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{{Adams|number = ML102100150}} | {{Adams | ||
| number = ML102100150 | |||
| issue date = 07/29/2010 | |||
| title = IR 05000293-10-003, on 04/01/10 - 06/30/10; Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station; Flood Protection Measures | |||
| author name = Jackson D E | |||
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB5 | |||
| addressee name = Bronson K | |||
| addressee affiliation = Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc | |||
| docket = 05000293 | |||
| license number = DPR-035 | |||
| contact person = Jackson, D E RI/DRP/PB5/610-337-5306 | |||
| document report number = IR-10-003 | |||
| document type = Inspection Report, Letter | |||
| page count = 50 | |||
}} | |||
{{IR-Nav| site = 05000293 | year = 2010 | report number = 003 }} | {{IR-Nav| site = 05000293 | year = 2010 | report number = 003 }} | ||
=Text= | =Text= | ||
{{#Wiki_filter: PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION -NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000293/2010003 | {{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 475 ALLENDALE KING OF PRUSSIA, PA July 29 t 2010 Mr. Kevin Bronson Site Vice President Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 600 Rocky Hill Road Plymouth, MA 02360-5508 PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION -NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000293/2010003 | ||
==Dear Mr. Bronson:== | ==Dear Mr. Bronson:== | ||
On June 30, 2010, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS). The enclosed inspection report documents the results, which were discussed on July 1.3, 2010, with you and members of your staff. The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations, and with the Gonditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. The report documents one NRC identified finding of very low safety significance (Green). Additionally, a licensee-identified violation, which was determined to be of very low safety significance, is listed in this report. However, because of the very low safety significance and because it is entered into your corrective action program (CAP), the NRC is treating this as a non-cited violation (NCV), consistent with Section | On June 30, 2010, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS). The enclosed inspection report documents the results, which were discussed on July 1.3, 2010, with you and members of your staff. The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations, and with the Gonditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. | ||
The report documents one NRC identified finding of very low safety significance (Green). Additionally, a licensee-identified violation, which was determined to be of very low safety significance, is listed in this report. However, because of the very low safety significance and because it is entered into your corrective action program (CAP), the NRC is treating this as a non-cited violation (NCV), consistent with Section VLA 1 of the NRC's Enforcement Policy. If you contest any NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the baSis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Senior Resident Inspector at PNPS. In addition, if you disagree with the cross-cutting aspect assigned to the finding in this report. you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region I, and the NRC Senior Resident Inspector at PNPS. I In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice, II a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.govlreading-rm/adams.html(the Public Electronic Reading Room). ;JI:iJr Donald E. Jack 0 Projects Branc Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-293 License No. DPR-35 | |||
===Enclosure:=== | ===Enclosure:=== | ||
Line 18: | Line 34: | ||
===w/Attachment:=== | ===w/Attachment:=== | ||
Supplemental Information Distribution w/encl: M. Dapas, Acting RA (R10RAMAIL RESOURCE) T. Setzer, DRP D. Lew, Acting DRA (R10RAMAIL RESOURCE) J. Heinly, DRP J. Clifford, R1DRPMAIL. RESOURCE) M. Schneider, DRP, SRI D. Collins, DRP (R1DRPMAIL RESOURCE) 8. Smith, DRP, RI A. Ford, DRP, Resident | Supplemental Information Distribution w/encl: M. Dapas, Acting RA (R10RAMAIL RESOURCE) | ||
1 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I Docket No: 50-293 License No: DPR-35 Report No: 05000293/2010003 Licensee: Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. Facility: Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) Location: 600 Rocky Hill Road Plymouth, MA 02360 Inspection Period: April 1, 2010 through June 30, 2010 Inspectors: M. Schneider, Senior Resident Inspector, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP) B. Smith, Resident Inspector, DRP S. Rich, Reactor Inspector. DRP J. Schoppy. Senior Reactor Inspector, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS) R. Rolph, Health PhYSicist, DRS J. Richmond, Senior Reactor Inspector, DRS D. Molteni, Operator Licensing Inspector, DRS S. Pindale, Senior Reactor Inspector, DRS M. Balazik, Reactor Inspector, DRS C. Williams. Reactor Inspector. DRS Approved By: Donald E. Jackson. Chief Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure TABLE OF | T. Setzer, DRP D. Lew, Acting DRA (R10RAMAIL RESOURCE) | ||
J. Heinly, DRP J. Clifford, R1DRPMAIL. | |||
RESOURCE) | |||
M. Schneider, DRP, SRI D. Collins, DRP (R1DRPMAIL RESOURCE) | |||
8. Smith, DRP, RI A. Ford, DRP, Resident OA D. Roberts, DRS (R1DRSMail RESOURCE) | |||
RidsNrrPMPilgrim Resource P. Wifson, (R1 DRSMail RESOURCE) | |||
RidsNrrDorlLPL 1-1 l. Trocine, RI OEDO ROPreports.Resource@nrc.gov D. Jackson, DRP SUNSI Review Complete: | |||
_-..!..TCl:!:!S"'-- | |||
__(Reviewer's Initials) | |||
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DRP\BRANCH5\Reports\Orafts\PilgrimIR201 0003 revO. docm ML 102100150 After declaring this document "An Official Agency Record" it will be releasecilo the Public. To receive a copy of this document, Indicate in the box: "0" = Copy without attachment/enclosure "E" =Copy with attachmenllenctosure "N" =No copy OFFICE RIIDRP I'hp RIIDRP I RIIDRP I NAME MSchneider/tcs for TSetzer/tcs OJackson/dej DATE 07/27/10 07/27/10 07/28/10 OFFICIAL RECORD COpy I' | |||
1 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I Docket No: 50-293 License No: DPR-35 Report No: 05000293/2010003 Licensee: | |||
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. Facility: | |||
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) Location: | |||
600 Rocky Hill Road Plymouth, MA 02360 Inspection Period: April 1, 2010 through June 30, 2010 Inspectors: | |||
M. Schneider, Senior Resident Inspector, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP) B. Smith, Resident Inspector, DRP S. Rich, Reactor Inspector. | |||
DRP J. Schoppy. Senior Reactor Inspector, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS) R. Rolph, Health PhYSicist, DRS J. Richmond, Senior Reactor Inspector, DRS D. Molteni, Operator Licensing Inspector, DRS S. Pindale, Senior Reactor Inspector, DRS M. Balazik, Reactor Inspector, DRS C. Williams. | |||
Reactor Inspector. | |||
DRS Approved By: Donald E. Jackson. Chief Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure TABLE OF | |||
=SUMMARY OF FINDINGS= | =SUMMARY OF FINDINGS= | ||
...........................................................................................................'" ... | ........................................................................................................... | ||
'" ... | |||
=REPORT DETAILS= | =REPORT DETAILS= | ||
==REACTOR SAFETY== | ==REACTOR SAFETY== | ||
....................................................................................................................... | ....................................................................................................................... 1 R01 Adverse Weather Protection | ||
...................................................................... 1 R04 Equipment Alignment. | |||
.......................... | |||
., ....... , ............................................. 1 R05 Fire Protection | |||
........................................................................................... 1 R06 Flood Protection Measures .. ., ....., .............................................................. 1 R07 Heat Sink Performance | |||
.............................................................................. 1 R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program ............................................ | |||
{{a|1R12}} | |||
==1R12 Maintenance== | |||
Effectiveness | |||
...................................................................... 1 R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control ................ 1 R15 Operability Evaluations | |||
............................................................................ 1 R18 Plant Modifications | |||
................................................................................... | |||
{{a|1R19}} | |||
==1R19 Post-Maintenance== | |||
Testing ....................................................................... 1 R22 Surveillance Testing ................................................................................. 1EP6 Drill Evaluation | |||
......................................................................................... 2. RADIATION .................................................................................................................. 2RS01 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls | |||
==OTHER ACTIVITIES== | ==OTHER ACTIVITIES== | ||
.................................................................................................................... 40A1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification .................................................... 40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems ............................................... 40A3 Event Follow-up ....................................................................................... 40A5 Other Activities .......................................................................................... 40A6 Meetings, Including Exit ...........................................................................40A7 Licensee-Identified Violations ......................................................... | .................................................................................................................... 40A1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification | ||
.................................................... 40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems ............................................... 40A3 Event Follow-up | |||
....................................................................................... 40A5 Other Activities | |||
.......................................................................................... 40A6 Meetings, Including Exit ...........................................................................40A7 Licensee-Identified Violations | |||
......................................................... | |||
=SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION= | =SUPPLEMENTAL | ||
INFORMATION= | |||
==KEY POINTS OF CONTACT== | ==KEY POINTS OF CONTACT== | ||
........................................................................................................... | ........................................................................................................... | ||
==LIST OF ITEMS== | ==LIST OF ITEMS== | ||
OPENED. CLOSED AND DISCUSSED ............................................................... | OPENED. CLOSED AND DISCUSSED | ||
==LIST OF DOCUMENTS | ............................................................... | ||
..............................................................................................LIST OF ACRONyMS ....................................................................................................................EnClosure | ==LIST OF DOCUMENTS== | ||
REVIEWED ..............................................................................................LIST OF ACRONyMS ....................................................................................................................EnClosure | |||
: SUMMARY OF | : SUMMARY OF | ||
: IR 05000293/2010003; 04/01/2010-06/30/2010; Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station; Flood Protection Measures. The report covered a three-month period of inspection by the resident inspector staff and region based inspectors. One Green finding was identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC} 0609, "Significance Determination Process." The cross-cutting aspect for the finding was determined using | : IR 05000293/2010003; | ||
: 04/01/2010-06/30/2010; | |||
: Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station; Flood Protection Measures. | |||
: The report covered a three-month period of inspection by the resident inspector staff and region based inspectors. | |||
: One Green finding was identified. | |||
: The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC} 0609, "Significance Determination Process." The cross-cutting aspect for the finding was determined using | |||
: IMC 0310, "Components Within The Cross-Cutting Areas." Findings for which the significance determination process does riot apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in | : IMC 0310, "Components Within The Cross-Cutting Areas." Findings for which the significance determination process does riot apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in | ||
: NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006. Cornerstone: Initiating Events Green. The inspectors identified a Green finding (FIN) for improper maintenance of underground non-safety related medium voltage electric cables. The inspectors identified that Entergy allowed non-safety related medium voltage cables to remain submerged in water for extended periods of time. Entergyentered this issue into their Corrective Action Program (CAP), and specified corrective actions to identify all underground medium voltage cables included under the Cable Reliability Program, and to identify which manholes should have dewatering capability. The inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone, and affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, continued submergence of the non-safety related power cables (from the start-up transformer to electrical buses A2 and A4) could lead to cable failure and cause an event that would affect plant stability. The inspectors performed a Phase 1 Significance Determination Process screening of the finding in accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, "Phase 1 -Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because the condition did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the unavailability of mitigating systems equipment. The inspectors determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Problem Identification and Resolution cross-cutting area, Corrective Action Program component, because Entergy personnel did not thoroughly evaluate the problem when submerged cabling was initially identified [P.1(c}]. (Section | : NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006. Cornerstone: | ||
.1 REPORT DETAILS Summary of Plant Status Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) began the inspection period operating at 100 percent power. On May 1,2010, operators reduced power to 56 percent in response to the "8" Feedwater Regulating Valve (FRV) drifting closed. The valve was manually locked and Pilgrim returned to 100 percent power later the same day. On May 20,2010, operators reduced power to 50 percent power for a backwash of the main condenser and to support troubleshooting of the "8" FRV. Pi/grim returned to 100 percent power on May 21,2010. following successful repairs to the "8" FRV. On May 24, 2010, operators reduced power to 49 percent power for a second backwash of the main condenser. Pilgrim returned to 100 percent power later the same day. On May 27, 2010. operators reduced power to 80 percent for a control rod pattern adjustment and returned to 100 percent power !ater the same day. Operators maintained the reactor at or near 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period. 1. REACTOR SAFETY Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01) Seasonal Readiness a. Inspection Scope (1 sample) The inspectors performed a review of severe weather preparations during the week of May 13, 2010, to evaluate the site's readiness for the onset of hurricane season, including the readiness of three risk-significant systems, which included the intake structure, the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) and the Station Blackout (SBO) Diesel Generator. The inspection examined selected equipment and supporting structures to determine if they were configured in accordance with Entergy procedures and if adequate controls were in place to ensure functionality of the systems. The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the intake structure, the EDG enclosures, and the SBO enclosure to determine the adequacy of equipment protection from the effects of hurricanes. The documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. b. Findings No findings were identified. | : Initiating Events Green. The inspectors identified | ||
.2 Grid Stability* Alternating Current (AC) Power System Readiness a. Inspection Scope (1 sample) The inspectors performed a review of Entergy's offsite and onsite AC power system readiness for susceptibilities during adverse weather. The inspectors reviewed Entergy's plant features and procedures for operation and continued availability of offsite and onsite AC power systems to determine if they were appropriate. The inspection focused on procedures affecting these areas and communication protocols between the transmisSion system operator (TSO) and Entergy to verify that appropriate information would be exchanged when issues arise that could impact the offsite power system. The inspectors also reviewed Entergy's procedures to ensure that they addressed actions to be taken when notified by the TSO to transfer safety-related loads to the onsite power supply, compensatory actions to be performed if it were not possible to predict grid conditions, and reassessment of plant risk based on maintenance activities which could affect grid reliability. The documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. b. Findings No findings were identi'fied. | a Green finding (FIN) for improper maintenance of underground non-safety related medium voltage electric cables. The inspectors identified that Entergy allowed non-safety related medium voltage cables to remain submerged in water for extended periods of time. Entergyentered this issue into their Corrective Action Program (CAP), and specified corrective actions to identify all underground medium voltage cables included under the Cable Reliability Program, and to identify which manholes should have dewatering capability. | ||
.2 Complete System Walkdowns (71111.04S) a. Inspection Scope (1 sample) The inspeCtors completed a detailed review of the "B" Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) system to assess the functional capability of the system. The inspectors performed a walkdown of the system to determine whether the critical components, such as valves and circuit breakers, were aligned in accordance with operating procedures, and to assess the material condition of valves, piping, and seismic supports. The inspectors discussed system health with the system engineer, reviewed the system's Maintenance Rule status, and performed a review of outstanding maintenance work orders to determine whether the deficiencies significantly affected the "8" RBCCW system function. The inspectors also reviewed condition reports from the past year to determine whether "B" RBCCW equipment problems were being identified and appropriately resolved. The documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment. b. Findings No findings were identified. | : The inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone, and affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. | ||
.2 Annual Fire Drill Observation (71111.05A) a. Inspection Scope (1 sample) The inspectors observed an announced fire drill in the Operations and Maintenance Building Weld Shop Area. The fire drill was performed in accordance with procedure | : Specifically, continued submergence of the non-safety related power cables (from the start-up transformer to electrical buses A2 and A4) could lead to cable failure and cause an event that would affect plant stability. | ||
: EN-TQ-125, Revision 0, "Fire Brigade Drills." The inspectors observed performance of the fire brigade personnel to determine whether Entergy's fire fighting pre-plan strategies were utilized, the pre-planned drill scenario was followed, and the drill objectives were met. The inspectors observed the drill to verify that protective clothing and breathing apparatus were donned: sufficient fire fighting equipment was brought to the scene; the fire brigade leader's fire fighting directions were clear: and communications with the plant operators and between fire brigade members were effective. The inspectors observed the drill critique to determine whether areas to improve fire brigade performance were identified. Additional documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment. b. Findings No findings were identified. | : The inspectors performed | ||
: EN-DC-346, Revision 0, "Cable Reliability Program," was issued and effective on December 31, 2009. This procedure discusses manhole inspections and dewatering, and requires, in part, "If manual inspections and pumping are used to maintain a cable system dry, the intervals must be sufficient to keep the cables dry. Adjust intervals as necessary, based on inspection results." Discussions with Entergy personnel involved with these inspections indicated that cables in Manhole 2A were periodically found submerged or partially submerged, and that cables in Manholes 4 and 5 were always found submerged. The cables that were submerged included cables that were installed from the 4160V, non-safety related startup . transformer and connected to the A2 and A4 non-safety related busses. The inspectors identified that Entergy had previously identified submerged cables in August and September of 2009, however, corrective actions were not sufficient to preclude these cables from being submerged. The inspectors also determined that Entergy had not implemented the Cable Reliability Program guidance in a timely manner to ensure that the degrading effects of this environmental condition were minimized (Le., pumping intervals were not sufficient to maintain the cables dry). Entergy generated Condition Report (CR) | a Phase 1 Significance Determination Process screening of the finding in accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment | ||
: CR-PNp*2010*1529, and specified actions to identify a\l underground medium voltage cables included in the Cable Reliability Program, and to identify which manholes should have dewatering capability. Entergy also created a corrective action to increase the frequency of the dewatering activities for these areas. In addition, the Electric Power Research Institute has generated a cable testing database that will be used to compare the test results of cables that have been removed from service to evaluate the potential for degradation of in-service cables. Analysis: The inspectors determined that allowing medium voltage cables to remain submerged for extended periods of time was a performance deficiency. The cause of the issue was within Entergy's ability to foresee and correct, and should have been prevented. Traditional Enforcement did not apply, as the issue did not have actual or potential safety consequence, had no willful aspects, nor did it impact the NRC's ability to perform its regulatory function. A review of NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, Appendix E, "Minor Examples," revealed that no minor examples were applicable to this finding. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone, and affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically. continued submergence of the safety related power cables (from the start-up transformer to electrical buses A2 and A4) Enclosure could lead to cable failure and cause an event that would affect plant stability. The inspectors performed a Phase 1 Significance Determination Process screening of the finding in accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachmenl 4, "Phase 1 -Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because the condition did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the unavailability of mitigating systems equipment. The inspectors determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Problem Identification and Resolution cross-cutting area, Corrective Action Program component, because Entergy personnel did not thoroughly evaluate the problem when submerged cabling was initially identified | : 4, "Phase 1 -Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because the condition did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the unavailability of mitigating systems equipment. | ||
: IP.1(c)]. Enforcement: This finding does not involve enforcement action because no regulatory requirement violation was identified. Because this finding does not involve a violation and has very low safety significance, it is identified as | : The inspectors determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Problem Identification and Resolution cross-cutting area, Corrective Action Program component, because Entergy personnel did not thoroughly evaluate the problem when submerged cabling was initially identified | ||
: FIN 0500029312010003-01 t Submerged Medium Voltage Cables. 1 R07 Heat Sink Performance (71111.07T) a. Inspection Scope (2 samples) Based on a plant specific risk assessment, previous inspections, recent operational experience, and resident inspector input, the inspector selected the following heat sink samples: Operation and performance testing of the salt service water(SSW) system; and Performance of the ultimate heat sink (UHS), which included SSW piping integrity and SSW intake structure functionality. The SSW system was designed to function as the UHS for all the systems cooled by the RBCCW and turbine building closed cooling water (TBCCW) systems during all operating modes by continuously providing adequate cooling water flow to the RBCCW and TBCCW heat exchangers. The inspectors reviewed the SSW system design to evaluate the adequacy of system monitoring and performance testing. The inspectors reviewed a sample of SSW pump and valve performance tests, system health and walkdown reports, and in*service test vibration monitoring results for adverse trends and to verify that the system functioned as designed. The inspectors verified that Entergy performed the pump and valve in-service tests in accordance with American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code requirements. In addition, the inspectors reviewed Entergy's monitoring, maintenance, and testing of interface valves between related SSW and non-safety related or non-seismic piping systems to ensure that adequate SSW flow is available post-accident consistent with design basis assumptions. The inspectors reviewed Entergy's buried pipe inspection and monitoring program to independently assess the condition and structural integrity of the SSW piping. The inspectors reviewed a sample of SSW pipe nondestructive examination records and videos of underwater inspections of the SSW intake bays to ensure that Entergy appropriately identified and dispositioned any SSW system degradation. The inspectors performed an above ground walkdown of accessible areas containing buried SSW piping Enclosure to look for soil subsidence or other indications of piping leakage and/or degradation. The inspectors also directly observed the condition of SSW piping in the accessible portions of the SSW bays and valve pits. The inspectors reviewed Entergy's procedures for SSW and intake structure operation, abnormal SSW operations, adverse weather conditions, and for a loss of the SSW system. The inspectors verified that Entergy maintained these procedures consistent with their design and licensing basis and that plant operators could reasonably implement the procedures as written. The inspectors independently verified that SSW and intake level instrumentation, which operators rely upon for decision making, was available and functional. The inspectors also reviewed recent SSW and intake area modifications to verify that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of the SSW system had not been degraded by the design changes. The inspectors walked down control room instrument panels, the RBCCW and TBCCW heat exchangers, accessible portions of SSW piping in the auxiliary building, and SSW intake area (including the SSW pumps, spray wash pumps, and traveling water screens) to assess the material condition and configuration control of these structures, systems and components (S5Cs). The inspectors also reviewed a sample of corrective action condition reports (CRs) related to the SSW isolation valves, SSW pumps, and SSW piping integrity to ensure that Entergy appropriately identified, characterized, and corrected problems related to these essential 5SCs. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. b. Findings No findings were identified. | [P.1(c}]. (Section 1 R06) Other Findings A violation of very low safety Significance that was identified by Entergy has been reviewed by the inspectors. | ||
: R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12Q) a. Inspection Scope (3 samples) The inspectors reviewed the three samples listed below for items such as: (1) appropriate work practices; (2) identifying and addressing common cause failures; (3) scoping in accordance with 10 | : Corrective actions taken or planned by Entergy have been entered into Entergy's corrective action program. This violation and corrective action tracking number is listed in Section 40A7 of this report. Enclosure | ||
: CFR 50.65 paragraph (b) of the Maintenance Rule; (4) characterizing reliability issues for performance; (5) trending key parameters for condition monitoring; (6) charging unavailability for performance; (7) classification and reclassification in accordance with 10 | .1 REPORT DETAILS Summary of Plant Status Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) began the inspection period operating at 100 percent power. On May 1,2010, operators reduced power to 56 percent in response to the "8" Feedwater Regulating Valve (FRV) drifting closed. The valve was manually locked and Pilgrim returned to 100 percent power later the same day. On May 20,2010, operators reduced power to 50 percent power for a backwash of the main condenser and to support troubleshooting of the "8" FRV. Pi/grim returned to 100 percent power on May 21,2010. following successful repairs to the "8" FRV. On May 24, 2010, operators reduced power to 49 percent power for a second backwash of the main condenser. | ||
: CFR 50.65 paragraph (a)(1) or (a)(2); and (8) appropriateness of performance criteria for structures, systems, and components (SSCs)/functions classified as paragraph (a)(2) and/or appropriateness and adequacy of goals and corrective actions for SSCs/functions classified as paragraph (aX1). The documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment. Items reviewed included the following: Loop "B" Salt Service Water Flow Indicator, Indicating Flow with Flow Control Valve Closed; Air Introduction into Standby Liquid Control System; and Functional Failure Determinations of the Feedwater Regulating Valves (FRV). b. Findings No findings were identified. | : Pilgrim returned to 100 percent power later the same day. On May 27, 2010. operators reduced power to 80 percent for a control rod pattern adjustment and returned to 100 percent power !ater the same day. Operators maintained the reactor at or near 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period. 1. REACTOR SAFETY Cornerstones: | ||
.1 b. Findings No findings were identified. 1 R 15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15) a. Inspection Scope (5 samples) The inspectors reviewed five operability determinations associated with degraded or non-conforming conditions to determine if the operability determination was justified and if the mitigating systems or barriers remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk had occurred. The inspectors also reviewed compensatory measures to determine if the compensatory measures were in place and were appropriately controlled. The inspectors reviewed Entergy's performance against related Technical Specifications and Updated Final Safety Analysis Report requirements. The documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors reviewed the following degraded or non-conforming conditions: | : Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity | ||
: 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection | |||
(71111.01) | |||
: Seasonal Readiness | |||
a. Inspection Scope (1 sample) The inspectors performed | |||
a review of severe weather preparations during the week of May 13, 2010, to evaluate the site's readiness for the onset of hurricane season, including the readiness of three risk-significant systems, which included the intake structure, the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) and the Station Blackout (SBO) Diesel Generator. | |||
: The inspection examined selected equipment and supporting structures to determine if they were configured in accordance with Entergy procedures and if adequate controls were in place to ensure functionality of the systems. The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the intake structure, the EDG enclosures, and the SBO enclosure to determine the adequacy of equipment protection from the effects of hurricanes. | |||
: The documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. | |||
b. Findings No findings were identified. | |||
.2 Grid Stability* | |||
: Alternating Current (AC) Power System Readiness | |||
a. Inspection Scope (1 sample) The inspectors performed | |||
a review of Entergy's offsite and onsite AC power system readiness for susceptibilities during adverse weather. The inspectors reviewed Entergy's plant features and procedures for operation and continued availability of offsite and onsite AC power systems to determine if they were appropriate. | |||
: The inspection focused on procedures affecting these areas and communication protocols between the transmisSion system operator (TSO) and Entergy to verify that appropriate information would be exchanged when issues arise that could impact the offsite power system. The inspectors also reviewed Entergy's procedures to ensure that they addressed actions to be taken when notified by the TSO to transfer safety-related loads to the onsite power supply, compensatory actions to be performed if it were not possible to predict grid conditions, and reassessment of plant risk based on maintenance activities which could affect grid reliability. | |||
: The documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. | |||
b. Findings No findings were identi'fied. | |||
: R04 Equipment Alignment | |||
(71111.04) | |||
.1 Partial System Walkdowns | |||
(71111.040) | |||
a. Inspection Scope (3 samples) The inspectors performed three partial system walkdowns during this inspection period. The inspectors reviewed the documents listed in the Attachment to determine the correct system alignment. | |||
: The inspectors performed | |||
a partial walkdown of each system to determine if the critical portions of the selected systems were correctly aligned in accordance with procedures, and to identify any discrepancies that may have had an effect on operability. | |||
: The walkdowns included selected control switch reviews, valve position checks, and verification of electrical power to critical components. | |||
: Finally. the inspectors evaluated other elements. | |||
such as material condition, housekeeping, and component labeling. | |||
: The following systems were reviewed based on their risk significance for the given plant configuration: Electric Fire Pump following testing on the Diesel Fire Pump; Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System with the High Pressure Coolant Injection System out of service for maintenance; | |||
and Station Blackout Diesel Generator with the fiN Emergency Diesel Generator out of service for maintenance. | |||
b. Findings No findings were identified. | |||
.2 Complete System Walkdowns | |||
(71111.04S) | |||
a. Inspection Scope (1 sample) The inspeCtors completed | |||
a detailed review of the "B" Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) system to assess the functional capability of the system. The inspectors performed | |||
a walkdown of the system to determine whether the critical components, such as valves and circuit breakers, were aligned in accordance with operating procedures, and to assess the material condition of valves, piping, and seismic supports. | |||
: The inspectors discussed system health with the system engineer, reviewed the system's Maintenance Rule status, and performed | |||
a review of outstanding maintenance work orders to determine whether the deficiencies significantly affected the "8" RBCCW system function. | |||
: The inspectors also reviewed condition reports from the past year to determine whether "B" RBCCW equipment problems were being identified and appropriately resolved. | |||
: The documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment. | |||
b. Findings No findings were identified. | |||
: R05 Fire Protection | |||
(71111.05) | |||
.1 Fire Protection | |||
-Tours (71111.050) | |||
a. Inspection Scope (5 samples) The inspectors performed walkdowns of five fire protection areas during the inspection period. The inspectors reviewed Entergy's fire protection program to determine the specified fire protection design features, fire area boundaries, and combustible loading requirements for the selected areas. The inspectors walked down these areas to assess Entergy's control of transient combustible material and ignition sources. In addition, the inspectors evaluated the material condition and operational status of fire detection and suppression capabilities and fire barriers. | |||
: The inspectors then compared the existing condition of the areas to the fire protection program requirements to determine whether all program requirements were met The documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment. | |||
: The fire protection areas reviewed were: Fire Area 1.10, Fire Zone 1.30A, Torus Compartment; Fire Area 1.9, Fire Zone 1.9, Control Rod Drive Hydraulic Control Units East Side; Fire Area 1.10, Fire Zone 1.26, Auxiliary Boiler Room; Fire Area 1.10, Fire Zone 1.28, Reactor Recirculation Pump Motor Generator Sets Room; and Fire Area 1.10, Fire Zone 1.3, High Pressure Coolant Injection Pump and Turbine Room. Enclosure | |||
.2 Annual Fire Drill Observation | |||
(71111.05A) | |||
a. Inspection Scope (1 sample) The inspectors observed an announced fire drill in the Operations and Maintenance Building Weld Shop Area. The fire drill was performed in accordance with procedure | |||
: EN-TQ-125, Revision 0, "Fire Brigade Drills." The inspectors observed performance of the fire brigade personnel to determine whether Entergy's fire fighting pre-plan strategies were utilized, the pre-planned drill scenario was followed, and the drill objectives were met. The inspectors observed the drill to verify that protective clothing and breathing apparatus were donned: sufficient fire fighting equipment was brought to the scene; the fire brigade leader's fire fighting directions were clear: and communications with the plant operators and between fire brigade members were effective. | |||
: The inspectors observed the drill critique to determine whether areas to improve fire brigade performance were identified. | |||
: Additional documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment. | |||
b. Findings No findings were identified. | |||
: R06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06) | |||
: Underground Cable Inspection | |||
a. Inspection Scope (1 sample) The inspectors reviewed a sample of flood protection measures affecting cables located in underground manholes. | |||
: The inspectors selected an inspection of cable pits 2A, 4, and 5 that contain underground non-safety related power cables (from the start-up transformer to electrical buses A2 and A4) near the main transformer and the south side of the switchyard near the start-up transformer. | |||
: The inspectors monitored Entergy's maintenance inspection and dewatering activities associated with each manhole to evaluate the as-found condition and corrective actions. The inspectors assessed the condition of power cables, splices, and supports. | |||
: The inspectors also reviewed Entergy's Cable Reliability Program and corrective actions taken for this issue and the Cable Reliability Program in general. The documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment. | |||
b. Findings Introduction: | |||
: The inspectors identified | |||
a finding (FIN) of very low safety Significance (Green) for improper maintenance of underground non-safety related medium voltage electric cables. The inspectors observed partially and fully submerged medium voltage cables during the regularly scheduled monthly dewatering and inspection of three cable vaults. Enclosure Description: | |||
: The electric power distribution system provides electric power to safety and non-safety related distribution buses in the plant. Off-site power is provided to the system by two independent circuits through non-safety related, medium voltage (typically those rated from 2 kilovolts to 35 kilovolts), Kente cables that are routed through . underground vaults and ducts. These cables are not rated for continuous submergence in water. On April 28, 2010, the inspectors observed water in each of the manholes and vaults listed above. The inspectors noted that no dewatering or drainage systems existed in the manholes. | |||
: Entergy procedure | |||
: EN-DC-346, Revision 0, "Cable Reliability Program," was issued and effective on December 31, 2009. This procedure discusses manhole inspections and dewatering, and requires, in part, "If manual inspections and pumping are used to maintain a cable system dry, the intervals must be sufficient to keep the cables dry. Adjust intervals as necessary, based on inspection results." Discussions with Entergy personnel involved with these inspections indicated that cables in Manhole 2A were periodically found submerged or partially submerged, and that cables in Manholes 4 and 5 were always found submerged. | |||
: The cables that were submerged included cables that were installed from the 4160V, non-safety related startup . transformer and connected to the A2 and A4 non-safety related busses. The inspectors identified that Entergy had previously identified submerged cables in August and September of 2009, however, corrective actions were not sufficient to preclude these cables from being submerged. | |||
: The inspectors also determined that Entergy had not implemented the Cable Reliability Program guidance in a timely manner to ensure that the degrading effects of this environmental condition were minimized (Le., pumping intervals were not sufficient to maintain the cables dry). Entergy generated | |||
===Condition Report (CR)=== | |||
: CR-PNp*2010*1529, and specified actions to identify a\l underground medium voltage cables included in the Cable Reliability Program, and to identify which manholes should have dewatering capability. | |||
: Entergy also created a corrective action to increase the frequency of the dewatering activities for these areas. In addition, the Electric Power Research Institute has generated | |||
a cable testing database that will be used to compare the test results of cables that have been removed from service to evaluate the potential for degradation of in-service cables. Analysis: | |||
: The inspectors determined that allowing medium voltage cables to remain submerged for extended periods of time was a performance deficiency. | |||
: The cause of the issue was within Entergy's ability to foresee and correct, and should have been prevented. | |||
: Traditional Enforcement did not apply, as the issue did not have actual or potential safety consequence, had no willful aspects, nor did it impact the NRC's ability to perform its regulatory function. | |||
: A review of NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, Appendix E, "Minor Examples," revealed that no minor examples were applicable to this finding. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone, and affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. | |||
: Specifically. | |||
continued submergence of the safety related power cables (from the start-up transformer to electrical buses A2 and A4) Enclosure could lead to cable failure and cause an event that would affect plant stability. | |||
: The inspectors performed | |||
a Phase 1 Significance Determination Process screening of the finding in accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachmenl | |||
: 4, "Phase 1 -Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because the condition did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the unavailability of mitigating systems equipment. | |||
: The inspectors determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Problem Identification and Resolution cross-cutting area, Corrective Action Program component, because Entergy personnel did not thoroughly evaluate the problem when submerged cabling was initially identified | |||
: IP.1(c)]. | |||
: Enforcement: | |||
: This finding does not involve enforcement action because no regulatory requirement violation was identified. | |||
: Because this finding does not involve a violation and has very low safety significance, it is identified as | |||
: FIN 0500029312010003-01 | |||
t Submerged Medium Voltage Cables. 1 R07 Heat Sink Performance | |||
(71111.07T) | |||
a. Inspection Scope (2 samples) Based on a plant specific risk assessment, previous inspections, recent operational experience, and resident inspector input, the inspector selected the following heat sink samples: Operation and performance testing of the salt service water(SSW) | |||
system; and Performance of the ultimate heat sink (UHS), which included SSW piping integrity and SSW intake structure functionality. | |||
: The SSW system was designed to function as the UHS for all the systems cooled by the RBCCW and turbine building closed cooling water (TBCCW) systems during all operating modes by continuously providing adequate cooling water flow to the RBCCW and TBCCW heat exchangers. | |||
: The inspectors reviewed the SSW system design to evaluate the adequacy of system monitoring and performance testing. The inspectors reviewed a sample of SSW pump and valve performance tests, system health and walkdown reports, and in*service test vibration monitoring results for adverse trends and to verify that the system functioned as designed. | |||
: The inspectors verified that Entergy performed the pump and valve in-service tests in accordance with American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code requirements. | |||
: In addition, the inspectors reviewed Entergy's monitoring, maintenance, and testing of interface valves between related SSW and non-safety related or non-seismic piping systems to ensure that adequate SSW flow is available post-accident consistent with design basis assumptions. | |||
: The inspectors reviewed Entergy's buried pipe inspection and monitoring program to independently assess the condition and structural integrity of the SSW piping. The inspectors reviewed a sample of SSW pipe nondestructive examination records and videos of underwater inspections of the SSW intake bays to ensure that Entergy appropriately identified and dispositioned any SSW system degradation. | |||
: The inspectors performed an above ground walkdown of accessible areas containing buried SSW piping Enclosure to look for soil subsidence or other indications of piping leakage and/or degradation. | |||
: The inspectors also directly observed the condition of SSW piping in the accessible portions of the SSW bays and valve pits. The inspectors reviewed Entergy's procedures for SSW and intake structure operation, abnormal SSW operations, adverse weather conditions, and for a loss of the SSW system. The inspectors verified that Entergy maintained these procedures consistent with their design and licensing basis and that plant operators could reasonably implement the procedures as written. The inspectors independently verified that SSW and intake level instrumentation, which operators rely upon for decision making, was available and functional. | |||
: The inspectors also reviewed recent SSW and intake area modifications to verify that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of the SSW system had not been degraded by the design changes. The inspectors walked down control room instrument panels, the RBCCW and TBCCW heat exchangers, accessible portions of SSW piping in the auxiliary building, and SSW intake area (including the SSW pumps, spray wash pumps, and traveling water screens) to assess the material condition and configuration control of these structures, systems and components (S5Cs). The inspectors also reviewed a sample of corrective action condition reports (CRs) related to the SSW isolation valves, SSW pumps, and SSW piping integrity to ensure that Entergy appropriately identified, characterized, and corrected problems related to these essential | |||
: 5SCs. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. | |||
b. Findings No findings were identified. | |||
: R11 Licensed Operator Regualification Program (71111.11) | |||
: Resident Inspector Quarterly Review (71111.11Q) | |||
a. Inspection Scope (1 sample) The inspectors observed licensed operator "as-found" simulator training on April 19, 2010. The inspectors observed crew response to an AntiCipated Transient Without Scram. The inspectors assessed the licensed operators' performance to determine if the training evaluators adequately addressed observed deficiencies. | |||
: The inspectors reviewed the applicable training objectives from the scenario to determine if they had been achieved. | |||
: In addition. | |||
the inspectors performed | |||
a simulator fidelity review 10 determine if the arrangement of the simulator instrumentation, controls. | |||
and tagging closely paralleled that of the control room. The documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment. | |||
b. Findings . No findings were identified. | |||
: R12 Maintenance Effectiveness | |||
(71111.12Q) | |||
a. Inspection Scope (3 samples) The inspectors reviewed the three samples listed below for items such as: (1) appropriate work practices; | |||
(2) identifying and addressing common cause failures; | |||
(3) scoping in accordance with 10 | |||
: CFR 50.65 paragraph (b) of the Maintenance Rule; (4) characterizing reliability issues for performance; | |||
(5) trending key parameters for condition monitoring; | |||
(6) charging unavailability for performance; | |||
(7) classification and reclassification in accordance with 10 | |||
: CFR 50.65 paragraph (a)(1) or (a)(2); and (8) appropriateness of performance criteria for structures, systems, and components (SSCs)/functions classified as paragraph (a)(2) and/or appropriateness and adequacy of goals and corrective actions for SSCs/functions classified as paragraph (aX1). The documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment. | |||
: Items reviewed included the following: Loop "B" Salt Service Water Flow Indicator, Indicating Flow with Flow Control Valve Closed; Air Introduction into Standby Liquid Control System; and Functional Failure Determinations of the Feedwater Regulating Valves (FRV). b. Findings No findings were identified. | |||
: R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control {71111.13} | |||
a. Inspection Scope (5 samples) The inspectors evaluated five maintenance risk assessments for planned maintenance activities. | |||
: The inspectors reviewed maintenance risk evaluations, work schedules, and control room logs to determine if concurrent maintenance or surveillance activities adversely affected the plant risk already incurred with components. | |||
: The inspectors evaluated whether Entergy took the necessary steps to control work activities, minimized the probability of initiating events, and maintained the functional capability of mitigating systems. The inspectors assessed Entergy's risk management actions during plant walkdowns. | |||
: The documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors reviewed the conduct and adequacy of maintenance risk assessments for the following maintenance and testing activities: Yellow Risk for "8" Diesel Logic Test and Fire Protection Features Out-of-Service; Yellow Risk Due to Unavailability of One Offsite Power Line, Diesel Fire Pump, Increased Loss of Offsite Power and Increased Trip Risk; Yellow Risk with High Pressure Coolant Injection Out of Service for Maintenance; Yellow Risk During Unavailability of "8" Residual Heat Removal Motor Operated Valve; and Yellow Risk with Station Blackout Maintenance and Shutdown Transformer Out of Service. Enclosure | |||
.1 b. Findings No findings were identified. 1 R 15 Operability Evaluations | |||
(71111.15) | |||
a. Inspection Scope (5 samples) The inspectors reviewed five operability determinations associated with degraded or non-conforming conditions to determine if the operability determination was justified and if the mitigating systems or barriers remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk had occurred. | |||
: The inspectors also reviewed compensatory measures to determine if the compensatory measures were in place and were appropriately controlled. | |||
: The inspectors reviewed Entergy's performance against related Technical Specifications and Updated Final Safety Analysis Report requirements. | |||
: The documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment. | |||
: The inspectors reviewed the following degraded or non-conforming conditions: | |||
: CR-PNP-2010-1303, High Pressure Coolant Injection Steam Une Drain Root Valve Steam Leak; | : CR-PNP-2010-1303, High Pressure Coolant Injection Steam Une Drain Root Valve Steam Leak; | ||
: CR-PNP-2009-4944, Drywell Leakage Upward Trend over Three Pump-Downs; | : CR-PNP-2009-4944, Drywell Leakage Upward Trend over Three Pump-Downs; | ||
: CR-PNP-2010-1289, Potential Air in Standby Liquid Control System; | : CR-PNP-2010-1289, Potential Air in Standby Liquid Control System; | ||
: CR-PNP-2010-1481 , GNF2 Fuel Assembly Manufacturing Defects; and | : CR-PNP-2010-1481 , GNF2 Fuel Assembly Manufacturing Defects; and | ||
: CR-PNP-2010-1609, Calculation for Operators' Dose during Main Steam Line 6reak outside containment cannot be retrieved. b. Findings No findings were identified. 1 R 18 Plant Modifications (71111.18) Permanent Modification to "6" Salt Service Water (SSW} Pump Flange Connection a. Inspection Scope (1 sample) The inspectors reviewed Permanent Modification EC21320, "Evaluate and Provide Altemate DeSign for P-208B Discharge Head to Top Column Flange Connection," to determine whether the performance capability of the "6" SSW pump had been degraded through the modification. The inspectors reviewed engineering drawings, relevant condition reports, and work packages to ensure the modification did not adversely affect the SSW system. The inspectors reviewed the drawings to determine whether they properly reflected the modification. The inspectors also walked down the SSW pump compartment room in the intake structure. The documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment. | : CR-PNP-2010-1609, Calculation for Operators' Dose during Main Steam Line 6reak outside containment cannot be retrieved. | ||
b. Findings No findings were identified. 1 R 18 Plant Modifications | |||
(71111.18) | |||
: Permanent Modification to "6" Salt Service Water (SSW} Pump Flange Connection | |||
a. Inspection Scope (1 sample) The inspectors reviewed Permanent Modification | |||
: EC21320, "Evaluate and Provide Altemate DeSign for P-208B Discharge Head to Top Column Flange Connection," to determine whether the performance capability of the "6" SSW pump had been degraded through the modification. | |||
: The inspectors reviewed engineering drawings, relevant condition reports, and work packages to ensure the modification did not adversely affect the SSW system. The inspectors reviewed the drawings to determine whether they properly reflected the modification. | |||
: The inspectors also walked down the SSW pump compartment room in the intake structure. | |||
: The documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment. | |||
: I j' I I Findings No findings were identified . . Permanent Modification for Installing Turbine-Style Air Start Motors and Regulators Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) b. Inspection Scope (1 sample) The inspectors reviewed Permanent Modification | : I j' I I Findings No findings were identified . . Permanent Modification for Installing Turbine-Style Air Start Motors and Regulators Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) b. Inspection Scope (1 sample) The inspectors reviewed Permanent Modification | ||
: EC 12969, Revision 0, "Install Style Air Start Motors and Regulators on EDG X-107B," and the aSSOCiated | : EC 12969, Revision 0, "Install Style Air Start Motors and Regulators on EDG X-107B," and the aSSOCiated | ||
: CFR 50.59 screening, to determine whether the licensing bases and performance capability of the "B" EDG system had been degraded through the modification. A walkdown was performed to determine whether the components inside the room were as described in the permanent modification documentation. The inspectors reviewed applicable drawings to determine whether they properly reflected the permanent modification. The documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment. Findings No findings were identified. 1PostwMaintenance Testing (71111.19) Inspection Scope (6 samples) The inspectors reviewed s!xsamples of post-maintenance tests during this inspection period. The inspectors reviewed these activities to determine whether the maintenance test adequately demonstrated that the safety-related function of the equipment was satisfied, given the scope of the work performed, and that operability of the system was restored. In addition, the inspectors evaluated the applicable test acceptance criteria to verify consistency with the associated deSign and licensing bases, as well as Technical SpeCification requirements. The inspectors also evaluated whether conditions adverse to quality were entered into the CAP for resolution. The documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment. The following maintenance activities and their post-maintenance tests were evaluated: Overhaul Power Supply Circuit Breaker for Reactor Recirculation Pump Suction to Reactor Water Clean Up Pump Valve (MO-1201 Disconnect and Reconnect "S" Salt Service Water Pump Motor during P-208B Overhaul; "S" Salt Service Water Pump Check Valve 29-CK-3880B Rebuild; . High Pressure Coolant Injection Valve | : CFR 50.59 screening, to determine whether the licensing bases and performance capability of the "B" EDG system had been degraded through the modification. | ||
: AO-2301-64, Replacement for Limit Switch; "A" Emergency Diesel Generator | : A walkdown was performed to determine whether the components inside the room were as described in the permanent modification documentation. | ||
b. Findings No findings were identified. | : The inspectors reviewed applicable drawings to determine whether they properly reflected the permanent modification. | ||
: 2. RADIATION SAFETY (RS) Cornerstone: Occupational and Public Radiation Safety 2RS01 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (71124.01) a. Inspection Scope During the period May 17, 2010, through May 20,2010, the inspectors performed the following activities to verify that Entergy properly assessed the radiological hazards in the workplace and implemented appropriate radiation monitoring and exposure controls during routine operations. Implementation of these controls was reviewed against the criteria contained in 10 | : The documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment. Findings No findings were identified. | ||
: CFR 20, "Standards for Protection Against Radiation," relevant Technical Specifications, and Entergy's procedures. This inspection effort represented partial completion of one sample. Further inspection is planned to fully complete this sample, and the results will be documented in a future report. Inspection Planning The inspectors reviewed all of Pilgrim's Performance Indicators for the Occupational Exposure Cornerstone for follow up; The inspectors reviewed radiation protection program self assessments and audits; and The inspectors verified no operational events occurred relating to radiation safety. Radiological Hazard Assessment The inspectors verified no changes to plant operations were implemented or planned that would result in a change to plant radiological conditions; The inspectors reviewed the last two (2) surveys performed on each level of the Reactor Building to include the Refuel Floor and the Traversing In-core Probe Room; The inspectors walked down the faCility, including the Trash Compactor Facility, the radioactive waste processing area, storage, and handling areas to evaluate material and radiological conditions and the reactor building. With the assistance of a radiation protection technician, dose rates were verified at the boundary of several high radiation areas and at the doors to locked high radiation areas; and The inspectors observed work in progress in the condenser bay at 100% power. The inspectors reviewed pre-work surveys and documentation which identified appropriate hazards. Instructions to Workers The inspectors verified the labeling of several drums containing licensed material staged in cubicles and entrances to cubicles in the radwaste hallway; The inspectors reviewed four radiation work permits (RWP) used to access High Radiation Areas and verified specified work control instructions; and Enclosure The inspectors reviewed five (5) condition reports where a worker's personal dosimeter (EPD) Contamination and Radioactive Material Control The inspectors reviewed Pilgrim's criteria for the survey and release of material the response required for an alarm indicating the presence of licensed The inspectors verified the presence of three (3) sources on Pilgrim's inventory verified that the sources were leak tested and were not leaking; The inspectors verified that Pilgrim has three (3) sources meeting the requirements to be reported on the nationally tracked sources system. The sources have not been moved and are still in use. Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage The inspectors observed work in progress in the condenser bay at 100% power. The workers removed and re-instal.led a feedwater regulating valve controller. The inspectors attended the pre-job briefing and verified the eXisting conditions were conSistent with posted surveys, RWP, and worker briefing; The inspectors verified the adequacy of radiological controls such as radiation and contamination surveys, video surveillance, communication, and stay time tracking during personnel entry and egress from the condenser bay; The inspectors verified the placement of radiation monitOring devices on the individuals; and There was no opportunity to review an RWP for airborne radioactivity area entry. No airborne area entries were specified therefore, no RWPs were written. Radiation Worker Performance The inspectors observed radiation worker performance and observed that they were aware of the radiological conditions and the RWP controls and that their performance reflected the level of radiological hazards present; and The inspectors reviewed six (6) condition reports where hUman performance errors were the cause. Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency The inspectors observed radiation protection technician performance to determine if technicians were aware of the radiological conditions in their workplace and the RWP controls; and The inspectors reviewed five (5) condition reports where the cause was radiation protection technician error. Problem Identification and Resolution The inspectors reviewed Pilgrim's self-assessments, audits, and Special Reports related to the radiation protection program to determine if identified problems were entered into the CAP. The inspectors verified that problems identified were entered into the CAP and appropriate corrective actions were identified. | : 1PostwMaintenance Testing (71111.19) Inspection Scope (6 samples) The inspectors reviewed s!xsamples of post-maintenance tests during this inspection period. The inspectors reviewed these activities to determine whether the maintenance test adequately demonstrated that the safety-related function of the equipment was satisfied, given the scope of the work performed, and that operability of the system was restored. | ||
.1 No findings were OTHER ACTIVITIES lOA] 40APerformance Indicator (PI) Verification (71151) Cornerstone: Initiating Events Inspection ScoRe (3 samples) The Initiating Events cornerstone PI data for unplanned scrams per 7,000 critical hours (IE01); unplanned scrams with loss of normal heat removal (IE04); and unplanned power changes per 7,000 critical hours (IE03) was reviewed to assess the completeness and accuracy ofthe report information. Specifically, PI data from the second quarter of 2009 through the first quarter of 2010 was reviewed and compared to information contained in NRC inspection reports, Licensee Event Reports (LERs), and operator logs. The documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. No findings were Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152) Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program (CAP) Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a screening of each item entered into Entergy's Corrective Action Program. This review was accomplished by reviewing printouts of each Condition Report (CR). attending daily screening meetings and/or accessing Entergy's database. The purpose of this review was to identify conditions such as repetitive equipment failures or human performance issues that might warrant additional follow-up. Findings No findings were identified . . 2 Semi-Annual Review to Identity Trends Inspection Scope (1 sample) The inspectors performed a review of Entergy's CAP and associated documents to identify trends that could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The review was focused on repetitive equipment and corrective maintenance issues, but also considered the results of daily inspector. CAP item screening. The review included Enclosure I t 1 I I I- | : In addition, the inspectors evaluated the applicable test acceptance criteria to verify consistency with the associated deSign and licensing bases, as well as Technical SpeCification requirements. | ||
issues documented in CAP trend reports and the site CAP performance indicator The review focused on the six month period of January 2010, through June although the inspectors also evaluated previous trend results for Condition Reports July 2009, through December 2009, which were discussed in Pilgrim Inspection Report 2009005. The documents reviewed during the inspection are listed the b. Findings and ObselVations No findings were identified. One low level trend discussed in Integrated Inspection Report | : The inspectors also evaluated whether conditions adverse to quality were entered into the CAP for resolution. | ||
: 2009005 was reviewed and is discussed below. In a new low level trend was identified in the area of the Maintenance Rule Program Post Maintenance and Modification Testing The inspectors reviewed | : The documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment. | ||
: CR-PNP-2009-2778, which was written to perform assessment of post maintenance test activities documented at Pi/grim during and Pilgrim's most recent refueling outage (RF017). The inspectors performed post-maintenance test samples during the first two quarters of 2010 and identified deficiencies in post maintenance testing. Due to the identification of fewer and because corrective actions to improve post maintenance testing at Pilgrim appear have been effective, the inspectors consider this low level trend Maintenance Rule Program The inspectors have reviewed eleven MRP samples since the second quarter of 2009 in order to verify that Entergy appropriately addresses Maintenance Rule component performance and condition problems. In addition, the inspectors reviewed Entergy's implementation of the Maintenance Rule seoping requirements, functional failure evaluations and their baSis. and the conduct of oversight of the MRP by the onsite Maintenance Rule Committee. Examples of problems identified by the inspectors during this time period included: A non-cited violation of 10 | : The following maintenance activities and their post-maintenance tests were evaluated: Overhaul Power Supply Circuit Breaker for Reactor Recirculation Pump Suction to Reactor Water Clean Up Pump Valve (MO-1201 Disconnect and Reconnect "S" Salt Service Water Pump Motor during P-208B Overhaul; "S" Salt Service Water Pump Check Valve 29-CK-3880B | ||
: CFR 50.65 was identified for the failure to include the security diesel generator into the Pilgrim Maintenance Rule scoping document (Pilgrim inspection report 05000293/2009004). The inspectors identified that the security diesel generator was credited in the fire hazards analysis for the backup battery power supply for safe shutdown emergency lighting but was not included in the Maintenance Rule scoping document. Entergy evaluated this condition and subsequently incorporated the security diesel generator into Maintenance Rule scoping documents. | : Rebuild; . High Pressure Coolant Injection Valve | ||
: CR-PNP-2009-2852 was written to evaluate the seoping of the ! I I security diesel and to include the diesel in Maintenance Rule scoping documents. iA Maintenance Rule functional failure evaluation for the "An Feedwater Valve (FRV) was not performed. | : AO-2301-64, Replacement for Limit Switch; "A" Emergency Diesel Generator year, 4 year, and 8 year Preventive Maintenance; | ||
: CR-PNP-201 0-1299 was written to evaluate FRV failure and concluded a functional failure had occurred. This functional exceeded the Feedwater Level Control System functional failure criteria and required an evaluation for 10 | and Replace Fuel Injector Snubber Valves on "At! Emergency Diesel Generator. | ||
: CFR 50.65 (a)(1) I Enclosure | |||
: A Maintenance Rule functional failure evaluation of Process Radiation Monitoring (PRM) instruments for the Steam Jet Air Ejectors (SJAE) was not performed. The inspectors identified that a failure of SJAE PRMs was not evaluated under the Maintenance Rule procedure to determine if a functional failure had occurred. | b. Findings No findings were identified. | ||
: PNP-2009-4070 was written to evaluate the PRM failures and concluded a functional failure had occurred. The basis for a Standby Liquid Control (SLC) Maintenance Rule functional failure determination was incorrect. The inspectors identified that the basis for a SLC Maintenance Rule functional faiture concluded that both trains of SLC were needed to perform the SLC function and, therefore, the loss of one of the pumps was a functional failure. The inspectors reviewed Pilgrim design basis documents and determined that only one pump was required to meet the SLC function and that the loss of one pump would not constitute a Maintenance Rule functional failure. | : R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22) a. Inspection Scope (6 samples) The inspectors witnessed six surveillance activities and/or reviewed test data to determine whether the testing adequately demonstrated eqUipment operational readiness and the ability to perform the intended safety-related functions. | ||
: PNP-2009-4006 was written to document the incorrect basis and to re-perform the functional failure evaluation. A Maintenance Rule Functional Failure (MRFF) evaluation of secondary containment incorrectly concluded that secondary containment was not seeped within the Maintenance Rule. The inspectors then determined that the subsequent MRFF evaluation used incorrect piping sizes in evaluatin9 an allowable gap size for secondary containment. | : The inspectors reviewed selected prerequiSites and precautions to determine jf they were met and if the tests were performed in accordance with the procedural steps. Additionally, the inspectors evaluated the applicable test acceptance criteria for consistency with associated design bases, licensing bases, and Technical Specification requirements. | ||
: CR-PNP-2010-1181 was written to document the issue and the basis in the original CR was corrected. In addition to the above examples, the inspectors attended Maintenance Rule Committee meetings and noted examples of inadequate preparation by presenters, a lack of . understanding of the role of the Maintenance Rule Coordinator, and problem solving by the Maintenance Rule Committee members versus providing oversight of the products brought to the meeting. The inspectors discussed this trend with Entergy in the fall of 2009 and | : The inspectors also evaluated whether conditions adverse to quality were entered into the Corrective Action Program for resolution. | ||
: CR-PNP-2009-4197 was written to document examples. conduct an apparent cause evaluation, and to specify corrective actions. Corrective actions have included clarifying the roles and responsibilities of the Maintenance Rule Coordinator, conduct of training on the Maintenance Rule and the need for rigor and review of design basis documents in the conduct of functional failure evaluations, and formalizing Maintenance Rule Committee protocols and meeting conduct guidelines. The inspectors have noted improvement in the conduct of Maintenance Rule Committee meetings; however. additional examples of MRP issues continued to occur over the last two quarters. The inspectors have therefore concluded that the number and extent of MRP issues during the past year constitutes a low level trend with the implementation of this program. The inspectors will follow Entergy's corrective actions to evaluate their response to this low level trend . . 3 Annual Sample: Maintenance Rule Program Issues a. Inspection Scope (1 sample) The inspectors focused on Entergy's identification, evaluation, and resolution of MRP deficiencies and issues as documented in | : The documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment. | ||
: The following surveillance tests were evaluated: | |||
.4 The inspectors reviewed Entergy's apparent cause analysis, extent of condition review, and their short-term and long-term corrective actions. The inspectors conducted interviews, reviewed corporate procedures and condition reports related to the implementation of the MRP at Pilgrim. The documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. b. Findings and Observations No findings were identified. See Section 40A2.2 for a discussion on the identification of a low level trend in the implementation of the MRP at Pilgrim. The apparent cause identified that Engineering Management had provided a greater focus on the equipment reliability process and had not provided the same level of oversight to the MRP. In addition, the Condition Report (CR) discussed a lack of rigor by engineers in implementing the process. Corrective actions discussed in the apparent cause to correct the problem included; review of expectations with System Engineers for daily CR screening, assigning qualified engineers to review functional failures and (a)(1) action plans, briefing of the Condition Report Review Group on Maintenance Rule risk significant components, and a review of the Maintenance Rule basis documents to ensure accuracy and adequate scoping. In addition, the System Engineering Maintenance Rule Coordinator, SE Supervisor and SE Manager reviewed all corporate MRP documents to ensure they understood all requirements, roles, and responsibilities. Also, additional formal training was provided to System Engineers on MRP responsibilities, proper documentation, and expectations for completing functional failure determinations and 10 | * Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Operability and In-Service Test (1ST); * Standby Liquid Control Operability and 1ST; * Main Steam Line Containment Isolation Valve (CIV) Logic Test; * High Pressure Coolant Injection System Operability and 1ST; * "8" Residual Heat Removal Operability Test (Routine); | ||
: CFR 50.65 (a)(1) action plans. The inspectorp determined that MRP deficiencies continue to occur at Pilgrim. The inspectors also concluded that the number of issues identified during MRP inspections constitutes a low level trend which is documented in Section 40A2.2. The inspectors will conduct follow-up inspections of Entergy MRP performance as part of the periodic assessment of low level trends . Annual Sample: Feedwater Regulating Valve Lockup Concerns a. Inspection Scope (1 sample) This inspection focused on Entergy's problem identification, evaluation, and resolution conceming feedwater regulating valve (FRV) lockup issues that provided a challenge to automatic reactor water level control. The inspectors selected Entergy's FRV corrective actions for review based on the potential impact on reactor vessel level control as undesired FRV lockups could complicate event response, result in a plant transient, andlor unnecessarily challenge control room operators. The inspectors reviewed Entergy's associated troubleshooting documentation, root cause evaluations, condition review, and short and long-term corrective actions. The inspectors performed a walkdown of the FRV electronic control modules and a remote camera inspection of the normally inaccessible FRVs to assess the FRV controller error code status, actuator pressures, material condition, and configuration control. The inspectors also interviewed plant personnel; inspected several replaced FRV actuator components and Entergy's | and * "An Core Spray Pump Operability and 1ST. b. Findings No findings were identified. | ||
: FRV mock-up facility; and reviewed procedures, vendor manuals, related operating experience, and drawings. Documents reviewed are listed in the b. Findings and Observations No findings were identified. I&C technicians determined that the "8" FRV control system not locked up electrically in the conventional way, but had locked up by a computer failure as evidenced by the FRV actuator response and the recorded error Engineering concluded that the root cause of the abnormal and spurious operation resulted in the "silent" lockups of the "8" FRV was high input process noise caused by failure to adequately set up the FW level transmitters for maximum dampening following replacement in RF017. In addition, engineering concluded that the failure to install software in the "8" FRV control system was a contributing cause. The new provided sensitivity changes to improve overall system response and operation. adjusted the level transmitters for maximum dampening on May 27, 2009 and installed new software in the 8 FRV controller on June 16, 2009. Entergy's corrective actions included: increased system monitoring in accordance with their Operational Making Issue (ODMI) process, implementation of permanent changes to the documents associated with the replacement and calibration of FW level transmitters. conducting an extent-of-condition Regarding the above "8" FRV lockup issue, the inspectors concluded that Entergy had taken appropriate action in accordance with station procedures, NRC Maintenance Rule (MR) requirements, and their corrective action program (CAP). The inspectors determined that engineering's associated root cause evaluation was sufficiently thorough and based on the best available information, troubleshooting, sound engineering judgment. and relevant industry operating experience. In general, Entergy's assigned corrective actions were aligned with the identified causal factors, adequately tracked, appropriately documented, and completed as scheduled. The inspectors noted that Entergy created and effectively used a FRV actuator mock-up to facilitate their root cause evaluation, troubleshooting, and training i " efforts. In addition, Entergy management effectively implemented their ODMI process to provide additional monitoring and oversight of FRV performance in response to the identified lockups. During the extent-of-condition review for the "8" FRV "silent" lockup issue, the noted that Entergy had also identified degraded conditions associated with the "An actuator assembly. On April 17, 2009 (prior to RF017), the FW system engineer an adverse trend in the actuator pressures and initiated | : EP6 Drill Evaluation | ||
: CR-PNP-2009-1372 to assess trend the condition. The condition had no noticeable impact on FRV performance engineering continued to monitor the FRV performance. A focused engineering immediately following the plant shutdown for RF017 identified that the "A" FRV was as expected, but locked up {a "silent" lockup caused by a friction failure error code}. Engineering inspection of the "A" FRV stepper motor found excessive friction in the motor worm gear due to hardened grease, and some indications of scoring inside the and sleeve assembly (CR-PNP-2009-1983). Engineering determined that the cause was the vendor supplied lubricant found in the spool/sleeve assembly and mismatched spool/sleeve assembly that may have contributed to the friction. (The applied lubricant to the stepper motor shaft and gear; however, the spool/sleeve assembly a matched set with tight tolerances that should not be lubricated.) Entergy replaced the Enclosure | (71114.06) Cornerstone: | ||
: FRV actuator internals (with a matched spoollsleeve set) and performed an condition inspection on the "6" FRV. The inspectors noted that the causal factors for the two FRV performance issues noted above were different. even though they both resulted in "silent" FRV lockups. The inspectors noted that Entergy took prompt and appropriate corrective actions to address the short-term concerns associated with the A FRV high friction failure (and accompanying "silent" lockup); however, did not effectively track long-term actions within their CAP and did not adequately evaluate potential MR aspects of the issue. Specifically, (1) the equipment failure evaluation for | : Emergency Preparedness | ||
: CR-PNP-2009-1983 noted that "the condition resulted in the loss of a critical function of the SSC" and "the failed SSC resulted in an unexpected operational effect," however, engineering did not perform a MR functional failure evaluation of the condition; (2) the discovery of the "eilenr lockup (an unexpected failure) did not trigger a higher Significance CR review; (3) long-term corrective actions to ensure appropriate changes were made to preventive maintenance procedures to verify actuator assembly lubrication and spool/sleeve condition were labeled as enhancements and remained open; and (4) there were no apparent corrective actions to address the excessive wear identified within the spool assembly. Engineering initiated | a. Inspection Scope (1 sample) The inspectors observed licensed operator "as-found" simulator training on April 19, 2010. The inspectors evaluated the operating crew activities related to an accurate and timely classification and notification of a Site Area Emergency, Emergency Action Level Declaration | ||
: CR-PNP-20 | : 2.3.1.3. Additionally, the inspectors assessed the ability of training evaluators to adequately address operator performance deficiencies identified during the exercise. | ||
: CR 2010*1299 . . 5 Annual Sample: Motor Control Center Relay Failure a. Inspection Scope (1 sample) The inspectors performed an in-depth review of Entergy's root cause analysis and corrective actions associated with condition report (CR) High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System Injection Valve Motor Control Center (MeC) D954 Under-Voltage Relay Failure. Specifically, a normally energized under-voltage relay failed, which resulted in de-energizing the motor actuator for the normally closed HPCI injection valve, The inspectors assessed Entergy's problem identification threshold, cause analyses. extent of condition reviews, compensatory actions, and the prioritization and timeliness of Entergy's corrective actions to determine whether Entergy was appropriately identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems associated with this issue and whether the planned or completed corrective actions were appropriate. The inspectors compared the Enclosure actions taken to the requirements of Entergy's corrective action program and 10 | : The documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment. | ||
: CFR 50, Appendix B. In addition, the inspectors performed field walkdowns and interviewed engineering personnel to assess the effectiveness of the implemented corrective actions. Specific documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report. b. Findings and Observations No findings were identified. Entergy determined the most probable cause was an isolated relay failure early in its service life due to a manufacturing defect. Entergyalso determined that the relay had operated at a higher voltage than assumed in the environmental qualification (EO) report, because the 250 VDC battery bus typically operated at about 266 VDC while the battery was on float charge. Entergy determined that operating the relay at a slightly higher voltage would result in a higher component intemal temperature, which may have led to a shortened life expectancy and may have been a contributing cause to the premature relay failure. Entergy conducted a thorough technical review of the relay failure, including a comprehensive failure analysis performed by an independent third party laboratory. Entergy's extent of condition review identified additional normally energized DC relays which were also operating on a battery float voltage greater than assumed in their EO reports. Corrective actions included replacing the failed relay and revising the EO service life and preventative maintenance (PM) replacement tasks for the affected relays. The inspectors reviewed selected relay maintenance records and did not identify any additional issues. The inspectors determined Entergy's overall response to the issue was commensurate with the safety significance, timely, and included appropriate compensatory actions. The inspectors determined that the actions taken were reasonable to resolve both the initial relay failure and the impact from elevated operating temperatures to relay service life. However, the inspector's review of selected design records identified insufficient design control measures had been used during the revision of the relays EO service life. Specifically, the inspectors identified that a field measurement of relay temperature had been used as a key design input parameter to re-calculate the EO service life. However, Entergy did not use calibrated measurement and test equipment (M& TE) for the field measurement, and did not evaluate the measurement or test uncertainty in the field measurement. In addition, Entergy used a vendor to re-calculate the relay EO service life. However, the vendors new EQ service life values were documented in a memorandum from the vendor to Entergy, without any supporting details or analysis, and the memorandum was not controlled under a quality assurance (OA) program. This performance deficiency was determined to be a minor because it was related to equipment qualification and no equipment operability or functionality was Significantly affected. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, "Power Reactor Inspection Reports," the above 'issue constituted a violation of minor significance that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy. Entergy entered the inspector's observations into their CAP (CR-PNP-201 0-2073). Enclosure Event Follow-up (71153) Operator Performance During Thermal Backwash a. Inspection Scope (1 sample) The inspectors observed an infrequently performed evolution on May 20,2010. | b. Findings No findings were identified. | ||
: LER 05000293/2010-001-00, which are addressed in | : 2. RADIATION | ||
: SAFETY (RS) Cornerstone: | |||
: Occupational and Public Radiation Safety 2RS01 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (71124.01) | |||
a. Inspection Scope During the period May 17, 2010, through May 20,2010, the inspectors performed the following activities to verify that Entergy properly assessed the radiological hazards in the workplace and implemented appropriate radiation monitoring and exposure controls during routine operations. | |||
: Implementation of these controls was reviewed against the criteria contained in 10 | |||
: CFR 20, "Standards for Protection Against Radiation," relevant Technical Specifications, and Entergy's procedures. | |||
: This inspection effort represented partial completion of one sample. Further inspection is planned to fully complete this sample, and the results will be documented in a future report. Inspection Planning The inspectors reviewed all of Pilgrim's Performance Indicators for the Occupational Exposure Cornerstone for follow up; The inspectors reviewed radiation protection program self assessments and audits; and The inspectors verified no operational events occurred relating to radiation safety. Radiological Hazard Assessment The inspectors verified no changes to plant operations were implemented or planned that would result in a change to plant radiological conditions; The inspectors reviewed the last two (2) surveys performed on each level of the Reactor Building to include the Refuel Floor and the Traversing In-core Probe Room; The inspectors walked down the faCility, including the Trash Compactor Facility, the radioactive waste processing area, storage, and handling areas to evaluate material and radiological conditions and the reactor building. | |||
: With the assistance of a radiation protection technician, dose rates were verified at the boundary of several high radiation areas and at the doors to locked high radiation areas; and The inspectors observed work in progress in the condenser bay at 100% power. The inspectors reviewed pre-work surveys and documentation which identified appropriate hazards. Instructions to Workers The inspectors verified the labeling of several drums containing licensed material staged in cubicles and entrances to cubicles in the radwaste hallway; The inspectors reviewed four radiation work permits (RWP) used to access High Radiation Areas and verified specified work control instructions; | |||
and Enclosure The inspectors reviewed five (5) condition reports where a worker's personal dosimeter (EPD) | |||
: Contamination and Radioactive Material Control The inspectors reviewed Pilgrim's criteria for the survey and release of material the response required for an alarm indicating the presence of licensed The inspectors verified the presence of three (3) sources on Pilgrim's inventory verified that the sources were leak tested and were not leaking; The inspectors verified that Pilgrim has three (3) sources meeting the requirements to be reported on the nationally tracked sources system. The sources have not been moved and are still in use. Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage The inspectors observed work in progress in the condenser bay at 100% power. The workers removed and re-instal.led | |||
a feedwater regulating valve controller. | |||
: The inspectors attended the pre-job briefing and verified the eXisting conditions were conSistent with posted surveys, RWP, and worker briefing; The inspectors verified the adequacy of radiological controls such as radiation and contamination surveys, video surveillance, communication, and stay time tracking during personnel entry and egress from the condenser bay; The inspectors verified the placement of radiation monitOring devices on the individuals; | |||
and There was no opportunity to review an RWP for airborne radioactivity area entry. No airborne area entries were specified therefore, no RWPs were written. Radiation Worker Performance The inspectors observed radiation worker performance and observed that they were aware of the radiological conditions and the RWP controls and that their performance reflected the level of radiological hazards present; and The inspectors reviewed six (6) condition reports where hUman performance errors were the cause. Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency The inspectors observed radiation protection technician performance to determine if technicians were aware of the radiological conditions in their workplace and the RWP controls; | |||
and The inspectors reviewed five (5) condition reports where the cause was radiation protection technician error. Problem Identification and Resolution The inspectors reviewed Pilgrim's self-assessments, audits, and Special Reports related to the radiation protection program to determine if identified problems were entered into the CAP. The inspectors verified that problems identified were entered into the CAP and appropriate corrective actions were identified. | |||
.1 | |||
: No findings were OTHER ACTIVITIES | |||
lOA] 40APerformance Indicator (PI) Verification | |||
(71151) Cornerstone: | |||
: Initiating Events Inspection ScoRe (3 samples) The Initiating Events cornerstone | |||
: PI data for unplanned scrams per 7,000 critical hours (IE01); unplanned scrams with loss of normal heat removal (IE04); and unplanned power changes per 7,000 critical hours (IE03) was reviewed to assess the completeness and accuracy ofthe report information. | |||
: Specifically, PI data from the second quarter of 2009 through the first quarter of 2010 was reviewed and compared to information contained in NRC inspection reports, Licensee Event Reports (LERs), and operator logs. The documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. | |||
: No findings were Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152) Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program (CAP) Inspection Scope The inspectors performed | |||
a screening of each item entered into Entergy's Corrective Action Program. This review was accomplished by reviewing printouts of each Condition Report (CR). attending daily screening meetings and/or accessing Entergy's database. | |||
: The purpose of this review was to identify conditions such as repetitive equipment failures or human performance issues that might warrant additional follow-up. Findings No findings were identified . . 2 Semi-Annual Review to Identity Trends Inspection Scope (1 sample) The inspectors performed | |||
a review of Entergy's | |||
: CAP and associated documents to identify trends that could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The review was focused on repetitive equipment and corrective maintenance issues, but also considered the results of daily inspector. | |||
: CAP item screening. | |||
: The review included Enclosure I t 1 I I I- | |||
issues documented in CAP trend reports and the site CAP performance indicator The review focused on the six month period of January 2010, through June although the inspectors also evaluated previous trend results for Condition Reports July 2009, through December 2009, which were discussed in Pilgrim Inspection Report 2009005. The documents reviewed during the inspection are listed the | |||
b. Findings and ObselVations No findings were identified. | |||
: One low level trend discussed in Integrated Inspection Report | |||
: 2009005 was reviewed and is discussed below. In | |||
a new low level trend was identified in the area of the Maintenance Rule Program Post Maintenance and Modification Testing The inspectors reviewed | |||
: CR-PNP-2009-2778, which was written to perform assessment of post maintenance test activities documented at Pi/grim during and Pilgrim's most recent refueling outage (RF017). The inspectors performed post-maintenance test samples during the first two quarters of 2010 and identified deficiencies in post maintenance testing. Due to the identification of fewer and because corrective actions to improve post maintenance testing at Pilgrim appear have been effective, the inspectors consider this low level trend Maintenance Rule Program The inspectors have reviewed eleven MRP samples since the second quarter of 2009 in order to verify that Entergy appropriately addresses Maintenance Rule component performance and condition problems. | |||
: In addition, the inspectors reviewed Entergy's implementation of the Maintenance Rule seoping requirements, functional failure evaluations and their baSis. and the conduct of oversight of the MRP by the onsite Maintenance Rule Committee. | |||
: Examples of problems identified by the inspectors during this time period included: A non-cited violation of 10 | |||
: CFR 50.65 was identified for the failure to include the security diesel generator into the Pilgrim Maintenance Rule scoping document (Pilgrim inspection report 05000293/2009004). | |||
: The inspectors identified that the security diesel generator was credited in the fire hazards analysis for the backup battery power supply for safe shutdown emergency lighting but was not included in the Maintenance Rule scoping document. | |||
: Entergy evaluated this condition and subsequently incorporated the security diesel generator into Maintenance Rule scoping documents. | |||
: CR-PNP-2009-2852 | |||
was written to evaluate the seoping of the ! I I security diesel and to include the diesel in Maintenance Rule scoping documents. | |||
iA Maintenance Rule functional failure evaluation for the "An Feedwater Valve (FRV) was not performed. | |||
: CR-PNP-201 | |||
: 0-1299 was written to evaluate FRV failure and concluded | |||
a functional failure had occurred. | |||
: This functional exceeded the Feedwater Level Control System functional failure criteria and required an evaluation for 10 | |||
: CFR 50.65 (a)(1) | |||
: I Enclosure | |||
: A Maintenance Rule functional failure evaluation of Process Radiation Monitoring (PRM) instruments for the Steam Jet Air Ejectors (SJAE) was not performed. | |||
: The inspectors identified that a failure of SJAE PRMs was not evaluated under the Maintenance Rule procedure to determine if a functional failure had occurred. | |||
: PNP-2009-4070 | |||
was written to evaluate the PRM failures and concluded | |||
a functional failure had occurred. The basis for a Standby Liquid Control (SLC) Maintenance Rule functional failure determination was incorrect. | |||
: The inspectors identified that the basis for a SLC Maintenance Rule functional faiture concluded that both trains of SLC were needed to perform the SLC function and, therefore, the loss of one of the pumps was a functional failure. The inspectors reviewed Pilgrim design basis documents and determined that only one pump was required to meet the SLC function and that the loss of one pump would not constitute | |||
a Maintenance Rule functional failure. | |||
: PNP-2009-4006 | |||
was written to document the incorrect basis and to re-perform the functional failure evaluation. A Maintenance Rule Functional Failure (MRFF) evaluation of secondary containment incorrectly concluded that secondary containment was not seeped within the Maintenance Rule. The inspectors then determined that the subsequent | |||
: MRFF evaluation used incorrect piping sizes in evaluatin9 | |||
an allowable gap size for secondary containment. | |||
: CR-PNP-2010-1181 | |||
was written to document the issue and the basis in the original CR was corrected. | |||
: In addition to the above examples, the inspectors attended Maintenance Rule Committee meetings and noted examples of inadequate preparation by presenters, a lack of . understanding of the role of the Maintenance Rule Coordinator, and problem solving by the Maintenance Rule Committee members versus providing oversight of the products brought to the meeting. The inspectors discussed this trend with Entergy in the fall of 2009 and | |||
: CR-PNP-2009-4197 | |||
was written to document examples. | |||
conduct an apparent cause evaluation, and to specify corrective actions. Corrective actions have included clarifying the roles and responsibilities of the Maintenance Rule Coordinator, conduct of training on the Maintenance Rule and the need for rigor and review of design basis documents in the conduct of functional failure evaluations, and formalizing Maintenance Rule Committee protocols and meeting conduct guidelines. | |||
: The inspectors have noted improvement in the conduct of Maintenance Rule Committee meetings; | |||
however. additional examples of MRP issues continued to occur over the last two quarters. | |||
: The inspectors have therefore concluded that the number and extent of MRP issues during the past year constitutes | |||
a low level trend with the implementation of this program. The inspectors will follow Entergy's corrective actions to evaluate their response to this low level trend . . 3 Annual Sample: Maintenance Rule Program Issues a. Inspection Scope (1 sample) The inspectors focused on Entergy's identification, evaluation, and resolution of MRP deficiencies and issues as documented in CR-PNP*2009-4197. | |||
.4 The inspectors reviewed Entergy's apparent cause analysis, extent of condition review, and their short-term and long-term corrective actions. The inspectors conducted interviews, reviewed corporate procedures and condition reports related to the implementation of the MRP at Pilgrim. The documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. | |||
b. Findings and Observations No findings were identified. | |||
: See Section 40A2.2 for a discussion on the identification of a low level trend in the implementation of the MRP at Pilgrim. The apparent cause identified that Engineering Management had provided a greater focus on the equipment reliability process and had not provided the same level of oversight to the MRP. In addition, the Condition Report (CR) discussed | |||
a lack of rigor by engineers in implementing the process. Corrective actions discussed in the apparent cause to correct the problem included; | |||
review of expectations with System Engineers for daily CR screening, assigning qualified engineers to review functional failures and (a)(1) action plans, briefing of the Condition Report Review Group on Maintenance Rule risk significant components, and a review of the Maintenance Rule basis documents to ensure accuracy and adequate scoping. In addition, the System Engineering Maintenance Rule Coordinator, SE Supervisor and SE Manager reviewed all corporate | |||
: MRP documents to ensure they understood all requirements, roles, and responsibilities. | |||
: Also, additional formal training was provided to System Engineers on MRP responsibilities, proper documentation, and expectations for completing functional failure determinations and 10 | |||
: CFR 50.65 (a)(1) action plans. The inspectorp determined that MRP deficiencies continue to occur at Pilgrim. The inspectors also concluded that the number of issues identified during MRP inspections constitutes | |||
a low level trend which is documented in Section 40A2.2. The inspectors will conduct follow-up inspections of Entergy MRP performance as part of the periodic assessment of low level trends . Annual Sample: Feedwater Regulating Valve Lockup Concerns a. Inspection Scope (1 sample) This inspection focused on Entergy's problem identification, evaluation, and resolution conceming feedwater regulating valve (FRV) lockup issues that provided a challenge to automatic reactor water level control. The inspectors selected Entergy's | |||
: FRV corrective actions for review based on the potential impact on reactor vessel level control as undesired | |||
: FRV lockups could complicate event response, result in a plant transient, andlor unnecessarily challenge control room operators. | |||
: The inspectors reviewed Entergy's associated troubleshooting documentation, root cause evaluations, condition review, and short and long-term corrective actions. The inspectors performed | |||
a walkdown of the FRV electronic control modules and a remote camera inspection of the normally inaccessible | |||
: FRVs to assess the FRV controller error code status, actuator pressures, material condition, and configuration control. The inspectors also interviewed plant personnel; | |||
inspected several replaced FRV actuator components and Entergy's | |||
: FRV mock-up facility; | |||
and reviewed procedures, vendor manuals, related operating experience, and drawings. | |||
===Documents=== | |||
reviewed are listed in the | |||
b. Findings and Observations No findings were identified. | |||
: I&C technicians determined that the "8" FRV control system not locked up electrically in the conventional way, but had locked up by a computer failure as evidenced by the FRV actuator response and the recorded error Engineering concluded that the root cause of the abnormal and spurious operation resulted in the "silent" lockups of the "8" FRV was high input process noise caused by failure to adequately set up the FW level transmitters for maximum dampening following replacement in RF017. In addition, engineering concluded that the failure to install software in the "8" FRV control system was a contributing cause. The new provided sensitivity changes to improve overall system response and operation. adjusted the level transmitters for maximum dampening on May 27, 2009 and installed new software in the 8 FRV controller on June 16, 2009. Entergy's corrective actions included: | |||
increased system monitoring in accordance with their Operational Making Issue (ODMI) process, implementation of permanent changes to the documents associated with the replacement and calibration of FW level transmitters. conducting an extent-of-condition Regarding the above "8" FRV lockup issue, the inspectors concluded that Entergy had taken appropriate action in accordance with station procedures, NRC Maintenance Rule (MR) requirements, and their corrective action program (CAP). The inspectors determined that engineering's associated root cause evaluation was sufficiently thorough and based on the best available information, troubleshooting, sound engineering judgment. | |||
and relevant industry operating experience. | |||
: In general, Entergy's assigned corrective actions were aligned with the identified causal factors, adequately tracked, appropriately documented, and completed as scheduled. | |||
: The inspectors noted that Entergy created and effectively used a FRV actuator mock-up to facilitate their root cause evaluation, troubleshooting, and training i " efforts. In addition, Entergy management effectively implemented their ODMI process to provide additional monitoring and oversight of FRV performance in response to the identified lockups. During the extent-of-condition review for the "8" FRV "silent" lockup issue, the noted that Entergy had also identified degraded conditions associated with the "An actuator assembly. | |||
: On April 17, 2009 (prior to RF017), the FW system engineer an adverse trend in the actuator pressures and initiated | |||
: CR-PNP-2009-1372 | |||
to assess trend the condition. | |||
: The condition had no noticeable impact on FRV performance engineering continued to monitor the FRV performance. | |||
: A focused engineering immediately following the plant shutdown for RF017 identified that the "A" FRV was as expected, but locked up {a "silent" lockup caused by a friction failure error code}. Engineering inspection of the "A" FRV stepper motor found excessive friction in the motor worm gear due to hardened grease, and some indications of scoring inside the and sleeve assembly (CR-PNP-2009-1983). | |||
: Engineering determined that the cause was the vendor supplied lubricant found in the spool/sleeve assembly and mismatched spool/sleeve assembly that may have contributed to the friction. (The applied lubricant to the stepper motor shaft and gear; however, the spool/sleeve assembly a matched set with tight tolerances that should not be lubricated.) | |||
: Entergy replaced the Enclosure | |||
: FRV actuator internals (with a matched spoollsleeve set) and performed an | |||
condition inspection on the "6" FRV. The inspectors noted that the causal factors for the two FRV performance issues noted above were different. | |||
even though they both resulted in "silent" FRV lockups. The inspectors noted that Entergy took prompt and appropriate corrective actions to address the short-term concerns associated with the A FRV high friction failure (and accompanying "silent" lockup); however, did not effectively track long-term actions within their CAP and did not adequately evaluate potential | |||
: MR aspects of the issue. Specifically, (1) the equipment failure evaluation for | |||
: CR-PNP-2009-1983 | |||
noted that "the condition resulted in the loss of a critical function of the SSC" and "the failed SSC resulted in an unexpected operational effect," however, engineering did not perform a MR functional failure evaluation of the condition; | |||
(2) the discovery of the "eilenr lockup (an unexpected failure) did not trigger a higher Significance | |||
: CR review; (3) long-term corrective actions to ensure appropriate changes were made to preventive maintenance procedures to verify actuator assembly lubrication and spool/sleeve condition were labeled as enhancements and remained open; and (4) there were no apparent corrective actions to address the excessive wear identified within the spool assembly. | |||
: Engineering initiated | |||
: CR-PNP-20 | |||
: 0-1299 to address these issues. Based upon direct observation of the FRV module error codes and operational history review, the inspectors noted that Pilgrim had not experienced any "silent" lockups Since implementing corrective actions in June 2009. The inspectors noted that engineering initiated actions to work with the FRV controller vendor to eliminate any potential "silent" lockups (all error codes that disable the FRV but do not trip the fault relay to provide control room alarm). Entergy proceeded cautiously and appropriately to ensure that they did not introduce any additional electronic lockups below the threshold of those previously analyzed and expected. | |||
: Although engineering believed that they had addressed the causal factors associated with the unexpected | |||
: FRV "silent" lockups in May and June 2009, the inspectors noted that operations had not incorporated periodic FRV control module monitoring to check the error code status to verify no "silent" lockups present (until such time that they were no longer vulnerable to "silent" lockups). | |||
: Engineering captured this inspector observation within | |||
: CR 2010*1299 . . 5 Annual Sample: Motor Control Center Relay Failure a. Inspection Scope (1 sample) The inspectors performed an in-depth review of Entergy's root cause analysis and corrective actions associated with condition report (CR) | |||
: High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System Injection Valve Motor Control Center (MeC) D954 Under-Voltage Relay Failure. Specifically, a normally energized under-voltage relay failed, which resulted in de-energizing the motor actuator for the normally closed HPCI injection valve, The inspectors assessed Entergy's problem identification threshold, cause analyses. | |||
extent of condition reviews, compensatory actions, and the prioritization and timeliness of Entergy's corrective actions to determine whether Entergy was appropriately identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems associated with this issue and whether the planned or completed corrective actions were appropriate. | |||
: The inspectors compared the Enclosure actions taken to the requirements of Entergy's corrective action program and 10 | |||
: CFR 50, Appendix B. In addition, the inspectors performed field walkdowns and interviewed engineering personnel to assess the effectiveness of the implemented corrective actions. Specific documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report. b. Findings and Observations No findings were identified. | |||
: Entergy determined the most probable cause was an isolated relay failure early in its service life due to a manufacturing defect. Entergyalso determined that the relay had operated at a higher voltage than assumed in the environmental qualification (EO) report, because the 250 VDC battery bus typically operated at about 266 VDC while the battery was on float charge. Entergy determined that operating the relay at a slightly higher voltage would result in a higher component intemal temperature, which may have led to a shortened life expectancy and may have been a contributing cause to the premature relay failure. Entergy conducted | |||
a thorough technical review of the relay failure, including | |||
a comprehensive failure analysis performed by an independent third party laboratory. | |||
: Entergy's extent of condition review identified additional normally energized | |||
: DC relays which were also operating on a battery float voltage greater than assumed in their EO reports. Corrective actions included replacing the failed relay and revising the EO service life and preventative maintenance (PM) replacement tasks for the affected relays. The inspectors reviewed selected relay maintenance records and did not identify any additional issues. The inspectors determined Entergy's overall response to the issue was commensurate with the safety significance, timely, and included appropriate compensatory actions. The inspectors determined that the actions taken were reasonable to resolve both the initial relay failure and the impact from elevated operating temperatures to relay service life. However, the inspector's review of selected design records identified insufficient design control measures had been used during the revision of the relays EO service life. Specifically, the inspectors identified that a field measurement of relay temperature had been used as a key design input parameter to re-calculate the EO service life. However, Entergy did not use calibrated measurement and test equipment (M& TE) for the field measurement, and did not evaluate the measurement or test uncertainty in the field measurement. | |||
: In addition, Entergy used a vendor to re-calculate the relay EO service life. However, the vendors new EQ service life values were documented in a memorandum from the vendor to Entergy, without any supporting details or analysis, and the memorandum was not controlled under a quality assurance (OA) program. This performance deficiency was determined to be a minor because it was related to equipment qualification and no equipment operability or functionality was Significantly affected. | |||
: In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, "Power Reactor Inspection Reports," the above 'issue constituted | |||
a violation of minor significance that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy. Entergy entered the inspector's observations into their CAP (CR-PNP-201 | |||
: 0-2073). Enclosure Event Follow-up | |||
(71153) Operator Performance During Thermal Backwash a. Inspection Scope (1 sample) The inspectors observed an infrequently performed evolution on May 20,2010. r Specifically, the inspectors observed a plant downpower to support thermal backwash of the condenser and "B" feedwater regulating valve post maintenance testing. The I inspectors reviewed procedural guidance for station power changes and the power maneuver plan, and observed control room conduct and control of the evolution. | |||
: The documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment. | |||
b. Findings No findings were identified . . (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER 05000293/2010-001-00) | |||
: Single Train of Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) System Inoperable for Time Period Exceeding Technical Specification Limits The inspectors reviewed Entergy's actions and reportability criteria associated with | |||
: LER 05000293/2010-001-00, which are addressed in CR-PNP-2010-0130. | |||
: On January 10, 2010, plant operators discovered | |||
a broken bolt on the clamp of the seismic support for the instrument line of the local pump suction pressure gauge on the "A" train of R8CCW. Upon discovery, Entergy entered and then exited their Technical Specifications (TS) once the bolt was replaced. | |||
: However, subsequent engineering reviews could not determine the exact time the bolt broke. 8ased on the condition of the bolt it was assumed that the bolt was broken for a time period that exceeded the 72 hour allowable | |||
: TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) action statement for one RBCCW subsystem being inoperable. | |||
: Entergy took corrective actions which included installation of the new bolt on the instrument line and performing an extent of condition review on the "8" train of R8CCW from which they identified no other broken bolts or seismic support damage. The documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. | |||
: The enforcement aspects of this finding are discussed in Section 40A7. This LER is closed . . (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER 05000293/2010-002-00), Standby Gas Treatment Declared Inoperable After Discovery of Open Demister Door The inspectors reviewed Entergy's actions associated with | |||
: LER 05000293/2010-002-00, which are addressed in the CAP as | : LER 05000293/2010-002-00, which are addressed in the CAP as | ||
: CR-PNP-201 0-1 079. The event and enforcement aspects of a licensee-identified violation were discussed in NRC Inspection Report (IR) 05000293(2010002 in Section 40A7 of that report. The documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. This LER is closed. Enclosure | : CR-PNP-201 | ||
: 0-1 079. The event and enforcement aspects of a licensee-identified violation were discussed in NRC Inspection Report (IR) 05000293(2010002 | |||
in Section 40A7 of that report. The documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. | |||
: This LER is closed. Enclosure | |||
: 40A5 Other Activities (CLOSED) | : 40A5 Other Activities (CLOSED) | ||
: EA-10-003, | : EA-10-003, | ||
: NOV 050000293/2009005-01, Incomplete Licensed Operator Medical Examinations Inspection Scope In accordance with Inspection Procedure | : NOV 050000293/2009005-01, Incomplete Licensed Operator Medical Examinations Inspection Scope In accordance with Inspection | ||
: EA-10-003, which was identified due to the submittal of inaccurate medical information for licensed operators. The submittals to the NRC were inaccurate due to incomplete olfactory testing "to detect odor of products of combustion" from required licensed operator and initial applicant medical examinations. This issue was documented as a cited violation in inspection report 05000293/2009005. The inspectors reviewed the condition reports and analyses developed by Entergy to ensure the adequacy of (1) the evaluation of the issue; (2) the eValuation and impact of generic implications; and (3) that corrective actions have been fully implemented. The inspectors reviewed the scope and depth of the analysis in addressing the identified deficiency. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's assessment of generic implications of the identified violation on other Entergy facilities and other aspects of licensed operator medical examinations. The inspectors evaluated the corrective actions implemented by Entergy to determine whether they were adequate to address the identified deficiency and prevent recurrence. Additionally, the inspectors evaluated the licensee's determination of why appropriate action was not taken in response to Information Notice (IN) 2004-20, "Recent Issues Associated with NRC Medical Requirements for Licensed Operators," to identify that appropriate olfactory testing was not being conducted. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's identified causes and the actions taken by the licensee to prevent recurrence of those causes. Findings No findings were identified. The inspectors determined that the scope and depth of the analysis to address the identified deficiency was adequate and appropriate. The inspectors also determined that the generic implications identified by the corrective action process were adequate and appropriate. The inspectors concluded that Entergy's corrective actions were both timely and appropriate to address the identified deficiency and generic implications. The inspectors determined that weaknesses in the Operating Experience Program that were identified as contributing causes in the failure to take appropriate action when | ===Procedure=== | ||
: IN 2004-20 was issued, were adequately corrected by changes made to the program. The changes were determined to correct the identified cause and prevent recurrence. The inspectors determined that no cross*cutting aspect would be assigned to the NOV, because the failure to use operating experience effectively was not indicative of current performance. | : 2702, "Followup on Corrective Actions for Violations and Deviations," the inspectors conducted | ||
a follow-up inspection of enforcement action | |||
: EA-10-003, which was identified due to the submittal of inaccurate medical information for licensed operators. | |||
: The submittals to the NRC were inaccurate due to incomplete olfactory testing "to detect odor of products of combustion" from required licensed operator and initial applicant medical examinations. | |||
: This issue was documented as a cited violation in inspection report 05000293/2009005. | |||
: The inspectors reviewed the condition reports and analyses developed by Entergy to ensure the adequacy of (1) the evaluation of the issue; (2) the eValuation and impact of generic implications; | |||
and (3) that corrective actions have been fully implemented. | |||
: The inspectors reviewed the scope and depth of the analysis in addressing the identified deficiency. | |||
: The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's assessment of generic implications of the identified violation on other Entergy facilities and other aspects of licensed operator medical examinations. | |||
: The inspectors evaluated the corrective actions implemented by Entergy to determine whether they were adequate to address the identified deficiency and prevent recurrence. | |||
: Additionally, the inspectors evaluated the licensee's determination of why appropriate action was not taken in response to Information Notice (IN) 2004-20, "Recent Issues Associated with NRC Medical Requirements for Licensed Operators," to identify that appropriate olfactory testing was not being conducted. | |||
: The inspectors reviewed the licensee's identified causes and the actions taken by the licensee to prevent recurrence of those causes. Findings No findings were identified. | |||
: The inspectors determined that the scope and depth of the analysis to address the identified deficiency was adequate and appropriate. | |||
: The inspectors also determined that the generic implications identified by the corrective action process were adequate and appropriate. | |||
: The inspectors concluded that Entergy's corrective actions were both timely and appropriate to address the identified deficiency and generic implications. | |||
: The inspectors determined that weaknesses in the Operating Experience Program that were identified as contributing causes in the failure to take appropriate action when | |||
: IN 2004-20 was issued, were adequately corrected by changes made to the program. The changes were determined to correct the identified cause and prevent recurrence. The inspectors determined that no cross*cutting aspect would be assigned to the NOV, because the failure to use operating experience effectively was not indicative of current performance. | |||
(CLOSED) | (CLOSED) | ||
: URI 050000293/2009005-01. Procedure Change to Allow Disabling DUring Inspection Scope During the previous reporting period, the NRC issued an Unresolved Item (URI) document an issue involving | : URI 050000293/2009005-01. | ||
: CFR 50.59, "Changes, Test and Experiments," due the improper implementation of a procedure change which may have resulted in a than minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of a system or component (SSC) important to safety...." The issue was opened as Unresolved Item (URI) in NRC Inspection Report 050000293/2009005. The concluded that the 1 0 | ===Procedure=== | ||
: CFR 50.59 preliminary evaluation checklist developed to the current and previous revisions to procedure 2.2.21.5, "HPCllnjection and Contro'" was incorrect and did not support the procedure The inspectors reviewed the licensee actions to develop a 10 | : Change to Allow Disabling DUring Inspection Scope During the previous reporting period, the NRC issued an Unresolved Item (URI) document an issue involving | ||
: CFR 50.59 evaluation addressed the conditions described in procedure 2.2.21.5. The inspectors evaluated the completed | : CFR 50.59, "Changes, Test and Experiments," due the improper implementation of a procedure change which may have resulted in a than minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of a system or component (SSC) important to safety...." The issue was opened as Unresolved Item (URI) in NRC Inspection Report 050000293/2009005. | ||
: CFR 50.59 evaluation to ensure that the changes made procedure 2.2.21.5 did not require prior NRC Findings No findings were identified. The inspectors determined that the actions taken to address the issue were and adequate. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the 10 | : The concluded that the 1 0 | ||
: CFR 50.59 developed by the licensee and determined that procedure 2.2.21.5 did not require license amendment or NRC approval prior to use. Per the guidance provided in the Enforcement Manual, this issue meets the definition of a minor violation per 2.10.6. The inspectors concluded that | : CFR 50.59 preliminary evaluation checklist developed to the current and previous revisions to procedure | ||
: URI 050000293/2009005-01 can be closed the corrective actions taken to address this issue were adequate to correct the TI2515/179 Verification of Licensee Responses to NRC Requirement for Inventories of Tracked in the National Source Tracking System Pursuant to Title 10, Code of I* Eederal Regulations. Part 20.2207 (10 | : 2.2.21.5, "HPCllnjection and Contro'" was incorrect and did not support the procedure The inspectors reviewed the licensee actions to develop a 10 | ||
: CFR 20.2207) IInsQection Scope | : CFR 50.59 evaluation addressed the conditions described in procedure | ||
: CFR 20.2207 Inspection Planning I The inspectors retrieved a copy of Pilgrim's NSTS inventory from Pilgrim's account via Regional staff with NSTS I/ Enclosure I | : 2.2.21.5. | ||
: Inventory Verification The inspectors performed a physical inventory of the sources listed on the Pilgrim's inventory and visually identified each source listed on the inventory; The inspectors verified the presence of the nationally tracked sources by having a radiation protection supervisor perform a survey with a radiation survey instrument; The inspectors examined the physical condition of the source containers, evaluated the effectiveness of the procedures for secure storage and handling. discussed Pilgrim's maintenance of the devices including source leak tests, and verified the posting and labeling of the sources was appropriate; and The inspectors reviewed Pilgrim's records for these sources and compared the records with the data from the NSTS inventory. The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of Pilgrim's procedures for updating the inventory records. Determine the Location of Unaccounted-for Nationally tracked source(s} The inspectors verified Pilgrim has no unaccounted-for source(s). Review of Other Administrative Information The inspectors reviewed the administrative information contained in the NSTS inventory printout with Pilgrim personnel. All administrative information, mailing address, docket number, and license number, was verified to be correct. Findings No findings were identified . (Closed) NRC Temporary Instruction 2515/177 -Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling, Decay Heat Removal and Containment Spray Systems Inspection Scope The inspectors performed the inspection in accordance with Temporary Instruction (TI} 2515/177, "Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling, Decay Heat Removal and Containment Spray Systems". The NRC staff developed TI25151177 to support the NRC's confirmatory review of licensees' response to NRC Generic Letter (GL) 2008-01, "Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling, Decay Heat Removal and Containment Spray Systems." The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) documented completion of their review of Entergy's | : The inspectors evaluated the completed | ||
: | : CFR 50.59 evaluation to ensure that the changes made procedure | ||
: ML 100950092). Based on the review of Entergy's | : 2.2.21.5 did not require prior NRC Findings No findings were identified. | ||
: GL 2008-01 response letters, the NRR staff provided guidance on TI inspection scope to the regional inspectors. The inspectors used this inspection guidance along with the TI to verify that Entergy implemented or was in the process of acceptably implementing the commitments, modifications, and programmatically controlled actions described in their | : The inspectors determined that the actions taken to address the issue were and adequate. | ||
: GL 2008-01 response. The inspectors verified that the plant-specific information (including licensing bases documents and design information) was consistent with the information used by NRR in their assessment and Enclosure that it supported a conclusion that the subject systems' operability was reasonably assured. The inspectors reviewed a sample of isometric drawings and piping and instrument diagrams (P&IDs). and conducted selected system piping walkdowns to verify that Entergy's drawings reflected the subject system configurations and Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) descriptions. Specifically, the inspectors verified the following related to a sample of isometric drawings for the high pressure injection (HPCI), core spray, and residual heat removal (RHR) systems: High point vents were identified; High points that did not have vents were recognized and evaluated with to their potential for gas Other areas where gas could accumulate and potentially impact subject system operability, such as at orifices in horizontal pipes, isolated branch lines, heat exchangers, improperly sloped piping, and under closed valves, were acceptably evaluated in engineering reviews or had ultrasonic testing (UT) points which would reasonably detect void formation; and, For piping segments reviewed, branch lines and fittings were clearly shown. The inspectors conducted walkdowns of portions of the above systems to reasonably assure the acceptability of Entergy's drawings utilized during their review of the | : Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the 10 | ||
: GL 01. The inspectors verified that Entergy conducted walkdowns of the applicable systems to confirm that system orientations, vents and alarms, in combination with instructions, procedures, tests, and training, would ensure that each system was sufficiently full of water to assure operability. The inspectors reviewed Entergy's methodology used to determine system piping high points, identification of negative sloped piping, and calculations of void sizes based on UT equipment readings, to ensure the methods were reasonable. The inspectors reviewed engineering analyses associated with the development of acceptance criteria for as-found voids. The review included engineering assumptions for void transport and acceptability of void fractions at the suction and discharge piping of the applicable system pumps. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the pressure transient analysis downstream of the low pressure core injection (LPCI) isolation valve (MO 1001-29NB) associated with steam voiding conditions within the piping to ensure LPCI operability following reactor depressurization. The inspectors also observed a field UT measurement in the HPCI suction piping from the torus to assess the adequacy of the monitoring techniques used to ensure system operability. The inspectors reviewed a sample of Entergy's procedures used for filling and venting the associated | : CFR 50.59 | ||
: GL 2008-1 systems to verify that the procedures were effective in venting or reducing voiding to acceptable levels. The inspectors verified that Entergy had plans in place to install two hardware vents, one vent located in the HPCI pump suction torus piping and the other located at a highpoint within the core spray discharge piping, as committed to in their GL response. The inspectors verified that Entergy's surveillance frequencies were consistent with Pilgrim's technical specifications and associated bases, and the UFSAR. The inspectors reviewed a sample of system venting surveillance results to ensure proper implementation of the surveillance program and that the existence of unacceptable gas accumulation was evaluated within the CAP, as necessary. The inspectors reviewed CAP documents to verify that selected actions Enclosure described in Entergy's submittals were acceptably documented including completed actions, implementation schedule for incomplete actions, and verification that NRC commitments were included the CAP. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed evaluations and corrective actions for various issues Entergy identified during their | developed by the licensee and determined that procedure | ||
: GL 2008-01 review. The inspectors performed this review to ensure Entergy appropriately evaluated and adequately addressed any gas voiding concerns including the evaluation of operability for gas voids discovered in the field. Finally, the inspectors reviewed Entergy's training program and documentation to assess if appropriate training had been provided to the operations and engineering support staff to ensure appropriate awareness of the effects of gas voiding. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. b. Finding!? No findings were identified. 40A6 Meetings, Including Exit On March 30, 2010, Donald Jackson, NRC Regional Branch Chief for Pilgrim, presented and discussed the End-of-Cycle performance assessment of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station with Mr. Stephen Bethay. The licensee acknowledged the assessment and planned regulatory oversight. This discussion was completed prior to a public performance assessment open-house meeting on March 30, 2010. (ADAMS Accession | : 2.2.21.5 did not require license amendment or NRC approval prior to use. Per the guidance provided in the Enforcement Manual, this issue meets the definition of a minor violation per 2.10.6. The inspectors concluded that | ||
: ML 100621417). On April 22, 2010, the inspectors presented the inspection results from a heat sink inspection and feedwater valve lockup issues to Mr. Robert Smith, General Manager Pilgrim Operations, and other members of the Entergy staff. The inspectors confirmed that no proprietary information was provided to the inspectors for the inspection. On May 20, 2010, an occupational radiation inspection exit meeting was held with the plant. Kevin Bronson, Site Vice President, attended the meeting. At the exit meeting, the inspectors confirmed that no proprietary information was provided to the inspectors for the inspection. On June 11, 2010, the inspectors presented the inspection results from the failure ofthe High Pressure Coolant Injection system Condition Report review to Mr. Vincent Fallacara, Director of Engineering, and other members of Entergy's staff. The inspectors confirmed that no proprietary information was provided to the inspectors for the inspection. On June 24,2010, the inspectors presented the inspection results from a gas accumulation inspection to Mr. Robert Smith, General Manager of Plant Operations, and other members of the Entergy staff. The team reviewed proprietary information, which was returned to Entergy at the end of the inspection. The inspectors verified that no proprietary information is documented in this report. On July 13, 2010, the resident inspectors conducted an exit meeting and presented the preliminary inspection results to Mr. Kevin Bronson, and other members of the Pilgrim staff. At the exit meeting, the inspectors confirmed that no proprietary information was provided to the inspectors for the inspection. | : URI 050000293/2009005-01 | ||
: 40A7 licensee-Identified Violations The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by Entergy and is a violation of NRC requirements, which meets the criteria of the NRC Enforcement Policy, for being dis positioned as an NeV. Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.B.3, Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) System, requires that two RBCCW subsystems shall be operable whenever irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel, reactor coolant temperature is >212° F, and prior to startup from a cold shutdown. With one RBCCW subsystem inoperable, the required action is to restore the subsystem to operable within 72 hours or be in Cold Shutdown within an additional | can be closed the corrective actions taken to address this issue were adequate to correct the TI2515/179 | ||
: CR-PNP-201 0-0130. The finding was evaluated using | : Verification of Licensee Responses to NRC Requirement for Inventories of | ||
: IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, and was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding would not have resulted in the total 1055 of a safety function during a seismic event ATIACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION | : Tracked in the National Source Tracking System Pursuant to Title 10, Code of I* Eederal Regulations. | ||
: FIN 05000293/2010003-01 Submerged Medium Voltage Cables Closed | : Part 20.2207 (10 | ||
: NOV 050000293/2009005-01 Incomplete Licensed Operator Medical Examinations | : CFR 20.2207) IInsQection Scope I During the period May 17, 2010 through May 20,2010, the inspectors performed the I following activities to confirm the inventories of materials possessed by Pilgrim were I appropriately reported and documented in the National Source Tracking System (NSTS) in accordance with 10 | ||
: URI 050000293/2009005*01 Procedure Change to Allow Disabling HPCI During Transients | : CFR 20.2207 Inspection Planning I The inspectors retrieved | ||
: LER 0500029312010-001-00 Single Train of Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) System. Inoperable for Time Period Exceeding Technical Specification Limits | a copy of Pilgrim's | ||
: LER 05000293/2010-002-00 Standby Gas Treatment Declared Inoperable After Discovery of Open Demister Door Attachment | : NSTS inventory from Pilgrim's account via Regional staff with NSTS I/ Enclosure | ||
: LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Section 1R01 Procedure 2.1.27, Revision 25, Coastal Storm -Preparations and Procedure 8.C.40, Revision 24, Seasonal Weather Procedure 2.1.42, Revision 9, Operation During Severe Procedure 5.2.2, Revision 31, High Winds | : I | ||
: Inventory Verification The inspectors performed | |||
a physical inventory of the sources listed on the Pilgrim's inventory and visually identified each source listed on the inventory; The inspectors verified the presence of the nationally tracked sources by having a radiation protection supervisor perform a survey with a radiation survey instrument; The inspectors examined the physical condition of the source containers, evaluated the effectiveness of the procedures for secure storage and handling. | |||
discussed Pilgrim's maintenance of the devices including source leak tests, and verified the posting and labeling of the sources was appropriate; | |||
and The inspectors reviewed Pilgrim's records for these sources and compared the records with the data from the NSTS inventory. | |||
: The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of Pilgrim's procedures for updating the inventory records. Determine the Location of Unaccounted-for Nationally tracked source(s} The inspectors verified Pilgrim has no unaccounted-for source(s). | |||
: Review of Other Administrative Information The inspectors reviewed the administrative information contained in the NSTS inventory printout with Pilgrim personnel. | |||
: All administrative information, mailing address, docket number, and license number, was verified to be correct. Findings No findings were identified . (Closed) NRC Temporary Instruction | |||
: 2515/177 -Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling, Decay Heat Removal and Containment Spray Systems Inspection Scope The inspectors performed the inspection in accordance with Temporary Instruction (TI} 2515/177, "Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling, Decay Heat Removal and Containment Spray Systems". | |||
: The NRC staff developed | |||
: TI25151177 | |||
to support the NRC's confirmatory review of licensees' response to NRC Generic Letter (GL) 2008-01, "Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling, Decay Heat Removal and Containment Spray Systems." The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) documented completion of their review of Entergy's GL | |||
: 2008-01 response in a closure letter dated April 6, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. | |||
: ML 100950092). | |||
: Based on the review of Entergy's | |||
: GL 2008-01 response letters, the NRR staff provided guidance on TI inspection scope to the regional inspectors. | |||
: The inspectors used this inspection guidance along with the TI to verify that Entergy implemented or was in the process of acceptably implementing the commitments, modifications, and programmatically controlled actions described in their | |||
: GL 2008-01 response. | |||
: The inspectors verified that the plant-specific information (including licensing bases documents and design information) | |||
was consistent with the information used by NRR in their assessment and Enclosure that it supported | |||
a conclusion that the subject systems' operability was reasonably assured. The inspectors reviewed a sample of isometric drawings and piping and instrument diagrams (P&IDs). and conducted selected system piping walkdowns to verify that Entergy's drawings reflected the subject system configurations and Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) descriptions. Specifically, the inspectors verified the following related to a sample of isometric drawings for the high pressure injection (HPCI), core spray, and residual heat removal (RHR) systems: High point vents were identified; High points that did not have vents were recognized and evaluated with to their potential for gas Other areas where gas could accumulate and potentially impact subject system operability, such as at orifices in horizontal pipes, isolated branch lines, heat exchangers, improperly sloped piping, and under closed valves, were acceptably evaluated in engineering reviews or had ultrasonic testing (UT) points which would reasonably detect void formation; | |||
and, For piping segments reviewed, branch lines and fittings were clearly shown. The inspectors conducted walkdowns of portions of the above systems to reasonably assure the acceptability of Entergy's drawings utilized during their review of the | |||
: GL 01. The inspectors verified that Entergy conducted walkdowns of the applicable systems to confirm that system orientations, vents and alarms, in combination with instructions, procedures, tests, and training, would ensure that each system was sufficiently full of water to assure operability. | |||
: The inspectors reviewed Entergy's methodology used to determine system piping high points, identification of negative sloped piping, and calculations of void sizes based on UT equipment readings, to ensure the methods were reasonable. | |||
: The inspectors reviewed engineering analyses associated with the development of acceptance criteria for as-found voids. The review included engineering assumptions for void transport and acceptability of void fractions at the suction and discharge piping of the applicable system pumps. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the pressure transient analysis downstream of the low pressure core injection (LPCI) isolation valve (MO 1001-29NB) | |||
associated with steam voiding conditions within the piping to ensure LPCI operability following reactor depressurization. | |||
: The inspectors also observed a field UT measurement in the HPCI suction piping from the torus to assess the adequacy of the monitoring techniques used to ensure system operability. | |||
: The inspectors reviewed a sample of Entergy's procedures used for filling and venting the associated | |||
: GL 2008-1 systems to verify that the procedures were effective in venting or reducing voiding to acceptable levels. The inspectors verified that Entergy had plans in place to install two hardware vents, one vent located in the HPCI pump suction torus piping and the other located at a highpoint within the core spray discharge piping, as committed to in their GL response. | |||
: The inspectors verified that Entergy's surveillance frequencies were consistent with Pilgrim's technical specifications and associated bases, and the UFSAR. The inspectors reviewed a sample of system venting surveillance results to ensure proper implementation of the surveillance program and that the existence of unacceptable gas accumulation was evaluated within the CAP, as necessary. | |||
: The inspectors reviewed CAP documents to verify that selected actions Enclosure described in Entergy's submittals were acceptably documented including completed actions, implementation schedule for incomplete actions, and verification that NRC commitments were included the CAP. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed evaluations and corrective actions for various issues Entergy identified during their | |||
: GL 2008-01 review. The inspectors performed this review to ensure Entergy appropriately evaluated and adequately addressed any gas voiding concerns including the evaluation of operability for gas voids discovered in the field. Finally, the inspectors reviewed Entergy's training program and documentation to assess if appropriate training had been provided to the operations and engineering support staff to ensure appropriate awareness of the effects of gas voiding. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. | |||
b. Finding!? | |||
: No findings were identified. | |||
: 40A6 Meetings, Including Exit On March 30, 2010, Donald Jackson, NRC Regional Branch Chief for Pilgrim, presented and discussed the End-of-Cycle performance assessment of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station with Mr. Stephen Bethay. The licensee acknowledged the assessment and planned regulatory oversight. | |||
: This discussion was completed prior to a public performance assessment open-house meeting on March 30, 2010. (ADAMS Accession | |||
: ML 100621417). | |||
: On April 22, 2010, the inspectors presented the inspection results from a heat sink inspection and feedwater valve lockup issues to Mr. Robert Smith, General Manager Pilgrim Operations, and other members of the Entergy staff. The inspectors confirmed that no proprietary information was provided to the inspectors for the inspection. | |||
: On May 20, 2010, an occupational radiation inspection exit meeting was held with the plant. Kevin Bronson, Site Vice President, attended the meeting. At the exit meeting, the inspectors confirmed that no proprietary information was provided to the inspectors for the inspection. | |||
: On June 11, 2010, the inspectors presented the inspection results from the failure ofthe High Pressure Coolant Injection system Condition Report review to Mr. Vincent Fallacara, Director of Engineering, and other members of Entergy's staff. The inspectors confirmed that no proprietary information was provided to the inspectors for the inspection. | |||
: On June 24,2010, the inspectors presented the inspection results from a gas accumulation inspection to Mr. Robert Smith, General Manager of Plant Operations, and other members of the Entergy staff. The team reviewed proprietary information, which was returned to Entergy at the end of the inspection. | |||
: The inspectors verified that no proprietary information is documented in this report. On July 13, 2010, the resident inspectors conducted an exit meeting and presented the preliminary inspection results to Mr. Kevin Bronson, and other members of the Pilgrim staff. At the exit meeting, the inspectors confirmed that no proprietary information was provided to the inspectors for the inspection. | |||
: 40A7 licensee-Identified Violations The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by Entergy and is a violation of NRC requirements, which meets the criteria of the NRC Enforcement Policy, for being dis positioned as an NeV. Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.B.3, Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) System, requires that two RBCCW subsystems shall be operable whenever irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel, reactor coolant temperature is >212° F, and prior to startup from a cold shutdown. | |||
: With one RBCCW subsystem inoperable, the required action is to restore the subsystem to operable within 72 hours or be in Cold Shutdown within an additional hours. Contrary to the above, the "N' train of RBCCW was inoperable for an indeterminate amount of time that likely exceeded the 72 hours of TS allowed outage time. Upon discovery of the broken bolt on the seismic support, the "A" train of RBCCW was declared inoperable. | |||
: An immediate corrective action was completed to install a new bolt on the seismic support and TS 3.5.8.3 was exited. The event is documented in Entergy's Corrective Action Program as | |||
: CR-PNP-201 | |||
: 0-0130. The finding was evaluated using | |||
: IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, and was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding would not have resulted in the total 1055 of a safety function during a seismic event ATIACHMENT: | |||
: SUPPLEMENTAL | |||
: INFORMATION | |||
: Entergy personnel: | |||
: S. Bethay K. Bronson R. Byrne B. Chenard V. Fallacara | |||
: J. Gaedtke K. Kampschneider | |||
: W. Lobo J. Lynch B. Mello F. Mulcahy D. Noyes J. Priest R. Smith M. Thornhill | |||
: E. Varmette S. Wollman Opened and Closed SUPPLEMENTAL | |||
: INFORMATION | |||
: KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Nuclear Safety Assessment Site Vice Licensing System Engineering Engineering System System Licensing Licensing Program System Operations Radiation Protection General Manager Pilgrim Radiation Protection Radiation Protection Engineering | |||
: LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED | |||
: FIN 05000293/2010003-01 | |||
: Submerged Medium Voltage Cables Closed | |||
: NOV 050000293/2009005-01 | |||
: Incomplete Licensed Operator Medical Examinations | |||
: URI 050000293/2009005*01 | |||
===Procedure=== | |||
: Change to Allow Disabling | |||
: HPCI During Transients | |||
: LER 0500029312010-001-00 | |||
: Single Train of Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) System. Inoperable for Time Period Exceeding Technical Specification Limits | |||
: LER 05000293/2010-002-00 | |||
: Standby Gas Treatment Declared Inoperable After Discovery of Open Demister Door Attachment | |||
: LIST OF DOCUMENTS | |||
: REVIEWED Section 1R01 Procedure | |||
: 2.1.27, Revision 25, Coastal Storm -Preparations and Procedure | |||
: 8.C.40, Revision 24, Seasonal Weather | |||
===Procedure=== | |||
: 2.1.42, Revision 9, Operation During Severe Procedure | |||
: 5.2.2, Revision 31, High Winds | |||
: WO 5221003101, 8.C.40, Section 8.3, Warm Weather | : WO 5221003101, 8.C.40, Section 8.3, Warm Weather | ||
: CR-PNP-201 0-0 1740, Discrepancies identified during inventory of coastal storm Procedure 1.4.4, Revision 21, New England Power Grid Procedure 2.1.14, Revision 102, Station Power NRC Generic letter 2006-02, Grid Reliability and the Impact on Plant Risk and the Operability Offsite Procedure 1.5.22, Revision 12, Risk Assessment ISO New England Procedure, Master/local Control Center Procedure #1, Revision 7, Plant Transmission Operations, Attachment A, Pilgrim Nuclear Pilgrim Response to Gl 2006-02, dated April 3, Section 1 R04 Procedure 2.2.30, Revision 69, RBCCW System UFSAR 10.5, RBCCW System | : CR-PNP-201 | ||
: 0-0 1740, Discrepancies identified during inventory of coastal storm Procedure | |||
: 1.4.4, Revision 21, New England Power Grid | |||
===Procedure=== | |||
: 2.1.14, Revision 102, Station Power NRC Generic letter 2006-02, Grid Reliability and the Impact on Plant Risk and the Operability Offsite Procedure | |||
: 1.5.22, Revision 12, Risk Assessment ISO New England Procedure, Master/local Control Center Procedure | |||
#1, Revision 7, Plant Transmission Operations, Attachment | |||
: A, Pilgrim Nuclear Pilgrim Response to Gl 2006-02, dated April 3, Section 1 R04 Procedure | |||
: 2.2.30, Revision 69, RBCCW System UFSAR 10.5, RBCCW System | |||
: CR-PNP-2010-0130, Bolt on RBCCW seismic support strap broken | : CR-PNP-2010-0130, Bolt on RBCCW seismic support strap broken | ||
: CR-PNP-2010-0906, RBCCW system requires Maintenance Rule (a)(1) evaluation | : CR-PNP-2010-0906, RBCCW system requires Maintenance Rule (a)(1) evaluation | ||
: CR-PNP-2010-3399, RBCCW Head Tank "An has a pegged high level gauge | : CR-PNP-2010-3399, RBCCW Head Tank "An has a pegged high level gauge | ||
: CR-PNP-2009-1863, Pipe supports H-30-1-53 and H-30-1-54 have corroded base plates | : CR-PNP-2009-1863, Pipe supports H-30-1-53 | ||
and H-30-1-54 | |||
have corroded base plates | |||
: CR-PNP-2009-2529, "D" RBCCW pump vibration in alert CR*PNP-2010-0131, Pressure instrument | : CR-PNP-2009-2529, "D" RBCCW pump vibration in alert CR*PNP-2010-0131, Pressure instrument | ||
: PI-4001 and | : PI-4001 and | ||
: PI-4054 are not calibrated | : PI-4054 are not calibrated | ||
: CR-PNP-2010-1095. "E" RBCCW pump has a seal leak Drawing M-319-E, Sheet 8, Revision 2, Cooling Water Surge Tanks Drawing M-215, Sheet 1,2.3,4, Revision 41, Cooling Water System, Reactor Building System Health Report, Revision 0, RBCCW 4th Quarter 2009 | : CR-PNP-2010-1095. "E" RBCCW pump has a seal leak Drawing M-319-E, Sheet 8, Revision 2, Cooling Water Surge Tanks Drawing M-215, Sheet 1,2.3,4, Revision 41, Cooling Water System, Reactor Building System Health Report, Revision 0, RBCCW 4th Quarter 2009 | ||
: CR-PNP-201 0-1357, Difference between the supply air pressure for two AOVs on the CRD area cooler Procedure 8.B.1, Revision 86, Fire Pump Test Procedure 2.2.25, Revision 57, Fire Water Supply System | : CR-PNP-201 | ||
: CR-PNP-2010-1652, Seal on Electric Fire Pump Suction Valve was not installed properly Procedure 2.2.22, Revision 71, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Planning Schedule for "A" EDG overhaul, the week of June 6,2010 Procedure 2.2.146, Revision 40, SBO Diesel Generator Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 8.10, Blackout AC power source | : 0-1357, Difference between the supply air pressure for two AOVs on the CRD area cooler Procedure | ||
: 8.B.1, Revision 86, Fire Pump Test Procedure | |||
: 2.2.25, Revision 57, Fire Water Supply System | |||
: CR-PNP-2010-1652, Seal on Electric Fire Pump Suction Valve was not installed properly Procedure | |||
: 2.2.22, Revision 71, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Planning Schedule for "A" EDG overhaul, the week of June 6,2010 Procedure | |||
: 2.2.146, Revision 40, SBO Diesel Generator Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 8.10, Blackout AC power source | |||
: CR-PNP-2010-1984, After rain and thunderstorms, two circuit breakers were tripped in SBO enclosure | : CR-PNP-2010-1984, After rain and thunderstorms, two circuit breakers were tripped in SBO enclosure | ||
: CR-PNP-2010*1987, Water found on floor of SSO enclosure I I' Attachment I I | : CR-PNP-2010*1987, Water found on floor of SSO enclosure | ||
: Section 1 R05 Fire Hazards Fire Data Sheet for Torus Revision 0, Fire Brigade Fire Drill Scenario dated April 26, Fire Drill Report dated April 26, 10 CFR50, Appendix R, Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power Facilities Operating prior January 1, 1979 Procedure 5.5.2, Revision 46, Special Fire Procedure | : I I' Attachment | ||
: I I | |||
: Section 1 R05 Fire Hazards Fire Data Sheet for Torus Revision 0, Fire Brigade Fire Drill Scenario dated April 26, Fire Drill Report dated April 26, 10 CFR50, Appendix R, Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power Facilities Operating prior January 1, 1979 Procedure | |||
: 5.5.2, Revision 46, Special Fire Procedure | |||
: CR-PNP-2010-1480, Fire Hydrant House #10 is severely rusted at the base of the house | : CR-PNP-2010-1480, Fire Hydrant House #10 is severely rusted at the base of the house | ||
: EN-TQ-125, Revision 0, Attachment 9.3, Fire Drill Report Procedure | : EN-TQ-125, Revision 0, Attachment | ||
: 9.3, Fire Drill Report Procedure | |||
: EN-DC-161, Revision 3, Control of Combustibles Compensatory Measures Sheet -Multiple Spurious Operations Compensatory Measure Procedure | : EN-DC-161, Revision 3, Control of Combustibles Compensatory Measures Sheet -Multiple Spurious Operations Compensatory Measure Procedure | ||
: EN-DC-115, Revision 8, Engineering Change Process Fire Watch log for transient combustibles in a Level 1 Zone Fire Hazards Analysis, Fire Zone Data Sheet for Fire Area 1.10, Fire Zone 1.28 Fire Zone Data Sheets for Fire Area 1.10, Fire Zone 1.3 Procedure 5.5.2, Revision 46, Special Fire Procedure Section | : EN-DC-115, Revision 8, Engineering Change Process Fire Watch log for transient combustibles in a Level 1 Zone Fire Hazards Analysis, Fire Zone Data Sheet for Fire Area 1.10, Fire Zone 1.28 Fire Zone Data Sheets for Fire Area 1.10, Fire Zone 1.3 Procedure 5.5.2, Revision | ||
: 46, Special Fire Procedure Section 1 ROG Manhole Inspection Schedule Work Order (WO) | |||
: 52250347 01, InspectlPump Manhole Number 2A | : 52250347 01, InspectlPump Manhole Number 2A | ||
: WO 5225034501, InspectlPump Manhole Number 4 | : WO 5225034501, InspectlPump Manhole Number 4 | ||
: WO 52250346 01, InspectlPump Manhole Number 5 | : WO 52250346 01, InspectlPump Manhole Number 5 | ||
: CR-PNP-201 0-1529, Cables found submerged and in contact with water in Manhole Numbers 2A, 4, &5 | : CR-PNP-201 | ||
: 0-1529, Cables found submerged and in contact with water in Manhole Numbers 2A, 4, &5 | |||
: EN-DC-346, Revision 0, Cable Reliability Program | : EN-DC-346, Revision 0, Cable Reliability Program | ||
: CR-PNP-2009-3459, During inspections of Maintenance Rule and Safety-Related Manholes, water was found in all required manholes Specification No. 6498-E-18, 5000 volt and 15000 volt cable specification Electric Power Research Institute paper, Review of Suitability of EPR medium voltage cables for wet and submerged conditions NRC Generic Letter (GL) Inaccessible or underground power cable failures that disable accident mitigation systems or cause plant transients Pilgrim Letters 2.07.034 and 2.07.091, Response to NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 Section 1 R07 Audits and Self-Assessments | : CR-PNP-2009-3459, During inspections of Maintenance Rule and Safety-Related Manholes, water was found in all required manholes Specification No. 6498-E-18, 5000 volt and 15000 volt cable specification Electric Power Research Institute paper, Review of Suitability of EPR medium voltage cables for wet and submerged conditions | ||
: NRC Generic Letter (GL) | |||
: Inaccessible or underground power cable failures that disable accident mitigation systems or cause plant transients Pilgrim Letters 2.07.034 and 2.07.091, Response to NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 Section 1 R07 Audits and Self-Assessments | |||
: LO-PNPLO-2010-00013, UHS Snapshot Self Assessment Report. dated February 12, 2010 | : LO-PNPLO-2010-00013, UHS Snapshot Self Assessment Report. dated February 12, 2010 | ||
: QA-08-2009-PNP-1, Engineering Programs Quality Assurance Audit Report, dated July 6,2009 Surveillance and Functional Tests 3.M.3-47.1, "An Train Functional Test of Individual Load Shed Components, performed July 14, 2008 & January 14,2010 Attachment | : QA-08-2009-PNP-1, Engineering Programs Quality Assurance Audit Report, dated July 6,2009 | ||
: 3.M.3-47.2. "B" Train Functional Test of Individual Load Shed Components. September 25, 2008 & February 20, 8.5.3.2.1. SSW Pump Quarterly and Biennial (Comprehensive) Operability and Valve Operability Tests (A SSW Pump), performed March 10,2010 8.5.3.2.1, SSW Pump Quarterly and Biennial (Comprehensive) Operability and Valve Operability Tests (8 SSW Pump), performed March 16,2010 & April 1 0, 2010 8.5.3.2.1, SSW Pump Quarterly and Biennial (Comprehensive) Operability and Valve Operability Tests (C SSW Pump), performed March 29.2010 8.5.3.2.1, SSW Pump Quarterly and Biennial (Comprehensive) Operability and Valve Operability Tests (0 SSW Pump). performed March 22, 2010 8.5.3.2.1. SSW Pump Quarterly and Biennial (Comprehensive) Operability and Valve Operability Tests (E SSW Pump), performed February 17, 2010 8.5.3.2.2, ASME Flow Comparison Test of the SSW System Underground Supply Piping (A Loop). performed January 21,2006 8.5.3.2.2, ASME Flow Comparison Test of the SSW System Underground Supply Piping (8 Loop), performed January 27,2006 8.5.3.11, SSW Valve Operability Test (A Loop), performed April 6, 2010 8.5.3.11, SSW Valve Operability Test (B Loop). performed January 20, 2010 8.5.3.14, SSW Flow Rate Operability Test (A Loop), performed April 1 O. 2010 8.5.3.14, SSW Flow Rate Operability Test (B Loop), performed March 22,2010 8.E.29.1, SSW Instrumentation Calibration and Functional Test, performed January 20,2010 8.1.45, 1ST Instrument Calibration (FT-6240), performed September 14,2005 8.1.45, 1ST Instrument Calibration (FT -6241). performed October 27, 2005 Condition Reports (CR-PNP-) 2006-1588,2006-2771,2006-2938,2006-4239,2006-4256,2007-3387.2007-4370. 2008-1641, 2008-1643, 2008-2611, 2009-0695, 2009-1703. 2009-1809. 2009-3054. 2009-3407.2009-3668.2009-3924,2009-4723. 2009-5061.2010-0658,2010-1421. 2010-1502 Drawings C44 Sheet 1, Revision E11. Intake Structure Plan Section C47, Revision E7. Intake Structure Section & Details C1271, Revision 1, SSW Piping Replacement REAC. AUX Bay Pipe Vaults Plans, Section & Details E-171, Revision E4. Schematic Diagram SSW System ISIM212 Sheet 1, Revision 14. Inservice Inspection Service Water System M27, Revision E15, Equipment Location Intake Structure Plan & Sections M100-7257, Revision E2, "8" Loop Pump Header Service Water M100-7258, Revision E7, SSW System West Service Water Pump Discharge Piping M100-7259, Revision E4, Service Water System Discharge Header from Service Water M212 Sheet 1, Revision 92, Service Water System M212 Sheet 2. Revision 76, Screen Wash System I* Attachment I | : Surveillance and Functional Tests 3.M.3-47.1, "An Train Functional Test of Individual Load Shed Components, performed July 14, 2008 & January 14,2010 Attachment | ||
: EC 13625, Revision 0, SSW Baffle Plate Assembly | : 3.M.3-47.2. "B" Train Functional Test of Individual Load Shed Components. | ||
: | : September | ||
: 25, 2008 & February 20, 8.5.3.2.1. | |||
: SSW Pump Quarterly and Biennial (Comprehensive) | |||
: Operability and Valve Operability Tests (A SSW Pump), performed March 10,2010 8.5.3.2.1, SSW Pump Quarterly and Biennial (Comprehensive) | |||
: Operability and Valve Operability Tests (8 SSW Pump), performed March 16,2010 & April 1 0, 2010 8.5.3.2.1, SSW Pump Quarterly and Biennial (Comprehensive) | |||
: Operability and Valve Operability Tests (C SSW Pump), performed March 29.2010 8.5.3.2.1, SSW Pump Quarterly and Biennial (Comprehensive) | |||
: Operability and Valve Operability Tests (0 SSW Pump). performed March 22, 2010 8.5.3.2.1. | |||
: SSW Pump Quarterly and Biennial (Comprehensive) | |||
: Operability and Valve Operability Tests (E SSW Pump), performed February 17, 2010 8.5.3.2.2, ASME Flow Comparison Test of the SSW System Underground Supply Piping (A Loop). performed January 21,2006 8.5.3.2.2, ASME Flow Comparison Test of the SSW System Underground Supply Piping (8 Loop), performed January 27,2006 8.5.3.11 , SSW Valve Operability Test (A Loop), performed April 6, 2010 8.5.3.11 , SSW Valve Operability Test (B Loop). performed January 20, 2010 8.5.3.14 , SSW Flow Rate Operability Test (A Loop), performed April 1 O. 2010 8.5.3.14 , SSW Flow Rate Operability Test (B Loop), performed March 22,2010 8.E.29.1, SSW Instrumentation Calibration and Functional Test, performed January 20,2010 8.1.45, 1ST Instrument Calibration (FT-6240), performed September | |||
: 14,2005 8.1.45, 1ST Instrument Calibration (FT -6241). performed October 27, 2005 Condition Reports (CR-PNP-) | |||
: 2006-1588,2006-2771,2006-2938,2006-4239,2006-4256,2007-3387.2007-4370. | |||
: 2008-1641, 2008-1643, 2008-2611, 2009-0695, 2009-1703. | |||
: 2009-1809. | |||
: 2009-3054. | |||
: 2009-3407.2009-3668.2009-3924,2009-4723. | |||
: 2009-5061.2010-0658,2010-1421. | |||
: 2010-1502 | |||
===Drawings=== | |||
: C44 Sheet 1, Revision E11. Intake Structure Plan Section C47, Revision E7. Intake Structure Section & Details C1271, Revision 1, SSW Piping Replacement | |||
: REAC. AUX Bay Pipe Vaults Plans, Section & Details E-171, Revision E4. Schematic Diagram SSW System ISIM212 Sheet 1, Revision 14. Inservice Inspection Service Water System M27, Revision E15, Equipment Location Intake Structure Plan & Sections M100-7257, Revision E2, "8" Loop Pump Header Service Water M100-7258, Revision E7, SSW System West Service Water Pump Discharge Piping M100-7259, Revision E4, Service Water System Discharge Header from Service Water | |||
: M212 Sheet 1, Revision 92, Service Water System M212 Sheet 2. Revision 76, Screen Wash System I* Attachment | |||
: I | |||
: EC 13625, Revision 0, SSW Baffle Plate Assembly | |||
: EN M U-100 Attachment | |||
: 9.1, Motor Operated Butterfly Valve in the Service Water 10 | |||
: CFR 50.59 Process Applicability Determination, dated February 25, | : CFR 50.59 Process Applicability Determination, dated February 25, | ||
: ER 4119033, Revision 0, Motor Operated Butterfly Valve in the Service Water | : ER 4119033, Revision 0, Motor Operated Butterfly Valve in the Service Water | ||
: ER 5100785, Requesting SEC XI Repair Replacement Plan for | : ER 5100785, Requesting | ||
: SEC XI Repair Replacement Plan for | |||
: MO-3805 (New Valve Bolting), dated February 24, | : MO-3805 (New Valve Bolting), dated February 24, | ||
: ER 6114606. RBCCW Heat Exchanger E-209A SSW Outlet Valve DeSign Evaluation Form, dated November | : ER 6114606. RBCCW Heat Exchanger | ||
: ER 6115644, Revision 0, Nuclear Change to Replace 29-HO-3A and 5A with Ball Miscellaneous 2.1.16, Outside/Turbine Tour Logs, dated December 12, 2009 -December 18, 2009, February 2,2010 -February 8. 2010 3.M.4-85, Station Diving Procedure for Underwater Work and Inspections, performed November 17,2006, July 31.2009, August 3,2009 Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection and Monitoring Program Long Term Inspection Plan, dated April CALC No. M-630. Revision 3, SSW System Hydraulic Control Room Log Entries Report. dated December 1, 2009 -December 31,2009, 3, 2010 -February 5, 2010 East & West SSW Bays Underwater Diver Inspection Video, performed January 30, 2009. November 30,2009, and April 1, 2010 | : E-209A SSW Outlet Valve DeSign Evaluation Form, dated November | ||
: EN-MA-118 | : ER 6115644, Revision 0, Nuclear Change to Replace 29-HO-3A and 5A with Ball Miscellaneous | ||
: 2.1.16, Outside/Turbine Tour Logs, dated December 12, 2009 -December 18, 2009, February 2,2010 -February 8. 2010 3.M.4-85, Station Diving Procedure for Underwater Work and Inspections, performed November 17,2006, July 31.2009, August 3,2009 Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection and Monitoring Program Long Term Inspection Plan, dated April CALC No. M-630. Revision 3, SSW System Hydraulic Control Room Log Entries Report. dated December 1, 2009 -December 31,2009, | |||
: 3, 2010 -February 5, 2010 East & West SSW Bays Underwater Diver Inspection Video, performed January 30, 2009. November 30,2009, and April 1, 2010 | |||
: EN-MA-118 | |||
: 96. Foreign Material Exclusion Component Close-Out Data Sheet, dated July 31, 2009 M591 , Revision E7, Specification for SSW & RBCCW Safety-Related Piping & Heat Exchanger Inspection, Maintenance, & Testing Requirements in Response to Generic Letter 89-13 Risk-Informed Inspection Notebook for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Unit 1, Revision 2.1 a | |||
: SDBD-29. Revision E1, System Design Basis Document for the SSW System Nondestructive Examination Reports | : SDBD-29. Revision E1, System Design Basis Document for the SSW System Nondestructive Examination Reports | ||
: BOP-PT-09-015, SSW Spool JF29-13-1 Liquid Penetrant EXamination, dated April 29, 2009 | : BOP-PT-09-015, SSW Spool JF29-13-1 | ||
: BOP-UT-09-003, SSW Spool JF29-13-1 Ultrasonic Test Erosion/Corrosion Examination, dated Apri128,2009 | : Liquid Penetrant | ||
: VT-29-06018, SSW (29) "B" Loop (SLT-SSW"3B) Visual Test | : EXamination, dated April 29, 2009 | ||
: BOP-UT-09-003, SSW Spool JF29-13-1 | |||
: Ultrasonic Test Erosion/Corrosion Examination, dated Apri128,2009 | |||
: VT-29-06018, SSW (29) "B" Loop (SLT-SSW"3B) | |||
: Visual Test | |||
: VT-2 Examination, dated July 31, 2006 | : VT-2 Examination, dated July 31, 2006 | ||
: VT-29-06019, SSW (29) "B" Loop (SLT-SSW-4B) | : VT-29-06019, SSW (29) "B" Loop (SLT-SSW-4B) | ||
: VT-2 Examination, dated July 31, 2006 | : VT-2 Examination, dated July 31, 2006 | ||
: VT-29-06020, SSW (29)(SLT-SSW-1 B) | : VT-29-06020, SSW (29)(SLT-SSW-1 | ||
: VT-2 Examination, dated July 31,2006 | : B) | ||
: VT-2 Examination, dated July 31,2006 VT-29-06021. | |||
: SSW (29) (SLT-SSW-5B) | |||
: VT-2 Examination, dated August 29,2006 | : VT-2 Examination, dated August 29,2006 | ||
: VT-29-06025, SSW (29) "B" Loop (SLT-SSW-8B) | : VT-29-06025, SSW (29) "B" Loop (SLT-SSW-8B) | ||
: VT-2 Examination, dated September 7,2006 | : VT-2 Examination, dated September | ||
: 7,2006 | |||
: VT-29-06026, SSW (29) "B" Loop (SLT-SSW-7B) | : VT-29-06026, SSW (29) "B" Loop (SLT-SSW-7B) | ||
: VT-2 Examination, dated September 7,2006 | : VT-2 Examination, dated September | ||
: 7,2006 | |||
: VT-29-06027, SSW (29) "An Loop (SLT-SSW-9A) | : VT-29-06027, SSW (29) "An Loop (SLT-SSW-9A) | ||
: VT-2 EXamination, dated September 7,2006 | : VT-2 EXamination, dated September | ||
: 7,2006 | |||
: VT-29-06028, SSW (29) "An Loop (SLT-SSW-8A) | : VT-29-06028, SSW (29) "An Loop (SLT-SSW-8A) | ||
: VT-2 Examination, dated September 7,2006 | : VT-2 Examination, dated September | ||
: 7,2006 | |||
: VT-29-07124, SSW (29) "AU Loop (MO-3800) | : VT-29-07124, SSW (29) "AU Loop (MO-3800) | ||
: VT-2 Examination, dated April 19, 2007 | : VT-2 Examination, dated April 19, 2007 | ||
: VT-30-06022, RBCCW (30) | : VT-30-06022, RBCCW (30) | ||
: VT-2 Examination, dated July 31,2006 | : VT-2 Examination, dated July 31,2006 | ||
: VT-30-06024, RBCCW Piping/Components (30) | : VT-30-06024, RBCCW Piping/Components | ||
(30) | |||
: VT-2 Examination, dated August 29,2006 Attachment | : VT-2 Examination, dated August 29,2006 Attachment | ||
: OQerating Generic Service Water System Risk-Based Inspection Guide, NUREG/CR-5865 | : OQerating Generic Service Water System Risk-Based Inspection Guide, NUREG/CR-5865 | ||
: LO-NOE-2007-00078, Operating Experience Impact Evaluation for NRC Information 2007-06, dated June29, NRC Generic Letter 96-01: Testing of Safety-Related Logic Circuits, dated January 10. 2006 NRC Information Notice 89-49: Failure to Close Service Water Cross-Connect Isolation dated May 22, NRC Information Notice 2007-06: Potential Common Cause Vulnerabilities in Essential Water Systems, dated February 9, Procedures 2.1.37, Revision 25, Coastal Storm -Preparations and Actions 2.1.42, Revision 9, Operation During Severe Weather 2.2.32, Revision 82, SSW System 2.4.43, Revision 20, Loss of One SSW Loop 2.4.154, Revision 21, Intake Structure Fouling 5.3.3, Revision 26, Loss of All Service Water 8.5.3.2.1, Revision 22, SSW Pump Ouarterly and Biennial (Comprehensive) Operability and Valve Operability Tests 8.5.3.11, Revision 11, SSW Valve Operability Test 8.5.3.14, Revision 28, SSW Flow Rate Operability Test 8.C.13. Revision 80, Locked Component Lineup Surveillance 8.M.3-1, Revision 54, Special Test for Automatic Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) Load Sequencing of Diesels and Shutdown Transformer with Simulated Loss of Off-Site Power and Special Shutdown Transformer Load Test | : LO-NOE-2007-00078, Operating Experience Impact Evaluation for NRC Information 2007-06, dated June29, NRC Generic Letter 96-01: Testing of Safety-Related Logic Circuits, dated January 10. 2006 NRC Information Notice 89-49: Failure to Close Service Water Cross-Connect Isolation dated May 22, NRC Information Notice 2007-06: Potential Common Cause Vulnerabilities in Essential Water Systems, dated February 9, Procedures | ||
: 2.1.37, Revision 25, Coastal Storm -Preparations and Actions 2.1.42, Revision 9, Operation During Severe Weather 2.2.32, Revision 82, SSW System 2.4.43, Revision 20, Loss of One SSW Loop 2.4.154, Revision 21, Intake Structure Fouling 5.3.3, Revision 26, Loss of All Service Water 8.5.3.2.1, Revision 22, SSW Pump Ouarterly and Biennial (Comprehensive) | |||
: Operability and Valve Operability Tests 8.5.3.11 , Revision 11, SSW Valve Operability Test 8.5.3.14 , Revision 28, SSW Flow Rate Operability Test 8.C.13. Revision 80, Locked Component Lineup Surveillance | |||
: 8.M.3-1, Revision 54, Special Test for Automatic Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) Load Sequencing of Diesels and Shutdown Transformer with Simulated Loss of Off-Site Power and Special Shutdown Transformer Load Test | |||
: ARP-C1 R, Revision 24. PNL C'I R Alarm Response Procedure | : ARP-C1 R, Revision 24. PNL C'I R Alarm Response Procedure | ||
: CEP-BPT -0100, Revision 0, Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection and Monitoring | : CEP-BPT -0100, Revision 0, Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection and Monitoring | ||
: EN-DC-343. Revision 2, Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection and Monitoring Program | : EN-DC-343. | ||
: EP-IP-100.1, Revision 4, Emergency Actions Levels System Health Reports. Maintenance History &Trending 29-SSW System Health Report, | : Revision 2, Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection and Monitoring Program | ||
: EP-IP-100.1, Revision 4, Emergency Actions Levels System Health Reports. Maintenance History &Trending 29-SSW System Health Report, 1 st | |||
: OTR 2010 29-SSW System Health Report. 4th | : OTR 2010 29-SSW System Health Report. 4th | ||
: OTR 2009 SSW Pump 1ST Trending, dated October 23, 2009 -April 11, 2010 SSW System Walkdown Inspection Checklist, performed February 19,2010 & March 30, 2010 SSW Valves &SSW Pipe Spool Maintenance Data Bases Work Orders {WO)s | : OTR 2009 SSW Pump 1ST Trending, dated October 23, 2009 -April 11, 2010 SSW System Walkdown Inspection Checklist, performed February 19,2010 & March 30, 2010 SSW Valves &SSW Pipe Spool Maintenance Data Bases Work Orders {WO)s | ||
: 00193084,00207004,03102362,06106924,51524723,51699224,52189189,52194954, | : 00193084,00207004,03102362,06106924,51524723,51699224,52189189,52194954, | ||
: 52204147,52204148,52210280 Section 1R11 LORT/NRC Simulator Exam Scenario: | : 52204147,52204148,52210280 | ||
: Section 1R11 LORT/NRC Simulator Exam Scenario: | |||
: SES-176, Revision 1, ATWS Attachment I | : SES-176, Revision 1, ATWS Attachment I | ||
: Section 1R12 | : Section 1R12 | ||
: CR-PNP-2010-1713, SSW Loop "B" flow at 500 gpm with RB HX "Bu SSW outlet flow control valve Salt Service Water Maintenance Rule Basis | : CR-PNP-2010-1713, SSW Loop "B" flow at 500 gpm with RB HX "Bu SSW outlet flow control valve Salt Service Water Maintenance Rule Basis | ||
: EN-DC-205, Revision 2, Maintenance Rule CR*PNP-2010-1289. Air introduction into standby liquid control Procedure 8.4.1, Revision 72. Standby liquid Control Pump Quarterly and Biennial Capacity Flowrate Test Standby Liquid Control System Health Report Feedwater Level Control System Health Report Feedwater Flow Traces on May 1, 2010 | : EN-DC-205, Revision 2, Maintenance Rule | ||
: CR*PNP-2010-1289. | |||
: CR-PNP-2010-1562, "8" FRV slowly drifted closed Procedure 2.4.49, Revision 40, Feedwater Malfunctions | : Air introduction into standby liquid control Procedure | ||
: 8.4.1, Revision 72. Standby liquid Control Pump Quarterly and Biennial Capacity Flowrate Test Standby Liquid Control System Health Report Feedwater Level Control System Health Report Feedwater Flow Traces on May 1, 2010 CR-PNP-2010-1824. | |||
: MRFF placed feed level control improbable | |||
a(1) | |||
: CR-PNP-2010-1562, "8" FRV slowly drifted closed Procedure | |||
: 2.4.49, Revision 40, Feedwater Malfunctions | |||
: CR-PNP-2010-1299, "A" FRV not tracked in Maintenance Rule failure back in 2009 | : CR-PNP-2010-1299, "A" FRV not tracked in Maintenance Rule failure back in 2009 | ||
: CR-PNP-2009-1983, "A" FRV received Friction Error Section 1R13 Daily Risk Profile for April 19, 2010 Procedure 1.3.34.15, Revision 1, Protection Area Postings | : CR-PNP-2009-1983, "A" FRV received Friction Error Section 1R13 Daily Risk Profile for April 19, 2010 Procedure | ||
: CR-PNP-2010-1393, Upper switchgear protected area barrier not installed per Procedure 1.3.34.15 Scheduler's risk evaluation for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station for the week of May 2, 2010 Equipment Out-of-Service Quantitative Risk Assessment Tool Daily Risk Sheet for May 18, 201 0 Control Room Logs Work Week Schedule for the week of May 25,2010 Daily Risk for June 3, 2010 Section 1 R15 | : 1.3.34.15, Revision 1, Protection Area Postings | ||
: CR-PNP-201 0-1303, Packing leak on Valve 23-HO-51 is now a 2-foot steam plume | : CR-PNP-2010-1393, Upper switchgear protected area barrier not installed per Procedure | ||
: 1.3.34.15 | |||
: Scheduler's risk evaluation for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station for the week of May 2, 2010 Equipment Out-of-Service Quantitative Risk Assessment Tool Daily Risk Sheet for May 18, 201 0 Control Room Logs Work Week Schedule for the week of May 25,2010 Daily Risk for June 3, 2010 Section 1 R15 | |||
: CR-PNP-201 | |||
: 0-1303, Packing leak on Valve 23-HO-51 is now a 2-foot steam plume | |||
: CR-PNP-2010-1312, After repairing packing leak on valve 23-HO-51 , observed a small bonnet leak | : CR-PNP-2010-1312, After repairing packing leak on valve 23-HO-51 , observed a small bonnet leak | ||
: CR-PNP-2010-0901, Small packing leak on valve 23-HO-51 System Design Basis Document 23, High Pressure Coolant Injection System | : CR-PNP-2010-0901, Small packing leak on valve 23-HO-51 System Design Basis Document 23, High Pressure Coolant Injection System | ||
: CR-PNP-2009-4944, Drywell Leakage | : CR-PNP-2009-4944, Drywell Leakage | ||
: EN-OP-104, Revision 4, Operability Determination Process Operational Decision Making Issue Plan: Drywell Leakage dated January 30,2010 Procedure 2.5.2.71. Revision 31, Attachment 8, Manual Pumping of the DryweU Floor and Equipment Sumps Procedure 3.M.3-24.19. Revision O. Special test for electrically backseating motor-operated valves Information Notice 87-40, Backseating valves routinely to prevent packing leakage Drywell Leakage 7 -day Rolling Average Data | : EN-OP-104, Revision 4, Operability Determination Process Operational Decision Making Issue Plan: Drywell Leakage dated January 30,2010 Procedure | ||
: CR-PNP-20 10-1289, Potential air in standby liquid control system and operability evaluation Isometric Drawing No. 6498-688. Standby liquid control pump suction Attachment | : 2.5.2.71. | ||
: Revision 31, Attachment | |||
: 8, Manual Pumping of the DryweU Floor and Equipment Sumps Procedure | |||
: 3.M.3-24.19. | |||
: Revision O. Special test for electrically backseating motor-operated valves Information Notice 87-40, Backseating valves routinely to prevent packing leakage Drywell Leakage 7 -day Rolling Average Data | |||
: CR-PNP-20 | |||
: 10-1289, Potential air in standby liquid control system and operability evaluation Isometric Drawing No. 6498-688. | |||
: Standby liquid control pump suction Attachment | |||
===Procedure=== | ===Procedure=== | ||
: EN-MA-125, Revision 6, Troubleshooting control of maintenance activities Technical Specifications Temporary Instruction 2515/177, Revision 1, Managing gas accumulation in ECCS systems Procedure 8.4.1, Revision 72, Standby liquid control pump quarterly and biennial capacity and flow rate lest NRC Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation in ECCS Systems Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station PNPS Core Operating Limits Report, Cycle 18 Global Nuclear Fuel (GNF) letter | : EN-MA-125, Revision 6, Troubleshooting control of maintenance activities Technical Specifications Temporary Instruction | ||
: RA-ENO-GEN-10-061 dated Apri! 26,2010, GNF 2 Spacer Flow Vane Damage | : 2515/177, Revision 1, Managing gas accumulation in ECCS systems Procedure | ||
: 8.4.1, Revision 72, Standby liquid control pump quarterly and biennial capacity and flow rate lest NRC Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation in ECCS Systems Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station PNPS Core Operating Limits Report, Cycle 18 Global Nuclear Fuel (GNF) letter | |||
: RA-ENO-GEN-10-061 | |||
dated Apri! 26,2010, GNF 2 Spacer Flow Vane Damage | |||
: CR-PNP-2010-1481 , GNF2 Fuel Defects discovered at JAF GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy, Part 21, Notification | : CR-PNP-2010-1481 , GNF2 Fuel Defects discovered at JAF GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy, Part 21, Notification | ||
: MFN 10-152 dated May 14, 2010 GNF Letter | : MFN 10-152 dated May 14, 2010 GNF Letter | ||
: RA-ENO-GEN-10-068 dated May 7, 2010, GESTAR Evaluation of GNF2 Spacer Issue GNF Quality Update dated April 27, 2010, | : RA-ENO-GEN-10-068 | ||
: QU 2010-001: GNF2 Bent Spacer Flow Vanes GNF Letter | dated May 7, 2010, GESTAR Evaluation of GNF2 Spacer Issue GNF Quality Update dated April 27, 2010, | ||
: RA-ENO-GEN-10-074 dated May 10, 2010, Entergy GNF2 Fuel Transitions: Disposition of Bent Spacer Flow Wing Effects on NFl -ReVision 1 GNF Letter | : QU 2010-001: | ||
: RA-ENO-GEN-10-076 dated May 11,2010, GNF2 Spacer Flow Vane F7/F8 Location -Revision 1 GNF Letter | : GNF2 Bent Spacer Flow Vanes GNF Letter | ||
: RA-ENO-GEN-10-075 dated May 11, 2010, GNF2 Bent Spacer Wing NFl Tasks 900/902, OLMCPR Evaluations and RBM Analysis for JAF C19 and PNPS C18 GNF Letter | : RA-ENO-GEN-10-074 | ||
: RA-ENO-GEN-10-077 dated May 12. 2010, Fuel Loading Error for JAF C19 and PNPS TeChnical Specification 3.11.C, Minimum Critical Power Ratio | dated May 10, 2010, Entergy GNF2 Fuel Transitions: | ||
: Disposition of Bent Spacer Flow Wing Effects on NFl -ReVision 1 GNF Letter | |||
: RA-ENO-GEN-10-076 | |||
dated May 11,2010, GNF2 Spacer Flow Vane F7/F8 Location -Revision 1 GNF Letter | |||
: RA-ENO-GEN-10-075 | |||
dated May 11, 2010, GNF2 Bent Spacer Wing NFl Tasks 900/902, OLMCPR Evaluations and RBM Analysis for JAF C19 and PNPS C18 GNF Letter | |||
: RA-ENO-GEN-10-077 | |||
dated May 12. 2010, Fuel Loading Error for JAF C19 and PNPS TeChnical Specification | |||
: 3.11.C, Minimum Critical Power Ratio | |||
: CR-PNP-2010-1609, Cannot retrieve calculation for operators' dose during MSL break containment Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 10.17, Main Control Room Environmental Control System Topical Design Basis Document, | : CR-PNP-2010-1609, Cannot retrieve calculation for operators' dose during MSL break containment Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 10.17, Main Control Room Environmental Control System Topical Design Basis Document, | ||
: TDBO-110, for operator dose following main steam line break outside containment Technical Specifications 3.7.B.2, Control Room High Efficiency Air Filtration System Compensatory Actions Log from June 7, 2010 | : TDBO-110, for operator dose following main steam line break outside containment Technical Specifications | ||
: 3.7.B.2, Control Room High Efficiency Air Filtration System Compensatory Actions Log from June 7, 2010 | |||
: CR-PNP-2010-2032, Compensatory Measure for chemistry not implemented Section 1 R18 | : CR-PNP-2010-2032, Compensatory Measure for chemistry not implemented Section 1 R18 | ||
: EC-21320 -Evaluate and provide alternate design for P-208B discharge head to top column flange connection | : EC-21320 -Evaluate and provide alternate design for P-208B discharge head to top column flange connection | ||
: CR-PNP-2010-1216, Pump P-208B discharge head counter bore, making surface worn | : CR-PNP-2010-1216, Pump P-208B discharge head counter bore, making surface worn | ||
: CR-PNP-2010-1273, SSW pump discharge pressure gauge tubing is leaking Procedure 8.C.13, Revision 80. locked Component Lineup Surveillance | : CR-PNP-2010-1273, SSW pump discharge pressure gauge tubing is leaking Procedure | ||
: 8.C.13, Revision 80. locked Component Lineup Surveillance | |||
: ERM 90.46, Locked Valve Criteria, dated July 17, 1990 | : ERM 90.46, Locked Valve Criteria, dated July 17, 1990 | ||
: EC 12969, Revision 0, Install TOI Turbine Style Air Start Motors and Regulators on | : EC 12969, Revision 0, Install TOI Turbine Style Air Start Motors and Regulators on | ||
: EDG-X-107B Section 1 R19 WO 8.9.3.4, | : EDG-X-107B | ||
: Section 1 R19 WO 8.9.3.4, | |||
: WO 51524183 01,02,03,04, Circuit Breaker Testing, on 72-731, DC to | : WO 51524183 01,02,03,04, Circuit Breaker Testing, on 72-731, DC to | ||
: MO-1201-5 Engineering Change (EC) 19431, Revision 0, Replace GE overload relay and heater with Cutler Hammer overload relay and heater Procedure 8.6.5.2. Revision 17. Reactor Water Cleanup Valve Quarterly Operability | : MO-1201-5 | ||
: WO 00184796, Reconnect motor and bump for rotation on P-208B, Task Report No. IR10-0015, Re-terminate Motor and Raychem the terminations in accordance Procedure 3.M.3-17.1, Revision 25, Raychem or taping of 1000 volt and under cables wires Procedure 3.M.3-51, Revision 26, Electrical termination procedure | : Engineering Change (EC) 19431, Revision 0, Replace GE overload relay and heater with Cutler Hammer overload relay and heater Procedure | ||
: 8.6.5.2. Revision 17. Reactor Water Cleanup Valve Quarterly Operability | |||
: WO 00184796, Reconnect motor and bump for rotation on P-208B, Task Report No. IR10-0015, Re-terminate Motor and Raychem the terminations in accordance | |||
===Procedure=== | |||
: 3.M.3-17.1, Revision 25, Raychem or taping of 1000 volt and under cables wires Procedure | |||
: 3.M.3-51, Revision 26, Electrical termination procedure | |||
: WO 52222708, Clean and inspect motor for P-208B | : WO 52222708, Clean and inspect motor for P-208B | ||
: WO 00184796, Task 4, Perform overhaul on "B" SSW pump CR*PNP-2010-1050, Rebuild of 29-CK-3880b, found threads holding seat ring in place are gone | : WO 00184796, Task 4, Perform overhaul on "B" SSW pump CR*PNP-2010-1050, Rebuild of 29-CK-3880b, found threads holding seat ring in place are gone | ||
: CEP-NDE-0902, Revision 7. | : CEP-NDE-0902, Revision 7. | ||
: VT-2 Examination Report CR*PNP-201 0-1 083, Only one out of eight line shaft coupling worked ISIM, Sheet 1, Revision 13, Inservice inspection Service Water System Procedure 3.M.4-10, Revision 39, Valve Maintenance | : VT-2 Examination Report CR*PNP-201 | ||
: WO 00221205, Tasks 1 and 2, Replace open limit switch and post work test Procedure 8.5.4.4, Revision 49, High Pressure Coolant Injection Valve (Quarterly) Operability Test | : 0-1 083, Only one out of eight line shaft coupling worked ISIM, Sheet 1, Revision 13, Inservice inspection Service Water System Procedure | ||
: 3.M.4-10, Revision 39, Valve Maintenance | |||
: WO 00221205, Tasks 1 and 2, Replace open limit switch and post work test Procedure | |||
: 8.5.4.4, Revision 49, High Pressure Coolant Injection Valve (Quarterly) | |||
: Operability Test | |||
: WO 00224248 01, 3.M.3-61.5, Attachments 1A, 1E, 1F EDG RFO Preventive Maintenance (X-107A) (MEC) | : WO 00224248 01, 3.M.3-61.5, Attachments 1A, 1E, 1F EDG RFO Preventive Maintenance (X-107A) (MEC) | ||
: WO 00224431 01, 3.M.3-61.11, X-107A, EDG "A" Preventive Maintenance (3 year) | : WO 00224431 01, 3.M.3-61.11, X-107A, EDG "A" Preventive Maintenance | ||
: WO 00224248 02, 3.M.3-61.5, Attachment 1A, 1E, 1F EDG RFO Preventive Maintenance (X-1 07 A), Post Maintenance Test Procedure 8.9.1, Revision 116, Emergency Diesel Generator and Ass()ciated Emergency Bus Surveillance | (3 year) | ||
: WO 52246258 01, 8.9.1, Attachment | : WO 00224248 02, 3.M.3-61.5, Attachment 1A, 1E, 1F EDG RFO Preventive Maintenance (X-1 07 A), Post Maintenance Test Procedure | ||
: 8.9.1, Revision 116, Emergency Diesel Generator and Ass()ciated Emergency Bus Surveillance | |||
: WO 52246258 01, 8.9.1, Attachment | |||
: E, EDG "A" -Additional | |||
: 1ST check valve testing | |||
: WO 52241388 01, EDG "A", Four year PM (3.M.3-61.9) | : WO 52241388 01, EDG "A", Four year PM (3.M.3-61.9) | ||
: WO 52246257 01, 3.M.3-61.3, EDG Preventive Maintenance (X-107 A). Quarterly | : WO 52246257 01, 3.M.3-61.3, EDG Preventive Maintenance (X-107 A). Quarterly | ||
: WO 00224431 03. EDG "A" 8 year PM, Post Maintenance Test | : WO 00224431 03. EDG "A" 8 year PM, Post Maintenance Test | ||
: WO 00167857 02, Replace Fuel Injector Snubber Valves on aN EDG | : WO 00167857 02, Replace Fuel Injector Snubber Valves on aN EDG | ||
: WO 0016785701, Replace Fuel Injector Snubber Valves on "An EDG Section 1 R22 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) Suction Pressure Data following run of RCIC system Procedure 8.5.5.1, Revision 72, RCIC Pump Quarterly and Biennial Operability Flow Rate and Valve Test Procedure 2.1.19, ReVision 18, Suppression Chamber Temperatures Hydrodynamics Pressure Test Data Sheets Control Room Logs Technical Specifications Procedure 8.4.1, Revision 72, Standby liquid control pump quarterly and biennial capacity and flow rate test | : WO 0016785701, Replace Fuel Injector Snubber Valves on "An EDG Section 1 R22 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) Suction Pressure Data following run of RCIC system Procedure | ||
: CR-PNP-2010-1289, Potential air in standby liquid control system Procedure 8.M.2-1.5.1, Revision 18, Main Steam Line Isolation Valve Logic -Test A -Inboard Technical Specification (TS) 3.2.A and 4.2.a, Primary Containment Isolation Functions TS 4.2.A, Table 4.2.A, Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for PCIS TS 4.7.A.2.b.1, Primary Containment Isolation Valves TS 3.13, Inservice Code Testing Procedure 8.5.4.1. Revision 105, High Pressure Coolant Injection System Pump and Valve Quarterly and Biennial Comprehensive Operability | : 8.5.5.1, Revision 72, RCIC Pump Quarterly and Biennial Operability Flow Rate and Valve Test Procedure | ||
: 2.1.19, ReVision 18, Suppression Chamber Temperatures Hydrodynamics Pressure Test Data Sheets Control Room Logs Technical Specifications | |||
===Procedure=== | |||
: 8.4.1, Revision 72, Standby liquid control pump quarterly and biennial capacity and flow rate test | |||
: CR-PNP-2010-1289, Potential air in standby liquid control system Procedure | |||
: 8.M.2-1.5.1, Revision 18, Main Steam Line Isolation Valve Logic -Test A -Inboard Technical Specification (TS) 3.2.A and 4.2.a, Primary Containment Isolation Functions | |||
: TS 4.2.A, Table 4.2.A, Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for PCIS TS 4.7.A.2.b.1, Primary Containment Isolation Valves TS 3.13, Inservice Code Testing Procedure | |||
: 8.5.4.1. Revision 105, High Pressure Coolant Injection System Pump and Valve Quarterly and Biennial Comprehensive Operability | |||
===Procedure=== | |||
: 2.1.19, Revision 18, Suppression Chamber Temperatures | |||
===Procedure=== | ===Procedure=== | ||
: | : 8.M.2-2.5.1, Revision | ||
: WO 52247337 01, Perform Core Spray Operability and Flow Rate Test Procedure 8.5.1.1, Core Spray System Operability Pump Quarterly and Biennial Comprehensive Flow Rate Tests and Valve Tests TS 4.5.A.1, Core Spray System Testing Section 1 EP6 LORT/NRC Simulator Exam Scenario: | : 56, High Pressure Coolant Injection Steam Line High Flow Isolation | ||
: TS 4.5 Core and Containment Coolin9 Systems, Section A, Core Spray and LPCI Systems Procedure | |||
: 8.5.2.2.2, Revision 42, LPCI System Loop B Operability | |||
: NRC Bulletin 88-04, Potential Safety -Related Pump Loss NRC Information Notice 97-90, Use of Non-conservative Acceptance Criteria in Safety-Related Pump Surveillance Tests | |||
: WO 52247337 01, Perform Core Spray Operability and Flow Rate Test Procedure | |||
: 8.5.1.1, Core Spray System Operability Pump Quarterly and Biennial Comprehensive Flow Rate Tests and Valve Tests TS 4.5.A.1, Core Spray System Testing Section 1 EP6 LORT/NRC Simulator Exam Scenario: | |||
: SES-176, Revision 1, ATWS EP Performance Indicator Reporting and Information Form Section 2RS01 Procedures: | : SES-176, Revision 1, ATWS EP Performance Indicator Reporting and Information Form Section 2RS01 Procedures: | ||
: EN-RP-101 Access Control for Radiologically Controlled Areas, Revision 4 | : EN-RP-101 | ||
: EN-RP-108 Radiation Protection Posting, Revision 7 | : Access Control for Radiologically Controlled Areas, Revision 4 | ||
: EN-RP-110 ALARA Program, Revision 7 | : EN-RP-108 | ||
: EN-RP-121 Radioactive Material Control, Revision 5 | : Radiation Protection Posting, Revision 7 | ||
: EN-RP-131 Air Sampling, Revision 7 | : EN-RP-110 | ||
: EN-RP-143 Source Control, Revision 5 6.10-021 Station ALARA Performance, Revision 8 6.10-022 ALARA Engineering Controls, Revision 10 6.10-023 ALARA Planning Assessments, Revision 4 Condition Reports: Radiological Hazard Radiation Worker Radiation Technician | : ALARA Program, Revision 7 | ||
: EN-RP-121 | |||
: Radioactive Material Control, Revision 5 | |||
: EN-RP-131 | |||
: Air Sampling, Revision 7 | |||
: EN-RP-143 | |||
: Source Control, Revision 5 6.10-021 Station ALARA Performance, Revision 8 6.10-022 ALARA Engineering Controls, Revision 10 6.10-023 ALARA Planning Assessments, Revision 4 Condition Reports: Radiological Hazard Radiation Worker Radiation Technician | |||
: CR-PNP-2009-04233 | : CR-PNP-2009-04233 | ||
: CR-PNP-2009-04480 | : CR-PNP-2009-04480 | ||
Line 272: | Line 846: | ||
: CR-PNP-2009-04266 | : CR-PNP-2009-04266 | ||
: CR-PNP-2009-04773 | : CR-PNP-2009-04773 | ||
: CR-PNP-2009-05138 CR*PNp*2010-00644 | : CR-PNP-2009-05138 | ||
: CR*PNp*2010-00644 | |||
: CR-PNp*2009-04881 | : CR-PNp*2009-04881 | ||
: CR-PNP-2009-05026 | : CR-PNP-2009-05026 | ||
Line 281: | Line 856: | ||
: CR-PNp*2010-01117 | : CR-PNp*2010-01117 | ||
: CR-PNP-2009-05298 | : CR-PNP-2009-05298 | ||
: CR-PNP-20 | : CR-PNP-20 | ||
: 0-01412 | |||
: CR-PNP-2010-00016 | : CR-PNP-2010-00016 | ||
: CR-PNP-2010-00075 | : CR-PNP-2010-00075 | ||
: CR-PNP-2010-01140 | : CR-PNP-2010-01140 | ||
: CR-PNP-2010-01198 | : CR-PNP-2010-01198 | ||
: LO-PNPLO-2009*00075: Focused self assessment -ALARA (11/16-19/2009) | : Audits and Assessments | ||
: LO-PNPLO-2010-00003: Focused self assessment -Portable Radiation Protection Calibration and Inventory Control | : LO-PNPLO-2009*00075: | ||
: LO-PNPLO-2009-00130: Snapshot assessment I Benchmark -Applicability of GGNS assessment at PNPS | : Focused self assessment | ||
: LO-PNPLO-2009-00129: Snapshot assessment -High and Locked High Radiation Area Controls (9/21/09) | -ALARA (11/16-19/2009) | ||
: LO-PNPLO-2009*00032: Snapshot assessment -Post (6/22/2009) | : LO-PNPLO-2010-00003: | ||
: LO-PNPLO-2010-00015: Snapshot assessment-RP records (1/21/2010) | : Focused self assessment | ||
: LO-PNPLO-2009-00038: Snapshot assessment -Radwaste Shipping (7/6-24/2009) | -Portable Radiation Protection Calibration and Inventory Control | ||
: QA-14/15-2009-PNP-01: Audit -Radiation Protection Radwaste (9t8 -101212009) | : LO-PNPLO-2009-00130: | ||
: QS-2009-PNP-037: SUrveillance -Follow-up on RP yellow QA rating (11/5/2009) Section 40A1 NRC Performance Indicator (PI) Technique/Data Sheet submittals for Pilgrim for Initiating Event Pis from the second quarter 2009 through the first quarter 2010 NRC Inspection Reports from the second quarter of 2009 through the first quarter 2010 Pilgrim Power History . | : Snapshot assessment | ||
: I Benchmark | |||
-Applicability of GGNS assessment at PNPS | |||
: LO-PNPLO-2009-00129: | |||
: Snapshot assessment | |||
-High and Locked High Radiation Area Controls (9/21/09) | |||
: LO-PNPLO-2009*00032: | |||
: Snapshot assessment | |||
-Post | |||
(6/22/2009) | |||
: LO-PNPLO-2010-00015: | |||
: Snapshot assessment- | |||
: RP records (1/21/2010) | |||
: LO-PNPLO-2009-00038: | |||
: Snapshot assessment | |||
-Radwaste Shipping (7/6-24/2009) | |||
: QA-14/15-2009-PNP-01: | |||
: Audit -Radiation Protection Radwaste (9t8 -101212009) | |||
: QS-2009-PNP-037: | |||
: SUrveillance | |||
-Follow-up on RP yellow QA rating (11/5/2009) | |||
: Section 40A1 NRC Performance Indicator (PI) Technique/Data Sheet submittals for Pilgrim for Initiating Event Pis from the second quarter 2009 through the first quarter 2010 NRC Inspection Reports from the second quarter of 2009 through the first quarter 2010 Pilgrim Power History . | |||
: NEI 99-02, Revision 6, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline Section 40A2 Pilgrim Station Quarterly Trend Report | : NEI 99-02, Revision 6, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline Section 40A2 Pilgrim Station Quarterly Trend Report | ||
: CR-PNP-2009-2515, Pre-treatment Radiation Monitors Declared Inoperable | : CR-PNP-2009-2515, Pre-treatment Radiation Monitors Declared Inoperable | ||
: CR-PNP-2089-4070, Failure to perform MRFF on pre-treatment Radiation Monitors failure | : CR-PNP-2089-4070, Failure to perform MRFF on pre-treatment Radiation Monitors failure CR-PNP-2009-4006. | ||
: Incorrect basis for SLC MRFF | |||
: CR-PNP-2009-3088, SBLC pump failure | : CR-PNP-2009-3088, SBLC pump failure | ||
: CR-PNP-2009-5295, Loss of Secondary Containment | : CR-PNP-2009-5295, Loss of Secondary Containment | ||
: CR-PNP-2010-1181. Incorrect basis for Secondary Containment MRFF | : CR-PNP-2010-1181. | ||
: Incorrect basis for Secondary Containment | |||
: MRFF | |||
: CR-PNP-2010-1289, Air in SLC System | : CR-PNP-2010-1289, Air in SLC System | ||
: CR-PNP-2009-2852, Failure to Scope Security EDG into Maintenance Rule | : CR-PNP-2009-2852, Failure to Scope Security EDG into Maintenance Rule CR-PNP-2009-4197. | ||
: Gaps to Excellence in the MRP | |||
: CR-PNP-2009-4943, Maintenance Rule Action Plan changes are not clearly delineated as either updates or revisions Condition Reports 2007-3082; 2008-2644; 2008-2722: 2008-3289; 2008-3291; 2008-3472; 2009-0348; 2009-0597; 2009-1372; 2009-1588; 2009-1787; 2009-1983; 2009-2502; 2009-2519; 2009-2553;2009-2206; 2009-2480; 2009-2687; 2010-1299; 2008-3338; 2010-2064; | : CR-PNP-2009-4943, Maintenance Rule Action Plan changes are not clearly delineated as either updates or revisions | ||
===Condition Reports=== | |||
: 2007-3082; 2008-2644; 2008-2722: 2008-3289; 2008-3291; 2008-3472; | |||
: 2009-0348; | |||
: 2009-0597; | |||
: 2009-1372; 2009-1588; 2009-1787; 2009-1983; | |||
: 2009-2502; | |||
: 2009-2519; | |||
: 2009-2553;2009-2206; | |||
: 2009-2480; | |||
: 2009-2687; | |||
: 2010-1299; | |||
: 2008-3338; | |||
: 2010-2064; | |||
: 237-21, | : 237-21, | ||
: FV-642A1B Feedwater Regulating Valve Electronic Module | : FV-642A1B | ||
: FY-642A1B Diagram, Revision 0 201931-1 Pilgrim, Pneumatic Diagram Double Acting Pneumatic Actuator with Positioner, Revision F M1-J14-14 Sh. 2. HPCI System Elementary DC MOV & Control Center Diagram. Rev. E4 E-13, 125 & 250 VDC System Single Line, Rev. ESO E-9-12, Cutler Hammer Motor Starter Wiring Diagram. Rev. E4 Engineering | : Feedwater Regulating Valve Electronic Module | ||
: FY-642A1B | |||
: Diagram, Revision 0 201931-1 Pilgrim, Pneumatic Diagram Double Acting Pneumatic Actuator with Positioner, Revision F M1-J14-14 | |||
: Sh. 2. HPCI System Elementary | |||
: DC MOV & Control Center Diagram. Rev. E4 E-13, 125 & 250 VDC System Single Line, Rev. ESO E-9-12, Cutler Hammer Motor Starter Wiring Diagram. Rev. E4 Engineering | |||
: CR-PNP-2007-03082, Feed Water Level Control Valve | : CR-PNP-2007-03082, Feed Water Level Control Valve | ||
: FV-642A Lock Up Root Cause Report, dated July 27, | : FV-642A Lock Up Root Cause Report, dated July 27, | ||
Line 314: | Line 930: | ||
: FRV-642B Root Cause Evaluation Report. June 25, | : FRV-642B Root Cause Evaluation Report. June 25, | ||
: EC 15070, Software Upgrade for | : EC 15070, Software Upgrade for | ||
: FY-642A on Feedwater REG Valve | : FY-642A on Feedwater | ||
: REG Valve | |||
: FV-642A, Revision | : FV-642A, Revision | ||
: EC 15220, Software Upgrade for FY*642B on Feedwater REG Valve | : EC 15220, Software Upgrade for FY*642B on Feedwater | ||
: REG Valve | |||
: FV-642B. Revision | : FV-642B. Revision | ||
: EC 5000072369, Redesign FRV Controllers, Revision | : EC 5000072369, Redesign FRV Controllers, Revision | ||
: EN-Ll-119 | : EN-Ll-119 | ||
: 9.1, | |||
: ZC-642A Equipment Failure Evaluation (CR 2009-1983), Revision | : ZC-642A Equipment Failure Evaluation (CR 2009-1983), Revision | ||
: EN-Ll-100 | : EN-Ll-100 | ||
: 9.1, EC15220 Software Upgrade for | |||
: FY-642B on Feedwater Valve | : FY-642B on Feedwater Valve | ||
: FV-642B 10CFR50.59 Process Applicability Determination, dated | : FV-642B 10CFR50.59 | ||
: Process Applicability Determination, dated | |||
: ER 05111346, Feedwater Regulating Valves | : ER 05111346, Feedwater Regulating Valves | ||
: FV-642A1B Pneumatic Actuator and Upgrade, Revision Miscellaneous 201931-1, | : FV-642A1B | ||
: Pneumatic Actuator and Upgrade, Revision Miscellaneous | |||
: 201931-1, | |||
: SN 708191-4 Certificate of Conformance, dated March 15,2007 451 -FW Reactor Level Control System Health Report, Third Quarter 2009 -Fourth Quarter 2009 Compensatory Actions and Disabled Annunciator Log, dated April 7, 2010 | : SN 708191-4 Certificate of Conformance, dated March 15,2007 451 -FW Reactor Level Control System Health Report, Third Quarter 2009 -Fourth Quarter 2009 Compensatory Actions and Disabled Annunciator Log, dated April 7, 2010 | ||
: CR-PNP-2009-02519, Feedwater Regulating Valves | : CR-PNP-2009-02519, Feedwater Regulating Valves | ||
: FV-642A1B On-Line MonitOring & Lock-up Restoration ODMllmplementation Action Plan, Revision 0 Feedwater Level Control Maintenance Rule SSC Basis Document, Revision 1 | : FV-642A1B | ||
: On-Line MonitOring | |||
& Lock-up Restoration | |||
: ODMllmplementation Action Plan, Revision 0 Feedwater Level Control Maintenance Rule SSC Basis Document, Revision 1 | |||
: LO-OLP-2009-00006, Lessons Learned for RF018, dated March 12, 2009 | : LO-OLP-2009-00006, Lessons Learned for RF018, dated March 12, 2009 | ||
: LO-PNPLO-2009-00095, | : LO-PNPLO-2009-00095, | ||
: CR 2009-2502 Effectiveness Review, dated September 14, 2009 Operator Compensatory Measures Log, dated April 7, 2010 Risk-Informed Inspection Notebook for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Unit 1, ReVision 2. | : CR 2009-2502 | ||
: Effectiveness Review, dated September | |||
: 14, 2009 Operator Compensatory Measures Log, dated April 7, 2010 Risk-Informed Inspection Notebook for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Unit 1, ReVision 2.1 a | |||
: SDBO-06, Design Basis Document for Condensate and Feedwater System, ReviSion 1 STI Instruction Manual Quick Trak III. Revision 0 V-2036, Feedwater Regulating Valves (Vendor Manual). Revision 7 Altran Report 08-0508-TR-001, Failure Analysis of 250 VDC MCC D9 Relay. Rev. 0 | : SDBO-06, Design Basis Document for Condensate and Feedwater System, ReviSion 1 STI Instruction Manual Quick Trak III. Revision 0 V-2036, Feedwater Regulating Valves (Vendor Manual). Revision 7 Altran Report 08-0508-TR-001, Failure Analysis of 250 VDC MCC D9 Relay. Rev. 0 | ||
: MEMO-AW-2008-04, Rev. 1, from Nuclear Logistics Inc. to Entergy, Continuous Overvoltage Operation of BFD Relays, Dated 12/18/08 | : MEMO-AW-2008-04, Rev. 1, from Nuclear Logistics Inc. to Entergy, Continuous Overvoltage Operation of BFD Relays, Dated 12/18/08 | ||
Line 340: | Line 968: | ||
: MCC 72-912 BDF33S Relay Replacement Task, Dated 4/14/09 PMID | : MCC 72-912 BDF33S Relay Replacement Task, Dated 4/14/09 PMID | ||
: 50077458-05, DC | : 50077458-05, DC | ||
: MCC 72-912 BDF33T Relay Replacement Task, Dated 5/11/09 Procedures 2.4.49. Feedwater Malfunctions, Revision 40 8.1.45, 1ST Instrument Calibration, Revision 25 Attachment | : MCC 72-912 BDF33T Relay Replacement Task, Dated 5/11/09 Procedures | ||
: 2.4.49. Feedwater Malfunctions, Revision 40 8.1.45, 1ST Instrument Calibration, Revision 25 Attachment | |||
: 8,M.2-6.3, Reactor Level Readout, Revision | : 8,M.2-6.3, Reactor Level Readout, Revision | ||
: ARP-C905R-G8, Feed REG VLV Control Signal Failure, Revision | : ARP-C905R-G8, Feed REG VLV Control Signal Failure, Revision | ||
Line 346: | Line 975: | ||
: ARP-C3RC, Alarm Response Procedure, Rev, | : ARP-C3RC, Alarm Response Procedure, Rev, | ||
: EN-DC-164, Environmental Qualification Program, Rev. | : EN-DC-164, Environmental Qualification Program, Rev. | ||
: ENN-DC-164, Environmental Qualification Program, Rev. EDSM T03, Design Guide for Environmental Qualification of Electrical EqUipment, Rev. Testing. Troubleshooting. and 3.M.4-122, Air-Operated Valve Diagnostic Equipment (FV-642A). performed May 15, 8.1.1.21. Feedwater Regulating Valve Testing, performed June 18, 2009 | : ENN-DC-164, Environmental Qualification Program, Rev. EDSM T03, Design Guide for Environmental Qualification of Electrical EqUipment, Rev. Testing. Troubleshooting. | ||
and | |||
: 3.M.4-122, Air-Operated Valve Diagnostic Equipment (FV-642A). | |||
performed May 15, 8.1.1.21. Feedwater Regulating Valve Testing, performed June 18, 2009 | |||
: EC 15220, Post Maintenance Test Plan for FRV Off-Line Power Conditions (wi FRV Full-Stroke Calibration Performed), Revision 0 ECT -0000015220-01, | : EC 15220, Post Maintenance Test Plan for FRV Off-Line Power Conditions (wi FRV Full-Stroke Calibration Performed), Revision 0 ECT -0000015220-01, | ||
: FV-642B Response Test, performed June 18,2009 | : FV-642B Response Test, performed June 18,2009 | ||
: EN-MA-125 | : EN-MA-125 | ||
: EN-MA-125 | : 9.3, Troubleshooting Control Forms (FY-642A Controller), dated April 22, 2009 -May | ||
: EN-MA-125 | |||
: 9.3, Troubleshooting Control Forms (FY-642B Controller), May 20, 2009 -June 4, | |||
: FV-642A and | : FV-642A and | ||
: FV-642B Actuator Performance Trending, dated June 29,2007 -March 8, | : FV-642B Actuator Performance Trending, dated June 29,2007 -March 8, | ||
: LSP-10725, | : LSP-10725, | ||
: FV-642S Performance Test Report, dated March Work DeSign Basis Documents , | : FV-642S Performance Test Report, dated March Work DeSign Basis Documents , SDBD-46G. | ||
: DC Power System, Rev. 1 | |||
: ER 4100787, Replace Under-Voltage Relays in 250V DC MCC D9, Rev. Environmental Qualification | : ER 4100787, Replace Under-Voltage Relays in 250V DC MCC D9, Rev. Environmental Qualification | ||
: QMR-MCCITEMSDCCUBICLES, DC MCC EQ Maintenance Requirements, Rev. | : QMR-MCCITEMSDCCUBICLES, DC MCC EQ Maintenance Requirements, Rev. | ||
: EQDF-MCCITEMSDCCUBICLES, EO Evaluation Sheet for DC MCC Cubicles, Rev. EODFREF421, NLI Qualification Report | : EQDF-MCCITEMSDCCUBICLES, EO Evaluation Sheet for DC MCC Cubicles, Rev. EODFREF421, NLI Qualification Report | ||
: QR-038-003 &WR-033-003, Rev. EQDFREF421A, Comments & Revisions to NLI | : QR-038-003 | ||
: QR-038-003, Rev. EQDFREF421 Bf NLI | &WR-033-003, Rev. EQDFREF421A, Comments & Revisions to NLI | ||
: MEMO-AW-2008-04 Rev. 1, Continuous Overvoltage Operation of Relays, Rev. 0 Section 40A3 NUREG 1022, Event Reporting Downpower Schedule and Power Maneuvering Procedure 2.2.94.5, Revision 5, Main Condenser Procedure 2.1.14, Revision 102, Station Power Attachment Licensee Event Report (LER Single Train of Reactor Building Cooling Water System (RBCCW) Inoperable for Time Period Exceeding Specification | : QR-038-003, Rev. EQDFREF421 | ||
: CR-PNP-2010-0130, Operators discover broken bolt on pipe clamp rendering RBCCW subsystem inoperable Licensee Event Report (LER 0500Q293/2010-002-00), Standby Gas Treatment Declared Inoperable After Discovery of Open Demister Door | : Bf NLI | ||
: MEMO-AW-2008-04 | |||
: Rev. 1, Continuous Overvoltage Operation of Relays, Rev. 0 Section 40A3 NUREG 1022, Event Reporting Downpower Schedule and Power Maneuvering Procedure | |||
: 2.2.94.5, Revision 5, Main Condenser | |||
===Procedure=== | |||
: 2.1.14, Revision 102, Station Power Attachment Licensee Event Report (LER | |||
: Single Train of Reactor Building Cooling Water System (RBCCW) Inoperable for Time Period Exceeding Specification | |||
: CR-PNP-2010-0130, Operators discover broken bolt on pipe clamp rendering | |||
: RBCCW subsystem inoperable Licensee Event Report (LER 0500Q293/2010-002-00), Standby Gas Treatment Declared Inoperable After Discovery of Open Demister Door | |||
: CR-PNP-2010-1079, Demister Door Found Open on Standby Gas Treatment Section 40A5 Procedures: | : CR-PNP-2010-1079, Demister Door Found Open on Standby Gas Treatment Section 40A5 Procedures: | ||
: EN-NS-112, "Medical Program", Revision 6 | : EN-NS-112, "Medical Program", Revision 6 | ||
: EN-NS-112, "Medical Program", Revision 7 2.2.21.5, "HPCllnjection and Pressure Contro''', Revision 8 2.1.11.1, System Fill, Vent, and Drain Instructions, Rev. 21 2.2.19, Residual Heat Removal, Rev. 101 2.2.19.1, RHR System -Shutdown Cooling Mode of Operation, Rev. 31 2.2.20, Core Spray, Rev. 73 2.2.21, High Pressure Coolant Injection System, Rev. 77 2.2.21.5, High Pressure Coolant Injection and Pressure Control, Rev. 17 8.5.1.7, Core Spray Keepfill Supply Check Valve Seat Leak Test, Rev. 10 8.5.1.8, Core Spray CST Suction Valve Leak Test, Rev. 6 8.5.2.15, LPCI System and Core Spray System Keepfill Checks, Rev. 17 CEP*NDE-0530, UT Examination of Components to Determine Fluid Level, Rev. 2 | : EN-NS-112, "Medical Program", Revision 7 2.2.21.5, "HPCllnjection and Pressure Contro''', Revision 8 2.1.11.1, System Fill, Vent, and Drain Instructions, Rev. 21 2.2.19, Residual Heat Removal, Rev. 101 2.2.19.1, RHR System -Shutdown Cooling Mode of Operation, Rev. 31 2.2.20, Core Spray, Rev. 73 2.2.21, High Pressure Coolant Injection System, Rev. 77 2.2.21.5, High Pressure Coolant Injection and Pressure Control, Rev. 17 8.5.1.7, Core Spray Keepfill Supply Check Valve Seat Leak Test, Rev. 10 8.5.1.8, Core Spray CST Suction Valve Leak Test, Rev. 6 8.5.2.15 , LPCI System and Core Spray System Keepfill Checks, Rev. 17 CEP*NDE-0530, UT Examination of Components to Determine Fluid Level, Rev. 2 | ||
: ENN-NDE-9.05, Ultrasonic Thickness Examination, Rev. 1 Condition Reports: | : ENN-NDE-9.05 , Ultrasonic Thickness Examination, Rev. 1 Condition Reports: | ||
: HQN-2009-00955 | : HQN-2009-00955 | ||
: LO-NOE-2008-00361 | : LO-NOE-2008-00361 | ||
Line 373: | Line 1,015: | ||
: PNP-2010-00486 | : PNP-2010-00486 | ||
: PNp*2010-00564 | : PNp*2010-00564 | ||
: PNP-2006-01802 PNp*2008-02095 | : PNP-2006-01802 | ||
: PNp*2008-02095 | |||
: PNP-2008-03049 | : PNP-2008-03049 | ||
: PNP-2010-01631 | : PNP-2010-01631 | ||
: PNP-2010-01632 PNp*2010-02019 | : PNP-2010-01632 | ||
: PNp*2010-02019 | |||
: PNP-201 0-021 90 | : PNP-201 0-021 90 | ||
: PNP-2010-02212 | : PNP-2010-02212 | ||
: PNP-2010-02362 Calculations and Evaluations | : PNP-2010-02362 | ||
===Calculations=== | |||
and Evaluations | |||
: PNP-ME-08-0002, Summary of Activities Associated with the Resolution of NRC | : PNP-ME-08-0002, Summary of Activities Associated with the Resolution of NRC | ||
: GL 2008-01 and INPO SER 2-05, Rev. 0 Attachment Report 1900039-R-003, Walkdown Report Associated with NRC | : GL 2008-01 and INPO SER 2-05, Rev. 0 Attachment Report 1900039-R-003, Walkdown Report Associated with NRC | ||
: GL 2008-01, Managing Accumulation in ECCS, Decay Heat and Containment Spray Systems, Rev. Report 1900039-R-001, Summary Report Associated with NRC | : GL 2008-01, Managing Accumulation in ECCS, Decay Heat and Containment Spray Systems, Rev. Report 1900039-R-001, Summary Report Associated with NRC | ||
: GL 2008-01, Managing Accumulation in ECCS, Decay Heat and Containment Spray Systems, Rev. M-662, RHR and Core Spray Pump Net Positive Suction Head and Pressure Drop, Rev. Calculation 1900039-C-002, Evaluation of Acceptable Void Sizes in ECCS, Decay Heat. Containment Spray Systems, Rev. Calculation 1900039-C-003, Evaluation of RHR System LPCI Transient, Rev. Report 1900039-R-004, Piping Structural System Screening Methodology for NRC GL Associated ECCS, Decay Heat and Containment Spray Systems, Rev. | : GL 2008-01, Managing Accumulation in ECCS, Decay Heat and Containment Spray Systems, Rev. M-662, RHR and Core Spray Pump Net Positive Suction Head and Pressure Drop, Rev. Calculation | ||
: PNPS-ME-08-00001, Evaluation of Safety Related and MOCI Pumps for the Adequacy Protection from Air Ingestion Due to Low Submergence, Rev. Completed Tests 8.5.2.15, LPC! System and Core Spray System Keepfilt Checks (performed on 12/13/09, 12127/09,1110/10,1126/10,2110/10,2/23/10,3/15/10, 3/16/10,3/28/10,4/13/10, 4/30/10. 5/11/10, 5/22/10, and 6/14/10) Design & Licensing Bases Letter 2.09.048, Entergy to NRC, Nine-Month Supplemental (Post-Outage) Response to NRC Generic Letter 2008-01, "Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling, Decay Heat Removal, and Containment Spray Systems," dated 08/13/09 Letter 2.08.025, Entergy to NRC, Three-Month Response to NRC Generic Letter 2008-01, "Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling, Decay Heat Removal. and Containment Spray Systems," dated 05/07/08 Letter 2.08.055, Entergy to NRC, Nine-Month Response to NRC Generic Letter 2008-01, "Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling. Decay Heat Removal, and Containment Spray Systems," dated 1 0114/08 Letter 2.08.023, Entergy to NRC, Three-Month Response Extension Request to NRC Generic Letter 2008-01, "Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling, Decay Heat Removal, and Containment Spray Systems," dated 04/10/08 | : 1900039-C-002, Evaluation of Acceptable Void Sizes in ECCS, Decay Heat. Containment Spray Systems, Rev. Calculation | ||
: 1900039-C-003, Evaluation of RHR System LPCI Transient, Rev. Report 1900039-R-004, Piping Structural System Screening Methodology for NRC GL Associated | |||
: ECCS, Decay Heat and Containment Spray Systems, Rev. | |||
: PNPS-ME-08-00001, Evaluation of Safety Related and MOCI Pumps for the Adequacy Protection from Air Ingestion Due to Low Submergence, Rev. Completed Tests 8.5.2.15 , LPC! System and Core Spray System Keepfilt Checks (performed on 12/13/09, 12127/09,1110/10,1126/10,2110/10,2/23/10,3/15/10, 3/16/10,3/28/10,4/13/10, 4/30/10. 5/11/10, 5/22/10, and 6/14/10) Design & Licensing Bases Letter 2.09.048, Entergy to NRC, Nine-Month Supplemental (Post-Outage) | |||
: Response to NRC Generic Letter 2008-01, "Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling, Decay Heat Removal, and Containment Spray Systems," dated 08/13/09 Letter 2.08.025, Entergy to NRC, Three-Month Response to NRC Generic Letter 2008-01, "Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling, Decay Heat Removal. and Containment Spray Systems," dated 05/07/08 Letter 2.08.055, Entergy to NRC, Nine-Month Response to NRC Generic Letter 2008-01, "Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling. Decay Heat Removal, and Containment Spray Systems," dated 1 0114/08 Letter 2.08.023, Entergy to NRC, Three-Month Response Extension Request to NRC Generic Letter 2008-01, "Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling, Decay Heat Removal, and Containment Spray Systems," dated 04/10/08 | |||
: SDBD-10, Design Basis Document for RHR System, Rev. 2 | : SDBD-10, Design Basis Document for RHR System, Rev. 2 | ||
: SDBD-14, Design Basis Document for Core Spray System, Rev. 1 Design Basis Document for HPCI System, Rev. EO Pilgrim Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Rev. 26 Drawings M215, P&ID Cooling Water System Reactor Building, Sh. 2, Rev. 49 M215, P&ID Cooling Water System Reactor Building. Sh. 3. Rev. 41 M241 , P&ID Residual Heat Removal System, Sh. 1, Rev. 86 M241 , P&ID Residual Heat Removal System, Sh. 2, Rev. 47 M242, P&ID Core Spray System, Rev. 52 M244, P&ID High Pressure Coolant Injection System, Sh. 1, Rev. E30 M209, P&IO Condensate & Demineralized Water Storage & Transfer Systems, Rev. 66 | : SDBD-14, Design Basis Document for Core Spray System, Rev. 1 | ||
===Design Basis Document=== | |||
for HPCI System, Rev. EO Pilgrim Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Rev. 26 Drawings M215, P&ID Cooling Water System Reactor Building, Sh. 2, Rev. 49 M215, P&ID Cooling Water System Reactor Building. | |||
: Sh. 3. Rev. 41 M241 , P&ID Residual Heat Removal System, Sh. 1, Rev. 86 M241 , P&ID Residual Heat Removal System, Sh. 2, Rev. 47 M242, P&ID Core Spray System, Rev. 52 M244, P&ID High Pressure Coolant Injection System, Sh. 1, Rev. E30 M209, P&IO Condensate | |||
& Demineralized Water Storage & Transfer Systems, Rev. 66 | |||
: IR-M242, Isometric Roadmap Core Spray System, Rev. E1 1900039-D-001, | : IR-M242, Isometric Roadmap Core Spray System, Rev. E1 1900039-D-001, | ||
: GL 2008-01 Walkdown Data Points HPCI, Rev. 0 Attachment | : GL 2008-01 Walkdown Data Points HPCI, Rev. 0 Attachment | ||
Line 393: | Line 1,048: | ||
: GL 2008-01 Walkdown Data Points Core Spray System. Sh. 3, Rev. 0 1900039-0-004, | : GL 2008-01 Walkdown Data Points Core Spray System. Sh. 3, Rev. 0 1900039-0-004, | ||
: GL 2008-01 Walkdown Data Points RHR System, Sh. 2, Rev. 0 1900039-0-004, | : GL 2008-01 Walkdown Data Points RHR System, Sh. 2, Rev. 0 1900039-0-004, | ||
: GL 2008-01 Walkdown Data Points RHR System. Sh. 3. Rev. 0 Miscellaneous ANSI/ANS 3.4-1983, "Medical Certification and Monitoring of Personnel Requiring Operator Licenses for Nuclear Power Plants" NRC Information Notice 2009-21, "'ncomplete Medical Testing for Licensed Operators" Letter 2.10.012, Pilgrim, Unit 1, Reply to Notice of Violation | : GL 2008-01 Walkdown Data Points RHR System. Sh. 3. Rev. 0 Miscellaneous | ||
: ANSI/ANS 3.4-1983, "Medical Certification and Monitoring of Personnel Requiring Operator Licenses for Nuclear Power Plants" NRC Information Notice 2009-21, "'ncomplete Medical Testing for Licensed Operators" Letter 2.10.012, Pilgrim, Unit 1, Reply to Notice of Violation | |||
: ML 100640668 | |||
: 50.59 Safety Evaluation | |||
: 3404, Rev. 0, PNPS 2.2.21.S "HPCllnjection and Pressure Control", Rev. B and Rev. 17 UT Examination Report | |||
: OB-U-006, Piping at Inlet to | : OB-U-006, Piping at Inlet to | ||
: MO-2301-36 (HPCI), dated 09/25/08 Self Assessment of Pilgrim's Response to | : MO-2301-36 (HPCI), dated 09/25/08 Self Assessment of Pilgrim's Response to GL-08-01. | ||
dated 04/02/10 | |||
: LO-LAR-2008-00027, Licensing Response to NRC | : LO-LAR-2008-00027, Licensing Response to NRC | ||
: GL 2008-01, dated 01130/08 Core Spray Health Report, 1Q10, 4009,3009, & 2009 Residual Heat Removal Health Report, 1010,4009,3009, & 2009 High Pressure Core Injection Health Report. 1010,4009.3009, & 2009 Operating Experience NRC Generic Letter 2008-01: Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling, Decay Heat Removal and Containment Spray Systems, dated 1111/08 Work Orders | : GL 2008-01, dated 01130/08 Core Spray Health Report, 1Q10, 4009,3009, & 2009 Residual Heat Removal Health Report, 1010,4009,3009, & 2009 High Pressure Core Injection Health Report. 1010,4009.3009, & 2009 Operating Experience | ||
: NRC Generic Letter 2008-01: Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling, Decay Heat Removal and Containment Spray Systems, dated 1111/08 Work Orders | |||
: WO 00164001 | : WO 00164001 | ||
: WO 00201155 Attachment | : WO 00201155 Attachment | ||
Line 405: | Line 1,065: | ||
: RBCCW RCIC RWP SBO SJAE SLC SSC SSW TBCCW TS TSO UHS WO A-17 | : RBCCW RCIC RWP SBO SJAE SLC SSC SSW TBCCW TS TSO UHS WO A-17 | ||
==LIST OF ACRONYMS== | ==LIST OF ACRONYMS== | ||
As Low As Reasonably Achievable Agencywide Documents Access and Management System American Society of Mechanical Engineers Corrective Action Program Code of Federal Regulations Condition Report Division of Reactor Projects Division of Reactor Safety Emergency Core Cooling Systems Emergency Diesel Generator Electronic Personal Dosimeter Feedwater Regulating Valve Feedwater Level Control Global Nuclear Fuel Instrumentation and Controls Inspection Manual Chapter Maintenance Rule Functional Failure Maintenance Rule Program Non-Cited Violation Nuclear Regulatory Commission National Source Tracking System Operational Decision-Making Issue Performance Indicator Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Process Radiation Monitoring Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Radiation Work Permit Station Blackout Steam Jet Air Ejectors Standby Liquid Contra! Structure, System or Component Salt Service Water Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water Technical Specifications Transmission System Operator Ultimate Heat Sink Work Order Attachment | As Low As Reasonably | ||
Achievable | |||
Agencywide | |||
Documents | |||
Access and Management | |||
System American Society of Mechanical | |||
Engineers | |||
Corrective | |||
Action Program Code of Federal Regulations | |||
Condition | |||
Report Division of Reactor Projects Division of Reactor Safety Emergency | |||
Core Cooling Systems Emergency | |||
Diesel Generator | |||
Electronic | |||
Personal Dosimeter | |||
Feedwater | |||
Regulating | |||
Valve Feedwater | |||
Level Control Global Nuclear Fuel Instrumentation | |||
and Controls Inspection | |||
Manual Chapter Maintenance | |||
Rule Functional Failure | |||
Maintenance | |||
Rule Program Non-Cited | |||
Violation | |||
Nuclear Regulatory | |||
Commission | |||
National Source Tracking System Operational | |||
Decision-Making | |||
Issue Performance | |||
Indicator | |||
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Process Radiation | |||
Monitoring | |||
Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water Reactor Core Isolation | |||
Cooling Radiation | |||
Work Permit Station Blackout Steam Jet Air Ejectors Standby Liquid Contra! Structure, System or Component | |||
Salt Service Water Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water Technical | |||
Specifications | |||
Transmission | |||
System Operator Ultimate Heat Sink Work Order Attachment | |||
}} | }} |
Revision as of 23:04, 21 August 2018
ML102100150 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Pilgrim |
Issue date: | 07/29/2010 |
From: | Jackson D E NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB5 |
To: | Bronson K Entergy Nuclear Operations |
Jackson, D E RI/DRP/PB5/610-337-5306 | |
References | |
IR-10-003 | |
Download: ML102100150 (50) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 475 ALLENDALE KING OF PRUSSIA, PA July 29 t 2010 Mr. Kevin Bronson Site Vice President Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 600 Rocky Hill Road Plymouth, MA 02360-5508 PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION -NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000293/2010003
Dear Mr. Bronson:
On June 30, 2010, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS). The enclosed inspection report documents the results, which were discussed on July 1.3, 2010, with you and members of your staff. The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations, and with the Gonditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
The report documents one NRC identified finding of very low safety significance (Green). Additionally, a licensee-identified violation, which was determined to be of very low safety significance, is listed in this report. However, because of the very low safety significance and because it is entered into your corrective action program (CAP), the NRC is treating this as a non-cited violation (NCV), consistent with Section VLA 1 of the NRC's Enforcement Policy. If you contest any NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the baSis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Senior Resident Inspector at PNPS. In addition, if you disagree with the cross-cutting aspect assigned to the finding in this report. you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region I, and the NRC Senior Resident Inspector at PNPS. I In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice, II a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.govlreading-rm/adams.html(the Public Electronic Reading Room). ;JI:iJr Donald E. Jack 0 Projects Branc Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-293 License No. DPR-35
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000293/2010003
w/Attachment:
Supplemental Information co w.encl:Distribution via ListServ K. 2 In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html(the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,IRA! . Donald E. Jackson, Chief Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-293 License No. DPR-35 Inspection Report 05000293/2010003
w/Attachment:
Supplemental Information Distribution w/encl: M. Dapas, Acting RA (R10RAMAIL RESOURCE)
T. Setzer, DRP D. Lew, Acting DRA (R10RAMAIL RESOURCE)
J. Heinly, DRP J. Clifford, R1DRPMAIL.
RESOURCE)
M. Schneider, DRP, SRI D. Collins, DRP (R1DRPMAIL RESOURCE)
8. Smith, DRP, RI A. Ford, DRP, Resident OA D. Roberts, DRS (R1DRSMail RESOURCE)
RidsNrrPMPilgrim Resource P. Wifson, (R1 DRSMail RESOURCE)
RidsNrrDorlLPL 1-1 l. Trocine, RI OEDO ROPreports.Resource@nrc.gov D. Jackson, DRP SUNSI Review Complete:
_-..!..TCl:!:!S"'--
__(Reviewer's Initials)
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DRP\BRANCH5\Reports\Orafts\PilgrimIR201 0003 revO. docm ML 102100150 After declaring this document "An Official Agency Record" it will be releasecilo the Public. To receive a copy of this document, Indicate in the box: "0" = Copy without attachment/enclosure "E" =Copy with attachmenllenctosure "N" =No copy OFFICE RIIDRP I'hp RIIDRP I RIIDRP I NAME MSchneider/tcs for TSetzer/tcs OJackson/dej DATE 07/27/10 07/27/10 07/28/10 OFFICIAL RECORD COpy I'
1 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I Docket No: 50-293 License No: DPR-35 Report No: 05000293/2010003 Licensee:
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. Facility:
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) Location:
600 Rocky Hill Road Plymouth, MA 02360 Inspection Period: April 1, 2010 through June 30, 2010 Inspectors:
M. Schneider, Senior Resident Inspector, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP) B. Smith, Resident Inspector, DRP S. Rich, Reactor Inspector.
DRP J. Schoppy. Senior Reactor Inspector, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS) R. Rolph, Health PhYSicist, DRS J. Richmond, Senior Reactor Inspector, DRS D. Molteni, Operator Licensing Inspector, DRS S. Pindale, Senior Reactor Inspector, DRS M. Balazik, Reactor Inspector, DRS C. Williams.
Reactor Inspector.
DRS Approved By: Donald E. Jackson. Chief Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure TABLE OF
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
...........................................................................................................
'" ...
REPORT DETAILS
REACTOR SAFETY
....................................................................................................................... 1 R01 Adverse Weather Protection
...................................................................... 1 R04 Equipment Alignment.
..........................
., ....... , ............................................. 1 R05 Fire Protection
........................................................................................... 1 R06 Flood Protection Measures .. ., ....., .............................................................. 1 R07 Heat Sink Performance
.............................................................................. 1 R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program ............................................
1R12 Maintenance
Effectiveness
...................................................................... 1 R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control ................ 1 R15 Operability Evaluations
............................................................................ 1 R18 Plant Modifications
...................................................................................
1R19 Post-Maintenance
Testing ....................................................................... 1 R22 Surveillance Testing ................................................................................. 1EP6 Drill Evaluation
......................................................................................... 2. RADIATION .................................................................................................................. 2RS01 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls
OTHER ACTIVITIES
.................................................................................................................... 40A1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification
.................................................... 40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems ............................................... 40A3 Event Follow-up
....................................................................................... 40A5 Other Activities
.......................................................................................... 40A6 Meetings, Including Exit ...........................................................................40A7 Licensee-Identified Violations
.........................................................
=SUPPLEMENTAL
INFORMATION=
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
...........................................................................................................
LIST OF ITEMS
OPENED. CLOSED AND DISCUSSED
...............................................................
LIST OF DOCUMENTS
REVIEWED ..............................................................................................LIST OF ACRONyMS ....................................................................................................................EnClosure
- SUMMARY OF
- 04/01/2010-06/30/2010;
- Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station; Flood Protection Measures.
- The report covered a three-month period of inspection by the resident inspector staff and region based inspectors.
- One Green finding was identified.
- The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC} 0609, "Significance Determination Process." The cross-cutting aspect for the finding was determined using
- IMC 0310, "Components Within The Cross-Cutting Areas." Findings for which the significance determination process does riot apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in
- NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006. Cornerstone:
- Initiating Events Green. The inspectors identified
a Green finding (FIN) for improper maintenance of underground non-safety related medium voltage electric cables. The inspectors identified that Entergy allowed non-safety related medium voltage cables to remain submerged in water for extended periods of time. Entergyentered this issue into their Corrective Action Program (CAP), and specified corrective actions to identify all underground medium voltage cables included under the Cable Reliability Program, and to identify which manholes should have dewatering capability.
- The inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone, and affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations.
- Specifically, continued submergence of the non-safety related power cables (from the start-up transformer to electrical buses A2 and A4) could lead to cable failure and cause an event that would affect plant stability.
- The inspectors performed
a Phase 1 Significance Determination Process screening of the finding in accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment
- 4, "Phase 1 -Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because the condition did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the unavailability of mitigating systems equipment.
- The inspectors determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Problem Identification and Resolution cross-cutting area, Corrective Action Program component, because Entergy personnel did not thoroughly evaluate the problem when submerged cabling was initially identified
P.1(c}. (Section 1 R06) Other Findings A violation of very low safety Significance that was identified by Entergy has been reviewed by the inspectors.
- Corrective actions taken or planned by Entergy have been entered into Entergy's corrective action program. This violation and corrective action tracking number is listed in Section 40A7 of this report. Enclosure
.1 REPORT DETAILS Summary of Plant Status Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) began the inspection period operating at 100 percent power. On May 1,2010, operators reduced power to 56 percent in response to the "8" Feedwater Regulating Valve (FRV) drifting closed. The valve was manually locked and Pilgrim returned to 100 percent power later the same day. On May 20,2010, operators reduced power to 50 percent power for a backwash of the main condenser and to support troubleshooting of the "8" FRV. Pi/grim returned to 100 percent power on May 21,2010. following successful repairs to the "8" FRV. On May 24, 2010, operators reduced power to 49 percent power for a second backwash of the main condenser.
- Pilgrim returned to 100 percent power later the same day. On May 27, 2010. operators reduced power to 80 percent for a control rod pattern adjustment and returned to 100 percent power !ater the same day. Operators maintained the reactor at or near 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period. 1. REACTOR SAFETY Cornerstones:
- 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
(71111.01)
- Seasonal Readiness
a. Inspection Scope (1 sample) The inspectors performed
a review of severe weather preparations during the week of May 13, 2010, to evaluate the site's readiness for the onset of hurricane season, including the readiness of three risk-significant systems, which included the intake structure, the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) and the Station Blackout (SBO) Diesel Generator.
- The inspection examined selected equipment and supporting structures to determine if they were configured in accordance with Entergy procedures and if adequate controls were in place to ensure functionality of the systems. The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the intake structure, the EDG enclosures, and the SBO enclosure to determine the adequacy of equipment protection from the effects of hurricanes.
- The documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings No findings were identified.
.2 Grid Stability*
- Alternating Current (AC) Power System Readiness
a. Inspection Scope (1 sample) The inspectors performed
a review of Entergy's offsite and onsite AC power system readiness for susceptibilities during adverse weather. The inspectors reviewed Entergy's plant features and procedures for operation and continued availability of offsite and onsite AC power systems to determine if they were appropriate.
- The inspection focused on procedures affecting these areas and communication protocols between the transmisSion system operator (TSO) and Entergy to verify that appropriate information would be exchanged when issues arise that could impact the offsite power system. The inspectors also reviewed Entergy's procedures to ensure that they addressed actions to be taken when notified by the TSO to transfer safety-related loads to the onsite power supply, compensatory actions to be performed if it were not possible to predict grid conditions, and reassessment of plant risk based on maintenance activities which could affect grid reliability.
- The documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings No findings were identi'fied.
- R04 Equipment Alignment
(71111.04)
.1 Partial System Walkdowns
(71111.040)
a. Inspection Scope (3 samples) The inspectors performed three partial system walkdowns during this inspection period. The inspectors reviewed the documents listed in the Attachment to determine the correct system alignment.
- The inspectors performed
a partial walkdown of each system to determine if the critical portions of the selected systems were correctly aligned in accordance with procedures, and to identify any discrepancies that may have had an effect on operability.
- The walkdowns included selected control switch reviews, valve position checks, and verification of electrical power to critical components.
- Finally. the inspectors evaluated other elements.
such as material condition, housekeeping, and component labeling.
- The following systems were reviewed based on their risk significance for the given plant configuration: Electric Fire Pump following testing on the Diesel Fire Pump; Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System with the High Pressure Coolant Injection System out of service for maintenance;
and Station Blackout Diesel Generator with the fiN Emergency Diesel Generator out of service for maintenance.
b. Findings No findings were identified.
.2 Complete System Walkdowns
(71111.04S)
a. Inspection Scope (1 sample) The inspeCtors completed
a detailed review of the "B" Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) system to assess the functional capability of the system. The inspectors performed
a walkdown of the system to determine whether the critical components, such as valves and circuit breakers, were aligned in accordance with operating procedures, and to assess the material condition of valves, piping, and seismic supports.
- The inspectors discussed system health with the system engineer, reviewed the system's Maintenance Rule status, and performed
a review of outstanding maintenance work orders to determine whether the deficiencies significantly affected the "8" RBCCW system function.
- The inspectors also reviewed condition reports from the past year to determine whether "B" RBCCW equipment problems were being identified and appropriately resolved.
- The documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings No findings were identified.
- R05 Fire Protection
(71111.05)
.1 Fire Protection
-Tours (71111.050)
a. Inspection Scope (5 samples) The inspectors performed walkdowns of five fire protection areas during the inspection period. The inspectors reviewed Entergy's fire protection program to determine the specified fire protection design features, fire area boundaries, and combustible loading requirements for the selected areas. The inspectors walked down these areas to assess Entergy's control of transient combustible material and ignition sources. In addition, the inspectors evaluated the material condition and operational status of fire detection and suppression capabilities and fire barriers.
- The inspectors then compared the existing condition of the areas to the fire protection program requirements to determine whether all program requirements were met The documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment.
- The fire protection areas reviewed were: Fire Area 1.10, Fire Zone 1.30A, Torus Compartment; Fire Area 1.9, Fire Zone 1.9, Control Rod Drive Hydraulic Control Units East Side; Fire Area 1.10, Fire Zone 1.26, Auxiliary Boiler Room; Fire Area 1.10, Fire Zone 1.28, Reactor Recirculation Pump Motor Generator Sets Room; and Fire Area 1.10, Fire Zone 1.3, High Pressure Coolant Injection Pump and Turbine Room. Enclosure
.2 Annual Fire Drill Observation
(71111.05A)
a. Inspection Scope (1 sample) The inspectors observed an announced fire drill in the Operations and Maintenance Building Weld Shop Area. The fire drill was performed in accordance with procedure
- EN-TQ-125, Revision 0, "Fire Brigade Drills." The inspectors observed performance of the fire brigade personnel to determine whether Entergy's fire fighting pre-plan strategies were utilized, the pre-planned drill scenario was followed, and the drill objectives were met. The inspectors observed the drill to verify that protective clothing and breathing apparatus were donned: sufficient fire fighting equipment was brought to the scene; the fire brigade leader's fire fighting directions were clear: and communications with the plant operators and between fire brigade members were effective.
- The inspectors observed the drill critique to determine whether areas to improve fire brigade performance were identified.
- Additional documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings No findings were identified.
- R06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06)
- Underground Cable Inspection
a. Inspection Scope (1 sample) The inspectors reviewed a sample of flood protection measures affecting cables located in underground manholes.
- The inspectors selected an inspection of cable pits 2A, 4, and 5 that contain underground non-safety related power cables (from the start-up transformer to electrical buses A2 and A4) near the main transformer and the south side of the switchyard near the start-up transformer.
- The inspectors monitored Entergy's maintenance inspection and dewatering activities associated with each manhole to evaluate the as-found condition and corrective actions. The inspectors assessed the condition of power cables, splices, and supports.
- The inspectors also reviewed Entergy's Cable Reliability Program and corrective actions taken for this issue and the Cable Reliability Program in general. The documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings Introduction:
- The inspectors identified
a finding (FIN) of very low safety Significance (Green) for improper maintenance of underground non-safety related medium voltage electric cables. The inspectors observed partially and fully submerged medium voltage cables during the regularly scheduled monthly dewatering and inspection of three cable vaults. Enclosure Description:
- The electric power distribution system provides electric power to safety and non-safety related distribution buses in the plant. Off-site power is provided to the system by two independent circuits through non-safety related, medium voltage (typically those rated from 2 kilovolts to 35 kilovolts), Kente cables that are routed through . underground vaults and ducts. These cables are not rated for continuous submergence in water. On April 28, 2010, the inspectors observed water in each of the manholes and vaults listed above. The inspectors noted that no dewatering or drainage systems existed in the manholes.
- Entergy procedure
- EN-DC-346, Revision 0, "Cable Reliability Program," was issued and effective on December 31, 2009. This procedure discusses manhole inspections and dewatering, and requires, in part, "If manual inspections and pumping are used to maintain a cable system dry, the intervals must be sufficient to keep the cables dry. Adjust intervals as necessary, based on inspection results." Discussions with Entergy personnel involved with these inspections indicated that cables in Manhole 2A were periodically found submerged or partially submerged, and that cables in Manholes 4 and 5 were always found submerged.
- The cables that were submerged included cables that were installed from the 4160V, non-safety related startup . transformer and connected to the A2 and A4 non-safety related busses. The inspectors identified that Entergy had previously identified submerged cables in August and September of 2009, however, corrective actions were not sufficient to preclude these cables from being submerged.
- The inspectors also determined that Entergy had not implemented the Cable Reliability Program guidance in a timely manner to ensure that the degrading effects of this environmental condition were minimized (Le., pumping intervals were not sufficient to maintain the cables dry). Entergy generated
Condition Report (CR)
- CR-PNp*2010*1529, and specified actions to identify a\l underground medium voltage cables included in the Cable Reliability Program, and to identify which manholes should have dewatering capability.
- Entergy also created a corrective action to increase the frequency of the dewatering activities for these areas. In addition, the Electric Power Research Institute has generated
a cable testing database that will be used to compare the test results of cables that have been removed from service to evaluate the potential for degradation of in-service cables. Analysis:
- The inspectors determined that allowing medium voltage cables to remain submerged for extended periods of time was a performance deficiency.
- The cause of the issue was within Entergy's ability to foresee and correct, and should have been prevented.
- Traditional Enforcement did not apply, as the issue did not have actual or potential safety consequence, had no willful aspects, nor did it impact the NRC's ability to perform its regulatory function.
- A review of NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, Appendix E, "Minor Examples," revealed that no minor examples were applicable to this finding. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone, and affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations.
- Specifically.
continued submergence of the safety related power cables (from the start-up transformer to electrical buses A2 and A4) Enclosure could lead to cable failure and cause an event that would affect plant stability.
- The inspectors performed
a Phase 1 Significance Determination Process screening of the finding in accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachmenl
- 4, "Phase 1 -Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because the condition did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the unavailability of mitigating systems equipment.
- The inspectors determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Problem Identification and Resolution cross-cutting area, Corrective Action Program component, because Entergy personnel did not thoroughly evaluate the problem when submerged cabling was initially identified
- IP.1(c)].
- Enforcement:
- This finding does not involve enforcement action because no regulatory requirement violation was identified.
- Because this finding does not involve a violation and has very low safety significance, it is identified as
t Submerged Medium Voltage Cables. 1 R07 Heat Sink Performance
(71111.07T)
a. Inspection Scope (2 samples) Based on a plant specific risk assessment, previous inspections, recent operational experience, and resident inspector input, the inspector selected the following heat sink samples: Operation and performance testing of the salt service water(SSW)
system; and Performance of the ultimate heat sink (UHS), which included SSW piping integrity and SSW intake structure functionality.
- The SSW system was designed to function as the UHS for all the systems cooled by the RBCCW and turbine building closed cooling water (TBCCW) systems during all operating modes by continuously providing adequate cooling water flow to the RBCCW and TBCCW heat exchangers.
- The inspectors reviewed the SSW system design to evaluate the adequacy of system monitoring and performance testing. The inspectors reviewed a sample of SSW pump and valve performance tests, system health and walkdown reports, and in*service test vibration monitoring results for adverse trends and to verify that the system functioned as designed.
- The inspectors verified that Entergy performed the pump and valve in-service tests in accordance with American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code requirements.
- In addition, the inspectors reviewed Entergy's monitoring, maintenance, and testing of interface valves between related SSW and non-safety related or non-seismic piping systems to ensure that adequate SSW flow is available post-accident consistent with design basis assumptions.
- The inspectors reviewed Entergy's buried pipe inspection and monitoring program to independently assess the condition and structural integrity of the SSW piping. The inspectors reviewed a sample of SSW pipe nondestructive examination records and videos of underwater inspections of the SSW intake bays to ensure that Entergy appropriately identified and dispositioned any SSW system degradation.
- The inspectors performed an above ground walkdown of accessible areas containing buried SSW piping Enclosure to look for soil subsidence or other indications of piping leakage and/or degradation.
- The inspectors also directly observed the condition of SSW piping in the accessible portions of the SSW bays and valve pits. The inspectors reviewed Entergy's procedures for SSW and intake structure operation, abnormal SSW operations, adverse weather conditions, and for a loss of the SSW system. The inspectors verified that Entergy maintained these procedures consistent with their design and licensing basis and that plant operators could reasonably implement the procedures as written. The inspectors independently verified that SSW and intake level instrumentation, which operators rely upon for decision making, was available and functional.
- The inspectors also reviewed recent SSW and intake area modifications to verify that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of the SSW system had not been degraded by the design changes. The inspectors walked down control room instrument panels, the RBCCW and TBCCW heat exchangers, accessible portions of SSW piping in the auxiliary building, and SSW intake area (including the SSW pumps, spray wash pumps, and traveling water screens) to assess the material condition and configuration control of these structures, systems and components (S5Cs). The inspectors also reviewed a sample of corrective action condition reports (CRs) related to the SSW isolation valves, SSW pumps, and SSW piping integrity to ensure that Entergy appropriately identified, characterized, and corrected problems related to these essential
- 5SCs. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings No findings were identified.
- R11 Licensed Operator Regualification Program (71111.11)
- Resident Inspector Quarterly Review (71111.11Q)
a. Inspection Scope (1 sample) The inspectors observed licensed operator "as-found" simulator training on April 19, 2010. The inspectors observed crew response to an AntiCipated Transient Without Scram. The inspectors assessed the licensed operators' performance to determine if the training evaluators adequately addressed observed deficiencies.
- The inspectors reviewed the applicable training objectives from the scenario to determine if they had been achieved.
- In addition.
the inspectors performed
a simulator fidelity review 10 determine if the arrangement of the simulator instrumentation, controls.
and tagging closely paralleled that of the control room. The documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings . No findings were identified.
- R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
(71111.12Q)
a. Inspection Scope (3 samples) The inspectors reviewed the three samples listed below for items such as: (1) appropriate work practices;
(2) identifying and addressing common cause failures;
(3) scoping in accordance with 10
- CFR 50.65 paragraph (b) of the Maintenance Rule; (4) characterizing reliability issues for performance;
(5) trending key parameters for condition monitoring;
(6) charging unavailability for performance;
(7) classification and reclassification in accordance with 10
- CFR 50.65 paragraph (a)(1) or (a)(2); and (8) appropriateness of performance criteria for structures, systems, and components (SSCs)/functions classified as paragraph (a)(2) and/or appropriateness and adequacy of goals and corrective actions for SSCs/functions classified as paragraph (aX1). The documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment.
- Items reviewed included the following: Loop "B" Salt Service Water Flow Indicator, Indicating Flow with Flow Control Valve Closed; Air Introduction into Standby Liquid Control System; and Functional Failure Determinations of the Feedwater Regulating Valves (FRV). b. Findings No findings were identified.
- R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control {71111.13}
a. Inspection Scope (5 samples) The inspectors evaluated five maintenance risk assessments for planned maintenance activities.
- The inspectors reviewed maintenance risk evaluations, work schedules, and control room logs to determine if concurrent maintenance or surveillance activities adversely affected the plant risk already incurred with components.
- The inspectors evaluated whether Entergy took the necessary steps to control work activities, minimized the probability of initiating events, and maintained the functional capability of mitigating systems. The inspectors assessed Entergy's risk management actions during plant walkdowns.
- The documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors reviewed the conduct and adequacy of maintenance risk assessments for the following maintenance and testing activities: Yellow Risk for "8" Diesel Logic Test and Fire Protection Features Out-of-Service; Yellow Risk Due to Unavailability of One Offsite Power Line, Diesel Fire Pump, Increased Loss of Offsite Power and Increased Trip Risk; Yellow Risk with High Pressure Coolant Injection Out of Service for Maintenance; Yellow Risk During Unavailability of "8" Residual Heat Removal Motor Operated Valve; and Yellow Risk with Station Blackout Maintenance and Shutdown Transformer Out of Service. Enclosure
.1 b. Findings No findings were identified. 1 R 15 Operability Evaluations
(71111.15)
a. Inspection Scope (5 samples) The inspectors reviewed five operability determinations associated with degraded or non-conforming conditions to determine if the operability determination was justified and if the mitigating systems or barriers remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk had occurred.
- The inspectors also reviewed compensatory measures to determine if the compensatory measures were in place and were appropriately controlled.
- The inspectors reviewed Entergy's performance against related Technical Specifications and Updated Final Safety Analysis Report requirements.
- The documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment.
- The inspectors reviewed the following degraded or non-conforming conditions:
- CR-PNP-2010-1303, High Pressure Coolant Injection Steam Une Drain Root Valve Steam Leak;
- CR-PNP-2009-4944, Drywell Leakage Upward Trend over Three Pump-Downs;
- CR-PNP-2010-1289, Potential Air in Standby Liquid Control System;
- CR-PNP-2010-1481 , GNF2 Fuel Assembly Manufacturing Defects; and
- CR-PNP-2010-1609, Calculation for Operators' Dose during Main Steam Line 6reak outside containment cannot be retrieved.
b. Findings No findings were identified. 1 R 18 Plant Modifications
(71111.18)
- Permanent Modification to "6" Salt Service Water (SSW} Pump Flange Connection
a. Inspection Scope (1 sample) The inspectors reviewed Permanent Modification
- EC21320, "Evaluate and Provide Altemate DeSign for P-208B Discharge Head to Top Column Flange Connection," to determine whether the performance capability of the "6" SSW pump had been degraded through the modification.
- The inspectors reviewed engineering drawings, relevant condition reports, and work packages to ensure the modification did not adversely affect the SSW system. The inspectors reviewed the drawings to determine whether they properly reflected the modification.
- The inspectors also walked down the SSW pump compartment room in the intake structure.
- The documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment.
- I j' I I Findings No findings were identified . . Permanent Modification for Installing Turbine-Style Air Start Motors and Regulators Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) b. Inspection Scope (1 sample) The inspectors reviewed Permanent Modification
- EC 12969, Revision 0, "Install Style Air Start Motors and Regulators on EDG X-107B," and the aSSOCiated
- CFR 50.59 screening, to determine whether the licensing bases and performance capability of the "B" EDG system had been degraded through the modification.
- A walkdown was performed to determine whether the components inside the room were as described in the permanent modification documentation.
- The inspectors reviewed applicable drawings to determine whether they properly reflected the permanent modification.
- The documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment. Findings No findings were identified.
- 1PostwMaintenance Testing (71111.19) Inspection Scope (6 samples) The inspectors reviewed s!xsamples of post-maintenance tests during this inspection period. The inspectors reviewed these activities to determine whether the maintenance test adequately demonstrated that the safety-related function of the equipment was satisfied, given the scope of the work performed, and that operability of the system was restored.
- In addition, the inspectors evaluated the applicable test acceptance criteria to verify consistency with the associated deSign and licensing bases, as well as Technical SpeCification requirements.
- The inspectors also evaluated whether conditions adverse to quality were entered into the CAP for resolution.
- The documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment.
- The following maintenance activities and their post-maintenance tests were evaluated: Overhaul Power Supply Circuit Breaker for Reactor Recirculation Pump Suction to Reactor Water Clean Up Pump Valve (MO-1201 Disconnect and Reconnect "S" Salt Service Water Pump Motor during P-208B Overhaul; "S" Salt Service Water Pump Check Valve 29-CK-3880B
- Rebuild; . High Pressure Coolant Injection Valve
- AO-2301-64, Replacement for Limit Switch; "A" Emergency Diesel Generator year, 4 year, and 8 year Preventive Maintenance;
and Replace Fuel Injector Snubber Valves on "At! Emergency Diesel Generator.
b. Findings No findings were identified.
- R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22) a. Inspection Scope (6 samples) The inspectors witnessed six surveillance activities and/or reviewed test data to determine whether the testing adequately demonstrated eqUipment operational readiness and the ability to perform the intended safety-related functions.
- The inspectors reviewed selected prerequiSites and precautions to determine jf they were met and if the tests were performed in accordance with the procedural steps. Additionally, the inspectors evaluated the applicable test acceptance criteria for consistency with associated design bases, licensing bases, and Technical Specification requirements.
- The inspectors also evaluated whether conditions adverse to quality were entered into the Corrective Action Program for resolution.
- The documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment.
- The following surveillance tests were evaluated:
- Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Operability and In-Service Test (1ST); * Standby Liquid Control Operability and 1ST; * Main Steam Line Containment Isolation Valve (CIV) Logic Test; * High Pressure Coolant Injection System Operability and 1ST; * "8" Residual Heat Removal Operability Test (Routine);
and * "An Core Spray Pump Operability and 1ST. b. Findings No findings were identified.
- EP6 Drill Evaluation
(71114.06) Cornerstone:
a. Inspection Scope (1 sample) The inspectors observed licensed operator "as-found" simulator training on April 19, 2010. The inspectors evaluated the operating crew activities related to an accurate and timely classification and notification of a Site Area Emergency, Emergency Action Level Declaration
- 2.3.1.3. Additionally, the inspectors assessed the ability of training evaluators to adequately address operator performance deficiencies identified during the exercise.
- The documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings No findings were identified.
- 2. RADIATION
- SAFETY (RS) Cornerstone:
- Occupational and Public Radiation Safety 2RS01 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (71124.01)
a. Inspection Scope During the period May 17, 2010, through May 20,2010, the inspectors performed the following activities to verify that Entergy properly assessed the radiological hazards in the workplace and implemented appropriate radiation monitoring and exposure controls during routine operations.
- Implementation of these controls was reviewed against the criteria contained in 10
- CFR 20, "Standards for Protection Against Radiation," relevant Technical Specifications, and Entergy's procedures.
- This inspection effort represented partial completion of one sample. Further inspection is planned to fully complete this sample, and the results will be documented in a future report. Inspection Planning The inspectors reviewed all of Pilgrim's Performance Indicators for the Occupational Exposure Cornerstone for follow up; The inspectors reviewed radiation protection program self assessments and audits; and The inspectors verified no operational events occurred relating to radiation safety. Radiological Hazard Assessment The inspectors verified no changes to plant operations were implemented or planned that would result in a change to plant radiological conditions; The inspectors reviewed the last two (2) surveys performed on each level of the Reactor Building to include the Refuel Floor and the Traversing In-core Probe Room; The inspectors walked down the faCility, including the Trash Compactor Facility, the radioactive waste processing area, storage, and handling areas to evaluate material and radiological conditions and the reactor building.
- With the assistance of a radiation protection technician, dose rates were verified at the boundary of several high radiation areas and at the doors to locked high radiation areas; and The inspectors observed work in progress in the condenser bay at 100% power. The inspectors reviewed pre-work surveys and documentation which identified appropriate hazards. Instructions to Workers The inspectors verified the labeling of several drums containing licensed material staged in cubicles and entrances to cubicles in the radwaste hallway; The inspectors reviewed four radiation work permits (RWP) used to access High Radiation Areas and verified specified work control instructions;
and Enclosure The inspectors reviewed five (5) condition reports where a worker's personal dosimeter (EPD)
- Contamination and Radioactive Material Control The inspectors reviewed Pilgrim's criteria for the survey and release of material the response required for an alarm indicating the presence of licensed The inspectors verified the presence of three (3) sources on Pilgrim's inventory verified that the sources were leak tested and were not leaking; The inspectors verified that Pilgrim has three (3) sources meeting the requirements to be reported on the nationally tracked sources system. The sources have not been moved and are still in use. Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage The inspectors observed work in progress in the condenser bay at 100% power. The workers removed and re-instal.led
a feedwater regulating valve controller.
- The inspectors attended the pre-job briefing and verified the eXisting conditions were conSistent with posted surveys, RWP, and worker briefing; The inspectors verified the adequacy of radiological controls such as radiation and contamination surveys, video surveillance, communication, and stay time tracking during personnel entry and egress from the condenser bay; The inspectors verified the placement of radiation monitOring devices on the individuals;
and There was no opportunity to review an RWP for airborne radioactivity area entry. No airborne area entries were specified therefore, no RWPs were written. Radiation Worker Performance The inspectors observed radiation worker performance and observed that they were aware of the radiological conditions and the RWP controls and that their performance reflected the level of radiological hazards present; and The inspectors reviewed six (6) condition reports where hUman performance errors were the cause. Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency The inspectors observed radiation protection technician performance to determine if technicians were aware of the radiological conditions in their workplace and the RWP controls;
and The inspectors reviewed five (5) condition reports where the cause was radiation protection technician error. Problem Identification and Resolution The inspectors reviewed Pilgrim's self-assessments, audits, and Special Reports related to the radiation protection program to determine if identified problems were entered into the CAP. The inspectors verified that problems identified were entered into the CAP and appropriate corrective actions were identified.
.1
- No findings were OTHER ACTIVITIES
lOA] 40APerformance Indicator (PI) Verification
(71151) Cornerstone:
- Initiating Events Inspection ScoRe (3 samples) The Initiating Events cornerstone
- PI data for unplanned scrams per 7,000 critical hours (IE01); unplanned scrams with loss of normal heat removal (IE04); and unplanned power changes per 7,000 critical hours (IE03) was reviewed to assess the completeness and accuracy ofthe report information.
- Specifically, PI data from the second quarter of 2009 through the first quarter of 2010 was reviewed and compared to information contained in NRC inspection reports, Licensee Event Reports (LERs), and operator logs. The documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment.
- No findings were Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152) Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program (CAP) Inspection Scope The inspectors performed
a screening of each item entered into Entergy's Corrective Action Program. This review was accomplished by reviewing printouts of each Condition Report (CR). attending daily screening meetings and/or accessing Entergy's database.
- The purpose of this review was to identify conditions such as repetitive equipment failures or human performance issues that might warrant additional follow-up. Findings No findings were identified . . 2 Semi-Annual Review to Identity Trends Inspection Scope (1 sample) The inspectors performed
a review of Entergy's
- CAP and associated documents to identify trends that could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The review was focused on repetitive equipment and corrective maintenance issues, but also considered the results of daily inspector.
- CAP item screening.
- The review included Enclosure I t 1 I I I-
issues documented in CAP trend reports and the site CAP performance indicator The review focused on the six month period of January 2010, through June although the inspectors also evaluated previous trend results for Condition Reports July 2009, through December 2009, which were discussed in Pilgrim Inspection Report 2009005. The documents reviewed during the inspection are listed the
b. Findings and ObselVations No findings were identified.
- One low level trend discussed in Integrated Inspection Report
- 2009005 was reviewed and is discussed below. In
a new low level trend was identified in the area of the Maintenance Rule Program Post Maintenance and Modification Testing The inspectors reviewed
- CR-PNP-2009-2778, which was written to perform assessment of post maintenance test activities documented at Pi/grim during and Pilgrim's most recent refueling outage (RF017). The inspectors performed post-maintenance test samples during the first two quarters of 2010 and identified deficiencies in post maintenance testing. Due to the identification of fewer and because corrective actions to improve post maintenance testing at Pilgrim appear have been effective, the inspectors consider this low level trend Maintenance Rule Program The inspectors have reviewed eleven MRP samples since the second quarter of 2009 in order to verify that Entergy appropriately addresses Maintenance Rule component performance and condition problems.
- In addition, the inspectors reviewed Entergy's implementation of the Maintenance Rule seoping requirements, functional failure evaluations and their baSis. and the conduct of oversight of the MRP by the onsite Maintenance Rule Committee.
- Examples of problems identified by the inspectors during this time period included: A non-cited violation of 10
- CFR 50.65 was identified for the failure to include the security diesel generator into the Pilgrim Maintenance Rule scoping document (Pilgrim inspection report 05000293/2009004).
- The inspectors identified that the security diesel generator was credited in the fire hazards analysis for the backup battery power supply for safe shutdown emergency lighting but was not included in the Maintenance Rule scoping document.
- Entergy evaluated this condition and subsequently incorporated the security diesel generator into Maintenance Rule scoping documents.
was written to evaluate the seoping of the ! I I security diesel and to include the diesel in Maintenance Rule scoping documents.
iA Maintenance Rule functional failure evaluation for the "An Feedwater Valve (FRV) was not performed.
- CR-PNP-201
- 0-1299 was written to evaluate FRV failure and concluded
a functional failure had occurred.
- This functional exceeded the Feedwater Level Control System functional failure criteria and required an evaluation for 10
- CFR 50.65 (a)(1)
- I Enclosure
- A Maintenance Rule functional failure evaluation of Process Radiation Monitoring (PRM) instruments for the Steam Jet Air Ejectors (SJAE) was not performed.
- The inspectors identified that a failure of SJAE PRMs was not evaluated under the Maintenance Rule procedure to determine if a functional failure had occurred.
was written to evaluate the PRM failures and concluded
a functional failure had occurred. The basis for a Standby Liquid Control (SLC) Maintenance Rule functional failure determination was incorrect.
- The inspectors identified that the basis for a SLC Maintenance Rule functional faiture concluded that both trains of SLC were needed to perform the SLC function and, therefore, the loss of one of the pumps was a functional failure. The inspectors reviewed Pilgrim design basis documents and determined that only one pump was required to meet the SLC function and that the loss of one pump would not constitute
a Maintenance Rule functional failure.
was written to document the incorrect basis and to re-perform the functional failure evaluation. A Maintenance Rule Functional Failure (MRFF) evaluation of secondary containment incorrectly concluded that secondary containment was not seeped within the Maintenance Rule. The inspectors then determined that the subsequent
- MRFF evaluation used incorrect piping sizes in evaluatin9
an allowable gap size for secondary containment.
was written to document the issue and the basis in the original CR was corrected.
- In addition to the above examples, the inspectors attended Maintenance Rule Committee meetings and noted examples of inadequate preparation by presenters, a lack of . understanding of the role of the Maintenance Rule Coordinator, and problem solving by the Maintenance Rule Committee members versus providing oversight of the products brought to the meeting. The inspectors discussed this trend with Entergy in the fall of 2009 and
was written to document examples.
conduct an apparent cause evaluation, and to specify corrective actions. Corrective actions have included clarifying the roles and responsibilities of the Maintenance Rule Coordinator, conduct of training on the Maintenance Rule and the need for rigor and review of design basis documents in the conduct of functional failure evaluations, and formalizing Maintenance Rule Committee protocols and meeting conduct guidelines.
- The inspectors have noted improvement in the conduct of Maintenance Rule Committee meetings;
however. additional examples of MRP issues continued to occur over the last two quarters.
- The inspectors have therefore concluded that the number and extent of MRP issues during the past year constitutes
a low level trend with the implementation of this program. The inspectors will follow Entergy's corrective actions to evaluate their response to this low level trend . . 3 Annual Sample: Maintenance Rule Program Issues a. Inspection Scope (1 sample) The inspectors focused on Entergy's identification, evaluation, and resolution of MRP deficiencies and issues as documented in CR-PNP*2009-4197.
.4 The inspectors reviewed Entergy's apparent cause analysis, extent of condition review, and their short-term and long-term corrective actions. The inspectors conducted interviews, reviewed corporate procedures and condition reports related to the implementation of the MRP at Pilgrim. The documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings and Observations No findings were identified.
- See Section 40A2.2 for a discussion on the identification of a low level trend in the implementation of the MRP at Pilgrim. The apparent cause identified that Engineering Management had provided a greater focus on the equipment reliability process and had not provided the same level of oversight to the MRP. In addition, the Condition Report (CR) discussed
a lack of rigor by engineers in implementing the process. Corrective actions discussed in the apparent cause to correct the problem included;
review of expectations with System Engineers for daily CR screening, assigning qualified engineers to review functional failures and (a)(1) action plans, briefing of the Condition Report Review Group on Maintenance Rule risk significant components, and a review of the Maintenance Rule basis documents to ensure accuracy and adequate scoping. In addition, the System Engineering Maintenance Rule Coordinator, SE Supervisor and SE Manager reviewed all corporate
- MRP documents to ensure they understood all requirements, roles, and responsibilities.
- Also, additional formal training was provided to System Engineers on MRP responsibilities, proper documentation, and expectations for completing functional failure determinations and 10
- CFR 50.65 (a)(1) action plans. The inspectorp determined that MRP deficiencies continue to occur at Pilgrim. The inspectors also concluded that the number of issues identified during MRP inspections constitutes
a low level trend which is documented in Section 40A2.2. The inspectors will conduct follow-up inspections of Entergy MRP performance as part of the periodic assessment of low level trends . Annual Sample: Feedwater Regulating Valve Lockup Concerns a. Inspection Scope (1 sample) This inspection focused on Entergy's problem identification, evaluation, and resolution conceming feedwater regulating valve (FRV) lockup issues that provided a challenge to automatic reactor water level control. The inspectors selected Entergy's
- FRV corrective actions for review based on the potential impact on reactor vessel level control as undesired
- FRV lockups could complicate event response, result in a plant transient, andlor unnecessarily challenge control room operators.
- The inspectors reviewed Entergy's associated troubleshooting documentation, root cause evaluations, condition review, and short and long-term corrective actions. The inspectors performed
a walkdown of the FRV electronic control modules and a remote camera inspection of the normally inaccessible
- FRVs to assess the FRV controller error code status, actuator pressures, material condition, and configuration control. The inspectors also interviewed plant personnel;
inspected several replaced FRV actuator components and Entergy's
- FRV mock-up facility;
and reviewed procedures, vendor manuals, related operating experience, and drawings.
Documents
reviewed are listed in the
b. Findings and Observations No findings were identified.
- I&C technicians determined that the "8" FRV control system not locked up electrically in the conventional way, but had locked up by a computer failure as evidenced by the FRV actuator response and the recorded error Engineering concluded that the root cause of the abnormal and spurious operation resulted in the "silent" lockups of the "8" FRV was high input process noise caused by failure to adequately set up the FW level transmitters for maximum dampening following replacement in RF017. In addition, engineering concluded that the failure to install software in the "8" FRV control system was a contributing cause. The new provided sensitivity changes to improve overall system response and operation. adjusted the level transmitters for maximum dampening on May 27, 2009 and installed new software in the 8 FRV controller on June 16, 2009. Entergy's corrective actions included:
increased system monitoring in accordance with their Operational Making Issue (ODMI) process, implementation of permanent changes to the documents associated with the replacement and calibration of FW level transmitters. conducting an extent-of-condition Regarding the above "8" FRV lockup issue, the inspectors concluded that Entergy had taken appropriate action in accordance with station procedures, NRC Maintenance Rule (MR) requirements, and their corrective action program (CAP). The inspectors determined that engineering's associated root cause evaluation was sufficiently thorough and based on the best available information, troubleshooting, sound engineering judgment.
and relevant industry operating experience.
- In general, Entergy's assigned corrective actions were aligned with the identified causal factors, adequately tracked, appropriately documented, and completed as scheduled.
- The inspectors noted that Entergy created and effectively used a FRV actuator mock-up to facilitate their root cause evaluation, troubleshooting, and training i " efforts. In addition, Entergy management effectively implemented their ODMI process to provide additional monitoring and oversight of FRV performance in response to the identified lockups. During the extent-of-condition review for the "8" FRV "silent" lockup issue, the noted that Entergy had also identified degraded conditions associated with the "An actuator assembly.
- On April 17, 2009 (prior to RF017), the FW system engineer an adverse trend in the actuator pressures and initiated
to assess trend the condition.
- The condition had no noticeable impact on FRV performance engineering continued to monitor the FRV performance.
- A focused engineering immediately following the plant shutdown for RF017 identified that the "A" FRV was as expected, but locked up {a "silent" lockup caused by a friction failure error code}. Engineering inspection of the "A" FRV stepper motor found excessive friction in the motor worm gear due to hardened grease, and some indications of scoring inside the and sleeve assembly (CR-PNP-2009-1983).
- Engineering determined that the cause was the vendor supplied lubricant found in the spool/sleeve assembly and mismatched spool/sleeve assembly that may have contributed to the friction. (The applied lubricant to the stepper motor shaft and gear; however, the spool/sleeve assembly a matched set with tight tolerances that should not be lubricated.)
- Entergy replaced the Enclosure
- FRV actuator internals (with a matched spoollsleeve set) and performed an
condition inspection on the "6" FRV. The inspectors noted that the causal factors for the two FRV performance issues noted above were different.
even though they both resulted in "silent" FRV lockups. The inspectors noted that Entergy took prompt and appropriate corrective actions to address the short-term concerns associated with the A FRV high friction failure (and accompanying "silent" lockup); however, did not effectively track long-term actions within their CAP and did not adequately evaluate potential
- MR aspects of the issue. Specifically, (1) the equipment failure evaluation for
noted that "the condition resulted in the loss of a critical function of the SSC" and "the failed SSC resulted in an unexpected operational effect," however, engineering did not perform a MR functional failure evaluation of the condition;
(2) the discovery of the "eilenr lockup (an unexpected failure) did not trigger a higher Significance
- CR review; (3) long-term corrective actions to ensure appropriate changes were made to preventive maintenance procedures to verify actuator assembly lubrication and spool/sleeve condition were labeled as enhancements and remained open; and (4) there were no apparent corrective actions to address the excessive wear identified within the spool assembly.
- Engineering initiated
- CR-PNP-20
- 0-1299 to address these issues. Based upon direct observation of the FRV module error codes and operational history review, the inspectors noted that Pilgrim had not experienced any "silent" lockups Since implementing corrective actions in June 2009. The inspectors noted that engineering initiated actions to work with the FRV controller vendor to eliminate any potential "silent" lockups (all error codes that disable the FRV but do not trip the fault relay to provide control room alarm). Entergy proceeded cautiously and appropriately to ensure that they did not introduce any additional electronic lockups below the threshold of those previously analyzed and expected.
- Although engineering believed that they had addressed the causal factors associated with the unexpected
- FRV "silent" lockups in May and June 2009, the inspectors noted that operations had not incorporated periodic FRV control module monitoring to check the error code status to verify no "silent" lockups present (until such time that they were no longer vulnerable to "silent" lockups).
- Engineering captured this inspector observation within
- CR 2010*1299 . . 5 Annual Sample: Motor Control Center Relay Failure a. Inspection Scope (1 sample) The inspectors performed an in-depth review of Entergy's root cause analysis and corrective actions associated with condition report (CR)
- High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System Injection Valve Motor Control Center (MeC) D954 Under-Voltage Relay Failure. Specifically, a normally energized under-voltage relay failed, which resulted in de-energizing the motor actuator for the normally closed HPCI injection valve, The inspectors assessed Entergy's problem identification threshold, cause analyses.
extent of condition reviews, compensatory actions, and the prioritization and timeliness of Entergy's corrective actions to determine whether Entergy was appropriately identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems associated with this issue and whether the planned or completed corrective actions were appropriate.
- The inspectors compared the Enclosure actions taken to the requirements of Entergy's corrective action program and 10
- CFR 50, Appendix B. In addition, the inspectors performed field walkdowns and interviewed engineering personnel to assess the effectiveness of the implemented corrective actions. Specific documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report. b. Findings and Observations No findings were identified.
- Entergy determined the most probable cause was an isolated relay failure early in its service life due to a manufacturing defect. Entergyalso determined that the relay had operated at a higher voltage than assumed in the environmental qualification (EO) report, because the 250 VDC battery bus typically operated at about 266 VDC while the battery was on float charge. Entergy determined that operating the relay at a slightly higher voltage would result in a higher component intemal temperature, which may have led to a shortened life expectancy and may have been a contributing cause to the premature relay failure. Entergy conducted
a thorough technical review of the relay failure, including
a comprehensive failure analysis performed by an independent third party laboratory.
- Entergy's extent of condition review identified additional normally energized
- DC relays which were also operating on a battery float voltage greater than assumed in their EO reports. Corrective actions included replacing the failed relay and revising the EO service life and preventative maintenance (PM) replacement tasks for the affected relays. The inspectors reviewed selected relay maintenance records and did not identify any additional issues. The inspectors determined Entergy's overall response to the issue was commensurate with the safety significance, timely, and included appropriate compensatory actions. The inspectors determined that the actions taken were reasonable to resolve both the initial relay failure and the impact from elevated operating temperatures to relay service life. However, the inspector's review of selected design records identified insufficient design control measures had been used during the revision of the relays EO service life. Specifically, the inspectors identified that a field measurement of relay temperature had been used as a key design input parameter to re-calculate the EO service life. However, Entergy did not use calibrated measurement and test equipment (M& TE) for the field measurement, and did not evaluate the measurement or test uncertainty in the field measurement.
- In addition, Entergy used a vendor to re-calculate the relay EO service life. However, the vendors new EQ service life values were documented in a memorandum from the vendor to Entergy, without any supporting details or analysis, and the memorandum was not controlled under a quality assurance (OA) program. This performance deficiency was determined to be a minor because it was related to equipment qualification and no equipment operability or functionality was Significantly affected.
- In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, "Power Reactor Inspection Reports," the above 'issue constituted
a violation of minor significance that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy. Entergy entered the inspector's observations into their CAP (CR-PNP-201
- 0-2073). Enclosure Event Follow-up
(71153) Operator Performance During Thermal Backwash a. Inspection Scope (1 sample) The inspectors observed an infrequently performed evolution on May 20,2010. r Specifically, the inspectors observed a plant downpower to support thermal backwash of the condenser and "B" feedwater regulating valve post maintenance testing. The I inspectors reviewed procedural guidance for station power changes and the power maneuver plan, and observed control room conduct and control of the evolution.
- The documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings No findings were identified . . (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER 05000293/2010-001-00)
- Single Train of Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) System Inoperable for Time Period Exceeding Technical Specification Limits The inspectors reviewed Entergy's actions and reportability criteria associated with
- LER 05000293/2010-001-00, which are addressed in CR-PNP-2010-0130.
- On January 10, 2010, plant operators discovered
a broken bolt on the clamp of the seismic support for the instrument line of the local pump suction pressure gauge on the "A" train of R8CCW. Upon discovery, Entergy entered and then exited their Technical Specifications (TS) once the bolt was replaced.
- However, subsequent engineering reviews could not determine the exact time the bolt broke. 8ased on the condition of the bolt it was assumed that the bolt was broken for a time period that exceeded the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> allowable
- TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) action statement for one RBCCW subsystem being inoperable.
- Entergy took corrective actions which included installation of the new bolt on the instrument line and performing an extent of condition review on the "8" train of R8CCW from which they identified no other broken bolts or seismic support damage. The documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment.
- The enforcement aspects of this finding are discussed in Section 40A7. This LER is closed . . (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER 05000293/2010-002-00), Standby Gas Treatment Declared Inoperable After Discovery of Open Demister Door The inspectors reviewed Entergy's actions associated with
- LER 05000293/2010-002-00, which are addressed in the CAP as
- CR-PNP-201
- 0-1 079. The event and enforcement aspects of a licensee-identified violation were discussed in NRC Inspection Report (IR) 05000293(2010002
in Section 40A7 of that report. The documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment.
- This LER is closed. Enclosure
- 40A5 Other Activities (CLOSED)
- NOV 050000293/2009005-01, Incomplete Licensed Operator Medical Examinations Inspection Scope In accordance with Inspection
Procedure
- 2702, "Followup on Corrective Actions for Violations and Deviations," the inspectors conducted
a follow-up inspection of enforcement action
- EA-10-003, which was identified due to the submittal of inaccurate medical information for licensed operators.
- The submittals to the NRC were inaccurate due to incomplete olfactory testing "to detect odor of products of combustion" from required licensed operator and initial applicant medical examinations.
- This issue was documented as a cited violation in inspection report 05000293/2009005.
- The inspectors reviewed the condition reports and analyses developed by Entergy to ensure the adequacy of (1) the evaluation of the issue; (2) the eValuation and impact of generic implications;
and (3) that corrective actions have been fully implemented.
- The inspectors reviewed the scope and depth of the analysis in addressing the identified deficiency.
- The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's assessment of generic implications of the identified violation on other Entergy facilities and other aspects of licensed operator medical examinations.
- The inspectors evaluated the corrective actions implemented by Entergy to determine whether they were adequate to address the identified deficiency and prevent recurrence.
- Additionally, the inspectors evaluated the licensee's determination of why appropriate action was not taken in response to Information Notice (IN) 2004-20, "Recent Issues Associated with NRC Medical Requirements for Licensed Operators," to identify that appropriate olfactory testing was not being conducted.
- The inspectors reviewed the licensee's identified causes and the actions taken by the licensee to prevent recurrence of those causes. Findings No findings were identified.
- The inspectors determined that the scope and depth of the analysis to address the identified deficiency was adequate and appropriate.
- The inspectors also determined that the generic implications identified by the corrective action process were adequate and appropriate.
- The inspectors concluded that Entergy's corrective actions were both timely and appropriate to address the identified deficiency and generic implications.
- The inspectors determined that weaknesses in the Operating Experience Program that were identified as contributing causes in the failure to take appropriate action when
- IN 2004-20 was issued, were adequately corrected by changes made to the program. The changes were determined to correct the identified cause and prevent recurrence. The inspectors determined that no cross*cutting aspect would be assigned to the NOV, because the failure to use operating experience effectively was not indicative of current performance.
(CLOSED)
- URI 050000293/2009005-01.
Procedure
- Change to Allow Disabling DUring Inspection Scope During the previous reporting period, the NRC issued an Unresolved Item (URI) document an issue involving
- CFR 50.59, "Changes, Test and Experiments," due the improper implementation of a procedure change which may have resulted in a than minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of a system or component (SSC) important to safety...." The issue was opened as Unresolved Item (URI) in NRC Inspection Report 050000293/2009005.
- The concluded that the 1 0
- CFR 50.59 preliminary evaluation checklist developed to the current and previous revisions to procedure
- 2.2.21.5, "HPCllnjection and Contro'" was incorrect and did not support the procedure The inspectors reviewed the licensee actions to develop a 10
- CFR 50.59 evaluation addressed the conditions described in procedure
- 2.2.21.5.
- The inspectors evaluated the completed
- CFR 50.59 evaluation to ensure that the changes made procedure
- 2.2.21.5 did not require prior NRC Findings No findings were identified.
- The inspectors determined that the actions taken to address the issue were and adequate.
- Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the 10
- CFR 50.59
developed by the licensee and determined that procedure
- 2.2.21.5 did not require license amendment or NRC approval prior to use. Per the guidance provided in the Enforcement Manual, this issue meets the definition of a minor violation per 2.10.6. The inspectors concluded that
- URI 050000293/2009005-01
can be closed the corrective actions taken to address this issue were adequate to correct the TI2515/179
- Verification of Licensee Responses to NRC Requirement for Inventories of
- Tracked in the National Source Tracking System Pursuant to Title 10, Code of I* Eederal Regulations.
- Part 20.2207 (10
- CFR 20.2207) IInsQection Scope I During the period May 17, 2010 through May 20,2010, the inspectors performed the I following activities to confirm the inventories of materials possessed by Pilgrim were I appropriately reported and documented in the National Source Tracking System (NSTS) in accordance with 10
- CFR 20.2207 Inspection Planning I The inspectors retrieved
a copy of Pilgrim's
- I
- Inventory Verification The inspectors performed
a physical inventory of the sources listed on the Pilgrim's inventory and visually identified each source listed on the inventory; The inspectors verified the presence of the nationally tracked sources by having a radiation protection supervisor perform a survey with a radiation survey instrument; The inspectors examined the physical condition of the source containers, evaluated the effectiveness of the procedures for secure storage and handling.
discussed Pilgrim's maintenance of the devices including source leak tests, and verified the posting and labeling of the sources was appropriate;
and The inspectors reviewed Pilgrim's records for these sources and compared the records with the data from the NSTS inventory.
- The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of Pilgrim's procedures for updating the inventory records. Determine the Location of Unaccounted-for Nationally tracked source(s} The inspectors verified Pilgrim has no unaccounted-for source(s).
- Review of Other Administrative Information The inspectors reviewed the administrative information contained in the NSTS inventory printout with Pilgrim personnel.
- All administrative information, mailing address, docket number, and license number, was verified to be correct. Findings No findings were identified . (Closed) NRC Temporary Instruction
- 2515/177 -Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling, Decay Heat Removal and Containment Spray Systems Inspection Scope The inspectors performed the inspection in accordance with Temporary Instruction (TI} 2515/177, "Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling, Decay Heat Removal and Containment Spray Systems".
- The NRC staff developed
- TI25151177
to support the NRC's confirmatory review of licensees' response to NRC Generic Letter (GL) 2008-01, "Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling, Decay Heat Removal and Containment Spray Systems." The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) documented completion of their review of Entergy's GL
- 2008-01 response in a closure letter dated April 6, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No.
- Based on the review of Entergy's
- GL 2008-01 response letters, the NRR staff provided guidance on TI inspection scope to the regional inspectors.
- The inspectors used this inspection guidance along with the TI to verify that Entergy implemented or was in the process of acceptably implementing the commitments, modifications, and programmatically controlled actions described in their
- GL 2008-01 response.
- The inspectors verified that the plant-specific information (including licensing bases documents and design information)
was consistent with the information used by NRR in their assessment and Enclosure that it supported
a conclusion that the subject systems' operability was reasonably assured. The inspectors reviewed a sample of isometric drawings and piping and instrument diagrams (P&IDs). and conducted selected system piping walkdowns to verify that Entergy's drawings reflected the subject system configurations and Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) descriptions. Specifically, the inspectors verified the following related to a sample of isometric drawings for the high pressure injection (HPCI), core spray, and residual heat removal (RHR) systems: High point vents were identified; High points that did not have vents were recognized and evaluated with to their potential for gas Other areas where gas could accumulate and potentially impact subject system operability, such as at orifices in horizontal pipes, isolated branch lines, heat exchangers, improperly sloped piping, and under closed valves, were acceptably evaluated in engineering reviews or had ultrasonic testing (UT) points which would reasonably detect void formation;
and, For piping segments reviewed, branch lines and fittings were clearly shown. The inspectors conducted walkdowns of portions of the above systems to reasonably assure the acceptability of Entergy's drawings utilized during their review of the
- GL 01. The inspectors verified that Entergy conducted walkdowns of the applicable systems to confirm that system orientations, vents and alarms, in combination with instructions, procedures, tests, and training, would ensure that each system was sufficiently full of water to assure operability.
- The inspectors reviewed Entergy's methodology used to determine system piping high points, identification of negative sloped piping, and calculations of void sizes based on UT equipment readings, to ensure the methods were reasonable.
- The inspectors reviewed engineering analyses associated with the development of acceptance criteria for as-found voids. The review included engineering assumptions for void transport and acceptability of void fractions at the suction and discharge piping of the applicable system pumps. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the pressure transient analysis downstream of the low pressure core injection (LPCI) isolation valve (MO 1001-29NB)
associated with steam voiding conditions within the piping to ensure LPCI operability following reactor depressurization.
- The inspectors also observed a field UT measurement in the HPCI suction piping from the torus to assess the adequacy of the monitoring techniques used to ensure system operability.
- The inspectors reviewed a sample of Entergy's procedures used for filling and venting the associated
- GL 2008-1 systems to verify that the procedures were effective in venting or reducing voiding to acceptable levels. The inspectors verified that Entergy had plans in place to install two hardware vents, one vent located in the HPCI pump suction torus piping and the other located at a highpoint within the core spray discharge piping, as committed to in their GL response.
- The inspectors verified that Entergy's surveillance frequencies were consistent with Pilgrim's technical specifications and associated bases, and the UFSAR. The inspectors reviewed a sample of system venting surveillance results to ensure proper implementation of the surveillance program and that the existence of unacceptable gas accumulation was evaluated within the CAP, as necessary.
- The inspectors reviewed CAP documents to verify that selected actions Enclosure described in Entergy's submittals were acceptably documented including completed actions, implementation schedule for incomplete actions, and verification that NRC commitments were included the CAP. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed evaluations and corrective actions for various issues Entergy identified during their
- GL 2008-01 review. The inspectors performed this review to ensure Entergy appropriately evaluated and adequately addressed any gas voiding concerns including the evaluation of operability for gas voids discovered in the field. Finally, the inspectors reviewed Entergy's training program and documentation to assess if appropriate training had been provided to the operations and engineering support staff to ensure appropriate awareness of the effects of gas voiding. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Finding!?
- No findings were identified.
- 40A6 Meetings, Including Exit On March 30, 2010, Donald Jackson, NRC Regional Branch Chief for Pilgrim, presented and discussed the End-of-Cycle performance assessment of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station with Mr. Stephen Bethay. The licensee acknowledged the assessment and planned regulatory oversight.
- This discussion was completed prior to a public performance assessment open-house meeting on March 30, 2010. (ADAMS Accession
- On April 22, 2010, the inspectors presented the inspection results from a heat sink inspection and feedwater valve lockup issues to Mr. Robert Smith, General Manager Pilgrim Operations, and other members of the Entergy staff. The inspectors confirmed that no proprietary information was provided to the inspectors for the inspection.
- On May 20, 2010, an occupational radiation inspection exit meeting was held with the plant. Kevin Bronson, Site Vice President, attended the meeting. At the exit meeting, the inspectors confirmed that no proprietary information was provided to the inspectors for the inspection.
- On June 11, 2010, the inspectors presented the inspection results from the failure ofthe High Pressure Coolant Injection system Condition Report review to Mr. Vincent Fallacara, Director of Engineering, and other members of Entergy's staff. The inspectors confirmed that no proprietary information was provided to the inspectors for the inspection.
- On June 24,2010, the inspectors presented the inspection results from a gas accumulation inspection to Mr. Robert Smith, General Manager of Plant Operations, and other members of the Entergy staff. The team reviewed proprietary information, which was returned to Entergy at the end of the inspection.
- The inspectors verified that no proprietary information is documented in this report. On July 13, 2010, the resident inspectors conducted an exit meeting and presented the preliminary inspection results to Mr. Kevin Bronson, and other members of the Pilgrim staff. At the exit meeting, the inspectors confirmed that no proprietary information was provided to the inspectors for the inspection.
- 40A7 licensee-Identified Violations The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by Entergy and is a violation of NRC requirements, which meets the criteria of the NRC Enforcement Policy, for being dis positioned as an NeV. Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.B.3, Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) System, requires that two RBCCW subsystems shall be operable whenever irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel, reactor coolant temperature is >212° F, and prior to startup from a cold shutdown.
- With one RBCCW subsystem inoperable, the required action is to restore the subsystem to operable within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in Cold Shutdown within an additional hours. Contrary to the above, the "N' train of RBCCW was inoperable for an indeterminate amount of time that likely exceeded the 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of TS allowed outage time. Upon discovery of the broken bolt on the seismic support, the "A" train of RBCCW was declared inoperable.
- An immediate corrective action was completed to install a new bolt on the seismic support and TS 3.5.8.3 was exited. The event is documented in Entergy's Corrective Action Program as
- CR-PNP-201
- 0-0130. The finding was evaluated using
- IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, and was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding would not have resulted in the total 1055 of a safety function during a seismic event ATIACHMENT:
- SUPPLEMENTAL
- INFORMATION
- Entergy personnel:
- S. Bethay K. Bronson R. Byrne B. Chenard V. Fallacara
- J. Gaedtke K. Kampschneider
- W. Lobo J. Lynch B. Mello F. Mulcahy D. Noyes J. Priest R. Smith M. Thornhill
- E. Varmette S. Wollman Opened and Closed SUPPLEMENTAL
- INFORMATION
- KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Nuclear Safety Assessment Site Vice Licensing System Engineering Engineering System System Licensing Licensing Program System Operations Radiation Protection General Manager Pilgrim Radiation Protection Radiation Protection Engineering
- LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED
- Submerged Medium Voltage Cables Closed
- NOV 050000293/2009005-01
- Incomplete Licensed Operator Medical Examinations
- URI 050000293/2009005*01
Procedure
- Change to Allow Disabling
- HPCI During Transients
- LER 0500029312010-001-00
- Single Train of Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) System. Inoperable for Time Period Exceeding Technical Specification Limits
- Standby Gas Treatment Declared Inoperable After Discovery of Open Demister Door Attachment
- LIST OF DOCUMENTS
- REVIEWED Section 1R01 Procedure
- 2.1.27, Revision 25, Coastal Storm -Preparations and Procedure
- 8.C.40, Revision 24, Seasonal Weather
Procedure
- 2.1.42, Revision 9, Operation During Severe Procedure
- 5.2.2, Revision 31, High Winds
- WO 5221003101, 8.C.40, Section 8.3, Warm Weather
- CR-PNP-201
- 0-0 1740, Discrepancies identified during inventory of coastal storm Procedure
- 1.4.4, Revision 21, New England Power Grid
Procedure
- 2.1.14, Revision 102, Station Power NRC Generic letter 2006-02, Grid Reliability and the Impact on Plant Risk and the Operability Offsite Procedure
- 1.5.22, Revision 12, Risk Assessment ISO New England Procedure, Master/local Control Center Procedure
- 1, Revision 7, Plant Transmission Operations, Attachment
- A, Pilgrim Nuclear Pilgrim Response to Gl 2006-02, dated April 3, Section 1 R04 Procedure
- 2.2.30, Revision 69, RBCCW System UFSAR 10.5, RBCCW System
- CR-PNP-2010-0130, Bolt on RBCCW seismic support strap broken
- CR-PNP-2010-0906, RBCCW system requires Maintenance Rule (a)(1) evaluation
- CR-PNP-2010-3399, RBCCW Head Tank "An has a pegged high level gauge
- CR-PNP-2009-1863, Pipe supports H-30-1-53
and H-30-1-54
have corroded base plates
- CR-PNP-2009-2529, "D" RBCCW pump vibration in alert CR*PNP-2010-0131, Pressure instrument
- PI-4001 and
- PI-4054 are not calibrated
- CR-PNP-2010-1095. "E" RBCCW pump has a seal leak Drawing M-319-E, Sheet 8, Revision 2, Cooling Water Surge Tanks Drawing M-215, Sheet 1,2.3,4, Revision 41, Cooling Water System, Reactor Building System Health Report, Revision 0, RBCCW 4th Quarter 2009
- CR-PNP-201
- 8.B.1, Revision 86, Fire Pump Test Procedure
- 2.2.25, Revision 57, Fire Water Supply System
- CR-PNP-2010-1652, Seal on Electric Fire Pump Suction Valve was not installed properly Procedure
- 2.2.22, Revision 71, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Planning Schedule for "A" EDG overhaul, the week of June 6,2010 Procedure
- 2.2.146, Revision 40, SBO Diesel Generator Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 8.10, Blackout AC power source
- CR-PNP-2010-1984, After rain and thunderstorms, two circuit breakers were tripped in SBO enclosure
- CR-PNP-2010*1987, Water found on floor of SSO enclosure
- I I' Attachment
- I I
- Section 1 R05 Fire Hazards Fire Data Sheet for Torus Revision 0, Fire Brigade Fire Drill Scenario dated April 26, Fire Drill Report dated April 26, 10 CFR50, Appendix R, Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power Facilities Operating prior January 1, 1979 Procedure
- 5.5.2, Revision 46, Special Fire Procedure
- CR-PNP-2010-1480, Fire Hydrant House #10 is severely rusted at the base of the house
- EN-TQ-125, Revision 0, Attachment
- 9.3, Fire Drill Report Procedure
- EN-DC-161, Revision 3, Control of Combustibles Compensatory Measures Sheet -Multiple Spurious Operations Compensatory Measure Procedure
- EN-DC-115, Revision 8, Engineering Change Process Fire Watch log for transient combustibles in a Level 1 Zone Fire Hazards Analysis, Fire Zone Data Sheet for Fire Area 1.10, Fire Zone 1.28 Fire Zone Data Sheets for Fire Area 1.10, Fire Zone 1.3 Procedure 5.5.2, Revision
- 46, Special Fire Procedure Section 1 ROG Manhole Inspection Schedule Work Order (WO)
- 52250347 01, InspectlPump Manhole Number 2A
- WO 5225034501, InspectlPump Manhole Number 4
- WO 52250346 01, InspectlPump Manhole Number 5
- CR-PNP-201
- 0-1529, Cables found submerged and in contact with water in Manhole Numbers 2A, 4, &5
- EN-DC-346, Revision 0, Cable Reliability Program
- CR-PNP-2009-3459, During inspections of Maintenance Rule and Safety-Related Manholes, water was found in all required manholes Specification No. 6498-E-18, 5000 volt and 15000 volt cable specification Electric Power Research Institute paper, Review of Suitability of EPR medium voltage cables for wet and submerged conditions
- NRC Generic Letter (GL)
- Inaccessible or underground power cable failures that disable accident mitigation systems or cause plant transients Pilgrim Letters 2.07.034 and 2.07.091, Response to NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 Section 1 R07 Audits and Self-Assessments
- LO-PNPLO-2010-00013, UHS Snapshot Self Assessment Report. dated February 12, 2010
- QA-08-2009-PNP-1, Engineering Programs Quality Assurance Audit Report, dated July 6,2009
- Surveillance and Functional Tests 3.M.3-47.1, "An Train Functional Test of Individual Load Shed Components, performed July 14, 2008 & January 14,2010 Attachment
- 3.M.3-47.2. "B" Train Functional Test of Individual Load Shed Components.
- September
- 25, 2008 & February 20, 8.5.3.2.1.
- SSW Pump Quarterly and Biennial (Comprehensive)
- Operability and Valve Operability Tests (A SSW Pump), performed March 10,2010 8.5.3.2.1, SSW Pump Quarterly and Biennial (Comprehensive)
- Operability and Valve Operability Tests (8 SSW Pump), performed March 16,2010 & April 1 0, 2010 8.5.3.2.1, SSW Pump Quarterly and Biennial (Comprehensive)
- Operability and Valve Operability Tests (C SSW Pump), performed March 29.2010 8.5.3.2.1, SSW Pump Quarterly and Biennial (Comprehensive)
- Operability and Valve Operability Tests (0 SSW Pump). performed March 22, 2010 8.5.3.2.1.
- SSW Pump Quarterly and Biennial (Comprehensive)
- Operability and Valve Operability Tests (E SSW Pump), performed February 17, 2010 8.5.3.2.2, ASME Flow Comparison Test of the SSW System Underground Supply Piping (A Loop). performed January 21,2006 8.5.3.2.2, ASME Flow Comparison Test of the SSW System Underground Supply Piping (8 Loop), performed January 27,2006 8.5.3.11 , SSW Valve Operability Test (A Loop), performed April 6, 2010 8.5.3.11 , SSW Valve Operability Test (B Loop). performed January 20, 2010 8.5.3.14 , SSW Flow Rate Operability Test (A Loop), performed April 1 O. 2010 8.5.3.14 , SSW Flow Rate Operability Test (B Loop), performed March 22,2010 8.E.29.1, SSW Instrumentation Calibration and Functional Test, performed January 20,2010 8.1.45, 1ST Instrument Calibration (FT-6240), performed September
- 14,2005 8.1.45, 1ST Instrument Calibration (FT -6241). performed October 27, 2005 Condition Reports (CR-PNP-)
- 2006-1588,2006-2771,2006-2938,2006-4239,2006-4256,2007-3387.2007-4370.
- 2008-1641, 2008-1643, 2008-2611, 2009-0695, 2009-1703.
- 2009-1809.
- 2009-3054.
- 2009-3407.2009-3668.2009-3924,2009-4723.
- 2009-5061.2010-0658,2010-1421.
- 2010-1502
Drawings
- C44 Sheet 1, Revision E11. Intake Structure Plan Section C47, Revision E7. Intake Structure Section & Details C1271, Revision 1, SSW Piping Replacement
- REAC. AUX Bay Pipe Vaults Plans, Section & Details E-171, Revision E4. Schematic Diagram SSW System ISIM212 Sheet 1, Revision 14. Inservice Inspection Service Water System M27, Revision E15, Equipment Location Intake Structure Plan & Sections M100-7257, Revision E2, "8" Loop Pump Header Service Water M100-7258, Revision E7, SSW System West Service Water Pump Discharge Piping M100-7259, Revision E4, Service Water System Discharge Header from Service Water
- M212 Sheet 1, Revision 92, Service Water System M212 Sheet 2. Revision 76, Screen Wash System I* Attachment
- I
- EN M U-100 Attachment
- 9.1, Motor Operated Butterfly Valve in the Service Water 10
- CFR 50.59 Process Applicability Determination, dated February 25,
- ER 4119033, Revision 0, Motor Operated Butterfly Valve in the Service Water
- ER 5100785, Requesting
- SEC XI Repair Replacement Plan for
- MO-3805 (New Valve Bolting), dated February 24,
- ER 6114606. RBCCW Heat Exchanger
- E-209A SSW Outlet Valve DeSign Evaluation Form, dated November
- ER 6115644, Revision 0, Nuclear Change to Replace 29-HO-3A and 5A with Ball Miscellaneous
- 2.1.16, Outside/Turbine Tour Logs, dated December 12, 2009 -December 18, 2009, February 2,2010 -February 8. 2010 3.M.4-85, Station Diving Procedure for Underwater Work and Inspections, performed November 17,2006, July 31.2009, August 3,2009 Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection and Monitoring Program Long Term Inspection Plan, dated April CALC No. M-630. Revision 3, SSW System Hydraulic Control Room Log Entries Report. dated December 1, 2009 -December 31,2009,
- 3, 2010 -February 5, 2010 East & West SSW Bays Underwater Diver Inspection Video, performed January 30, 2009. November 30,2009, and April 1, 2010
- 96. Foreign Material Exclusion Component Close-Out Data Sheet, dated July 31, 2009 M591 , Revision E7, Specification for SSW & RBCCW Safety-Related Piping & Heat Exchanger Inspection, Maintenance, & Testing Requirements in Response to Generic Letter 89-13 Risk-Informed Inspection Notebook for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Unit 1, Revision 2.1 a
- SDBD-29. Revision E1, System Design Basis Document for the SSW System Nondestructive Examination Reports
- BOP-PT-09-015, SSW Spool JF29-13-1
- EXamination, dated April 29, 2009
- BOP-UT-09-003, SSW Spool JF29-13-1
- Ultrasonic Test Erosion/Corrosion Examination, dated Apri128,2009
- VT-29-06018, SSW (29) "B" Loop (SLT-SSW"3B)
- Visual Test
- VT-2 Examination, dated July 31, 2006
- VT-29-06019, SSW (29) "B" Loop (SLT-SSW-4B)
- VT-2 Examination, dated July 31, 2006
- VT-29-06020, SSW (29)(SLT-SSW-1
- B)
- VT-2 Examination, dated July 31,2006 VT-29-06021.
- SSW (29) (SLT-SSW-5B)
- VT-2 Examination, dated August 29,2006
- VT-29-06025, SSW (29) "B" Loop (SLT-SSW-8B)
- VT-2 Examination, dated September
- 7,2006
- VT-29-06026, SSW (29) "B" Loop (SLT-SSW-7B)
- VT-2 Examination, dated September
- 7,2006
- VT-29-06027, SSW (29) "An Loop (SLT-SSW-9A)
- VT-2 EXamination, dated September
- 7,2006
- VT-29-06028, SSW (29) "An Loop (SLT-SSW-8A)
- VT-2 Examination, dated September
- 7,2006
- VT-2 Examination, dated April 19, 2007
- VT-30-06022, RBCCW (30)
- VT-2 Examination, dated July 31,2006
- VT-30-06024, RBCCW Piping/Components
(30)
- VT-2 Examination, dated August 29,2006 Attachment
- OQerating Generic Service Water System Risk-Based Inspection Guide, NUREG/CR-5865
- LO-NOE-2007-00078, Operating Experience Impact Evaluation for NRC Information 2007-06, dated June29, NRC Generic Letter 96-01: Testing of Safety-Related Logic Circuits, dated January 10. 2006 NRC Information Notice 89-49: Failure to Close Service Water Cross-Connect Isolation dated May 22, NRC Information Notice 2007-06: Potential Common Cause Vulnerabilities in Essential Water Systems, dated February 9, Procedures
- 2.1.37, Revision 25, Coastal Storm -Preparations and Actions 2.1.42, Revision 9, Operation During Severe Weather 2.2.32, Revision 82, SSW System 2.4.43, Revision 20, Loss of One SSW Loop 2.4.154, Revision 21, Intake Structure Fouling 5.3.3, Revision 26, Loss of All Service Water 8.5.3.2.1, Revision 22, SSW Pump Ouarterly and Biennial (Comprehensive)
- Operability and Valve Operability Tests 8.5.3.11 , Revision 11, SSW Valve Operability Test 8.5.3.14 , Revision 28, SSW Flow Rate Operability Test 8.C.13. Revision 80, Locked Component Lineup Surveillance
- 8.M.3-1, Revision 54, Special Test for Automatic Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) Load Sequencing of Diesels and Shutdown Transformer with Simulated Loss of Off-Site Power and Special Shutdown Transformer Load Test
- ARP-C1 R, Revision 24. PNL C'I R Alarm Response Procedure
- CEP-BPT -0100, Revision 0, Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection and Monitoring
- Revision 2, Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection and Monitoring Program
- EP-IP-100.1, Revision 4, Emergency Actions Levels System Health Reports. Maintenance History &Trending 29-SSW System Health Report, 1 st
- OTR 2010 29-SSW System Health Report. 4th
- OTR 2009 SSW Pump 1ST Trending, dated October 23, 2009 -April 11, 2010 SSW System Walkdown Inspection Checklist, performed February 19,2010 & March 30, 2010 SSW Valves &SSW Pipe Spool Maintenance Data Bases Work Orders {WO)s
- 00193084,00207004,03102362,06106924,51524723,51699224,52189189,52194954,
- 52204147,52204148,52210280
- Section 1R11 LORT/NRC Simulator Exam Scenario:
- SES-176, Revision 1, ATWS Attachment I
- Section 1R12
- CR-PNP-2010-1713, SSW Loop "B" flow at 500 gpm with RB HX "Bu SSW outlet flow control valve Salt Service Water Maintenance Rule Basis
- EN-DC-205, Revision 2, Maintenance Rule
- Air introduction into standby liquid control Procedure
- 8.4.1, Revision 72. Standby liquid Control Pump Quarterly and Biennial Capacity Flowrate Test Standby Liquid Control System Health Report Feedwater Level Control System Health Report Feedwater Flow Traces on May 1, 2010 CR-PNP-2010-1824.
- MRFF placed feed level control improbable
a(1)
- CR-PNP-2010-1562, "8" FRV slowly drifted closed Procedure
- 2.4.49, Revision 40, Feedwater Malfunctions
- CR-PNP-2010-1299, "A" FRV not tracked in Maintenance Rule failure back in 2009
- CR-PNP-2009-1983, "A" FRV received Friction Error Section 1R13 Daily Risk Profile for April 19, 2010 Procedure
- 1.3.34.15, Revision 1, Protection Area Postings
- CR-PNP-2010-1393, Upper switchgear protected area barrier not installed per Procedure
- 1.3.34.15
- Scheduler's risk evaluation for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station for the week of May 2, 2010 Equipment Out-of-Service Quantitative Risk Assessment Tool Daily Risk Sheet for May 18, 201 0 Control Room Logs Work Week Schedule for the week of May 25,2010 Daily Risk for June 3, 2010 Section 1 R15
- CR-PNP-201
- 0-1303, Packing leak on Valve 23-HO-51 is now a 2-foot steam plume
- CR-PNP-2010-1312, After repairing packing leak on valve 23-HO-51 , observed a small bonnet leak
- CR-PNP-2010-0901, Small packing leak on valve 23-HO-51 System Design Basis Document 23, High Pressure Coolant Injection System
- CR-PNP-2009-4944, Drywell Leakage
- EN-OP-104, Revision 4, Operability Determination Process Operational Decision Making Issue Plan: Drywell Leakage dated January 30,2010 Procedure
- 2.5.2.71.
- Revision 31, Attachment
- 8, Manual Pumping of the DryweU Floor and Equipment Sumps Procedure
- 3.M.3-24.19.
- Revision O. Special test for electrically backseating motor-operated valves Information Notice 87-40, Backseating valves routinely to prevent packing leakage Drywell Leakage 7 -day Rolling Average Data
- CR-PNP-20
- 10-1289, Potential air in standby liquid control system and operability evaluation Isometric Drawing No. 6498-688.
- Standby liquid control pump suction Attachment
Procedure
- EN-MA-125, Revision 6, Troubleshooting control of maintenance activities Technical Specifications Temporary Instruction
- 2515/177, Revision 1, Managing gas accumulation in ECCS systems Procedure
- 8.4.1, Revision 72, Standby liquid control pump quarterly and biennial capacity and flow rate lest NRC Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation in ECCS Systems Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station PNPS Core Operating Limits Report, Cycle 18 Global Nuclear Fuel (GNF) letter
- RA-ENO-GEN-10-061
dated Apri! 26,2010, GNF 2 Spacer Flow Vane Damage
- CR-PNP-2010-1481 , GNF2 Fuel Defects discovered at JAF GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy, Part 21, Notification
- MFN 10-152 dated May 14, 2010 GNF Letter
- RA-ENO-GEN-10-068
dated May 7, 2010, GESTAR Evaluation of GNF2 Spacer Issue GNF Quality Update dated April 27, 2010,
- QU 2010-001:
- GNF2 Bent Spacer Flow Vanes GNF Letter
- RA-ENO-GEN-10-074
dated May 10, 2010, Entergy GNF2 Fuel Transitions:
- Disposition of Bent Spacer Flow Wing Effects on NFl -ReVision 1 GNF Letter
- RA-ENO-GEN-10-076
dated May 11,2010, GNF2 Spacer Flow Vane F7/F8 Location -Revision 1 GNF Letter
- RA-ENO-GEN-10-075
dated May 11, 2010, GNF2 Bent Spacer Wing NFl Tasks 900/902, OLMCPR Evaluations and RBM Analysis for JAF C19 and PNPS C18 GNF Letter
- RA-ENO-GEN-10-077
dated May 12. 2010, Fuel Loading Error for JAF C19 and PNPS TeChnical Specification
- 3.11.C, Minimum Critical Power Ratio
- CR-PNP-2010-1609, Cannot retrieve calculation for operators' dose during MSL break containment Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 10.17, Main Control Room Environmental Control System Topical Design Basis Document,
- TDBO-110, for operator dose following main steam line break outside containment Technical Specifications
- 3.7.B.2, Control Room High Efficiency Air Filtration System Compensatory Actions Log from June 7, 2010
- CR-PNP-2010-2032, Compensatory Measure for chemistry not implemented Section 1 R18
- EC-21320 -Evaluate and provide alternate design for P-208B discharge head to top column flange connection
- CR-PNP-2010-1216, Pump P-208B discharge head counter bore, making surface worn
- CR-PNP-2010-1273, SSW pump discharge pressure gauge tubing is leaking Procedure
- 8.C.13, Revision 80. locked Component Lineup Surveillance
- ERM 90.46, Locked Valve Criteria, dated July 17, 1990
- EC 12969, Revision 0, Install TOI Turbine Style Air Start Motors and Regulators on
- EDG-X-107B
- Section 1 R19 WO 8.9.3.4,
- WO 51524183 01,02,03,04, Circuit Breaker Testing, on 72-731, DC to
- MO-1201-5
- Engineering Change (EC) 19431, Revision 0, Replace GE overload relay and heater with Cutler Hammer overload relay and heater Procedure
- 8.6.5.2. Revision 17. Reactor Water Cleanup Valve Quarterly Operability
- WO 00184796, Reconnect motor and bump for rotation on P-208B, Task Report No. IR10-0015, Re-terminate Motor and Raychem the terminations in accordance
Procedure
- 3.M.3-17.1, Revision 25, Raychem or taping of 1000 volt and under cables wires Procedure
- 3.M.3-51, Revision 26, Electrical termination procedure
- WO 52222708, Clean and inspect motor for P-208B
- WO 00184796, Task 4, Perform overhaul on "B" SSW pump CR*PNP-2010-1050, Rebuild of 29-CK-3880b, found threads holding seat ring in place are gone
- CEP-NDE-0902, Revision 7.
- VT-2 Examination Report CR*PNP-201
- 0-1 083, Only one out of eight line shaft coupling worked ISIM, Sheet 1, Revision 13, Inservice inspection Service Water System Procedure
- 3.M.4-10, Revision 39, Valve Maintenance
- WO 00221205, Tasks 1 and 2, Replace open limit switch and post work test Procedure
- 8.5.4.4, Revision 49, High Pressure Coolant Injection Valve (Quarterly)
- Operability Test
- WO 00224248 01, 3.M.3-61.5, Attachments 1A, 1E, 1F EDG RFO Preventive Maintenance (X-107A) (MEC)
- WO 00224431 01, 3.M.3-61.11, X-107A, EDG "A" Preventive Maintenance
(3 year)
- WO 00224248 02, 3.M.3-61.5, Attachment 1A, 1E, 1F EDG RFO Preventive Maintenance (X-1 07 A), Post Maintenance Test Procedure
- 8.9.1, Revision 116, Emergency Diesel Generator and Ass()ciated Emergency Bus Surveillance
- WO 52246258 01, 8.9.1, Attachment
- E, EDG "A" -Additional
- 1ST check valve testing
- WO 52241388 01, EDG "A", Four year PM (3.M.3-61.9)
- WO 52246257 01, 3.M.3-61.3, EDG Preventive Maintenance (X-107 A). Quarterly
- WO 00224431 03. EDG "A" 8 year PM, Post Maintenance Test
- WO 00167857 02, Replace Fuel Injector Snubber Valves on aN EDG
- WO 0016785701, Replace Fuel Injector Snubber Valves on "An EDG Section 1 R22 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) Suction Pressure Data following run of RCIC system Procedure
- 8.5.5.1, Revision 72, RCIC Pump Quarterly and Biennial Operability Flow Rate and Valve Test Procedure
- 2.1.19, ReVision 18, Suppression Chamber Temperatures Hydrodynamics Pressure Test Data Sheets Control Room Logs Technical Specifications
Procedure
- 8.4.1, Revision 72, Standby liquid control pump quarterly and biennial capacity and flow rate test
- CR-PNP-2010-1289, Potential air in standby liquid control system Procedure
- 8.M.2-1.5.1, Revision 18, Main Steam Line Isolation Valve Logic -Test A -Inboard Technical Specification (TS) 3.2.A and 4.2.a, Primary Containment Isolation Functions
- TS 4.2.A, Table 4.2.A, Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for PCIS TS 4.7.A.2.b.1, Primary Containment Isolation Valves TS 3.13, Inservice Code Testing Procedure
- 8.5.4.1. Revision 105, High Pressure Coolant Injection System Pump and Valve Quarterly and Biennial Comprehensive Operability
Procedure
- 2.1.19, Revision 18, Suppression Chamber Temperatures
Procedure
- 8.M.2-2.5.1, Revision
- 56, High Pressure Coolant Injection Steam Line High Flow Isolation
- TS 4.5 Core and Containment Coolin9 Systems, Section A, Core Spray and LPCI Systems Procedure
- 8.5.2.2.2, Revision 42, LPCI System Loop B Operability
- NRC Bulletin 88-04, Potential Safety -Related Pump Loss NRC Information Notice 97-90, Use of Non-conservative Acceptance Criteria in Safety-Related Pump Surveillance Tests
- WO 52247337 01, Perform Core Spray Operability and Flow Rate Test Procedure
- 8.5.1.1, Core Spray System Operability Pump Quarterly and Biennial Comprehensive Flow Rate Tests and Valve Tests TS 4.5.A.1, Core Spray System Testing Section 1 EP6 LORT/NRC Simulator Exam Scenario:
- SES-176, Revision 1, ATWS EP Performance Indicator Reporting and Information Form Section 2RS01 Procedures:
- Access Control for Radiologically Controlled Areas, Revision 4
- Radiation Protection Posting, Revision 7
- ALARA Program, Revision 7
- Radioactive Material Control, Revision 5
- Air Sampling, Revision 7
- Source Control, Revision 5 6.10-021 Station ALARA Performance, Revision 8 6.10-022 ALARA Engineering Controls, Revision 10 6.10-023 ALARA Planning Assessments, Revision 4 Condition Reports: Radiological Hazard Radiation Worker Radiation Technician
- CR*PNp*2010-00644
- CR-PNp*2009-04881
- CR-PNp*2010-01117
- CR-PNP-20
- 0-01412
- Audits and Assessments
- LO-PNPLO-2009*00075:
- Focused self assessment
-ALARA (11/16-19/2009)
- LO-PNPLO-2010-00003:
- Focused self assessment
-Portable Radiation Protection Calibration and Inventory Control
- LO-PNPLO-2009-00130:
- Snapshot assessment
- I Benchmark
-Applicability of GGNS assessment at PNPS
- LO-PNPLO-2009-00129:
- Snapshot assessment
-High and Locked High Radiation Area Controls (9/21/09)
- LO-PNPLO-2009*00032:
- Snapshot assessment
-Post
(6/22/2009)
- LO-PNPLO-2010-00015:
- Snapshot assessment-
- RP records (1/21/2010)
- LO-PNPLO-2009-00038:
- Snapshot assessment
-Radwaste Shipping (7/6-24/2009)
- QA-14/15-2009-PNP-01:
- Audit -Radiation Protection Radwaste (9t8 -101212009)
- QS-2009-PNP-037:
- SUrveillance
-Follow-up on RP yellow QA rating (11/5/2009)
- Section 40A1 NRC Performance Indicator (PI) Technique/Data Sheet submittals for Pilgrim for Initiating Event Pis from the second quarter 2009 through the first quarter 2010 NRC Inspection Reports from the second quarter of 2009 through the first quarter 2010 Pilgrim Power History .
- NEI 99-02, Revision 6, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline Section 40A2 Pilgrim Station Quarterly Trend Report
- CR-PNP-2009-2515, Pre-treatment Radiation Monitors Declared Inoperable
- CR-PNP-2089-4070, Failure to perform MRFF on pre-treatment Radiation Monitors failure CR-PNP-2009-4006.
- CR-PNP-2009-3088, SBLC pump failure
- CR-PNP-2009-5295, Loss of Secondary Containment
- Incorrect basis for Secondary Containment
- CR-PNP-2010-1289, Air in SLC System
- CR-PNP-2009-2852, Failure to Scope Security EDG into Maintenance Rule CR-PNP-2009-4197.
- Gaps to Excellence in the MRP
- CR-PNP-2009-4943, Maintenance Rule Action Plan changes are not clearly delineated as either updates or revisions
Condition Reports
- 2007-3082; 2008-2644; 2008-2722: 2008-3289; 2008-3291; 2008-3472;
- 2009-0348;
- 2009-0597;
- 2009-1372; 2009-1588; 2009-1787; 2009-1983;
- 2009-2502;
- 2009-2519;
- 2009-2553;2009-2206;
- 2009-2480;
- 2009-2687;
- 2010-1299;
- 2008-3338;
- 2010-2064;
- 237-21,
- FV-642A1B
- Feedwater Regulating Valve Electronic Module
- FY-642A1B
- Diagram, Revision 0 201931-1 Pilgrim, Pneumatic Diagram Double Acting Pneumatic Actuator with Positioner, Revision F M1-J14-14
- Sh. 2. HPCI System Elementary
- DC MOV & Control Center Diagram. Rev. E4 E-13, 125 & 250 VDC System Single Line, Rev. ESO E-9-12, Cutler Hammer Motor Starter Wiring Diagram. Rev. E4 Engineering
- CR-PNP-2007-03082, Feed Water Level Control Valve
- FV-642A Lock Up Root Cause Report, dated July 27,
- CR-PNPS-2009-2502, Internal Silent Lock-up of
- FRV-642B Root Cause Evaluation Report. June 25,
- EC 15070, Software Upgrade for
- FY-642A on Feedwater
- REG Valve
- FV-642A, Revision
- REG Valve
- FV-642B. Revision
- EC 5000072369, Redesign FRV Controllers, Revision
- EN-Ll-119
- 9.1,
- ZC-642A Equipment Failure Evaluation (CR 2009-1983), Revision
- EN-Ll-100
- 9.1, EC15220 Software Upgrade for
- FY-642B on Feedwater Valve
- Process Applicability Determination, dated
- ER 05111346, Feedwater Regulating Valves
- FV-642A1B
- Pneumatic Actuator and Upgrade, Revision Miscellaneous
- 201931-1,
- SN 708191-4 Certificate of Conformance, dated March 15,2007 451 -FW Reactor Level Control System Health Report, Third Quarter 2009 -Fourth Quarter 2009 Compensatory Actions and Disabled Annunciator Log, dated April 7, 2010
- CR-PNP-2009-02519, Feedwater Regulating Valves
- FV-642A1B
- On-Line MonitOring
& Lock-up Restoration
- ODMllmplementation Action Plan, Revision 0 Feedwater Level Control Maintenance Rule SSC Basis Document, Revision 1
- LO-OLP-2009-00006, Lessons Learned for RF018, dated March 12, 2009
- CR 2009-2502
- Effectiveness Review, dated September
- 14, 2009 Operator Compensatory Measures Log, dated April 7, 2010 Risk-Informed Inspection Notebook for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Unit 1, ReVision 2.1 a
- SDBO-06, Design Basis Document for Condensate and Feedwater System, ReviSion 1 STI Instruction Manual Quick Trak III. Revision 0 V-2036, Feedwater Regulating Valves (Vendor Manual). Revision 7 Altran Report 08-0508-TR-001, Failure Analysis of 250 VDC MCC D9 Relay. Rev. 0
- MEMO-AW-2008-04, Rev. 1, from Nuclear Logistics Inc. to Entergy, Continuous Overvoltage Operation of BFD Relays, Dated 12/18/08
- 50077448-02, DC
- 50077458-04, DC
- 50077458-05, DC
- MCC 72-912 BDF33T Relay Replacement Task, Dated 5/11/09 Procedures
- 2.4.49. Feedwater Malfunctions, Revision 40 8.1.45, 1ST Instrument Calibration, Revision 25 Attachment
- 8,M.2-6.3, Reactor Level Readout, Revision
- ARP-C905R-G8, Feed REG VLV Control Signal Failure, Revision
- EN-L1-102, Corrective Action Process, Revision 2,2.13, 250V DC Battery System, Rev. 2.2.14, 125V DC Battery System, Rev.
- ARP-C3RC, Alarm Response Procedure, Rev,
- EN-DC-164, Environmental Qualification Program, Rev.
- ENN-DC-164, Environmental Qualification Program, Rev. EDSM T03, Design Guide for Environmental Qualification of Electrical EqUipment, Rev. Testing. Troubleshooting.
and
- 3.M.4-122, Air-Operated Valve Diagnostic Equipment (FV-642A).
performed May 15, 8.1.1.21. Feedwater Regulating Valve Testing, performed June 18, 2009
- EC 15220, Post Maintenance Test Plan for FRV Off-Line Power Conditions (wi FRV Full-Stroke Calibration Performed), Revision 0 ECT -0000015220-01,
- FV-642B Response Test, performed June 18,2009
- 9.3, Troubleshooting Control Forms (FY-642A Controller), dated April 22, 2009 -May
- 9.3, Troubleshooting Control Forms (FY-642B Controller), May 20, 2009 -June 4,
- FV-642A and
- FV-642B Actuator Performance Trending, dated June 29,2007 -March 8,
- LSP-10725,
- FV-642S Performance Test Report, dated March Work DeSign Basis Documents , SDBD-46G.
- DC Power System, Rev. 1
- EQDF-MCCITEMSDCCUBICLES, EO Evaluation Sheet for DC MCC Cubicles, Rev. EODFREF421, NLI Qualification Report
- QR-038-003
&WR-033-003, Rev. EQDFREF421A, Comments & Revisions to NLI
- QR-038-003, Rev. EQDFREF421
- Bf NLI
- MEMO-AW-2008-04
- Rev. 1, Continuous Overvoltage Operation of Relays, Rev. 0 Section 40A3 NUREG 1022, Event Reporting Downpower Schedule and Power Maneuvering Procedure
- 2.2.94.5, Revision 5, Main Condenser
Procedure
- 2.1.14, Revision 102, Station Power Attachment Licensee Event Report (LER
- Single Train of Reactor Building Cooling Water System (RBCCW) Inoperable for Time Period Exceeding Specification
- CR-PNP-2010-0130, Operators discover broken bolt on pipe clamp rendering
- RBCCW subsystem inoperable Licensee Event Report (LER 0500Q293/2010-002-00), Standby Gas Treatment Declared Inoperable After Discovery of Open Demister Door
- CR-PNP-2010-1079, Demister Door Found Open on Standby Gas Treatment Section 40A5 Procedures:
- EN-NS-112, "Medical Program", Revision 6
- EN-NS-112, "Medical Program", Revision 7 2.2.21.5, "HPCllnjection and Pressure Contro, Revision 8 2.1.11.1, System Fill, Vent, and Drain Instructions, Rev. 21 2.2.19, Residual Heat Removal, Rev. 101 2.2.19.1, RHR System -Shutdown Cooling Mode of Operation, Rev. 31 2.2.20, Core Spray, Rev. 73 2.2.21, High Pressure Coolant Injection System, Rev. 77 2.2.21.5, High Pressure Coolant Injection and Pressure Control, Rev. 17 8.5.1.7, Core Spray Keepfill Supply Check Valve Seat Leak Test, Rev. 10 8.5.1.8, Core Spray CST Suction Valve Leak Test, Rev. 6 8.5.2.15 , LPCI System and Core Spray System Keepfill Checks, Rev. 17 CEP*NDE-0530, UT Examination of Components to Determine Fluid Level, Rev. 2
- ENN-NDE-9.05 , Ultrasonic Thickness Examination, Rev. 1 Condition Reports:
- PNp*2010-00564
- PNp*2008-02095
- PNp*2010-02019
- PNP-201 0-021 90
Calculations
and Evaluations
- PNP-ME-08-0002, Summary of Activities Associated with the Resolution of NRC
- GL 2008-01 and INPO SER 2-05, Rev. 0 Attachment Report 1900039-R-003, Walkdown Report Associated with NRC
- GL 2008-01, Managing Accumulation in ECCS, Decay Heat and Containment Spray Systems, Rev. Report 1900039-R-001, Summary Report Associated with NRC
- GL 2008-01, Managing Accumulation in ECCS, Decay Heat and Containment Spray Systems, Rev. M-662, RHR and Core Spray Pump Net Positive Suction Head and Pressure Drop, Rev. Calculation
- 1900039-C-002, Evaluation of Acceptable Void Sizes in ECCS, Decay Heat. Containment Spray Systems, Rev. Calculation
- 1900039-C-003, Evaluation of RHR System LPCI Transient, Rev. Report 1900039-R-004, Piping Structural System Screening Methodology for NRC GL Associated
- ECCS, Decay Heat and Containment Spray Systems, Rev.
- PNPS-ME-08-00001, Evaluation of Safety Related and MOCI Pumps for the Adequacy Protection from Air Ingestion Due to Low Submergence, Rev. Completed Tests 8.5.2.15 , LPC! System and Core Spray System Keepfilt Checks (performed on 12/13/09, 12127/09,1110/10,1126/10,2110/10,2/23/10,3/15/10, 3/16/10,3/28/10,4/13/10, 4/30/10. 5/11/10, 5/22/10, and 6/14/10) Design & Licensing Bases Letter 2.09.048, Entergy to NRC, Nine-Month Supplemental (Post-Outage)
- Response to NRC Generic Letter 2008-01, "Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling, Decay Heat Removal, and Containment Spray Systems," dated 08/13/09 Letter 2.08.025, Entergy to NRC, Three-Month Response to NRC Generic Letter 2008-01, "Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling, Decay Heat Removal. and Containment Spray Systems," dated 05/07/08 Letter 2.08.055, Entergy to NRC, Nine-Month Response to NRC Generic Letter 2008-01, "Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling. Decay Heat Removal, and Containment Spray Systems," dated 1 0114/08 Letter 2.08.023, Entergy to NRC, Three-Month Response Extension Request to NRC Generic Letter 2008-01, "Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling, Decay Heat Removal, and Containment Spray Systems," dated 04/10/08
- SDBD-14, Design Basis Document for Core Spray System, Rev. 1
Design Basis Document
for HPCI System, Rev. EO Pilgrim Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Rev. 26 Drawings M215, P&ID Cooling Water System Reactor Building, Sh. 2, Rev. 49 M215, P&ID Cooling Water System Reactor Building.
- Sh. 3. Rev. 41 M241 , P&ID Residual Heat Removal System, Sh. 1, Rev. 86 M241 , P&ID Residual Heat Removal System, Sh. 2, Rev. 47 M242, P&ID Core Spray System, Rev. 52 M244, P&ID High Pressure Coolant Injection System, Sh. 1, Rev. E30 M209, P&IO Condensate
& Demineralized Water Storage & Transfer Systems, Rev. 66
- IR-M242, Isometric Roadmap Core Spray System, Rev. E1 1900039-D-001,
- GL 2008-01 Walkdown Data Points HPCI, Rev. 0 Attachment
- 1900039-0-003,
- GL 2008-01 Walkdown Data Points Core Spray System. Sh. 2, Rev. 0 1900039-0-003,
- GL 2008-01 Walkdown Data Points Core Spray System. Sh. 3, Rev. 0 1900039-0-004,
- GL 2008-01 Walkdown Data Points RHR System, Sh. 2, Rev. 0 1900039-0-004,
- GL 2008-01 Walkdown Data Points RHR System. Sh. 3. Rev. 0 Miscellaneous
- ANSI/ANS 3.4-1983, "Medical Certification and Monitoring of Personnel Requiring Operator Licenses for Nuclear Power Plants" NRC Information Notice 2009-21, "'ncomplete Medical Testing for Licensed Operators" Letter 2.10.012, Pilgrim, Unit 1, Reply to Notice of Violation
- 50.59 Safety Evaluation
- 3404, Rev. 0, PNPS 2.2.21.S "HPCllnjection and Pressure Control", Rev. B and Rev. 17 UT Examination Report
- OB-U-006, Piping at Inlet to
dated 04/02/10
- LO-LAR-2008-00027, Licensing Response to NRC
- GL 2008-01, dated 01130/08 Core Spray Health Report, 1Q10, 4009,3009, & 2009 Residual Heat Removal Health Report, 1010,4009,3009, & 2009 High Pressure Core Injection Health Report. 1010,4009.3009, & 2009 Operating Experience
- NRC Generic Letter 2008-01: Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling, Decay Heat Removal and Containment Spray Systems, dated 1111/08 Work Orders
- WO 00201155 Attachment
LIST OF ACRONYMS
As Low As Reasonably
Achievable
Agencywide
Documents
Access and Management
System American Society of Mechanical
Engineers
Corrective
Action Program Code of Federal Regulations
Condition
Report Division of Reactor Projects Division of Reactor Safety Emergency
Core Cooling Systems Emergency
Diesel Generator
Electronic
Personal Dosimeter
Regulating
Valve Feedwater
Level Control Global Nuclear Fuel Instrumentation
and Controls Inspection
Manual Chapter Maintenance
Rule Functional Failure
Maintenance
Rule Program Non-Cited
Violation
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
National Source Tracking System Operational
Decision-Making
Issue Performance
Indicator
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Process Radiation
Monitoring
Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water Reactor Core Isolation
Cooling Radiation
Work Permit Station Blackout Steam Jet Air Ejectors Standby Liquid Contra! Structure, System or Component
Salt Service Water Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water Technical
Specifications
Transmission
System Operator Ultimate Heat Sink Work Order Attachment