ML20214J558
| ML20214J558 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Mcguire, Catawba, McGuire, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 05/11/1987 |
| From: | Grace J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Tucker H DUKE POWER CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8705280104 | |
| Download: ML20214J558 (68) | |
See also: IR 05000369/1987004
Text
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Docket Nos. 50-413, 50-414
License Nos. NPF-35, NPF-52 g jg
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uke Power Company
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ATTN: Mr. H. B. Tucker, Vice President
Nuclear Production Department
422 South Church Street
Charlotte, NC 28242
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1 Gentlemen:
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SUBJECT: MEETING SUMMARY OF EflFORCEMENT CONFERENCE - NRC INSPECTION REPORT
50-369/87-15, 50-370/87-15, 50-414-/87-15 REGARDING NRC INSPECTION
REPORT NOS. 50-369/87-04, 50-370/87-04, 502413/87-06, 50-414/87-06,
50-413/87-08, AND 50-414/87-08
This refers to a meeting held or: April 16, 1987, at the Nuclear Regulatory
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Comissicn's (NRC) Region II Office in Atlanta, Georgia. The subject of this
meeting was contained in Inspection Report Nos. 50-369/87-04, 50-370/87-04,
50-413/87-06, 50-414/87-06, 50-413/87-08, and 50-414/87-08 which concerned
inoperability of containment spray system at McGuire and Catawba, Power
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Operated Relief Valves operability and testing at Catawba, and containment air
return system inoperability on both the McGuire and Catawba facilities.
Enclosed is a meeting sumary including a list of attendees, a sumary of ,
! issues discussed, and an outline of the information presented by Duke Power
Company regarding specific issues discussed.
! In accordance with Section 2.790 of NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2,
Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclosure
i will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
Should you have any questions concerning these matters, we will be pleased to
discuss them.
Sincerely,
IRG;MAE SIGNED Irh
3.HELSC:!0:3
J. Nelson Grace
Regional Administrator
Enclosure:
Meeting Sumary w/ attachments
Sc w/ encl: ,
/J. W. Hampton, Station Manager, Catawba
f. L. McConnell, Station Manager, McGuire
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Duke Power Company 2 I? 11 IT7
bec w/ encl:
v'K. N. Jabbour, NRR
/RCResidentInspectors
/ Catawba and McGuire
Document Control Desk
State of South Carolina
RII RII , RI RII
T eebles:jt B oriser
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5/4/87 5/f/87 /)5/ /87 5/') /87
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ENCLOSURE
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MEETING SUMMARY
On April 16, 1987, representatives of Duke Power Company (DPC) met with the NRC
at the NRC's request in the NRC Region II Office in Atlanta Georgia. The
> topics of discussion were the operability of the Containment Spray system (NS)
at McGuire and Catawba, the operability of the Containment Air Return Fan
systems (VX) at McGuire and Catawba, and the operability and testing of the
Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) at Catawba. The list of those attending
is in Attachment 1.
DPC gave a presentation which consisted of an evaluation of the specific
concerns that the NRC had requested to be discussed. The evaluation entailed
l an assessment of the sequence of events, root causes, corrective actions, and
l safety significance of each issue.
The outline of the evaluation is embodied herein as Attachments 2, 3, 4, and 5.
The NRC is presently considering enforcement action on these issues. This
meeting served to enhance Region II's understanding of the issues and DPC's
plans to preclude recurrence of similar problems.
Attachments:
1. List of Attendees at the McGuire,
Catawba Enforcement Conference and Agenda
2. Operability of the McGuire Nuclear
Station Containment Spray System
3. Inoperability of Containment Air
Return Fans at the McGuire/ Catawba
Nuclear Stations
, 4. Operability of the Containment Spray
System at Catawba Nuclear Station
5. Operability and Testing of PORVs at
the Catawba Nuclear Station
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ATTACHMENT 1
LIST OF ATTENDEES AT THE MCGUIRE, CATAWBA ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE
April 16, 1987
Name Title Organization
T. A. Peebles Acting Branch Chief Nuclear Regulatory Commission
N. Rutherford Sys. Engr. Licensing Duke Power Company
B. L. Peele Principal Engineer Duke Power Company
R. F. Wardell Supt. Tech. Svs. Duke Power Company, Catawba
C. L. Hartzell Compliance Eng. Duke Power Company, Catawba
B. Travis Supt. of Operations Duke Power Company, McGuire
P. Kim VanDoorn SRI-Catawba Nuclear Regulatory Commission
M. S. Lesser RI Catawba Nuclear Regulatory Commission
B. Uryc Enforcement Coordinator Nuclear Regulatory Commission
R. J. Goddard Regional Counsel Nuclear Regulatory Commission
E. O. McCraw Compliance Engineer Duke Power Power, McGuire
H. J. Lee Design Engineering-G. O. Duke Power Company, G. 0.
M. D. McIntosh General Manager Duke Power Company, G. O.
H. B. Tucker VP Nuclear Production Duke Power Compa'1y, G. O.
V. L. Brownlee Acting Deputy Director Nuclear Regulatory Commission
M. L. Ernst Deputy Regional Administrator Nuclear Regulatory Commission
L. Trocine Enforcement Specialist Nuclear Regulatory Commission
F. Jape TPS Div. of Reactor Safety Nuclear Regulatory Commission
R. O. Sharpe Nuclear Engineer-Licensing Duke Power Company
T. L. McConnell Station Manager /MNS Duke Power Company
G. R. Jenkins Director, EICS Nuclear Regulatory Commission
W. T. Orders Sr. Res. McGuire Nuclear Regulatory Commission
AGENDA
DUKE /NRC ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE
APRIL 16, 1987
Introduction J. N. Grace /M. L. Ernst
H. B. Tucker
(1) McGuire NS/SSPS B. Travis
Sequence of Events
Previous Evente
Root Causes
Corrective Action
Safety Significance
Summary T. L. McConnell
(2) H
McGuire E. O. McCraw
Sequence of Events
Rooc Causes
Corrective Action
Catawba
Sequence of Events C. L. Hartzell
Corrective Action (CNS) C. L. Hartzell
Root Causes B. L. Peele
Corrective Action (DED) B. L. Peele
Safety Assessment H. J. Lee
Summary M. D. McIntosh
(3) Catawba NS System Operability R. F. Wardell
Sequence of Events
Corrective Action
Root Causes
Corrective Action
Safety Significance
(4) Catawba PORV Upgrade
Sequence of Events C. L. Hartzell
Corrective Action C. L. Hartzell
Root Causes B. L. Peele
Corrective Action B. L. Peele
Safety Significance H. J. Lee i
Closing Remarks H. B. Tucker ,
L. A. Reyes
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ATTACHMENT 2
OPERABILITY OF MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM
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SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
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12/30/86
0839 SOLID STATE PROTECTION SYSTEM (SSPS) TRAIN 'B'
LOGGED INOPERABLE FOR SURVElLLANCE TESTING BY
CONTROL ROOM (CR) SRO.
0900 PRIOR TO STARTING THE TEST, PERFORMANCE PERSONNEL
LOGGED IN PT/1/A/4208/03A [ CONTAINMENT SPRAY (NS)
1A HEAT EXCHANGE PT] WITH CR RO. PERFORMANCE
PERSONNEL DID NOT CONFER WITH THE CR SRO.
0931 CR SRO WAS NOTIFIED BY UNIT 1 RO THAT POWER HAD
JUST BEEN REMOVED FROM 'A' TRAIN NS CONTAINMENT
ISOLATION VALVES AS PART OF NS HEAT REMOVAL TEST
AND THAT 'A' TRAIN NS WAS INOPERABLE. THE UNIT 1
RO ASSUMED THAT PERFORMANCE PERSONNEL HAD DISCUSSED
THIS TEST WITH CR SRO BUT IN FACT THEY-HAD NOT.
CR SRO LOGGED 'A' TRAIN NS INOPERABLE.
UNIT 1 RO AND CR SRO DISCUSSED THE SSPS TRAIN 'B'
TEST AND CR SRO CONCLUDED THAT THE OPERABILITY OF
TRAIN 'B' NS WAS NOT AFFECTED. THIS.WAS BASED ON
THE FACT THAT THE UNIT 1 RO HAD PREVIOUSLY
CONCLUDED THAT NS TRAIN OPERABILITY WAS NOT
AFFECTED BY THE SSPS TEST FROM AN EARLIER GENERAL
CONSERVATION WITH INSTRUMENT AND ELECTRICAL (IAE)
PERSONNEL.
AFTER THE ABOVE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE UNIT 1 RO
AND CR SRO, THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR NOTICED BOTH
SSPS TRAIN 'B' AND NS TRAIN 'A' LOGGED INOPERABLE.
HE QUESTIONED THE CR SRO ABOUT THIS AND WAS GIVEN
ASSURANCE THAT 'B' TRAIN NS OPERABILITY WOULD NOT
BE AFFECTED BY THE SSPS TEST BEING PERFORMED.
1010 SSPS TRAIN 'B' WAS RETURNED TO OPERABLE UPON
COMPLETION OF THE SURVEILLANCE TESTING.
1447 NS TRAIN 'A' WAS RETURNED TO OPERABLE UPON
COMPLETION OF PERFORMANCE TESTING.
1/14/87 LATER REVIEW WITH THE TECHNICAL STAFF AND NRC
RESIDENT INSPECTOR DETERMINED THAT THE SSPS
SURVEILLANCE TEST MADE THE NS SYSTEM INOPERABLE.
BOTH TRAINS OF NS WERE INOPERABLE FOR 39 MINUTES.
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PREVIOUS EVENT
03/12/86 * TRAIN B NS PUMP DECLARED INOPERABLE FOR
PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE
- TRAIN A SSPS DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO
PERIODIC TESTING.
- ALTHOUGH BOTH TRAINS WERE' LOGGED, TRAIN A SSPS
WAS NOT REMOVED FROM SERVICE. THEREFORE, TWO
TRAINS OF NS WERE NEVER ACTUALLY INOPERABLE.
INOPERABILITY WAS PREVENTED BY A MORE IN DEPTH
EVALUATION BY THE UNIT ASSISTANT OPERATING
ENGINEER WORKING WITH THE NRC RESIDENT
INSPECTOR.
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ROOT CAUSES
(1) THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL TO ENSURE THAT
THE PERFORMANCE PERSONNEL CONTACTED THE CR SRO PRIOR TO
BEGINNING THE NS TEST.
(2) THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE UNIT 1 RO,
THE IAE TECHNICIAN, AND THE CR SRO CONCERNING THE SSPS
TESTING AND INSUFFICIENT COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE UNIT 1 RO,
THE PERFORMANCE TECHNICIAN, AND THE CR SRO CONCERNING THE NS
TESTING.
(3) THE CR SRO WAS A SHIFT SUPERVISOR WHO HAD BEEN ON LOAN TO THE
TECHNICAL TRAINING CENTER FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE (1) YEAR AS A
SIMULATOR INSTRUCTOR. HE WAS FULFILLING HIS LICENSE
REQUIREMENT TO SPEND ONE 12-HOUR SHIFT PER QUARTER IN A
LICENSED CAPACITY. BECAUSE HE HAD BEEN AWAY FROM THE PLANT
FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE (1) YEAR, HE RELIED MORE HEAVILY ON THE
VETERAN CONTROL ROOM RO.
(4) THE OPERATING SCHEDULE WAS NOT ADHERED TO DURING THIS
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INCIDENT, 'A' AND B' TRAIN SYSTEMS ARE NOT NORMALLY TESTED
ON THE SAME DAY.
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CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
TO PREVENT THE INCIDENT FROM OCCURRING AGAIN:
(1) THE PERFORMANCE PERIODIC TEST PROCEDURE WAS CHANGED TO
REQUIRE OPERATIONS SRO SIGNOFF PRIOR TO BEGINNING THE
TEST.
(2) THE INCIDENT IS BEING COVERED IN LICENSED OPERATOR
REQUAL TRAINING EMPHASIZING COMMUNICATION / AUTHORITY WITH
ALL LICENSED OPERATORS, BOTH ROs AND SROs.
. (3) TRAINING AND STAFF LICENSED PERSONNEL ARE NO LONGER
PERMITTED TO MAKE AN OPERABILITY DETERMINATION
INDEPENDENTLY. OPERABILITY DETERMINATIONS BY TRAINING
INSTRUCTORS AND STAFF SROs MUST BE MADE WITH THE
CONCURRENCE OF A REGULAR SHIFT SRO.
(4) (A) McGUIRE IS CURRENTLY DEVELOPING A METHOD OF
IDENTIFYING " OPERATING SCHEDULE" ITEMS THAT ARE ON
THE "DAI LY WORK SCHEDULE" OF THE INDIVIDUAL CREW
SUPERVISORS. (THE STATION " OPERATING SCHEDULE" IS
A SUBGROUP OF ALL DAILY WORK SCHEDULES OF THE
INDIVIDUAL SUPERVISORS AND INCLUDES ITEMS THAT
AFFECT MORE THAN ONE AREA / GROUP AND ALL TECHNICAL
SPECIFICATION WORK ACTIVITIES.)
(B) STATION SUPERVISORS WHO DEVIATE FROM THE ACTIVITIES
SCHEDULED ON THE OPERATING SCHEDULE ARE TO NOTIFY
THE SHIFT ENGINEER ON DUTY AND HE WILL EVALUATE THE
IMPACT ON TECH SPEC COMPLIANCE AND STATION
OPERATION.
(C) WITH THIS ADDITIONAL EMPHASIS ON THE OPERATING
SCHEDULE, ON TIME COMPLETION OF " OPERATING
SCHEDULE" ACTIVITIES HAS INCREASED FROM ,
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APPROXIMATELY 75% TO GREATER THAN 90%.
I (5) LICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING ON THE NEW NUCLEAR PRODUCTION
DEPARTMENT " OPERABILITY DIRECTIVE" WILL BEGIN IN I
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MAY, 1987.
(6) LICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING ON THE ENGINEERED SAFETY
FEATURE (ESF) VALVE STUDY IS IN PROGRESS.
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(7) LICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING ON SELECTED " CASE STUDIES" OF
APPLICABLE INDUSTRY INCIDENT REPORTS INVOLVING TECH SPEC
VIOLATIONS AND TRAINING ON SELECTED STATION TECH SPEC
INTERPRETATIONS WILL BEGIN IN MAY, 1987.
(8) STATION MANAGEMENT MET WITH ALL LINE AND STAFF
MANAGEMENT TO RE-EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF AN IN-DEPTH
EVALUATION OF TECH SPEC ITEMS POTENTIALLY AFFECTING
OPERABILITY. A SEPARATE SESSION WAS HELD WITH THE
OPERATIONS SHIFT SUPERVISORS TO FURTHER EMPHASIZE THE
IMPORTANCE OF THIS ISSUE.
(9) A MANUAL LOGIC MODEL OF TECH SPECS IS BEING DEVELOPED
AND IS PARTIALLY IMPLEMENTED. FULL IMPLEMENTATION WILL
BE COMPLETE BY JULY, 1987.
(10) THE CORRECTIVE ACTION FOR THE PREVIOUS INCIDENT ON
3/12/86 WAS TO COVER THE INCIDENT IN A SHIFT
SUPERVISORS' MEETING HELD ON 4/4/86. SIMULATOR AND
CLASSROOM INSTRUCTORS DO NOT ATTEND THE SHIFT
SUPERVISORS' MEETING AND THEREFORE, THE INCIDENT WAS NOT
COVERED WITH THE INDIVIDUAL INVOLVED.
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SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
NONE
- 'B' TRAIN NS COULD HAVE BEEN MANUALLY STARTED FROM THE
CONTROL ROOM. ONLY THE AUTO SIGNAL WAS BLOCKED BY SSPS.
EMERGENCY PROCEDURES WOULD HAVE REQUIRED MANUALLY STARTING
NS.
- 'A' TRAIN NS COULD HAVE BEEN STARTED WITH THE BREAKERS FOR
NS 29A & 32A CLOSED (IEMXA 4C, 4D)
- BOTH TRAINS WERE INOPERABLE FOR 39 MINUTES. STANDARDlZED
TECH SPECS ALLOWS BOTH TRAINS OF NS TO BE INOPERABLE FOR
ONE (1) HOUR.
- THE TECH SPEC ENTRY AT 0839 FOR SSPS TRAIN 'B' TESTING
REQUIRED UNIT SHUTDOWN IF TESTING WAS NOT COMPLETE BY 1039.
IF THIS OCCURRED, THE PLANT WOULD HAVE STARTED SHUTDOWN 68
MINUTES AFTER BOTH TRAINS OF NS WERE INOPERABLE, 8 MINUTES
LONGER THAN ALLOWED BY TECH SPECS.
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SOLID STATE PROTECTION SYSTE M
TRAIN A 04TPUT ROD CONTROL
^ ^ SYSTIB4
1 HASTER & St. AVE
9T REuvS
CONTROL I-'~~--~~~~--~~~7*- CONTROL
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REACTOR PROTECTION
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MASTER & SLAVE
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TRAIN 8 OUTPUT NC-IC-IPE-6 lDATE: 6-20-83
REF. l
TRAINING USE ONI.Y
REVISION 8
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HANUAL
S.R. HICH !IDX
1.R. HICil FLUX
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HICH FIDX (HICil S.P.) O "
P4 REACTOR TRIP SIGNAL
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HICH FLUX (IDW S.P.) m N c.
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ARMS COND. DUMPS
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HICl4 PRESSURE g * ; '
g , m m h m D- TURBINE TRIP
IDW PRESSURE
Q ' D P4 REACTOR TRIP SIGNAL.
HICH PZR LEVEL - TRAIN 'B'
IDCIC TR. 'B' O _
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LO-ID S/C LEVEL N
INPUTS 3
SAFETY INJECTION
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CENERAI. WARNING
-
)52RTB ) 52BYB
RX TRIP ON TURBINE TRIP
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ROD bRIVE POWER SUPPLY
MC-IC-IPE-19 lDATE: 6-20-83
REACTOR PROTECTION 1. REACTOR TRIP LOGIC DWC. REF. FSAR VOL. 7 l
SYSTt21 (IPE) 2. DURING TEST ONE BYB BKR. IS IN FERVICE, AND THE RESPECTIVE RTB BKR. IS DRAWN NVS l APP.WC
OPER. USING A SIMULATED REACTOR TRIP SIGNAt; IN THE TRAIN UNDER TEST. TRAINING USE ONLY
.. REVISION 8
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April 7, 1987
MEMORANDUM
TO: All Licensed Operators
SUBJECT: Logging of Technical Specification Items
In order to improve our tracking of inoperable Technical Specification
equipment, some additional guidance is being given in this memo and in a
revision to Operations Management Procedure 2-5. The revision to OMP 2-5
Section 7.1.0 states:
"Any system or component which is made inoperable by taking one of its
support systems (instrumentation, controls, electrical power, cooling or
seal water, lubrication or other required auxiliary equipment) out of
service shall also be logged. However in this case only the support
system itself needs to have all entries completed. For the systems
affected, they need only be listed in the component / system column beneath
the support system. No item number will be assigned to them or any other
entries (i.e., date/ time inoperable, reason for removal, etc.) made for
them. Example: If the "1A" RN Pump is declared inoperable, the RN Pump
would be logged inoperable with all entries for it completed. Below the
entry for RN, in the component / system column, the following A train
equipment would be listed: DG, NS, KC, ND, NI, NV, CA, VC/YC (if
applicable)."
Operations procedure and training group is developing some " Guidelines for
Inoperability" that will help in consistently logging what systems are affected
by incperable support systems. Three examples of those guidelines are given as
enclosures to this memo: the nuclear service water system, the emergency
diesel generators, and the solid state protection system.
The remaining " Guidelines for Inoperability" will be developed by July 1, 1987
and maintained as a controlled document either as part of the technical
specification reference manual or as a new Operations Management Procedure.
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. Memorandum to Licsns d Opnrators
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April 7, 1987
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Effective immediately, logging of Tech Spec items should be consistent with
these examples given and the revision of OMP 2-5, Section 7.1.D. We will have
" rubber stamps" made for the three systems given as examples because of the
large number of systems supported; but in the interim, this logging will be
done manually. An information copy of " Guidelines for Inoperability" will be
maintained at the SRO desk for either unit. As Operations training and the
procedure group develop additional guidelines, they will be included in the
information copy until July 1, 1987 when the guidelines will be officially
issued as a controlled docilment as stated previously.
Any questions concerning how items should be logged or the new " Guidelines for
Inoperability" should be referred to Louie Massey. Thank you for your support
in making these changes.
C
WlS
Bruce Travis
Superintendent of Operations
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McGuire Nuclear Station
RBT/sct
cc: T. L. McConnell B. G. Addis
B. H. Hamilton E. O. McCraw
W. M. Sample W. T. Orders
D. J. Rains P. F. 9.2
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GUIDELINES FOR INOPERABILITY
RN SYSTEM - Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4
DIRECTLY: 3.7.4 (RN System)
INDIRECTLY: 3.1.2.2 (Boration Flow Paths - NV System)
3.1.2.4 (Charging Pumps - NV System)
- 3.5.2 (ECCS - NV, NI, ND System)
3.6.2 (NS)
- 3.7.1.2 (CA System)
3.7.3 (KC System)
3.7.6 (VC/YC System - IF aligned to affected RN train)
3.8.1.1 (DG)
NOTES: An operability PT must be performed for the operable DG and
offsite power sources within I hour.
- Modes 1, 2, 3 - for Mode 4, 3.5.3 (ECCS - NV, ND System) is applicable.
- Modes 1, 2, 3 only.
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GUIDELINES FOR INOPERABILITY
SSPS Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4
DIRECTLY: 3.3.2.1.a and 1.b (ESF - Manual and Auto Initiation)
INDIRECTLY: 3.5.2 (ECCS)'
3.6.1.8 (VE)
3.6.2 (NS)
3.6.3 (Containment Isolation)
- 3.6.5.6 (VX)
3.7.1.2 (CA)
3.7.3 (KC)
3.7.4 (RN)
3.7.6 (VC/YC)
3.7.7 (VA)
3.8.1.1 (DG)
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NOTE: (1) All inoperable components on the train opposite to the SSPS
train (being declared inoperable) should be evaluated to
determine if they receive a signal via SSPS. If they do
receive a signal, then both trains of that system should be
declared inoperable.
(2) An operability PT does NOT need to be performed on the opposite
diesel and offsite power sources within one (1) hour for SSPS
surveillance testing per discussions with the NRC.
- Modes 1, 2 only.
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GUIDELINES FOR INOPERABILITY
Diesel Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4
Generator
DIRECTLY: 3.8.1.1 (AC Sources)
- 3.7.1.2 (CA System)
INDIRECTLY: NI System
NV System
ND System
KC System
RN System
VC/YC System
VA System
VE System
, NS System
VX System
Containment Isolation System
- Hydrogen Recombiner
- Pressurizer Heater Group
600V Essential Power
,
- Hydrogen Mitigation System
- Hydrogen Monitor
Vital Battery Charger
NOTES: An operability PT must be performed for the operable diesel
generator and offsite power sources within I hour.
Ensure Vital Battery Chargers are capable of being powered from
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an operable diesel generator within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. Power supplies
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should be swapped as necessary.
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- ' Modes 1, 2 only
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ATTACHMENT 3
IN0PERABILITY OF CONTAINMENT AIR RETURN FANS
AT THE MCGUIRE/ CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATIONS
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CATAWBA
NUCLEAR STATION
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VIOLATION
413/87-06-01
414/87-06-01
Inoperability Of .
Containment Air Return
And Hydrogen Skimmer Systems
Since l
Initial Required Operation i
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T.S.3.6.5.6
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SEQUENCE OF EVENTS !
1
30 January,1987
1805 - Catawba notified of potential VX Dam prob-
lem. Unit 1 at 100X Power, Unit 2 in Mode 3
1810 - Confirmed absence of required Dame around
Fan openings. Declared Fans inoperable on
both Units.
1709 - Commenced Unit 1 shutdown as required by
i
Technical Specifcations.
1715 - Declared Unusual Event IAW RP/0/A/5000
l /001
2230 - Commenced installation of required Curb
Dame.
2235 - Completed Unit 1 Shutdown.
31 January,1987
0915 - Completed installation of Dame on Unit 1.
Secured from Unusual Event and exited T/8
Action Statement.
!
1825 - Completed installation of Dams on Unit 2.
Exlted T/8 Action Statement
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INOPERABILITY OF CONTAINMENT
AIR RETURN FANS DUE TO MISSING CURB -
DAMS-AROUND FLOOR OPENING
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
'
14 JAN Nuclear Production Licensing Received call from
Region II identifying Fan Pit Drainage problem at
TVA plant.
' l-6 JAN Catawba personnel verified that drain lines were .
'
installed to carry off water entering fan pits and
shutoff valves were open.
,
,
! Problem Investigation Report (1-C87-0009) initiated
>
to follow up on potential problem of drain capacity
and control of shutoff valve position.
29 JAN Catawba was contacted'that evening to examine if
curbing was installed at Catawba Nuclear Station.
- No curbing was found by shift personnel doing the
investigation.
30 JAN Design Engineering review shows no curb dams-around
VX fan opening on CNS Design drawings. Review-
started to determine need for curb dams at. Catawba ,
- based on design parameters.
~1500 Nuclear Production Licensing notified that
absence of curb dams compromised fan operability.
1505 Catawba notified of potential VX problem by NPD
Licensing personnel. Unit one.at 100% power. Unit
two in Mode 3. Containment entry made to verify
the specified curb dams are in fact missing.
1610 Both trains of VX on Units 1 and 2 were declared
3
inoperable, both units entered Technical
, Specification 3.0.3, Unit 1 was at 100% power.and
Unit 2 was in Mode 3. Project Services initiated
Exempt Change Variation Notices CE-1108 and 1109 to
4 construct and install the curb dams. Project
i
Services and construction and Maintenance
Department (CMD) personnel began scoping the job
and started prefabrication for the modification.
i
1700 NRC Region II granted extensions to the action
times allowed by Technical Specification 3.0.3.
Unit 1 would be allowed to stay in Mode 3 until
!
.~ - , , _ , _ - - . . . . , . - . _ _ . - - .__.- - - --. ..-- , . . _ - - - . _ _ . , _ . .. - < . . . _ , _ , ,
_ _ _ _ _ _ ___-
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-
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,
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0800 January 31, 1987. Unit 2 would be allowed to
stay in Mode 3 until 1800, January 31, 1987. Unit
2 would then have 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> to be in Mode 5.
1709 ' Commenced Unit 1 shutdown in accordance with
Technical Specifications. Shutdown rate was ~17%
per hour.
1715 Declared Unusual event on Unit 1 in accordance with
RP/0/A/5000/001 " Classification of Emergency" due
to both trains of a safety system being inoperable
with a shutdown with intent to enter Mode 3 in
progress. Unit 2 was already in Mode 3, therefore
no Unusual Event was required.
1728 Operations initiated NRC Notification of Unusual
Event.
1732 Operations initiated Notification of Unusual Event
to local government agencies.
2230 Unit 1 entered Mode 2. Design engineering gave
verbal signature approval of the Exempt Change
Variations Notices. Work was started to install
the required curb dams on Unit 1 and Unit 2.
2235. Unit i entered Mode 3
31 JAN
0915 Unit 1 modification to install the required curbs
was completed and the VX system was declared
operable. Unit 1 exited Technical specification 3.0.3 and the Unusual Event was secured.
1625 Unit 2 modification to install the required curbs
was completed and the VX system was declared
operable. Unit 2 exited Technical specification 3.03.
.
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-. . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ __
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!
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
.
l
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Installed 6 inch floor dams around VX Fan !
floor openings on both Unit 1 and 2.
-
A study of safety significant civil and
structural design features within containment
will be completed by Design and provided to
NPD personnel. ,
.
-
8tation Management will use the above study
to develop any necessary procedures to on- l
sure passive safety features are in place.
-
Station Pre-Mode Four Checklist
will be revised by June 1987 to verify Air
- Return Fan Curbs are installed. ,
!
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A Routine Work Request will be
developed by June 1987 to remove and j
reinstall fan curbs for refusiing outages. l
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. . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _
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<
,.
COMMENTS ON VIOLATION 413/87-06-01, 414/87-06-1:
INOPERABILITY OF CONTAINMENT AIR RETURN AND HYDROGEN SKIMMER s
i
SYSTEMS SINCE INITIAL REQUIRED OPERATION - T.S. 3.6.5.6
<
t
1. The initial reason for examining the VX system was a ,
~'
NRC request to look at the Fan Pit Drains. This
violation was identified by Duke Power Company as a
result of a more indepth investigation of the design of
the system installation.
2. Upon discovery of the inoperable condition the
appropriate Technical Specification Action Statement
was promptly entered and the NRC notified o$ the
situation. All required actions were followed and the
deficiency was corrected on both units within 25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />
of discovery.
3. The Corrective Actions which are being taken go beyond
installation of the required curb dams. New and ll
revised procedures along with a Design study to highten
awareness of passive safety functions will minimize the
likelihood of future occurrences. s,
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GRATING 6" ANGLE HDR
PLATFORM CURB .
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'
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DESIGN .'
'
ENGINEERING
1
DEPARTMENT
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_______7-____
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( PROJECT e
CIVIL i
MECHANICAL / 1 ELECTRICAL I
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MANAGEMENT
f ENVIRONMENTAL NUCLEAR I DIVISION 'Jl GENERAL
SERVICES
'
l DIVISION I DIVISION '
DIVISION l I DIVISION I
l I
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l _ _. _ _ __ _ !_ __
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8 9
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4
MCGUIRE AND CATAWBA CONTAINMENT AIR RETURN FANS
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
DESIGN ENGINEERING SCOPE
AUGUST, 1975 MECHANICAL LETTER REQUESTING 4" CURB AND DRAIN
IN FAN ROOM FOR MCGUIRE
MARCH, 1976 CIVIL DRAWINGS ISSUED SHOWING CURBS FOR MCGUIRE 1
NOVEMBER, 1976 CIVIL DRAWINGS ISSUED SHOWING CURBS FOR MCGUIRE 2
SEPTEMBER, 1978 MECHANICAL LETTER REQUESTING MCGUIRE CURBS BE
INCREASED FROM 4" To 6" IN HEIGHT, AND ADDING
DRAINS / CURBS FOR CATAWBA 1-2
OCTOBER, 1978 CIVIL LETTER TO MECHANICAL STATING CURBS AND DRAINS
HAVE BEEN PROVIDED IN THE MCGUIRE AND CATAWBA
DESIGNS
DECEMBER, 1978 CIVIL DRAWINGS ISSUED SHOWING DRAINS IN THE FAN
'
ROOM FOR CATAWBA 1-2
JANUARY, 1979 CIVIL DRAWINGS ISSUED SHOWING INCREASE IN HEIGHT
l
0F CURBS FOR MCGUIRE 1-2
JANUARY, 1987 TELECON FROM NRC ADVISING THAT TVA HAD IDENTIFIED
PROBLEM WITH FAN ROOM DRAINAGE
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,
MCGUIRE AND CATA'BA
W CONTAINMENT AIR RETURN FANS
ROOT CAUSE
' DESIGN ENGINEERING SCOPE
I
-
THE CIVIL DRAWINGS DETAILING THE CURBS FOR CATAWBA 1-2 WERE
INTENDED TO BE ISSUED, BUT WERE NOT
,
1
- ISOLATED CASE OF HUMAN ERROR: OVERSIGHT BY ENGINEER RESPONSIBLE
FOR THE WORK
- SAME ENGINEER WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR MCGUIRE AND CATAWBA CURBS AND
DRAINS
,
i
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_- . - _ . _ _,
..
,- . .
i
MCGUIRE AND CATAWBA CONTAINMENT AIR RETURN FANS
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
DESIGN ENGINEERING SCOPE
IMMEDIATE
- CATAWBA CIVIL CONCRETE DRAWINGS REVISED TO SHOW CURBS
~
-
- CIVIL, ELECTRICAL, MECHANICAL CORRESPONDENCE FILES WERE REVIEWED
FOR A SIX-MONTH PERIOD CENTERED ON.9/1/78
e CHANGE OR ADDITION REQUESTS WERE.NOTED
e REQUESTS COMPARED AGAINST DRAWINGS
e N0 OTHER PROBLEMS WERE FOUND
SHORT TERM
- DESIGN STUDY IS BEING DEFINED TO DESCRIBE CIVIL DESIGN FEATURES
WITHIN CONTAINMENT WHICH ARE SAFETY-RELATED
LONG TERM
, -ENHANCEMENTS TO NSM PROCESS: "TOPFORM"
!
4
!
!
!
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AIR RETURN FAN INOPERABILITY SAFETY ANALYSIS
DESIGN BASIS CONTAINMENT ANALYSES
DESIGN BASIS CONTAINMENT ANALYSES CAN BE DIVIDED INTO TWO CATEGORIES:
1) SHORT TERM (0-10 SECONDS) ANALYZED WITH TMD
2) LONG TERM (10+ SECONDS) ANALYZED WITH LOTIC
FANS ARE ACTUATED AT 911 tilNUTES (10 MINUTES ASSUMED IN ANALYSES)
SO ONLY LONG TERM ANALYSES WITH LIMITING CONDITION AFTER THIS TIME
ARE AFFECTED
LONG TERM ANALYSES: -
1) PEAK CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE
2) PEAK REVERSE DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE (UPPER > LOWER)
3) MINIMUM CONTAINMENT PRESSURE
4) PEAK CONTAINMENT PRESSURE
,
h
--, r.
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f
'
AIR RETURN FAN INOPERABILITY SAFETY ANALYSIS
'
LONG TERM CONTAINMENT ANALYSES
- ANALYSES TIME OF LIMITING CONDITION.(SEC)
McGUIRE CATAWBA
i PEAK CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE 158.5 127
PEAK REVERSE DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE 48 50
I
MINIMUM CONTAINMENT PRESSURE 80 (130) 100 (100)
i PEAK CONTAINMENT PRESSURE 6730 6920
1
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CONTAINMENT l
AIR RETURN SYSTEM
'
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
JAN. 14 -
NRC REGION 11 CONTACTED DUKE POWER G.O.
LICENSING PERSONNEL ABOUT A TVA PROBLEM
CONCERNING THE LACK OF CONTAINMENT AIR RETURN
FAN PIT DRAINS.
JAN. 14-16 -
DUKE INITIATED A REVIEW OF DRAWINGS BOTH
CIVIL AND MECHANICAL. FLOOR DRAINS, VALVES
AND PIPING WERE INDICATED ON THE DRAWINGS
(McGUIRE AND CATAWBA).
JAN. 16 A.M. -
VIRGIL BROWNLEE WAS ADVISED THAT THE DRAINS
WERE SHOWN ON THE DRAWINGS AND THE STATIONS
(McGUIRE AND CATAWBA) WOULD VERIFY
INSTALLATION OF THE DRAINS AND VALVES AND THAT
THEY WERE OPERABLE.
P.M. -
A VISUAL INSPECTION WAS CONDUCTED TO VERIFY
THE DRAINS AND VALVES WERE OPERABLE (McGUlRE
AND CATAWBA).
AT DUKE'S INITIATIVE, A PROBLEM INVESTIGATION
REPORT WAS INITIATED (McGUIRE AND CATAWBA) TO
PERFORM A MORE IN-DEPTH INVESTIGATION ON THE
SIZING OF THE DRAINS AND OTHER DESIGN
CRITERIA.
JAN. 30 -
DESIGN ENGINEERING AND STATION PERSONNEL
PERFORM AN INSPECTION IN BOTH UNIT 1 AND 2
UPPER CONTAINMENTS AND DISCOVER WATER CURBS
NOT INSTALLED.
. ._ _ ._ . . - _.
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1
AIR RETURN FAN IN0PERABILITY SAFETY ANALYSIS
RESULTS
McGUIRE CATAWBA
. DESIGN PRESSURE 15.0 15.0
T.S. PRESSURE FOR LEAK RATE TESTING 14.8 14.68
.
1986 FSAR ANALYSIS RESULT 13.59 14.35
AIR RETURN FAN INOPERADILITY 14.6 13.9
2
.
9
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CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
- DESIGN ENGINEERING WILL PROVIDE A LIST OF ALL CONTAINMENT
CIVIL STRUCTURES THAT PERFORM A PASSIVE SAFETY FUNCTION AND
DESCRIBE THEIR FUNCTION.
- STATION PERSONNEL WILL REVIEW THE LIST OF CIVIL
STRUCTURES / COMPONENTS PROVIDED BY DESIGN ENGINEERING TO
ENSURE APPROPRIATE PROCEDURES VERITY THE OPERABILITY OF THESE
STRUCTURES.
- EXISTING INSPECTION PROCEDURES OR NEW PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN
WRITTEN TO VERIFY THE WATER CURBS ARE INSTALLED PRIOR TO
ENTERING MODE 4, HOT SHUTDOWN.
A ROUTINE MAINTENANCE WORK REQUEST HAS BEEN GENERATED TO
REMOVE AND REINSTALL THE WATER CURBS BEFORE AND AFTER
REFUELING OUTAGES.
,
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1420 - THE AIR RETURN FANS ON BOTH UNITS WERE
.
DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO THE MISSING WATER
CURBS.
1505 - NOTIFICATION OF CATAWBA WAS MADE.
.
1519 - A NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT WAS DECLARED
AND A LOAD REDUCTION WAS BEGUN ON UNITS 1 AND-
2 IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.
1618 - NRC REGION ll GRANTED DISCRETIONARY
ENFORCEMENT ALLOWING AN 8 HOUR EXTENSION TO
~
THE ALLOWABLE OUTAGE TIME.
2320 - THE 8 HOUR EXTENSION EXPIRED REQUIRING
CONTINUED SHUTDOWN OF BOTH UNITS 1 AND 2.
JAN. 31 *0020 -
MAINTENANCE IS COMPLETED ON THE UNIT 2 WATER
CURBS. THE AIR RETURN FANS ARE DECLARED
, *0154 -
MAINTENANCE IS COMPLETED ON THE UNIT 1 WATER
CURBS. THE AIR RETURN FANS ARE DECLARED
ROOT CAUSE
THE WATER CURBS WERE REMOVED AND NOT REINSTALLED DUE TO INADEQUATE
ADMINISTRATIVE / PROCEDURAL CONTROLS. IT COULD NOT BE DETERMINED
WHEN THE WATER CURBS WERE REMOVED. THE FUNCTION OF THESE CURBS IS
NOT DESCRIBED IN THE BASE DOCUMENTS USED TO DEVELOP SAFETY RELATED
STATION PROCEDURES.
v.
,
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-
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AIR RETURN FAN INOPERABILITY SAFETY ANALYSIS
MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
PEAK CONTAINMENT PRESSURE ANALYSIS IS IN FSAR SECTION 6.2.1.1.3.1-
CHANGES FROM THE LATEST FSAR ANALYSES ARE
1) REVISED HEAT SINK DATA
2) INNCREASED AUXILIARY CONTAINMENT SPRAY FLOW
3) INCREASED ICE MASS
4) DECREASED SERVICE WATER TEMPERATURE
5) INCREASED SERVICE WATER FLOWS
6) INCREASED HEAT EXCHANGER FOULING -
1) CALCULATIONS FROM LATE 1970s UPDATED - UNRELATED TO AIR RETURN
FAN INOPERABILITY
2) BASED ON McGUIRE STARTUP TESTS - UNRELATED TO AIR RETURN FAN
INOPERABILITY
3)-6) WORST HISTORICAL OBSERVED VALUES DURING IN0PERABILITY PERIOD
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _
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SUMMARY
- ORIGINAL REGION II QUESTION WAS RESOLVED IN A TIMELY MANNER
- PROBLEM 0F MISSING CURBS WAS LATER IDENTIFIED BY DUKE
DURING FOLLOWUP REVIEW
- IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION WAS TAKEN TO FABRICATE AND
INSTALL CURBS
.
- FOLLOWUP CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN TO INSURE CURBS ARE
MAINTAINED
- ISOLATED INCIDENT
- DETAILED SAFFTY ANALYSIS DEMONSTRATED NO SAFETY
SIGNIFICANCE
.> .
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ATTACHMENT 4
OPERABILITY OF THE CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM AT
CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION
.
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- CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION
i CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM OPERABILITY-
-
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! OUTLINE .
i
- -SYSTEM DESIGN 'AND TESTING
.;
!
-SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
i
-ROOT CAUSE
!
1
-CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
'
-SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
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SYSTEM DESIGN AND TESTING
PURPOSE
-REMOVE CONTAINMENT HEAT POST-LOCA
-KEEP CONTAINMENT <15 PSIG AFTER ICE MELT
DESIGN
-TWO REDUNDANT 100% CAPACITY TRAINS
-TRAIN H AS PUMP, HX, TWO SPRAY HEADERS
-WATER SOURCE IS FWST
-RECIRCULATION FROM CONTAINMENT SUMP
-HX COOLED BY (RAW) NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER (RN)
TESTNG -
-OUARTERLY HEAT EXCH ANGE CAPACITY TEST
-TEST RUN B PERFORM ANCE
-FWST HEATED & RECIRCUL ATED
-RN OPER ATING NORM ALLY
-DATA
-NS INLET & QUTLET TEMPS
. . .
-NS FLOW
-RN INLET & OUTLET TEMPS
-RN FLOW
-- -
. _ . - _ _ . _ - - - , _. _ _ _ - - __ _
. . - . _ . . . -
~
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. ; ,
-PERFORM ANCE CALCULATES H/T COEFFS. (BOTH SIDES)
-DATA SENT TO DESIGN ENG FOR AN ALYSIS
-RESULTS SHOW PERCENTAGE OF DESIGN H/T COEFF.
AND CONCLUSION OF ACCEPTABILITY-
.
4
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4
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SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
1/30/86 HEAT EXCH ANGER TESTING PROGRAM FOR FOULING BEG AN.
NS HX 2 A TESTED AT 86% DESIGN CAPACITY 9/86.
12/26/86 NS 2 A HX TESTED - DATA WAS SUSPECT BECAUSE
-lNCONSISTENT WITH TRENDS
-H/T DIFFERENT FOR TWO SIDES OF HX
1/2/87 NS 2A HX RETESTED - SIMILAR RESULTS. PERFORMANCE
DID NOT CONSIDER INOPERABLE DUE TO
-KNOWN PROBLEM WITH' THE DATA
-R APID, UNCH AR ACTERISTIC *DEGR ADATION*
-KNOWN 25% MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE CAPACITY
-lNDICATED INSTRUMENT / METHODOLOGY PROBLEM
PERFORMANCE COULD NOT FIND A SPECIFIC PROBLEM,
HOWEVER.
1/5/87 PERFORMANCE REQUESTED DESIGN ENG ANALYSIS OF THE
DATA AND ADVICE ON THE PROBLEM. DESIGN ENG STATED
OPERABLE VERBALLY SHORTLY AFTERWARD.
I
1/13/87 DESIGN ENG RESPONSE SENT STATING l
l
'lF THERE iS NO MISTAKE IN THE DATA, THIS HX DOES l
NOT MEET MINIMUM PERFORM ANCE CRITERI A".
- NPD-PERFORMANCE SUSPECTS INSTRUMENTATION
ERRORS IN THE NS HX 2 A TEST OF 1/2/87*. l
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,
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,
AND
~
) "MBCE. FINDS IT VERY UNLIKELY TH AT THIS HEAT
EXCHANGER BECAME FOULED SO QUICKLY'.
,
1/28/87 DESIGN ' ENG 1/13/87 RESPONSE RECEIVED BY UNIT _1 TEST
ENGINEER. DATE RECEIVED BY UNIT 2 TEST ENGINEER IS
,
NOT KNOWN. BOTH HAD BEEN IN THREE WEEK TRAINING.
,
2/17/87 PROBLEM BROUGHT TO MANAGEMENT ATTENTION. NS 2A HX
CHEMICALLY CLEANED AND RETESTED IMMEDIATELY (ON.
1
NEXT DAY).
'
- 2/18/87 RETEST RESULTS SHOWED.NO IMPROVEMENT. PERFORMANCE
REQUESTED DESIGN ENG ANALYSIS FOR EXISTING CONDITIONS
!
- -HIGHER-TH AN-DESIGN (CE M ASS
-LOWER-TH AN-DESIGN RN TEMPER ATURE
2/19/87 DESIGN ENG DECLARED OPERABLE W/ LIMITATION ON RN
TEMPER ATURE < 51 DEGREES F USING ' WORST * SIDE DATA.
PERFORMANCE BEG AN COMPREHENSIVE, DETAILED
l
INVESTIG ATION INTO TEST INSTRUMENTATION.
}
} 2/24/87
PROBLEM INVESTIGATION REPORT INITIATED BY PERFORMANCE
$ 2/27/87 PROBLEM FOUND WITH NS T UTLET TEMPER ATURE RlG. H AD
i
NOT BEEN FOUND BEFORE DUE TO LOCATION, INTERN AL
l
CONCEALMENT AND STATIC VERIFICATION METHOD..
{
THERMOWELL ADDED TO TEST LOOP PIPING.
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RETEST - DATA APPEARED VALID. REQUESTED
t
- DESIGN ENG AN ALYZE. .
,
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4
3/3/87 DESIGN ENG DECLARED HX OPERABLE WITHOUT LIMITATION.
2
3/3/87- PERFORMANCE REVIEWED OTHER NS HX TEST SETUPS AND
- 3/31/87 DATA. NO ADVERSE SAFETY PROBLEMS FOUND, BUT
(APPROX) THERMOWELLS ADDED TO _lMPROVE .RELI ABILITY OF FUTURE
TESTS. RECALCULATION OF 12/26/87 AND 1/2/87 DATA ,
,
(CORRECTED FOR NS OUTLET TEMP) SHOWED NS 2A HX
HAD BEEN OPERABLE BY A LARGE MARGIN.
'
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,
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- -- - - - - . - , , - - , , - - , ,-,,--,-a -ver-+--a , -m-- , - - -c'--- - -=-, e- =
. .
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ROOT CAUSES
PROBLEM
-A PROBLEM INVESTIGATION REPORT WAS NOT GENERATED IN A
- TIMELY MANNER AS REQUIRED BY STATION DIRECTIVE TO
4
DOCUMENT AND' CONTROL THE IDENTIFICATION, EVALU.\ TION,
REPORTING AND CORRECTION OF THE PROBLEM FOUND WITH
THE NS 2A HX.
t
ROOT CAUSE
-PERSONNEL ERROR. PERFORMANCE PERSONNEL DID NOT
PROMPTLY INITIATE A PIR ( AND THUS MAKE A CONSClOUS
OPERABILITY DECISION) BASED ON THE DATA FROM THE
} 1/2/87 HX RETEST.
-
!
CONSIDERATIONS
't
!
-PIR STATION DIRECTIVE WAS NEW (EFFECTIVE 1/2/87)
-PERFORMANCE PERSONNEL KNEW TEST AND RETEST DATA
WAS NOT INDICATIVE OF ACTUAL HX PERFORMANCE BASED
ON TREND OF PREVIOUS TESTS, DEGR ADATION TOO R APID,
AND DIFFERENCE IN SIDES. i
l
-PERFORMANCE PERSONNEL KNEW NS HX'S WERE ADEQUATE
DOWN TO 25% OF THEIR DESIGN-R ATED CAPACITY SO
CONSIDERABLE MARGIN EXISTED. . ,
<
f
1
-,,..._.v--,_,-.-,..-_.,,_,_,m.-- . ~ , . - . . . .._ . ,_. .,_.. . . . _m,,_- .. - - , ..~.._...-,-. . . - -..... -
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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-
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p .- .
, .
!
-ALL OTHER NS HX'S HAD TESTED SATISFACTORILY, AND
THEY UTILIZED SAME COOLING WATER.
-FLOWS AND PRESSURE DROPS ON NS 2A HX WERE
COMPARABLE TO PREVIOUS VALUES FOR BOTH SIDES.
-BOTH DESIGN ENG AND NPD-PERFORMANCE JUDGED THE
PROBLEM TO BE IN THE DATA / INSTRUMENTS RATHER THAN
ACTUAL HX PERFORMANCE.
-DESIGN ENG HAD VERBALLY DECLARED OPERABLE EARLIER ON.
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_. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-
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CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
-PERFORMANCE PERSONNEL AND LOCATION MANAGEMENT WERE
COUNSELED ABOUT THIS INCIDENT AND SENSITIZED ABOUT THE
NEED TO MAKE PROMPT OPERABILITY DECISIONS.
-CALCULATIONS WERE PERFORMED SHOWING THE NS 2A HX HAD BEEN
OPERABLE SINCE 12/26/87 (DATE OF FIRST TEST WITH SUSPECT DATA).
- A REVIEW OF OTHER NS HX'S VERIFIED THEIR ACCEPTABILITY.
-PERFORMANCE HAS BEGUN USING A QUICK-RUNNING COMPUTER
PROGRAM FOR INITIAL ANALYSIS AND SCREENING OF DATA AT THE
STATION BEFORE SENDING TO DESIGN ENG FOR DETAILED AN ALYSIS.
-PERFORMANCE WILL BE USING DESIGN ENG'S PROGRAM IN THE
FUTURE TO PERFORM THE ANALYSIS AT THE STATION.
-A NEW OPERABILITY DIRECTIVE WILL BE IMPLEMENTED AT CATAWBA
6/1/87 WITH SPECIFIC GUIDANCE AND EXAMPLES FOR MAKING
OPERABILITY DECISIONS.
THIS INCIDENT WILL BE INCLUDED AS ONE
OF THE EXAMPLES.
-DESIGN ENG WILL DISCUSS AT NUCLEAR STATION PROJECT MEETINGS
ITS RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAKING OPERABILITY DETERMINATIONS U
-
FINDING UNUSUAL OR SUSPECT DATA OR INFORMATION.
~
-COMMUNICATION BETWEEN DESIGN ENG AND CATAWBA H AS BEEN
IMPROVED BY MAKING MORE DIRECT AND INCLUDING COPIES TO
STATION MANAGEMENT. -
_ . . _ . . . - .
- - -a
9
4 e m
9
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
-NS 2A HX WAS OPERABLE THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE
TIME PERIOD OF THIS INCIDENT BASED ON BOTH THE
VALID AND INVALID DATA.
-THERE WAS NO ADVERSE EFFECT ON PLANT SAFETY.
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ATTACHMENT 5
OPERABILITY AND TESTING OF PORV's 0F
CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION
1
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CATAWBA
NUCLEAR STATION l
l :
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- Unit Shutdown
Resulting From
Power Operated Relief Valve
Inoperability
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. _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . - .
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SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
Unit One Refueling Outage
! September-October 1988
PORV's modified to be upgraded l
to Safety Related. l
l
8 November,1988 l
PORV Modification and T/8 Surveillance !
Test run. Results appear satifactory.
l
10 March,1987
- ~1800 - lWV Test Procedure Indicates
problem with PORV operability.
11 March,1987
0230 - Tubin8 to PORV's identlfled as
reversed. All PORV's declared Inoperable.
Unit is in Mode 3.
1815 - Unit re-enters Mode 4.
12 March,1987
0100 - Modification to correct tubing
problem begins.
1600 - Re-testing completed. PORV's
re-declared operable.
._. ._ . - _ - _ _ - - . . - --. __ - _ _ _ _ . -
. -
.
,..'...
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POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVE
- INOPERABILITY DUE TO TUBING ERROR
,
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
.
SEPT-OCT 1986
Unit one PORV's are modified to upgrade installation to
Safety Related (NSM's 10436 and 10523).
(1) Upgraded PORV acuators to improve response time
and to upgrade to Safety Related.
(2) Increased size of tubing to solenoids (3/4" to
1").
(3) Added instrument air system (VI) isolation valve
and test vent to allow testing.
! (4) Added Controls for motor operated isolation valves
NI 438A and 439B on main control boards.
a
f 6 NOV 1986
.
Ran new Periodic Test PT/1/A/4600/03C to carry out new
'
technical specification surveillance 4.4.4.3. This test is
,
run to re-enter Mode 3 after the refueling outage. The test
1 is designed to verify the-emergency air power supply (NI)
will operate PORV's 32B and 34A.
The test did not detect the switched tubing because:
t *
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(1) The VI header vent valve was closed too early in
the Test Procedure.
(2) NI leaking back through check valve allowed
PORV 1NC32B to be successfully stroked.
10 MAR 1987
~1800 Unit in Mode 4 and heating up to Mode.3. Ran
Periodic Test PT/1/A/4150/30 to satisfy IWV
requirements. This test duplicates the test run
to satisfy Technical Specification 4.4.4.3 but for
a different purpose. PORV 1NCO32B fails to open
with only emergency backup nitrogen to it.
1 Investigation of cause begun.
2137 Unit enters Mode 3.
4
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11 MAR 1987
i
0230 Determination is made by operating personnel that
pressurizer PORV's are incorrectly connected. All' i
< PORV's are declared inoperable and the appropriate
Technical Specification action statement entered
(30 HRS to be in Mode 5).
1815 Unit re-enters Mode 4. ,
. !
12 MAR 1987
' 0100 Physical work to correct tubing problem begins
under control of NSM program. l
j 1030 PORV's are successfully retested by Surveillance
Procedure PT/1/A/4150/30.
1600 All other testing required by modifications and
'
re-entry into Mode 4 completed. PORV's
re-declared operable.
1755 Unit re-enters Mode 3.
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.
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CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
,
- PORV tubing was re-routed, under the
! modification program, to correct the
! deficiency.
- The Surveillance Test to stroke the
PORV's from the Nitrogen Supply was
i changed to better ensure the selected
air source is stroking the PORV.
'
- The Personnel Error in completing the
i Post-Modification Test Procedure was
- reviewed with the involved personnel.
!
l - Operator Update Program will include I
lessons learned from this event.
,
j - A special Task Force was formed to
review testing methods for adequacy and
j
completeness.
i
! - Design Drawings will be updated to
! show specific Instrument air headers
! to connect to solenold valves.
!
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.. -- .- - . - - _ .-__ . . _ . . - . - .= ..-
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- COMMENTS ON PROPOSED VIOLATIONS
STEMMING FROM REVERSED TUBING TO l
$ UNIT ONE PORV's
2
1. While'it is true that the procedure used to verify the
j
PORV's would stroke on nitrogen did not detect the
reversed tubing, it is also true it took a concurrent
!
component failure to-mask the problem. If check valve ,
j
4
' (lVI368) had not been defective it is likely that the l
i problem would have been detected using the original
test procedure even with the vent valve closed out of
l
sequence. If the vent valve had been left open, as
l required, then the problem would have been uncovered as
,
it ultimately was when the procedure technique was used
on the 10th of March 1987. It is Duke Power Company's
l opinion that while Test Procedure improvements could be
and have been made, that the original Test Procedure
7, PT/1/A/4600/03C was not defective.
f
2. The power supply for the PORV Solenoid Valves shows as
train related. If a power train and instrument air
1
f
failed concurrently the PORV solenoid valves would ,
still have been energized as they receive power from
4
vital (battery backed) DC power sources. This means
i that there would have been at least one PORV operable
from a back-up nitrogen source for all but seismic
' events (NCO36B is non-seismic).
.
!
.
$ 3. This deficiency was discovered by Catawba operating t
personnel and as soon as the reversed tubing was
discovered the appropriate Technical Specification 1
1
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Action Statement was entered and complied with. The
4
tubing was correctly routed within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />. l
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.
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.:
l\ STA _ _ATON
-
AS DESIGNED
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NO 3+A NC 3GB NC 32B
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NI ()
ACC ULATOR
, , ACCUMULATOR
18
INSTRUMENT AIR s " "
SUPPLY o TEST VENT
1
_TO 3 PROTICTION
NC 328 AND NC 34A (AUTOMATIC)
NC 3GB (MANUAL)
OPERATING RANGE PROTECTION
ALL AUTOMATIC
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CATAWBA PRESSURIZER PORV'S
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
l
DESIGN ENGINEERING SCOPE
APRIL, 1981
DESIGN INITIATES MODIFICATION TO OPERATE PORV'S
NC34A AND NC32B FOR LOW TEMPERATURE OVERPRESSURE
PROTECTION MODE ,
MAY, 1981 MECHANICAL FLOW DIAGRAMS ISSUED
JUNE, 1981
MECHANICAL PIPING DRAWINGS AND lac DETAILS ISSUED
JANUARY -
AUGUST, 1983 PIPING INSTALLED AND INSPECTED
u
JANUARY -
MARCH, 1984 !
TUBING AND S0LEN0ID VALVES INSTALLED
,
JUNE, 1984
TUBING INSPECTED AND TURNOVER EXCEPTION CLEARED
i
APRIL, 1985 DESIGN ISSUES NSM CN-10523. i
MODIFICATION INVOLVED
UPGRADE OF ELECTRICAL CONTROL SYSTEMS TO SAFETY
RELATED TO MEET LICENSING COMMITMENTS CONCERNING
POSTULATED STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK
OCTOBER, 1986
NSM'S IMPLEMENTED AT FIRST REFUELING OUTAGE
MARCH, 1987 CHECK VALVE TESTING IDENTIFIES PROBLEM, DESIGN
INVESTIGATES DRAWINGS
l
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r. 1
... .-
. 1
__
INC34A INC36B INC328 __
OPE RATOR OPERATOR OPERATOR
$ A A A /
IVI373 IVI374
__
" __
~~
IVIPG IVIP
1
5500 -* 5490 ~*
,
N %
IVI369 d h
- )
'
IVI370 d
O U
MIVI371 klVI372
/. IVI367 /IVI368
-x -x
- #
A
NI ACCUMULATOR lA NI ACCUMULATOR IE ,
i C>C
-
><
IVI462 IVI463
~
C N - 16 0 5 - l.1
REV. 8
.
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.
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'
-
- $6*U/ .
'
.-
.
- .-
61
9
FROM ACCUMULATOR TANK IB
'
$ PIPING ISOMETRIC
, , INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM
CATAWBA REACTOR BUILDING
C N- 1522 -09. 23-OO
,
q, REV.24
y FROM ACCUMULATOR TANK IA
( .
.- -
ISOLATION
VALVE INCSVO32O(B)
\ INCSVO340(A)
U!
I
FROM ,\g 1
CN-1522-09,23-OO ' :
- __
V
DC >
INC32B (INCCVO328)
INC34 A (INCCVO34A;
% INC36B (INCCVO368)
v
INCSVO321 (B)
INC SVO 341(A)
INCSVO36l(B)
C N - 14 99-NC I O
.
REV.4
.
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(
CATAWBA PRESSURIZER PORV'S
ROOT CAUSE
DESIGN ENGINEERING SCOPE
- DESIGN PHYSICAL DRAWINGS (PIPING AND INSTRUMENT) FAILED TO
PROVIDE ADEQUATE CONTINUATION INFORMATION,
CORRECTIVE ACTION
DESIGN ENGINEERING SCOPE
IMMEDIATE '
- DESIGN DRAWINGS WERE REVISED VIA EXPEDITED MODIFICATION
- REVIEW CONCLUDED THIS IS A SPECIAL CASE DUE TO TRAIN-SPECIFIC
REQUIREMENT FOR INSTRUMENT AIR
LONG TERM
-
ENHANCEMENTS TO NSM PROCESS: "TOPFORM"
.
k . .
-
I. '
. . . . .-
D.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
l 0 CREDIT IS TAKEN FOR THE PRESSURIZER PORV'S IN THE E0G
'
- STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE SUBGROUP REPORT,
WCAP-10698, SGTR ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY TO DETERMINE THE
MARGIN TO STEAM GENERATOR OVERFILL. THE NRC STAFF HAS
NOT YET ISSUED AN SER ON THE REPORT.
o AS NOTED IN CATAWBA SSER-2, SECT 10N'5.4.4.1, THERE ARE
AT LEAST THREE MEANS TO ACHIEVE RCS DEPRESSURIZATION
-
NORMAL PRESSURIZER SPRAY
-
THREE PRESSURIZER PORV'S
-
AUXILIARY PRESSURIZER SPRAY (WITH SAFETY GRADE
EM0)
o THEREFORE, THIS OCCURRENCE HAD N0 IMPACT ON THE HEALTH
AND SAFETY OF THE PUBLIC.
I
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