ML17331A707

Forwards Second Quarterly Rept on Hydrogen Mitigation & Control & Technical Rept Re Limiting Internal Uniform Pressure Capacity

ML17331A707
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	04/24/1981
From:	HUNTER R S INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
To:	DENTON H R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML17326A884	List: ML17326A883 ML17331A707 ML17331A708
References
AEP:NRC:00500A, AEP:NRC:500A, NUDOCS 8104290515
Download: ML17331A707 (3)

Text

'[NDIANALMICHIGANELECTRICCOMPANYP.OaBOX18BOWLINGGREBMSTATIOHNEWYORK,H.Y.1000iApril24,1981AEP:NRC:00500A DonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnitNos.1and2DocketNos.50-315and50-316.LicenseNos.DPR-58andDPR-74'econd quarterly ReportonHydrogenMitigation andControlMr.HaroldR.Denton,DirectorOfficeofNuclearReactorRegulation U.S.NuclearRegulatory ComIission Washington, D.C.20555g~~=L

DearMr.Denton:

Thisletteranditsattachments constitute oursecondquarterly reportonhydrogen..mitigation andcontrolfortheDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnit[los.1and2.Thisreportisb'eingsubmitted infulfillment ofthecommitment madeinourAEP:NRC:00476 submittal datedOctober7,1980andsupplements theinformation previously transmitted totheCommission

.viaourfirstquarterly report,AEP:NRC:00500, datedJanuary12,1981.Asstatedinourfirstquarterly report,installation ofthein-containment portionofaDistributed IgnitionSystem(DIS)isscheduled

-duringthe1981refueling outagesforUnitNos.1and2oftheCookPlant.Detailedinformation concerning thein-containment portionoftheDISisprovidedinAttachment No.2tothisletterasrequested bymembersofyourStaff.Designoftheoutside-containment portionoftheDIShasbeencompleted andthenecessary materialordersplaced.OureffortsaredirectedtowardhavingtheDISoperational inUnitNo.2byJune1,1981.Theattachments tothisletteraddressthevarioustopicsassociated withahypothetical eventresulting inthegeneration ofsub-stantiveamountsofhydrogen.

Thisinformation isprovidedintheattachments asfollows:

Mr.HaroldR.DentonAEP:NRC:00500A Attachment No.-~ToicContainm'ent Structural Evaluation 213Distributed IgnitionSystemDesignInadequate CoreCooling/f{ydrogen ControlEquipment Equipment Survivability ResearchProgramStatusCoreCoolingCapability Subsequent=to

@drogenCombustion Preliminary SafetyEvaluation As'statedinSection2.0oftheenclosure toourAEP:NRC:00500 submittal, AEPisinvestigating variouscandidate hydrogencontrolmethodsinconjunction withDukePowerCompanyandtheTennessee ValleyAuthority.

Anevaluation o'fthestudiesperformed todatewithregardtoHaloninerting,=

Electro-magnetic interference emissions fromsparkdischarge

igniters, andtheuseofcatalytic combustors willbeforwarded totheNRCinournextsub-mittalonthistopic.Testing.performed byAEP/TVA/Duke/Westinghouse atFenwalIncorporated verifiedtheabilityoftheglowplugigniterutilizedintheDIStoreliablyigniteleanhydrogen/air/steam mixturesinthepresenceofwatersprayandfans.Confirmatory tests.performed bytheLawrenceLivermore Laboratory (UCRb-84167)furthersubstantiated ourconclusions.

withregardtotheFenwaltestresults;thatis,theglowplugigniterisareliableignitionsourceunderavarietyofadverseconditions.

Thecontaihment pressureandtemperature responses tohydrogencombustion havebeenconservatively estimated usingtheCLASIXcomputercode.The=results oftheCLASIXanalysesshowthatde-liberateignitionofhydrogenwouldnotposeathreattocontainment integrity andwouldnotresultinenvironmental conditions moreseverethanthecon-ditionstowhichmostofthenecessary equipment hasbeenqualified to.Basedontheresultsof.theaforementioned testingandanalyses, wehaveconcluded thattheDISwouldservetoreducetheconsequences ofhypo-theticaleventssimilarinnaturetotheTMI-2accidentinvolving thegener-ationofsubstantive amountsofhydrogen.

Theresearchanddevelopment

programs, described inAttachment No.5tothisletter(beingfundedbyAEP/TVA/Dukeinconjunction withtheE1ectricPowerResearchInstitute},

areex-pectedtoprovideconfirmatory information insupportoftheDISmitigation concept.Themeritsofanypotential modification

.tothepresentDISdesignuncovered duringtheresearchprogramwillbedulyconsidered.

Mr.HaroldR.Denton3AEP:NRC:00500A Ahypotelcasma~tht1smal'lbreakloss-of;coolant accident.

withfailedECCSinjection

'{S2D)hasbeenanalyzedandtheacceptabslity oftheDISmitsationconceptshownforthehydrogengeneration associated with-aroximately 80weightpercentzircohium claddingoxidation; amorefhydrogencontrolstandpoint thantheTMI-2accident.

Inlightoftheknowledge gainedfromtheabovementioned, testginandanalyses, assupplemented byourcontinued awareness oftheissues'dis-cussedbytheNRCStaffwithregardstotheSequoyahandMcGuireNuclearlants,itisourpositionthattheDISdescribed inAttachment No.2to1t'llostitutethefinalhydrogencontrolsystemfortheDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantpendingcompletion ofthegeneg~~ricderadedcorerulemasng.vsoukIturbeliefthatconsideration ofadditional eventsequences, beyondS2Disnotwarranted atthistime.Indiana8MichiganElectricCompany.interprets 10CFR170.22asrequiring thatnofeeaccompany thissubmittal.

Verytrulyyours,hYR.S.HunterVicePresident cc:DohnE.Dolan-ColumbusR.C.Callen,G.Charno'ff D..V.Shaller-'ridgman R.M.Jurgensen RegionIIISite-Inspector