ML20214J558

Forwards Summary of 870416 Enforcement Conference W/Util at Region II Ofc Re Insp Repts 50-369/87-04,50-370/87-04, 50-413/87-06,50-414/87-06,50-413/87-08 & 50-414/87-08.List of Attendees & Viewgraphs Also Encl

ML20214J558
Person / Time
Site:	Mcguire, Catawba, McGuire, 05000000
Issue date:	05/11/1987
From:	Grace J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	Tucker H DUKE POWER CO.
References
NUDOCS 8705280104
Download: ML20214J558 (68)

See also: IR 05000369/1987004

Text

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1

Docket Nos. 50-413, 50-414

License Nos. NPF-35, NPF-52 g jg

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'

uke Power Company

2

ATTN: Mr. H. B. Tucker, Vice President

Nuclear Production Department

422 South Church Street

Charlotte, NC 28242

l

1 Gentlemen:

,

SUBJECT: MEETING SUMMARY OF EflFORCEMENT CONFERENCE - NRC INSPECTION REPORT

50-369/87-15, 50-370/87-15, 50-414-/87-15 REGARDING NRC INSPECTION

REPORT NOS. 50-369/87-04, 50-370/87-04, 502413/87-06, 50-414/87-06,

50-413/87-08, AND 50-414/87-08

This refers to a meeting held or: April 16, 1987, at the Nuclear Regulatory

'

Comissicn's (NRC) Region II Office in Atlanta, Georgia. The subject of this

meeting was contained in Inspection Report Nos. 50-369/87-04, 50-370/87-04,

50-413/87-06, 50-414/87-06, 50-413/87-08, and 50-414/87-08 which concerned

inoperability of containment spray system at McGuire and Catawba, Power

'

Operated Relief Valves operability and testing at Catawba, and containment air

return system inoperability on both the McGuire and Catawba facilities.

Enclosed is a meeting sumary including a list of attendees, a sumary of ,

! issues discussed, and an outline of the information presented by Duke Power

Company regarding specific issues discussed.

! In accordance with Section 2.790 of NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2,

Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclosure

i will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

Should you have any questions concerning these matters, we will be pleased to

discuss them.

Sincerely,

IRG;MAE SIGNED Irh

3.HELSC:!0:3

J. Nelson Grace

Regional Administrator

Enclosure:

Meeting Sumary w/ attachments

Sc w/ encl: ,

/J. W. Hampton, Station Manager, Catawba

f. L. McConnell, Station Manager, McGuire

!

$33000 5

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-

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Duke Power Company 2 I? 11 IT7

bec w/ encl:

v'K. N. Jabbour, NRR

/RCResidentInspectors

/ Catawba and McGuire

Document Control Desk

State of South Carolina

RII RII , RI RII

T eebles:jt B oriser

'

.R es st

5/4/87 5/f/87 /)5/ /87 5/') /87

, __ __ -. _ . . _ _

,

,

ENCLOSURE

i

MEETING SUMMARY

On April 16, 1987, representatives of Duke Power Company (DPC) met with the NRC

at the NRC's request in the NRC Region II Office in Atlanta Georgia. The

> topics of discussion were the operability of the Containment Spray system (NS)

at McGuire and Catawba, the operability of the Containment Air Return Fan

systems (VX) at McGuire and Catawba, and the operability and testing of the

Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) at Catawba. The list of those attending

is in Attachment 1.

DPC gave a presentation which consisted of an evaluation of the specific

concerns that the NRC had requested to be discussed. The evaluation entailed

l an assessment of the sequence of events, root causes, corrective actions, and

l safety significance of each issue.

The outline of the evaluation is embodied herein as Attachments 2, 3, 4, and 5.

The NRC is presently considering enforcement action on these issues. This

meeting served to enhance Region II's understanding of the issues and DPC's

plans to preclude recurrence of similar problems.

Attachments:

1. List of Attendees at the McGuire,

Catawba Enforcement Conference and Agenda

2. Operability of the McGuire Nuclear

Station Containment Spray System

3. Inoperability of Containment Air

Return Fans at the McGuire/ Catawba

Nuclear Stations

, 4. Operability of the Containment Spray

System at Catawba Nuclear Station

5. Operability and Testing of PORVs at

the Catawba Nuclear Station

1

ATTACHMENT 1

LIST OF ATTENDEES AT THE MCGUIRE, CATAWBA ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE

April 16, 1987

Name Title Organization

T. A. Peebles Acting Branch Chief Nuclear Regulatory Commission

N. Rutherford Sys. Engr. Licensing Duke Power Company

B. L. Peele Principal Engineer Duke Power Company

R. F. Wardell Supt. Tech. Svs. Duke Power Company, Catawba

C. L. Hartzell Compliance Eng. Duke Power Company, Catawba

B. Travis Supt. of Operations Duke Power Company, McGuire

P. Kim VanDoorn SRI-Catawba Nuclear Regulatory Commission

M. S. Lesser RI Catawba Nuclear Regulatory Commission

B. Uryc Enforcement Coordinator Nuclear Regulatory Commission

R. J. Goddard Regional Counsel Nuclear Regulatory Commission

E. O. McCraw Compliance Engineer Duke Power Power, McGuire

H. J. Lee Design Engineering-G. O. Duke Power Company, G. 0.

M. D. McIntosh General Manager Duke Power Company, G. O.

H. B. Tucker VP Nuclear Production Duke Power Compa'1y, G. O.

V. L. Brownlee Acting Deputy Director Nuclear Regulatory Commission

M. L. Ernst Deputy Regional Administrator Nuclear Regulatory Commission

L. Trocine Enforcement Specialist Nuclear Regulatory Commission

F. Jape TPS Div. of Reactor Safety Nuclear Regulatory Commission

R. O. Sharpe Nuclear Engineer-Licensing Duke Power Company

T. L. McConnell Station Manager /MNS Duke Power Company

G. R. Jenkins Director, EICS Nuclear Regulatory Commission

W. T. Orders Sr. Res. McGuire Nuclear Regulatory Commission

AGENDA

DUKE /NRC ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE

APRIL 16, 1987

Introduction J. N. Grace /M. L. Ernst

H. B. Tucker

(1) McGuire NS/SSPS B. Travis

Sequence of Events

Previous Evente

Root Causes

Corrective Action

Safety Significance

Summary T. L. McConnell

(2) H

McGuire E. O. McCraw

Sequence of Events

Rooc Causes

Corrective Action

Catawba

Sequence of Events C. L. Hartzell

Corrective Action (CNS) C. L. Hartzell

Root Causes B. L. Peele

Corrective Action (DED) B. L. Peele

Safety Assessment H. J. Lee

Summary M. D. McIntosh

(3) Catawba NS System Operability R. F. Wardell

Sequence of Events

Corrective Action

Root Causes

Corrective Action

Safety Significance

(4) Catawba PORV Upgrade

Sequence of Events C. L. Hartzell

Corrective Action C. L. Hartzell

Root Causes B. L. Peele

Corrective Action B. L. Peele

Safety Significance H. J. Lee i

Closing Remarks H. B. Tucker ,

L. A. Reyes

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ATTACHMENT 2

OPERABILITY OF MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM

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SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

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12/30/86

0839 SOLID STATE PROTECTION SYSTEM (SSPS) TRAIN 'B'

LOGGED INOPERABLE FOR SURVElLLANCE TESTING BY

CONTROL ROOM (CR) SRO.

0900 PRIOR TO STARTING THE TEST, PERFORMANCE PERSONNEL

LOGGED IN PT/1/A/4208/03A [ CONTAINMENT SPRAY (NS)

1A HEAT EXCHANGE PT] WITH CR RO. PERFORMANCE

PERSONNEL DID NOT CONFER WITH THE CR SRO.

0931 CR SRO WAS NOTIFIED BY UNIT 1 RO THAT POWER HAD

JUST BEEN REMOVED FROM 'A' TRAIN NS CONTAINMENT

ISOLATION VALVES AS PART OF NS HEAT REMOVAL TEST

AND THAT 'A' TRAIN NS WAS INOPERABLE. THE UNIT 1

RO ASSUMED THAT PERFORMANCE PERSONNEL HAD DISCUSSED

THIS TEST WITH CR SRO BUT IN FACT THEY-HAD NOT.

CR SRO LOGGED 'A' TRAIN NS INOPERABLE.

UNIT 1 RO AND CR SRO DISCUSSED THE SSPS TRAIN 'B'

TEST AND CR SRO CONCLUDED THAT THE OPERABILITY OF

TRAIN 'B' NS WAS NOT AFFECTED. THIS.WAS BASED ON

THE FACT THAT THE UNIT 1 RO HAD PREVIOUSLY

CONCLUDED THAT NS TRAIN OPERABILITY WAS NOT

AFFECTED BY THE SSPS TEST FROM AN EARLIER GENERAL

CONSERVATION WITH INSTRUMENT AND ELECTRICAL (IAE)

PERSONNEL.

AFTER THE ABOVE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE UNIT 1 RO

AND CR SRO, THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR NOTICED BOTH

SSPS TRAIN 'B' AND NS TRAIN 'A' LOGGED INOPERABLE.

HE QUESTIONED THE CR SRO ABOUT THIS AND WAS GIVEN

ASSURANCE THAT 'B' TRAIN NS OPERABILITY WOULD NOT

BE AFFECTED BY THE SSPS TEST BEING PERFORMED.

1010 SSPS TRAIN 'B' WAS RETURNED TO OPERABLE UPON

COMPLETION OF THE SURVEILLANCE TESTING.

1447 NS TRAIN 'A' WAS RETURNED TO OPERABLE UPON

COMPLETION OF PERFORMANCE TESTING.

1/14/87 LATER REVIEW WITH THE TECHNICAL STAFF AND NRC

RESIDENT INSPECTOR DETERMINED THAT THE SSPS

SURVEILLANCE TEST MADE THE NS SYSTEM INOPERABLE.

BOTH TRAINS OF NS WERE INOPERABLE FOR 39 MINUTES.

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PREVIOUS EVENT

03/12/86 * TRAIN B NS PUMP DECLARED INOPERABLE FOR

PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE

• TRAIN A SSPS DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO

PERIODIC TESTING.

• ALTHOUGH BOTH TRAINS WERE' LOGGED, TRAIN A SSPS

WAS NOT REMOVED FROM SERVICE. THEREFORE, TWO

TRAINS OF NS WERE NEVER ACTUALLY INOPERABLE.

INOPERABILITY WAS PREVENTED BY A MORE IN DEPTH

EVALUATION BY THE UNIT ASSISTANT OPERATING

ENGINEER WORKING WITH THE NRC RESIDENT

INSPECTOR.

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ROOT CAUSES

(1) THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL TO ENSURE THAT

THE PERFORMANCE PERSONNEL CONTACTED THE CR SRO PRIOR TO

BEGINNING THE NS TEST.

(2) THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE UNIT 1 RO,

THE IAE TECHNICIAN, AND THE CR SRO CONCERNING THE SSPS

TESTING AND INSUFFICIENT COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE UNIT 1 RO,

THE PERFORMANCE TECHNICIAN, AND THE CR SRO CONCERNING THE NS

TESTING.

(3) THE CR SRO WAS A SHIFT SUPERVISOR WHO HAD BEEN ON LOAN TO THE

TECHNICAL TRAINING CENTER FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE (1) YEAR AS A

SIMULATOR INSTRUCTOR. HE WAS FULFILLING HIS LICENSE

REQUIREMENT TO SPEND ONE 12-HOUR SHIFT PER QUARTER IN A

LICENSED CAPACITY. BECAUSE HE HAD BEEN AWAY FROM THE PLANT

FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE (1) YEAR, HE RELIED MORE HEAVILY ON THE

VETERAN CONTROL ROOM RO.

(4) THE OPERATING SCHEDULE WAS NOT ADHERED TO DURING THIS

'

INCIDENT, 'A' AND B' TRAIN SYSTEMS ARE NOT NORMALLY TESTED

ON THE SAME DAY.

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CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

TO PREVENT THE INCIDENT FROM OCCURRING AGAIN:

(1) THE PERFORMANCE PERIODIC TEST PROCEDURE WAS CHANGED TO

REQUIRE OPERATIONS SRO SIGNOFF PRIOR TO BEGINNING THE

TEST.

(2) THE INCIDENT IS BEING COVERED IN LICENSED OPERATOR

REQUAL TRAINING EMPHASIZING COMMUNICATION / AUTHORITY WITH

ALL LICENSED OPERATORS, BOTH ROs AND SROs.

. (3) TRAINING AND STAFF LICENSED PERSONNEL ARE NO LONGER

PERMITTED TO MAKE AN OPERABILITY DETERMINATION

INDEPENDENTLY. OPERABILITY DETERMINATIONS BY TRAINING

INSTRUCTORS AND STAFF SROs MUST BE MADE WITH THE

CONCURRENCE OF A REGULAR SHIFT SRO.

(4) (A) McGUIRE IS CURRENTLY DEVELOPING A METHOD OF

IDENTIFYING " OPERATING SCHEDULE" ITEMS THAT ARE ON

THE "DAI LY WORK SCHEDULE" OF THE INDIVIDUAL CREW

SUPERVISORS. (THE STATION " OPERATING SCHEDULE" IS

A SUBGROUP OF ALL DAILY WORK SCHEDULES OF THE

INDIVIDUAL SUPERVISORS AND INCLUDES ITEMS THAT

AFFECT MORE THAN ONE AREA / GROUP AND ALL TECHNICAL

SPECIFICATION WORK ACTIVITIES.)

(B) STATION SUPERVISORS WHO DEVIATE FROM THE ACTIVITIES

SCHEDULED ON THE OPERATING SCHEDULE ARE TO NOTIFY

THE SHIFT ENGINEER ON DUTY AND HE WILL EVALUATE THE

IMPACT ON TECH SPEC COMPLIANCE AND STATION

OPERATION.

(C) WITH THIS ADDITIONAL EMPHASIS ON THE OPERATING

SCHEDULE, ON TIME COMPLETION OF " OPERATING

SCHEDULE" ACTIVITIES HAS INCREASED FROM ,

I

APPROXIMATELY 75% TO GREATER THAN 90%.

I (5) LICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING ON THE NEW NUCLEAR PRODUCTION

DEPARTMENT " OPERABILITY DIRECTIVE" WILL BEGIN IN I

!

MAY, 1987.

(6) LICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING ON THE ENGINEERED SAFETY

FEATURE (ESF) VALVE STUDY IS IN PROGRESS.

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(7) LICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING ON SELECTED " CASE STUDIES" OF

APPLICABLE INDUSTRY INCIDENT REPORTS INVOLVING TECH SPEC

VIOLATIONS AND TRAINING ON SELECTED STATION TECH SPEC

INTERPRETATIONS WILL BEGIN IN MAY, 1987.

(8) STATION MANAGEMENT MET WITH ALL LINE AND STAFF

MANAGEMENT TO RE-EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF AN IN-DEPTH

EVALUATION OF TECH SPEC ITEMS POTENTIALLY AFFECTING

OPERABILITY. A SEPARATE SESSION WAS HELD WITH THE

OPERATIONS SHIFT SUPERVISORS TO FURTHER EMPHASIZE THE

IMPORTANCE OF THIS ISSUE.

(9) A MANUAL LOGIC MODEL OF TECH SPECS IS BEING DEVELOPED

AND IS PARTIALLY IMPLEMENTED. FULL IMPLEMENTATION WILL

BE COMPLETE BY JULY, 1987.

(10) THE CORRECTIVE ACTION FOR THE PREVIOUS INCIDENT ON

3/12/86 WAS TO COVER THE INCIDENT IN A SHIFT

SUPERVISORS' MEETING HELD ON 4/4/86. SIMULATOR AND

CLASSROOM INSTRUCTORS DO NOT ATTEND THE SHIFT

SUPERVISORS' MEETING AND THEREFORE, THE INCIDENT WAS NOT

COVERED WITH THE INDIVIDUAL INVOLVED.

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SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

NONE

• 'B' TRAIN NS COULD HAVE BEEN MANUALLY STARTED FROM THE

CONTROL ROOM. ONLY THE AUTO SIGNAL WAS BLOCKED BY SSPS.

EMERGENCY PROCEDURES WOULD HAVE REQUIRED MANUALLY STARTING

NS.

• 'A' TRAIN NS COULD HAVE BEEN STARTED WITH THE BREAKERS FOR

NS 29A & 32A CLOSED (IEMXA 4C, 4D)

• BOTH TRAINS WERE INOPERABLE FOR 39 MINUTES. STANDARDlZED

TECH SPECS ALLOWS BOTH TRAINS OF NS TO BE INOPERABLE FOR

ONE (1) HOUR.

• THE TECH SPEC ENTRY AT 0839 FOR SSPS TRAIN 'B' TESTING

REQUIRED UNIT SHUTDOWN IF TESTING WAS NOT COMPLETE BY 1039.

IF THIS OCCURRED, THE PLANT WOULD HAVE STARTED SHUTDOWN 68

MINUTES AFTER BOTH TRAINS OF NS WERE INOPERABLE, 8 MINUTES

LONGER THAN ALLOWED BY TECH SPECS.

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.

SOLID STATE PROTECTION SYSTE M

TRAIN A 04TPUT ROD CONTROL

^ ^ SYSTIB4

1 HASTER & St. AVE

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CONTROL I-'~~--~~~~--~~~7*- CONTROL

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MASTER & SLAVE

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TRAIN 8 OUTPUT NC-IC-IPE-6 lDATE: 6-20-83

REF. l

DRAWN ARB l APP. CEM

TRAINING USE ONI.Y

REVISION 8

1

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HANUAL

S.R. HICH !IDX

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HICH FIDX (HICil S.P.) O "

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IDW PRESSURE

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LO-ID S/C LEVEL N

INPUTS 3

SAFETY INJECTION

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-

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RX TRIP ON TURBINE TRIP

,

.

)S2RTA ) 52BTA

4

ROD bRIVE POWER SUPPLY

MC-IC-IPE-19 lDATE: 6-20-83

REACTOR PROTECTION 1. REACTOR TRIP LOGIC DWC. REF. FSAR VOL. 7 l

SYSTt21 (IPE) 2. DURING TEST ONE BYB BKR. IS IN FERVICE, AND THE RESPECTIVE RTB BKR. IS DRAWN NVS l APP.WC

OPER. USING A SIMULATED REACTOR TRIP SIGNAt; IN THE TRAIN UNDER TEST. TRAINING USE ONLY

.. REVISION 8

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April 7, 1987

MEMORANDUM

TO: All Licensed Operators

SUBJECT: Logging of Technical Specification Items

In order to improve our tracking of inoperable Technical Specification

equipment, some additional guidance is being given in this memo and in a

revision to Operations Management Procedure 2-5. The revision to OMP 2-5

Section 7.1.0 states:

"Any system or component which is made inoperable by taking one of its

support systems (instrumentation, controls, electrical power, cooling or

seal water, lubrication or other required auxiliary equipment) out of

service shall also be logged. However in this case only the support

system itself needs to have all entries completed. For the systems

affected, they need only be listed in the component / system column beneath

the support system. No item number will be assigned to them or any other

entries (i.e., date/ time inoperable, reason for removal, etc.) made for

them. Example: If the "1A" RN Pump is declared inoperable, the RN Pump

would be logged inoperable with all entries for it completed. Below the

entry for RN, in the component / system column, the following A train

equipment would be listed: DG, NS, KC, ND, NI, NV, CA, VC/YC (if

applicable)."

Operations procedure and training group is developing some " Guidelines for

Inoperability" that will help in consistently logging what systems are affected

by incperable support systems. Three examples of those guidelines are given as

enclosures to this memo: the nuclear service water system, the emergency

diesel generators, and the solid state protection system.

The remaining " Guidelines for Inoperability" will be developed by July 1, 1987

and maintained as a controlled document either as part of the technical

specification reference manual or as a new Operations Management Procedure.

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. Memorandum to Licsns d Opnrators

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. ' Pag 2 2

,

April 7, 1987

.

Effective immediately, logging of Tech Spec items should be consistent with

these examples given and the revision of OMP 2-5, Section 7.1.D. We will have

" rubber stamps" made for the three systems given as examples because of the

large number of systems supported; but in the interim, this logging will be

done manually. An information copy of " Guidelines for Inoperability" will be

maintained at the SRO desk for either unit. As Operations training and the

procedure group develop additional guidelines, they will be included in the

information copy until July 1, 1987 when the guidelines will be officially

issued as a controlled docilment as stated previously.

Any questions concerning how items should be logged or the new " Guidelines for

Inoperability" should be referred to Louie Massey. Thank you for your support

in making these changes.

C

WlS

Bruce Travis

Superintendent of Operations

.

McGuire Nuclear Station

RBT/sct

cc: T. L. McConnell B. G. Addis

B. H. Hamilton E. O. McCraw

W. M. Sample W. T. Orders

D. J. Rains P. F. 9.2

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GUIDELINES FOR INOPERABILITY

RN SYSTEM - Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4

DIRECTLY: 3.7.4 (RN System)

INDIRECTLY: 3.1.2.2 (Boration Flow Paths - NV System)

3.1.2.4 (Charging Pumps - NV System)

• 3.5.2 (ECCS - NV, NI, ND System)

3.6.2 (NS)

• • 3.7.1.2 (CA System)

3.7.3 (KC System)

3.7.6 (VC/YC System - IF aligned to affected RN train)

3.8.1.1 (DG)

NOTES: An operability PT must be performed for the operable DG and

offsite power sources within I hour.

• Modes 1, 2, 3 - for Mode 4, 3.5.3 (ECCS - NV, ND System) is applicable.

• • Modes 1, 2, 3 only.

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GUIDELINES FOR INOPERABILITY

SSPS Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4

DIRECTLY: 3.3.2.1.a and 1.b (ESF - Manual and Auto Initiation)

INDIRECTLY: 3.5.2 (ECCS)'

3.6.1.8 (VE)

3.6.2 (NS)

3.6.3 (Containment Isolation)

• 3.6.5.6 (VX)

3.7.1.2 (CA)

3.7.3 (KC)

3.7.4 (RN)

3.7.6 (VC/YC)

3.7.7 (VA)

3.8.1.1 (DG)

,

NOTE: (1) All inoperable components on the train opposite to the SSPS

train (being declared inoperable) should be evaluated to

determine if they receive a signal via SSPS. If they do

receive a signal, then both trains of that system should be

declared inoperable.

(2) An operability PT does NOT need to be performed on the opposite

diesel and offsite power sources within one (1) hour for SSPS

surveillance testing per discussions with the NRC.

• Modes 1, 2 only.

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GUIDELINES FOR INOPERABILITY

Diesel Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4

Generator

DIRECTLY: 3.8.1.1 (AC Sources)

• 3.7.1.2 (CA System)

INDIRECTLY: NI System

NV System

ND System

KC System

RN System

VC/YC System

VA System

VE System

, NS System

VX System

Containment Isolation System

• • Hydrogen Recombiner

• Pressurizer Heater Group

600V Essential Power

,

• • Hydrogen Mitigation System

• • Hydrogen Monitor

Vital Battery Charger

NOTES: An operability PT must be performed for the operable diesel

generator and offsite power sources within I hour.

Ensure Vital Battery Chargers are capable of being powered from

,

an operable diesel generator within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. Power supplies

+

should be swapped as necessary.

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• Modes 1, 2, 3 only

• • ' Modes 1, 2 only

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ATTACHMENT 3

IN0PERABILITY OF CONTAINMENT AIR RETURN FANS

AT THE MCGUIRE/ CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATIONS

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CATAWBA

NUCLEAR STATION

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VIOLATION

413/87-06-01

414/87-06-01

Inoperability Of .

Containment Air Return

And Hydrogen Skimmer Systems

Since l

Initial Required Operation i

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T.S.3.6.5.6

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.. . . .. . . - . _ _ _ _ _ _ .

'

-

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.

_

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i

.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS  !

1

30 January,1987

1805 - Catawba notified of potential VX Dam prob-

lem. Unit 1 at 100X Power, Unit 2 in Mode 3

1810 - Confirmed absence of required Dame around

Fan openings. Declared Fans inoperable on

both Units.

1709 - Commenced Unit 1 shutdown as required by

i

Technical Specifcations.

1715 - Declared Unusual Event IAW RP/0/A/5000

l /001

2230 - Commenced installation of required Curb

Dame.

2235 - Completed Unit 1 Shutdown.

31 January,1987

0915 - Completed installation of Dame on Unit 1.

Secured from Unusual Event and exited T/8

Action Statement.

!

1825 - Completed installation of Dams on Unit 2.

Exlted T/8 Action Statement

_ - - . _

.- _ - _ - _ . . _ - -

- -. - . . . . . . .- -

• '

. . . .

- - . .

,

,

'

i

s

INOPERABILITY OF CONTAINMENT

AIR RETURN FANS DUE TO MISSING CURB -

DAMS-AROUND FLOOR OPENING

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

'

14 JAN Nuclear Production Licensing Received call from

Region II identifying Fan Pit Drainage problem at

TVA plant.

' l-6 JAN Catawba personnel verified that drain lines were .

'

installed to carry off water entering fan pits and

shutoff valves were open.

,

,

! Problem Investigation Report (1-C87-0009) initiated

>

to follow up on potential problem of drain capacity

and control of shutoff valve position.

29 JAN Catawba was contacted'that evening to examine if

curbing was installed at Catawba Nuclear Station.

No curbing was found by shift personnel doing the

investigation.

30 JAN Design Engineering review shows no curb dams-around

VX fan opening on CNS Design drawings. Review-

started to determine need for curb dams at. Catawba ,

based on design parameters.

~1500 Nuclear Production Licensing notified that

absence of curb dams compromised fan operability.

1505 Catawba notified of potential VX problem by NPD

Licensing personnel. Unit one.at 100% power. Unit

two in Mode 3. Containment entry made to verify

the specified curb dams are in fact missing.

1610 Both trains of VX on Units 1 and 2 were declared

3

inoperable, both units entered Technical

, Specification 3.0.3, Unit 1 was at 100% power.and

Unit 2 was in Mode 3. Project Services initiated

Exempt Change Variation Notices CE-1108 and 1109 to

4 construct and install the curb dams. Project

i

Services and construction and Maintenance

Department (CMD) personnel began scoping the job

and started prefabrication for the modification.

i

1700 NRC Region II granted extensions to the action

times allowed by Technical Specification 3.0.3.

Unit 1 would be allowed to stay in Mode 3 until

!

.~ - , , _ , _ - - . . . . , . - . _ _ . - - .__.- - - --. ..-- , . . _ - - - . _ _ . , _ . .. - < . . . _ , _ , ,

_ _ _ _ _ _ ___-

• '

.. . . .

-

.

,

,,

0800 January 31, 1987. Unit 2 would be allowed to

stay in Mode 3 until 1800, January 31, 1987. Unit

2 would then have 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> to be in Mode 5.

1709 ' Commenced Unit 1 shutdown in accordance with

Technical Specifications. Shutdown rate was ~17%

per hour.

1715 Declared Unusual event on Unit 1 in accordance with

RP/0/A/5000/001 " Classification of Emergency" due

to both trains of a safety system being inoperable

with a shutdown with intent to enter Mode 3 in

progress. Unit 2 was already in Mode 3, therefore

no Unusual Event was required.

1728 Operations initiated NRC Notification of Unusual

Event.

1732 Operations initiated Notification of Unusual Event

to local government agencies.

2230 Unit 1 entered Mode 2. Design engineering gave

verbal signature approval of the Exempt Change

Variations Notices. Work was started to install

the required curb dams on Unit 1 and Unit 2.

2235. Unit i entered Mode 3

31 JAN

0915 Unit 1 modification to install the required curbs

was completed and the VX system was declared

operable. Unit 1 exited Technical specification 3.0.3 and the Unusual Event was secured.

1625 Unit 2 modification to install the required curbs

was completed and the VX system was declared

operable. Unit 2 exited Technical specification 3.03.

.

- _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _

-. . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ __

-

. .

.

'

,

.

!

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

.

l

-

Installed 6 inch floor dams around VX Fan  !

floor openings on both Unit 1 and 2.

-

A study of safety significant civil and

structural design features within containment

will be completed by Design and provided to

NPD personnel. ,

.

-

8tation Management will use the above study

to develop any necessary procedures to on- l

sure passive safety features are in place.

-

Station Pre-Mode Four Checklist

will be revised by June 1987 to verify Air

Return Fan Curbs are installed. ,

!

-

A Routine Work Request will be

developed by June 1987 to remove and j

reinstall fan curbs for refusiing outages. l

I

l

l

_.. _ .

. . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _

__

- *

.. .

. .

<

,.

COMMENTS ON VIOLATION 413/87-06-01, 414/87-06-1:

INOPERABILITY OF CONTAINMENT AIR RETURN AND HYDROGEN SKIMMER s

i

SYSTEMS SINCE INITIAL REQUIRED OPERATION - T.S. 3.6.5.6

<

t

1. The initial reason for examining the VX system was a ,

~'

NRC request to look at the Fan Pit Drains. This

violation was identified by Duke Power Company as a

result of a more indepth investigation of the design of

the system installation.

2. Upon discovery of the inoperable condition the

appropriate Technical Specification Action Statement

was promptly entered and the NRC notified o$ the

situation. All required actions were followed and the

deficiency was corrected on both units within 25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />

of discovery.

3. The Corrective Actions which are being taken go beyond

installation of the required curb dams. New and ll

revised procedures along with a Design study to highten

awareness of passive safety functions will minimize the

likelihood of future occurrences. s,

l

.'

I

e

I

I

\

l

__. - -. ._ - .

.. . - - . - .

. .

. . .

-

.

.

.

.

.

GRATING 6" ANGLE HDR

PLATFORM CURB .

i

f 0PERATING FLOOR

'

EL. 778 + lO L . , . . . ,

. *

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. .. ., ..

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\ ANNULUS REFUELING

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CANAL

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DESIGN .'

'

ENGINEERING

1

DEPARTMENT

,

.

'

_

,

_______7-____

l I I

1 1 -

1

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- l- m -  ! - - J..-. -

( PROJECT e

CIVIL i

MECHANICAL / 1 ELECTRICAL I

l

I

MANAGEMENT

f ENVIRONMENTAL NUCLEAR I DIVISION 'Jl GENERAL

SERVICES

'

l DIVISION I DIVISION '

DIVISION l I DIVISION I

l I

l l I

- - - - - - - _ ,

l _ _. _ _ __ _ !_ __

i L_. i

,

t

6

8 9

.

.

- -

.

,

4

MCGUIRE AND CATAWBA CONTAINMENT AIR RETURN FANS

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

DESIGN ENGINEERING SCOPE

AUGUST, 1975 MECHANICAL LETTER REQUESTING 4" CURB AND DRAIN

IN FAN ROOM FOR MCGUIRE

MARCH, 1976 CIVIL DRAWINGS ISSUED SHOWING CURBS FOR MCGUIRE 1

NOVEMBER, 1976 CIVIL DRAWINGS ISSUED SHOWING CURBS FOR MCGUIRE 2

SEPTEMBER, 1978 MECHANICAL LETTER REQUESTING MCGUIRE CURBS BE

INCREASED FROM 4" To 6" IN HEIGHT, AND ADDING

DRAINS / CURBS FOR CATAWBA 1-2

OCTOBER, 1978 CIVIL LETTER TO MECHANICAL STATING CURBS AND DRAINS

HAVE BEEN PROVIDED IN THE MCGUIRE AND CATAWBA

DESIGNS

DECEMBER, 1978 CIVIL DRAWINGS ISSUED SHOWING DRAINS IN THE FAN

'

ROOM FOR CATAWBA 1-2

JANUARY, 1979 CIVIL DRAWINGS ISSUED SHOWING INCREASE IN HEIGHT

l

0F CURBS FOR MCGUIRE 1-2

JANUARY, 1987 TELECON FROM NRC ADVISING THAT TVA HAD IDENTIFIED

PROBLEM WITH FAN ROOM DRAINAGE

l

l

l

.

.

- -

. . . .

,

,

. .

,

MCGUIRE AND CATA'BA

W CONTAINMENT AIR RETURN FANS

ROOT CAUSE

' DESIGN ENGINEERING SCOPE

I

-

THE CIVIL DRAWINGS DETAILING THE CURBS FOR CATAWBA 1-2 WERE

INTENDED TO BE ISSUED, BUT WERE NOT

,

1

- ISOLATED CASE OF HUMAN ERROR: OVERSIGHT BY ENGINEER RESPONSIBLE

FOR THE WORK

- SAME ENGINEER WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR MCGUIRE AND CATAWBA CURBS AND

DRAINS

,

i

!

_- . - _ . _ _,

..

,- . .

i

MCGUIRE AND CATAWBA CONTAINMENT AIR RETURN FANS

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

DESIGN ENGINEERING SCOPE

IMMEDIATE

- CATAWBA CIVIL CONCRETE DRAWINGS REVISED TO SHOW CURBS

~

-

- CIVIL, ELECTRICAL, MECHANICAL CORRESPONDENCE FILES WERE REVIEWED

FOR A SIX-MONTH PERIOD CENTERED ON.9/1/78

e CHANGE OR ADDITION REQUESTS WERE.NOTED

e REQUESTS COMPARED AGAINST DRAWINGS

e N0 OTHER PROBLEMS WERE FOUND

SHORT TERM

- DESIGN STUDY IS BEING DEFINED TO DESCRIBE CIVIL DESIGN FEATURES

WITHIN CONTAINMENT WHICH ARE SAFETY-RELATED

LONG TERM

, -ENHANCEMENTS TO NSM PROCESS: "TOPFORM"

!

4

!

!

!

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _

-

- -

. .

.

.

AIR RETURN FAN INOPERABILITY SAFETY ANALYSIS

DESIGN BASIS CONTAINMENT ANALYSES

DESIGN BASIS CONTAINMENT ANALYSES CAN BE DIVIDED INTO TWO CATEGORIES:

1) SHORT TERM (0-10 SECONDS) ANALYZED WITH TMD

2) LONG TERM (10+ SECONDS) ANALYZED WITH LOTIC

FANS ARE ACTUATED AT 911 tilNUTES (10 MINUTES ASSUMED IN ANALYSES)

SO ONLY LONG TERM ANALYSES WITH LIMITING CONDITION AFTER THIS TIME

ARE AFFECTED

LONG TERM ANALYSES: -

1) PEAK CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE

2) PEAK REVERSE DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE (UPPER > LOWER)

3) MINIMUM CONTAINMENT PRESSURE

4) PEAK CONTAINMENT PRESSURE

,

h

--, r.

-. . _ _ . . . _ _

-

- -

. . .

-

. .

.

f

'

AIR RETURN FAN INOPERABILITY SAFETY ANALYSIS

'

LONG TERM CONTAINMENT ANALYSES

ANALYSES TIME OF LIMITING CONDITION.(SEC)

McGUIRE CATAWBA

i PEAK CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE 158.5 127

PEAK REVERSE DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE 48 50

I

MINIMUM CONTAINMENT PRESSURE 80 (130) 100 (100)

i PEAK CONTAINMENT PRESSURE 6730 6920

1

-

1

I

I

i

3

i,

3

,

i

. - , - . . -- - - . - , ,, - - . - . - - . . - , . . . . - - - - - . - . , , . . - . . . - - - , -

2

-

. .

.. .

-

s , ,

4

l

CONTAINMENT l

AIR RETURN SYSTEM

'

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

JAN. 14 -

NRC REGION 11 CONTACTED DUKE POWER G.O.

LICENSING PERSONNEL ABOUT A TVA PROBLEM

CONCERNING THE LACK OF CONTAINMENT AIR RETURN

FAN PIT DRAINS.

JAN. 14-16 -

DUKE INITIATED A REVIEW OF DRAWINGS BOTH

CIVIL AND MECHANICAL. FLOOR DRAINS, VALVES

AND PIPING WERE INDICATED ON THE DRAWINGS

(McGUIRE AND CATAWBA).

JAN. 16 A.M. -

VIRGIL BROWNLEE WAS ADVISED THAT THE DRAINS

WERE SHOWN ON THE DRAWINGS AND THE STATIONS

(McGUIRE AND CATAWBA) WOULD VERIFY

INSTALLATION OF THE DRAINS AND VALVES AND THAT

THEY WERE OPERABLE.

P.M. -

A VISUAL INSPECTION WAS CONDUCTED TO VERIFY

THE DRAINS AND VALVES WERE OPERABLE (McGUlRE

AND CATAWBA).

AT DUKE'S INITIATIVE, A PROBLEM INVESTIGATION

REPORT WAS INITIATED (McGUIRE AND CATAWBA) TO

PERFORM A MORE IN-DEPTH INVESTIGATION ON THE

SIZING OF THE DRAINS AND OTHER DESIGN

CRITERIA.

JAN. 30 -

DESIGN ENGINEERING AND STATION PERSONNEL

PERFORM AN INSPECTION IN BOTH UNIT 1 AND 2

UPPER CONTAINMENTS AND DISCOVER WATER CURBS

NOT INSTALLED.

. ._ _ ._ . . - _.

-

- -

.. . ..

-

. .

,

1

AIR RETURN FAN IN0PERABILITY SAFETY ANALYSIS

RESULTS

McGUIRE CATAWBA

. DESIGN PRESSURE 15.0 15.0

T.S. PRESSURE FOR LEAK RATE TESTING 14.8 14.68

.

1986 FSAR ANALYSIS RESULT 13.59 14.35

AIR RETURN FAN INOPERADILITY 14.6 13.9

2

.

9

1

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'

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. . .

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.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

• DESIGN ENGINEERING WILL PROVIDE A LIST OF ALL CONTAINMENT

CIVIL STRUCTURES THAT PERFORM A PASSIVE SAFETY FUNCTION AND

DESCRIBE THEIR FUNCTION.

• STATION PERSONNEL WILL REVIEW THE LIST OF CIVIL

STRUCTURES / COMPONENTS PROVIDED BY DESIGN ENGINEERING TO

ENSURE APPROPRIATE PROCEDURES VERITY THE OPERABILITY OF THESE

STRUCTURES.

• EXISTING INSPECTION PROCEDURES OR NEW PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN

WRITTEN TO VERIFY THE WATER CURBS ARE INSTALLED PRIOR TO

ENTERING MODE 4, HOT SHUTDOWN.

A ROUTINE MAINTENANCE WORK REQUEST HAS BEEN GENERATED TO

REMOVE AND REINSTALL THE WATER CURBS BEFORE AND AFTER

REFUELING OUTAGES.

,

. . .

.

. . y

-

. .

_

s l

-

1

'

1420 - THE AIR RETURN FANS ON BOTH UNITS WERE

.

DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO THE MISSING WATER

CURBS.

1505 - NOTIFICATION OF CATAWBA WAS MADE.

.

1519 - A NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT WAS DECLARED

AND A LOAD REDUCTION WAS BEGUN ON UNITS 1 AND-

2 IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

1618 - NRC REGION ll GRANTED DISCRETIONARY

ENFORCEMENT ALLOWING AN 8 HOUR EXTENSION TO

~

THE ALLOWABLE OUTAGE TIME.

2320 - THE 8 HOUR EXTENSION EXPIRED REQUIRING

CONTINUED SHUTDOWN OF BOTH UNITS 1 AND 2.

JAN. 31 *0020 -

MAINTENANCE IS COMPLETED ON THE UNIT 2 WATER

CURBS. THE AIR RETURN FANS ARE DECLARED

OPERABLE.

, *0154 -

MAINTENANCE IS COMPLETED ON THE UNIT 1 WATER

CURBS. THE AIR RETURN FANS ARE DECLARED

OPERABLE.

ROOT CAUSE

THE WATER CURBS WERE REMOVED AND NOT REINSTALLED DUE TO INADEQUATE

ADMINISTRATIVE / PROCEDURAL CONTROLS. IT COULD NOT BE DETERMINED

WHEN THE WATER CURBS WERE REMOVED. THE FUNCTION OF THESE CURBS IS

NOT DESCRIBED IN THE BASE DOCUMENTS USED TO DEVELOP SAFETY RELATED

STATION PROCEDURES.

v.

,

. . . - .

-

.

.

.

AIR RETURN FAN INOPERABILITY SAFETY ANALYSIS

MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS

PEAK CONTAINMENT PRESSURE ANALYSIS IS IN FSAR SECTION 6.2.1.1.3.1-

CHANGES FROM THE LATEST FSAR ANALYSES ARE

1) REVISED HEAT SINK DATA

2) INNCREASED AUXILIARY CONTAINMENT SPRAY FLOW

3) INCREASED ICE MASS

4) DECREASED SERVICE WATER TEMPERATURE

5) INCREASED SERVICE WATER FLOWS

6) INCREASED HEAT EXCHANGER FOULING -

1) CALCULATIONS FROM LATE 1970s UPDATED - UNRELATED TO AIR RETURN

FAN INOPERABILITY

2) BASED ON McGUIRE STARTUP TESTS - UNRELATED TO AIR RETURN FAN

INOPERABILITY

3)-6) WORST HISTORICAL OBSERVED VALUES DURING IN0PERABILITY PERIOD

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _

-

..~-.

,

,

. -

.

.

SUMMARY

- ORIGINAL REGION II QUESTION WAS RESOLVED IN A TIMELY MANNER

- PROBLEM 0F MISSING CURBS WAS LATER IDENTIFIED BY DUKE

DURING FOLLOWUP REVIEW

- IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION WAS TAKEN TO FABRICATE AND

INSTALL CURBS

.

- FOLLOWUP CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN TO INSURE CURBS ARE

MAINTAINED

- ISOLATED INCIDENT

- DETAILED SAFFTY ANALYSIS DEMONSTRATED NO SAFETY

SIGNIFICANCE

.> .

.

e y

.

1E

,

ATTACHMENT 4

OPERABILITY OF THE CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM AT

CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION

.

, .. _-. _ _ . . . .. . - _ - .._. __

.

.

,- -; '

- ,

.

1

CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION

i CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM OPERABILITY-

-

.

! OUTLINE .

i

-SYSTEM DESIGN 'AND TESTING

.;

!

-SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

i

-ROOT CAUSE

!

1

-CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

'

-SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

~

t

.

i l

..

....

!

1

l

, .

!

'

.

1

- ., .. . - - , _ , - , . , , _ _ , . - - . , - , . . -. . - , - _ . . . - . _ , . - - . - . , _ . , , , . . . , - _ . . , . . , . . _ _ , . . _ . . - . . .

.

.  ; .

.

SYSTEM DESIGN AND TESTING

PURPOSE

-REMOVE CONTAINMENT HEAT POST-LOCA

-KEEP CONTAINMENT <15 PSIG AFTER ICE MELT

DESIGN

-TWO REDUNDANT 100% CAPACITY TRAINS

-TRAIN H AS PUMP, HX, TWO SPRAY HEADERS

-WATER SOURCE IS FWST

-RECIRCULATION FROM CONTAINMENT SUMP

-HX COOLED BY (RAW) NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER (RN)

TESTNG -

-OUARTERLY HEAT EXCH ANGE CAPACITY TEST

-TEST RUN B PERFORM ANCE

-FWST HEATED & RECIRCUL ATED

-RN OPER ATING NORM ALLY

-DATA

-NS INLET & QUTLET TEMPS

. . .

-NS FLOW

-RN INLET & OUTLET TEMPS

-RN FLOW

-- -

. _ . - _ _ . _ - - - , _. _ _ _ - - __ _

. . - . _ . . . -

~

.

.  ; ,

-PERFORM ANCE CALCULATES H/T COEFFS. (BOTH SIDES)

-DATA SENT TO DESIGN ENG FOR AN ALYSIS

-RESULTS SHOW PERCENTAGE OF DESIGN H/T COEFF.

AND CONCLUSION OF ACCEPTABILITY-

.

4

.

)

.,

4

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. . , . - - - ~ . . , - - , - - - - - - - . . , - - - - - . . . , - . . . -. . . - . . ., . . - , - - - -- . , _ . - _ - , , - . , . .

. - -

4

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.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

1/30/86 HEAT EXCH ANGER TESTING PROGRAM FOR FOULING BEG AN.

NS HX 2 A TESTED AT 86% DESIGN CAPACITY 9/86.

12/26/86 NS 2 A HX TESTED - DATA WAS SUSPECT BECAUSE

-lNCONSISTENT WITH TRENDS

-H/T DIFFERENT FOR TWO SIDES OF HX

1/2/87 NS 2A HX RETESTED - SIMILAR RESULTS. PERFORMANCE

DID NOT CONSIDER INOPERABLE DUE TO

-KNOWN PROBLEM WITH' THE DATA

-R APID, UNCH AR ACTERISTIC *DEGR ADATION*

-KNOWN 25% MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE CAPACITY

-lNDICATED INSTRUMENT / METHODOLOGY PROBLEM

PERFORMANCE COULD NOT FIND A SPECIFIC PROBLEM,

HOWEVER.

1/5/87 PERFORMANCE REQUESTED DESIGN ENG ANALYSIS OF THE

DATA AND ADVICE ON THE PROBLEM. DESIGN ENG STATED

OPERABLE VERBALLY SHORTLY AFTERWARD.

I

1/13/87 DESIGN ENG RESPONSE SENT STATING l

l

'lF THERE iS NO MISTAKE IN THE DATA, THIS HX DOES l

NOT MEET MINIMUM PERFORM ANCE CRITERI A".

• NPD-PERFORMANCE SUSPECTS INSTRUMENTATION

ERRORS IN THE NS HX 2 A TEST OF 1/2/87*. l

l

l

l

_ -

-. - - - . - - - - .-. . . _--- __ ..

1 .

,

. . .

,

AND

~

) "MBCE. FINDS IT VERY UNLIKELY TH AT THIS HEAT

EXCHANGER BECAME FOULED SO QUICKLY'.

,

1/28/87 DESIGN ' ENG 1/13/87 RESPONSE RECEIVED BY UNIT _1 TEST

ENGINEER. DATE RECEIVED BY UNIT 2 TEST ENGINEER IS

,

NOT KNOWN. BOTH HAD BEEN IN THREE WEEK TRAINING.

,

2/17/87 PROBLEM BROUGHT TO MANAGEMENT ATTENTION. NS 2A HX

CHEMICALLY CLEANED AND RETESTED IMMEDIATELY (ON.

1

NEXT DAY).

'

2/18/87 RETEST RESULTS SHOWED.NO IMPROVEMENT. PERFORMANCE

REQUESTED DESIGN ENG ANALYSIS FOR EXISTING CONDITIONS

!

-HIGHER-TH AN-DESIGN (CE M ASS

-LOWER-TH AN-DESIGN RN TEMPER ATURE

2/19/87 DESIGN ENG DECLARED OPERABLE W/ LIMITATION ON RN

TEMPER ATURE < 51 DEGREES F USING ' WORST * SIDE DATA.

PERFORMANCE BEG AN COMPREHENSIVE, DETAILED

l

INVESTIG ATION INTO TEST INSTRUMENTATION.

}

} 2/24/87

PROBLEM INVESTIGATION REPORT INITIATED BY PERFORMANCE

$ 2/27/87 PROBLEM FOUND WITH NS T UTLET TEMPER ATURE RlG. H AD

i

NOT BEEN FOUND BEFORE DUE TO LOCATION, INTERN AL

l

CONCEALMENT AND STATIC VERIFICATION METHOD..

{

THERMOWELL ADDED TO TEST LOOP PIPING.

..

l

,

RETEST - DATA APPEARED VALID. REQUESTED

t

• DESIGN ENG AN ALYZE. .

,

.

,

-rn , - ,- ..- , r- . -, - . - - - - ,,,.,.<,,,----.m.m.,,,.,,-.,,,- . , , .,a ,n , ., , ,,,-m.,,-m-n,,.,_, , - , -

-.__ ._ . _ __ . __ - - _ - - _ - -

.

-

. .

.

4

3/3/87 DESIGN ENG DECLARED HX OPERABLE WITHOUT LIMITATION.

2

3/3/87- PERFORMANCE REVIEWED OTHER NS HX TEST SETUPS AND

3/31/87 DATA. NO ADVERSE SAFETY PROBLEMS FOUND, BUT

(APPROX) THERMOWELLS ADDED TO _lMPROVE .RELI ABILITY OF FUTURE

TESTS. RECALCULATION OF 12/26/87 AND 1/2/87 DATA ,

,

(CORRECTED FOR NS OUTLET TEMP) SHOWED NS 2A HX

HAD BEEN OPERABLE BY A LARGE MARGIN.

'

I

j

!

r

i

..

.

,

---n - - - .,- -r er, - - - n ,x ,e--- , . .- .-,,--w-

- -- - - - - . - , , - - , , - - , ,-,,--,-a -ver-+--a , -m-- , - - -c'--- - -=-, e- =

. .

-

~

.

.

.- .

.

,

ROOT CAUSES

PROBLEM

-A PROBLEM INVESTIGATION REPORT WAS NOT GENERATED IN A

TIMELY MANNER AS REQUIRED BY STATION DIRECTIVE TO

4

DOCUMENT AND' CONTROL THE IDENTIFICATION, EVALU.\ TION,

REPORTING AND CORRECTION OF THE PROBLEM FOUND WITH

THE NS 2A HX.

t

ROOT CAUSE

-PERSONNEL ERROR. PERFORMANCE PERSONNEL DID NOT

PROMPTLY INITIATE A PIR ( AND THUS MAKE A CONSClOUS

OPERABILITY DECISION) BASED ON THE DATA FROM THE

} 1/2/87 HX RETEST.

-

!

CONSIDERATIONS

't

!

-PIR STATION DIRECTIVE WAS NEW (EFFECTIVE 1/2/87)

-PERFORMANCE PERSONNEL KNEW TEST AND RETEST DATA

WAS NOT INDICATIVE OF ACTUAL HX PERFORMANCE BASED

ON TREND OF PREVIOUS TESTS, DEGR ADATION TOO R APID,

AND DIFFERENCE IN SIDES. i

l

-PERFORMANCE PERSONNEL KNEW NS HX'S WERE ADEQUATE

DOWN TO 25% OF THEIR DESIGN-R ATED CAPACITY SO

CONSIDERABLE MARGIN EXISTED. . ,

<

f

1

-,,..._.v--,_,-.-,..-_.,,_,_,m.-- . ~ , . - . . . .._ . ,_. .,_.. . . . _m,,_- .. - - , ..~.._...-,-. . . - -..... -

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

.

-

.

p .- .

, .

!

-ALL OTHER NS HX'S HAD TESTED SATISFACTORILY, AND

THEY UTILIZED SAME COOLING WATER.

-FLOWS AND PRESSURE DROPS ON NS 2A HX WERE

COMPARABLE TO PREVIOUS VALUES FOR BOTH SIDES.

-BOTH DESIGN ENG AND NPD-PERFORMANCE JUDGED THE

PROBLEM TO BE IN THE DATA / INSTRUMENTS RATHER THAN

ACTUAL HX PERFORMANCE.

-DESIGN ENG HAD VERBALLY DECLARED OPERABLE EARLIER ON.

l

l

i

.

,

..

_. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

-

.

. .- .

.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

-PERFORMANCE PERSONNEL AND LOCATION MANAGEMENT WERE

COUNSELED ABOUT THIS INCIDENT AND SENSITIZED ABOUT THE

NEED TO MAKE PROMPT OPERABILITY DECISIONS.

-CALCULATIONS WERE PERFORMED SHOWING THE NS 2A HX HAD BEEN

OPERABLE SINCE 12/26/87 (DATE OF FIRST TEST WITH SUSPECT DATA).

- A REVIEW OF OTHER NS HX'S VERIFIED THEIR ACCEPTABILITY.

-PERFORMANCE HAS BEGUN USING A QUICK-RUNNING COMPUTER

PROGRAM FOR INITIAL ANALYSIS AND SCREENING OF DATA AT THE

STATION BEFORE SENDING TO DESIGN ENG FOR DETAILED AN ALYSIS.

-PERFORMANCE WILL BE USING DESIGN ENG'S PROGRAM IN THE

FUTURE TO PERFORM THE ANALYSIS AT THE STATION.

-A NEW OPERABILITY DIRECTIVE WILL BE IMPLEMENTED AT CATAWBA

6/1/87 WITH SPECIFIC GUIDANCE AND EXAMPLES FOR MAKING

OPERABILITY DECISIONS.

THIS INCIDENT WILL BE INCLUDED AS ONE

OF THE EXAMPLES.

-DESIGN ENG WILL DISCUSS AT NUCLEAR STATION PROJECT MEETINGS

ITS RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAKING OPERABILITY DETERMINATIONS U

-

FINDING UNUSUAL OR SUSPECT DATA OR INFORMATION.

~

-COMMUNICATION BETWEEN DESIGN ENG AND CATAWBA H AS BEEN

IMPROVED BY MAKING MORE DIRECT AND INCLUDING COPIES TO

STATION MANAGEMENT. -

_ . . _ . . . - .

- - -a

9

4 e m

9

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

-NS 2A HX WAS OPERABLE THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE

TIME PERIOD OF THIS INCIDENT BASED ON BOTH THE

VALID AND INVALID DATA.

-THERE WAS NO ADVERSE EFFECT ON PLANT SAFETY.

!

,

i

. - . - - , . - , , - . . , , - - - . . .- . , . , - , -.. .n --... , . . . . - , .,,.

.

-

, . .-

,

'a.

ATTACHMENT 5

OPERABILITY AND TESTING OF PORV's 0F

CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION

1

- ._ - -. - - -

.

,

,.*.. -

..

.

CATAWBA

NUCLEAR STATION l

l  :

l

,

LER 413/87-12

,

l

Unit Shutdown

Resulting From

Power Operated Relief Valve

Inoperability

l

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l

- - _ - _ _ - _ - - - - - ._----.._-.-..-..-l

. _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . - .

.

. ..-

.

..

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Unit One Refueling Outage

! September-October 1988

PORV's modified to be upgraded l

to Safety Related. l

l

8 November,1988 l

PORV Modification and T/8 Surveillance  !

Test run. Results appear satifactory.

l

10 March,1987

~1800 - lWV Test Procedure Indicates

problem with PORV operability.

11 March,1987

0230 - Tubin8 to PORV's identlfled as

reversed. All PORV's declared Inoperable.

Unit is in Mode 3.

1815 - Unit re-enters Mode 4.

12 March,1987

0100 - Modification to correct tubing

problem begins.

1600 - Re-testing completed. PORV's

re-declared operable.

._. ._ . - _ - _ _ - - . . - --. __ - _ _ _ _ . -

. -

.

,..'...

'

,

'

.

POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVE

- INOPERABILITY DUE TO TUBING ERROR

,

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

.

SEPT-OCT 1986

Unit one PORV's are modified to upgrade installation to

Safety Related (NSM's 10436 and 10523).

(1) Upgraded PORV acuators to improve response time

and to upgrade to Safety Related.

(2) Increased size of tubing to solenoids (3/4" to

1").

(3) Added instrument air system (VI) isolation valve

and test vent to allow testing.

! (4) Added Controls for motor operated isolation valves

NI 438A and 439B on main control boards.

a

f 6 NOV 1986

.

Ran new Periodic Test PT/1/A/4600/03C to carry out new

'

technical specification surveillance 4.4.4.3. This test is

,

run to re-enter Mode 3 after the refueling outage. The test

1 is designed to verify the-emergency air power supply (NI)

will operate PORV's 32B and 34A.

The test did not detect the switched tubing because:

t *

'

(1) The VI header vent valve was closed too early in

the Test Procedure.

(2) NI leaking back through check valve allowed

PORV 1NC32B to be successfully stroked.

10 MAR 1987

~1800 Unit in Mode 4 and heating up to Mode.3. Ran

Periodic Test PT/1/A/4150/30 to satisfy IWV

requirements. This test duplicates the test run

to satisfy Technical Specification 4.4.4.3 but for

a different purpose. PORV 1NCO32B fails to open

with only emergency backup nitrogen to it.

1 Investigation of cause begun.

2137 Unit enters Mode 3.

4

- . - -. ._ . - _ . - - - -. . __ _. .-. .-

__ -

- _ ._ - - - --

i

.

- '

,..

. <

.

I

11 MAR 1987

i

0230 Determination is made by operating personnel that

pressurizer PORV's are incorrectly connected. All' i

< PORV's are declared inoperable and the appropriate

Technical Specification action statement entered

(30 HRS to be in Mode 5).

1815 Unit re-enters Mode 4. ,

.  !

12 MAR 1987

' 0100 Physical work to correct tubing problem begins

under control of NSM program. l

j 1030 PORV's are successfully retested by Surveillance

Procedure PT/1/A/4150/30.

1600 All other testing required by modifications and

'

re-entry into Mode 4 completed. PORV's

re-declared operable.

1755 Unit re-enters Mode 3.

i

t

i

1

N >

I

1

i

i

-,-------r, -. - , . m,, , , , . . ~ - --,- --- - - . , . , , . , _ . . .e , - - . , e-- - - - -e,, . - --r - -, - - . , . ,---e ~,- -

.

-

..

.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

,

- PORV tubing was re-routed, under the

! modification program, to correct the

! deficiency.

- The Surveillance Test to stroke the

PORV's from the Nitrogen Supply was

i changed to better ensure the selected

air source is stroking the PORV.

'

- The Personnel Error in completing the

i Post-Modification Test Procedure was

reviewed with the involved personnel.

!

l - Operator Update Program will include I

lessons learned from this event.

,

j - A special Task Force was formed to

review testing methods for adequacy and

j

completeness.

i

! - Design Drawings will be updated to

! show specific Instrument air headers

! to connect to solenold valves.

!

I

_ . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ . - __ _. _ __ __ __ _ __

.. -- .- - . - - _ .-__ . . _ . . - . - .= ..-

,

, . .

,

,...

.

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l

i

COMMENTS ON PROPOSED VIOLATIONS

STEMMING FROM REVERSED TUBING TO l

$ UNIT ONE PORV's

2

1. While'it is true that the procedure used to verify the

j

PORV's would stroke on nitrogen did not detect the

reversed tubing, it is also true it took a concurrent

!

component failure to-mask the problem. If check valve ,

j

4

' (lVI368) had not been defective it is likely that the l

i problem would have been detected using the original

test procedure even with the vent valve closed out of

l

sequence. If the vent valve had been left open, as

l required, then the problem would have been uncovered as

,

it ultimately was when the procedure technique was used

on the 10th of March 1987. It is Duke Power Company's

l opinion that while Test Procedure improvements could be

and have been made, that the original Test Procedure

7, PT/1/A/4600/03C was not defective.

f

2. The power supply for the PORV Solenoid Valves shows as

train related. If a power train and instrument air

1

f

failed concurrently the PORV solenoid valves would ,

still have been energized as they receive power from

4

vital (battery backed) DC power sources. This means

i that there would have been at least one PORV operable

from a back-up nitrogen source for all but seismic

' events (NCO36B is non-seismic).

.

!

.

$ 3. This deficiency was discovered by Catawba operating t

personnel and as soon as the reversed tubing was

discovered the appropriate Technical Specification 1

1

'

Action Statement was entered and complied with. The

4

tubing was correctly routed within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />. l

i

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!

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_ _ _ , _ _ _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ . . _ , - . , _ . . _____.__. _ _____._. _ _. _ ._. , _ .._.__ _ _

.

. . . .

.:

l\ STA _ _ATON

-

AS DESIGNED

..

l

PORV 'ORV PORV

NO 3+A NC 3GB NC 32B

n .,

,,

N  :  : g

X X

3 EMO

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NI ()

ACC ULATOR

, , ACCUMULATOR

18

INSTRUMENT AIR s " "

SUPPLY o TEST VENT

1

_TO 3 PROTICTION

NC 328 AND NC 34A (AUTOMATIC)

NC 3GB (MANUAL)

OPERATING RANGE PROTECTION

ALL AUTOMATIC

-

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AC 3G 3 NC 32B \C 34A

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i

... ,-

I

CATAWBA PRESSURIZER PORV'S

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

l

DESIGN ENGINEERING SCOPE

APRIL, 1981

DESIGN INITIATES MODIFICATION TO OPERATE PORV'S

NC34A AND NC32B FOR LOW TEMPERATURE OVERPRESSURE

PROTECTION MODE ,

MAY, 1981 MECHANICAL FLOW DIAGRAMS ISSUED

JUNE, 1981

MECHANICAL PIPING DRAWINGS AND lac DETAILS ISSUED

JANUARY -

AUGUST, 1983 PIPING INSTALLED AND INSPECTED

u

JANUARY -

MARCH, 1984  !

TUBING AND S0LEN0ID VALVES INSTALLED

,

JUNE, 1984

TUBING INSPECTED AND TURNOVER EXCEPTION CLEARED

i

APRIL, 1985 DESIGN ISSUES NSM CN-10523. i

MODIFICATION INVOLVED

UPGRADE OF ELECTRICAL CONTROL SYSTEMS TO SAFETY

RELATED TO MEET LICENSING COMMITMENTS CONCERNING

POSTULATED STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK

OCTOBER, 1986

NSM'S IMPLEMENTED AT FIRST REFUELING OUTAGE

MARCH, 1987 CHECK VALVE TESTING IDENTIFIES PROBLEM, DESIGN

INVESTIGATES DRAWINGS

l

,

4 t

r. 1

... .-

. 1

TO PORV TO PORV TO PORV

__

INC34A INC36B INC328 __

OPE RATOR OPERATOR OPERATOR

$ A A A /

IVI373 IVI374

__

" __

~~

IVIPG IVIP

1

5500 -* 5490 ~*

,

N  %

IVI369 d h

- )

'

IVI370 d

O U

MIVI371 klVI372

/. IVI367 /IVI368

-x -x

1. #

A

NI ACCUMULATOR lA NI ACCUMULATOR IE ,

i C>C

-

><

IVI462 IVI463

~

C N - 16 0 5 - l.1

REV. 8

.

h_____

F.

.-

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90 p -

'

,149 g . o'

.

00 6\

gdg0

"CO

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6

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9 61

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3

.

-

}- , -

'

-

$6*U/ .

'

.-

.

- .-

61

9

FROM ACCUMULATOR TANK IB

'

$ PIPING ISOMETRIC

, , INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM

CATAWBA REACTOR BUILDING

C N- 1522 -09. 23-OO

,

q, REV.24

y FROM ACCUMULATOR TANK IA

( .

.- -

ISOLATION

VALVE INCSVO32O(B)

\ INCSVO340(A)

U!

I

FROM ,\g 1

CN-1522-09,23-OO '  :

__

V

DC >

INC32B (INCCVO328)

INC34 A (INCCVO34A;

% INC36B (INCCVO368)

v

INCSVO321 (B)

INC SVO 341(A)

INCSVO36l(B)

C N - 14 99-NC I O

.

REV.4

.

f, '

-

,..-

(

CATAWBA PRESSURIZER PORV'S

ROOT CAUSE

DESIGN ENGINEERING SCOPE

- DESIGN PHYSICAL DRAWINGS (PIPING AND INSTRUMENT) FAILED TO

PROVIDE ADEQUATE CONTINUATION INFORMATION,

CORRECTIVE ACTION

DESIGN ENGINEERING SCOPE

IMMEDIATE '

- DESIGN DRAWINGS WERE REVISED VIA EXPEDITED MODIFICATION

- REVIEW CONCLUDED THIS IS A SPECIAL CASE DUE TO TRAIN-SPECIFIC

REQUIREMENT FOR INSTRUMENT AIR

LONG TERM

-

ENHANCEMENTS TO NSM PROCESS: "TOPFORM"

.

k . .

-

I. '

. . . . .-

D.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

l 0 CREDIT IS TAKEN FOR THE PRESSURIZER PORV'S IN THE E0G

'

- STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE SUBGROUP REPORT,

WCAP-10698, SGTR ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY TO DETERMINE THE

MARGIN TO STEAM GENERATOR OVERFILL. THE NRC STAFF HAS

NOT YET ISSUED AN SER ON THE REPORT.

o AS NOTED IN CATAWBA SSER-2, SECT 10N'5.4.4.1, THERE ARE

AT LEAST THREE MEANS TO ACHIEVE RCS DEPRESSURIZATION

-

NORMAL PRESSURIZER SPRAY

-

THREE PRESSURIZER PORV'S

-

AUXILIARY PRESSURIZER SPRAY (WITH SAFETY GRADE

EM0)

o THEREFORE, THIS OCCURRENCE HAD N0 IMPACT ON THE HEALTH

AND SAFETY OF THE PUBLIC.

I

l

l