ML20197B830

Forwards Addl Info on Comanche Peak Response Team Results Repts for Isaps I.a.4,I.b.3,II.b,III.d & VII.b.2 Re Fire Protection,In Response to 860428 Request

ML20197B830
Person / Time
Site:	Comanche Peak
Issue date:	05/02/1986
From:	Beck J TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC CO. (TU ELECTRIC)
To:	Noonan V Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20197B836	List: ML20197F832 TXX-4786, Forwards Addl Info on Comanche Peak Response Team Results Repts for Isaps I.a.4,I.b.3,II.b,III.d & VII.b.2 Re Fire Protection,In Response to 860428 Request
References
CPRT-404, TXX-4786, NUDOCS 8605130146
Download: ML20197B830 (50)

Text

I CPRT-404 ~ LOG NO. TXX-4786 r

FILE NO. 10068 5e 945 l

pq l

TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING COMPANY MRYW AY TOWER e 400 NORTH OBJVE NTREET. l.R. 5 8 e DALLAM. TEXAm *,830 5 May 2, 1986 EN$50?0$0h Mr. Vincent S. Noonan Director, Comanche Peak Project Division of Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

REFERENCE:

LETTER TO W. G. COUNSIL (TUGCO), FROM V. S. NOONAN (NRC) DATED 4/28/86

SUBJECT:

NRC STAFF REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON COMANCHE PEAK RESPONSE TEAM RESULTS REPORTS FOR ISAPs (I.a.4, I.b.3, II b, III.d and VII.b.2)

DATED 4/28/86

Dear Mr. Noonan:

Enclosed herewith is the information requested by the referenced letter. Should you have any questions or need further clarification, please contact Mr. John W. Beck at (214) 979-8646.

Very truly yours, W. G. Counsil By:

Jo' W.~ Beck d # -

Vice President WGC:JWB:tj Enclosure cc: See Attached 8605130146 860502 PDR ADOCK 05000445 F PDR '\

A Dis'ES10N UP TEXAN E1188211EN ED.CCTRIC (D%2PANY

May 2, 1986 Page 2 cc: J. Ellis A. Roisman, Esq.

N. Williams N. S. Reynolds W. G. Counsil T. G. Dignan, Jr.

R. K. Gad, III R. P. Lessy, Jr.

L. A. Sinkin e

4 r

i-

-g Pcgs 1 of 23 ENCLOSURE

REFERENCE:

DOCKET NOS. 50-445 and 50-446 REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR THE FIVE ISAP RESULTS REPORTS (I.a.4, I.b.3, II.b, III.d. and VII.b.2) AND FUTURE RESULTS REPORTS.

QUESTION:

1. Address those questions raised in ASLB Memorandum, Proposed Memorandum and Order dated April 14, 1986, and provide appropriate documentation.

RESPONSE

The SRT expects to publish responses to the Board's questions, as propounded in its " Proposed Memorandum" and modified during the pre-hearing conference of April 22, 1986, in the form and time frame described at that conference. See Tr. 24353 (4/22/86).

QUESTION:

2. Address whether the issues raised in the results reports had implications of deficiencies in the QA/QC program, design and/or construction and reference documents that will be provided to the staff that will address these implications.

RESPONSE

These issues fall into two categories: issues relating to design, construction or testing identified during the conduct of action plans, and the evaluation of action plan results for impact on collective evaluations of the design, hardware, testing program or QA/QC program.

For the first category, Review Team Leaders have and continue to formally notify each other of findings in the conduct of their respective action plans that could impact or require investigation in the context of another Review Tesa Leader's ISAP or DSAP. In addition, deficiencies identified during the conduct of some action plans may be evaluated for impact within that specific action plan Results Report.

For the second category, the intent of the Collective Evaluation Reports described in Section VI of the CPRT Program Plan, though not explicitly stated, is to address the implications of any design, hardware, testing or QA/QC deficiencies discovered during the conduct of any Issue Specific Action Plan (ISAP) or Discipline Specific Action Plan (DSAP) in the appropriate Collection Evaluation Report. These Collective Evaluation Reports will be issued during the latter stages of the CPRT Program.

NRC i

g, D .

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (Cont'd)

QUESTION:

3. Where an ISAP resulted in corrective action, address the status of the corrective action and identify the method you plan for communicating to the staff the corrective action is completed.

RESPONSE

Specific corrective action initiated as a result of discrepancies identified during the course of implementing ISAPs are translated to Project NCRs, TDDRs and TDCRs in accordance with the Project's Program.

With respect to Results Reports I.a.4, I.b.3 II.b, III.d and VII.b.2 no cortactive action beyond the scope of specific deficiencies has been recommended to the project. ,

To the extent that the Program Plan might require third-party oversight of corrective action in any case, reporting of this overview will be done as set forth in Appendix H, Section B, Paragraph 3.

QUESTION:

4. Describe how findings from one ISAP, which relate to a particular ISAP that is being addressed are considered.

RESPONSE

We do not understand the question as posed.

2 NRC

r1 I.a.4 Agreement Between Drawings and Field Terminations QUESTION:

1. For the instances identified by the NRC TRT and Region IV, and CPRT where the drawings have not yet been revised, to reflect the existing field termination conditions, provide the actions you are taking to upgrade your as-huilt ficld termination drawings.

RESPONSE

For discrepancies identified by the NRC-TRT and CPRT, the drawings have been revised or the field terminations corrected such that the field terminations are appropriately reflected on the drawings.

Discrepancies identified to the Project by NRC Region IV have been documented on NCRs and TDDRs. When these are dispositioned the field terminations and drawings will agree.

To the extent the question encompass,es nonterminated spara conductors, the project drawings will not be revised to reflect the field; because such conformity is neither a design nor project requirement.

QUESTION:

2. What is the basis for considering terminated and non-terminated spare conductors as valid population sample items for essential Class 1E Systems.

RESPONSE

The basis for including spare conductors in the population was as follows:

Spare conductors could potentially be involved with functional deficiencies (e.g., a spare conductor reversed with a functional conductor, a spare conductor connected to an active circuit, etc.), thus information concerning spares should not be bypassed.

Conductors that were once functional were often converted to spares by design change, and it was considered to be important to check these conductors for adequacy of the design change implementation process.

The NRC/TRT checked and addressed spares. One of their findings involved spare conductors that had once been functional and (after being spared by design change) were not lifted from their respective terminal points.

3 NRC

I.b.3 Conduit to Cable Tray Separation QUESTION:

Provide the following information:

(1) Gibbs and Hill analysis report on conduit separation:

(3) DCA-15917 mentioned on page 2 of the Results Report which reduced the conduit separation to one inch (this may be included in the G&H analysis report), and (4) Gibbs and Hill memo EE-863, 1/17/84, which contained simplified analysis reviewed by NRC-TRT on site (this may be included in the G&H analysis report) ;

RESPONSE

The information requested in items 1,, 3 and 4 is attached. These documents are all contained in the Results Report Working File or Project Document Control Center.

ITEM DOCUMENT ISAP I.b.3 FILE NO.

(1) GTN-71266 1.b.3 - 8A.022 GTN-71284 I.b.3 - 8A.023 CPRT-294 I.b.3 - 8A.028 (3) DCA-15917 (from Document Control Center)

(4) TWX #14,958 1.b.3 - 8A.001 GTN-69531 1.b.3 - 8A.002 Sandia Report I.b.3 - 8B.001 QUESTION:

(2) Documentation to indicate that TUGC0 has approved the Gibbs and Hill analysis report:

RESPONSE

A FSAR change request which utilizes the Gibbs & Hill analysis as supporting documentation is being prepared. When submitted, it will document TUGCO's acceptancelof the analysis.

2 4 NRC

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L b.3 6 &oos SENT BY TELECOPY

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INDEXED I'3OA.M.

DATL m

SEPTEMBER 20, 1984 TWX #14,958 ATTN: R. E. BALLARD / T. R. VARDAR0 / S. P. MARTIN 0VICH SUB: NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION THE NRC TECHNICAL REVIEW TEAM (TRT) HAS REQUESTED ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IN THE AREA 0F ELECTRICAL SEPARATION. THEIR SPECIFIC REQUEST IS AS FOLLOWS:

"THE TRT FOUND THAT THE EXISTING TUEC ANALYSIS SUBSTANTIATING THE ADEQUACY OF THE CRITERIA FOR SEPARATION BETWEEN CONDUITS AND CABLE TRAYS HAD NOT BEEN REVIEWED BY THE NRC STAFF.

ACCORDINGLY, TUEC SHALL SUBMIT THE ANALYSIS THAT SUBSTANTIATES THE ACCEPTABILITY OF THE CRITERIA STATED IN THE ELECTRICAL SPECIFICATIONS GOVERNING THE SEPARATION BETWEEN INDEPENDENT CONDUITS AND CABLE TRAYS."

WE HAVE DISCUSSED THIS RE00EST WITH T. R. VARDAR0 AND S. P. MARTIN 0VICH.

PLEASE PROCEED IMMEDIATELY TO FORMULATE THE REQUIRED RESPONSE AND TELECOPY IT TO US. A TIMELY RESPONSE IS OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE TO US. AS SUCH, OVERTIME IS AUTHORIZED AND EXPECTED IN ORDER TO GET THE RESPONSE AS 500N AS POSSIBLE.

IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS OR REQUIRE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, PLEASE ADVISE.

W. I. V0GELSANG - ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING L. M. POPPLEWELL PROJECT ENGINEERING MANAGER CPSES JOBSITE 910/890-8660 TUGC0 GRSE LMP:WIV:ery CC: ARMS - D C C 35-1195 FILE RECElVED SEP 2 01984 DOCUMENT CONTROL

/18 Martinovich, PNLala' go$ng, MMilam,.sie e

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A Dravo Company September 27, 1984 GTN 69531 Texas Utilities Generating Company Post Office Box 1002 Glen Rose, Texas 76043 Attention: Mr. J. B. George Vice President / Project Gen. Manager Gentlemen:

TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING COMPANY COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION G&H PROJECT NO.2323 NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFO ELECTRICAL SEPARATION CRITERIA REF: TWX-14958 (9-20-84) .

Attached please find the analysis requested in the referenced TWX substantiating the adequacy of Anthe criteriacopy advance for separation of this between conduits and cable trays.

4 analysis was telecopied to W.I. Vogelsang on Monday 9-24-84.

(We have also transmitted under separate cover, one copy of Sandia Laboratories Report on Cable Tray Fire Tests (SAND 77-1125C).

Please advise if we can provide any additional assistance.

Very truly yours, l .

GIBBS & HILL, INC.

h W= "

Robert E. Ballard, Jr.

b"' Director of Projects REBa- NLd$g" PM:sce 1 Letter + Attachment cc: ARMS (B&R Site) OL (TUSI Site) IL + Attachment W. I. Vogelsang OrmVO

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Gibbs & Hill,Inc.

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b;A1 September 24, 1984 To: W. I. Vogelsang Per your request to Sam Martinovich enclosed please find one copy of Sandia Laboratories Report on Cable Tray Fire Tests (SAND 77-1125C) and one copy of report entitled Separation Criteria as prepared by SPMartinovich and telecopied to you on September 24.

k S. M. Marano

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4

, , SEPARATION CRITERIA The raceway separation criteria utilized in the Gibbs & Hill electrical drawings and specifications is based upon the require-i ments of IEEE-384, 1974 and Regulatory Guide 1.75 (Rev. 1, 1/75). '

Although very specific criteria is provided in the Standard and

> Regulatory Guide for separation between cable trays, no specific  ;

criteria is provided for separation between conduits and cable i trays.  ;

In developing the separation details currently in Specification ES-100 and on Drawing El-1702-02, it was recognized that conduit provides a raceway medium. which ef fectively isolates internal events (e.g., faults) from the external surroundings. In this regard, a conduit system provides enclosure integrity far superior to that of enclosed tray with covers and/or solid bottoms and splice plates between sections. Therefore, the same criteria required by the Standard and Regulatory Guide specif-ically for trays, need not be arbitrarily applied to conduits.

~ In comparing rigid conduit to enclosed. tray, it was noted that conduit has:

i 1. Substantially heavier gauge body than tray - providing a more effective heat sink than equivalent cross-sectional area of tray.

2. Threaded connections providing essentially air-tight medium which inhibits internal combustion and effectively isolates internal events from the existing surroundings.

3. Size typically limited to 5-inch OD thus limiting both volume ,

of cables (combustibles) contained and exposed surface area. *

4. Curved surface providing radial distribution of heat and much .

less favorable heat transfer characteristics to or from an  !

adjacent tray than a flat surface of equivalent area.

i

Thus, in many instances, conduits satisfy the Standard's require-ments for a barrier *.

6 1

5

• IEEE 384 defines'a barrier as - "A device or structure interposed between Class 1E equipment or circuits and a potential source of damage to limit damage to Class 1E systems to an acceptable level."

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t Details 45 through 49, 52 through 55 and 57. on El-1702-02 identify the separation requirements between cable tray and conduit. In general, these details require a minimum of 3-foot t horizontal and.3-foot vertical separation in all general plant

areas, and 1-foot horizontal and 2-foot vertical separation in i

the c&ble spreading room. This separation is reduced to 1-inch only in those instances where the conduit is considered to be an effective tarrier as discussed below.

i s F For the details shown in ES-100 and on Drawing El-1702-02, a

. conduit ' has been considered to be an ef fective barrier whenever

, it is at least 1-inch away from circuits or raceway of a i

, dissimilar train and:

4

a. It contains no Class lE or associated circuits or,

b. It-does not traverse directly above or in front /behind a horizontal or vertical tray, respectively, of dissimilar train.

4 i When a conduit contains no Class 1E or associated circuits, for i example, it clearly satisfies the requirements of a barrier. It should be noted that the barrier need not limit damage to non-  !

safety circuits to any level. Logically then, a conduit con-t taining non-Class lE circuits can be placed up to 1-inch from the

, top, bottom or sides of a Class 1E open ladder tray since the conduit provides a protective barrier separated by at least 1-inch from the Class 1E circuits (see Detail 49, El-1702-02) .

It is recognized that the converse is not true and conduits

. containing safety-related circuits may require more than 1-inch separation from open trays of dissimilar . train depending upon i orientation of conduit and tray.

l This has been considered in the separation criteria where in

general, the minimum required separation in any direction exceeds ,

t 12 inches.

i-The results of cable tray fire tests performed by Sandial

, Laboratories for NRC (subsequent to issuance of IEEE-384,1974),

to' confirm the suitability of then current design standards and regulatory guides, are supportive of the judgments ' used in developing Conduit Separation Criteria for CPSES back in 1975

! regarding self-induced fire effects on IEEE-383 qualified cables.

i i

. --- -- . - _- ~ _ - - _-_- . .-. _. - _ _ -

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.- Summarizing some of the more significant findings in the Sandia

-Report:

i 1. In electrically initiated fires, the intense period of the

- fire persisted at a particular location for between 40 and 240 seconds before die out began to occur. This is less than the time required to consistently ignite a tray of IEEE-383 qualified ~ cables in the propane-fueled exposure fires t (typically 300 seconds).

2. In the electrically initiated fire, cables in the tray 10.5 inches above the donor (fire) tray were exposed to a i convective heat flux of about 6000 BTU /hr/ft2, which corresponds to a local gas temperature of approx. 1000 -

degrees F. The circuits remained functional and samples of

, the insulation from the bottom of the tray over the fire zone

which were given elongation measu,rements, showed less than a

10 percent increase .

3. The luminous zone of the electrically initiated fire was i optically thin which enabled immersed objects to radiate heat

to the cooler surroundings. Thus equilibrium surface temper-

atures of engulfed cylindrical objects varied from about 1200 7

degrees F just above the tray to 650 degrees F at a height of 1 10 inches. (Note that minimum vertical separation of 24 inches utilized on CPSES is more than twice this distance and maximum temperatures are anticipated to be well below temper-atures successfully withstood during the fire tests.)

4'

4. In the electrically initiated fire, heat transfer to immersed

• objects is convection dominated with radiation accounting for no more than 30 percent of the total heat flux, even in the l- luminous region. (Logically then, conduits beside or below  ;

4 horizontal trys are shielded from the major, convective heat j flux.)

l Probably the stronges evidence in support of CPSES conduit i separation is the results of the exposure fire test conducted by

Sandia in which condaits and trays were included. In these .

l tests, 14 trayL were stacked 10.5 inches apart. Directly above i each tray within 10 inches, a conduit containing additional cables was 10:sted No separation was provided between any t

conduit and the'b ctom of the tray above. Although all circuits in the conduits -uova the third tray failed during the exposure fire (the condurserr short-circuiting to the conduit and each other) , c i rc u i'.. . i ne lower two (2) conduits maintained circuit i

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integrity throughout the duration of the exposure fire.

Considering that the fire in the lower two (2) trays was more severe than an electrically initiated fire, being externally fueled and of longer duration, the results provide a conservative wors,t case.

Recognizing that the Sandial tests are not plant specific, the following analysis is presented to demonstrate with margin, the adequacy of CPSES conduit / tray separation. A hypothetical worst case is chosen whereby an open horizontal tray is separated by only an air gap from a vertical conduit (note that El-1702-02 requies a minimum of 12 inches in Detail 47) . See Figure below

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air gap Since the conduit is vertically oriented, convective heat transfer is essentially negligible. Reference 1 establishes the time-mean height of the luminous zonel:as 5 to 7 inches above the tray and the radiated heat flux (for a cylindrical object immersed in the fire) as 7000 BTU /hr/ft2,,

s Since exposed cables of one train cannot run within 3-feet vertically of another train per IEEE-384,' it can be very con-servatively assumed that the minimum length of conduit will never be less than this distance. Assuming this entire radiated heat flux were transferred to 50 percent of the conduit circumference (f acing the tray) over a length of 7-inches corresponding to the height of the luminous zone, the heat input rate is given as:

q in = 7000 x .5( 7 d) 7" Btu /hr.

144"/ft2 Where d = conduit diameter (inches) 6 l

9

'. Since the only heat dissipation considered herein will be via convection to surrounding air, the worst case value of 'd' is for the minimum conduit size. Per NEC, a 1-inch trade size conduit >

has an inside diameter of 1.05 inches. This will be assumed also for the outside diameter.

Then q in = 7000 x .08018 = 561 atu/hr.

The heat dissipated to surroundings is given by:

q out = hAA T (ref. 2)

Where AT = difference between conduit surface temperature and surrounding air A = free surface area of conduit for convection h=C ( AT) 0.25 for natural convection of a solid surface in still air C = 0.4/d 0.25 for vertical pipes more than 2 ft in length with

• diameter = d (inches)

Assuming: q in = q out q in = hA AT or T = q in/hA and A = 17 d [36" .5 (7") ] = .744 ft2 144  ;

0 0.25 h = 0.4j/d .25 (2LT) = 0.395 ( AT)0.25 then g1T = ,, 561 1.25 = 1908.2 or 21T

( . 3 95 ) ( . 7 4 4 ) z1T **#

and 21T = 421 degrees F l

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Even in a 122 degree F ambient, the maximum conduit surface temperaedre.would not exceed 543 degrees F (122 + 421). This is well below the temperatures to which exposed cables were subjected "(1000 degrees F local gas) in reference 1 with satisf actory results. The analysis herein is also extremely conservative in that conduit supports (and heat conducted to them) and radiant heat dissipation are neglected, a continuous 7-

. inch' flame is assumed adjacent to the conduit, a conduit length of~only 3-feet is assumed, and only an air-gap separation is assumed between conduit and tray.

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0 Sandia Report No. SAND 77-1125C -

JJGeneral Electric Handbook 2nd Edition, C. E. O'Rourke

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• 0 0. 02 2 Gibbe S Hill. Inc.

11 Pom Plaza New Wf k. New York 10001 212 760-Teen Domeste 127636/968694 intemational. 420813/234475 A Dravo Company February 28, 1986 GTN-71266 Texas Utilities Generating Company Post Office Box 1002 Glen Rose, Texas 76043 Attention: Mr. J. B. George Vice President / Project Gen. Mgr.

Gentlemen:

TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING COMPANY COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION G&H PROJECT NO. 2323 CONDUIT TO CABLE TRAY SEPARATION REF 1: TRT ITEM 1.b.3 REF 2: GTN-70600 DTD 9/19/85 Enclosed please find Gibbs & Hill's Tray / Conduit Separation Criteria for incorporation in the TRT Item 1.b.3 results report. Mechanical calculation No. 800, Rev. I will be transmitted under separate cover on Monday, March 3, 1986 upon completion of design review.

The criteria and analysis are in agreement with and support the FSAR change request previously submitted via reference 2.

Therefore, no additional changes to the FSAR regarding this subject are anticipated.

Please advise if you have any questions or require further assistance.

Very tru yours, GIB S ,& HIL , Inc.

\Ls .

REBa-J Ic ober Ballard, Jr.

1 Letter Director of Projects CC: Aft!S (B&R Site) OL .

"") W . I. Vogelsang (TUSI Site) lL lA

TRAY / CONDUIT SEPARATION CRITERIA IDiC9dWE1190 The raceway separation criteria utili:ed in the Gibbs & Hill electrical drawings and specifications for the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES) are based upon the requirements of IEEE-384, 1974 and Regulatory Guide 1.75 (Rev. 1, 1/75). Although very specific criteria are provided in the Standard and Regulatory Guide for separation between cable trays, the same degree of specificity is not provided for separation between conduits and cable trays.

This discussion will therefore present the methodology used in applying IEEE-384, 1974 and Regulatory Guide 1.75 (Rev. 1, 1/75) to conduits requiring separation from cable trays of redundant

• safety trains. Separation details are shown on Drawing El-1702-02 which, as stated therein, apply when hazards are limited to failures or faults internal to electrical equipment or raceways.

Where other potential hazards from sources such as missiles, high energy line breaks, pipe whip or external fires exist, greater separation may be required. Such conditions however, are beyond the scope of the drawing and this discussion.

It is apparent from the discussion in the foreward to IEEE-384, 1974 (and in the subsequent revision in 1977) that the minimum separation distances in the standard were based upon the potential effects of an electrical fire. Regarding the additional work needed to arrive at a standard wire and cable test to determine if lesser separation distances could be called out, the standard states - "such a test should be designed to provide data on potential propagation to circuits above, below, and adjacent to a cable fire." In the 1977 revision, the f or ward states that "the distances that are given for separation between trays required to be separated in areas of limited hazard potential are l based on current available data from actual cable fire situations and are considered to provide an adequate degree of separation."

In both revisions of the standard, the separation distances indicated between trays are the same.

Consistent with the standard's. intent, the most severe ha:ard

! considered herein will be an electrical fault of sufficient

! magnitude and duration to cause a fire in the raceway. The results of actual electrically initiated cable tray fire tests on IEEE-!83 qualified cables performed by Sandia (Ref. 1) will be used to provide the characteri:ation of such a fire and to l evaluate a thermal analysis of a worst case configuration.

l

• The term " redundant" as used herein, applies to different l safety-related trains or safety and non safety-related trains.

. 1

F~

DissWasieu In developing the separation details currently on Drawing El-1702-02 it was recognized that conduit provides a raceway medium which ef fectively isolates internal events (e.g. faults) from the external surroundings. In this regard, a conduit system provides enclosure integrity which is superior to that of encioned tray with covers and/or solid bottoms and splice plates between sections. Therefore, the same criteria required by the Standard and Regulatory Guide specifically for trays need not be arbitrarily applied to conduits.

In general, the separation distances required by IEEE-384 between redundant cable trays is three feet between trays separated horizontally and five feet between trays separated vertically.

This separation applies to open ventilated cable trays in general plant areas in which potential ha:ards such as missiles, external fires, and pipe whip are excluded. Lesser separation is permitted in limited hazard areas such as the cable spreading room where the minimum required hori: ental and vertical separation between redundant trays are reduced to one foot and three feet respectively. The standard requires that where these distances are used to provide adequate physical separations (1) Cables and raceways involved shall be flame retardant (2) The design basis shall be that the cable trays will not be filled above the side rails (3) Hazards shall be limited to failures or faults internal to the electrical equipment (raceways) or cables Where termination arrangements preclude maintaining the above separation distances, the standard requires that the redundant circuits shall be run in enclosed raceways that qualify as barriers. A minimum distance of one inch is required between these redundant enclosed raceways. Regulatory Guide 1.75, Rev.1 is in agreement with these provisions of the standard and for the balance of this discussion, reference'to the " standard" will mean IEEE-094, 1974 and Regulatory Guide 1.75, Rev. 1 as applicable.

2

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'- Figures 2 cnd 0 in IEEE-384 depict arrcngsments of redundant cable trays enclosed with solid bottoms and/or covers which will satisfy the separation criteria therein. Applicable details in these figures are shown below.

4-loivisioni 50u0 rest sous Tnats amo covees t estm

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'l.oivi...f =O FIGURE 2 FIGURE In the above figures, the standard provides examples of " enclosed raceway". It should be noted however, that in Figure 2 the trays are not totally enclosed as in Figure 3. Thus, as would be expected, crientation of the raceway is obviously a consideration as is the degree of enclosure which'is commensurate with the hazard potential. No examples of acceptable separation between a conduit and a redundant cable tray are illustrated. However, a one inch separation is implicit per Figure 3 when the trays are enclosed and conduits are considered to be " enclosed raceways".

Separation requirements between conduits and geen trays must be determined by similar reasoning and analysis where required.

The CPSES separation criteria are consistent with the requirements of the standard for tray separation and in addition, define conduit separation requirements which are intended to provide an equivalent level of protection for redundant circuits.

The results of cable tray fire tests (Ref 1) performed by Sandia Laboratories for NRC (subsequent to issuance of IEEE-384, 1974),

to confirm the suitability of then current design Standards and Regulatory Guides, are supportive of the rationale used in developing raceway separation criteria for CPSES in 1975 regarding self-induced fire effects on IEEE-383 qualified cables.

Details 45 thru 49, 52 thru 55 and 57 on drawing El-1702-02 identify the balance-of-plant (BOP) separatico requirements between coble tray and conduit. (Detail 60 is a special case for the Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS) conduits which addresses specific requirements of the Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) vendor. These NIS conduit separation requirements will not be discussed here, however in all cases the NIS requirements either meet or exceed the BOP conduit separation criteria.)

3

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These details can be grouped into four basic categories:

• l

1) Safety-related conduits located above hori: ental trays of redundant safety train (Details 46 and 48)

2) Safety-related conduits located adjacent to or below hori: ental trays of redundant safety train (Datails 45, 47 and 57)

3) Safety-relaned hori:ontal or vertical condeits located parallel to or crossing vertical trays of reduncant safety train (Details 52 thru 55) conduits located above, beside or below 4)safety-related Non saf ety-rel her.

atad,iontal or vertical trays (Detail 49)

In general, these details require a minimum of 3-foot hori: ental and 3-foot vertical separation in all general plant areas and 1-foot hori:ontal and 2-foot vertical separation in the cable spreading room. This separation is reduced to 1-inch only in those instances where the conduit is considered to be an ef f ective barrier as discussed below. .

The orientation of conduit and tray in the electrically-initiated fire tests (Ref. 1) conductad by Sandia included all configurations in categories 1 and 2 above except for the conduit running parallel with and 1-inch from the side rail of the tray as in Detail 45 of Drawing El-1702-02. Conduits used in the Sandia tests consisted of 3-inch schedule 40 pipe, whereas the minimum conduit si:e used at CFCES is 1/2-inch nominal ID. An analysis (Ref. 3) was performed to address these differences between the as-built and test configurations and justify adequacy of the CPSES conduit separation criteria.

The Sandia tests also demonstrated acceptable separation with only 10.5-inch vertical spacing between trays, far less than the minimum 24-inch required between a tray and redundant conduit on Drawing El-1702-02. It must be emphasized that in these electrically initiated fire tests, " exposed" cables in overlying trays were subjected to the high temperature gases (approximately 1000 F) from the fire without damage. This provides additional assurance that cables in conduits at more than twice this distance above a tray will be adequately protected. -

The separation of vertical trays from conduits (category 3 above) shown on Drawing El-1702-02 is equivalent to that shown in IEEE-384, 1974 for redundant trays and therefore does not require further justification, particularly considering the additional protection afforded by the conduits.

l 4

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r In comparing rigid conduit to an enclosed tray, it should be noted that conduit has:

a. Heavier gauge body than tray providing a more effective heat sink than equivalent surface area of tray

b. Threaded connections providing an essentially air-tight medium which inhibits internal combustion and effectively isolates internal events from the surroundings.

c. Si:e limited to 5-inch nominal ID thus limiting both volume of cables (combustibles) contained and exposed surface area.

d. Curved surface providing radial distribution of heat and therefore much less favorable heat transfer characteristics to or from an adjacent tray than a flat surface of equivalent area.

Thus, when a conduit contains no safety-related (Class 1E or associated) circuits (category 4 above), it clearly satisifies IEEE-384, 1974 requirements of a barrier *. The barrier need not limit damage of non-safety circuits to any level. Consequently, only failures of the non safety-related circuits affecting safety-related circuits are of concern. Logically then, a conduit containing non safety-related circuits can be placed up to 1-inch from the top, bottom or sides of a Class 1E open ladder tray since the conduit provides a protective barrier separated by at least 1-inch from the Class 1E or associated circuits.

It is recogni:ed that the converse is not true and conduits containing safety-related circuits may require more than 1-inch separation from open trays of a redundant train depending upon orientation of the conduit and tray. This has been considered in the separation criteria shown on Drawing El-1702-02 where in general, the minimum required separation in any direction is 12-inches or more. The allowable separation is reduced to less than 12-inches (1-inch minimum) only when the conduit does not extend above the side rail of the open tray.

• IEEE-384, 1974 defines a barrier as - "A device or structure interposed between Class 1E equipment or circuits and a potential source of damage to limit damage to Class 1E systems to an acceptable 1e' vel."

5

r BesWits of ecaixais Analysis were performed (Ref. 3) using finite element techniques and computer heat transfer program HEATING-5 to determine the effects of an electrically-initiated fire in an open ladder cab.e tray on a 1/2-inch conduit located 1-inch away either beside or below the tray, Key parameters taken from reference 1 characterizing the tray fire were the vertical variation of total heat flux (worst case from October 5, 1976 fire in Figure 11 of the report), flame and gas temperature, and duration of exposure of the conduit to the heat source. The model assumed the heat flux to impinge on an 8-inch segment of conduit located directly below the fire . (This was considered worse than having the conduit beside the tray where much of the radiative heat f lu::

would be blocked by the tray side rail.) The heat f l u:: was assumed constant in this region. This assumption is conservative sir.ca the report (Ref. 1) indicated that "the flame zone does not comprise a continuous line fire, but instead consists of one or more "axisymmetric" luminous zones which are on the order of 5 to 8 inches in " diameter" at the base". No credit was taken for the decrease in radiative heat flux with increasing distance (note that conduits located 1-inch below ladder trays are actually more than 1-inch away from the cables due to the height and thickness of the tray rungs which raise the cables approximately 7/8-inch from the tray bottom). No credit was also taken for blockage of heat flux by the cables in the tray or heat absorbed by the cables in the conduit.

The maximum temperature calculated on the conduit surface was 057 F (180.6 C). This temperature cccured at a point directly below the  : enter of the flame (mid point of the 8-inch conduit segment). Temperatures dropped sharply away from this point along the conduit to about 240 F at 4-inches, and below 170 F at 6-inches. The maximum temperature calculated was not a steady-state value due to the transient nature of the event (approximately 6 minutes) as shown in Figure 10 of the report (Ref. 1) for the October 5, 1976 fire. The report characteri:es this fire as "one of the most intense and longest duration of those studied".

C90E1Ws190 The analysis performed presents a comparative basis for evaluating the effectivenass of CPSES separation against cable tray and conduit configurations used in actual fire tests. The Sandia report (Ref. 1) referred to provides a characteri:ation of electrically initiated cable tray fires which, as stated in the report, does not vary greatly from one fire to the next. One of the objectives of the test was to use cables representative of those used in the nuclear industry. The report indicates that 10 leading architect-engineer firms, 13 utility companies and 13 6

r e

cable manufacturers were included in the industry survey which preceded the testing. Twenty (20) different cable types were screened on the basis of popularity of use, small scale electrically initiated cable insulation fire tests, UL FR-1 flame test and pyroli=or and thermal chromatograph testing (which measured insulation outgassing as a function of temperature). The cable constructions tested are representative of those used most extensively at CPSES, namely XLPE and EPR insulations with CSPE (Hypalon) Jackets. The cables used in the full scale testing were, as a worst case, all XLPE insulated, with single conductor cables having no Jacket and 3-conductor cables having an XLPE jacket.

Summari=ing some of the more significant findings in the Sandia Reports

a. In electrically initiated fires, the intense period of the fire persisted at a particular location for between 40 and 240 seconds

• before die-out began to occur. This is less than the time required to consistently ignite a tray of IEEE-383 qualified cables in the propane-fueled exposure fires (typically 300 seconds).

b. In the electrically initiated fire, cables in the tray 10.5 inches above the donor (fire) tray were exposed to a convective heat flux of about 6,000 BTU /hr/ft2 , which corresponds to a local gas temperature of approximately 1000 degrees F. The circuits remained functional and samples of the insulation from the bottom of the tray over the fire zone which were given elongation measurements, showed less than a 10 percent increase.

c. The luminous =ene of the electrically initiated fire was optically thin which enabled immersed objects to radiate heat to the cooler surroundings. Thus, equilibrium surface temperatures of engulfed cylindrical objects varied from about 1200 degrees F just above the tray to 650 degrees F at a height of 10 inches. (Note that minimum vertical i

separation of 24-inches utili:ed in the CPSES design is more than twice this distance and maximum temperatures are anticipated to be well below temperatures successfully withstood during the fire tests.

d. In the.. electrically initiated fire, heat transfer to

immersed objects is convection dominated with radiaticn i

accounting for no more than 30 percent of the total heat flux, even in the luminous region. (Logically then, conduits beside or below hori: ental trays are shielded from the

, major, convective heat flux.)

l

• The high currents required for cable ignition open-circuited the conductors during this period, removing the fault current.

t

7 L

Com'puter analyses (Ref. 3) of the effects of the most severe fire encountered during testing (Ref. 1) on the smallest size conduit used at CPSES (1/2-inch) resulted in a maximum conduit temperature of approximately 181 C. Actual temperatures enpected would be appreciably lower due to the assumptions made in the analysis that the heat flux resulted from a continuous B-inch line fire and the fact that effects of distance and cable blockage on the~ radiative ieat input flux was neglected.

All safety-related cables used at CPSES have an emergency overload rating of at least 130 C for 100 hours per specifications. In addition, the cables are designed to withstand

, temperatures up to Ciu C under short circuit conditions. The fire analy:ed will therefore not subject the cables to temperatures exceeding design conditions.

Additional evidence which supports the adequacy of CFSES conduit separation is provided in the results of the prop ane-f uel ed exposure fire tests (Ref. 2) also conducted by Sandia in which conduits and trays were included. In these tests, 14 trays were stacked 10.5-inch vertically and B-inch horizontally apart.

Directly below each tray (except for the bottom tray exposed to the propane-fueled source) was a conduit containing additional cables. No separation was provided between any conduit and the tray bottom. Although all circuits in the conduits above the third tray failed during the exposure fire (the conductors short-circuiting to the conduit and each other), circuits in the lower two (2) conduits maintained circuit integrity throughout the duration of the exposure fire. Considering that the fire in the lower two (2) trays was more severe than in an electrically initiated fire, being larger in si:e and of longer duration, the results provide a conservative indication of the adequacy of protection offered by conduits during the less severe electrical fire even when installed as in the tests (with no separation of a conduit from the tray bottom, and conduits only 10.5-inch above an open tray) with significantly less separation than provided for in the CPSES design (conduits separated a minimum of 1-inch from the bottom or side of a tray and 24-inch minimum from the top of an open tray).

~

References

1. Sandia Report No. SAND 77-11252

2. L. J. Klamerus, " Cable Tray Fire Tests" - IEEE paper A79091-0 (SAND 77-1424)

~. Gibbs & Hill Mechanical Dept. Cal cul at i on No. 800, Rev. 1.

O

SPEC,' EAH, TUGC0 (2), a g)

PAGE 10F 3

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CHANGE INDEX:0EI COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION  : II

) DESIGN CHANGE AUTHORIZATION :III xv JM (WILL) (miXXM) BE INCORPORATED IN DESIGN DOCUMENT DCA NO. 15.917

1. SAFETY RELATED DOCUMENT: XX YES NO

2. ORIGINATOR: CPPE XX ORIGINAL DESIGNER

3. DESCRIPTION:

A. APPLICABLE SPEC /TX3733332EXX 2323-ES-100 REV. 2 B. DETAIL 3 Revise the following paragraph and sketch details for ES-100:

4.11.3.2. Separation Distance for Conduits (2) Minimum separation between a conduit containing safety related cables and the top of an open tray having different train or channel shall be 2'-0" in cable spreading room and 3'-0" in general plant area. When it is imoossible to maintain this separation, the distance may be reduced to one (1) inch where a solid cover is provided (see Dwg.2323-El-1702-01, detail 38). Minimum separation between a l conduit containing safety related cables and the bottom or side of an open trav (solid bottom or ladder) havino different train or channel shall be one (11 inch.

When a conduit conduit containing non-safety related cables is above. beside. or below an open tray (solid bottom or ladder) havina different train or channel .

(30@inie] M age 2)

4. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION:

703 OECE g,gC EIV E D NM{gQ (SEWM83 S. APPROVAL SIGNATURES: CE :

f, COCUiiiENT CONTR0h25-83 A. ORIGINATOR:

/ <~ CP/J DATE /- fr-B ~T

3. DESIGN REPRESENTATIVE:

--/)//)8M DATE A24 -63

6. VENDOR TRANSMITTAL REOUIRED: YES N0 XX

7. STANDARD DISTRIBUTION:

ARMS (0RIGINAL) (1) Clark Conzatti EE (1)

QUALITY ENGINEERING (1) Fred Powers EE (1)

.) TS FOR ORIG. DESIGN (1)

WESTINGHOUSE - SITE (1)

COMPLETIONS (1)

JERRY HENSON-PROD. CONTROL (1)

DCA FORM 11-80 Admin. Rev 7 M

l .

l .

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f

• DCA # 15,917 Page 2 of 3 i

)

i DETAILS: (Continued from Page 1)

Paragraph 4.11.3.2 ,

l minimum separation shall be one (1) inch. There is no separation required -

I between raceway of same train or channel.

See Separation Sketches "A" and "B".  ;

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. DCA # 15,917 Page 3 of 3

' Separation Sketch "A., Train "B" Conduit r 7 \

N Solid Cover On Tray Required When Vertical

-Ladder or Solid Bottom Tray Separation Is Less Train A or Train C Than:

(a)----

(b)----

(c) With soli cover 1" acceptab e (Min.),

6" preferred.

(d)....

.i Seoaration Sketch "B" Train "B" Conduit Tray Requires Solid

' [e Covers If This Distance Is Less I I Than:

Train A Tray, Ladder (a)----

or Solid Bottom (b)----

Section "A., (c) W th' solid covers acceptable (Min.),

6" preferred.

See Plan for min.

length of cover. -

~ .

F

E.63 84 023 Gibbs C Hill. Inc.

=w a >:s Ne* vy Ne* Yern 10001 2 ; tsa

.  ; .;$s':

GTN-71284 March 6, 1986 Texas Utilities Generating Company Post Office Box 1002 Glen Rose, Texas 76043 Attention: Mr. J. B. George Vice President Project Gen. Mgr.

Gentlemen:

TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING COMPANY COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION G&H PROJECT NO. 2323 CONDUIT TO CABLE TRAY SEPARATION REF: GTN-71266 DTD 2/28/86 Enclosed per the referenced letter is a copy of Mechanical Oepartment Calculation No. 800, Rev. 1 for your information and use.

Design review of this activity is complete and documentation has been transmitted through normal procedures to duplicate file.

Very truly yours, GIBBS & HILL, Inc.

'Y REBa-Jir:lc Robert E. Ballard, Jr.

1 Letter Director of Projects CC: ARMS (B&R Site) OL

'. I. Vogelsang (TUSI Site) IL 1A ormo3

DESIGN REVIEW 3

RECORD FORM r

Te xas Ot :1;t ie s Se r-t;:e s . Inc. Comanc.".e Peak S.E.5. 23:2 CLI E.C F AN E;! G 4 E .' .ic .

F;ro

Title:

/'en {uit Te m oerature s Dur:g Gbie 'ir cy ,

j l[l Drawing @ Calculation ,

l[l Specification R5 S00 I i-2-%

DOGWMENT NO. M DAIL COMMENTS ARE AS NOTED ON DOCUMENT SEEETS LISTED BELOW EXCEM As ETATED REMEIN:

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assisa asvuw uswux u nsw oats AEQUIagD ACTION SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED YES CI NO Cl COMMENTS PE5IGN REVIId ENG I.N EL A RLviss GA!!

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.. Pago 1 of 3 MICHANICAL DESIGN VERITICATICN CHEOF*:ST CALOULAT::N! ANO ANA*.YSII Project Cranche Peak Stasm Electric Station G&H Jcb No. 2323 _

Filing Code 800 Rev. No. l Date 1 .2 Subject Co nd u'it Togerxtures bring Cable Tray F; ce Considered by Item Des. Rev'r

1. Appropria'te Nuclear Safety Related designation marked on cover sheet .

u

2. Filing code, revision, and page no. noted on each page -

3. Properly signed by preparer and checker

4. Purpose of calculation properly stated e

5. Input data properly listed and referenced .

6. Assumptions are, reasonable, properly listed and referenced- .

7. Items to be re-verified, later in design, l identified

6. References listed, including revision no., page no., letter no., section no., ute. as applicable

/P. I , ?. 3 _ 3 l 9. Method is accepted practicar formulas applicable,

! referenced and identified by equation no. or page '

j l no m, etc.

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. , - - , , , - , . * . - -..---. --,w w-+-- ~ * - - -- *"-w---- - - ' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Pago 2 of 3 MECHANICAL DESIGN VERIFICATION CHECKLIST CALOULATIONS AND ANALYSES Pro;ect C ra-: e Pe=_< Stea- Elec r:. Stat e- G & H .* :0 No. 2323 Filing Code - 7)00 aav. No. I Date i .2 - T (-

subject Co nduit b perafures During Cable Tray Are Considered by Item -- Des. Rev'r

10. General approach and accuracy are reasonable; output reasonable compared to input ,

11. Spot check of mathematics or check by alternate .

method indicates accuracy is reasonable -

l  !

12. Computer program approved for use ,a /MM $

s'

13. Consistent with project guide s t

i

14. Consistent with FSAR s

15. NSSS and other vendors interface requirements complied with referenced v ,

i

16. Codes, Standards and Regulatory Guide require- ' '

ments cceplied with and r.eferenced i

17. All required modes of operation considered and '

listed --.

18. Safety Class / Seismic Category identified ,

19. Interface with other calculations and other s- -

, disciplines listed and compatibility ver:.fied

? .

Page 3 ef 3 y_I MU:::AL III:3S . I: : 7 :'-: : : . :: I:e _;IT CA* C'.:'.AT 0S5 M;; M;ALYSIS Project Crane.".e Peak Staam Electric Static . G&H Job No. 2323 Filing Code 600 Rev. No. l Date / 8[-

Sub3ect C cin d u i t Te m pe rcd u re s During Co bie Trav Fire Considered by Item __

Des. Rev'r

20. Results to be used in design are identified and are responsive to the purpose of the calculation l for sufficiency, accuracy, safety margins, and  :

compliance with applicable Regulatory Guides, I Codes and Standards, etc.

s_-

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21. Complete equipment parame.:ers are listed -

i l

l NOTI: As a minimum, all items on this checklist shall be c:nsidered by the design review engineer. If relevant to the input ma-terial being reviewed, the item shall be check marked (/),

otherwise the item shall be marked not applicable (NA) by the design review engineer.

/ ' '

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' ' - . f'. . .i. -

j Signature of Design Review Engineer V A Cate# -

l .

Gibba C Hill. Inc.

, Calculation Cover Sheet 35  ::N: _ i . 'E C. ent - _

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Subject c C N C'J i i~ .

8 NuclearSafety Related O Non-Nuclear Safety Related-QA Program Applicable O Non-NuclearSafety Related Sheets Sheets Sheets Joo Engineer Deleted Added Revised _ Signature l Date Onginal XIXl ~

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@comeusmen a,f W '

y

.,i

> % ' '. :$.?: h ,,0 .\..', Y i

Ps. I: cowoutT as.ct Q ". we m e t- Q. A e m .v. :t '#cy c.1.

c ,,2 r1.,,c. p uiru .g :er a : . -

g R f.'/ Mf(Ptn olisuN. Cc i . r s,'la , e m s.w F .w.~.f c .,o .

2. Checking Method # ' na m _ C M ' 5 +) F-166, 7-82

.t---

- --. - , - , . ~ ,

l Gibba C Hill. Inc. Job No. 2.;2? Cfient -- - -::

r.

Subject cont Ji- U F = p e n u 9 :i s, can ns .f. e _

p 4 . = c- .

Calculation Number 903 Sheet No.  :.

---. -. . _ . =- -

..n- - . . . _ . . . . . . _...

-< t. ... - e, .o -e. .

c. a.,

i. . :~. . y ~_ *

>< ~X 'x y;

. p.ec a e- ca .--H*' f .js 54 * ,

Checue' */ w i ?/ i ?* M - QA i Mrt OL I l l 1 I I  !  ! l l I

CA S E b) As su M ES 75 wouiT L o cA'_C 20 m ._ r 2 .s 3 TH E N A 'f AND PARALLEL. ro T 3 A xi s C F 7 2 7 .t. , peg T's; 3 cosciGO N , F Ro M G 5 F 1, g -), 3 , o p, 3cco g g. .,b. j[.

. j, FOR T C- I C) S/76 C.A S T , (W $ iS 75 re t s' . r. r 13 _ I-  ;

-- ) .

. /- OF F I P . I'), UGINS Ts2 P 2- ';C a ri p....  ; r.

. 3 - b ( T-e T j ; 3000 : ~7 (T - 7 D

~~

= 4 9 9 5 'F. l-

$ ( t s r ,- c :, : -': -

--5 CASE A ss .:.v l s - A' --2 P '< 1 i s 8 INCH ES Lo s .= -pg . c; J ;

TMT A fr u R7 :_R TWo F :_ =_,- 05: tcucmT cn EiTr2P 5es iG . c CA 3 D IN ST S'R

- AT 12 2 I#'

._ 24" _ , _ 8" _ 24' @ ecnsusvien sas s

'~ -- --

' G eor %usTlow . ,-

w w C=As es S

// 'A ' '3 0 0 0 2. 6 /

y , /g ,,.

3 n .

1 1 19 439, g =

Y;t.% y) h ame.or m @ h = N- he - 4t.re o c o Cc~ect.cr yarc u to'*

gg  % d . at.c.,

1 3 N 't N

\ TRA/ \ umE F

Fici  ?. CoNOulf AEOVE TR A'r

%. 1 T c ,: yo ? 3 c. . . : _ .  :-  ; s . r, 3

:. ?:  :.- - -1

.e:: :

h 7 mb/wn.-r-2.p Checking Method #

1'- .=. .m. _-

~ . ~ - , - , -

F-166, 7- 82

Gibbs S Hill. Inc. Job No.  : =.; i Client . . , ' -

Subject _,e t- , e y : , e 3 2 c.:. -  % e ,, 3 0 g e Fr. , ,

e2 Calculation Number 1oO Sheet No. 5 ___

_u

-e. . o. -e. _n a. e -n ,. n

r. x i X x- x xy-- -

. p.ecaw . % . : : - 7.:.  ; j .

Checaer i I CtL tim bai  ! l } , t

!  ! I I i l I j i 5 e_1}___p.i5 ub e . Se~ co nd.ait _ J cEs ted o n e. i n c.'e. _ be ! n

_ _._ _ . the., __cabl e. te a.y , . ct n ch poca l l el to__ -th e a e i t c1 C r.et.cic'i a_.Ck/ .__Tbc coNd 5 CEd. tE5.UC.EElt tra.y Ae2 G J :. ._. . _..

Po7 Nis ions 3vrotter_,'

~

~

~_c.de&echhorit.5ktchI nu -

gee.r_s.;cr.ence..ty y.a$ ._..mg ,= 3000 q ( c h ta t, le i.

4.t a f- L54. _te ga eaty _re .d7[19 Ed* $ ~ C:- <e fle _._ A h __'. .

~

1 I b__ s>0wld be ne3U [ ele 5n 3 i.s'hase~ be: A v.s.c c : - c d .' : -

~

.l_ nr.. 5)ou'~'td 5e.'d.fi wr? v.f.$r s u.v~t5er it e tr 3-( 1~'- x .

-~ ~

~ 'te E?f c2br ,. . of In.o F.. _

' ~

~~

___ '7_Ne, late a.sSENes that %e h re .i s Einches long arl

" ~ ~ '

-t,bo,t_3w~o.__~4eet._ol__co Mud _lo n eIIhe e U.de oC %e, firo is Sc1ted_;Uiti![ai r.[o.t .J;L5.5 F, [

~ ~

1 .

._. _ .u ME _._ ._. . _ _ .

bMy$f#) Q Rio AT - u.- =_a

~ ~ P[ o 'o" frX/WZ4 l  %/A ~ 10 c 0  ?*> /ke :5

___N '

N TRAY @ 140c*F l -'il' i hcoomT @h he-h,- Ud r a l

__ . __. - G J" W/ > _ _ . _ _

. _ . . . Co mee N 0 d D D h c f I--C-saroo:nr ~

cus -- - ~ - - ~

%gy p 39 %., g,,

,. n, chess [/6 y :e

.____ _D wsIEur Act .ne & o\s W v r"3 boh M! a i

. ~ _ . . _ _ . . . efuals 0 87W* . There fort ,'trt 'ao 1 so -

_ . _ _ . _ _ . . ... __. ___ ._.h at least 1 376 Er> nt %'~ *] cn *:

._ . ELL. S roup.mT ut.cW__. T R N r. ____ ses G~. fope des-e3$ GG Rsl t.106 CQ

_. _ _ _ __ _ ___. ___ ._ .64-J85L-12-o6-c P o rd GG-305I.-Q-c6 -cP.

~ - -- - -

Checking Method -#~ 1' d-__h ,, L ' p.166, 7- 82

.c>,-. -,.- -, . - .

Gibbo E Hill. Inc. Job No. .: . ;- -

Client e :. '. -

Sub;ect C<A.,+  %. - .: c , e : ~~.,r,., c, e r , , . ..,.,

Calculation Number 2OD -Sheet No.

2

.a a..

. - e, .o -.

n -o a ,. :n T". X r X X X- X-o een v - g ~ re. -

CP*> e' 8

'A ! > Inhb i i i i l l l l l } j

} he___ cone. guedel:n __ SE:_n C_li cc.s e ._ b) ha 5 a l r e A d/ ..

~

beer. . Ulc~e s".e~d . _1T re fe r.e o c e__ I wit e ceyed w conduits

- ~ ~

whic.b- o.ri ab'ove ' ~ ~the burning ~ cable tray bu.t w it hin _.__ .

- ~ ~

___._one .M..if the caEit tray.

~

The plot on pace s.5 o

~

.refere nce. .I ihods the. tempera.ture res ponse of upiied..._~

~~ ~ ~

.__ cables ~ aT.hei{ hts of %".[E",9" and il " above thi ~ ~~~ ~ _

~ ~ ~

Eunin[cAbiei.. Tne~Easd'wh'ich resembtes case b) % e.

_. most Is the. one, at -tk< 11" ~helpt. The maxi . u m _.

~ - ~

__ ~ Te4pera.ture reiorded inTe Est wa5 2.3co*F. The~ ~~ _ ~~

~ ~

tempe ra kre ~o.t ao " Ji t i be lower since the

~ - ~ ~

~ _combustionl gaie.s cool as %ey rise ,and , per referents I,

~ ~ -

.__ _ [ convection 'h de dominant ~ heat Pronsfer mecharism in -tQs

~ ~ ~

._ 'c ah.The_ redo.ril,_cde. 5)_. will _nk be a.naly zed . . . . . . ~1~ .

6:rce_ cases a) ard c.). are. some what (;-itar , le as .

~ '

. __ consider. ctEA followi na j. 4's thE disEance. between d e and.ait

_ _.ar2_We~ftF4EiEc7eas'e~s~, o .roaiie c ~ pee c ~nta}e e ih'd c:r74.-

~ '

~_ _ sv_d5c c_SU_. edieivei 4e edit

o .h r C r e r p In a d diti o r ,

~

n

__ ~ ~ idd :.o M o --heAE GIAE va~ ries inverse.(y wit h d.;sta nc e sp1a red.

l

.61nce. _thz . co nduit in cas,e a) is fact ne r- %o n % one._,n

~

..Co5.e MI 4.b E ~ cde a) conflit_ui 15 recei ve. less rad .'c. _ bea.; .

__ M ere dre _c.pse. . cf..i f ~m or e . s e ver e. tha n ca s e. a.) , a n d. __ .' ~

-- ~~

. c.ase_.a.) _w ii I .no t . be__angly fed .~ __ .Z. ~ T _1_ I _

ChecMng Method # 1WM-~ F-166, 7-82

! CT.". M M = - , -

Gibba S Hill. Inc. Job No. =, ;. :. Client . '- L -

Suo;ect  % .- 1 , - T4 n s e 1 , e .,: T ., c n o Q c.g ~ ~e , . .

,g Calculation Number 2oo Sheet No. 56 _._

. re -aa

.. - . , , .a -e, e, a.. =,, . a.,

X: ' X X X

.W__. X-Pr.a e , w . ; .

,m, , i ,  ; ,

cree,w .'tt; m N i l l 4 8  ! l l 1 l l l

~

Sn1dti.._xt- thk I P556 r 1.3 n~ 5iitd Iram '/:. ' '_.Io __

'oS Iord.Ni. M Evretec. In o r.d e'r to Seiec.*- th 4 ' c o e[Ii t .

~

1 b d Abich E l.fd5uif._in A ad E.urd temyer2 uet, .'e b ..

_ 'u ccNUder fat Oliowb .3 Re pre se n t. The co nd u i ~

~

1La bn _'ed 5nd[E 3 __b N 7 5t R heurce._ h t. s o l di.o r _

_in. tb e "AS _ $ p.r_ o b I e_m _1 5 pees _in Tdttfe e Cf. [, P_ _$9 -

~

~1 ~

~~

1

~ '

f =TJh PkA ']..Ts _h) . .

___ ..__ M o ut __ P. .? d a . ._ _. _. __. _. __ . _

--- A

• 5 Uw*- d?) =-h(do-d;)(do.rd;) : [ t (do -d;) - _

._ - . _. _ . . _ _ _ .__ ___ _ ~ '

.___ where: _. 4 co ndait . _ _ . .o u tside J:a, e'er- _ .

- - .-- .- _-_ -_ d; :..cond <ik inside du% der

._. . _ . - . _ _ _ ._ _ t - conduit wall {isic kne s:

klsa:.- p.,* _da. . ._ . a <. d .. h * (' ) -.

__Me c e h re We c4n.Sa/- __

p_

do___o_c_

da , _ (do)(da_+..di) 4] i, (L.T ) . . .

o .,

1 - .t.

. (Oc S hn5 = .

d, fl* ,'

_ _ . . _ . .D t __c c # oi n a.t[C n . O k _ cl e , d i . 0.* d ..i. . WWCh m I r '. M Z e 1. 4. E t

$ kr e _ .'e c_S 's a f fooY,. 5rog_ et v)i \ \ ret,qlf'{e b e . .

~

wofe s.t 6 er.e ce. . Pased_oe. W in ory.s C cn in 7

_fde t'.t.nCd 3, ihe . k71.CEkd t_k i S, %t J o r(t c o i.e. . .

@ . .-6* 66* e _h w *_.*ese. .sh e.w- D _ lDya _

W 6N N *Sh@ *6_ +-6 * -

t- -- ~~.~.- -

Gibba S Hill. Inc. Job No. a~;1 Client ~ ,5'.-

Subject C e ,. i s .. 7 e c . , 2 2 ,., wrw Co se i c ., , ,. e Calculation Number QoC Sheet No. c .

..2..- ae. . i

% ..a:e A e, ., a e 4ev ;a:,

. .~. O X X X X X~

D'eci e* i ?A( v ; /J ' / 24

{ t ,

~

Checmor i I

.%  ! Inia ~

l  !  !

_ NO F _C 154..T- . _.Wf. S. CO M M 'l wad p d f d Y ** N Of h. . _.

~

~ ~~

.1he. _CoSd.wi[ clN u Me eeAc.e.__5 hic 'h wi Il reeeise "*r e

___..T ' d, b. T'h _ ._. . .. .

gg g7 .. . . . . .._ ._ .. ._ .

i Y

. I ,,. _ . 3 , ,, .. .. . . .

,, a s >

Fcom referene.e la L i co n d a t_t. . _._ __ .

s 4 > . , . _

's o

\

l

,' _ d.d 0._CLA in. .0. rg s.0. 31 % :.A Oa5 ?]-

._. g,g. db s

/

.d, = 0 2 '+ 0 i n . -* or : 0. MO in. : 0.0 35 0

o

"$ ~~~

k" co m'dM ~ ~~t : T[-a Q~- 0. t 0 9 ', ,, , = 0 0 0 9 _t S t . __,

J A

a. .

__f a n 4 %_-7,y t J . / 7 8 ? ._ .. ._-.

_. 2._ I - _y _. _-_ _ . - -

N ** =' _* O ,

-* m ". / ~

O . T .; /

. . r.s d I

. _ _ . / The to% \ a -ount o5 coe&ait to.

__ .-. J ._ .x ..

_ . .__ . .I . _s . r~ece itt . . ea d ;.1nt h ea t e e e 3 y _ t 1 ..

_jk _ _

L_ . . . . __. _ .

__ _ _ _ . . __ . 3#4 0- d(S Ne7 T- 3 / O Io . . . . _

___ . ;p_. . _ . _ _ -. . _ . . ._ ._ .

. _ _ . _ . _ _ _ . - _V .. . ._ ..

. - _ . -. O,n ' - _ _ _ . .' he_rc i.s. ci re a f o r _ vjar ,, e A r j , \s .u. st ' o <.'. 4 e r .: m Ok .C o n St.0 . . . . _ .

NS

~

~~

O !_h 6 A_~dt.~/ ?. ~ ~.'(n o_ hear i npu t ). ._

M.1* < 9 < it o .. ( ra d; a. nr h ea t i yut ) .. h . .

Checking Method #' 1' -

"_ ,,,,,E_m.~~_

- -- ~ ~~~~

~~

p.15,7 782

Gibba C Mill. Inc. Job No.  : 1. ~- Clier'st Subject 1, 3 2 . .. To , 3 e r 3 , r e . n . i c : ,- 3 _ , e .,

c,, = e3 Cak:ulation Number ' EOO Sheet No. 5i _-

..- .. -a __

. .......n _

-#. . u

5. X >

X 7< ~x X - --

=.n a v , v  :. ; , n  !

i C. ecne, ! M i .!ntse 4 i e i i  ! I i i l l

~

~~ ~

~T ha. "Ci e._yd~r~ie.s U.t h f.i Je~ a. 5~ shown in retere,,ce l, ya.a u e . s.5

~

- _ I-le. lis e 5) ,'~u s i na . curve @ , -k e calaci~e te e _ .

~

~ ~ ~

.kiOp.e<A%<i cise.s Nen. To

• F at t = 0 s n e e d. - -

~' ~~

~

~ ~ '

lo_l A.o_o F__at _t : 3 0 seco Ed.s ._ The te-paco w re . . . _ _.

'~

~~

re $11ns _at J100 *? .up~~' %:~aub~ sac ~ d s ~ , o. e J do-oyi . . _

~

The rad;at;<e hes+ ?In she e

~ ~

_. ko .2 oo?_E aE~ tT 'o~6 5 se~c~c nd s .

. . _ _. _. . m

. _ _. Q____I A c o

• F i s _..opf ro,< ;ma te ly 70cc Q . . .

_ _ In__o ed er ~~to TeteLinE t'hc he a t 7 % of T% ; 4do'F

-~

~

_ ~~O e ~.= ~e s 7 e T d ; e o, 4G A tenpera-.<re. .v a :..+

~

e.

~~

4iest.

__ ~~dc+ Erric7d. . . _

U.stns Yns he a.r cal axe e showe in reEerr ece ' _,

.=.? y =

• 9

_T s )._e_w(T - 1T y) = (t - C r(~ a-i>)

.. . _ _ _ h_

_._.___.(,I; g

~

1. __.-Os_^~4 t aXs [ernpa ra t Ge. . c o n be detecwad. .

.__. .._G : v e r :._ i 0. ' S , _ h .7 .T,. ,;9.k

~ ~

~L:

~

-~

_ _ f a :~ T u: e o Y = $/.- o

• R f.:=isIo*

3

_17(T.:-8ss)+(o.ls)(c.ni+<idS )y-(2'oof :(1-0,i5)(0.ple =ii )((28-(:?(q l

7 T .. . ' co a o + .57tx d ,oT,a 7

- i +]. 61 'r o 1."2

~ ~

~ ~

. ,2. 51 t.x 15~' Tl_~ 7 Ti = 'o t +a n -.

Z

~~~~

.'. ~ ~4 T . 2 992 R =+' 28 F [Fla e der pero 6.re )

._ w.e_ .p

. _ a-- . _p a6 . m. ,w .e h N *

.m - w m .. a d- .N -._ .e += .e .. .si

.I~ -.~- -, _ ,_, .

E 4

Gibbs S Mill. Inc. Job No.

• 1: L

, Chem .1 ', -.,

~

C e .4 , . '

Sub l ect n -er2 a re 1 ar ea C., e e c, =.<e Calculabon Number 9)O ' Sheet No. e,

=_ _

.. .n -.. _ re -e. -e, ,..e  % _ _ ,e _

3.'D

~

LW X X X 3-( _

m e:a.er V , ' * 'a i / ! b I  ; 1 C ec=er T. 8 2 /> c. M i i l i I  ! I. l l l The heat fS leovinf

~ ~

_ Fred the 4iole_ teropeFalu7eg

~

__ %E~~4 (avr e ..w i l l b e .. c a t e_v.tatzd . . . .

. _ _ , . . . . ~~ ~

f r,.,. = 4 7 \'T f* ~T. s*/ ' . . .

~ ^~ ~

Q. Q(0.'I 5)16. I_.7)aru . _ . . _ . , , _ _ .

ino") {H 48V- (%M)$ ~ . _ ..

. _ { r .__. (o.7,.O .hr.ft'._. .__. (gt T:, = yoo F ) ,_ ___

~S-

~

. 1. T'hk %Ifowing_inpu. t . wiiI' Ee"Edd ~~ .

, ._ _ .~ .i ." ~ ~

_ _ _ _ _ . .._ . _. ,u s

. __. __Ilm e_-(se cond s). . ___ ._ # eat. Pww (, se. 4p /

O.C C . C-

_10. O_ _ .._ _ . ._1oo0.O

']p 00 0 .

A QO. C -. _. ..

• 'o o O . _ ._. .. 'o'7 0 ,

__. The. heat.A'.e is assu. fred to i~girce' on the S inch se3 Met of the. conduit which is directN below .the

_~~1]iYe. . 'The heat 4im is assu~ed % be consta.rt i n

~ ~ ~

E. +hi s . re gio n . h]c credit is taken~ -br the d.ec r eas.o_

~

in radi a tive. heat . flux win increasin3 dis ta n ce .

~

I__ de Hd flux. is app l:ed % We. re m ainde r- of- th e.

~

1 __AchduiE It- is more. cor.ser mt-tve wi+h rea,ard, to % e

.__. _ ynaximu.m conduit._ ternye rat w r e to appl y a c o nsb r.t

~~ ~

- ~~'be5_ ff ux. _ 4[ the . 8 iAc h eedion

. - .o r.d ne0l ecT tk e eed

~ ~

~~ .33ects_ of_the.. bea+ f M i n ike ef hee re3;ec.. - -

~ '

%_Aridi.t'~ i s, taken_ fo7_ blockage . of..hea.t 9tw d se to

.._t_be. filstance. 9E adjaceat ed' ele 5. t n the trap _

. Checking Method # 1 =&_~ ~

_. ~

F-1Fi6. 7-82

! mL%'l::::'.= -- , .- .

Gibba S Hill. Inc. Job No.  :.1: 1 Cfient  : ';, ' -_

Subject C e, <. 4 , , + Te n -- c , ., c , s 2 ., , , , G ee T , ,.  ::,,

Calculation Number qoo ~ Sheet No. 5.:

. a. :n = e. .n 2,. :n  % :n 3.';". ~hi

- X 'X X ^XT

~

me :a.e vs .:..: , n f i ,

c .c. i i cte i .,om i i i i i i l l I l

~ ~ ~

._ The__conclet .i.s MiuvreCh. lose ~ heo.t by con /ecdon .

omd. rAlii.ifin 6thienUronNeetl .

~ ~~ ~ ~

~

a.)__solwcE\ _Cc5e~crion from QorttontE\ C ype,ders __

. b f.,. . - . . . .- ..

...N;A s 7: O. 5 3 @ --Pr.g rg .' . _ . /

. . _ . . . {ref, .J f. ).9, .

._ Ath e rs .. .Pr_7 0.! 5 .and.._. !O y-4 G (6 4 Io , . _ _ _ _ _ _

~ ~~

-- . ?m Lef. A.,p.6% : . (Sir .yroperi;es $~ sob ?P) ^ ~~ ~ -

..aru .-

~yg. ,

h c. ol1+ w.gf ,_ ._Pr.-o.71, p . o. Es x to' .:pp .

~

-o. s s k--- - -

_ _ 9. . . _g . .. (S Wd. %n ) (p,. )}- __. . . . ._-

-_ . _ h = (o.53) (0.0174) . (0.85x !o,) (0 02)3>/.U. . '] *\ ftT) -

( c .07j.

~~ ^

h.: o 5 (LT)5^T -. ._ _ _

~ ~'

b' ~ RA~d t o.t_;cr.Z ..Z __ Z . _~ . T _

1;d galva!: zed. Sheer

~~~ ~

_s E_o~. 3._. (rel.;,.7,157:

~ ~

[ .__ . E_6.7 ..(0 3 h 00.~[iG d I [ E 5 1 4A210 $,,p

~

Z^T_( Fo r_5cnsedatiim, Oe share factor is a suned to be 10)

- - - ~~ ~ ~

Checking Method #~ ichC_ ~ F-156, 7- 82

! 8',".;;.^~ 37'~~' - -.- -

Gibba e Hill. Inc. Job No. 325 Cfient ~:

Subject C.: C - ~9 P 2 R A ~ u ;- M ORu a e .- 7. A - 2 ' . -

r CaloJlation Number eo: Sheet No. 6

=

3-

.m

-e. _n -e . t.

-e. :r. ! % :n T =.~. X: -

X ~X X ^X a.ecy.,  ; .< t - : . +; :. a ..n,s, , 1 i 1 hk, i;.j2i,Ir6 I Checner '/ a m / ? *.)/ 75; l l l l l

~

ImPG CAn ". F:P ud3 C

//MLUSECT F JOB ( C48. ' 11320 ' , '002323006', ' 5076' ), 'M. LUBRANO 15 FL -1019 ' .

// CLA$S=C. NOT I FYsMLU,MSCCLASSs0

// EXEC HEAT 5v2

//FT06F001 00 SYSOUT=*

//SYSIN 00

• CPSES ELECTRIC CABLE TRAY FIRE, 1/2" CONDUIT 1" BELOW BURNING TRAY 2400 1 3 2 1 2 2 3 3 1 9 500 .

-1 0.00002 0.0 0.15 1 1 0.0259 0.0350 0.431 3.14 2.0 2.33 1 1 2 2 0.0259 0.0350 0.431 3.14 0.0 2.0 1 2 3 2 0.0259 0.0350 0.0 0.431 0.0 2.33 1 2 1 STEEL 1 22.0 490.0 0.11 2 STEEL 2 26.0 490.0 0.11

(* 1 1

122.0 1 122.0 5.14E-10 0.5 0.25 0.3 1

-t ,i 2 1 122.0 5.14E-10 0.5 0.25 0.0259 0.0350 1

0.0 0.431 3.14 2 6 0.0 2.0 2.33 24 4 1 5 0.0 0.0 0.008 7000.0 0.067 7000.0 0.1 67.0 0.2 67.0

/*

//

l 6

We Checking Method #  ;=M-- F-166, 7-82

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CPRT-294 Page 2 Two assumptions that were considered inconsistent are:

The analysis states that the smallest conduit size is the worst case since the only heat dissipation considered is convection. However, the equations presented indicate that the largest diameter would give the highest temperatures (worst case). Subsequent analyses indicate that the smallest size is indeed the worst case.

The assumption that a three foot section of conduit would be at the maximum temperature is inconsistent. Subsequent analyses indicate that the maximum temperature is at the point in the middle of the flame region and temperatures die away rather rapidly as the distance from the flame increases. ,

Several other assumption were considered questionable. For example, the analysis assumed that a one-inch conduit was the smallest size. Specification ES-100 indicates that 1/2 and 3/4 inch conduit were used at the site. A walkdown has not been performed to determine the smallest conduit routed one-inch from a redundant open cable tray.

Attached for your information and use are copies of the documents noted above.

If you require any further information please contact me or Bob Bizzak. Please let me know what your conclusions are regarding the above design observations.

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• JJJ. flanda JJM/ls cc: T. G. Tyler (w/o attachments)

R. J. Bizzak (w/o attachments)

CPRT File I.b.3 (w/o attachments)

CPRT File (w/o attachments)

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CPRT-294 INTEROFFICE MEMORANDLH-TO: Howard A. Levin FROM:. John J. Mallanda DATE: March 12, 1986

SUBJECT:

Action Plan I.b.3 Design Observations During the implementation of Action Plan I.b.3, " Conduit to Cable Tray Separation", the Electrical Review Team noted two design observations that by themselves did not indicate an adverse trend. However, I believe these observations, since they involve design criteria, should be included with other findings generated by the Design Adequacy Program (DAP) to determine if an adverse trend exists.

The original issue as identified by the NRC is:

"The TRT found no evidence that the existing G6H analysis for establishing the criteria for a 1-inch separation between rigid conduits and cable trays, as stated in G&H Electrical Frection Specification 2323-ES-100, had been evaluated by the NRC staff for Comanche Peak. This analysis should have been referenced in the FSAR."

Upon investigation of this issue, the Electrical Review Team noted the following two design observations:

1) No analyses existed when the original criteria was incorporated into design and construction documents. The basis appears to be engineering judgment based on experience with other nuclear projects. The one inch separation between safety-related conduit and cable trays was originally sent to TUGC0 via Gibbs & Hill letter GTN-2441 dated February 19, 1975 which included the document " Criteria for Separation of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits".

Additional criteria involving conduit above cable trays was addad to the Electrical Erection Specification 2323-ES-100 via DCA-6132, Reviston 0, dated November 16, 1979. Again, engineering judgment appears to have been the basis.

2) The Gibbs & Hill analysis eventually used to verify the adequacy of a one-inch separation between conduits and cable trays contained inconsistent assumptions after design review was complete. The latest revision of this analysis is attached to latter GTN-70439 dated August 20, 1985, and the Design Review confirmation was transmitted via GTN-70614 dated September 23, 1985.

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