ML20197F832
| ML20197F832 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 07/31/1977 |
| From: | Klamerus L SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES |
| To: | Knight J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20197B836 | List: |
| References | |
| SAND77-1125C, NUDOCS 8210150277 | |
| Download: ML20197F832 (90) | |
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Y Q b \ 3 p\ d-.i* . . [ e] .,- l hgh qQ L.'J. Klamerus, 5432 R . !! . Nilson, 1262 tagQI F p Sandia Laboratories j 4 Albuquerque, New Mexico H s pl - p (SAND 77-1125C) n 5
/ N h Abstract k .- k if Funds were authorized by the Nuclear Regulatory Cosmission G to provide data needed for confirmation of the suitability of M current design ntandards and regulatory guides for fire protection Y and conctol in water reactor power plants. This paper summarize d tne activi~ ties of this program through March 1977. It describes P a survey of industry in order'to determine current design practices, l
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The adequacy of cable tray spacing designated in Regulatory Guide 1.75 was chosen for evaluation. Using electrical cabic types currently being selected for new nuclear power plant construction, .
$ a screening test was designed and completed to select two cable m constructions which were used in subsequent full scale tests.
# 3even full scale tests were run and resulted in no functional Ij da nago to cables in trays adjacent to that cable tray in which
[] a fire was electrically initiated. Characterization of theco p fires was made and reveal a margin of safety in the separation ) criteria of the regulatory guide for electrically initiated fires l Q~Q in IEEE-383 qualified cable. , q . P i
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' OlGTRIBUTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IS UNUMITI3 g 93.16 L 5G QU %A ~'
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i Introduction i i
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'; The Of fice of Nuc} car Regulatory Roscacch of the United States
! Nuclear Regulatory Commission is conducting con'firmatory research
'l in areas considered important to protecting the health and safety
;j of the public. Fire protection, as established by NUREC-0050,
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" Recommendations Related to Browns Ferry Fire," is one such
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,j critical area of research. -
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/ j! The objectives of the Fire Protection Research Project at tt i Sandia Laboratorios are (1) to provide data ither to confirm
- I the suitability of current design standards and regulatory guides
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for fire protection and control in light water reactor power {l plants or to indicate areas where they should be updcted; r (2) to obtain data that will provide improved technical basin
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[ either for modification of the standards and guides or for new I standards and guides if necessary. Such changes are to be made . 1, where appropria'te to decrease the vulnerability of the plant to
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fire; to provide for better control of fires; to mitigate the effcets of fires on plant safety systems; and to remove unnecessary j design restciction; (3) to obtain fire effects data for water r; reactor safety system equipment and to assess improved equipment,
, j .iesign concepts, and fire prevention data and methods that can
!j be used to reduce vulnerability of plant safety to fire. e j
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Background
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[i.' When the project was initiated in July 1974, the only task
.g assigned-was to provide the experimental and analytical information E
4 to evaluato the adequacy of cable tray spacing designated in g Regul. tory Guide 1.75, " Physical Independence of Electrical Systems, Section 5.14, General Plant Areas." This section of the
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guide covers separation of protective cystems in areas of the plant where power cable: are included and the only source of
~ ~{ fuel is that provided by the cabic materials. All evaluations
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were to involve the testing of equipment and configurations
. representative of those going into now nucicar power plant designs.
, , . It was decided that a survey of industry should be made to determine current design practicos. The cooperation by. members -
J. - of the nuclear power industry was outstanding. Either personal visits or correspondence elicited responses from 13 leading architect-engineering firms, 13 utility companies, and 13 cable
~
manufacturers. Three nuclear power plants were also' visited, although design practices of existing nuclear power plants were
, not included for evaluation. Information obtained during this /* survey has proven very valuable in determining cable constructions, -
cable tray constructions, cable loading, and types of cable assignments in cable trays. The survey also solicited information about previous incidents and experiences including the cable
\. tray fire at San Onofre 1 in 1968 and the subsequent investigation
\
to determine the cause.2 5 A primary concern was to insure that the test facility
, truly represented the reactor plant area. The discussions with f architectural and engineering firms were particularly valuable
[i for improving the realism of the proposed tests. i Since we had been warned of the difficulties of electrically initiating a fire in power cable it was decided early in the ( 8 pro)cet to conduct the test with 12 AWG, the smal'est . power s[4, cabic normally used in nuclearipower plants in order to minimize
,l the amperage demands in the test setup. A preliminary heat transfer
' ,I f, analysis was also p9rformed at that early date. A rough analycia
,8, was all that was ennsidered necessary to determine the approximate
> current required to raise cable inculation to a combustibic I
; temperature and to determine if the conductor temperaturo is at i its molting point 11003*C) when the outsido of the cablo insulation
,, is at its combu tion temperature. The analysin showed that
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g ev rents in the range of 300-120 amperes would raine the cabic j insulation to its combuctible temperature. This agreed with e subsequent testing. [ With the results of the survey and the preliminary analysis as guidelines, a test facility was developed to perform full scale testing of cable fires of electrically initiated origin. 5' Although it was originally intended to test all known types of cable currently specified and acceptabic for use in nuclear power -
, plant design and construction, the largo number of cable types coupled with budget limitations precluded such broad testing. .
Therefore, screening was indicated that would lead to selection } for testing of two typical cable types that would be most likely ' of propagating .a fire and would present a conservative approach. Cable Screening Tests , A survey of utility companies, architect-engineering firms, and cable manufactureres, ascertained their p .-ferences of inculation and jacket materials. The inquiries stipulated that the cable types
,' must be those currently being inctalled in or would be included in
. the design of nuclear power plants. As a result of this constraint, all cable types suggested were capable of passing IEEE Standard 383-74.3 v .
l There were thirty-nine rep 1*ies from industry which cited 20 different cable types that were being considered for use in , new construction. Screening was necessary to cut thic list
./ to manageable size and allow full scale te' sting to proceed. , /'
! . The first. cut was made ,on the basis of popularity. .he leading types were crosslinked polyethylene with or without some jacket . l material (3T percent), EPR with a Hypalon jacket (23 percent), and EPR with a Neoprene jacket (19 percent). i t . l t l *
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-4 Considerations of the cost of filling cobic trays in a full scale test prompted a further screening t, cst-to obtain twn dif f3;gnt cabic types that were "most likely to procaqate a fire." The screening tests . tere performed merely to rank the various cable types in some manner. The relative differences ,hetween results
- were small thcreby subjecting the conclusions to disputo, especially if proprietary interests were involved. When burn length differtnces
. . are measured in millimeters, as they were in one of the tests, it.is difficult to attach true cignificance to those differences.
The relative ranking of the cable types was based on three
' different evaluations. They were chosen to complement other
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evaluations, not to duplicate them. The oxygen index test which has been done on all of tt.c cable insulation types under con-sideration is a case in point. The thr,ce types reported here h, r are a small scale electrically initiated cable insulation. fire ',, Underwriter Laboratories FR-1 flame test,4 and a pytnlyzer test, . and thermal chromatograph test (messure of insulation outgassing i as a function of temperature). , s
' Electrically Initiated cable Inculation Fire Test To determine the amount of current needed to produce a flame, five small scale tests were performed on five dif ferent electrical cables. The cable types were:
Cabic fl - Single conductor 112 AWG, 4,i. mil (1.14 mm) EPR, 30 mil (0.76 mm) flypalon jacket, 600 v. Cabic 12 - Single conductor 112 AWG, 47 mil (1.19 mm) e -~
, chlorinated rubber (proprietary), 47 mil (1.19 mm) chlorinated polymer (proprietary) jacket, 600 V.
Cable 93 - Single conductor f12 AWG, 47 mil (1.19 mm) EPM, 15 mil (0.38 mm) Neoprono jacket, 600 v. s .
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! Cable 44 - Single conductor 112 AWG, 30 mil (0.76 mm) cross-f ,,' linked PE, no jacket, 600 v (Supplion a).
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Cable 65 - Three conduc' tor 812 AWG, 30 mil ('0.76 mm) cross-l; linked PE, silicon glass tape, 65 mil (1.65 mm) crosslinked Pt jacket, 600 V (Supplier ~ A). 7 Figure 1 shows how the cables were arranged in a cable tray j , i for each test. Current was increased in increments of 5 ampercs . ! every 10 minutes until a flame was observed. Cable il flarad ! at l'a ames. Cable 42 flamed at 130 amps, Cable 43 flamed at
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124 amps (while increasing to 125), Cable $4 at 120 amps, and
, Cable 85 at_120 anos. The spread of current's measured and .
observations of flame extent (flames extinguished shortly after ! /h the conductor open circuited) make all resui.ts appear close, but rAlative positions were assigned with the better cables being the ones with the highest current for flaming to occur. h *g. +
' i,3 FR-1 Flame Test 4
- Underwriter Laboratories FR-1 Flame Test was chosen as another ,,
i screening test. It was not intended to be used as a pass-fall test (for which the test was devised) but to establish a rank based on length of burn and burn damage. It was expected that all l ,, ! cables tested would pass this test, and they did. In order to fail, s s, the paper flag 10 inches (254 mm) above the flame impact point must #
- burn. See Figure 2. , f, h
j The test was conducted in a three-sided metal enclosure a , under an exhaust hood. The metal enclosure was 12 inches (305 me) i wide, 14 inches (356 mm) deep, 24 inches (610 mm) high, and the top and f'ront were open.- An 18-inch (457 mm) specimen cut from a ,. sample icngth of each cable was secured with its longitudinsi -
; axis vertical in the centor of the enclosure. Figure 2 shows
- the test configuration.
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t rigura 2. Eccen*:ial Dimennions of Apparatun and ,
"',' Specimen of Vortical Flamo Tcst < ,
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I A Tirrell gas burner (which differs from a Bunsen burner in that the air flos as well as the flow of gas is adjustable) supplied the flame. The barrel of the burner extended 4 inches (102 mm) above the air inlets and its insido diamet'or was 3/8
? /* inch (9.5 mm). While the barrel was vertical, the overall height '
of the flame was adjusted to 5 inches (127 mr.). The blue inner core was 1-1/2 inches.(38 mm) high and the temperature at its tip was approximately 815 *C (1500 'F). A wedge was secured to the base of the burner to provide 5 a sloping surface of 20 degrees from the vertical. This wedge was positioned to place the point A 1-1/2 inches (38 mm) from the . ~ point B, Figure 2. Point B is the point at which the tip of the blue inner core touched the center of the front of the specimen. A half-inch (13 mm) wide strip of kraft pep'er was attached around
- the specimen with its lower edge 10 inches (254 mm) above's and with the paper protruding 3/4 inch (19 mm) to provide a flag.
See Figure 3. l The test procedure was to apply flame to point D for 15 seconds, turn it off for 15 seconds, on again to point 8 for 15 seconds, etc., for a total of five 15-cecond applications of the gas flame to the specimen with 15 seconds between applications. In no case was the specimen flaming from the previous application of tire flame when the 15 second "off" period had ended. The .
., duration of flaming of those specimens af ter each removal of the gas flame never exceeded five seconds. After the cable specimens ,
cooled, burn lengths were measured beginning at point B. O I d e . t l. l
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. . 4 Eight cables were used as test cpocamens.'
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.t Cabic fl - Singic condactor fl2 AwC, 45 mil (1.'14 mm) 1:Pn . f 30 mil (0.76 mm) Ilypalun jacket , . 600 V. I
- . i, Cabic 82 - Three conductor $12 AWG, 15 mil (0.38 mm) EPR, !
GO mil (1.52 mm) flypalon jacket, 500 v. i Ia Cable #3 - Single conductor 512 AWG, 47 mil (1.19 mm) i chlorinated 'ubber r (proprietary), 47 mil (1.19 .t.m) { chlorinated polymer (proprietary) jacket, 600 V. fj t , Cabic $4 - Single conductor $12 AWG, 47 mil (1.19 mm) [! ' chlorinated rubber (proprietary), 65 mil (1.65 mm) 6 j chlorinated polymer (proprietary) jacket, 600 v.
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i ij Cable #5 - three conduer.or $12 AWG, 47 mil (1.19 mm) chlorinated rubber (proprietary), 65 mil (1.65 mm) liiJ l< chlorinated polymer (proprietary) jacket, 600 v. i' I< I1 Cable 86 - Single conductor #12 AWG, 47 mil (1.19 mm) EPR, !~ 15 mil (0.38 mm) Neopecne jacket, 600 V. l
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Cable 97 - Three conductor $12 AWG, 30 mil (0.76 mm) cronnlinked [' PE, silicon glar4 c.tpe , 6 5 mil ( 1. ',5 mm) crosclinked f PE jacket, 600 V (Supplier A). {i 1 Cabic 00 - Single conductor $12 AWG, 30 all (0.76 mm) crosslinnoc lf ~ Pr, no jacket, 660 V (Oupplier B). h. Eight cabics were used i'n'the two scrooning tasts requiring chort g samples while five were used in the electrical test requiring [ longer sampics. If those three which had not cecn all three i test had been marginal performurs additional longths would have , l been obtained and given the cicetrical te,st. , U \ l ; O l bN a e-e l
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A Comparative results from UL FR-1 test were:
- h Cable Tvre Burn Lenoth (mm) comments-yT . * . ?
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. l' 76.2 H 3" jacket opened 5 f2 4.5 jacket not opened l
N 83 *50.2 jacket opened p 44 63.5 jacket opened 4 15 63.5 jacket not open d
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jacket op,ened 87 69.9' jac!.et opened f6 73 7 no jacket Pyrol12,er and Thermal Chromatograoh Test
- The last screening test used a pyrolizer on a thermal chromatograph interfaced to a gas chromatograph / mass spectrometer. Thermodocom-position chromatographs were obtained as a function of temperatoro and the area under each curve was measured. Approx;mately 50 mg h' of jacket material was used in each test and the temperature of the specimen raised from ambient to 600 *C at 20 *C/ min. The material driven off below 300 *C w;:s analyzed to test the hypothesis k that large a.nounts of material driven of f at lower temperatures -
k was an undesirable characteristic. SinceoutgassingofcombustIblo hh ! materials or fire retardants at these low temperatur<r: was tucorized b i as.being undosirable, . larger areas under the thermodocomoosition chromatographs w,ece assigned an ur.desirablo rating. rigure 4 d{ I shows a typical chromatograph. h.: bl h, I l
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e 1,! TEMPERATURC n rigtiro 4. Gas Chromatograph l= 1
PT, , 13-j The normali cd areas on the chromatographs for the same cable types previously described in the UL FR-1 test are:
'i Cable Tvoe Normalized Area
. (, . . .
'l 11 s .'
1.2
/
02 1.6 1 83 4.3 1 i ; r1 54 4.6 F1 IS 1.8 r.; 46 1.0 l - l- 17 4.9
] ~ 88 7.7 N
d , i _ M- screening Test conclusions H v Although the small scale electrically initiated cable inculations
/
[ fire test and the UL FR-1 Fire Test indicated none of theco cables would be capable of propagating a fire (in support of IECE 383 quali-fic6cion) cables 87 and 48 in the last two tests (came as cablos 84 and 35 in the first test) were designated as the cable typen to be used in the full scale tests by a relativo figure of merit. Work
.k U. performe,d in Europe in 1975 5
?
on radiation and fire resistanco of t-cable-insulating materials was recently brought to our attention and
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. Full Scale Testing Three phases of full scale testing have been completed. All involved electrically initiated fires in horizontally oriented
~
cable trays. The first phase was intended to 'evaiuate the adequacy
'of cable tray spacing as designated in Regulatory Guide 1.75,
" Physical Independence ot' Electrical Systems, Section 5.14, General
. Plant Areas." For this phase vertical separation of independent
, divis~ ion is designated as- - feet (1.52 m) and the horizontal separation as 3 feet (0.91 m).
The second phase was concerned with varying the separation , j distance between cable trays. Phase three required a stacking
- or matrix of fourteen cable trays, as one division with cable trays
} representing the secor.d division separated by distances ,as specified r in Regulatory Guide 1.75. The vertical and horizontal separation Fr ss
'l , in the first division was 10.5 inches (0.27 m) and 8 inches
'. ) , (0.20 m) while the sepiration between divisions was 5 feet (1.52 m)
'3(
and 3 feet (0.91 m). All testing involved equipment and cables
,\' representative of that goina into new nuclear power plant designs.
. See Figures 5, 6, and 7 depicting the three different test setups for the three phases.
Coupons of aluminum, galvaniz'd iron, and mild steel were hung in the building and periodically removed for corrosion analysis. A l profilometer is used for this purpose and has not shown significant
's,. corrosion products. .
3 An oxygen analyzer and gas sample manifold were installed ar: gas samples were taken before and during the fires. There was no l l depletion of oxygen found in the fire
- area. Flamo retardant l antimony bromide and an organophosphate were found in the gas i samples as well,as a high , molecular wax material.
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i i l t y Figure 7. Phase Threc Test Setup 1
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. 13 nemote controlled cameras were installed for closed circuit television, color acvies, photographic' thermometry, and infrared
. thermocraphy. Television was used to monitor the testing and l s,. in determining the proper time to at. tempt gas igni. tion _ (explosive
.o h
. bridgewires and electric matches were spaced over t'he ignition point and simulated. arcing), to take gas samples, and to start
- '. movie cameras. The movies not only orbvided a ecord of the eventbutgaveinformationontheignitionmech{anismaswellas measurement of flame velocity. Despite a lack of success in igniting the gases with simula*ted arcing th's movies show the combustible gases do indeed ignite as the flame producing mechanism. Measurement of flame velocity war needed so that n u the convective heat cransfer coefficient could be calculated.
, The photographic thermometry and infrared thermography were to supplement the discrete spatial mea'surements taken with thermo-
' couples and slog calorimeters.
- f On each test a minimum of 31 thermocouples and slug calorimeters were placed in the test setup and connected to recorders. Results of these measurements are discussed in the
- following section on the characterization of the fires. ,
Air velocity was va,ried somewhat during the tests because of
~
conflicting opinions e,n' worst case conditions. Coinione varied between zero flow, which might be encountered in a cable spreading roon, to high air velocity providing abundant oxygen,'which might be encountered nearran exhaust fan.in the open plant area. As a compromise, air velocitics for the different tests ranged between, 2 ft/ min (0.01 m/sec) and 30 ft/ min (0.15 m/sec). These measure- . ments were made with a hot wire anemometer before each test; , only fan exhaust 'relocities were monitored during the test. Seven full scale 'tists were,run in the three phases previously described. Spacing was reduced ,in pheca two to 10.5 inches (0.27 m) vertically and 8 inches (0.20 m) horizontally. In all s'ven e tests .- . r. 3: , ; .. '
. . . i
's ' all circuits other than the ignition tray circuits remained.
functional _. This was determined by operation of these circuits for some period of time after the test. In addition, samples af the cable insulation at the_ bottom of the tray over the fire zone were given insulation elongation measuremenis to determine mechani-cal change. These measurements showed less than a lot increase in elongation due to the fire. Outto often this small increase is attributed to a small chance in crosslinking due to heat. Characterization of Cable Tray Fires Characterization of the cable tray fires is based upon a review of the data that were collected in the full scale testing described above. The sources of data include:
- 1. Color Movies '
- 2. Radiation Thermometry I
- 3. Slug Calorimeters and Thermocouples -
4. Thermovision (infrared detection) This information is used to investigate the following characteristics of the fire:
.- 1. Size and Duration
- 7. Flame Temperature -
3. Gas velocity -
- 4. Optical Thickness 4 apparent emissivity) -
/ # Consideration is also given to the thermal response of simple cylindrical objects which are ongulfed by the fire.
- Approximate calculations provide estimates for:
- a 1.
Convective and Radiat'ive Heat Transfer
- 2. , Equilibrium (Steady-State) Surface Temperature
~
_There_in no attempt _to use the data t_o evaluate the likelihood of fire snreadino to an overlying trav. hecause this requires s consideration of the geometric arrange, ment of the exposed cables and the kineti,cn of decomposition0 .
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. s, ,' ,i It is emphasized that the measurements ard analysis techniques are approximate in nature, and aEe intended only to provide an overview of the gross characteristics o2 the fire. ,Within this framework, the data are found to be self . consistent and in reaso::able agreement with theoretical expectations and corp,arative data.
Color Movies . Observation and analy: sis of the 16 and 100 frames /second / motion pictures of the cable tray fire tests have proved enlightening in characterizing cable fires. (rigure 8 is an illustrative sequence shot at 14 frames /second.) For example, the following observations tend t'o characterize the pictured fires. '
/.
(1) The flame zone does not comprice a continuous line fire, f but instead consists of one or more "axisymmetric" luminous .
\ zones which are on the order of 5.to 8 inches in " diameter"
,i at,the base. ,
,l (2) A%though migration along the tray may occur, the propagation ,
I is quite slow. - (3) The height of the luminous zone varies rapidly, ranging
'- -I from 5_to 10 inches above tne burning tra y. -
I l (4) The time scale for variations of the luminous zone extent f is on the order of 1/10 second. . I (5) The flame f.4-. turbulent with luminous eddler clearly visible. I , i (6) By tracking the up@ard progress of small luminous eddies I . , which are shed from the flame, the gas velocity (time-mean)
, is estimated to bb in the range from 3 to 4 feet /second . , (0.9-1.22 si/s) variations from this range'are quite small, .
j even over a large number of measurements in different cable tray fire tests. Also it does not appear that velocity , is decreasing substantially in the ver,tical direction, at least in the first foot nf rise. These chsracteristics of tho' cable fires do not vary greatly from ' one fire to the next, even though significant variations in the
, duratior. are observed. ,
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1 Figura 8. Cabic Trcy Fire (1/16 Second betwcon l l framcc) l
;)
.i 84 t
[
\. . .
..- s.
l
. f 1
/
Plame Temperatures
~
Padiatiori tnermometry is used te determine the temperature
~
distribution in the fire. At chosen times, photographs are taken through two dif ferent narrow band filters (A A = .03p) which are centered er A = .55p and A = .65g. "The negatives are
'. ' scanned with a microdonsitometer to determine the exposure dis- '
tribution. The intensity of radiation received along a particular '\ line of sight is found by a comparison of the exposure at a particular point (small area) on the negative with that produced by a calibrated lamp which is also in the field of view. The
" brightness temperature" or corresponding blackbody temperature for each point is then calculated from the Planck function. -
) A typical plot of the isotheras (brightness temperature)
obtained from the radiation thermometry is included in Figure 9. ~ All areas enclosed by the isotherms are" at temperatures above
'1260*K[thelowercutoffonsensitivpgyofthefilm. Makimum
[4. - temperaturesareroughly1500'K.'Nigure9alsoshowsthevaria- [, , tion of temperature with horizontal position, taken as the hottest vertical location just above the tray (Section A-A in isotherm plot). l since the flame zone' is not optically thick, the apparent emissivity is less than unity and it is necessary to correct. the temperature measurements.7 However, the magnitude of temperature corrections is relatively small. For example, a five-fold reduction in apparent monochromatic emissivity (cA = 1.0 - 0.2)
/ only requires a. correction of about 100*K between the true temperature of the flame and the above brightness measurements.
The measured flame temperatures are well below adiabatic flame tem; etature, and are in agreement with theoretical exp'ectations.O I { /* 1 Thermocouoles and Calorimeters 5 l . l- The array of thermocouples and copper slug calorimetero l above the ignition tray provid.s two types of information: (a) heat fluxes (combined convection and r,adiation) that are determined from the transient temperature recponse of the calorimeters .g
+', .
A 7.... I z. , _ p
' / ,.
5,'
/ , ., ~~ - - - - .. _. . ... . . . . _ , _ , _ , , _ . ,
,' 't *
\' .
'N,
's e
4 i e i I *) 4 , e 4 4 , CaWe Troy 6 g e ,
, s =
ene . *
- 0 e . . ,
. . $ =
- 4
- e g* "_
! #* h g7 ,
!2 e
y ' . / *ea e C *- Isotherm Contourc
..'4 .. -
C*
- T'*7 k
- t i J f , , el b ,
x . cm .
- \
8***' I I Temperature g P Profilo , y J Along Tray
!'m. - I
- at Height h/16 j
i
. : ) in Above
. g I r .
_e _ i y _ Jy [ e y ,. t f aseenemme Ps amen e 4 . Figuro 9. Photometric Thermometry (11/15/76) '
~ .
-24 y
(b) steady state temperature which may be significantly less than the local gas temperature due to radiation I I'> through tbc flame + Figure 10 shows the temperature renpense of selected t i calorimeters (Hoc.1, 7, 9, and 11). and a sheathed thermocouple < (No. 2) for the fire test of 5 October 1976. The' separation between cable trays is approxtrately _two_ feet. This particular ; fire is one of the,most intence and longest duration of those :5
- studied. It is seen that the intensity of the thermal environment __ E falls off very rapidly in the region from 5 to 11 inches (.13 to N y
.20 m) above the fire. This height roughly corre pe;.ds to the l
the upper edge of the luminous zone.
,i In view of their relatively slow time response, the calori- ;
meters and even the thermocouplc rarely reach a qua:isteady temperature level. n However, in the fire test of 5 October 1976, L r" thermocouple No. 2 reaches and holds ll30*F for a short period H at early and at late times, and in the intervening period the temperature is clearly steady at 700*F. These quasisteady 3 temperatures are confirmed by similar data from calorimeter No. I which is also located about 3/8 inch (9.5 mm) above the burning [ [ tray. It is noted that these tenperatures do not represent f local gas temperatures, but rather the temperature of a surface hl immersed in the flame. 5 Figure 11 shows the variation of cold wall heat flux with y height above the burning tray for several fires. Each of these data points is calculated froe the initial slope of the tempers-
] ,
ture vs. time curve for a particular calorimeter. It is seen that f,J a significant reduction in heating rate occurs from the base of the flame to the upper reach of the luminous zone. Although these i are significant variations in heat flux distribution f rom one fire to the next, the two more intense fires (October 5 and % November 15) are very similar, as are three lesser fires (July 9 21, August.13, and December 16) . It is likely that some of : the differences a.e due'to unintentional changes in position of the instrun.entation relative to the f1 nmo zone because the exact Jocation of the flame could not be controlled. )
'l l ty tJ
{ -.-- . . - . . . . - - . - . - . - . . . . .. . . . _ . . ..
= -
W I
/i4
. ,,1
~ .
pa
,-j i d i l 3 i i l i I n00 - O '
1000 5 ~% s' p., N - = f a % l C / #' N
- -- a00 - / f \
\ s,*=
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.n i - -
/
; s'@
. ,s__ ./
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- s -
a W
' s- ' -
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*m
//
~~~~****,a***** ** % , ~ % m\s
/l & %
200 J/ ,j~~ ~g ~~~ - -
'4$C # ,.
f f f 0 to 80 120 f IGO f 200 f 310 f 280 f 320 f 360 f 400 e, (
. p Elapsed Time (see) #
[ lleight At,ove Burning Cables
@ Tc sis" @ CAL 8" ,
C w a 7
@ CAL s/s @ CAL 11"
( l G CAL *" . (, , - Q .. -
~ '- Figure 10. Temperature Responso of Thormocouplesy ' I and Slug Calorireters (10/5/76) $
A _ e
,5 tJ L - w i
/
g B N 9 i: W e
.A!
r , N . 2g. L
. I -
I l . . I ',
= .
e t i
,, 28,000 4 1 4 'l I I i .gj0/576
. N
- d 9
- A 12/6/7G
. 24.000 - -
D a 11/1s/73 1 k2 20.000 - S - a Eg
. 1
~
m . .ggf g2 fig
' i o E
; ; x is,000 - at/21/14 .
f 2 3
- i d S O e i 11.000 g -
.. g y e s E O A e B
! E 9 E
.- 8,000 -A -
t M
- M li 4 A O
*1 3 A 4.000 -
g - e A =
, ! 3 .
. i. h t f f f f f e f I I e f
. , , 0 2 4 6 8 to 12 14 10 13 20 Distanes Alanvu Tray' (in.)
.i 9
. t
. 9
, a s
- Figure 11. Vertical Variation of Iloat F3ux s
1 . n 1 [ .
- e
..I
. j.. .
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- 8
.. t.-
e Lu . / ..., *
, p .. .
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~
FI . . 2y i , Thermovision
] -
An infrared detection system marketed under the tra'de name
- ' "Thermovision" was used to monitor the cable tray fire tests.
,i
[ The field of view is continuously scanned by a mi-r,cor system, .
; and -for each point in the field the amplitude of the voltage
. i signal from the detector is converted to a gray " color level"
'i (intensity) which is displayed on a black and white monitor.
, j A movie is made from the monitor to provide a qualitative overview
;q of the development of the fire, and at later times particular frames are extract,ed for quantitative analysis.
l; selected frames from the thernovision movie are scanned by
;; a microdensitometer to obtain a quantitative map of the degree 1 of exposure. The exposure levels are then interpreted as
'j i levels of IR radiation intensity using the calibration charts
,/. i - provided by the manufacturer. *
.- c.' ' p since the broad band (thernovision) measurement of In ir. tensity
,: is fairly sensitive to the effective flame emissivity, this IR .,[ ha intensity can be used in conjunction with the previous estimates r
of flame temperature to calculate the flame emissivity. Dased on ,' , the procedure described by Sato and Matsumoto' the t.stal emissivity J of the flame is found to be on the order of i m.0.15. When this 3 result is compared with the theoretical calculations of Felske and I Tien 10, it is concluded that particulate (soot) concentrations in ~ flame are on the order of.10 4 cm3 /cm3 , whlen falls within the expected
~
,,4 U cange of concentration.11,12 5
'u u Analysis of Fire Test Data d
Heat transfer from the flame to an engulfed object occurs ,
$i by boca convection and radiation. Although the calorimeters
, ;h provide
- a measuremont of total heat flux, it is also of interest W S to know the relative importance of convective and radiative t4
? contributions. The following paragraphs outline some approximate IJ calculations which cnsser this question and at the saine time show that all of the measurements (flame temperature, total g heat flux, velocity, infrared radiation, thermocouples) comprise i
I.;
'E Y
w
. . .: x
,.-1 .
t.
-- , - - - - - - - . . - - - , , . - - - - - , . - - - , - , , , - - , - , - - - - - , , . - - - - - - - - - - - - - , . - - - - - , - ~ .- - - - - - - - -, - - , - - - - - - e----
s . .
,'.' \;
-f .- i f , ,
a reasonably scif-consistent characterization of the cable tray j fires.
- M At a location juct slightly above the burning tray we have tho following measurements of flame temperature, total em,iscivity, and Tiamo velocity: Tg = 1300*K, i = 0.15, V = 3 ft/sec. Using
~, this velocity and properties'of air,' the mean convective heat p transfer coefficient for a small cylindrical object (e.g., 3/8" colorimeter)'is approximately 13 ii = 7 BTU /hr/f t2/* F. The ' convective
~
N 5 H and radiative contributions to the cold vall heat flux can then
@ be separately calculated as follows: .
.---- N
. q"= Tg-T ew = 13,000 BTU /hr/ft 2
[ q'=toTf-T = 7,000 GTU/hr/ft 2
./ 5
. >. This shows that convection accounts for about 67% of the total 1
[ flux. Note that the total heat flux (convection and radiation)- j is in good agreement with the calorimeter data shown previously - A . in Figure 11. 2 In view of the above calculations, it is useful to reconsider
, the vertical variations of cold-wall heat flux .hown in Figure 11.
l It is seen that the heat flux is roughly 13,000 DTU/hr/ft 2 ggy, [ nominal convection rate) at a heiglit of 5 to 7 inches (0.13 .18 m) above the tray. From the color movies, this level also corresponds h to the time-mean height of the lumineus zone. c is therefore
,f+ expected that' convection dominaten above this level. In the
( upper nonluminous region the gas temperaturo fallr. of f r apidly
's due to entrainment of cool air and turbulent a ing. At a height i
l s 4 of.10 inches (0.25 m) above the fire the cold-wall heat flux s s', ? is only about 6,000 BTU /hr/ft2, which corresponds to a local d e gas temperature of 1000*F (900*K), assuming convection alone
~ }>\ j -
and a velocity of 3 ft/sec (0.91 m/sec). -
'l , 'Since the flame is optically thin, a cylindrical object f placed in the dire (thermocouple, calorimeter, cable) will, l if the fire continues long enough, reach an equilibrium temp-
.i erature which is well below the temperature of the surrounding I, r ,
\
}
, /' n. f_ , .,a' _ , s. . ,?',~ = . V' . . . - - . . . .. . ._ -= ..... . . . . -.....,..i.- -. .- . - . - .
\.
at . , , t' . . - I . i medium. Thic -teady-state surface temperature T, can be l catimated from the fulaowing energy balance in which heating of the aarface by convection and r&diation is equated with the cooling afforded by radtation from the surface which passes
'l through the flame to the coo 1 surroundings at 7 ,2 , ,
l . I E(T-T,)+ io(T - Tf) = (1 - ile (T' - T[) 4 i
~
- i, At a point near the tray, T = 13 0 0
- K , T = 0.1, and E = 7. These
!f values give a steady surface temperature of about 1100'r (870*K),
i in good agreement with the quasisteady temperature recorded by thermocouple No. 2 in Figure 10. ' Note that calorimeter No. 1 also approached this temperature befere the fire began to die out.
! It is interesting also to calculate the equilibrium surface temperature at a height of 10 inches (0.25 m) above the tray. ,
Daned on the measurement of cold-wall heat flux the local gas t temperature was estimated as 1000*F, assuming convection alone. l Using the steady energy balance with ? = 1000'F, thw equilibrium j surface temperature at the 10 inch (0.25 m) level is approximately
} 650*F.
~
f4 The above este.ytes of equilibrium surface temperature are indicstive of thre r rady state surface temperature of a single electrical, cable w u:n is subjected to fire. In an overlying
< tray, cables are c'nsely spaced and the details of the geometric configuration bocere important. Thus, higher surface temperatures probably are attair Ole because radiant losses from the expoced
. e ble are blocked uv adjacent cables and convective velocities a may be higher than an the single cable configuration. On the
. other hand, tae duratter. of the fire may not be sufficient to t
l realize equilibrium con.;ttions, as was usually obnorved with
- thermocouples and sluo calorimeters in the test fires. In any ,
; case, ths temperature of erposed cables ca_nnot exceed the i ~ ~
l~ ; temperature of the -orrounding medium which is estimated as _ _
]I roughly 1000*T, at height of 10 inches (0.25 m) .
I _ .. .i s
- s. 1 i:
- a .-
d - a E> -.
~
eman eas %- , . . . . an== == = = =ne s e=am-me * * * * - = = = * * *
.,.-..-,.-~,,,,.._._,.,,,._,,,,....,,,,,.,,,,..._,r., , , , _ . . , , _ , . . , , , , , _ . , _ _ , . _ _ , , , , , , . , ,y., _ _,.m ,,,
.,*r., .,,.,,,__..m .,,,_.m._,. ,,__y
t
;p -
.. /
g! . E . . f
- Summary of Characterization j Essential features of the cable tray fires are outlined below. Altnough based on worst caso conditions, these observa-
) tions are generally representative of the entipe sequence of
, fire tests.
D[ ~ (1) The intense period of the fire persists at a
- /
J ~/ particular location for between_40 and 240 seconds H ,.
, before die-out begins to secur (e.g., 240 seconds in
{ Figure 10). ,
? (2) The luminous flame zones fluctuate rapidly between !
! 4 and 10 inches (0.1-0.25 m) in height. !
1 o (3) Cas temperature in the luminous zone is roughly
, 1900*r (1300*K). '
! (4) Cas temperature at 1_0 inches _(0.25 m) above the burning tray is esti ated as 100,0*F. 0
- 1 .
i (5) Velocity of rising gasses is approximately 3 t'o 4 l feet /second (0.91-1.22 m/sec). l (6) The luminous zone is optically thin with an apparent l emissivity on the order of E = 0.1. (7)
~
f Heat transfer to immersed objects is convection j dominated with radiation accounting for no more than 30% of the total heat flux, even in the luminous i region. (8) Equilibrium surface temperature of engulfed cylindrical l
~~'l '
objects varies from about 1200*r just above the tray l { to 650*r at a height of 10 inches (0.25 m).
l Although the above measurements and analytical estimates are j approximate, they are indicative of the gross characteristico f of the fire.-
! It is noted that the present cable tray fires differ greatly I
from large fires which are of ten considered in safety studies. l Due to the small physical dimensions of the present flame,
, radiatio:' from 'the flame is lecs than 20- percent (e <ll 0.2) f l' of that encountered in large fires, and convection therefore
- l. .. , dominates. In large firea convection usually accounts I less i I l .
I l l l _ _ gg M ' t * * * ***
-\ . .
-g. .
,n,
' y*, , - _
e .
- - 31-i 14 than 25 percent of the total heat :tansfer . Also, objects immersed in a large fire will eventually reach temperature equilibrium with the flames..This may not occur tn the optically thin cable tray fires bec.suse an engulfed surface is able to radiate through the flame to the cool surroundings.
Thus, the cable tray fires comprise a considerably less severe f thermal environment than a large fite, even though the flame i temperatures are of comparable, magnitude for the two cases. summary and conclusions The first objective was to obtain data through experiments to aid in evaluating the effectiveness of cable tray separation as a means of assuring functional integrity of redundant safety systems. f- The first task undertaken to meet this objective was to survey the industry in order to determine current design practices particularly 1 . with regard to the materials used. Of these materials primary i, interest was focused on types of electrical cable constructions being used in new nuclear power plant design. A screening test was applied
~
i to these types in order to concentrate on two electrical cable con-
. structions representing a conservative approach. The evaluation h covered separation of protective syst' ens in areas of the plant where l power cables are included and no soutco of fuel esists except that
~~~'
provided by the cable materials. Thus, all fires in this proiect
~
have been electrically ini'. lated. . Seven quick-look report:15-21 and a progress report22 have _ j- been issued describing full scale tests included in the period . covered by this paper. Separation distances between cable trays
, . ~ - ',
of 5 feet (1.52 m) vertically and 3 feet (0.91 m) horizontally t vere used in phase one' tests. Four tests were run in phase two with spacing reduced in stages to 10.5 inches (0.27 m) vertically O h .. - i
. g
, ~,- ,-
~
y ,.
/ ,.. ,
r=,, -
.e, - - . -- -
and 8 inches (0.20 m) horizontally. Phase three involved three tests of a large matrix of trays arranged in such a manner thnt 14 cable trays closely spaced represented one division while 3 trays separated 5 feet (1.52 k) vert'ically and 3 f~ eat (0.91 m) . from that matrix represented the redundant division. In all thesc tests an overcurrent in one or'two 12 AWG conductors of an electrical cable in an open cable tray was the source of fire. Trays were i filled with electrical cable to the top of the 4 inch (0.10 m) I siderails. , <
=
,- Fire initiation appears to be from combustible gas initiation as seen in pictures taken during that tir.e period. Typical of this initiation is the sequence taken during initiation of a fire on November 15, 1976. This is.shown by Figure 12 where the gaseous ignition appears beyond a photometric calibration lamp.
t
, The maximum duration of any fire obtained was 29 minutes with ___
the mean time approximately_6 minutes4 At no time did the cables in trays displaced from the ignition tray begin to burn. All circuits in these trays remained functional and elongation measure-ments taken of insulation closest to the fire showed no major (<.10 % ) change. . l l l t l l l t .
~ '
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p- - REFERENCES , l.' . . ,
- 1. " Recommendations Related to Drowns Ferry Fire," HUREG 0050, February 1976, NRC Staf f. . .
, 2. ' Report on Cable Failures-1938 at San Onofre Nuclear Generating N Station, Unit I, South tr. California Edison Company. ;
- 3. IEEE Standard for Type Test of Class IE Electric Cables, Field Splices, and Connections for Nuclear Power Genersting Stations Std 383-1974.
- 4. James Gaffney, "The Significance of the New FR-1 Flame Test,"
Wire Journal,' October 1973.
- 5. H. Schonbacher and M. H. Van deVoorde, " Radiation and Fire
' Resistance of Cable-Insulating Materials Used in Accelerator
,.' Engineering," CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research,
' 15 April 1975. .
- 6. K. Annamalai and P. Durbetaki, " Ignition of Thin Forour.
Pyrolysing Solids Under Normally Impinging Flames," Combustion
. ,___ and Flame, Vol. 27, p. 253-266, 1976.
- 7. H. J. Kostkowski and C. W. Burns, " Thermocouple and Radiation -
. Thermometry above 900'K," Measurement Techniques in Heat Transfer , E. R. G. Ecker t and R. J. Goldstein, eds. , Circa Publications, N. Y., 1970.
- 8. D. durgess and M. Hertzberg, " Radiation from Pool Flames,"
Heat' Transfer in Flames, N. H. Afgan and J. M. Beess, eds, Scripta, Wash., D. C. 1974.
- 9. T. Sato and R. Matsumoto, " Radiant. Heat Transfer from Luminous Flames," Conf. on Int. Dev. in Heat Transfer, Part IV, p. 804-811, ASME, N. Y. 1961.
- 10. J. D. Felske and C. L. Tien, " Calculation of the Emissivity of Luminous Flames," Western States Section Combustion Institute, Monterey, October 1972.
- 11. M. W. Thring, J. M. Boer, and P. J. Foster, " Radiative Properties of Luminous Flames," Proc. Third Intl. Meat Transfer Conf., Vol. 5, p. 101-111, AICHE, Chicago, 1966.
- 12. R..Echigo, N. Nishiwaki, and M. Hirata, " Study on the Radiation of Luminous Fl.ames," Eleventh Symp. of Combustion, Combustion
,- , Institute, Pittsburg, p. 381-389, 1967. 13.
~
f ' . , . ,' W. M. Kays, convective neat and Mass Transfer, McGraw-Hill, N. Y. , 1966. l 9 l , , , \ %.. \ 1
~ . ~ ~ - / . . . -
I
-. - -- - _ - - - . . - . = _ _ - . - - - - - _ _ - . _ - _ _ _ . _ - _ - _
s s
- 14. L . 11. Russell and J. A. Canfield, " Experimental Measurements of Ilcat Transfer to a Cylinder Immer sed in a Large Aviation-Fuel Fir e," ASMC Jout nal of Heat Tr ansf er , 95, S, p. 397-404, 1973.
- 15. L. J. Klamerus, " Quick Look Repor t on Fit'e Protection Research,"
July 197G.
- 16. L. J. Klamerus, " Quick Look Repor t on Fire Protection Research,"
August 1976.
- 17. L. J. Klamerus, " Quick Look Report on Fire Protection Research,'
October 1976. ,
- 10. L. J. Klamerus, " Quick Look Repor t on Fire Protection Research,"
November 1976.
- 19. L. J. Klemerus, " Quick Look Report on Fire Protection Research,"
December 1976.
~
," 20. L. J. Klamerus, " Quick Look Report on Fire Protection Research," .
,- February 1977. *
- 21. L. J. Klamerus, " Quick Look Report on Fire Protection Research,"
March 1977. *
- 22. L. J. Klamerus and R. H.1111 son, " Progress Report on Fire Protection Research," SAND 77-0303, NUREG-0206, June 1977.
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1 1 . 7 ' II.b Concrete Compression Strength QUESTION:
- 1. Paragraph 2 on page 13 of ISAP II.b Results Report refers to errors in the Schmidt Hammer test program identified by third-party review, and refers to them as "not significant." Provide the basis for your concluding that the errors are not significant.
RESPONSE
The statement in the II b Results Report regarding the " error rate" relates to our initial use of an incomplete population (concrete volume established by identifying truckloads poured during each of the periods under evaluation) and subsequently determining a more complete though not exactly complete population. In the Results Report we conclude that the " error rate" in not exactly determining the population size was not significant., The initial evaluation of the hammer indication data (101 data points for the CAI and 99 for the CC) was conducted on an incomplete truckload population (see transcripts of TUGCO-NRC meeting of 3/6/85 and F. Webster, " Additional Background for TUGCO-NRC Meeting of 3/6/85," CPRT File II.b.4a-008, May,1985). The missing truckloads represented approximately 20-30 percent of the total number of truckloads. To complete the population determination, an attempt was made to identify all previously unidentified truckloads, and a proportional sample was selected from those additional truckloads identified. This augmented sample was then added to the original sample. The resulting evaluation of the hammer data (presented in the II.b Results Report) included 119 data points for the CAI and 132 for the CC. The added data did not change the conclusion that the CAI hammer indication is within 5 percent of the CC hammer indication at the tenth percentile level. If the population could have been completely determined an additional seven samples for the CAI population and two samples from the CC population would have been taken. If these additional samples were randomly selected from the remaining truckloads excluded, these test values should be dispersed among the other data (as was observed during the effort described above). Therefore, the distributions shown in Figure 3 of the Results Report would be changed very little and the conclusions not at all. QUESTION:
- 2. Review of Figure 1 of page 20 of ISAP II.b Results Report shows that CAI compression strength is approximately 9.4% less than CC compression strength at the 10th percentile level. It appears that this level of deviation was judged by applicants as not "significantly lower" than CC compression strength to trigger a need to implement calibration of the Schmidt Hammer test. Discuss the technical basis for the judgement.
5 NRC
f . 4 II.b Concrete Compression Strength (Cont'd)
RESPONSE
The design compressive strength of 4000 psi is 18.4 percent lower than the tenth percentile cylinder strength of'the CC. If one assumes the CAI cylinder data is valid, then it is seen from Figure 1 of the Results Report that the CAI strength is only 9.3 percent lower than the CC at the tenth percentile level, and is well above the design strength of 4000 psi. However, the validity of the CAI cylinder data has been questioned and'the CPRT investigation was established to determine whether or not the CAI strength is not more than 18.4 percent lower than the CC strength. This is done in the II.b Results Report through the use of the Schmidt Hammer tests in association with the CC cylinder data. A difference of 18.4 percent in compressive strength corresponds to a relative change in hammer indication of approximately 10 percent, based on the slope of the hammer indication vs. compressive strength curve (see Operating Instructions Concrete Test Hammer Types N and NR, copyright 1977, PROCEQ, Zurich, Switzerland; and Attachment A of F. Webster, " Target Tenth Percentile," CPRT File II.b.4a-003, February, 1985). The tenth percentile CAI hammer indication reported in the Results Report is only 2.5 percent lower than the CC hammer indication, and when we evaluate at a 95 percent confidence level the CAI hammer data is determined to be no more than 5 percent lower than the CC hammer data at the tenth percentile. This is less than the 10 percent difference in hammer data that would be required to signal that the CAI tenth percentile compressive strength is at the 4000 psi level, or lower. This provided reasonable assurance that the CAI tenth percentile cylinder strength is well above the 4000 psi design level. Therefore, it is unnecessary to further refine the relationship between hammer indications and compressive strength in the present application. QUESTION:
- 3. The resolution to ISAP II.b as presented in the Results Report may not be able to identify localized problems where the number of falsified records is small. Discuss potential safety implications on overall adequacy of the concrete strength due to such localized problems.
I i 6 NRC j
r: 7 . II.b Concrete Compression Strength (Cont'd)
RESPONSE
As discussed in the II.b Results Report, there are two general types of potential falsification. The first, and the focus of this discussion, is the masking of out-of-specification concrete by recording it to be within specification. The second, and of less concern, is the false recording of concrete test data for within specification concrete when tests were not performed. Neither of these two types of falsification appear to have occurred in any systematic way. There is a potential for not detecting specific examples of the first type where the number of falsified records is small; however, as discussed below, the engineering significance of such situations is limited. The methodology of our investigation was constructed such that if this type of localized falsification occurred, it would have been detected unless it had occurred very infrequently. Thus, our discussion is focused on evaluation of the engineering significance of a very small volume of concrete that may potentially be out-of-specification. ACI Standard 214-77 addresses the implications of out-of-specification concrete as related to the ACI criterion permitting ten-percent of cylinder tests to fall below the design strength. Specifically, the following excerpt from Chapter 4 of this Standard is also applicable to evaluation of potentially lower strength concrete due to falsification: 7 NRC
.~ _ , _ . _ - - , _ _ __ _ ,_ _ - . _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _
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II.b' Concrete Compression-Strength ',ont'd)
"4.1--General The strength of control cylinders is generally-the only tangible evidence of the quality of concrete used in
. constructing a structure. Because of the possible disparity between the strength of test cylinders and the load-carrying capacity of a structure it is unwise to place any reliance on inadequate strength data.
The number of tests lower than the desired strength is more important in computing the load-carrying capacity of concrete structures than the average strength obtained. It is impractical, however, to specify a minimum strength since there is always the possibility of even lower strengths, even when control is good. It is also recognized that the cylinders may-not accurately represent the concrete in each portion of the structure. Factors of safety are provided in design equations which allow for deviations from specified strengths without jeopardizing the safety of the structure. These have been evolved on the basis of construction practices, design procedures, and quality control techniques used by the construction industry. It should also be remembered that for a given mean strength, if a small percentage of the test.results f all below the design strength, a corresponding large percentage of the test results will be greater than the design strength with an equally large probability of being located in a critical area. The consequences of a localized zone of low-strength concrete in a structure depend on many factors; included are the probability of early. overload, the location and magnitude of the low-quality zone in the structural unit, the degree of reliance placed on strength in design, the initial cause of the low strength, and the consequences, economic and otherwise, of structural failure. The final criterion which allows for a certain probability of tests falling below f' used in design is a designer's decision based on his intimate knowledge of the conditions that are likely to prevail. ' Building Code Requirements for Reinforced Concrete (ACI 318-71),' provides guidelines in this regard, as do other building codes and specifications. To satisfy strength performance requirements expressed in this fashion the average strength of concrete must be in excess of f', the design strength. The amount of excess strength depefids on the expected variability of test results as expressed by a coefficient of variation or standard deviation, and on the allowable proportion of low tests." 8 NRC
e II.b Concrete Compression Strength (Cont'd) It should be noted that the criterion of allowing 10 percent or less of the cylinder strengths to fall below the design strength of 4000 psi is more than met by the CAI truckload population, which means that the frequency of potentially understrength concrete (regardless of whether it is masked by falsification or not) is very low. A supporting consideration is the fact that, with age, average concrete strength asymptotically increases above the 28 day strength on the order of 24% at one year (ref: A. M. Neville, " Properties of Concrete", J. Wiley, 1975, P.258-9) and continues to increase thereafter. Therefore, based upon the II.b results and general structural considerations, the chances of a potentially understrength concrete being coupled with a critical structural element are even lower. 4 9 NRC _, _ ~ - - _. - _
-??
- III.d Preoperational Testing QUESTION:
- 1. Section 5.4.1 of the Results Report stated, in part, that System Test Engineers (STEs) "...did use current design documeuts in the conduct of preoperational and prerequisite testing activities." During an inspection of documentation related to the 60 preoperational test samples that were evaluated by the CPRT, the NRC inspector identified 26 preoperational tests that were performed where the STEs failed to update the revisions of design documents referenced in Section 3.0 of the test procedures. The documentation clearly showed the CPRT's awareness of this discrepancy, but it was not identified in accordance with Appendix E of the Program Plan.
The NRC inspector informed the CPRT that failure to identify the discrepancy was deviation from Program Plan commitments. The Results Report should have addressed this discrepancy. The staff needs to know what actions were taken to determine whether this was a DCC problem or an STE problem, what impact this had on the objectives of the ISAP, and what assurance exists that other tests of safe,ty related components and systems, not evaluated under this ISAP, were conducted using current design documents.
RESPONSE
CP-SAP-21, " Conduct of Testing," contains the requirement for the review and update of test procedures. The administrative procedure was not explicit as to how the STE review and update should be documented. However, the STE was required to update the test procedure to be in accordance with the latest design information, therefore, but was left to his own discretion as to the method of documenting the update. Close examination of the specific procedures revealed that they had, in fact, always been updated, but that sometimes the updates were recorded only in those sections of the test procedures containing the action statements (i.e., sections other than Section 3.0). The procedures had been updated by the Test Procedure Deviation form in accordance with CP-SAP-12. " Deviations to Test Instructions / Procedures." The CPRT third-party concluded that the absence of specific notations to the reference section (Section 3.0) of the test procedures was neither a deviation nor indicative of a DCC or an STE problem. In those cases where the reference section had been updated, it was easy for the RTL to verify that the STE review and update had been accomplished. In those cases where.the reference section had not been updated, any design change would have to be verified as being implemented ia the remaining sections of the procedure. In all cases, it was possible for the RTL to confirm that implementation had occurred. Each design change requiring a response by the Startup organization was, in fact, incorporated into the test procedure. 10 NRC
111.d Preoperational Testing (Cont'd) Based on the foregoing, the objectives of the action plan were met and there is reasonable assurance that the document control problems which existed prior to 1984 did not adversely affect the testing program. Reasonable assurance regarding the extrapolatability of sample
-observations derives from it. facts (1) that there was a start-up administrative procedure which required such revisions and (2) that in all sampled cases the procedure was followed with.
QUESTION:
- 2. During the inspection of documentation related to the 60 preoperational test samples that were evaluated by the CPRT, the NRC inspector identified
~
an unresolved issue regarding twelve screening checklists that were not completely filled in. Three of the twelve checklists failed to show the CPRT's review to ensure the associated preoperational tests were conducted using current design documents. This issue must be resolved before the staff will be able to accept the Results Report.
RESPONSE
It is believed that the requisite data to demonstrate the adequacy of CPRT's review is available on 9 of the 12 checklists. The other three checklists were overlooked during the final file review. For these three, all the information required to perform the evaluations is contained in the various files, but the checklists are not completed properly. The project central file will be amended to correct this discrepancy. 4 i-l L i l L 11 NRC l L
i. VII.b.2 Valve Disassembly QUESTION:
- 1. Section 4.1.2 of the Results Report states, "in addition to proper matching of components, the procedures were reviewed for (sic) damage during the disassembly, storage and reassembly process."
Please provide the results of this review.
RESPONSE
As discussed in the " Procedure Review" portion of Section 5.2 (page 14 through 16) of the Results Report, the procedures used for valve disassembly - CP-CPM-6.9 or CP-CPM-9,18 - have always contained provisions to package disassembled valve parts. The purpose of this packaging (in a heavy duty plastic bag or wooden box marked with the valve tag number) as stated in CP-CPM-9.18 is "to prevent loss or damage and to maintain traceability.." This practice was found to be adequate to identify damaged parts. Additionally, the operational travelers and QC checklist for valves (QCV's) reviewed during the sample reinspections all contain a sign off by the craftsmen, QC engineet, or in the vast majority of cases - both, verifying all internals have been cleaned / prepared for reassembly. This constitutes a final check for visible damage prior to reassembly. See, e.g., action plan working file Section 5.0 (Item I-M-VALV-122). QUESTION:
- 2. Section 5.2 (page 12 of 20, last paragrre') addresses differences in t
non-ASME and ASME manufacturing processrs for the bonnets. The Results Report states that physical and chemical properties identified in the material specification would be the same for both and also that post manufacturing testing would be the same. Please address how you considered the differences between ASME Code and commercial requirements such as material identification and traceability, welding and weld repairs, personnel qualifications, and nondestructive r examinations. l . I RESPONSE: l l The conclusion as stated in the Results Report is that there is "no substantive effect of interchanging a ASME bonnet with a non-ASME i bonnet on ITT Grinnell diaphragm valves." This conclusion was based j on discussions with the manufacturer's QA Division Manager as ( , documented in the action plan working file number 9.0 item 9.0-25 l (copy attached). It was recognized that there are differences in the l quality assurance programs under which the ASME and commercial grade bonnets are manufactured, but this was determined not to be significant in this particular instance since post manufacturing testing is identical for both ASME and non-ASME (commerciol) bonnets. 12 NRC i
4 VII.b.2 Valve Disassembly (Cont'd) QUESTION:
- 3. It should be noted that NRC Inspection Report 50-445/85-14; 50-446/85-11 identified an unresolved item (Appendix E, paragraph 6.j) pertaining to the differences identified between the Westinghouse and Gibbs & Hill (G&H)
Lines Designation Tables, and differences between G6H Tables and Code Data Sheets. Please provide the necessary information for resolution of this unresolved item (445/85-14-U-15). This question is in no way related to the conduct of ISAP VII.b.2.
RESPONSE
TNE is currently performing an extensive line by line comparison between the G&R and Westinghouse Line Lists. Members of Gibbs & Hill's Design Engineering Department, Westinghouse's Design Engineering Department and TNE's Mechanical Engineering Department are involved in this review. The objective is to identify and reconcile all differences between the two lists and to determine the correct condition in each case. Site system flow diagrams and Westinghouse design flow diagrams are also being reviewed to insure that both are in agreement with one another and are consistent with both Line Lists. Following this review, TNE will compare the questionable Valve Code Data Sheets to their respective line number for final assurance that the valves are acceptable for their applicable conditions. QUESTION:
- 4. On page 1 in second paragraph under Section 3.0 reference is made to a valve testing program (a) Identify the program and/or programs and clearly indicate the scope i.e., how many and what type of valves are included, what types of valves are excluded, etc. (b) the loss or damage of valve parts is a QA programmatic concern when it's repetitive and uncontrolled, even if its documented. Explain how this _ issue is addressed in your implementation process.
Section 4.1.2 the third paragraph addresses an evaluation of the adequacy of present procedures. Was there a sampling inspection of valves (and documentation) installed under the present procedures? What are present procedures as opposed to past procedures? , RESPONSE: The system test engineer is required (by CP-SAP-20) to walkdown each system. The valves in the system are inspected (Section 4.4) for proper flow direction, accessibility, bolt tightness, stem travel, operability (smoothness, etc.), packing, etc. This is required for all valves in the system; safety-related as well as BOP. 13 NRC
VII.b.2 Valve Disassembly (Cont'd) Additionally, some valves are checked / tested for operability over and beyond those in CP-SAP-20, such as:
- All Motor Operated Valves are tested in accordance with XCP-EE10
- All Air Operated Valves are tested in accordance with XCP-EE11 The Main Steam Isolation Valves are tested in accordance with 1/2 CP-PT-3401 All the Steam Generator Relief Valves 1/2 CP-PT-3402 All valves used for containment isolation are local leak test (10CFR50 Appendix J) to 1/2 CP-PT-7501 The RCS Boundary Check Valves are tested to 1-CP-PT-5709 and 2-CP-PT-5706 In the sample of 106 valves, there was one instance of a lost valve bonnet and one instance of damage sustained to a bonnet requiring replacement. Both had been properly, documented by TUGC0 on Nonconformance Reports (NCRs). As less than one percent of the sample items indicated a loss of valve parts and less than one percent damage, the Issue Coordinator and Review Team Leader do not consider this to be a programmatic concern of repetitive and uncontrolled loss or damage. Had this condition been determined to be a programmatic concern, the action plan would have been expanded or corrective action would have been recommended to the Project. As stated in Section 3.0 of the Results Report, the action plan focused on the undocumented interchanging of parts.
It should be noted that the ISAP, as it pertained to damage, was only concerned with damage sustained during valve part storage as per the allegation. Other cases of valve damage were found in the sample items. This damage had nothing to do with the valve disassembly / reassembly process. Our review revealed that repair had been accomplished satisfactorily. The sample included valves which had been disassembled and reassembled under past or " earlier" procedures, valves which had been disassembled and reassembled under "present" procedures, and several valves which were disassembled more than once and so were dis / reassembled under both past and present procedures. Present procedures as used in the Results Report means CP-CPM-9.18 issued in mid-1983. 9arly procedures were.those used prior to that date. Section 5.2 of the 7esults Report discusses the details of both procedures. QUESTION:
- 5. Section 4.1.3 second paragraph states in part an evaluation was made to define potential code violations.
- What are they? They should be identified.
14 NRC
t VII.b.2 Valve Disassembly (Cont'd) a RESPONSE: , , The evaluation for potential code class violations mentioned in the second paragraph of Section 4.1.3.was done as part of the analysis discussed in the first paragraph 3 of this section. This analysis is contained in the action plan working file as document no. 6.0, item 6B-6 (copy attached). Revision 1 dated 11/25/85 of the analysis was inadvertently omitted from the action plan file and has now been added. QUESTION:
- 6. Section_4.1.4 first sentence states that reinspection of valves;which were disassembled was performed to provide assurance that the valves were reassembled using the correct components.
It is not clear how, or from what documentation, the corre'et components were identified. E'.SPONSE:
~
The acceptance criteria are stated in Section 4.6 of the Results Report.' 4 QUESTION:
- 7. Section 4.2 procedures are not identified per program plan attachment 3 ISAP format.
s
RESPONSE
The procedures in effect are CP-CPM-9.18 Rev. O, dated 6/8/83 and QI-QAP-11.1-26 Rev. 18 dated 12/19/85. QUESTION:
- 8. Section 4.6 appears to apply to only diaphragm valves - what was the basis acceptance of other types of valves with interchangeable top works,and
- tria.
RESPONSE
The criteria of Section 4.6'spplied to all valves inspected under this action plan. s t 4 QUESTION: i s \
- 9. Section 5.1 second paragraph state,s that the review installation procedures, revisions and dates should be identified.
15 NRC
._ _ _ , ~ .__... _ _. _ __
_ _ - . .f . _ -
VII.b.2 Valve Disassembly (Cont'd)
RESPONSE
This information can be found in action plan working file 6A, items 6A-1 and 6A-2 (copies attached).
-QUESTION:
- 10. Section 5.0 page 11 first paragraph states.that a lost bonnet and a damaged bonnet were not deviations because they were properly identified on NCRs and PETS.
The valve type, size, gag numbers, date of installation, the NCR and PET numbers should also state if the NPV-1 form was revised, or annotated. RESPONSE: , The NCR and/or PET associated with these valves, or any similar conditions, serve as the key to initiating any required code documentation relative to the repair or replacement. When NPV-1 certified parts of a component are replaced or repaired, an ASME Section XI NIS-2 form is executed to maintain component certification acceptability; this form is completed prior to N-3 certification of the Unit, and is utilized in lieu of annotating or revising an ASME
- Section III NPV-1 Data Report, which is not permitted by the Code.
i f QUESTION:
- 11. Section 5.0 page 11 fourth paragraph states that two types of ITT Grinnell valves were supplied. This paragraph should also provide complete identification of the valve types (manufacturer's drawing or identification numbers), valve sizes, rating and applicable code class.
RESPONSE
- This information can be found in action plan working file 6.0, item i' 6B-5 (copy attached). (Note that the Generic Safety Consequence i Analysis attached to this item is superceded by Revision I which is provided in response to item no. 5 above.)
i
-QUESTION:
- 12. 'Section 5.0 fifth paragraph states in part: For some application...the applications should be identified (page 11).
l RESPONSE: The applications of the valves rated 300 psi at 150' F. were those within the scope of the NSSS Vendor supply. Westinghouse always j specifies this type valve regardless of the application, system or
- plant for which their NSSS is supplied, for reason of standardization.
t 1 16 NRC L
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c se VII.b.2 Valve Disassembly (Cont'd) , e The ITT Grinnell standard' valve discussed in paragraph four of page 11 of the Results Report is used in all non-NSSS applications, a-- QUESTION:
- 13. Sect, ion 5.0 page 12 first paragraph is not clear $n its description of valve modifications.
.i 1- were the modifications made specifically for CPSES valves at the ij-specified 300 PSIC, or 2- are these valves just different configurations furnished by the supplier when the user specifies service conditions, pressure /
temperature, that gre higher than design.
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RESPONSE: j
,o Seeresponsetoquestinv}no. 12. ,
/
QUESTION:
- 14. Section 5.0 page 13 second paragraph, identifies two valves by tag numbers.
This paragraph should further identify the manufacturer's drawing or identification number, size, rating, code class and date of installation. Additionally this paragraph should identify the documents (e.g., NCR, IR, i PET) that substantiated acceptance of the installed valve body and bonnet.
RESPONSE
The information requested is: Valve Tag No. 2-8422 Mfg. Dwg. No. - SD-C-100552 Rating 300 psig at 150*F. Class 2 Size - 3" Install. Traveler No. MW81-1105-4900 Reinspection Pkg. No. - I-M-VALV-44 dated 10/16/81 Valve Tag No. 2-7131B Mfg. Dwg. No. - SD-C-100551 , Rating 300 psig at 150*F. Class 3 Size - 3" Install. Traveler No MW7980361-4100 Reinspection Pkg. No. - I-N.VALV dated 10/23/79 This information is in the; reinspection packages found in action plan working file Section 5.0. , The acceptance of the installed valves is documented on the installation traveler. No NCR or PET was in effect documenting the deviation at the time of the CPRT inspection of the valve which is the reason the deviation was declared. 17 NRC t _- _ _ . - -
~
l i i VII.b.2 Valve Disassembly (Cont'd) QUESTION:
- 15. Section 5.0 page 13 the second and third paragraphs, identify two valves by tag number. These paragraphs Jould t also identify the manufacturer's drawing or identification number, size, rating and code class and date of installation.
RESPONSE
This information is: Valve Tag No. 1-7046 Mfg. Dwg. No. - SD-C-101609 Rating 300 psig at 150*F. Class 3 Size - 3" Install. Traveler No. MW80-1020-4900 Reinspection Pkg. No. - I-M-VALV-9 dated 11/11/81 Valve Tag No. XSF-179 Mfg. Dwg. No. - SD-C-105686 Rating 255 psig at 150*F. Class 3 Size - 3" Install. Traveler No. MW79-081-4700 Reinspection Pkg. No. - I-M-VALV-67 dated 12/19/79 This information is in the reinspection packages found in action plan working file section 5.0. QUESTION:
- 16. Section 5.0 page 14 first paragraph states that because the installed valves (with deviations) match the numbers recorded on the operations travelers, this means that the bonnets were interchanged prior to issue for instal 3ation.
The staff finds that this deduction may not be valid if the valve was disassembled, installed and reassembled on the same day. If the traveler records these operations as performed on the same date (same shift), there is no assurance that the required information was recorded prior to disassembly. Another potential is the switching of valve tags.
RESPONSE
The installation of these valves, as documented on the installation traveler in the reinspection packages, showed that the valve bonnets were removed and stored for a period of months, and then reassembled when all welding was complete and the line was installed in the field. Switching of valve tags would not cause the noted deviations as numbers stamped on the valve body and bonnet were used for the reinspection. 1
m VII.b.2 Valve Disassembly (Cont'd)
-QUESTION: e
- 17. Section 5.0 page 14 second paragraph relates to travelers for the other two.
valves that were written prior to the practice of recording bonnet markings... This paragraph should identify the two valves in question, the date installed, the procedure and applicable revision at the time of installation.
RESPONSE
The valves in question are valve tag nos. 2-7131B and XSF-179 discussed on page 13. They were installed under procedure no. CP-CPM-5.9 Rev. O, dated 10/6/78 on 10/23/79 and 12/19/79 respectively, based on traveler coup,letion dates.
. QUE!riTON:
- 18. Section 5.0 page 15 second paragraph refers to early procedures. The specific procedures, revisions and dates should be identified.
RESPONSE
CP-CPM-6.9 Rev. O was the project source procedure which contained integrated Construction / QC direction for the disassembly / reassembly of valves on CPSES. CP-CPM-6.9 was divided into subsections shortly after its issuance, and the requirements for valve disassembly / reassembly were then encompassed.in CP-CPM-6.9E. CP-CPM-6.9/CP-CPM-6.9E Rev. 0 (2/6/80) set forth the following requirements with respect to valve disassembly / reassembly: + Detailed instructions, including the general rotuirements of CP-CPM-6.9/CP-CPM-6.9E, would be provided to Construction /QC via an Operational Traveler (OT), prepared and approved in accordance with CP-CPM-6.3; and, Section 3.14 of CP-CPM-6.9/CP-CPM-6.9E requires, in part "All
- parts removed from the valve shall be stored in a heavy duty plastic bag, or in the case of a large valve a wooden or cardboard box. The MS [ Millwright Superintendent] shall mark the box / bag with
-the valve number.
"Any valve that will remain dismantled for an extended period of time '
will have the bag / box of parts stored in a secure place in the
- . Millwright Shop or Warehouse. If the MS estimates that the valve will l remain disassembled for only a short period or that it is too large to l be easily removed from the work area, then the bag / box may remain in the. field."
19 NRC
7_ l l l VII.b.2 Valve Disassembly (Cont'd) The above requirements remained as written through DCN #5 to CP-CPM-6.9E Rev. 6 (8/1/83), at which time they were deleted and CP-CPM-9.18 (Rev. O, 6/8/83) was referenced. Additionally, Quality Instruction QI-QAP-11.1-39A Rev. O was issued on 6/8/83 to prescribe specific QC inspection and documentation requirements for valve disassembly / reassembly. Additional details can be found in action plan working file 7.0, items 7.0-1 and 7.0-2 (copies attached). QUESTION:
- 19. Section 5.0 page 15 third paragraph last sentence states; sufficient information for evaluating valve storage prior to this time is not available. ,
The issue of concern was the storage of disassembled valve components. The TRT found that the storage at installation locations was poorly controlled. The paragraph should address the storage of disassembled valve components. Addit'ionally, this paragraph refers to an effective program implemented by Millwrights. This " Effective Program" should be addressed in the aspect of the implementation of an identified procedure and the verification of training of millwright personnel in the applicable procedure.
RESPONSE
The Results Report does refer to the storage of valve parts. It was intended to relate that the Millwrights had effectively implemented the existing program. See response to Question 18. Records for the training of Millwright personnel are on file in the Construction Department Training Records. l QUESTION:
- 20. Section 5.0 page 15 the fourth paragraph states that the issue related to r
documentation of the interchange of valve bonnets was recognized by TUGCO... This paragraph should state the basis (NCR's, irs, etc.) for TUGCO's recognition and address this subject by including the identification of the procedures, revisions and dates, l 5 20 NRC
F' VII.b.2 Valve Disassembly (Cont'd)
RESPONSE
The RTL did not identify a specific event or discrete occurrence. The recognition was manifest by the recording of body and bonnet numbers on travelers which began in late 1980. This was a general practice within existing procedures. It was formally proceduralized by TUCCO with the issuance of CP-CPM-9.18 Rev. O in June 1983. QUESTION:
- 21. Section 5.0 page 16 the second paragraph states that the QC checklist requires recording of the bonnet identification number.
For the installation of valves, since valve tags can also be interchanged, the staff finds that the procedure should require that the checklist should record both the body and bonnet identific'ation.
RESPONSE
As stated in the first paragraph on page 16 of the Results Report, the checklist does require recording of both body and bonnet identification numbers stamped on the valve parts. QUESTION:
- 22. Section 5.0 page 16 third paragraph states the administrative action was taken (by TUGCO) in the startup test program.
The administrative action should be identified in terms of identification of any applicable procedures, revisions and the CPRT verification of the training of personnel.
RESPONSE
The administrative action taken by TUGC0 in 1985 was to require control of all work processes during the construction phase of CPSES, through implementation of the work package concept defined in the CP-CPM-7.1 series of procedures. Verification of program implementation and the awareness of project personnel with the program was evident from the process in which CPRT was required to obtain project documentation, prepare inspection packages and initiate work processes. The only question of applicability during implementation of the CP-CPM-7.1 (series) involved the Start-up Organization, which, as documented in the action plan working file 7.0 item 7.0-4, was resolved by letter CPPA #45,538, 21 NRC
r VII.b.2 Valve Disassembly (Cont'd) QUESTION:
- 23. Section 5.0 page 16 the fourth paragraph cites an example identified by the TRT as evidence of procedure implementation and effectiveness.
The TRT also identified (in SSER-11) numerous PETS that documented the interchange as replacements for lost and/or damaged valve components. The staff wishes to emphasize that the issue essentially was procedural inadequacy to control the interchange, loss and damage of disassembled valve components. The staff disagrees with the CPRTs reasoning that this is an example of procedure effectiveness. The TRT stated that although the deficiency was reported on the NCR, and procedures were in place, the loss and damage continued to occur.
RESPONSE
See the response to question 4. QUESTION:
- 24. Section 5.6 page 18 identification and discussion of Corrective Action first paragraph is vague.
The paragraph should identify the level of responsibility of the changed personnel and identify the procedure, revisions and dates as they apply to the subject of this paragraph.
RESPONSE
As addressed in response to questions 18 and 19, the corrective action was to implement effectively the existing program rather than developing a program to implement. Implementation was effected at the craftsman level and procedural compliance was and is stressed at the supervisory levels. QUESTION:
- 25. Section 5.7 page 19 Out-of-Scope Observations.
The paragraph refers in part to: acceptable TUGC0 Procedures... The procedures should be identified.
RESPONSE
CP-QAP-12.4 Rev. 1, dated 12/28/83. 22 NRC
O VII.b.2 Valve Disassembly (Cont'd) QUESTION:
- 26. Section 6.0 page 20 the second paragraph states that procedures were reviewed and found to be adequate except for .. and further, the last sentence states that improvements to the control process since 1983 ...
The procedures, revisions and dates should be identified, and the improvements to the control process should be specifically detailed in this paragraph.
RESPONSE
See response to question no. 18. QUESTION: ,
- 27. Section 7.0 page 20 does not clearly identify any of the results of the implementation of this plan (e.g., procedure inadequacy, lack of control, etc.) that must be addressed by TUGCO, and then evaluated under ISAP VII.a.2.
RESPONSE
TUGC0 must disposition the 4 identified via the Project NCR process. No programmatic concerns were identified during the conduct of this ISAP (See response to question 20). ISAP VII.a.2 will assess handling of any programmatic corrective actions by TUGCO. One of the specific allegations being investigated in ISAP VII.a.2 is the portion of the TRT issue on valve dis / reassembly (as stated in AQ-52 of SSER-11) that concerns
~
" effective programmatic corrective action was not implemented... ."
23 NRC
,3V M11atIOn Research COIp0Iation OrrICe ntx0RANDun
)
QA/QC-RT-076 TO: J. Hansel rROM: M. Solon DATE: April 8, 1985
SUBJECT:
Valve Disassembly, Issue VII.b.2 Generic Valve Evaluation Summary Documentation (i.e. specifications, vendor instruction manuals and drawings) were reviewed to determine which generic valve types required disassembly prior to welded installation into the piping systems.
~
It is concluded that diaphragm valves, manufactured by ITT-Grinnell, are the only valves which required disassembly prior to weldup. Purchase orders CP-0020A, 0020B, 0604 and 0001 (S.O.0220) contain nuclear safety related (Q) diaphragm valves with the potential for mismatching valve bodies and internals when the valves were reassembled. The number of valves in these purchase orders is apprcximately 600 total for Units 1, 2 and Common. Non-Q diaphragm valves contained in purchase orders CP-0021B.1, 0021D and 0604 are identical in form and fit to the Q valves, and will be considered as a source for rismatching internals and valve bodies. Discussion In accordance with the Action Plan, para. 4.1.1, an evaluation was made to determine the generic valve types that require disassembly and removal of internals prior to welding. Project specifications, drawings and vendor instruction manuals were reviewed. The latest specification index pages containing valves were marked up, and Table 1 was prepared to summarize the results of the documentation review. All Q valve types were reviewed first. For those valve types that were found to require disassembly, similar non-Q valve types were evaluated as a possible source for mismatching non-Q internals with Q valve bodies. Valves supplied with vendor packaged equipment were not reviewed. Specific discussion of all valve types, by specification, follows. Referring to Table 1. Page 1: (1) The vendor instruction manuals for the diaphragm valves (MS-20A, 20B) require that the bonnet assembly be removed to protect the diaphragm during veldup into the piping system. (2) The vendor instruction manuals for the bulk valve orders (MS-20A.1, 20.B.1, 20.B.2) do not require valve disassembly for welded installation into the piping system. g 4 ~ ,' - G -/ 800 Oak Ridgeihmpike Suite 501 Oak Ridge. Tennessee 37830 (615) 482-7973 ' I-
__ _ . __ _- ._ ~_ .- .
- 1. -- ,
" e QA/QC-RT-076 Page 2 April 8, 1985 (3) The specification for the rubber lined check valves (MS-208.3) has only four 24_ inch valves. These valves, which are in the service water system, are all valve type 24CC302WA, Notes 3, 39 and are identical. Therefore, there is no need for further evaluation of potential mismatch.
(4) Butterfly / wafer disc valves use bolted installation exclusively. Referring to Table 1, Page 2:
'(1) The non-Q diaphragm (MS-21B.1, 21D) require valve disassembly for weldup. They are identical in form and fit to the Q diaphragm valves, and will therefore, be considered a potential discrepancy source for
~
the Q valves. (2) The remaining non-Q valves (MS-21A, 21B, 21C, 21D.2, 21E) have no Q valve counterpart that requires disassembly; and therefore, they were not reviewed. Referring to Table 1, ' age 3: (1) No review is required for.the non-Q circulating water valves (MS-75). ' Referring to Table-1, Page 4: h (1) The main steam valves (MS-76, 77, 78, 79) are special valves and therefore were not reviewed. (2) Review of the specifications and vendor instruction manuals for the c butterfly deluge valves and the HVAC containment isolation valves (MS-82.1, 86) showed the valve installations to be bolted. Referring to Table 1, Page 5: (1) Review of the Q and non-Q control valves (MS-600, 601) shows that where i soft seats are used, the internals must be removed prior to welded installation. Specification MS-600 (Q valves) has only four valves with soft seats. These valves (HV-4710, 4711, Data Sheets A0-19) are identical 4 inch 150 psi carbon steel globe valves. Specification
. MS-601 (non-Q) does not contain non-Q valves of similar configuration.
Therefore, mismatch of valve internals and bodies need not be l considered.' (2) The vendor instruction manual for the process solenoid valves (MS-603) does not require valve disassembly.
- 800 Gak Ridre %rnnike hit,isn1 na pida. T,nn.... 2eam vici,ico en i
(
QA/QC-RT-076 Page 3 April 8, 1985 (3) The instruction manual for the power operated diaphraga valves (MS-604) requires valve disassembly before welded installation. The specification contains four Q valves. These are identical 150 psi 4 inch stainless steel valves (Tag No. HV-5157, 5158, Data Sheets A2-12, 13). Specification MS-604 contains 1, 2 and 3 inch air operated non-Q valves. These valves. Q and non-Q, are similar dimensionally to the air operated Q diaphragm valves in the NSSS purchase order, CP-0001 (S.O.0220). Therefore, there is a potential for mismatching parts. Referring to Table 1, Page 6: (1) The non-Q automatic pump recirculation valves (MS-627) need not be reviewed. (2) Per the specification for the pilot solenoid valves (MS-632), the valve ends are threaded. (3) The NSSS purchase order CP-0001 (Shop Order 0220) contains valves supplied by Rockwell, Fisher, Velan, Copes Vulcan, Crosby, Westinghouse and ITT-Grinnell. Vendor drawings and instruction manuals were reviewed to reach the following conclusions: (a) The Crosby valves are safety and relief valves, and are not considered. (b) The Rockwell, Fisher, Velan valves have metal seats and do not require disassembly before weldup. (c) Some Copes Vulcan valves have non-metallic seats. However, the instruction manual does not require valve disassembly before weldup. (d) The ITT-Grinnell valves include 3 and 4 inch manual Q valves, similar dimensionally to those in MS-20B; and air operated Q valves from 3/4 inch to 4 inch, of which the 1, 2, 3, 4 inch valves are similar dimensionally to those in MS-604. Therefore, these valves, with the possible exception of the 3/4 inch valves, will be added to the population of valves with the potential for having mismatched parts. Further review and evaluation is required to better define the sub populations, taking-into consideration the characteristics of the valve topworks. This effort will be limited to the ITT-Grinnell valves in purchase orders CP-020A, 020B, 0604 and 0001 (S.0. 0220). u. 800 Oak Ridge'nunpike Suite 301 Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 (615) 482 7973
l QA/QC-RT-076 Page 4 April 8, 1985 a
$H /
/
M. Solon . cc: D. Alexander V. Hoffman P. E. Ortstadt File VII.b.2.45 MS/s1 t f 4 e Y
.2 500 Oak Ridgelbrnpike Suite 501 Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 (615) 482 7973
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4 1 Evaluation Research COIp0Iation OrrICE MEMORAxDux QA/QC-RT-090 To: J. L. Hansel rROM: M. Solon DATE: May 2, 1985
SUBJECT:
Valve Disassembly, Issue VII.b.2 Additional Generic Valve Evaluation
References:
(1) Office Memorandum, M. Solon to J. Hansel, " Generic Valve Evaluation", dated 04/08/85 (2) SDAR CP-83-01, Corrective Action for Borg-Warner Check Valves (3) Telecon, M. Solon to P..Milinazzo, " Disassembly and Reassembly of Borg-Warner Check Valves", dated 04/22/85 Summary Reference 1 evaluated the generic valve types which required disassembly prior to welded installation into the piping system. The objective of this further evaluation is to determine if there ere generic valve types which required disassembly and subsequent reassemblysafter the valves were delivered to the site. It was determined that although many types of valves were disassembled and reassembled for purge, flush, test and repair, there was only one generic valve type (in addition to those in Ref.1) which required disassembly. These were
- c. heck valves supplied by the Borg-Warner Nuclear Valve Division (B-W), under P.O. No. CP-0020B.1. There are approximately 160 valves, total for Units 1, 2 and Common, which fall into this generic type valve category.
It was concluded that of this total only some of the low pressure (150 and 300 psi) valves could be reassembled with an incorrect body / bonnet generic configuration. All valves in question are ASME III, Code Class 2, and therefore, ade classification violations could not have occurred. Discussion Bdcheckvalveswerefoundtohavepossibledesignandmanufacturing deficiencies (Reference 2), which required that the valves already en site be disassembled for inspection and repair if required. Review of the B-W check valve drawings, with confirmation by the vendor (Reference 3) resulted in the conclusion that valve bodies and bonnets of the same size and pressure rating could have been reassembled, regardless of ASME III Code Class (Class 2, 3) or material (carbon, stainless steel). However, per the specification (MS-20-B.1, paragraph 3.3.3) the valves were all supplied as Class 2. am u- # - 1_. / 800 Oak Ridge Thrnpike Suite 501 Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 (615) 482 7973
QA/QC-RT-088 Page 2 May 2, 1985 A matrix of B-W check valve types is given in Table 1. All valves are ASME III, Code Class 2. Valve types which have the same body / bonnet fit-up are circled. The valves which could be reassembled with incorrect bonnet and internals are as follows: 3 inch /150 psi (carbon and stainless steel) 4 inch /150 psi (carbon and stainless steel) 10 inch /150 psi (CS and SS) and 300 psi (CS) There are approximately 70 valves falling into these categories. Valves which wars ?isassembled, other than those defined herein and in Reference 1, will be identified by reviewing operations travelers. k M. Solon / cc: D. Alexander V. Hoffman P. Ortstadt ERC File File VII.b.2-45
. File VII.b.2-9 MS/s1 Attachments l ..
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3M11afi0n DO On . 0FFICE MEMORANDUM QA/QC-RT-103 TO: J. L. Hansel FROM: M. Solon DATE: May 20, 1985
SUBJECT:
Valve Disassembly, Issue VII.b.2, Generic Safety Consequences Analysis
REFERENCES:
- 1. Memorandum QA/QC-RT-076, " Valve Disassembly. Issue VII.b.2 Generic Valve Evaluation," April 8, 1985
- 2. Memorandum QA/QC-RT-090, "Valv,e Disassembly, Issue VII b.2 Additional Generic Valve Evaluation," May 2, 1985 J. Telecon, M. Solon and B. Borst (ITT-Grinnell) April 9, 1985 4,Telecon, M. Solon and B. Borat (ITT-Grinnell, May 15, 1985 5.Telecon, M. Solon and P. Milinazzo (Borg-Warner), April 22, 1985
SUMMARY
The generic valve types that required disassembly and reassembly were identified in References 1 and 2. The safety implications resulting from reassembly of incorrect valve components were evaluated, and are summarized as follows:
- 1. Manual and air operated ITT-Grinnell diaphragm valves (except the 3/4 inch, stainless steel, Class 3, air eperated valves), if reassembled with incorrect bonnet assemblies, could result in significant safety implications ranging from violation of the ASME III code
- to failure of the valve.
- 2. The following Borg-Warner swing check valves, if reassembled with incorrect bonnet assemblies, could result in corrosion problems, potential failure of the bonnet and/or loss of function of the valve:
- a. 'Three and four inch /150 psi valves
- b. Ten inch /150 psi and 300 psi valves The combination of valve bodies and bonnet assemblies which can be bolted up are shown in Table 1 (manual diaphragm valves) Table 2 (air-operated diaphragm valves) and Table 3 (Borg-Warner check valves). The potential generic safety consequences of incorrectly reassembled valves are summarized in Table 4.
- Code violation herein loosely defined as an ASME valve reassembled with a bonnet assembly from a lower ASME class valve.
800OakRidgeTurnpWe S".ite501 OakRidge, Tennessee 37830 (615)482 7973 JUL%. 2-( 6B k'
QA/QC-RT-103 Page 2 May 20, 1985 - Valves which do not fall into the generic categories defined in References 1 and 2 will be treated on a case by case basis. Since there are many different valve types which were disassembled for test, repair, flush, etc., generic evaluations prior to defining the population are not practical. A recommended approach is given in Section 3 of Discussion. Discussion In accordance with the Action Plan, paragraph 4.1.3, an evaluation was made to determine the consequences of reassembling incorrect bonnet assemblies on valves which required disassembly. The two generic types of valves identified in References 1 and 2 were evaluated and are discussed below.
- 1. ITT-Grinnell Diaphragm Valves .
The ITT-Grinnell diaphragm valves were supplied under the following purchase orders: Purchase Order, CP- Description 0020A ASME III, Manual, 2 Inch and Smaller 0020B ASME III, Manual, 3 and 4 Inches 0604 ASME III and Non-ASME, Power Operated 0001 ASME III, Manual and Povsr Operated 0021B.1 Non-ASME, Manual, 2 Inch and .iraller 0021D Non-ASME, Manual, 3 and
- Inces9 Based on References 1, 3 and 4, the following conclusions were drawn rerarding possible reassembly configuration errors and resulting differences in valve construction:
- a. Valves of the same size have the same body /'onne: a fit-up, regardless of ASME III Class (including'non-A MC,, material and pressure rating.
- b. Bonnet m"terial is stainless steel regardless of body material
. (Stainit.s Steel or Carbon Steel).
- c. Bonnet wall thickness depends on valve size only, and is the same for 150 psi and 300 psi ratings.
- d. Diaphragm thickness depends on valve size only, and is the same for 150 psi and 300 psi ratings. However 300 psi, 2 inch, 3 inch and 4 inch valves have a diaphragm support cushion.
- e. Two, three and four inch, 300 psi manual valves use a brass spindle; whereas the 150 psi valves and the 300 psi air operated valves use a stainless steel spindle. All other internals are of the same materials.
800 Oak Ridge 1hrnpike Suite 501 Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 (615) 482 7973
QA/QC-RT-103 Page 3 May 20, 1985 The following additional information was obtained from the valve drawings.
- f. Operator action (air to open or close) was determined and is summarized in Table 2. Except for the 4 inch valves, all the valve operators with the same action were the same size for a given valve size,
- g. The 4 inch Cla-s 2 valves have a larger actuator than the 4 inch Class 3 valves.
It is presumed that reassembly of a manual valve with a bonnet assembly having an air operator, or vice versa, is not credible. Such an error would be obvious, both visually and during preop testing. . The evaluation was performed for the highest level of valve (be it ASME Class, pressure rating or material), assuming reassembly with a bonnat from a valve of lower level. In addition, valve operator action and size was considered. The possible reassembly errors were obtained from Table 1 (manual valves) and Table 2 (air operated valves) wherein the number of ASME valves, broken down'by class, pressure rating and material, are shown for each valve size. The various types of non-ASME valves are also shown in the tables. Except for the 3/4 inch and 4 inch air operated valves, non-ASME valve bonnets could be installed on the ASME valves. A summary of the evaluation is given in Table 4, Items 1 through 10B. Except for the 3/4 inch, Class 3, 300 psi, stainless steel valves (Item 7B), reassembly with an incorrect bonnet assembly could result in a code violation and/or potential valve failure or loss of function.
- 2. Borg-Warner Swing Check Valves The Borg-Warner swing check valves were supplied as part of purchase order CP-00208.1. Based on References 2 and 5, the following conclusions were drawn regarding possible reassembly configuration errors and resulting differences in valve construction:
- a. Except for the 10 inch valves, only valves of the same size and pressure rating have the same valve body / bonnet fit-up.
- b. Ten inch valves have the same body / bonnet fit-up for 150 psi and 300 psi.
- c. Carbon steel valves have carbon steel bodies, seats and bonnets.
Stainless steel valves have stainless steel bodies, seats and bonnets.
- d. Except for the 10 inch carbon steel valves, all valves nave stainless steel disks. The 10 inch carbon steel valves have carbon steel disks.
r i ... . . _.. _
I QA/QC-RT-103 Page 4 May 20, 1985 -
- e. All valves were provided as Class 2, regardless of class specified.
The possible reassembly errors were determined from Table 3, wherein the number of valves in each assembleable category is given. Only the 3 and 4 inch 150 pai valves and the 10 inch valves could be reassembled with body / bonnet errors with potential safety significance. A summary of the analysis is given in Table 4, Items 11 through 13. In each of these cases, reassembly errors could result in valve failure or loss of function.
- 3. -Other Valve Types Dis / Reassembled Analysis of the generic valves for safety consequences is practical only i- for the ITT-Grinnell diaphragm valves and Borg-Warner check valves. These i valves were known to have required dia/ reassembly of all the valves.. This I type of analysis for the remaining valves that werc Jis/ reassembled for i repair, test, flush, etc. should be done on a case by. case basis.
1 The recommended approach would be to include all the other valves
- in the population. When a valve is selected as a sample, the documentation should be reviewed to determine.if adverse effects could result from errors in reassembly. If no adverse effects are identified, the valve should be discarded from the sample, and another selected. If the evaluation is not conclusive, the valve should remain in the sample, and the evaluation would .
take place after the valve is inspected, if discrepancies are found. NNL I- W M. Solon / cc: D. Alexander , V. Hoffman P. E. Ortstadt File VII.,b.2-9 File VII.b.2-49 ERC' File MS/s1
- Other screening criteria, e.g. short time span between disassembly and reassembly, may be considered to eliminate valves from the population.
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i .. ? TA8tE 4 GENERIC SAFETY CONSEQUENCES ANALYSIS Page 1 ITEM DESCRIPTION SAFETY PRESSURE POTENTIA 8 POTENTIAL CLASS RATING REASSEMBLY ERROR FAILURE & EFFECTS I ITT-Grinnell
! I Diaphragm Valve 3 300pst 1. Bonnet assembly from C.S. 1. No failure. All bonnets are St. St. with interr.als Manual valve of same materials.
- 3/4 inch Stainless Steel 2. Bonnet assently from 150 pst 2. No failure. The bonnet and diaphragm triteknesses are the valve same for 150 pst and 300 pst valves.
- 3. Bonnet assembly from non-ASME 3. a. Potental failure during a seismic event. Loss of valve function, leakage.
l b. Code violation. 1 2 ITT-Grinnell Otaphragm Valve Manual l2 l 150 psi 1. Bonnet assesely from non-ASME valve
- 1. a. Potenttal failure during a seismic event. Loss of function, leakage.
3/4 insh ,' Carbon Steel '
- 2. Bonnet assently from ASME III. ,b . Code violation.
Class 3 valve
- 2. Code violation.
ITT-Grinnell 3 , Diaparage Valve ! 2 l150 1. Bonnet assently from C.S. 1. No failure. All bonnets are St. St. with internals of i' valve same materials. l Manual 1 inch
. Stainless Steel 2. Bonnet assestly from non-ASE 2. a. Potential failure during a sef saic event. Loss of l valve function leakage.
{
- 3. Bonnet assently ASE 111. Class 3 3. Code violation.
valve
N i
- w i
taste 4 (Cont'd) r.[hEHC 5AFITY CnNSIOUfMCES ANALYSIS (Cont'd) Page 2 SAFETT PRESSURC POTENTIAL POT [MTIAL \, ITEM DESCRIPTION CLASS RATING REA55EMRLY [RROR _ FAlt0R[ > I 4
- ITT.Grinnell Olaphrage 3 300 ,
- 1. Bonnet ' assembly from C.S. 1. No failure. All bonnets are St. St. with in-valve Manual 2 inch Valve. ternals of yme materials.
! Stainless Steel. .
2.a. Galling of St. Sti spindle (300 pst valve I 2. Sonnet assembly from 150 " pst valve. spindle is brass). Jesuming of talve.
- b. No support cushion. Failure of diaphrage -
g
& leakage. y ,
j 3. Bonnet assembly from non- 3.a. Potential fattere during a seismic event.
- ASME Valve. Loss of function leakaoe. %
- b. Code violation.
l 5 ITT-Grinnell Diaphragm 2 150 1. Bonnet assambly from C.S. 1. No failure. All bonnets are St. St. with in-Valve Manual 2 inch Valve. ternals of same materials. l , Stainless Steel.
- 2. Bonnet assembly from non- 2.a. Potential failure during a seismic event.
e
.{. .
- AIML Valve. Loss of function & leakaoe.
I l
- s b. Code violation.
I 3. Bonnet asien6ly from ASME I
?
- 3. Code violation.
e, lit, Class 3 valve. 6
- ITT-Grine11 Diaphrage 2 300 1. Bonnet assembly from C.S. 1. No f ailu'rt. All bonnets are St. St. .with in-Valve Manual 3 inch &
- Valve. ternals of same materials.
1 4 inch Stainless Steel. s g
- 2. Bonnet assembly from 150 2.a. Galling of St. St. spindle (300 pst valve
; pst valve. spindle is brass). Jaausing of valve.
a
- b. No support cushion. Failure of diaphraan t & leakage.
e , ..
- 3. Bonnet assenhly from non- 3.a. Potential failure during a seismic event.
l Asi1E valve. Loss of function & leakage, g
- b. Code violation.
! 4. Bonnet assem61y from ASHE 4. Code violation.
- Ill, Class 3 valve.
l. i.
? .
TABLE 4 (CONT'D) GENERIC SAFETY CONSEQUENCES ANALYSIS Page 3 i ! SAFETT PRESSURE POTENTIAL POTENTIAL ITEM DESCRIPTION CLASS RAIING REASSEMBLY ERROR FAILURE 7A ITT-Grinnell 2 300 1. Bonnet and actuator 1.a. Code violation. Diaphrage Valve assently.from Class b. No failure. Actuator action and size the same. Air operated (ATO) 3 valve , i 3/4 inch Carbon Steel 18 Stainless Steel 3 300 1. Bonnet and actuator 1.a. No failure. All bonnets are St. St. with internals
' assembly f rom C.5tl., of the same materials. Actuator action and stre the Class 2 valve same.
ITT-Grinnell 2 300 1. Bonnet and actuater 1.a. Code violation 8A Diaphragm Valve asses 61y from C. 5tl., b. No failure. All bonnets are St. St. with internals of Air operated (ATO)- Class 3 valve the same materials. Actuator action and size the same. 1 inch 1 Stainless Steel 1 2. Bonnet and actuator 2.a. Code violation, assembly from non-ASE, b. Potential failure during a seismic event. Loss of 150 pst valve function & leakage. 3 300 1. Bonnet and actuator 1. Same as 2 above. 8B assently from non-ASE, , 150 pst valve ITT-Grinnell 2 300 1. Bonnet and actuator 1.a. Code violation. 9A b. Incorrect actuator action and system operation. Diaphragm Valve assembly from Class 3 Air operated (ATO) valve with ATC actuator 2 inch and 3 inch . 2.a. Code violation. Stainless Steel 2. Bonnet and actuator assently from non-ASE , b. Potential failure during a seismec event. Loss of 150 pst valve function & leakage. Air operated (ATC) 3 300 1. Bonnet and ATO actuator 1. Same as 2 above. 98 ! assently from non-ASME. l 150 pst valve 2. Incorrect actuator action and system operation.
~ ___ .. _ _ _
?
TA8tE 4 (Cont'd) i GENERIC SAFETY CONS [m1ENCES AhALYSIS (Cont'd) Page 4 SAFETY PRESSURE POTENTIAL POTEN11AL ITEM DESCRIPTION CL ASS RAT!?f. REASSDSLY [RROR FAILURE i 10 A ITT-Grinnell Diaphraga 2 150 1. Bonnet and actuator assembly 1.a. Code violation valve air operated (ATO) from class 3. A10 valve. b. Smaller actuator; slower valve I openine & closine times 4 inch Stainless Steel
! 2. Bonnet & actuator assed ly 2.a. Code violation from class 3. ATC valve. b.Incorrectactuatoractionandsystem operation.
10 B Air operated (ATC) 3 300 1. Bonnet and actuator assembly 1.a. Failure of bonnet seal and/or bonnet from class 2, 150 psi, ATO cover. Enternal leakage. valve. b. Incorrect actuator action and system operation. 11 Borg. War r swing check 2 150 psi 1. Bonnet asseely from C.S. 1.a. Corrosion and potential failure of valve nc Stainless valve, bonnet. Centanlaation of system from corrosion products. 3*M dY Ach M # b. Corrosion of C.S. seat. Loss of leak tightness & check valve function. l Borg. Warner swing check 2 300 pst 1. Bonnet assembly from 150 1. Failure of bonnet seal and/or bonnet pst valve. cover. Enternal leakage. l12 valve 10 inch Stainless Steel. . l
- 2. Bonnet assembly from C.S. 2.a. Corrosion of bonnet. Potential
; valve. failure of bonnet. Contamination of system from corrosion products.
j b. Cortosion of C.S. seat. Loss of leak tightness and check valve function. l
- c. Corrosion and failure of C.S. disk.
2 150 psi 1. Bonnet assembly from C.S. 1.a. Corresten and potential fatture of 13 Borg. Warner swing check bonnet. Cantamination of system from valve 10 inch Stainless valve. corrosten products. i
- b. Correstem of C.S. seat. Loss of leak tightness and check valve function,
- c. Corrosion and failure of C.S. disk.
Aty. / 3l2Shg .
R;vicions 1 11/25/85 Page 1 of 6 ITEM NUMBER VII.b.2 GENERIC SAFETY CONSEQUENCES ANALYSIS TTEM DESCRIPTION SAFETY PRESSURE POTENTIAL POTENTIAL CLASS' RATING REASSEMBLY ERROR FAILURE & EFFECTS 1 ITT-Crinnell 3 300 psi 1. Bonnet assembly from C.S. 1. No failure. All bonnets are Stainless Liaphraga Valve valve. Steel with internals of same sisterials. Manual 3/4 inch Stainless Steel 2. Bonnet assembly from 150 psi 2. No failure. The bonnet and diaphragm valve. thicknesses are the same for 150 psi and 300 psi valves.
- 3. Bonnet assembly from non-ASME 3. Code violation.
valve. 2 ITT-Grinnell 2 150 psi 1. Bonnet assembly from non-ASME 1. Code violation. Diaphragm Valve valve. Manual 3/4 inch , Carbon Steel 2. Bonnet assembly from ASME III, 2. Code violation. Class 3 valve. 3 ITT-Grinnell 2 150 1. Bonnet assembly from C.S. 1. No failure. All bonnets are Stainless Diaphragm Valve valve. Steel with internals of same materials. Manual 1 inch Stainless Steel 2. Bonnet assembly from non-ASME 2. Code violation. valve.
- 3. Bonnet assembly ASME 111, 3. Code violation.
Class 3 valve. l l 3m . I,. 2 c i
Revision: 1 11/25/85 Page 2 of 6 ITEM NUMBER VII.b.2 GENERIC SAFETY CONSEQUENCES ANALYSIS ITEM DESCRIPTION SAFETY PRESSURE POTENTIAL POTENTIAL CLASS ' RATING REASSEMBLY ERROR FAILURE & EFFECTS l 4 ITT-Crinnell 3 300 1. Bonnet assembly from C.S. 1. No failure. All bonnets are Stainless Diaphragu valve valve. Steel with internals of same m'aterials.
, Manual 2 inch i
Stainless Steel 2. Bonnet assembly from 150 psi 2. a. Possible galling of Stainless Steel valve, spindle (300 psi valve spindle is brass).
- b. No support cushion. Reduced diaphragm life-increased maintenance.
- 3. Bonnet assembly from non-ASME 3. Code violation.
valve. 5 11T-Crinnell 2 150 1. Bonnet assembly from C.S. 'I. No failure. All bonnets are Stainless tiaphragm Valve valve. Steel with internals of same materials. Maausi 2 inch Stainless Steel 2. Bonnet assembly from non-ASME 2. Code violation. valve. t
- 3. Bonnet assembly from ASME III, 3. Code violation.
- Class 3 valve. >
i
I r Revision: 1 11/25/85 Page 3 of 6 ITEM NUMBER VII.b.2 CENERIC SAFETY CONSEQUENCES ANALYSIS CEM DESCRIPTION SAFETY PRESSURE POTENTIAL POTENTIAL CLASS RATING REASSEMBLY ERROR FAILURE & EFFECTS i ITT-Crinnell 2 300 1. Bonnet assembly from C.S. 1. No failure. All bonnets are Stainless Diaphragm Valve valve. Steel with internals of same materials. Manual 3 inch & 4 inch Stainless 2. Bonnet assembly from 150 psi 2. a. Possible galling of Stainless Steel Steel valve. spindle (300 psi valve spindle is brass).
- b. No support cushion. Decreased diaphragm life-increased maintenance.
- 3. Bonnet assembly from non-ASME 3. Code violation.
valve. .
- 4. Bonnet assembly from ASME III, 4. Code violation.
Class 3 valve. L ITT-Crinnell 2 300 1. Bonnet and actuator assembly 1. a. Code violation. Diaphragm Valve from Class 3 valve. Air Operated (ATO) b. No failure. Actuator action and size 3/4 inch Carbon the same. Steel i Stainless Steel 3 300 1. Bonnet and actuator assembly 1. No failure. All bonnets are Stainless from C. Stl., Class 2 valve. Steel with internals of the same materials. Actuator action and size the same.
is Revision: 1 11/25/85 Page 4 of 6
~
ITEM NUMBER VII.b.2 GENERIC SAFETY CONSEQUENCES ANALYSIS TEM DESCRIPTION SAFETY PRESSURE POTENTIAL POTENTIAL CLASS RATING REASSEMBLY ERROR FAILURE & EFFECTS A ITT-Grinnell 2 300 1. Bonnet and actuator assembly 1. a. Code violation. Diaphragm Valve from C. Scl., Class 3 valve. Air Operated (ATO) b. No failure. All bonnets are Stainless 1 inch Stainless Steel with internals of the same Steel materials. Actuator action and size the same. l 2. Bonnet and actuator assembly 2. Code violation. from non-ASME, 150 psi valve. B 3 300 1. Bonnet and actuator assembly 1. Same as 2 above. from non-ASME, 150 psi valve. A ITT-Grinnell 2 300 1. Bonnet and actuator assembly 1. a. Code violation. Diaphragm Valve from Class 3 valve with ATC Air Operated (ATO) actuator. b. Incorrect actuator action which would 2 inch & 3 inch be discovered during testing. Stainless Steel
- 2. Bonnet and actuator assembly 2. Code violation.
from non-ASME, 150 poi valve. B Air Operated (ATC) 3 300 1. Bonnet and ATO actuator 1. Same as 2 above. assembly from non-ASME, 150 psi valve. 2. Incorrect actuator action which would be discovered durir.g testing. I l
Revision: 1 11/25/85 Page 5 of 6 ITEM NUMBER VII.b.2 GENERIC SAFETY CONSEQUENCES ANALYSIS Of DESCRIPTION SAFETY PRESSURE POTENTIAL POTENTIAL FAILURE & EFFECTS CLASS RATING REASSEMBLY ERROR , L ITT-Grinnell 2 150 1. Bonnet and actuator assembly 1. a. Code violation. Dicphragm Valve from Class 3, ATO valve. Air Operated (ATO) b. Smaller actuator. Incorrect actuator 4 inch Stainless action which would be discovered Steel during testing.
- 2. Bonnet and actuator assembly 2. a. Code violation.
from Class 3, ATC valve.
- b. Incorrect actuator action which would be discovered during testing.
1 Air Operated (ATC) 3 300 1. Bonnet and actuator assembly 1. a. Incorrect actuator action which would from Class 2, 150 psi, ATO be discovered during testing. valve. , Borg-Warner 2 150 psi 1. Bonnet assembly from C.S. 1. a. Corrosion and potential failure of Swing Check valve. bonnet. Contamination of system from Valve 3 inch & corrosion products. 4 inch Stainless Steel Rev. I b. Corrosion of C.S. seat. Loss of leak tightness and check valve function.
4 Revision: 1
, 11/25/85 Page 6 of 6 ITEM NUMBER VII.b.2 GENERIC SAFETY CONSEQUENCES ANALYSIS ,
Di DESCRIPTION SAFETY PRESSURE POTENTIAL POTENTIAL CLASS RATING REASSEMBLY ERROR FAILURE & EFFECTS Borg-Warner 2 300 psi 1. Bonnet assembly from 150 psi 1. Failure of bonnet seal and/or bonnet Swing Check valve. cover. External leakage. Velve 10 inch Stainless Steel 2. Bonnet assembly from C.S. 2. a. Corrosion of bonnet. Potential-failure valve. of bonnet. Contamination of system from corrosion products.
- b. Corrosion of C.S. seat. Loss of leak tightness and check valve function.
- c. Corrosion and failure of C.S. disk.
Borg-Warner 2 150 psi 1. Bonnet assembly from C.S. 1. a. Corrosion and potential failure of Swing Check valve. . bonnet. Contamination of system from Velve 10 inch corrosion products. Stsinless Steel
- b. Corrosion of C.S. seat. Loss of leak l tightness and check valve function.
- c. Corrosion and failure of C.S. disk.
- r. 1 05/23/85
a VAL 1JATION WESEAWCM COWPOWATION QA/QC-RT-688 TO: File FROM: M. Obert DATE: October 2, 1985
SUBJECT:
Review of Procedures Pertinent to Valve Disassembly The following procedures were reviewed including a review of the historical file of previous revision: Procedure No. Title CP-CPM-6.9 Ceneral Piping Procedure CP-CPM-6.3 Preparation, Approval, and Control of Operation Travelers CP-CPM-9.18 Valve Disassembly / Reassembly QI-QAP-11.1-39A Valve Disassembly / Reassembly QI-QAP-11.1-26 ASME Pipe Fabrication and Installation Inspections The results of these reviews are reported in Memorandum QA/QC-RT-149 dated l 6/19/85 and in the ISAP VII.b.2 Results Report. 7//W- h~ M. P. Obert l K'0/my l
'327E . 6.2 -7. 0 o - 8~ 'ALUATION wdBEATCH COWPOWATION QA/QC-RT-149 TO: J. L. Hansel FROM: J. N. Barger DATE: June 19, 1985
SUBJECT:
Valve Disassembly. Issue VII.b.2, Dis /Reasseably Procedural Control
REFERENCE:
Memorandum QA/QC-RT-106 Review of the construction and QA procedures have been completed. Based on the review it was found that construction procedure CP-CPM-9.18 Revision 0 and QA procedure QI-QAP 11.1-26 require positive identification of parts for valves listed in supplements of CP-CPM-9.18. This function is controlled by QI-QAP 11.1-26 which requires the use of an approved, standard form, QC Checklist (QCV). The QCV lists inspection points for positive identification of valve parts which includes body, bonnet and disc heat numbers and, where prescribed the application of match marks for alignment purposes. Valves not addressed in supplements of CP-CPM-9.18 are dis / reassembled in accordance with construction operation travelers. These travelers are prepared in accordance with construction procedure CP-CPM-6.3 and further covered in QA procedure QI-QAP 11.1-26. CP-CPM-6.3 requires that the valve part, serial or tag number be l recorded on the traveler prior to the start of valve disassembly. Additional l positive information such as body, bonnet and disc heat numbers were included in some cases by personnel initiating the traveler, but was not required. Subsequent to issuing CP-CPM-9.18 and QI-QAP 11.1-26, positive identification of most valves were recorded prior to the start of valve disassembly. A number of valves have been dis / reassembled more than one time. Therefore, it is conceivable that a valve may have been dis / reassembled using the early l procedures and again using the current procedures. Based on the forgoing it is concluded that valves reassembled using early l procedures had more potential for reassembly errors than using the procedures
- now in effect. The significant difference being that the earlier procedures did not require recording the bonnet, body and disc heat number before disassembling the valve. The potential for reassembly error is considerably reduced for valves disassembled for the first time after the establishment of the QCV.
l 3Z2C 4. 2 - 7,o-/
Of MTION WaESEATCH COWPOWATION The assessment made in the reference memorandum has changed due to the large percentage of valves dis / reassembled using early procedures and some valves currently not covered by QCV. Therefore, the subpopulation for Issue VII.b.2 vill not be made up of valves dis / reassembled using early procedures. The basis for the subpopulation will be finalized and reported in the near future. N JM e A.4
'N. B rger cc: D. J. Alexander M. Obert &
V. Hoffman FILE VII.b.2-4 File VII.b.2-9 / ERC File JNB/sp l l a l l
/ . ERCI systems Integration g and Management
- a Corporation QA/QC-RT-1638 March 13, 1986 Mr. Frank Milliken ITT-Grinnell Valve Co., Inc.
P. O. Box 6164 Lancaster, PA. 17603-2064 -
Dear Frank:
Enclosed please find a Record of Telephone Conversation for our telecon of March 13, 1986. Please review it for correctness and completeness. Please advise me of any comments et (817) 897-8962. If you have no comments, please note your concurrence (inital and date) and return a copy in the enclosed addressed envelope. s sr 7
' Kiie Obert "
ERC c/o Texas Utilities Generating Co. Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station P. O. Box 1002 Glen Rose, Texas 76043 2600 Virginia Avenue NW. Suite 707. Washington, DC. 20037 202/342 6795 ,
O RECORD OF TELEDHONE CONVERSATION PAGE 1 0F 1 INCOMING _. OUTGOING X TIME 10:30 A.M. M. DATE. March 13, 1986 Person called: Fremk Millike N1
Title:
QA Division Manager Representing: ITT-Crinnel Tel . ( 712) 291-1901 Person Calling: Mike obert @ ,
Title:
ISAP VII.b.2 Issue Coordinator Representing: ERc 'Tel . I 8711 R97-8962 _ Other Parties Involved: None TOPICS REF. ITEM
- 1. I discussed with Mr. Milliken the differences between the bonnet assemblies of an ASME diaphragm valve and a non-ASME diaphragm valve. He stated the differences are as follows:
The castings used for making the bonnets are purchased from the foundry by ITT-G under different specifications. For ASME valves, an ASME material spec. is used and for non-ASME valvec an ASTM spec. is used. The same pattern is used for the castings of both ASME and non-ASME bonnets. The only difference in the castings is the paperwork that accompanies them. The chemical and physical properties of the metal required by the ASME material spec. are the same properties specified in the ASm material spec. The machining of the bonnets for both ASME and non-ASME bonnets is essentially the same. Again the only differences are in paperwork. There is more QA involvement in the repair of any defects found in ASME bonnets. The post manufacturing Non Destructive Examination program is the same for both ASME and non-ASME bonnets so it is not any more likely that a non-ASME valve bonnet with an undetected defect be shipped than an ASME valve bonnet.
- 2. It is a correct conclusion that there is no functional difference
,between an ASME and non-ASME bonnet. They are physically the same with a different " pedigree" or paperwork package. .}}