//RA//RA//RA//RA/10/4/0710/5/0710/4/0710/11/0710/15/0710/ 15 /07OFFICIAL RECORD COPY T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation-5-

Enclosure-1-ENCLOSUREU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV Docket:50-482 License:NPF-42Report No.:05000482/2007006Licensee:Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation Facility:Wolf Creek Generating StationLocation:1550 Oxen Lane NEBurlington, Kansas Dates:June 11, through July 20, 2007Team Leader:R. Deese, Senior Resident Inspector, Arkansas Nuclear OneInspectors:M. Murphy, Senior Examiner, Operations BranchS. Rutenkroger, PhD, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 1L. Owen, Reactor Inspector, Engineeering Branch 1AccompanyingPersonnel:L. Ellershaw, Mechanical Engineer, ContractorJ. Leivo, Electrical Engineer, ContractorS. Spiegelman, Mechanical Engineer, ContractorApproved By:W illiam B. Jones, ChiefEngineering Branch 1Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure-2-

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000482/2007006; 6/11/07 - 7/20/07; Wolf Creek Generating Station: baseline inspection,NRC Inspection Procedure 71111.21, Component Design Basis Inspection.The report covers an announced inspection by a team of two regional inspectors, oneoperations examiner, one consultant, two contractors, and one senior resident inspector. Eightfindings were identified. All of the findings were of very low safety significance. The finalsignificance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) usingInspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process. Findings for which thesignificance determination process does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity levelafter NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation ofcommercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process

,Revision 3, dated July 2000.A.

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green.

The team identified a noncited violation of TechnicalSpecification 5.4.1.a, for the licensee's inadequate procedure for remotelystarting the emergency diesel generator fuel oil transfer pump following a fire inthe control room. Specifically, the governing procedure failed to include thenecessary actions to replace the control power fuse in the associated motorcontrol center, which would likely be blown as a result of the fire-induced circuitfailures assumed in the licensee's analysis for the control room fire. In addition,the licensee had failed to specify and stage the control power fuse and fusepuller that could be required for timely restoration of the emergency dieselgenerator fuel oil transfer pump to service following the control room fire. Thisissue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as ConditionReport 2007-02790. The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the mitigatingsystems cornerstone attribute of procedural quality and affected the associated cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability ofsystems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The Phase 1 worksheets in Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance DeterminationProcess," were used to conclude that analysis with Manual Chapter 0609,Appendix F, "Fire Protection Findings Significance Determination Process," wasrequired because the issue involved a degradation in fire protection defense-in-depth strategies. A Phase 3 review was then performed by a senior reactoranalyst who determined the finding to be of very low safety significance becauseof the low probability of a fire in relevant cabinets that would result in a controlroom evacuation (Section 1R21.b.1).*Green. The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Desi gn Control," in that, the licensee did not ensure adequatesuction submergence for the containment spray pumps by not properlytranslating vortex design parameters into calculations relative to the refueling Enclosure-3-water storage tank. Specifically, the licensee used a non-conservative method tocalculate the level required to prevent pump vortexing in the refueling waterstorage tank. The licensee entered the issue into their corrective action programas Condition Report 2007-02597 and revised the affected calculations. The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the mitigatingsystems cornerstone attribute of design control and affected the associated cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability ofsystems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.Using the Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Phase 1Worksheet, the finding is determined to have very low safety significancebecause it was a design deficiency that did not result in a loss of operability. Thefinding had crosscutting aspects in the area of problem identification andresolution associated with the corrective action program (P.1(a)) because thelicensee did not identify an issue in a timely manner, commensurate with itssafety significance (Section 1R21.b.2).*Green. The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B,Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," for the failure to identify and take timelycorrective action to correct indications of material wastage at the base of theRefueling Water Storage Tank. Specifically, the licensee did not recognize andtake actions to prevent recurring discolored boric acid deposits for approximately9 years. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program asCondition Report 2007-02742.The finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected it would become amore significant safety concern in that continued wastage could impactcomponent operability. Using the Phase 1 worksheets in Manual Chapter 0609,"Significance Determination Process," the finding was determined to have verylow safety significance because it did not result in a system or component beinginoperabe and it did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic,flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The finding had crosscutting aspectsin the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the correctiveaction program (P.1(c) because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate theproblem such that the resolution addressed the cause and extent of condition(Section 1R21.b.3).*Green. The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B,Criterion III, "Design Control," for the failure of the licensee to ensure that the125 Vdc safety-related batteries would remain operable if all the intercell andterminal connections were at the resistance value of 150 micro-ohms as allowedby Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.8.4.5. The licensee'sdesign calculation used a non-conservative value. This issue was entered intothe licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 2007-02492.The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the mitigatingsystems cornerstone attribute of design control and affected the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability ofsystems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.

Enclosure-4-Using Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Phase 1Worksheet, the finding was determined to have very low safety significancebecause it was a design deficiency confirmed not to result in a loss of operability. The finding had crosscutting aspects in the area of problem identification andresolution associated with the corrective action program (P.1(a)) because thelicensee did not implement a program with a low threshold for identifying thisissue and the licensee did not identify the issue completely, accurately, and in atimely manner (Section 1R21.b.4).*Green. The team identified a noncited violation of TechnicalSpecification 5.4.1.a, for the licensee's failure to clean electrolyte from theoutside surfaces of the 125 Vdc safety-related batteries in accordance with procedures. Specifically, surveillance procedures for the 125 Vdc batteriesrequired appropriate cleaning of electrolyte on battery cell covers followingspecific gravity checks, however, maintenance personnel did not perform thiscleaning. The licensee has entered this issue into their corrective action programas Condition Report 2007-02580.The finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected the finding wouldbecome a more significant safety concern due to the corrosive effects ofelectrolyte on battery posts and terminal connections. Using the ManualChapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Phase 1 Worksheet, thefinding was determined to have very low safety significance because it did notresult in a design qualification deficiency or loss of function and it did not screenas risk significant due to external events. The finding had crosscutting aspects inthe area of human performance associated with work practices (H.4(a)) becauseof insufficient communication of human error prevention techniques tomaintenance personnel, specifically with respect to self and peer checking(Section 1R21.b.5).*Green. The team reviewed a self-revealing finding associated with the licensee'sfailure to correct normal charging pump balance line vibrations in a timelymanner. Because the licensee did not address the extended time andperiodically increased magnitude of the vibrations, the balance line cracked,rendering the pump inoperable. This issue was entered into the licensee'scorrective action program as Condition Report 2007-02339. The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the mitigatingsystems cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and affected the associated cornerstone objective ensuring the availability, reliability, andcapability of systems that respond to initiating ev ents to prev ent undesirableconsequences. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance DeterminationProcess," Phase 1 Worksheet, the finding was determined to have very lowsafety significance because the finding did not screen as potentially risksignificant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. Thefinding had crosscutting aspects in the area of problem identification andresolution associated with the corrective action program (P.1(d)) in that licenseepersonnel did not take corrective actions to address a safety issue in a timelymanner, commensurate with its safety significance (Section 1R21.b.6).

Enclosure-5-*Green. The team identified a finding associated with the licensee's failure tomaintain a procedure which ensured that control building room drains remainedavailable to pass their design flows for postulated flooding events. As a result ofthe licensee's procedure and practices, debris and items were found in controlbuilding room drains. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective actionprogram as Condition Report 2007-02753.The finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected it would become amore significant safety concern. This finding affected the mitigating systemscornerstone. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance DeterminationProcess," Phase 1 Worksheet, the finding is determined to have very low safetysignificance because the finding did not screen as potentially risk significant dueto a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The finding hadcrosscutting aspects in the area of human performance associated with workpractices (H.4(b)) because the licensee did not define and effectivelycommunicate expectations regarding procedural compliance and personnelfollowing procedures (Section 1R21.b.7).*Green. The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B,Criterion III, "Design Control," having very low safety significance for thelicensee's failure to account for the effect of emergency diesel generator frequency variation in the diesel loading calculations. Specifically, emergencydiesel generator loading was based on nominal 60 hertz operation of pumps andfans and did not account for the 2 percent variation allowed by TechnicalSpecifications. The licensee has entered this issue into their corrective actionprogram as Condition Report 2007-02683.The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the mitigatingsystems cornerstone attribute of design control and affected the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability ofsystems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, based on preliminary calculations, the failure to account forfrequency variations had more than a minimal effect on the outcome of theanalysis in that the continuous load rating for the emergency diesel generatorswould have been exceeded in the recirculation phase of a loss-of-coolantaccident with the assumed loads. The team determined that the findingscreened as very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design orqualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability(Section 1R21.b.8).

B.Licensee-Identified Violations

.

None.

Enclosure-6-

REPORT DETAILS

1.REACTOR SAFETYInspection of component design bases verifies the initial design and subsequentmodifications and provides monitoring of the capability of the selected components andoperator actions to perform their design bases functions. As plants age, their designbases may be difficult to determine and important design features may be altered or disabled during modifications. The pl ant risk assessment model assumes the capabilityof safety systems and components to perform their intended safety functionsuccessfully. This inspectable area verifies aspects of the Initiating Events, MitigatingSystems and Barrier Integrity cornerstones for which there are no indicators to measureperformance.

1R21 Component Design Bases Inspection (71111.21)The team selected risk-significant components and operator actions for review usinginformation contained in t

he licensee's probabilisti c risk assessment. In general, thisincluded components and operator actions that had a risk achievement worth factorgreater than two or a Birnbaum value greater than 1x10

-6.

a. Inspection Scope

To verify that the selected components would function as required, the team revieweddesign basis assumptions, calculations, and procedures. In some instances, the teamperformed calculations to independently verify the licensee's conclusions. The teamalso verified that the condition of the components was consistent with the design bases and that the te sted capabilities met t he required criteria.The team reviewed maintenance work records, corrective action documents, andindustry operating experience records to verify that licensee personnel considereddegraded conditions and their impact on the components. For the review of operatoractions, the team observed operators during simulator scenarios, as well as duringsimulated actions in the plant.The team performed a margin assessment and detailed review of the selectedrisk-significant components to verify that the design bases have been correctlyimplemented and maintained. This design margin assessment considered originaldesign issues, margin reductions because of modifications, and margin reductionsidentified as a result of mate rial condition issues.

Equipment reliability issues were alsoconsidered in the selection of components for detailed review. These included itemssuch as failed performance test results; significant corrective actions; repeatedmaintenance; 10 CFR 50.65(a)1 status; operable, but degraded conditions; NRCresident inspector input of problem equipment; system health reports; industry operatingexperience; and licensee problem equipment lists. Consideration was also given to theuniqueness and complexity of the design, operating experience, and the availabledefense in-depth margins.

-7-The inspection procedure requires a review of 15-20 risk-significant and low designmargin components, 3 to 5 relatively high-risk operator actions, and 4 to 6 operatingexperience issues. The sample selection for this inspection was 20 components,3 operator actions, and 4 operating experience issues. The components selected for review were:

• Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST)*125 VDC safety related Battery NK-11*Residual heat removal (RHR) Pump A*Component cooling water (CCW) Pump B*RWST discharge valves*Containment sump discharge valves*Turbine driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) Pump*Motor driven auxiliary feedwater (MDAFW) Pump*Condensate Storage Tank (CST)*RWST level instrumentation*4160 Volt safety related switchgear*Auxiliary feedwater (AFW) low suction pressu re transmitters*Emergency diesel generator (EDG) fuel oil transfer pumps*Essential service water (ESW) Traveling Screens*ESW Pump A*Normal charging pump*CCW heat Exchanger A*EDG B*EDG exhaust Damper A*125 VDC fused disconnect Switch 89NK0404The scenarios selected for risk-significant, time critical operator action included:.

Steam generator tube ruptureStation blackoutLarge break loss of coolant accidentThe operating experience issues were:

NRC Generic Letter 2006-01 - Steam Generator Tube Integrity and associatedTechnical Specifications.NRC Generic Letter 2006-02 - Grid Reliability and the Impac t on Plant Risk andthe Operability of Offsite Power.NRC Information Notice 2005-30 - Safe Shutdown Potentially Challenged byUnanalyzed Internal Flooding Events and Inadequate Design.NRC Information Notice 2006-06 - Loss of Offsite Power and Station BlackoutAre More Probable During Summer Period.

-8-

.1 Inadequate Procedure for Restoration of Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Fuel OilTransfer Pump Control Circuit Following a Fire Requiring Control Room Evacuation

.Introduction. The team identified a Green noncited violation (NCV) of TechnicalSpecification 5.4.1.a, for the licensee's inadequate procedures for remotely starting theEDG fuel oil transfer pump following a fire in the control room.Description. As part of the inspection of the EDG fuel oil transfer pumps, the teamreviewed the licensee's procedure for operation of the fuel oil transfer system. From thisreview the team discovered that the licensee had previously identified a vulnerability ofthe fuel oil transfer pumps during a fire in the control room. Specifically, control power tothe pumps could be lost and action would have to be taken by operators to restore thepumps to service.The licensee's procedure provided specific instructions for de-energizing the EDG fueloil transfer pump control circuit, cutting pre-identified control wiring, installing pre-stagedjumpers to pre-identified terminals, and restoring control power. However, the teamidentified that in preparation of this procedure, the licensee had failed to consider that fora fire-induced short-to-ground in the control circuit, the control power fuse would likelyblow. The licensee's procedure failed to include the necessary actions to replace thecontrol power fuse in the associated motor control center. In addition, the licensee hadfailed to specify and stage the control power fuse and fuse puller that would be requiredfor timely restoration of the EDG fuel oil transfer pump to service following the controlroom fire.Restoration of the EDG fuel oil transfer pump within sixty minutes was required by thelicensee's commitment for actions identified in Letter SLNRC 84-109, "Fire ProtectionReview." Based on discussions with licensee personnel during the inspection, the teamconcluded that these actions most likely would not be completed within sixty minutesbecause the requisite steps for specifying, staging, and replacing the control power fusehad not been provided. To address the team's concern, the licensee initiated Condition Report (CR) 2007-02790and an on-the-spot change to Procedure OFN RP-017, "Control Room Evacuation

,"Revision 23. The on-the-spot change added steps to obtain a previously staged 2ampere control power fuse and fuse pullers from the Train B EDG emergency locker andfor replacing the fuse.

Analysis.

The team identified the failure to provide adequate procedural guidance torestore the EDG fuel oil transfer pump to service following a fire requiring evacuation ofthe control room to be a performance deficiency. This finding was greater than minorbecause it affected the procedure quality attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstoneobjective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond toinitiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The team evaluated the findingusing Appendix F, "Fire Protection Significance Determination Process (SDP)," ofManual Chapter (MC) 0609. The team categorized the finding as a post-fire safeshutdown issue with a moderate degradation rating using the SDP. Also, the team

-9-assumed the condition existed for greater than thirty days and had a main control roomgeneric fire frequency of 8x10

-3. With these assumptions, the team determined furtheranalysis was necessary. The team consulted with regional senior reactor analysts whoconcluded that Phase 2 of the fire protection SDP in Appendix F of MC 0609 was not themost effective tool for this control room evacuation finding. Therefore, regional seniorreactor analysts performed a Phase 3 analysis. The analysis assumed the probability ofa fire in the relevant cabinets that would result in control room evacuation was 5.1x10

-5per year. In addition, it was assumed none of the fires postulated in the analysis would cause an unintentional loss of offsite power or preclude its recovery at some time later inthe scenario. A bounding value of 1.2x10

-7 , very low safety significance (Green), wasassessed for this finding.Enforcement.

Wolf Creek Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, requires, in part, that writtenprocedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicableprocedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February1978. Section 6.p of Regulatory Guide 1.33 requires a procedure for combating a fire inthe Control Room or forced evacuation of the Control Room. Procedure OFN RP-017,"Control Room Evacuation," is the licensee's procedure to meet this requirement. Contrary to the above, the licensee did not establish Procedure OFN RP-017, "ControlRoom Evacuation," Revision 23, specifically with respect to guidance in restoring theEDG fuel oil transfer pump to service following a fire resulting in evacuation of thecontrol room. This inadequate procedure was in effect until identified by the team onJuly 16, 2007. Because the licensee's actions taken during the inspection toimmediately revise this procedure and enter this item into the station corrective actionprogram as CR 2007-02790, this violation was identified as a NCV consistent withSection VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000482/2007006-01, "InadequateProcedure for Restoration of the Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer PumpControl Circuit Following a Fire Requiring Control Room Evacuation."

.2 Inadequate RWST Vortexing CalculationIntroduction.

The team identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," associated with a non-conservative calculation for theRWST tank empty level that could result in vortexing in the RWST prior to the post-accident swap-over of suction of the containment spray pumps from RWST to theContainment Sump.Description. During the review of Wolf Creek RWST design documentation, the teamquestioned if the calculation of the vortex level for the RWST was sufficientlyconservative based on available literature describing a more accurate prediction ofvortexing than contained in the licensee's calculation. The licensee's calculation wasperformed during initial plant design and predicted vortexing would occur at a levelwhere actual water level reached the top of the suction pipe. Operating experience andinspection results from other plants also indicated that this level may not be sufficient. After questioning by the team, licensee engineers determined that the RWST emptylevel (the level designed to assure that the pumps are protected from air entrainmentdue to vortex formation) should be raised from 6 percent full instrument span to 7percent full instrument span to assure that air entrainment would be precluded. Thischange increased the required submergence level by approximately 6 inches.

-10-Analysis. The performance deficiency associated with this finding involved the failure ofengineering personnel to properly account for potential vortex formation and subsequentair entrainment in the containment spray pumps prior to the completion of the transfer ofthe RWST to the containment sump. The team determined that the finding is greaterthan minor because it is associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute ofdesign control and affects the associated cornerstone objective of ensuring theavailability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events toprevent undesirable consequences. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, "SignificanceDetermination Process," Phase 1 Worksheet, the finding was determined to have verylow safety significance (Green), because it was a design deficiency confirmed not toresult in loss of operability. The finding had crosscutting aspects in the area of problemidentification and resolution associated with the corrective action program (P.1(a))because the licensee did not identify an issue in a timely manner, commensurate with itssafety significance.Enforcement. 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," requires, inpart, that design control measures be established and implemented to assure thatapplicable regulatory requirements and the design basis for structures, systems, andcomponents (SSCs) are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures,and instructions. Contrary to the above, the licensee did not implement design controlmeasures which assured that applicable regulatory requirements for SSCs werecorrectly translated into specifications. Specifically, from initial plant operation untilJuly 13, 2007, Wolf Creek engineering personnel failed to ensure that the RWST leveland resultant level alarm setpoint adequately maintained sufficient RWST level to assurethat the containment spray pumps were protected against air entrainment which couldhave resulted in pump damage because their design calculation did not accuratelypredict vortex formation. Because this issue was of very low safety significance and hasbeen entered into the licensee's corrective action program (CR 2007-02597), thisviolation is being treated as a NCV, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRCEnforcement Policy: NCV 05000482/2007006-02, "Inadequate Design ControlAssociated with Vortexing Calculation."

.3 Inadequate Identification of Boric Acid Deposits on the RWSTIntroduction.

The team identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B,Criterion XVI, for the failure to identify and promptly clean discolored boric acid depositson the RWST.

Description.

On June 12, 2007, during an inspection walkdown, the team noted whiteand orangish-brown deposits at the base of the RWST. The team questioned thelicensee about the deposits as they appeared to contain boric acid. The licensee indicated that their past analysis had determined t he deposits to be ca lcium-silicateinsulation which had been used for insulating the RWST. The team questioned thisanalysis because of the strong resemblance to boric acid deposits.In response the licensee sampled the deposits and shipped them to an offsite laboratoryto determine the content of the deposits. Results of this sample yielded that it containedboron.

-11-The team questioned how long the deposits could have been mistakenly identified asinsulation. The licensee had initiated a problem identification Report (PIR) 1998-03860in 1998. In this PIR, the licensee pursued the nature of the deposits and discovered thatthe deposits did contain amounts of insulation, but also contained boron. The licenseedismissed the boron as spillage from a samping evolution. On two subsequentoccasions after 1998 the deposits were questioned by the licensee and dismissed asinsulation based on the 1998 PIR resolution. In each of these cases the deposits werecleaned up and the focus of the PIR was the station's allowance of the poor materielcondition of the area.Subsequently, the licensee performed inspections of the carbon steel components in the area and determi ned that no signifcant wastage had occurred and operability of theRWST and its surrounding components was not affected.Analysis. The performance deficiency associated with this finding involved the licensee'sfailure to correctly identify the presence of boric acid corrosion.

The team determinedthat the issue was greater than minor because if left uncorrected, the failure to identifythe presence of boric acid for extended periods of time would become a more significantsafety concern in that continued wastage could impact plant components. The findingaffected the mitigating systems cornerstone. Using the Phase 1 worksheets in ManualChapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," the team determined that thefinding had very low safety significance (Green) because it did not result in a system orcomponent being inoperable and it did not screen as potentially risk significant due to aseismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The finding had crosscuttingaspects in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with thecorrective action program (P.1(c) because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate theproblem such that the resolution addressed the cause and extent of condition.Enforcement. Part 50, 10 CFR Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," states, inpart, that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality arepromptly identified and corrected. Contrary to the above, in 1998 and into 2007, thelicensee did not identify the source of the boric acid on the base of the RWST andtherefore did not take corrective actions to prevent recurrence. Because of the very lowsafety significance and because the licensee included this condition in their correctiveaction program as CR 2007-02742, this violation is being treated as an NCV, consistentwith Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000482/2007006-03, "Failureto Identify and Correct Discolored Boric Acid Deposits."

.4 Nonconservative Battery Intercell Connection Resistance ValueIntroduction.

The team identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," for the failure of the licensee to ensure that the 125 Vdcsafety-related batteries would remain operable if all the intercell and terminalconnections were at the resistance value of 150 micro-ohms as allowed by TechnicalSpecification Surveillance Requirement 3.8.4.5.

Description.

During a review of operating experience data from an inspection finding atanother facility that dealt with a nonconservative Technical Specification SR, the licensee determined that their Technical Specification surveill ance requirement

-12-appeared to be similar. A condition had been identified where the design calculationsused a reference value for the intercell resistance for the safety-related batteries thatwas less than the value in the station Technical Specification surveillance requirement. The licensee identified that the design value for safety-related batteries NK-11 and NK-14 was 19 micro-ohms in Calculation NK-E-002, and the Technical Specificationsurveillance requirement value was less than or equal to 150 micro-ohms.This issue was reviewed by licensee electrical engineers who concluded that since theirexisting intercell connection readings were below 19 micro-ohms, the battery wasoperable. The engineers also concluded that since their procedure for intercellresistance checks called for corrective action if the value exceeded 23 micro-ohms, theywould never approach operation with the resistances near the Technical Specificationallowed value. The team reviewed the procedure and noted that the type and timelinessof corrective action was not specified and the ultimate acceptance value of 150 micro-ohms was listed in the procedure. As a result, the team did not consider the procedureadequate to control intercell resistances at or below the 19 micro-ohm value.The team noted that a discussion or evaluation of the surveillance requirement limitbeing applicable to all of the cells of the battery was not made in the screening, and assuch, no discussion of the capability of the batteries to perform their design safetyfunction with the larger resistance values was present. The licensee could notconclusively determine if the battery was capable of performing its design function withall intercell resistances at 150 micro-ohms. As a result, the licensee updated theirdesign calculation using the correct resistances and determined that actual designmargin had been decreased from 19 percent to 6 percent. The team considered this acase where a new design basis calculation had to be performed to ensure componentcapability.Analysis. The performance deficiency associated with this finding involved thelicensee's failure to ensure that the 125 Vdc safety-related batteries would remainoperable if all the intercell connections were at the resistance value of 150 micro-ohmsas allowed by Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.8.2.3. This findingwas greater than minor because it was associated with the mitigating systemscornerstone attribute of design control and affects the associated cornerstone objectiveto ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of system s that respond to initiatingevents to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Manual Chapter 0609,"Significance Determination Process," Phase 1 Worksheet, the finding was determinedto have very low safety significance because it was a design deficiency confirmed not toresult in loss of operability. The finding had crosscutting aspects in the area of problemidentification and resolution associated with the corrective action program (P.1(a))because the licensee did not implement a corrective action program with a low thresholdfor identifying this issue and the licensee did not identify the issue completely,accurately, and in a timely manner.Enforcement. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Desi gn Control," requires, inpart, that measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatoryrequirements and the design basis for SSCs are correctly translated in specifications,drawings, procedures, and instructions. It further states that design control measuresshall provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of design, such as by the

-13-performance of design reviews, by the use of alternate or simplified calculationalmethods, or by the performance of a suitable testing program. Contrary to the above,prior to July 17, 2007, the licensee failed to verify that the specified 150 micro-ohmcriterion would be sufficient to ensure safety-related battery operability in accordancewith the design basis. Because this finding is of very low safety significance and hasbeen entered into the corrective action program as CR 2007-02492, this violation isbeing treated as an NCV consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000482/2007006-04, "Nonconservative Battery Intercell Connection ResistanceValue Specified in Design Calculation."

.5 Battery Surfaces Not Cleaned as Required by ProcedureIntroduction. The team identified a Green NCV of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, for thelicensee's failure to clean electrolyte from the outside surfaces of the 125 Vdc safety-related batteries in accordance with procedures.

Description.

During a walkdown performed on June 26, 2007, the team observed dropsof liquid on top of several cells for safety-related Battery NK-14. The licenseedetermined the liquid to be electrolyte that was spread during the performance ofspecific gravity checks during maintenance. In addition, further inspection revealed thiscondition to be present on all 125 Vdc batteries (Batteries NK11, NK12, NK13, andNK14). The battery cell covers have a translucent appearance with internal condensation dropscovering the inside surface of the cover. This attribute causes electrolyte residing on theoutside surface of the cover to be difficult to observe. Since maintenance personnel didnot realize that electrolyte was being spread during the specific gravity checks and didnot closely inspect the outside battery surfaces after the checks, the splattering hadbeen occurring for an indeterminate amount of time without being subsequently cleanedaccording to procedure. Specifically, Procedure STS MT-019, "125 VDC Class 1EQuarterly Battery Ins pection," stated, "Clean any electrolyte spillage on cell covers orcontainers with bicarbonate of soda solution or other suitable neutralizing agent. Wipeexcessive dirt from cells with a water moistened clean wiper."By not recognizing that the electrolyte splattering was occurring, and therefore notneutralizing and cleaning the electrolyte from outer battery surfaces, a corrosiveenvironment was being introduced. Although the battery cell cover itself is notsusceptible to the electrolyte, the dropping and splattering of electrolyte can impact thebattery cell terminal connections and posts. Vendor documentation, "LucentTechnologies LINEAGE 2000 Round Cell Battery," states, "When taking specificgravity readings, cover the bottom of the tube on the hydrometer with a paper towelwhile moving it from cell to cell to avoid splashing or throwing the electrolyte." "Corrosion from electrolyte leakage usually is caused by careless handling of thehydrometer syringe when measuring specific gravity" when referring to batteryconnection corrosion. No corrosion was observed. However the team determined thatthe splattering of electrolyte when measuring specific gravity would eventually lead tocorrosion on the battery terminals.

-14-Analysis. The team determined that the failure to follow the battery surveillanceprocedures was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because ifleft uncorrected the finding would become a more significant safety concern. Using theManual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Phase 1 Worksheet, thefinding was determined to have very low safety significance because it did not result in adesign qualification deficiency or loss of function and it did not screen as risk significantdue to external events. Although the licensee was not following the procedureinstructions for cleaning electrolyte on batteries, the station batteries were capable ofperforming their required safety function as evidenced by successful surveillance testingand lack of corrosion. The finding had crosscutting aspects in the area of humanperformance associated with work practices (H.4(a)) because of insufficientcommunication of human error prevention techniques to maintenance personnel,specifically with respect to self and peer checking.Enforcement. Wolf Creek Technical Specification 5.4.1.a requires, in part, that writtenprocedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicableprocedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A,February 1978. Section 9.a of Regulatory Guide 1.33 requires, in part, that maintenancethat can affect the performance of safety-related equipment be performed in accordancewith written procedures appropriate to the circumstances. Contrary to the above, prior tothe team's observation of the station's safety-related batteries on June 26, 2007,licensee personnel failed to clean electrolyte from the battery cell covers and containersaccording to Procedure STS MT-019, "125 VDC Class 1E Quarterly Battery Inspection." Because the violation was of very low safety significance and the licensee entered thefinding into their corrective action program as CR 2007-02580, this violation is beingtreated as an NCV consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000482/2007006-05, "Battery Surfaces Not Cleaned as Required by Procedure."

.6 Normal Charging Pump Balance Line CrackIntroduction.

The team reviewed a self-revealing Green finding for the licensee's failureto take appropriate corrective actions for vibrations in the normal charging pump balanceline in a timely manner.Description. During a walkdown on June 13, 2007, the team noted a maintenance tagon the balance line of the normal charging pump. The tag described that the line haddeveloped a crack at one elbow on June 6, 2007, and that the line needed to berepaired. The team questioned the history behind the crack. The team determined from interviews with licensee personnel that in 2005 vibrations inthe balance line of the normal charging pump were identified as increasing.

As a result,the licensee initiated Design Change Package 012166 to address the vibrations. Theteam did not identify a time schedule for implementation of the modification, nor was anassessment made that the line would not experience problems during the time themodification was developed.Delays were encountered during the modification preparation, including one for impropermaterials for the modification. These delays were never documented with regard to theireffect on extending the exposure time of the balance line to its existing vibrations.

-15-Subsequently, vibrations increased such that the noise made by the pipe support wasmore pronounced. In this instance, the piping restraints were adjusted. The licenseedid not formally document the effect of the increased vibrations.An apparent result of the extended vibrations was the balance line cracked and a 2 dropper minute leak occurred. The licensee removed the normal charging pump fromservice to repair the line, rendering the pump unavailable.

Analysis.

The performance deficiency associated with this finding involved licenseepersonnel not adequately evaluating the line vibration which led to a failure of acomponent important to safety. The finding was greater than minor because it isassociated with the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of equipment performanceand affects the associat ed cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability,and capability of system s that respond to initiating events to prev ent undesirableconsequences. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process,"Phase 1 Worksheet, the finding was determined to have very low safety significancebecause the finding did not screen as potentially risk significant because it did notrepresent a loss of system safety function and was not potentially risk significant due toa seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The finding had crosscuttingaspects in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with thecorrective action program (P.1(d)) in that licensee personnel did not take correctiveactions to address a safety issue in a timely manner, commensurate with its safetysignificance.Enforcement. While a performance deficiency was identified, there were no violations ofNRC requirements identified during the review of this issue, because the normalcharging pump is not a safety related component. The licensee has entered this issueinto the corrective action program as CR 2007-02339: FIN 05000482/2007006-06,"Normal Charging Pump Balance Line Crack."

.7 Inadequate Procedure for Maintaining Drains Capable of FunctioningIntroduction. The team reviewed a self-revealing Green finding for the licensee's failureto ensure that the procedure for ensuring that Control Building room drains remain freeof debris such that they could perform their design functions.Description.

The team conducted walkdowns with licensee engineers of the electricalswitchgear and battery rooms on June 26, 2007, and conducted additional toursthroughout the remainder of the inspection. The team focused on the condition of theroom drains in these rooms, including the grates and screens over the drainpipes andthe observable condition of the drainpipes. During these tours, the team noted thefollowing:*In safety related battery Room 3405, a pair of pliers was observed to be lodgedin the first bend of drainpipe leaving the room.*In safety related battery Room 3407, debris had accumulated on the screen forthe drain such that the effective diameter of the drain was affected.

-16-*In nonsafety related battery Room 3411, debris had accumulated on the screenfor the drain and a screwdriver was observed to be lodged in the first bend of thedrainpipe leaving the room.*In safety related switchgear Room 3301, debris had accumulated on one of thescreens for the drain such that the team questioned whether the effectivediameter of the drain was affected.The team questioned the licensee about the operability of the room dr ains and about thepreventive maintenance which would allow the drains to be found in these conditions. The team also noted from their review of flooding Calculation LE-M-004, "Flooding inClass 1E Switchgear Room 3301 and 3302 and Battery Room 2 and Battery Room 3,"Revision 0, that the drains in the switchgear and nonsafety related battery rooms wererequired to pass prescribed water flow rates to prevent water accumulation and roomflooding. Licensee engineers performed a field walkdown to assess the condition of the drainsand performed an evaluation on each condition. The licensee concluded that no designflooding condition existed for the safety related battery rooms since no credible floodingsource existed in the rooms. For the screen conditions in the other rooms, the licenseewas able to ensure operability by analyzing the amount of blockage and accounting forconservatism in the flooding source. The licensee then addressed the procedures and maintenance schedule which allowedthese conditions to persist. Their review determined that the drains were covered byStep 5.7.3 of Procedure AP 12-001, "Housekeeping Control," which stated that floordrain screens located outside the radiologically controlled area shall be inspected bysupport personnel to ensure they are not clogged. The licensee concluded that thisverbage was ambiguous and entered this condition into their corrective action programas CR 2007-02753.Analysis. The performance deficiency associated with this finding involved thelicensee's failure to maintain a procedure which would ensure that Control Building roomdrains would be available to perform their design function. The finding is greater thanminor because if left uncorrected it would become a more significant safety concern, inthat, with the observed practices and procedures, the room drains could have becomeincapable of passing their required flowrates during a flooding event. This findingaffected the mitigating systems cornerstone. Using the Manual Chapter 0609,"Significance Determination Process," Phase 1 Worksheet, the finding is determined tohave very low safety significance because the as-found conditions did not screen aspotentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The finding had crosscutting aspects in the area of human performance associated withwork practices (H.4(b)) because the licensee did not define and effectively communicateexpectations regarding procedural compliance and personnel following procedures.

Enforcement.

While a performance deficiency was identified, there were no violations ofNRC requirements identified during the review of this issue, because the ControlBuilding room drains are not a safety related components. The licensee has enteredthis issue into the corrective action program as CR 2007-02753:

-17-FIN 05000482/2007006-07, "Inadequate Procedure for Maintaining Drains Capable ofFunctioning."

.8 Diesel Generator Frequency Variation Not Considered in Loading CalculationsIntroduction.

The team identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," for the licensee's failure to account for the effect offrequency variation in the EDG loading calculations.Description. The team reviewed Drawing E-11005, "List of Loads Supplied byEmergency Diesel Generator," which supplied the load information used as input for thedesign analysis results contained in Report M-018-01502, "Engineering Report WolfCreek NPP 6201 kW Diesel Generator Set." Report M-018-01502 was a voltage andfrequency study of the EDGs during analyzed accident conditions. The team noted thatthe loading determined in the documents was based on nominal 60 Hertz operation ofpumps and fans, and did not account for the 2 percent variation allowed by TechnicalSpecification 3.8.1. The team recalled that mechanical affinity laws show that powerdemanded by centrifugal pumps and fans increases by the cube of the ratio of thespeeds. Since the EDG accident loading was comprised primarily of centrifugal loads,the team questioned the licensee as to why this phenomenon was not considered in theloading calculations. In response to the team's question, the licensee performed andprovided preliminary calculations that showed that EDG loading would increase byapproximately six percent. Consequently, when the maximum allowed frequencyvariation was included, the majority of the available margin for EDGs was removed, andin the case of the category "Recirculation Phase, Total Load on Load Group 2," thecalculated continuous load rating of the EDG of 6201 kilowatts was exceeded with anEDG loading at 6226 kilowatts. In response, the team and licensee engineers held discussions with operationspersonnel which revealed that implementation of actual plant procedures would result inslightly different loads being energized than assumed in Drawing E-11005. Mostimportantly, a nonsafety-related 250 Volt Battery Charger, PJ031, would not be manuallyadded to the bus. As a result, the expected EDG loading was preliminarily determinedto be 6168 kilowatts, which was within the EDG continuous load rating. This issue wasentered into the licensee's corrective action program as CR 2007-02683.Analysis. The team determined that the failure to properly account for the effect offrequency variation on diesel generator loading was a performance deficiency which hadto be corrected by revising the design loading calculation. The finding was determinedto be more than minor because the finding was associated with the design controlattribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone's objectiveto ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of system s that respond to initiatingevents to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, based on preliminarycalculations, the failure to account for frequency variations had more than a minimaleffect on the outcome of the analysis in that the continuous load rating for the EDGswould have been exceeded in the recirculation phase of a loss-of-coolant accident withthe assumed loads. Using Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process,"Phase 1 Worksheet, the finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green)

-18-because the finding represented a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not toresult in loss of operability.

Enforcement.

Part 50, 10 CFR, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Desi gn Control," requires, inpart, that measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirementsand the design basis are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures,and instructions. Contrary to the above, the licensee had not adequately translateddesign basis information into the diesel generator loading analysis. Specifically prior toJuly 16, 2007, the analysis providing the information in M-018-01502, "EngineeringReport Wolf Creek NPP 6201 kW Diesel Generator Set," did not properly account for thetechnical specification allowable diesel generator two percent frequency variation. Thelicensee failed to consider how the frequency variation could affect the design andlicensing basis of the diesel engines. Because the violation was of very low safetysignificance and the licensee entered the finding into their corrective action program asCR 2007-02683, this violation is being treated as an NCV consistent with Section VI.A.1of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000482/2007006-08, "Diesel GeneratorFrequency Variation Not Considered in Loading Calculations."

.9 Potential for Damage to TDAFW Pump and ESW System During CST UnavailabilityThe team reviewed the pertinent design calculations concerning the automatic swapoverof the suction source for the auxilary feedwater (AFW) pumps from the condensatestorage tank (CST) to the emergency service water (ESW) system.

In responding to aloss of offsite power (LOOP), the team noted that the TDAFW pump and EDGs arestarted immediately on an undervoltage signal, and safety loads are then automaticallysequenced after the EDG is ready to accept load. The team questioned the condition ifthe CST was not available and noted the ESW system would be automatically aligned bya low AFW suction pressure signal to provide suction to the AFW system. Consideringthe 12 second maximum start time for the diesel, and the subsequent load sequencetimes, the team noted that the first ESW pump might not be at full flow until about32 seconds after a LOOP, and the second ESW pump at about 37 seconds. Therefore,if the CST were not available and ESW were the AFW source, the water initiallyavailable to the TDAFW pump suction would be limited to the useable volume in the suction piping. The team questioned w hether the system had the capability to break avacuum in the suction piping with sufficient inflow of air. In addition, the teamquestioned when the ESW pumps are eventually started, if vacuums formed in thepiping, whether there would be potential for water hammer in both trains of the ESWsystem. The licensee responded with their design assumptions and calculations for thesystems. The team reviewed the licensee's response and questioned whether thelicensee's assumptions were within the design and licensing bases of the plant. Pending further inspection of the licensee's adherence to these bases, this issue wasconsidered an unresolved item (URI): URI 05000482/2007006-09, "Potential for Damageto TDAFW Pump and ESW System During CST Unavailability."

.10 Effect of EDG Frequency Variation on Supplied EquipmentThe team identified that during a LOOP event with the EDGs supplying plant loads, theoutput frequency of the supplied power would be allowed to vary from 58.8 hertz to 61.2hertz by Technical Specification 3.8.1.

The licensee had already begun to address this

-19-allowed frequency variation in specific cases, namely the effect of underfrequency in theemergency core cooling system pumps in PIR 2006-0481 and the effects of frequencyvariation on motor operated valves in CR 2007-002687. However, the team noted thatthe general plant-wide effect of the allowed frequency variation had not been completely addressed in the design calculations of the facility. Components such as fans,compressors, and actuators are depended upon to mitigate the effects of design basisaccidents and would be affected by the variation in frequency. The team noted that thesafety margins for the operation of this equipment could be less than currently analyzed. Examples of affected parameters could include reduced functional capacity, increasedpower cable loadings/heating, increased net positive suction head requirements, earliervortex formation, in creased and/or decreased draindown/fill times, andincreased/decreased required operator action times.The licensee initiated CR 2007-02734 in order to evaluate this issue. Once the licenseehas evaluated the effect of frequency variation and determined the degree of safetymargin impact throughout the plant, the NRC can complete the inspection of thatanalysis in order to close this issue. Pending this review, this issue is considered anURI: URI 05000482/2007006-10, "Effect of Emergency Diesel Generator FrequencyVariation on Supplied Equipment."

OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA6Meetings, Including ExitOn July 20, 2007, the team leader presented the preliminary inspection results to Mr. R.Muench, President and Chief Executive Officer, and other members of the licensee'sstaff. On August 31, 2007, the team leader presented the inspection resultstelephonically to Mr. B. Smith, and other members of the licensee's staff. The licenseeacknowledged the findings during each meeting. While some proprietary informationwas reviewed during this inspection, no proprietary information was included in thisreport.Attachments:Supplemental InformationInitial Information RequestSecond Information Request A-1

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel

T. J. Garrett, Vice

President, Engineering

S. E. Hedges, Vice President, Operations and Plant Manager

D. Helm, Engineering Team Leader

R. A. Muench, President and Chief Executive Officer

K. Scherich, Director, Engineering

M. Sunseri, Vice President, Oversight

P. Bedgood, Superintendent, Radiation Protection

T. Jensen, Superintendent, Chemistry

S. Koenig, Manager, Chemistry/Radiation Protection

B. Muilenburg, Licensing Engineer, Regulatory Affairs

M. Skiles, Supervisor, Radiation Protection

K. Thrall, Supervisor, Radiation Protection

P. Wagner, Steam Generator Engineer, Engineering

NRC personnel

S. Cochrum, Senior Resident Inspector

C. Long, Resident Inspector

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened and

Closed

05000482/FIN-2007006-01 NCVInadequate Procedure for Restoration of theEmergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil TransferPump Control Circuit Following a Fire RequiringControl Room Evacuation

(Section 1R21.b.1)

05000482/FIN-2007006-02NCV Inadequate Design Control Associated withVortexing Calculation (Section 1R21.b.2)

05000482/FIN-2007006-03NCV Failure to Identify and Correct Discolored BoricAcid Deposits (Section 1R21.b.3)

05000482/FIN-2007006-04NCVNonconservative Battery Intercell ConnectionResistance Value Specified in Design Calculation(Section 1R21.b.4)

05000482/FIN-2007006-05NCV Battery Surfaces Not Cleaned as Required byProcedure (Section 1R21.b.5)

05000482/FIN-2007006-06FIN Normal Charging Pump Balance Line Crack(Section 1R21.b.6)

AttachmentA-2

05000482/FIN-2007006-07FINInadequate Procedure for Maintaining DrainsCapable of Functioning (Section 1R21.b.7)

05000482/FIN-2007006-08NCVDiesel Generator Frequency Variation NotConsidered in Loading Calculations(Section 1R21.b.8)

05000482/FIN-2007006-09URIPotential for Damage to TDAFW Pump and ESWSystem During CST Unavailability(Section 1R21.b.9)

05000482/FIN-2007006-10URIEffect of Emergency Diesel Generator FrequencyVariation on Supplied Equipment(Section 1R21.b.10)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Surveillance Tests NumberTitleDateETS-AI-211TD AFW System Flow Path Verification and InserviceCheck Valve12/2/20035/19/200511/10/2006STS

AL-212MD AFW System Flow Path Verification and InserviceCheck Valve11/30/20035/15/20052/27/2007STN

PE-037AEssential Service Water A Heat Exchanger Flow andDifferential Pressure Trending2/9/2006STN

PE-037BEssential Service Water B Heat Exchanger Flow andDifferential Pressure Trending1/28/20047/27/20047/1/20057/25/20051/23/200610/27/20061/22/2007

AttachmentA-3STS

CH-008AEmergency Fuel Oil Storage Tank A7/6/20068/2/20069/7/200610/13/200611/10/200612/7/20061/4/20071/30/20073/8/20074/5/2007 5/2/20076/7/2007STS

CH-008BEmergency Fuel Oil Storage Tank B7/20/20068/16/20069/21/200610/03/200610/29/200611/15/200612/20/20061/18/20072/15/20073/20/20074/19/20075/17/2007STS

CH-015Emergency Diesel New Fuel4/7/20065/23/20069/21/20069/22/200610/3/200610/4/200610/26/200610/27/200610/29/200610/31/20061/05/20071/17/2007

AttachmentA-4STS

EF-100AEssential Service Water System Inservice Pump A &Essential Service Water A Discharge Check Valve Test3/11/20046/10/20049/10/200412/9/20043/10/20054/30/056/8/20059/9/200512/8/20053/9/2006 6/7/20069/8/200612/8/20063/9/2007STS

EF-100BEssential Service Water System Inservice Pump B &Essential Service Water B Discharge Check Valve Test2/19/20045/21/20048/19/200411/19/20042/23/20055/20/20058/18/200510/17/200511/18/20052/15/20065/19/20068/18/200610/26/200611/17/20062/16/20075/18/2007STS-KJ-015AManual/Auto Fast Start, Sync, and Loading ofEmergency Diesel Generator NE013/2006STS-KJ-015AManual/Auto Fast Start, Sync, and Loading ofEmergency Diesel Generator NE016/2006STS-KJ-015AManual/Auto Fast Start, Sync, and Loading ofEmergency Diesel Generator NE019/200610/200612/20063/20076/2007

AttachmentA-5STS-KJ-015BManual/Auto Fast Start, Sync, and Loading ofEmergency Diesel Generator NE022/20065/20068/200610/200611/20062/20075/2007Procedures NumberTitleRevision/DateAP 21G-001Control of Locked Component Status43BAP 23F-001Check Valve Reliability Improvement Program10AI 29B-002Check Valve Condition Monitoring Program4MGE

EOOP-05Insulation Resistance Testing15MPM

EF-002Essential Service Water Traveling Water ScreensPreventive Maintenance Activity

11OFN

RP-017Control Room Evacuation, Attachment F, Monitoringand Filling of EDG B Fuel Oil Day Tank

23OTSC 07-0043On the Spot Change, OFN

RP-017, Control RoomEvacuationJuly 16, 2007STN

PE-037BEssential Service Water B Heat Exchanger Flow andDifferential Pressure Trending

13STS

AL-101 MDAFW Pump A Inservice Pump Test35STS

AL-103TDAFW Pump Inservice Pump Test42STS

AL-210A MDAFW Pump A Inservice Check Valve Test6STS

AL-211Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater System Flow PathVerification and Inservice Check Valve Test

19STS

CH-008AEmergency Fuel Oil Storage Tank A21A STS

CH-008BEmergency Fuel Oil Storage Tank B20ASTS

CH-015Emergency Diesel New Fuel21ASTS

EF-100AESW System Inservice Pump A and ESW A DischargeCheck Valve Test

AttachmentA-6STS

EF-100BESW System Inservice Pump B and ESW B DischargeCheck Valve Test

28STS

EG-100AComponent Cooling Water Pumps A/C Inservice PumpTest 20ASTS

EG-100BComponent Cooling Water Pumps B/D Inservice PumpTest17STS-KJ-011ADiesel Generator 24 Hour Run:

Fuel Oil ConsumptionRate Determination

16STS-KJ-011ADiesel Generator 24 Hour Run:

Fuel Oil ConsumptionRate Determination

17STS

VT-001Verification of

OMN-1, MOV Exercise Requirements3ASYS

JE-201Emergency Fuel Oil Storage Tank Filling17AAP 05-005Design, Implementation & Configuration Control ofModifications

11AAP 21B-003Control of Temporary Equipment6CNT-MC-905DOW Corning 3-6548 Silicone RTV F

oam Seals andElastomer Top Cap

3MCE

BA-001Battery Connector Assembly Maintenance13RNM

C-0503Instantaneous Solenoid Overcurrent Relay Type

PJC11AV1A 3RNM

C-0521Induction Disc Voltage Relay Type IAV53L4RNM

C-0552Generator Differential Relay Type

SA-17RNM

C-0577General Electric IAC Induction Disc Overcurrent Relay3STN

IC-805AChannel Calibration Diesel Generation Trips KKJ01A11STS

IC-802A4KV Loss of Voltage and Loss of Offsite PowerChannel Calibration Train A

5STS

IC-803A4KV Undervoltage - Grid Degraded UndervoltageChannel Calibration NB01 Bus

4STS

MT-018Weekly Inspection of 125 VDC Lead-Calcium Batteries16STS

MT-019125 VDC Class 1E Quarterly Battery Inspection13

AttachmentA-7STS

MT-020125 Volt DC Battery Inspection/Charger OperationalTest 21STS

MT-021Service Test for 125 VDC Class 1E Batteries15STS

MT-058Modified Performance Test for 125 VDC Class 1EBatteries 4SYS

KJ-123Post Maintenance Run of Emergency Diesel Generator

A 36ACalculationsNumberTitleRevision10466-M-21-151Ingersoll Rand Pump Performance Test Record, SN#11344/17/197910466-M-21-146Ingersoll Rand(SD#-1081) Pump PerformanceCurves11/13/197810466-M-021147 Ingersoll Rand Performance Test Data, Sheet for4HMTA-9 Pump IN057614711/13/1978AL-30-WCAFW System Setpoints: Pump Suction Pressure;Automatic ESW Switchover; and CST Low Level

3AL-30-WC-003Calculation Change Notice, AFW System Setpoints:Pump Suction Pressure; Automatic ESW Switchover;and CST Low Level2/27/2001AL-M-007Thrust / Torque Calculation for Valves ALHV0005,ALHV0007, ALHV0009, ALHV0011

5AL-M-007Thrust / Torque Calculation for ValvesALHV0005,ALHV0007, ALHV0009, ALHV00116 (Draft)AL-02WAFW Max Allowable Recirculation for the MotorDriven Pumps

0AL-06-WAuxiliary Feedwater PumpsW0AL-07-WAuxiliary Feedwater PumpsW0Al-16--WDetermine the Available NPSH for the AuxiliaryFeedwater Pumps, with Dissolved Nitrogen in theCondensate TankAL-24Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps0

AttachmentA-8AL-30-WCAFW System Set-points, Pump Suction Pressure,Automatic ESW Switchover, and CST Low LevelAL-39AFWMD Pump Head Requirements1AL-40AFW Flow to ruptured Steam Generator (to be usedin S/G flood analysis being performed by SNUPPS)

0AN-94-052Revised Aux FW Flow-rate Requirements00AN-97-003 Evaluation of Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater PumpPerformanceAN-97-047Water Inventory Available and Requirements in theTDAFWP Suction Piping for Accidents Coincidentwith Loss of Offsite Power

0AN 98-001Uncertainty for Refueling Water Storage Tank(RWST) Level-Low, (Lo-Lo-1) Automatic SwitchoverSetpoint and Technical Specification Changes

0AN-99-025Steam Generator Tube Rupture Overfill Analysis withRevised Operator Action Times7/27/2001BJ-M-013Thrust and Torque Calculation for EJ8811A and

V8811B 5BN-23Blockage of RWST Vent to Atmosphere, Part III2BN-J-001RWST Level Transmitter Density Errors0BN-M-011Thrust and Torque Calculation for EJ8812A and

V8812BBN-M-013RWST Volume Requirements for Injection, ECCS,and Containment Spray Pumps Transfer and TimeAvailable for Operator Actions3/18/1999ECCS-47SI Pumps NPSH from RWST0EF-06-WEssential Service Water Component Flow Velocities0EF-10-WEssential Service Water Flows at 90 deg F - NormalMode Operation

1EF-35Essential Service Water Pump Head Requirement2EF-M-030Determine Required Essential Service WaterWarming Line Flow

1EF-M-039Pre-lubrication Line to Essential Service Water Pump0

AttachmentA-9EF-M-043Essential Service Water Make-up Flow Rate toAuxiliary Feedwater - Te st Acceptanc

e Criteria

0EF-M-046Ultimate Heat Sink Analysis with Initial LakeTemperature up to 94 deg F

0EG-06-WComponent Cooling Water SystemW-4EG-09-WTube Plugging for Component Cooling Water HeatExchangers EEG01A/B Maximum CCW Temperature

- LOCA 0EG-M-032Component Cooling Water Heat ExchangerPerformance During Normal Operations, Shutdown atFour Hours (and Twelve Hours), and Post-LOCARecirculation

0EJ-30Residual Heat Removal Pumps (RHR) REJ01B, NetPositive Suction Head (NPSH)EJ-30-WCAFW System Set-points: Pump Pressure: AutomaticESW Switchover and Low CST Level

3EN - 33Containment Spray NPSH1FL-01Flooding of the Auxiliary Building8/30/1993J-K-SA-06Instrument Loop Uncertainty Estimate: System AL,Loops

37, 38, 39

1J1GENInstrument Loop Uncertainty Estimates1J2A08Accuracy: Foxboro Dynamic Compensator (Lead /Lag) 2AC+DYC

0J2A10Accuracy: Voltage-to-Current Converter, Foxboro2AO-V2I 0J2C01Accuracy: Pressure Transmitters, Rosemount 1153Series B 1J2G01Accuracy: CCC Bistable and Sensing Resistor0JE-208Emergency Fuel Oil Flow Diagram and Transfer Pump 0JE-356Emergency Fuel Oil System Pressure DropCalculation

AttachmentA-10JE-MW-001Fuel Oil Storage Tank Volume and Adequacy Check0M-JE-321Emergency Diesel Storage Tank and Day TankVolumes and Level Limits

2M-AP-03Condensate Storage Tank Low-Low Level1M-BN-23Blockage of Refueling Water Storage Tank 2NK-E-001Class 1E DC Voltage Drop2NK-E-002Class 1E Battery Sizing4NK-E-003Class 1E Battery Short Circuit Study1SA-89-017Evaluation of CCW and RHR Heat ExchangePerformance for the Extended Fuel Operating Cycle(18 months)

0SA-91-013Determination of IHSI Flow rate Delivered to the RCSthrough the IHSI Pump Cross Connect Line

0TR 06-0627-TR-1Investigation of Air Entrainment of the ContainmentSpray Piping on the Operation of the ContainmentSpray Pump

0AN-98-001Uncertainty for Refueling Water Storage Tank(RWST) Level-Low, (Lo-Lo-1) Automatic SwitchoverSetpoint and Technical Specification Changes

0BN-20RWST Volumes/Level Set Points2BN-J-001RWST Level Transmitter Density Errors0BN-J-002Total Loop Uncertainty Calculation System BN, Loops0930, 0931, 0932, and 0933

0H-8System NB Protective Relays5H-10System NE Relay Settings5NK-E-001Class 1E DC Voltage Drop2NK-E-002Class 1E Battery Sizing4NK-E-003Class 1E 125V DC Batteries Short-Circuit Study1XX-E-004AC Motor Operated Valve Minimum Terminal Voltage13XX-E-006AC System Analysis5

AttachmentA-11XX-E-009System NB, NG, PG Undervoltage/Degraded VoltageRelay Setpoints

1XX-E-012Safety-Related MCC Control Circuit Allowable WireLengths 2Drawings NumberTitleRevision/Date10466-M-021-149-01Ingersoll Rand Co, Performance Test Data Sheet6HMTA-6 Pump S/N 007619012/4/197810466-M-771-0064-03Safety Class 1E Differential Pressure Indicator withSwitches (Qualification Group B), Sub. 4A8942Control Valve, 20,000 Series Butt Welded Ends,Quick Change -Anti-Cavitation Trim

AE-11NB01Lower Medium Voltage System Class 1E 4.16 kVSingle Line Meter and Relay Diagram

2E-11NG20Low Voltage System Class 1E Motor Control CenterSummary 241E-11NK01Class 1E 125 V DC System Meter & Relay Diagram9E-13AL02ASchematic Diagram, Motor Operated Valves5E-13AL02BSchematic Diagram, Motor Operated Valve5E-13AL04ASchematic Diagram, Motor Operated Valves7E-13AL04BSchematic Diagram, Motor Operated Valves8E-13JE01Schematic Diagram, Emergency Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps 5E-K3EF01Schematic Diagram, Essential Service Water Pump A18E-K3EF01ASchematic Diagram, Essential Service Water Pump B10E-K3EF02Schematic Diagram, Traveling Water Screens16J-04BN03(Q)Instrument Isometric Drawing, Refueling WaterStorage Tank Level Transmitter BN-LT-930

3J-04BN04(Q)Instrument Isometric Drawing, Refueling WaterStorage Tank Level Transmitter BN-LT-931

1J-04BN05(Q)Instrument Isometric Drawing, Refueling WaterStorage Tank Level Transmitter BN-LT-932

AttachmentA-12J-04BN06(Q)Instrument Isometric Drawing, Refueling WaterStorage Tank Level Transmitter BN-LT-933

1J-14AL20(Q)Instrument Isometric Drawing, ESFAS Low SuctionPressure 0J-14AL21(Q)Instrument Isometric Drawing, ESFAS Low SuctionPressure 1J-14AL22(Q)Instrument Isometric Drawing, ESFAS Low SuctionPressure 0J-14EJ05(Q)Instrument Isometric Drawing, RHR Pump 1ADischarge (EJ-FIS-610)

2J-14EJ06(Q)Instrument Isometric Drawing, RHR Pump 1BDischarge (EJ-FIS-611)

2KD-7496One Line Diagram32M-021-0153Terry Turbine Pump Head Curves1/14/1980M-082-029-06Essential Service water Pump Curves12/9/1969M-12AL01 P&ID Auxiliary Feedwater System10M -12BN01P&ID, Borated Refueling Water Storage System12M-12EF01Essential Service Water System20M-12EF02Essential Service Water System23M-12EG02Piping & Instrumentation Diagram ComponentCooling Water System

23M -12EN01P&ID Containment Spray System12M-12FB01Piping & Instrument Diagram, Auxiliary SteamSystem 17M -12FC02P&ID Auxiliary Turbines, Auxiliary feedwater pumpturbine 20M -13AL01Piping Isometric, Aux Feedwater, Suction Piping10M -13AL02 Piping Isometric, Motor Driven Aux Feedwater PumpA Discharge Piping

3M -13AL03 Piping Isometric, Motor Driven Aux Feedwater PumpB Discharge Piping

4M -13AL04 Piping Isometric, Turbine Driven Aux FeedwaterPump Discharge Piping

AttachmentA-13M -13AL05Piping Isometric, Aux Feedwater Pumps,Recirculation Piping

4M -13-BN01Piping Isometric, Borated Refueling Water StorageSys, Auxiliary Building

1M-109-0003-W09Refueling Water Storage Tank7M-1HX001Heat Exchanger Tube Sheet Map - ComponentCooling Water Heat Exchanger "A"

37M-1HX001Heat Exchanger Tube Sheet Map - ComponentCooling Water Heat Exchanger "B"

47M-225-0000612" 150 Welded Ends Stainless Steel, Flex WedgeGate Valve with

SMB-00 Limitorque Operator

1M-225-0000212" 150 Welded Ends Stainless Steel, Flex WedgeGate Valve with SMP Limitorque Operator

8M-724-00293Motor operated Gate Valve MOD 08000GM82FBB

0D)6M-724-00696Motor Operated Gate Valve M00 1402GN84FEHOEO5M-724-00697Motor Operated Gate Valve MOD14002GM84FEB0E0

2M-766-00923Motor Operated Gate Valve MOD14002GM84FEB0E0

4M-766-00948Motor Operated Valve 8811A 1M-K2EF01Essential Service Water System48M-KC0911Essential Service Water System Pumphouse PipingSections 18MS-02Piping Class Sheets48VendorPacific Pumps Division, Dresser Industries Drawing300-VN49768, Pump and Motor Outline, Pump Data,Sheet 3 711873956Instrument List SNUPPS - 7000018C-OCO213 (Q)Refuel'g Wtr. Stg. Tank & Valvehouse Conc. NeatLine and Reinf. Plans and Sections

4E-02NB02 (Q)Logic Diagram ESF XFMR XNB02 Feeder Brkr5E-02NB03 (Q)Logic Diagram NB01 & NB02 Bus Feeder Brkrs7

AttachmentA-14E-02NB04 (Q)Class IE 4.16KV System Notes and References6E-02NG02 (Q)Logic Diagram 480 V LC Main Feeder Breakers5E-02NG03 (Q)Logic Diagram 480 V LC Tie Breakers5E-02NG04 (Q)Logic Diagram 480 V System Notes & Ref.5E-051-00058W063 Phase SCR Controlled Battery Charger Schematic1E-11005List of Loads Supplied by Emergency DieselGenerator 31E-11013Installation, Inspection and Testing Details forElectrical Equipment and Cable

19E-11023Relay Setting Tabulation and Coordination CurvesSystem NB 5E-11024Relay Setting Tabulation & Coordination CurvesSystems NG/PG

2E-11025Relay Setting Tabulation and Coordination CurvesSystem

NE 13E-11028Relay Setting Tabulation Systems NK & NN5E-11028 (Q)Relay Setting Tabulation Systems NK & NN, Sheet 14E-11028 (Q)Relay Setting Tabulation Systems NK & NN, Sheet 25E-11028 (Q)Relay Setting Tabulation Systems NK & NN, Sheet 34E-11028 (Q)Relay Setting Tabulation Systems NK & NN, Sheet 43E-11028 (Q)Relay Setting Tabulation Systems NK & NN, Sheet 50E-11NB01Lower Medium Voltage Sys. Class 1E 4.16 kV SingleLine Meter and Relay Diagram

2E-11NB02Lower Medium Voltage Sys. Class 1E 4.16 kV SingleLine Meter and Relay Diagram

2E-11NG01Low Voltage System Class 1E 480V Single LineMeter & Relay Diagram

9E-11NG02Low Voltage System Class 1E 480V Single LineMeter & Relay Diagram

AttachmentA-15E-11NK01Class 1E 125V DC System Meter & Relay Diagram9E-11NK02Class 1E 125V DC System Meter & Relay Diagram7E-12NB01Logic Diagram ESF XFMR XNB01 Protection0E-12NF01 (Q)Load Shedding and Emergency Load SequencingLogic 3E-13JE01Schematic Diagram Emergency Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps 3E-13JE01Schematic Diagram Emergency Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps 4E-13KJ03ASchematic Diagram Diesel Gen. KKJ01B EngineControl (Start/Stop Circuit)

2E-13KJ03ASchematic Diagram Diesel Gen. KJ01A EngineControl (Start/Stop Circuit)

13E-13NK10125 Volt DC Class 1E Power System Schematic3E-13NK10B125 Volt DC Class 1E Power System Schematic,Train B 1E-13NN01Class 1E Instrument AC Schematic3E-1R8900Raceway Notes Symbols and Details22E-KR0231Raceway Plot Plan Essential Service Water SystemPlan & Sections

9KD-7496One Line Diagram32KL1909Logic Block Diagram Load Shedding & EmergencyLoad Sequencing System (LSELS)

EM-12BN01Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Borated RefuelingStorage Water System

2M-1G051Equipment Locations Control & Diesel Gens. Bldgs. &Comm. Corridor Plan El. 2000'-0" & El. 2016'-0"

AttachmentA-16Miscellaneous DocumentsJ-301-00064 W11 (Rosemount Report

108025 Revision H), Qualification Report for PressureTransmitters, Rosemount Model 1153 Series B, Section 7.1.7, Ambient Temperature Limits;Section 7.1.8, Humidity, July 7, 2000.J-301-00129, Specification and Outline Dimension Drawing for Absolute Pressure TransmitterModel 1153AB, March 26, 1999.Letter KNPLB 84-095, Subject: Setpoint Information, Attachment 1, M&TE Uncertainty,Attachment 2, M&TE Calculations, November 21, 1984.

OE-AL-07-003, Operability Evaluation, AL Auxiliary Feedwater System, July 18, 2007.E-mail from Bruce S. Herman, P.E., Siemens Water Technologies Corp., Subject: Wolf CreekTraveling Screen, July 2, 2007.M-771-00144, p. 116, [excerpt from Westinghouse document, Precautions, Limitations, andSetpoints, p. 71, Residual Heat Removal System

].M-771-00260, Specification Sheet 03810,

FE 610,

FE 611; Specification Sheet 04631,

FIS 610,

FIS 611, Revision 1.WCAP-8687, Qualified Life of Westinghouse Motors with Theramlastic Epoxy InsulationSystem, July 1981.1007461, Terry Turbine Maintenance Guide, AFW Application, November

1,2004

Plant Health Committee, Top Equipment Issue, Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater TurbineControl Speed, 5/11/2007NUREG/CR-2761, Results of Vortex Suppressor Tests, Single Outlet Sump Tests and Misc.Sensitivity Tests, UndatedChange Pkg 11779, EJHV8701A Evaluation of Valve Components Change Pkg 11779, EJHV8701A Pre3ssure Locking during RF14

JPGC2001,

PWR-19010, Air Entrainment in a Partially Filled Horizontal Pump Suction Line,June 4-5, 200100251-L-002, Altran Report - Gas Transportation Study in ECCS System

CSRV Log, Valve 8811 Maintenance Log

NSAL-06-2, RWT Air Entrainment, 10/31/2006

RWST Discharge Valve- Maintenance Log Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Maintenanced Log AttachmentA-17Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Maintenance Log

JPGC2001/CR2761 Air Entrainment in Partially Filled Horizontal Pi peSuction LineWCOP-02, "WCGS Inservice Testing Program, Third Ten-Year Interval," Revision 14

ASME OM Code Case

OMN-1, "Alternate Rules for Preservice and Inservice Testing of CertainMotor-Operated Valve Assemblies in Light-Water Reactor Power Plants, OM Code-1995,Subsection ISTC"Design Change Package 09971, Snubber Reduction for Class 2 and 3 Lines Inside/OutsideContainment, dated June 28, 2003Interoffice Correspondence, dtd 6/8/05, subject: Safety Analysis and Probabilistic SafetyAssessment (PSA) Time Critical Operator Action AssumptionsLetter dtd 1/31/07, subject: Docket No. 50-482: Response to NRC Request for AddtionalInformation Regarding

NRC Generic Letter 2006-02, "Grid Reliability and the Impact on Plantrisk and the Operability of Offsite Power"Letter dtd 3/31/06, subject: Docket No. 50-482: 60-day Response to NRC Generic Letter 2006-02, "Grid Reliability and the Impact on Plant Risk and the Operability of Offsite Power"Wolf Creek Revision 3 PSA Model - Operator Action Risk Ranking by Risk Achievement Worth Letter dtd 2/14/06, subject: Docket No. 50-482: Response rto NRC Generic Letter 2006-01

Letter dtd 11/3/05, subject: Docket No. 50-482: Application for Technical SpecificationImprovement Regarding Steam Generator Tube Integrity Using the Consolidated Line ItemImprovement ProcessLetter

ET 07-0007, WCNOC to USNRC, Subject: Docket No. 50-482: 90 day response to NRCGeneric Letter 2007-01, Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures that DisableAccident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients, May 2, 2007.

Letter SLNRC 81-10 dated February 19, 1981, SNUPPS to USNRC, Subject: SNUPPS AuxiliaryFeedwater System Meeting.

Letter SLNRC 81-39 dated June 3, 1981, SNUPPS to USNRC, Subject: Auxiliary FeedwaterSystem. Letter SLNRC 81-44 dated June 8, 1981, SNUPPS to USNRC, Subject: Reliability Analysis ofthe SNUPPS Auxiliary Feedwater System. Work Orders AttachmentA-1899-212649-00099-214431-00000-221114-00000-221114-00202-243824-00002-245755-00003-251876-000 03-257068-00004-258886-00004-258887-00004-258888-00004-258889-00004-259388-00104-260912-00004-261091-00004-261091-00104-263287-00004-263296-00004-265132-00004-265692-00004-266369-00004-266629-00004-266699-00005-269979-00005-270742-00005-272378-00005-272378-00105-272482-00005-272729-00005-273332-00005-274546-00005-274547-00005-276050-00105-276564-00005-278964-00006-284921-00006-286007-00006-286300-00006-288299-00006-288431-00006-290430-00006-290431-00006-290638-00006-290638-00106-290638-00206-290814-00006-290815-00007-292761-00007-292962-00007-293322-00007-296894-00007-297659-00007-297817-000Work Requests07-06265406-28927506-289426Condition Reports2006-018662006-019002006-023692006-029742006-032442007-000222007-023312007-025492007-025772007-025802007-025972007-026592007-026662007-026832007-026872007-027042007-027342007-027502007-027522007-027762007-027832007-027862007-027892007-027902007-027922007-027952007-027982007-028022007-028102007-028132007-028202007-028212007-02840Problem Identification Reports AttachmentA-191996-3256 1997-1778 1997-2546 1997-3197 1997-40401997-4056 1997-4057 1997-4058 1997-4059 1997-40631998-10081998-36751998-3677 1999-16291999-2045 2000-1105 2001-2745 2002-02422002-1401 2002-1544 2002-23892002-24712003-0242 2003-0479 2003-13522003-15952003-1867 2003-1868 2003-18702003-2853 2003-37522004-1224 2004-2182 2004-2502 2005-13652005-14302005-17222005-17362005-18012005-21072005-25252005-2879 2006-04812006-0489 2006-07542006-08082007-0226 2007-09302007-25972007-2813 Inservice Tests (Pumps and Valves)The inservice tests were comprised of the specified tests for the identified components inASME OM Code 1998 Edition through 2000Addenda.

The tests for the identified MOVs wereas specified in ASME OM Code Case

OMN-1, "Motor Operated Valve ExerciseRequirements." AttachmentA-20 ComponentMOV ALHV0030MOV ALHV0031MOV ALHV0032MOV ALHV0033MOV ALHV0034MOV ALHV0035MOV ALHV0036MOV EJHV8804AMOV EJHV8804BESW Pump A -

PEF 01Aand Discharge Check ValveEF-V001ESW Pump B - PEF01B andDischarge Check Valve EF-

V004Component Cooling Water Pumps A and CComponent Cooling Water Pumps B and DMDAFW A - PAL01A andDischarge Check Valve AL-

V042Test Dates2/23/20061/12/20069/13/20059/14/20052/22/20001/13/20063/17/20053/30/20024/13/20029/9/200512/9/20053/9/20066/8/20069/8/200612/8/20063/9/20076/9/200711/17/20062/16/20075/18/200712/2/20053/2/20066/1/20068/31/200611/29/20062/28/20075/25/200712/20/20053/23/20066/23/20069/20/200612/21/20063/22/20077/16/200510/12/20051/13/20064/13/20067/12/200610/5/20061/10/20074/10/2007

AttachmentA-21TDAFW Pump - PAL02TDAFW Discharge CheckValve,

AL-V054ESW Suction CheckValve

AL-V0093/14/20076/13/200711/10/20061/13/20063/10/20066/20/20069/8/200612/5/20063/7/2007 Completed Calibrations and Tests

RNM

C-0521Bus NG01 27B Undervoltage Relay03/11/98RNM

C-0521Bus NG02 27B Undervoltage Relay03/06/98RNM

C-0521Bus NG04 27B Undervoltage Relay03/06/98RNM

C-0552DG NE01 Generator Differential Relay (Differential 187/DG)12/09/04RNM

C-0552DG NE02 Generator Differential Relay (Differential 187/DG)08/23/04RNM

C-0552DG Spare 187 Generator Differential Relay08/25/04RNM

C-0552DG Spare 187 Generator Differential Relay12/10/04RNM

C-0577Aux Feedwater PpA Ph A Overcurrent Relay (150-151/M)05/08/07RNM

C-0577Aux Feedwater PpA Ph B Overcurrent Relay (150-151/M)05/08/07RNM

C-0577Aux Feedwater PpA Ph C Overcurrent Relay (150-151/M)05/08/07RNM

C-0577Aux Feedwater PpB Ph A Overcurrent Relay (150-151/M)05/22/07RNM

C-0577Aux Feedwater PpB Ph B Overcurrent Relay (150-151/M)05/22/07RNM

C-0577Aux Feedwater PpB Ph C Overcurrent Relay (150-151/M)05/22/07RNM

C-0577ESW Pump DPEF01A Ph A Overcurrent Relay (150-151/M)06/01/04RNM

C-0577ESW Pump DPEF01A Ph B Overcurrent Relay (150-151/M)06/01/04RNM

C-0577ESW Pump DPEF01A Ph C Overcurrent Relay (150-151/M)06/01/04

AttachmentA-22RNM

C-0577ESW Pump DPEF01B Ph A Overcurrent Relay (150-151/M)05/23/07RNM

C-0577ESW Pump DPEF01B Ph B Overcurrent Relay (150-151/M)05/23/07RNM

C-0577ESW Pump DPEF01B Ph C Overcurrent Relay (150-151/M)05/23/07RNM

C-0577RHR Pump DPEJ01A Ph A Overcurrent Relay (150-151/M)05/10/07RNM

C-0577RHR Pump DPEJ01A Ph B Overcurrent Relay (150-151/M)05/10/07RNM

C-0577RHR Pump DPEJ01A Ph C Overcurrent Relay (150-151/M)05/10/07RNM

C-0577RHR Pump DPEJ01B Ph A Overcurrent Relay (150-151/M)04/25/07RNM

C-0577RHR Pump DPEJ01B Ph B Overcurrent Relay (150-151/M)04/25/07RNM

C-0577RHR Pump DPEJ01B Ph C Overcurrent Relay (150-151/M)04/25/07RNM

C-0503Aux Feedwater PpA Ground Overcurrent Relay (150G/M)05/08/07RNM

C-0503Aux Feedwater PpB Ground Overcurrent Relay (150G/M)05/24/01RNM

C-0503Aux Feedwater PpB Ground Overcurrent Relay (150G/M)05/18/04RNM

C-0503Aux Feedwater PpB Ground Overcurrent Relay (150G/M)05/22/07RNM

C-0503ESW Pump DPEF01A Ground Overcurrent Relay (150G/M)06/01/04RNM

C-0503ESW Pump DPEF01B Ground Overcurrent Relay (150G/M)05/23/07RNM

C-0503RHR Pump DPEJ01A Ground Overcurrent Relay (150G/M)05/10/07RNM

C-0503RHR Pump DPEJ01B Ground Overcurrent Relay (150G/M)04/25/07

AttachmentA-23The team provided the following information request in writing to the licensee prior to theinspection.Initial Information RequestComponent Design Basis Inspection (71111.21)Wolf CreekPlease provide the following information in order to support the NRC's component design basisinspection effort at your facility.

If there are problems obtaining any of this information, pleasecall the Team Leader, Rick Deese at (479) 968-3290 to discuss alternate arrangements.

Wewould like to have the information ready when we arrive on site for the "bag-man" portion of theinspection on June 11, 2007.We prefer, but it's not required, that the information be provided electronically and in asearchable format, such as Adobe, Word, Word Perfect, or Excel.

Other licensee's have foundthat providing the information on a CD is effective and efficient.1.The risk ranking of components from your site specific probabilistic safety analysissorted by Risk Achievement Worth, Fussell-Veseley, and by Birnbaum Importance.2.A list of your top 500 cutsets from your probabilistic safety analysis.3.Risk ranking of operator actions from you site specific probabilistic safety analysis sortedby Risk Achievement Worth.

Provide copies of your human reliability worksheets forthese items (you may limit this list to the 100 most risk significant actions).4.If you have an external events or fire probabilistic safety analysis model, provide theinformation requested in Items 1 and 2 for external events and fire.5.Any pre-existing evaluation or list of components and calculations with low designmargins (i.e. pumps closest to the design limit for flow or pressure, diesel generatorsclose to design required output, heat exchangers close to rated design heat removaletc.)6.For the last two years, a list of operating experience evaluations, modifications andcorrective actions sorted by component or system.

A one line, or short, description isacceptable.7.A list of any common-cause failures of components in the last 5 years at your facility.8.A list of Maintenance Rule functions.

9.A list of your Maintenance Rule a(1) components.

10.A list of your current temporary modifications.

11.A current list of "operator work arounds." AttachmentA-2412.Piping and instrument drawings for your emergency core cooling systems, auxiliaryfeedwater system, emergency diesel generators, and off-site power supplies.

At thistime, only the mechanical piping drawings are needed for the emergency core coolingsystems and the emergency diesel generators.

A one line drawing of your AC electricaldistribution system is needed (showing offsite sources, EDGs, 4160 loads andtransformers to 480VAC loads).13.Licensee Event Reports from your site since 2002

14.System Health Reports for the last two years

15.A list of time dependent operator actions In addition to the above, if available electronically, please provide a copy of each of thefollowing on

CD.1.Final/Updated Safety Analysis Reports

2.Technical Specifications

3.Design Bases Documents for the emergency core cooling systems (including auxiliaryfeedwater), emergency diesel generators and off-site power supplies4.System descriptions or operator training manuals for the emergency core coolingsystems, emergency diesel generators and off-site power supply systemsThank you for your cooperation in these matters.

AttachmentA-25The team provided the following information request in writing to the licensee during theinspection.Second Information RequestComponent Design Basis InspectionWolf CreekPlease provide the following information in order to support the NRC's component design basisinspection effort at your facility.

If there are problems obtaining any of this information, pleasecall the Team Leader, Rick Deese at (479) 264-6700 to discuss alternate arrangements.

Wewould like to have the information ready when we arrive on site for the first on-site week portionof the inspection on June 25, 2007.We prefer, but it's not required, that the information be provided electronically and in asearchable format, such as Adobe, Word, Word Perfect, or Excel.

Other licensee's have foundthat providing the information on a CD is effective and efficient.

When naming the electronicfiles, please identify the component and requested item number (for example, the file containingthe refueling water storage tank volume calculation would be titled something like "RWST3"). Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST)1.Tank drawing including internal piping (if any)2.Inlet and outlet piping drawing and isometric to HHSI and Spray Pumps3.Tank volume calculation4.Tank vent drawing - including any vent components5.List of other pertinent tank calcs (flooding, stress analysis, etc.)6.Corrective action program document list (of significance) for the past 4 years7.Level measurement tests for the past 3 years + trends as available 8.Please schedule an interview of the responsible design and systems engineer 9.Operating procedure for switchover10.Design Change list for the past 5 years11.Calculation(s) of record that establish the scaling, instrument uncertainties, andsetpoints for the low-level RWST switchover from injection to recirculation mode, as wellas RWST level "setpoints" used in

EOPs.12.Instrument installation details for RWST level transmitters, showing impulse lineconfiguration, tap elevations, instrument enclosures, heat tracing, and process systeminterfaces (tank dimensions and nozzle locations, overflow line, vent, internal structures,etc.)Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps (MDAFWP)Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (TDAFWP)Essential Service Water Pumps (ESWP)Component Cooling Water Pumps (CCWP)Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps (EDGFOTP)1.Vendor Manual for the pump and motor2.Copy of maintenance log3.Piping drawings and isometrics to the 2

nd valve4.Inservice test reports since January 2004 and test procedures AttachmentA-265.Calculations (flow requirements + calculation of flow)6.Corrective action program document list (significant CRs) for the past years7.Design Change list for the past 5 years8.Industry operating experience/issues list for the past 3 years9.Discussion with the design and systems engineer 10.Piping and Instrumentation Diagram11.Industry issues identified and evaluated - past 5 years12.Operating Procedures13.Current Margins14.Applicable Requests for Relief and associated NRC approvals15.Current pump curves16.Degradation history/reconciliation with decrease in pump flow17.All Generic Communications and applicable responsesPower Operated Relief Valve (PORV)1.Corrective action program document list (significant CR's) for the past 3 years2.Valve manual3.Valve drawing4.Piping and Instrumentation Diagram5.Test reports - past 5 years6.Maintenance Logs - Past 3 years or 2 outages7.List of Design Changes - Past 5 years8.Isometrics - if any9.Industry issues identified and evaluatedContainment Recirculation Sump Valve (CSRV)Emergency Core Cooling System Piggy Back Valve (ECCSPV)Refueling Water Storage Tank Discharge Valve (RWSTDV)1.Valve Margin Calculation(s) 2. Corrective action program document list (significant CR's) for the past 3 years3.Valve manual4.Valve Drawing5.Piping and Instrumentation Diagram6.Test reports - past 5 years7.Maintenance Logs - Past 3 years or 2 outages8.List of Design Changes - Past 5 years9.Isometrics - if any10.Industry operating experience/issues identified and evaluated11.Piggyback valve and AFW - EOP and/or AOP12.Current Margins13.Check Valve Reliability Program data and/or IST data since January 200414.Applicable Requests for Relief and associated NRC approvals15.Applicable Surveillance Test Procedures16.All Generic Communications and applicable responses AttachmentA-27Component Cooling Water Heat Exchangers (CCWHX)1.Design Bases and supporting calculations2.Are there any

GL 89-13 commitments associated with this heat exchanger?3.Test Data since January 20044.Applicable Requests for Relief and associated NRC approvals5.Degradation history6.Maintenance Program history/status7.History - repairs/modifications8.Industry Operating Experience (if any) for each of the components9.All Generic Communications and applicable responses10.Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams containing the applicable componentsEmergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 1.Calculation(s) of record that determined and evaluated steady-state loading for thestandby diesel generator having the lowest margin.2.Calculation(s) of record that determined and evaluated transient loading for the standbydiesel generator having the lowest margin.Class 1E 125 Vdc Battery (BATT)1.Calculation(s) of record that determined and evaluated design basis minimum voltage atthe terminals of safety-related 125 Vdc loads (for the safety division having the lowestvoltage margin at load terminals); calculation(s) should include the basis fordetermination of the 8-hour "best-estimate" SBO duty cycle identified in PSA EvaluationPSA-05-0003.Class 1E 125 Vdc Fused Disconnect Switch 89NK0404 (FUSE)1.Calculation(s) of record that determined the basis for ratings and coordinated electricalprotection associated with fused disconnect switch 89NK0404 and the loads served bythe devices.2.Procedures that govern the use of this device.Auxiliary Feedwater Low suction Pressure Transfer In strumentati on & Circuits (AFWIC)1.Calculation(s) of record that determined the scaling, instrument uncertainties, andsetpoints for the low AFW suction pressure switchover from CST to essential servicewater.2.Instrument installation details for AFW suction pressure instrumentation, showing impulse line configuration, tap elevations, instrument configuration, and process systeminterfaces.3.Schematic diagrams for the AFW suction pressure auto-transfer circuits and associatedMOVs AttachmentA-28Residual Heat Removal Flow Interlock / Control Loop [EJFIS0611] (RHRIC)1.Calculation(s) of record that determined the scaling, instrument uncertainties, andsetpoints for RHR flow instrument EJFIS0611.2.Instrument installation details for RHR flow instrument EJFIS0611, showing impulse lineconfiguration, tap elevations, instrument installation configuration, and process systeminterfaces3.Schematic diagrams for the control loop and valve.Essential Service Water Traveling Screen Drive [TZEF-1A1B] (ESWTS)1.Calculation(s) of record that determined the minimum voltage available at the motorterminals under degraded voltage conditions.2.Schematic diagrams for the control loop and drive motor.3.Calculation (s) of record that determined the electrical protection settings for the screendrive circuits.4.Calculation(s) of record that determined the scaling, instrument uncertainties, andsetpoints for dp and / or other instrumentation used for automatic operation of the screendrive or for indication / alarm of a blocked screen.5.Instrument installation details for the screen dp and associated instrumentation, showing impulse line configuration, tap elevations, instrument installation configuration, processsystem interfaces, and support equipment.6.Drawings showing the overall configuration and layout / location of the traveling screensand associated instrumentation.Emergency Diesel Generator Exhaust Damper (EDGXD)1.Design Bases and supporting calculations2.Safety Functions3.Current Margins4.Check Valve Reliability Program data and/or IST data since January 20045.Applicable Requests for Relief and associated NRC approvals6.Applicable Surveillance Test Procedures7.History - repairs/mods8.Maintenance Program history/status9.Industry Operating Experience (if any) for each of the components10.All Generic Communications and applicable responses11.Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams containing the applicable componentsInformation (corrective action program documents, Calculations, etc) regarding "newlydiscovered scenario" on valve EJHV8811 A/B, M