IR 05000293/2018010
| ML18164A224 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 06/13/2018 |
| From: | Anthony Dimitriadis NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB5 |
| To: | Brian Sullivan Entergy Nuclear Operations |
| Dimitriadis A | |
| References | |
| EA-15-081, EA-17-086 IR 2018010 | |
| Download: ML18164A224 (22) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION une 13, 2018
SUBJECT:
PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION - CONFIRMATORY ACTION LETTER (EA-17-086) FOLLOW-UP INSPECTION REPORT 05000293/2018010
Dear Mr. Sullivan:
On March 23, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an on-site team inspection at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS). The NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff via a teleconference exit on May 3, 2018. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
The NRC inspection team reviewed PNPSs progress in implementing the actions from the PNPS Recovery Plan that were committed to in the Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) dated August 2, 2017 (NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS)
Accession No. ML17214A088) (EA-17-086). Specifically, for this inspection, the team reviewed the adequacy of the corrective actions PNPS completed to address 24 individual CAL items in the Operability Determination and Functionality Assessments, and the Safety Relief Valve (SRV) White Finding Area Action Plans. The team also reviewed site performance to determine whether all the actions completed for these plans, in aggregate, achieved the safety performance improvement objectives stated in the PNPS Recovery Plan.
The team determined that all 24 of the individual CAL items reviewed and the two associated Area Action Plans were effective in achieving the associated PNPS Recovery Plan performance improvement objectives and adequately completed. As a result, the 24 CAL items and the Operability Determination and Functionality Assessments and the SRV White Finding Area Action Plans are closed.
No findings or violations of NRC requirements were identified during this inspection.
As part of this inspection, the team also completed a follow-up supplemental inspection for the White finding related to the A SRV failure. On September 1, 2015, the NRC issued the final significance determination for the White finding (ADAMS Accession No. ML15230A217). The White finding was associated with a violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, in that Entergy did not identify, evaluate, and correct a significant condition adverse to quality associated with the A SRV. Entergy did not identify, evaluate, and correct the A SRVs failure to open upon manual actuation during a plant cool-down on February 9, 2013, following a loss of offsite power event caused by a winter storm. The failure to take actions to preclude repetition resulted in the C SRV failing to open due to a similar cause following a January 27, 2015, loss of offsite power event also caused by a winter storm. The NRC determined that the A SRV had been inoperable for a period greater than the technical specification allowed outage time of 14 days.
The Inspection Procedure (IP) 95003 Phase C inspection report (ADAMS Accession No. ML17129A217) documented the completion of an initial review of Entergys response to this finding using IP 95001, Supplemental Inspection Response to Action Matrix Column 2 Inputs.
That review identified a significant weakness related to several concerns regarding methodologies used in the associated root cause evaluation (CR-PNP-2016-01621). Most notably, there were incorrect conclusions and assumptions related to the adequacy of information in the condition report originally written for the A SRV operation during a 2013 plant transient. The significant weakness caused Entergy to inappropriately assess the impact of lack of rigor in shift manager operability determination review and its associated causal factors.
Based on this significant weakness, the NRC determined that all objectives for the IP 95001 inspection could not be met.
The corrective actions required to address the impact of the SRV White finding significant weakness on the objectives of the IP 95001 inspection were included in the SRV White Finding Area Action Plan items in the CAL. These items were inspected during this inspection and the previous CAL follow-up inspection, the results of which were documented in NRC Inspection Report 05000293/2017010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18032A463). During this most recent inspection, the team closed the remaining nine SRV White Finding Area Action Plan action items, and verified that all of the actions were complete and effective, and that they adequately addressed the identified significant weakness. The NRC concluded that PNPSs actions met the objectives of the IP 95001 inspection and, therefore, the White finding related to the A SRV failure (EA-15-081) is closed.
In accordance with the guidance in Inspection Manual Chapter 0305, Operating Reactor Assessment Program, this White finding will no longer be considered in assessing plant performance. However, PNPS will remain within the Multiple/Repetitive Degraded Cornerstone column of the NRCs Reactor Oversight Process Action Matrix pending completion of all actions needed to close the CAL. To review the remaining CAL actions and area action plans, the NRC currently plans and has scheduled at least three additional quarterly CAL follow-up inspections in addition to the two already completed. The NRC staff will assess the effectiveness of Entergys implementation of these corrective actions and evaluate whether the safety performance of PNPS has demonstrated sustained improvement warranting transition of PNPS out of Column 4 in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0305, Section 10.02d, paragraph 7. The NRC plans to communicate the results of this determination at a public meeting following the successful completion of these CAL closure activities. The final CAL follow-up inspection is currently scheduled to be completed in December 2018, and the report documenting the results of that inspection to be issued shortly thereafter. The NRC may schedule additional CAL inspections, as warranted. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Anthony Dimitriadis, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-293 License No. DPR-35
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000293/2018010 w/Attachment: Confirmatory Action Letter Item Status
Inspection Report
Docket Number: 50-293 License Number: DPR-35 Report Number: 05000293/2018010 Enterprise Identifier: I-2018-010-0044 Licensee: Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Entergy)
Facility: Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS)
Location: Plymouth, MA Inspection Dates: 03/19/2018 - 03/23/2018 Team Lead: Leonard M. Cline Jr., Senior Project Engineer Inspectors: Peter Boguszewski, Project Engineer Matthew Fannon, Resident Inspector Christopher Highley, Resident Inspector Adam Ziedonis, Resident Inspector Approved By: Anthony Dimitriadis, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring Entergys performance at PNPS by conducting the confimatory action letter (CAL) follow-up inspection in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP). The ROP is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
The team reviewed 24 of the 156 items that Entergy committed to complete in the PNPS CAL (EA-17-086). The team determined that all 24 of the items reviewed and the two associated area action plansOperability Determination and Functionality Assessments (ODFA) and Safety Relief Valve (SRV) White Findingwere adequately completed and effective in achieving the associated performance improvement objectives. As a result, the 24 CAL items and these two area action plans are closed. In addition, based on the closure of the SRV White Finding Area Action Plan, Notice of Violation (NOV)05000293/2015007-02, Failure to Identify,
Evaluate, and Correct A SRV Failure to Open Upon Manual Actuation, (EA-15-081), is also closed.
No findings or more-than-minor violations were identified.
Additional Tracking Items Type Issue Title Report Status number Section NOV 05000293/ Failure to Identify, Evaluate, and Inspection Closed 2015007-02 Correct A SRV Failure to Open Upon Results Manual Actuation 92702 CAL EA-17-086 PNPS Confirmatory Action letter Inspection Discussed Results 92702
INSPECTION SCOPES
This inspection was conducted using the appropriate portions of the applicable inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess Entergys performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
- TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT, AND ABNORMAL 95001 - Supplemental Inspection Response to Action Matrix Column 2 Inputs Scope of Review The NRC completed its assessment of Entergys corrective actions for a White finding associated with the A SRV failure to open, using IP 95001, Supplemental Inspection Response to Action Matrix Column 2 Inputs, dated August 24, 2016. The purpose of this inspection was to confirm that the corrective actions taken by Entergy to address the White finding met the following four objectives:
Objective 1 - To assure that the root and contributing causes of the significant performance issues are understood; Objective 2 - To independently assess and assure that the extent of condition and extent of cause of significant performance issues are identified; Objective 3 - To assure that corrective actions taken to address and preclude repetition of significant performance issues are prompt and effective; and Objective 4 - To assure that corrective action plans direct prompt actions to effectively address and preclude repetition of significant performance issues.
Background On January 27, 2015, PNPS was reducing power, in accordance with station procedures, due to loss of one of the two 345kV distribution lines during a winter storm. While at 52 percent power, operators observed a generator load reject and automatic reactor scram when the remaining 345kV offsite distribution line de-energized. Operator response to the scram was challenged by multiple equipment issues, including failure of the C SRV to operate at low pressure. On February 2, 2015, the NRC dispatched a Special Inspection Team to the station to review the event.
The Special Inspection Team identified a White finding with an associated violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, in that Entergy did not identify, evaluate, and correct a significant condition adverse to quality (SCAQ) associated with a failure of the A SRV to open upon manual actuation during a plant cooldown on February 9, 2013, following a loss of offsite power event caused by a winter storm. The failure to take actions to preclude repetition of the SCAQ resulted in the C SRV failing to open during the January 27, 2015, event described above. More information on this event and the White finding can be found in NRC Inspection Reports 05000293/2015007 and 05000293/2015011 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML15147A412 and ML15230A217, respectively).
On September 1, 2015, the NRC determined that due to its performance, Pilgrim was moved to the Multiple/Repetitive Degraded Cornerstone Column (Column 4) of the ROP Action Matrix retroactive to the beginning of the first quarter 2015. The entry into Column 4 was caused by the issuance of this White finding in the Mitigating Systems cornerstone while Pilgrim was in the Degraded Cornerstone Column (Column 3) of the ROP Action Matrix for more than five consecutive quarters. Pilgrim had entered the Degraded Cornerstone Column for two White inputs under the Initiating Events cornerstone. Four scrams in 2013 caused two performance indicators in the Initiating Events cornerstone, Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours and Unplanned Scrams with Complications, to cross the threshold from Green to White (ML15026A069).
As a result of PNPSs transition into the Multiple/Repetitive Degraded Cornerstone Column (Column 4) of the ROP Action Matrix, the NRC implemented IP 95003, in a phased approach, to ensure that continued operation of the facility was acceptable until the final phase of the inspection could be completed. The final phase of IP 95003 implementation, or Phase C, included a review of the White finding described above, using IP 95001. The results of the IP 95003 Phase C Inspection are documented in NRC Inspection Report 05000293/2016011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17129A217). As described in Section 4.4b of that inspection report, the NRC determined that the collective issues associated with the methodologies in Entergys associated root cause evaluation (RCE) represented a significant weakness, such that the objectives of IP 95001 could not be satisfied. The scope of this CAL inspection included a review of Entergys actions to address the significant weakness associated with the White finding, and to determine if the objectives of IP 95001 could be met. Entergys response to the RCE concerns was included in the SRV White Finding Area Action Plan item SRV-4.1.
92702 - Follow-up on Traditional Enforcement Actions Including Violations, Deviations, Confirmatory Action Letters, Confirmatory Orders, and Alternative Dispute Resolution Confirmatory Orders The inspectors reviewed the status of the corrective actions that Entergy had reported completed for 24 of the 156 items listed on Enclosure 2 of the PNPS CAL (EA-17-086)
(ADAMS Accession No. ML17214A088). The inspectors also reviewed the status of the area action plans associated with these 24 items, which in accordance with Enclosure 2 of the PNPS CAL included the ODFA and SRV White Finding Area Action Plans. Entergy had reported these two area action plans were complete and effective.
The inspection team examined these areas to determine if:
- (1) CAL item corrective actions were completed in a timely manner consistent with their safety significance;
- (2) Area action plans were effective at addressing the performance issues identified in the CAL;
- (3) CAL performance metrics were appropriate and accurate;
- (4) Closure of each CAL item and area action plan was completed in accordance with established PNPS procedural guidance; and,
- (5) The SRV White Finding Area Action Plan adequately addressed the weaknesses in Entergys cause evaluation and corrective actions for NOV 05000293/2015007-02, Failure to Identify, Evaluate, and Correct A SRV Failure to Open Upon Manual Actuation (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML15147A412 and ML15230A217) as documented in Sections 4.4 and 4.5 of the IP 95003 Phase C Inspection Report (ADAMS Accession No. ML17129A217).
During this review, the inspectors completed the following specific activities:
- (1) Reviewed Entergys closure packages for each CAL action included in the scope of this inspection.
- (2) Reviewed Entergys closure reports for the ODFA and SRV White Finding Area Action Plans.
- (3) Reviewed Entergys effectiveness reviews and self-assessments completed for the ODFA and SRV White Finding Area Action Plans.
- (4) Interviewed 20 senior reactor operators and 10 engineers.
- (5) Observed one simulator evaluated scenario and one simulator training scenario.
- (6) Reviewed simulator training results reported in the operator crew performance notebooks.
- (7) Observed the conduct of daily Operability Determination Challenge Boards (ODCBs).
- (8) Reviewed ODCB weekly feedback for each operating crew, and the monthly and quarterly roll-up reports of ODCB operability determination reviews.
- (9) Reviewed approximately 100 operability determinations completed between October 2017 and March 2018.
- (10) Confirmed the accuracy of the Recovery Plan performance metrics for both the SRV White Finding and the ODFA Area Action Plans.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Observation 95001 Objective 1 (IP 95001, Section 02.02b)
Entergy performed RCE CR-PNP-2016-01621 in response to the NRC White finding associated with a failure of the A SRV to open upon manual actuation during a plant cooldown on February 9, 2013. As discussed in Section 4.4b of the IP 95003 Phase C inspection report, the NRC determined that the collective issues associated with the methodologies in Entergys associated RCE represented a significant weakness. This ultimately resulted in Entergy inappropriately assessing the impact of shift manager review rigor, and any associated causal factors. In response to the significant weakness, Entergy completed Revision 3 to the RCE (CR-PNP-2016-1621). Revision 3 to the RCE addressed the problems identified during the IP 95003 Phase C inspection and identified a third root cause for the White finding: the shift manager approved the operability determination for SRV A without performing an adequate review that challenged and validated the results of the determination.
The CAL team reviewed the results of the IP 95003 Phase C inspection associated with the A SRV White finding and Entergys RCE, Revision 3. The team confirmed that Entergy had adequately addressed the collective issues identified by the IP 95003 Phase C inspection team regarding the RCE. The CAL team interviewed approximately 20 shift managers and senior reactor operators and 10 engineers to assess the organizations understanding of the operability determination process improvements and the reinforcement of the specified role of the shift manager in the process. Based on these interviews, its review of the revised RCE, and the IP 95003 inspection results, the CAL team concluded that Entergy understood the root and contributing causes associated with the SRV White finding. Therefore, the CAL team concluded that Objective 1 was now satisfied.
Objective 2 (IP 95001, Sections 02.02d, 02.02e, 02.03a, 02.04a, 02.03c, and 02.04b)
The IP 95003 Phase C inspection team conducted an independent extent of condition (EoC)and extent of cause (EoCa) review for the A SRV White finding. The team determined that the extent of condition for the failure to identify, evaluate, and correct a SCAQ was narrowly focused on PNPS personnel, and did not evaluate personnel performance at other stations or the corporate offices. Entergy documented this weakness in CR-PNP-2017-00828 and completed several corrective actions that included reviewing Entergy Corporate performance relative to identifying and correcting SCAQs, revising corporate procedures, and initiating fleet-wide actions for training and leadership development in this area.
The IP 95003 Phase C inspection team also determined that Entergys EoCa review required more evaluation to assess the extent of cause related to the impacts of inadequate shift manager operability review rigor. Entergy expanded the scope of the EoCa for this issue to include all areas that require shift manager quality reviews. Entergys corrective actions included procedure revisions that now require shift manager approval of limiting condition for operation entries and narrative logs, and also face-to-face sessions between operations management and all senior reactor operators to reinforce expectations associated with the procedure requirements governing review and approval of technical specification surveillance tests, narrative logs, and limiting condition for operation entries.
The IP 95003 Phase C inspection team identified weaknesses in Entergys consideration of the safety culture traits against the root cause, EoC, and EoCa evaluations. Specifically, the IP 95003 Phase C inspection team identified weaknesses in how some of the safety culture traits had been applied to the issues associated with the operability determination process.
As part of Revision 3 to RCE CR-PNP-2016-01621, Entergy re-performed the review of the safety culture traits and assigned traits to the newly identified third root cause, inadequate shift manager operability determination review rigor. Entergy determined that overall, there were 16 safety culture aspects associated with the root and contributing causes for the SRV White finding, and that all aspects would be addressed by the corrective actions already established by the PNPS Recovery Plan.
The CAL team determined that Entergy completed all of its corrective action program requirements for EoC and EoCa for the A SRV White finding and that Entergys review of the safety culture traits was adequate to satisfy the IP 95001 inspection requirement. Based on the results of the IP 95003 Phase C inspection, Entergys initial EoC and EoCa reviews, and the additional actions taken to address the IP 95003 Phase C inspection identified weaknesses in EoC and EoCa, the CAL team concluded that the EoC and EoCa for all of the significant performance issues associated with A SRV White finding were identified.
Therefore, the CAL team concluded that Objective 2 was now satisfied.
Objective 3 (IP 95001, Sections 02.03b, 02.04a, and 02.04c)
The IP 95003 Phase C inspection team determined that Entergy generally completed appropriate corrective actions to preclude repetition of the A SRV White finding. However, the IP 95003 Phase C inspection team identified a weakness in the lack of specific corrective actions to address shift manager operability determination rigor. As discussed under Objective 1, Entergy completed Revision 3 to the RCE (CR-PNP-2016-1621) to address the significant weakness that was identified by the IP 95003 Phase C inspection team. In this Revision 3 to the RCE, Entergy identified the lack of rigor in shift manager operability determination reviews as a root cause and has completed extensive corrective actions to address this problem. The actions included:
- (1) revising station procedures to clearly outline the roles and responsibilities of the shift manager in the operability determination process;
- (2) conducting shift manager and senior reactor operator training on the operability determination process;
- (3) creating operator aids and templates for the conduct of operability determinations;
- (4) creating an ODCB to independently assess all operability determinations using specific evaluation criteria; and
- (5) tracking the quality of crew operability determinations using metrics based on the results of ODCB evaluations. Entergy also performed operations management face-to-face training sessions with all shift manager-qualified individuals. The face-to-face sessions reinforced management expectations regarding the conduct of timely and rigorous shift manager reviews for operability and functionality determinations commensurate with the significance of the issue. This action was scheduled to recur semi-annually, until the A SRV RCE effectiveness review determined the corrective action plan was effective and shift manager performance was acceptable. In March 2018, Entergy completed the effectiveness review and determined the corrective action was effective based on satisfactory operability determination metrics.
The CAL team interviewed approximately 20 shift managers and senior reactor operators and reviewed a sample of 100 completed operability determinations to independently assess the effectiveness of the operability determination process improvements and the reinforcement of the specified role of the shift manager in the process. Based on the results of these activities and the documentation of the additional corrective actions Entergy completed to address the lack of rigor in shift manager operability determination reviews, the CAL team concluded that the corrective actions Entergy had completed to address and preclude repetition of the A SRV White finding were effective. Therefore, the CAL team concluded that Objective 3 was now satisfied.
Objective 4 (IP 95001, Sections 02.03a, 02.04a, 02.03b, 02.04a, 02.03c, 02.04b, and 02.04c)
As described in the results of the IP 92702 inspection described below, the CAL team determined that all corrective actions for the SRV White finding were complete and effective.
The CAL team concluded that Objective 4 was now satisfied.
Observation 92702 CAL Item Closure Based on the actions taken by the licensee, data evaluated by the team, and observations and interviews performed onsite, the team concluded the actions listed below were effective.
Therefore, the following actions are closed (a narrative description of each item is listed in 1 to the PNPS CAL (ADAMS Accession No. ML17214A088)):
Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments (ODFA) - 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 2.2, 3.1, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, 5.7, 5.8 Safety Relief Valve (SRV) White Finding - 1.1, 1.2, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 4.1, 5.1, 5.2 CAL Area Action Plan Summary Review The inspectors concluded that the individual CAL items described above and the associated area action plans were adequately completed and were effective in achieving the associated performance improvement objectives described in the PNPS Recovery Plan.
Based on this conclusion, the ODFA and the SRV White Finding Area Action Plans listed in 2 to the PNPS CAL are closed.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
On May 3, 2018, the inspectors telephonically presented the CAL follow-up inspection results to Mr. Brian Sullivan, Site Vice President, and other members of PNPS staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
CAL Item Closure Packages
ODFA-1.2 ODFA-5.2 SRV-1.2
ODFA-1.3 ODFA-5.3 SRV-3.1
ODFA-1.4 ODFA-5.4 SRV-3.2
ODFA-1.5 ODFA-5.5 SRV-3.3
ODFA-1.6 ODFA-5.6 SRV-3.4
ODFA-2.2 ODFA-5.7 SRV-4.1
ODFA-3.1 ODFA-5.8 SRV-5.1
ODFA-5.1 SRV-1.1 SRV-5.2
Procedures
1.3.34, Operations Administrative Policies and Processes, Responsibilities, Revision 157
1.3.34, Operations Administrative Policies and Processes, Responsibilities, Revision 139
EN-OP-104, Operability Determination Process, Revision 14
EN-OP-104, Operability Determination Process, Revision 13
EN-OP-104, Operability Determination Process, Revision 6
EN-LI-118, Cause Evaluation Process, Revision 26
EN-LI-102, Corrective Action Program, Revision 32
1.3.37, Post Trip Review, Revision 36
EN-LI-123-12-PNP-RC, Comprehensive Recovery Plan and Performance Metrics, Revision 2
EN-FAP-LI-005, Recovery Project Adminstration Controls, Revision 4
EN-FAP-LI-002, Project Review Board Guide, Revision 5
EN-LI-104, Self Assessment and Benchmark Process, Revision 13
EN-LI-121, Trending and Performance Review Process, Revision 24
JA-PI-01, Analysis Manual, Revision 6
EN-WM-100, Work Request Generation, Screening and Classification, Revision 13
EN-OP-115, Conduct of Operations, Revision 24
Operations Policy No. 5, Operability Determinations (Operability Template), Revision 0
EN-OP-115-09, Log Keeping, Revision 2
Audits/Self Assessments/Surveillances
LO-PNPLO-2016-00089, Operability Determination Performance Improvement Plan -
Corrective Action Effectiveness Review, 1/12/2017
LO-PNPLO-2018-00010, Self Assessment for NRC Inspection of Area Action Plan Operability
Determination and Functionality Assessment (Human Performance Focus Area, 2/5/2018
QS-2018-PNPS-02, NIOS Assessment of Operability Determination/Functionality Assessment
(ODFA) and SRV White Finding Recovery Problem Areas fro Readiness for NRC Inspection,
Revision 1
Condition Reports
CR-PNP-2013-00825 CR-PNP-2018-02132 CR-PNP-2018-02141
CR-PNP-2018-00112 CR-PNP-2018-02133 CR-PNP-2018-02142
CR-PNP-2018-02125 CR-PNP-2018-02134 CR-PNP-2018-02143
CR-PNP-2018-02126 CR-PNP-2018-02135 CR-PNP-2018-02144
CR-PNP-2018-02127 CR-PNP-2018-02136 CR-PNP-2018-02145
CR-PNP-2018-02128 CR-PNP-2018-02137 CR-PNP-2018-02146
CR-PNP-2018-02129 CR-PNP-2018-02138 CR-PNP-2018-02147
CR-PNP-2018-02130 CR-PNP-2018-02139 CR-PNP-2018-02148
CR-PNP-2018-02131 CR-PNP-2018-02140 CR-PNP-2018-02149
CR-PNP-2018-02150 CR-PNP-2018-02187 CR-PNP-2018-02224
CR-PNP-2018-02151 CR-PNP-2018-02188 CR-PNP-2018-02225
CR-PNP-2018-02152 CR-PNP-2018-02189 CR-PNP-2018-02226
CR-PNP-2018-02153 CR-PNP-2018-02190 CR-PNP-2018-02227
CR-PNP-2018-02154 CR-PNP-2018-02191 CR-PNP-2018-02228
CR-PNP-2018-02155 CR-PNP-2018-02192 CR-PNP-2018-02229
CR-PNP-2018-02156 CR-PNP-2018-02193 CR-PNP-2018-02230
CR-PNP-2018-02157 CR-PNP-2018-02194 CR-PNP-2018-02231
CR-PNP-2018-02158 CR-PNP-2018-02195 CR-PNP-2018-02232
CR-PNP-2018-02159 CR-PNP-2018-02196 CR-PNP-2018-02233
CR-PNP-2018-02160 CR-PNP-2018-02197 CR-PNP-2018-02234
CR-PNP-2018-02161 CR-PNP-2018-02198 CR-PNP-2018-02235
CR-PNP-2018-02162 CR-PNP-2018-02199 CR-PNP-2018-02236
CR-PNP-2018-02163 CR-PNP-2018-02200 CR-PNP-2018-02237
CR-PNP-2018-02164 CR-PNP-2018-02201 CR-PNP-2018-02238
CR-PNP-2018-02165 CR-PNP-2018-02202 CR-PNP-2018-02239
CR-PNP-2018-02166 CR-PNP-2018-02203 CR-PNP-2018-02240
CR-PNP-2018-02167 CR-PNP-2018-02204 CR-PNP-2018-02241
CR-PNP-2018-02168 CR-PNP-2018-02205 CR-PNP-2018-02242
CR-PNP-2018-02169 CR-PNP-2018-02206 CR-PNP-2018-02243
CR-PNP-2018-02170 CR-PNP-2018-02207 CR-PNP-2018-02244
CR-PNP-2018-02171 CR-PNP-2018-02208 CR-PNP-2018-02245
CR-PNP-2018-02172 CR-PNP-2018-02209 CR-PNP-2018-02246
CR-PNP-2018-02173 CR-PNP-2018-02210 CR-PNP-2018-02247
CR-PNP-2018-02174 CR-PNP-2018-02211 CR-PNP-2018-02248
CR-PNP-2018-02175 CR-PNP-2018-02212 CR-PNP-2018-02249
CR-PNP-2018-02176 CR-PNP-2018-02213 CR-PNP-2018-02250
CR-PNP-2018-02177 CR-PNP-2018-02214 CR-PNP-2018-02251
CR-PNP-2018-02178 CR-PNP-2018-02215 CR-PNP-2018-02252
CR-PNP-2018-02179 CR-PNP-2018-02216 CR-PNP-2018-02253
CR-PNP-2018-02180 CR-PNP-2018-02217 CR-PNP-2018-02254
CR-PNP-2018-02181 CR-PNP-2018-02218 CR-PNP-2018-02255
CR-PNP-2018-02182 CR-PNP-2018-02219 CR-PNP-2018-02256
CR-PNP-2018-02183 CR-PNP-2018-02220 CR-PNP-2018-02257
CR-PNP-2018-02184 CR-PNP-2018-02221 CR-PNP-2018-02258
CR-PNP-2018-02185 CR-PNP-2018-02222 CR-PNP-2018-02259
CR-PNP-2018-02186 CR-PNP-2018-02223
CR-PNP-2018-02260
CR-PNP-2017-00009 CR-PNP-2017-01101 CR-PNP-2017-02434
CR-PNP-2017-00033 CR-PNP-2017-01236 CR-PNP-2017-02622
CR-PNP-2017-00086 CR-PNP-2017-01363 CR-PNP-2017-02785
CR-PNP-2017-00204 CR-PNP-2017-01405 CR-PNP-2017-02900
CR-PNP-2017-00215 CR-PNP-2017-01531 CR-PNP-2017-02994
CR-PNP-2017-00239 CR-PNP-2017-01709 CR-PNP-2017-03541
CR-PNP-2017-00257 CR-PNP-2017-01747 CR-PNP-2017-03694
CR-PNP-2017-00494 CR-PNP-2017-01846 CR-PNP-2017-03952
CR-PNP-2017-00499 CR-PNP-2017-02194 CR-PNP-2017-04208
CR-PNP-2017-00714 CR-PNP-2017-02276 CR-PNP-2017-04563
CR-PNP-2017-00961 CR-PNP-2017-02381 CR-PNP-2017-04768
CR-PNP-2017-05067 CR-PNP-2017-09211 CR-PNP-2017-12571
CR-PNP-2017-05075 CR-PNP-2017-09589 CR-PNP-2017-12603
CR-PNP-2017-05137 CR-PNP-2017-09683 CR-PNP-2017-12603
CR-PNP-2017-05255 CR-PNP-2017-09684 CR-PNP-2017-12623
CR-PNP-2017-05390 CR-PNP-2017-09690 CR-PNP-2018-00045
CR-PNP-2017-05531 CR-PNP-2017-09699 CR-PNP-2018-00093
CR-PNP-2017-05586 CR-PNP-2017-09838 CR-PNP-2018-00112
CR-PNP-2017-05801 CR-PNP-2017-09925 CR-PNP-2018-00169
CR-PNP-2017-05903 CR-PNP-2017-10010 CR-PNP-2018-00257
CR-PNP-2017-06029 CR-PNP-2017-10242 CR-PNP-2018-00258
CR-PNP-2017-06197 CR-PNP-2017-10374 CR-PNP-2018-00306
CR-PNP-2017-06380 CR-PNP-2017-10482 CR-PNP-2018-00476
CR-PNP-2017-07320 CR-PNP-2017-10647 CR-PNP-2018-00489
CR-PNP-2017-07390 CR-PNP-2017-10660 CR-PNP-2018-00553
CR-PNP-2017-07658 CR-PNP-2017-10833 CR-PNP-2018-00666
CR-PNP-2017-07658 CR-PNP-2017-11023 CR-PNP-2018-00667
CR-PNP-2017-07745 CR-PNP-2017-11430 CR-PNP-2018-00923
CR-PNP-2017-08038 CR-PNP-2017-11612 CR-PNP-2018-00958
CR-PNP-2017-08724 CR-PNP-2017-12093 CR-PNP-2018-01034
CR-PNP-2017-08849 CR-PNP-2017-12105 CR-PNP-2018-01101
CR-PNP-2017-08971 CR-PNP-2017-12214 CR-PNP-2018-01417
CR-PNP-2017-09154 CR-PNP-2017-12516 CR-PNP-2018-01565
Work Orders
WO-PNP-00435308 WO-PNP-00435311 WO-PNP-00435314 WO-PNP-00435316
Training Material
AFG-2016-01, Simulator Based Exercise, 09/22/2016
SES-2018-01, LORT/NRC Simulator Exam Scenario, 03/06/2018
TQF-210-DD03-GRADE, LOR Simulator Crew Performance Evaluation Grading Criteria ,
Revision 4
TQF-201-IM05, Remedial Training Plan, 01/09/2017
O-RQ-04-01-230, Training Material: Operability Determinations, Revision 1
O-RQ-04-01-238, Training Material: Operability Determination Functionality Assessment
Fundamentals, Revision 0
O-RQ-06-02-177, LOR Cycle 7 Scenario #1 Loss 355 line, SSW leak, Chloride Intrusion,
Revision 0
SES-2018-01, LORT/NRC Simulator Exam Scenario, 03/06/2018
TQF-201-IM05, Remedial Training Plan, 01/09/2017
AFG-2016-01, Simulator Based Exercise, 09/22/2016
O-RQ-04-01-257, LOR Cycle 3 2017, HIT Plant Status Update, Revison 1
Effectivenes Reviews
PNPLO-2016-0002 CA-53, Effectiveness Review CR-PNP-2016-01621 RC-3 CAPR-1, CA -79,
3/7/2018
PNPLO-2016-0002 CA-35, Effectiveness Review CR-PNP-2016-01621 RC-2 CAPR-1, CA-13,
3/6/2018
PNPLO-2016-0002 CA-34, Effectiveness Review CR-PNP-2016-01621 RC-1 CAPR-1 CA-11,
10/20/2017
PNPLO-2016-0002 CA-70, Effectiveness Review for the Operability Determination and
Functionality Assessment (ODFA) Area Action Plan, 3/6/2018
Miscellaneous
ODCB Daily Meeting Minutes March 19, 2018
ODCB Daily Meeting Minutes March 20, 2018
ODCB Daily Meeting Minutes March 21, 2018
ODCB Daily Meeting Minutes March 22, 2018
ODCB Daily Meeting Minutes January 9, 2018
ODCB Daily Meeting Minutes January 10, 2018
ODCB Daily Meeting Minutes January 11, 2018
Overnight CR Report 2018-03-16
Overnight CR Report 2018-03-17
Overnight CR Report 2018-03-18
Overnight CR Report 2018-03-19
CR-PNP-2016-01621, PNPS, Root Cause Evaluation, Failure to classify SRV A Inoperable,
Revision 3
CR-PNP-2018-0093, Pilgrim Station Scram Report - January 4, 2018,
CR-PNP-2016-1340, Comprehensive Recovery Plan Operability Determination and
Functionality Assessment Area Action Plan Closure Report, March 9, 2018
CR-PNP-2016-1621, Comprehensive Recovery Plan Area Action Plan Safety Relief Valve White
Finding Closure Report, March 9, 2018
Operator Aid #16-06, EN-OP-104 Entry Requirements, March 6, 2018
Operator Aid #16-07, Immediate Operability Determination, March 6, 2018
CR-PNP-2017-7015, Human Performance Evaluation, Missed Reportability Determination for
Confirmatory Action Letter Item Status
Line Area Action Plan CAL Item Inspection Report Number Closed
Item
Nuclear Safety Culture NSC-1.1
Nuclear Safety Culture NSC-1.2
Nuclear Safety Culture NSC-1.3
Nuclear Safety Culture NSC-1.4
Nuclear Safety Culture NSC-1.5
Nuclear Safety Culture NSC-1.6
Nuclear Safety Culture NSC-1.7
Nuclear Safety Culture NSC-1.8
Nuclear Safety Culture NSC-1.10
Nuclear Safety Culture NSC-2.2
Nuclear Safety Culture NSC-2.3
Nuclear Safety Culture NSC-3.1
Nuclear Safety Culture NSC-3.2
Nuclear Safety Culture NSC-3.3
Nuclear Safety Culture NSC-3.4
Nuclear Safety Culture NSC-3.5
Nuclear Safety Culture NSC-3.6
Nuclear Safety Culture NSC-3.7
Nuclear Safety Culture NSC-3.8
Nuclear Safety Culture NSC-4.1
Nuclear Safety Culture NSC-4.2
Nuclear Safety Culture NSC-5.1
Nuclear Safety Culture NSC-5.2
Nuclear Safety Culture NSC-5.3
Nuclear Safety Culture NSC-5.4
Nuclear Safety Culture NSC-6.1
Nuclear Safety Culture NSC-7.1
Nuclear Safety Culture NSC-8.1
Nuclear Safety Culture NSC-8.6
Nuclear Safety Culture NSC-8.8
Nuclear Safety Culture NSC-8.9
Nuclear Safety Culture NSC-8.10
Nuclear Safety Culture NSC-8.21
Nuclear Safety Culture NSC-8.22
Nuclear Safety Culture NSC-8.25
Nuclear Safety Culture NSC-8.26
Nuclear Safety Culture NSC-8.27
Nuclear Safety Culture NSC-8.28
Nuclear Safety Culture NSC-8.29
Corrective Action Program CAP-1.1 05000293/2017010 Y
Line Area Action Plan CAL Item Inspection Report Number Closed
Item
Corrective Action Program CAP-1.2
Corrective Action Program CAP-1.3
Corrective Action Program CAP-1.4
Corrective Action Program CAP-1.5
Corrective Action Program CAP-1.7
Corrective Action Program CAP-1.8
Corrective Action Program CAP-1.9
Corrective Action Program CAP-1.10
Corrective Action Program CAP-1.11
Corrective Action Program CAP-2.1
Corrective Action Program CAP-2.2
Corrective Action Program CAP-2.3
Corrective Action Program CAP-3.1
Corrective Action Program CAP-3.2
Corrective Action Program CAP-4.2
Corrective Action Program CAP-4.3
Procedure Use and PUA-1.1 05000293/2017010 Y
Adherence
Procedure Use and PUA-1.2 05000293/2017010 Y
Adherence
Procedure Use and PUA-1.3 05000293/2017010 Y
Adherence
Procedure Use and PUA-1.4 05000293/2017010 Y
Adherence
Procedure Use and PUA-1.6
Adherence
Procedure Use and PUA-2.2
Adherence
Procedure Use and PUA-2.3
Adherence
Procedure Use and PUA-2.4
Adherence
Procedure Use and PUA-2.5
Adherence
Procedure Use and PUA-3.1
Adherence
Procedure Use and PUA-3.2
Adherence
Procedure Use and PUA-3.3
Adherence
Procedure Use and PUA-3.4
Adherence
Line Area Action Plan CAL Item Inspection Report Number Closed
Item
Procedure Use and PUA-4.1
Adherence
Procedure Use and PUA-4.2
Adherence
Procedure Use and PUA-4.3
Adherence
Procedure Use and PUA-5.1
Adherence
Procedure Use and PUA-5.2
Adherence
Procedure Use and PUA-5.7
Adherence
Procedure Use and PUA-5.8
Adherence
Procedure Use and PUA-5.9
Adherence
Operability Determinations ODFA- 05000293/2017010 Y
and Functionality 1.1
Assessments
Operability Determinations ODFA- 05000293/2018010 Y
and Functionality 1.2
Assessments
Operability Determinations ODFA- 05000293/2018010 Y
and Functionality 1.3
Assessments
Operability Determinations ODFA- 05000293/2018010 Y
and Functionality 1.4
Assessments
Operability Determinations ODFA- 05000293/2018010 Y
and Functionality 1.5
Assessments
Operability Determinations ODFA- 05000293/2018010 Y
and Functionality 1.6
Assessments
Operability Determinations ODFA- 05000293/2018010 Y
and Functionality 2.2
Assessments
Operability Determinations ODFA- 05000293/2018010 Y
and Functionality 3.1
Assessments
Operability Determinations ODFA- 05000293/2018010 Y
and Functionality 5.1
Assessments
Line Area Action Plan CAL Item Inspection Report Number Closed
Item
Operability Determinations ODFA- 05000293/2018010 Y
and Functionality 5.2
Assessments
Operability Determinations ODFA- 05000293/2018010 Y
and Functionality 5.3
Assessments
Operability Determinations ODFA- 05000293/2018010 Y
and Functionality 5.4
Assessments
Operability Determinations ODFA- 05000293/2018010 Y
and Functionality 5.5
Assessments
Operability Determinations ODFA- 05000293/2018010 Y
and Functionality 5.6
Assessments
Operability Determinations ODFA- 05000293/2018010 Y
and Functionality 5.7
Assessments
Operability Determinations ODFA- 05000293/2018010 Y
and Functionality 5.8
Assessments
Operations Department OPS-1.1
Standards and Leadership
Operations Department OPS-1.2
Standards and Leadership
Operations Department OPS-1.4
Standards and Leadership
Operations Department OPS-1.6
Standards and Leadership
Operations Department OPS-1.7
Standards and Leadership
Operations Department OPS-2.2
Standards and Leadership
100 Operations Department OPS-3.1
Standards and Leadership
101 Operations Department OPS-3.2
Standards and Leadership
2 Operations Department OPS-4.1
Standards and Leadership
103 Operations Department OPS-4.2
Standards and Leadership
104 Risk Recognition and RRDM-
Decision Making 1.1
Line Area Action Plan CAL Item Inspection Report Number Closed
Item
105 Risk Recognition and RRDM-
Decision Making 1.2
106 Risk Recognition and RRDM-
Decision Making 1.3
107 Risk Recognition and RRDM-
Decision Making 2.1
108 Risk Recognition and RRDM-
Decision Making 3.1
109 Risk Recognition and RRDM-
Decision Making 3.2
110 Risk Recognition and RRDM-
Decision Making 3.3
111 Risk Recognition and RRDM-
Decision Making 4.3
2 Risk Recognition and RRDM-
Decision Making 4.8
113 Risk Recognition and RRDM-
Decision Making 4.9
114 Procedure Quality PQ-1.1 Reviewed - 05000293/2017010 N
115 Procedure Quality PQ-2.1 05000293/2017010 Y
116 Procedure Quality PQ-2.2 05000293/2017010 Y
117 Procedure Quality PQ-3.1 05000293/2017010 Y
118 Procedure Quality PQ-3.2 05000293/2017010 Y
119 Procedure Quality PQ-3.3 05000293/2017010 Y
20 Procedure Quality PQ-5.1 05000293/2017010 Y
21 Procedure Quality PQ-5.2 Reviewed - 05000293/2017010 N
2 SRV White Finding SRV-1.1 05000293/2018010 Y
23 SRV White Finding SRV-1.2 05000293/2018010 Y
24 SRV White Finding SRV-1.3 05000293/2017010 Y
25 SRV White Finding SRV-2.1 05000293/2017010 Y
26 SRV White Finding SRV-3.1 05000293/2018010 Y
27 SRV White Finding SRV-3.2 05000293/2018010 Y
28 SRV White Finding SRV-3.3 05000293/2018010 Y
29 SRV White Finding SRV-3.4 05000293/2018010 Y
130 SRV White Finding SRV-4.1 05000293/2018010 Y
131 SRV White Finding SRV-5.1 05000293/2018010 Y
2 SRV White Finding SRV-5.2 05000293/2018010 Y
133 Engineering Programs EP-1.1 05000293/2017010 Y
134 Engineering Programs EP-1.2
135 Engineering Programs EP-2.1
136 Engineering Programs EP-2.2
137 Engineering Programs EP-2.3
138 Engineering Programs EP-2.4
Line Area Action Plan CAL Item Inspection Report Number Closed
Item
139 Engineering Programs EP-3.1
140 Engineering Programs EP-4.1
141 Equipment Reliability ER-1.1 05000293/2017010 Y
2 Equipment Reliability ER-1.2 05000293/2017010 Y
143 Equipment Reliability ER-1.3
144 Equipment Reliability ER-2.1
145 Equipment Reliability ER-2.2
146 Equipment Reliability ER-3.1
147 Equipment Reliability ER-3.2
148 Equipment Reliability ER-3.3
149 Work Management WM-1.1
150 Work Management WM-1.2
151 Work Management WM-1.3
2 Work Management WM-2.1
153 Work Management WM-2.2
154 Work Management WM-3.1
155 Work Management WM-3.3
156 Work Management WM-4.2