ML20137K678

Responds to 851218 Notice of Violation & Proposed Imposition of Penalty.Area Monitoring Program Developed to Oversee Plant Matl Condition.Civil Penalty Inappropriate But Not Contested

ML20137K678
Person / Time
Site:	San Onofre
Issue date:	01/17/1986
From:	Papay L SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO.
To:	Taylor J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
References
EA-85-128, NUDOCS 8601240183
Download: ML20137K678 (15)

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Southern Califdrnia Edison Company R O. SOX 800

$5 2244 WALNUT GROVE AVENUE

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l Mr. James M. Taylor Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Mr. Taylor:

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Subject:

Docket No. 50-206 Response to Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty - EA-85-128 San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1 By letter to Southern California Edison (SCE) dated December 18, 1985, the NRC forwarded a Notice of Violation and

, Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty related to events at San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1. Our response is provided in the enclosures to this letter as follows:

o Enclosure I responds to the violation described, as requested in the Notice.

! o Enclosure II provides SCE's evaluation of the facts and circumstances of the violation described in the Notice, in

terms of the application of NRC rules and procedures as we understand them.

o Enclosure III responds to the proposed civil penalty, and

, includes a check in full payment.

In summary, we recognize the importance of ensuring against errors that may lead to failure'of critical safety equipment.

However, _ as discussed in Enclosures II and III, SCE does not believe the civil penalty was appropriate'or warranted by the facts and circumstances of the violation-described in the

notice, and we have provided our-evaluation in this respect for l your information. Nevertheless, we do not believe the.expendi-ture-of further resources in pursuing this matter is warranted and, therefore, we are not protesting the proposed civil penalty.

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Mr. James M. Taylor Page 2 January 17, 1986 Subscribed on the /7 day of ovo , 1986.

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Subsc (bed and sworn to before me on this /7 day of _su m , 1986.

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Enclosures cc: John B. Martin, Region V (NRC)

R. Huey, Senior Resident Inspector I

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ENCLOSURE I Response to Notice of Violation (10 CFR 2.201)

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.201, this enclosure provides the Southern California Edison Company (SCE) response to the Notice of Violation forwarded by NRC letter dated December 18, 1985.

The Notice of Violation states in part:

"10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI states:

" Measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, Jefective material and equip-ment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected. In the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition. The identification of the significant condition adverse to quality, the cause of the condition, and the corrective action taken shall be documented and reported to appropriate levels of management.

" Southern California Edison Topical Quality Assurance Manual, Chapter 1-F states in part:

"A system shall be established, implemented and con-trolled by written procedures to assure that conditions adverse to quality are identified, documented, evalu-ated, and corrected and that action is taken to prevent recurrence of the condition.

" Station Procedure S0123-XV-5.0, paragraph 6.3.1, which defines nonconforming material, states in part:

"Any individual may identify a possible condition adverse to quality, through either their first-line supervisor or the Quality Assurance Organization. It is the responsibility of these supervisory personnel to evaluate the reported condition and take appropriate action based upon the evaluation.

" Contrary to the above, when foreign material was found in the Unit 1 turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump oil sight glass on February 22, 1985, and again on August 6, 1985, the condition of the sight glass was not identified as a signif-icant condition adverse to quality even though proper lubrication is essential to the reliable operation of the pump. The causes of the condition and the corrective

2 actions taken by supervision were not documented. Supervi-sory personnel did not adequately evaluate the condition nor were appropriate actions taken to correct the problem. In fact, an improper and unauthorized repair of the sight glass was made by a maintenance supervisor on August 6, 1985, which resulted in the failure of the Unit 1 turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump when called upon to operate September 19, 1985.

"This is a Severity Level III violation (Supplement I)."

(1) Admission or Denial of the Alleged Violation SCE admits that, when forc'.gn material was found in the turbine-driven auxiliary feecsater pump (TD AFWP) oil sight glass in February, and again in August, 1985 that the condition of the sight glass was not identified as a signif-icant condition adverse to quality, that the causes of the condition and the corrective actions taken by supervision were not documented, and that supervisory personnel did not

! adequately evaluate the condition or take appropriate actions to correct the prob--lem. SCE also admits that an improper and unauthorized repair of the sight glass was made by a maintenance supervisor on August 6, 1985, and that this created conditions which resulted in the subsequent failure of the TD AFWP on September 19, 1985.

As discussed in a separate enclosure, SCE does not consider that this is a Severity Level III violation.

(2) Reasons for the Violation (a) With respect to the events in February 1985, the discovery of the foreign material in the TD AFWP sight glass was not clearly described on the preventive maintenance (PM) maintenance order (MO) that was controlling the work at the time. Instead, the crafts-man made an ambiguous reference to the condition of the sight glass, as an addition to his description of a problem with the pump packing gland. (The reference was ambiguous in that it could.be interpreted by reviewing supervision as indicating that the condition of the sight glass had been corrected in the. course.of the PM.)

The description of both items was followed by the notation that a deficiency tag (DT) had been hung.

Evidently the DT only described the problem with the l pump packing gland because the corrective maintenance (CM) MO that was written based on the DT omitted any reference to the sight glass.

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3 In summary, although discovery of a problem with the sight glass was documented on the PM MO, the as-left condition was not described clearly on either the MO or on the DT. As a result, the condition remained until the next PM was performed in August. During the intervening period, the TD AFWP was routinely operated and performed normally.

(b) With respect to the events in August 1985, the foreign material was again identified during routine PM. This time, involvement of an SCE foreman (first-level supervisor) was requested by the craftsman performing the work. The foreman removed the foreign material, but this resulted in oil weepage from the sight glass. (The foreign material was a hardened, putty-like substance that had evidently been used at some time in the past to increase the pressure exerted by the screw cap on the top of the sight glass tube, so as to provide a more effective seal at the bottom gasket.)

The foreman recognized that the removal of the foreign material from the screw cap had reduced the force exerted on the sight glass tube, resulting in weepage from the bottom gasket. In order to evaluate this further, he fashioned a substitute for the material he had removed, using a piece of foam rubber, and inserted it between the screw cap and the top of the glass tube. This was intended to be a temporary measure. However, when the sight glass continued to weep oil slightly, and DTs were created to prmride for CM to stop the weepage, he lef t the piece of foam rubber in place. He stated subsequently that he expected the CM to occur shortly, but he failed to fcllow up to ensure this did occur.

Instead, the CM MO was initiated but work was deferred, and the TD AFWP was returned to-service with the piece of foam rubber remaining in place. (Minor sight glass weepage was evaluated as not affecting pump operability.) Subsequently, the piece of foam rubber evidently fell to the bottom of the sight glass result-ing in plugging the passage to the oil reservoir and yielding a false level indication. Following prolonged operation of the pump, the oil in the reservoir was consumed to the point that it provided inadequate lubrication to its associated bearing after a few minutes of operation on September 19.

In summary, the improper and unauthorized repair resulted when, what was intended by the foreman as a temporary measure, remained in place after the TD AFWP was returned to service. Although the sight glass was identified on a DT (and resulting CM MO) as weeping oil, I

the insertion of the piece of foam rubber was not documented.

4 (3) Corrective Steps Which Have Been Taken and the Results Achieved Failure to adequately document and evaluate the identi-fication of foreign material in the sight glass in February, and again in August, and leaving the piece of foam rubber in place when the pump was returned to service, are contrary to San Onofre maintenance policies and procedures and contrary to training provided to all personnel. .The lessons learned from this experience have been summarized and fully communi-cated to all concerned. In addition, the SCE Chief Executive Officer addressed all SCE management and supervi-sion at San Onofre concerning the necessity to ensure against any similar failures.

The foreman who performed the unauthorized repair readily volunteered what he had done after the pump failed on September 19, and he accepted full responsibility for violation of San Onofre maintenance policies and procedures. His actions have been evaluated as an isolated failure to follow those policies and procedures.

Disciplinary action has been taken, and he has been assigned to non-supervisory duties. The craftsman who initially identified the sight glass condition during PM in August has also received disciplinary action for failure to properly document and report the associated deficiencies.

As a consequence of these corrective steps, the impor-1 tance of consistent attention to detail, and of full compliance with maintenance policies and procedures, has been emphasized to all personnel.

(4) Corrective Steps Which Will Be Taken to Avoid Further Violations SCE has given careful consideration to measures that would further minimize the incidence of isolated failure to follow policies and procedures, as occurred in this instance, and would mitigate their effect if they do occur.

We have developed a formalized program to oversee plant material condition on an ongoing basis. This is identified as the Area Monitoring Program (AMP), and a description is included in a letter from Mr. H. B. Ray (SCE) to Mr. John B.

Martin (NRC-Region V) dated November 6, 1985.

We believe the AMP will supplement existing management and supervisory surveillance and provide for more systematic oversight of matters such as timely correction of deficien-

.cies and the early identification of conditions potentially adverse to quality. In addition, it will ensure that the activities of the cognizant system engineers are effectively integrated and utilized to prevent the development of problems, i

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It is intended that the AMP will be fully implemented for all three units by April 1986.

(5) Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved Full compliance was achieved on September 23, 1985, when the TD AFWP was properly repaired, tested and returned to service.

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ENCLOSURE II Evaluation of Facts and Circumstances of Violation The Southern California Edison (SCE) response to the Notice of Violation required by 10 CFR 2.201 is provided in a separate enclosure. The response indicates that SCE does not consider that the violation should be assigned to Severity Level III. Our evaluation of the facts and circumstances of the violation, in terms of the application of NRC rules and procedures as we understand them, ic provided below.

BACKGROUND 10 CFR 2, Appendix C, " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," includes the following provisions considered pertinent to the assignment of Severity Level:

o Section III, " Severity of Violations" "While examples are provided in Supplements I through VIII for determining the appropriate severity level for violations in each of the eight activity areas, the examples are neither exhaustive nor controlling.

"Each (example) is designed to illustrate the significance which the NRC places on a particular type of violation of NRC requirements. Each of the examples in the supplements is predicated on a violation of a regulatory requirement.

"In each case, the severity of a violation will be characterized at the level best suited to the significance of the particular violation.

"The severity level of a violation may be increased if the circumstances surrounding the matter involve careless disregard of requirements, deception or other indications of willfulness. The term ' willfulness' as used here embraces a spectrum of violations ranging from deliberate intent to violate or falsify to and including careless disregard for requirements. W111 fulness does not include acts which do not rise to the level of careless disregard, e.g. inadver-tent citrical errors in a document submitted to the NRC. In i determining the specific severity level of a violation involving wi11 fulness, consideration will be given to such factors as the position of the person involved in the violation (e.g., first-line supervisor or senior manager),

the significance of any underlying violation, the intent of l the violator (i.e., negligence not amounting to careless disregard, or deliberateness), and the economic advantage, if any, gained as a result of the violation."

2 o Section VII, Responsibilities

...In recognition that the regulation of nuclear activities in many cases does not lend itself to a mechanistic treatment, the Director, IE or the Regional Administrator must exercise judgment and discretion in determining the severity levels of the violations and the appropriate enforcement sanctions, including the decision to impose a civil penalty and the amount of such penalty, after i considering the general principles of this statement of policy and the technical significance of the violations and i

the surrounding circumstances."

o Supplement I - Severity Categories, Reactor Operations "C. Severity III - Violations involving for example:

"2. A system designed to prevent or mitigate a serious safety event not being able to perform its intended function under certain conditions (e.g., safety system not operable unless offsite power is available; materials or components not environmentally qualified)

" Note 7: ' Intended safety function' means the total safety function, and is not directed toward a loss of redundancy. For example, considering a BWR's high pressure ECCS capability, the violation must result in complete invalidation of both HPCI and ADS subsystems. A loss of one subsystem does not defeat the intended safety function as long as the other subsystem is operable.

"D. Severity IV - Violations involving for example:

"3. Failure to meet regulatory requirements that have more than minor safety or environmental significance."

The NRC Inspection and Enforcement Manual, Chapter 0400,

" Enforcement Program," dated April 24, 1985, includes the following additional provisions considered pertinent to the assignment of Severity Level:

o Section 0400-03, Definitions "03.09 Wi11 fulness An attitude toward compliance with regulations that ranges from the careless disregard for requirements to the deliberate intent to violate or falsify. Does not include acts which do not rise to the level of careless disregard, e.g., inadvertent clerical errors."

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3 o Section 0400-05, The Enforcement Process "05.03 b. 3. Is the violation an isolated incident or is it indicative of a programmatic breakdown? Programmatic breakdowns should be evaluated at higher severity levels than if they are isolated incidents.

"05.03 b. 4. Was management aware of or involved in the violation and to what extent? Violations in which management was directly involved are more significant than those of which management was unaware. Violations involving upper level management should be considered more significant than those involving first-line supervisors. Inattentiveness on the part of management should also be considered.

"05.03 c. The Supplements contained in the Policy provide guidance for the determination of severity levels.

If a violation fits an example contained in a Supplement, it should be evaluated at that severity level. If a region believes a different severity level should be assigned, and the violation fits an example of a Severity Level III or higher, consultation with IE is required, unless the type of violation is specifically covered by this Chapter. If a violation does not fit an example, it should be assigned a severity level commensurate with its significance."

DISCUSSION The facts and circumstances involved in the violation are summarized in a separate enclosure in response to the Notice and are described in more detail in a letter from Mr. H. B. Ray (SCE) to Mr. John B. Martin (NRC-Region V) dated November 6, 1985.

Based on the fact that the failure of the turbine-driven auxili-ary feedwater pump (TD AFWP) on September 19 due to inadequate bearing lubrication did not result in the auxiliary feedwater system being unable to perform its " intended safety function,"

and that it only represented a " loss of redundancy" or " loss of one subsystem," absent any other consideration, the event would appear not to constitute a Severity Level III violation, pursuant to Note 7 of 10CFR2, Appendix C, Supplement I.

The motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump was operable and performed normally in response to the auto-start signal on September 19. It was available to be operated (along with the two motor-driven main feedwater pumps) from either onsite or offsite power, if required. (Note: Design basis requirements do not include concurrent loss of both onsite and offsite power.) A total of three safety-grade pumps remained available to provide feedwater to the steam generators.

4 The violation appears to meet the provision of Section 05.03

c. of the enforcement manual in that it fits one of the examples in the Policy Supplement. (i.e., It is excluded from Severity Level III because the event was limited to a loss of redundancy or loss of one subsystem.) SCE does not believe a basis exists

for raising the Severity Level from IV (i.e., a failure to meet regulatory requirements that has more than minor safety signifi-cance) to III under either the general or specific provisions identified above, or under any other provisions of the enforcement program.

In 03rti"ular, we do not believe the facts or circumstances of the violation indicate wi11 fulness or careless disregard. On the contrary, we believe the violation in August 1985 resulted from isolated, inadvertent personnel error. (See note below.)

Also, we do not believe the facts and circumstances indicate a programmatic breakdown. The fact that a separate, but related, deficient condition was documented in February, and not corrected until August, is the result of an unclear description of the condition; not a programmatic breakdown.

Finally, we believe the facts and circumstances of this violation fit all of the five criteria of 10CFR2, Appendix C, Section V.A. under which a notice of violation would generally i

not be issued.

To summarize, it dcas not appear to SCE that an isolated maintenance error, whict results in the subsequent failure of a single component in a redundant system, is intended by tLa NRC to be assigned to Severity Level III, abcent specific aggravating conditions.

Note: ANS-3.2/ ANSI N 18.7-1976, Administrative Controls and Quality Assurance for the Operational Phase of Nuclear Power Plants Section 5.2.7 entitled, " Maintenance and Modifications" states: " Skills normally possessed by qualified maintenance personnel may not require detailed

, step-by-step delineations in a written procedure."

Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Rev. 2, Section 9 entitled, " Procedures for Performing Maintenance,"

states: "The following types of activities are among those t hat may not require detailed step-by-step written procedures: (1) Gasket Replacement...." Therefore, the action taken by the foreman to fashion and insert the piece of foam rubber as a temporary measure to further evaluate the sight glass weepage, is not by itself a

, violation of regulatory requirements. The failure to l follow San Onofre maintenance policies and procedures is a violation.

ENCLOSURE III Response to Proposed Civil Penalty The Southern California Edison (SCE) response to the Notice of Violation required by 10 CFR 2.201 is provided in a separate enclosure. Also, the SCE evaluation of the Severity Level assigned to the violation is provided in a separate enclosure.

Our response to the proposed civil penalty is provided below.

BACKGROUND 10 CFR 2, Appendix C, " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," includes the following provisions considered pertinent to the determination of a proposed Civil Penalty:

o Section V.B., " Civil Penalty" "A civil penalty is a monetary penalty that may be

imposed for violation of

(a) Certain specified licensing

provisions of the Atomic Energy Act or supplementary NRC 4 rules or orders,...

" Generally, civil penalties...are considered for Severity Level III violations, and may be imposed for Severity Level-IV violations that are similar to previous violations for

_ which the licensee did not take effective corrective action.

"The word 'similar,' as used in this policy, refers to i those violations which could have been reasonably expected to have been prevented by the licensee's corrective action for the previous violation.

"...After considering all relevant circumstances, adjustments to (the base civil penalties) may be made for the factors described below: i i

"1. Prompt Identification and Reporting...

! "2. Corrective Action to Prevent Recyrrence...

i "3. Past Performance. Reduction ny as much as 100% of the base civil penalty shown in Table-1 may be given for prior good performance in the general area of concern. On the other hund, the base civil penalty

may be increased as much as 100% for prior poor j performance in the general area of concern.

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2 "In weighing this factor, consideration will be given to, among other things, the effectiveness of previous corrective action for similar problems, overall performance such as Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) evaluations for power reactors, and prior enforcement history including Severity Level IV and V violations in the area of concern. For example, failure to implement previous corrective action for prior similar problems may result in an increase in the civil penalty.

"4. Prior Notice of Similar event...

"S. Multiple Occurrences..."

o Section VII, Responsibilities

"...In recognition that the regulation of nuclear activities in many cases does not lend itself to a mechanistic treatment, the Director, IE or the Regional Administrator must exercise judgment and discretion in determining the severity levels of the violations and the appropriate enforcement sanctions, including the decision to impose a civil penalty and the amount of such penalty, after considering the general principles of this statement of policy and the technical significance of the violations and surrounding circumstances."

10 CFR 2, Statements of Consideration, published in the Federal Register March 9, 1982, indicates that the enforcement policy is being adopted as a statement of general policy, and that discretion to tailor enforcement to the particular factual situation is intended. However, it also states that:

o "In drafting the statement it was expected that the specific enforcement criteria should provide adequate guidance and be applied in the majority of circumstances requiring enforcement actions.

The NRC Inspection and Enforcement Manual, Chapter 0400,

" Enforcement Program," dated April 24, 1985, includes the following i

additional provisions considered pertinent to the proposal of a civil penalty in this instance:

j o Section 0400-05, The Enforcement Process l

l "05.06 c. 3. Past Performance This factor may be used to

! increase or decrease the amount of a civil penalty.

Consideration of p&st performance should include SALP ratings and similar violations over the past two years.

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3 "05.06 c. 7. Use of Discretion The Policy stresses the use of discretion in enforcement actions. Clearly the intent of the Policy is to allow the staff latitude to tailor each sanction to the unique situation of each case, rather than to prescribe an inflexible process for determining a civil penalty amount. However, staff should be aware of precedents and attempt to ensure that the policy is applied uniformly throughout the country."

DISCUSSION As discussed in a separate enclosure, SCE's evaluation of the facts and circumstances of this violation indicate that assignment of Severity Level III is not consistent with the NRC Enforcement Policy and associated guidance. Also, in the absence of a cause for increasing the level of severity, ample bases exist for not issuing a Notice of Violation. In the event a Severity Level IV Notice of Violation had been issued, this violation would not meet the definition of "similar" in 10 CFR 2, Appendix C, Section V.B, and no civil penalty would have been appropriate.

Assuming a Severity Level III violation is determined to be appropriate, contrary to SCE's evaluation, and that a base civil penalty of $50,000 is considered appropriate, then SCE believes that mitigation should have been granted in accordance with the Policy and guidance. The NRC letter dated December 18, 1985, which forwards the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty to SCE, includes the following statement:

"We recognize that you acted promptly after identifying the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump failure in

_eporting the occurrence to the NRC and directing a timely investigation into the cause of the failure. We considered mitigation of the penalty on the basis of these actions.

However, in view of your prior poor performance related to maintenance activities and post-maintenance operability verification as evidenced by a Notice of Violation dated April 19, 1985, we have determined that no mitigation is appropriate."

With respect to maintenance activities, we believe the record does not indicate prior poor performance. To the contrary, we believe the criteria established in the Policy and related guidance, as indicated in the Background above and elsewhere, would lead to the finding that prior performance in the area of maintenance activities has been superior.

With respect to post-maintenance operability verification, we do not believe the current violation, involving what became an improper and unauthorized repair that created conditions which resulted in the subsequent failure of the pump, is related to the

4 general area of post-maintenance operability verification whatsoever. To the contrary, the pump was subjected to its full post-maintenance operability verification test, and it passed successfully. (It was also operated extensively following its return to service and prior to its failure.)

It is important that the concept of " general area of concern" discussed in the Policy and guidance be clear, in order to have meaning in the measurement of progress and the effectiveness of corrective action. The April 19, 1985, Notice of Violation referenced did pertain to the lack of documentation concerning a post-maintenance operability verification following maintenance of the containment personnel escape airlock in November 1984. We believe that our corrective action and performance in this area has been effective, and that the referenced Notice of Violation should have no bearing on mitigation of a civil penalty that might be proposed in the case of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump.

Finally, although it was not specifically noted in the comment from the NRC letter quoted above, we believe that corrective action to prevent recurrence, taken by SCE in response to the pump failure, was prompt and extensive by any measure, and should also be considered as a basis for mitigation.

CONCLUSION In summary, SCE concludes that the violation should not have resulted in a proposed civil penalty, and, assuming the NRC considers a base civil penalty warranted, mitigation would be appropriate and indicated by the Enforcement Policy and related guidance. We are concerned that imposing a civil penalty in this instance is inappropriate and that it conveys to all of the personnel involved in the operation and maintenance of San Onofre an incorrect indication of their performance. Although SCE will continue to make every effort to ensure that-its personnel are thoroughly self-critical and committed to disciplined attention to every detail, it is important that inappropriate enforcement action by the NRC not lead to the conclusion that there is no prospect that continuing improvement in their performance will be recognized.

SCE also concludes that protest of the proposed civil penalty is not warranted, and that our focus should remain on maintaining excellence in our future performance. Accordingly, a check in the amount of $50,000 is herewith attached, in full payment.

7799u Attachment i

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