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{{#Wiki_filter:~~ANEPICANELECTR1CPGWERSe>viceCorpo~etio)s2Broadu:ay.Xeu:Pork,.l.}.Ir)00.t(2/2p.S>0.9000September7,1982AEP:NRC:0739DonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnitNo.1DocketNo.50-315LicenseNo.DPR-58REQUESTFORRELIEFFROMTECHNICALSPECIFICATION3.5.2Mr.HaroldR.Denton,DirectorOfficeofNuclearReactorRegulationU.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionWashington,D.C.20555Attention:Mr.StevenA.'Varga
{{#Wiki_filter:~~ANEPICANELECTR1CPGWERSe>viceCorpo~etio)s2Broadu:ay.
Xeu:Pork,.l.}.Ir)00.t(2/2p.S>0.9000September 7,1982AEP:NRC:0739 DonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnitNo.1DocketNo.50-315LicenseNo.DPR-58REQUESTFORRELIEFFROMTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.5.2Mr.HaroldR.Denton,DirectorOfficeofNuclearReactorRegulation U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555Attention:
Mr.StevenA.'Varga


==DearMr.Denton:==
==DearMr.Denton:==
ThisletterdocumentsthediscussionsheldwithmembersofyourStaffconcerningourrequestforalicenseamendmentgrantingrelieffromtherequirementsof.TechnicalSpecification3.5.2.EachUnitoftheCookNuclearPlanthastwoSafetyInjectionPumpsplustwoCentrifugalChargingPumpsandtwoResidualHeatRemovalPumps.InpreparationfortheblackouttestperformedonAugust14,1982,UnitNo.1'sNorthSafetyInjectionPumpsufferedseveredamage.We",haveproceededtorepairthepumpexpeditiouslybuthavenotbeenabletocompletetherepairsasofthetimeofthisletter.UnitNo.1TechnicalSpecification(T/S)No.3.5.2requires,amongotherthings,thattwoSafetyInjection(SI)PumpsbeoperableinModes1,2and3.UnitNo.1iscurrently'completingitsrefuelingoutageandthereturntoModes3,2and1ispreventedbytheinoperabilityoftheSIpumpandtheT/Smentionedabove.Inordertoproceedwiththelowpowerphysicstesting,werequestawaiveroftherequirementtohavetwoSIpumpsoperableinModes2(reactorthermalpowerlessthanorequalto5%)and3foraperiodofoneweekbeginningatthetimetheUnitentersMode3.TheSouthSIpumpwillbedemonstratedoperablepriortoenteringMode3.Allremainingtechnicalspecificationrequirementswillbemet.Attachment1tothislettercontainsthesafetyevaluationpreparedbyusinconjunctionwithWestinghouse.Theconclusionisthatevenifweweretolosetheoperable1SSafetyInjectionPumpsufficientmarginKP wy,@5"-&~9'M~-'a wrMr.H.R.Dent.AEP:NRC:0739wouldstillexisttothelimitsspecifiedin10CFR50.46.Thus,thisreliefisnotdetrimentaltothehealthandsafetyofthepublic.IWewouldappreciatetheexpeditioushandlingofthisrequestbyyourStaff.AEPSCinterprets10CFR170.22asrequiringthataClassIIIAmendmentFeebepaidforthechange.Acheckintheamountof$4,000willbetransmittedtoyouinafutureletter.hThisTechnicalSpecificationreliefrequesthasbeenreviewedbytheCookPlantPNSRC.ItwillbereviewedbyAEPSC'sNSDRCatthenext~scheduledmeeting.Duetothisletterbeingwrittenonshortnotice,ithasnotbeenpreparedfollowingourstanda"dCorporateProceduresforsuchletters.Weshall,however,reviewtheletteraccordingtoourCorporateProceduresandwil'nformyouifanymodificationisrequired.Verytrulyyours,/emcAttachmentcc:JohnE.Dolan-ColumbusR.S.HunterM.P.AlexichW.G.Smith,Jr.-BridgmanR.C.CallenG.CharnoffJoeWilliams,Jr.NRCResidentInspectoratCookPlant-Bridgman'~~
Thisletterdocuments thediscussions heldwithmembersofyourStaffconcerning ourrequestforalicenseamendment grantingrelieffromtherequirements of.Technical Specification 3.5.2.EachUnitoftheCookNuclearPlanthastwoSafetyInjection PumpsplustwoCentrifugal ChargingPumpsandtwoResidualHeatRemovalPumps.Inpreparation fortheblackouttestperformed onAugust14,1982,UnitNo.1'sNorthSafetyInjection Pumpsufferedseveredamage.We",haveproceeded torepairthepumpexpeditiously buthavenotbeenabletocompletetherepairsasofthetimeofthisletter.UnitNo.1Technical Specification (T/S)No.3.5.2requires, amongotherthings,thattwoSafetyInjection (SI)PumpsbeoperableinModes1,2and3.UnitNo.1iscurrently
AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:0739LOCAEvaluationforD.C.CookUnit1withOneSafetInectionPumOutofServiceThepurposeofthisevaluationistoassesstheeffectofonesafetyinjectionpumpoutofservicefortheCookUnit1NuclearPlantonLossofCoolantAccident(LOCA)consequences.Presently,theplantisfueledbyExxonNuclearCompany.However,theevaluationprovidedbelowisjudgedtobeapplicabletothenon'Westinghousefuel,sincetherearenoknownmajordesigndifferencesthatwouldhaveasignificantimpactontheLOCAbehaviorimportantforthisevaluation.LareBreakLOCASafetyinjectionpumpflowprovidesaninsignificantproportionofthetotalECCSflowduringalargebreakaccident,whereRCSpressurerapidlydropstonearatmospheric.Accumulatorandlowheadsafetyinjection(RHR)flowareimportantforthisaccident.Therefore,thelossofasafetyinjectionpumphasanegligibleeffectonlargeLOCAcalculatedpeakcladtemperature.SmallBreakLOCATheplant'sprotectionagainstsmallLOCAscomesfromatwotrainsystemincludingatotaloftwosafetyinjectionpumpsandtwohighheadchargingpumps.SmallLOCAFSARlicensinganalysesassumetheworstsinglefailuretobelossofatrain,leavingoneintermediateheadSIpumpandonechargingpump.ThesmallLOCAanalysisyieldscladtemperatureswellbelow10CFR50.46limits.Thisanalysisassumptionboundsthepresentplantconfigurationwithonesafetyinjectionpumpoutofserviceandnosinglefailure.Iftheworstsinglefailureassumptionisconsideredinadditiontothe;lossofthesafetyinjectionpump,andfurther,thetrainlostisassumed'tohavetheoperationalsafetyinjectionpump,ECCSflowisdeliveredfromonlythehighheadchargingpump.Thefollowingparagraphsevaluatethisscenario.ReductionofECCSflowintherangeof600to1200psiahasanadverse--"effectoncalculatedcladtemperatureforarangeofsmallLOCAbreaksizes.ThelossofasafetyinjectionpumphastheeffectofreducingdeliveredECCSflowinthatimportantpressurerange.TotalECCSflowwillbedegradedbyapproximately56%averagedoverthispressureinterval.Establishedsensitivitystudieshaveindicatedthatsuchadegradationresultsinasmuchasa550oFsmallLOCAPCTincrease.  
'completing itsrefueling outageandthereturntoModes3,2and1isprevented bytheinoperability oftheSIpumpandtheT/Smentioned above.Inordertoproceedwiththelowpowerphysicstesting,werequestawaiveroftherequirement tohavetwoSIpumpsoperableinModes2(reactorthermalpowerlessthanorequalto5%)and3foraperiodofoneweekbeginning atthetimetheUnitentersMode3.TheSouthSIpumpwillbedemonstrated operablepriortoenteringMode3.Allremaining technical specification requirements willbemet.Attachment 1tothislettercontainsthesafetyevaluation preparedbyusinconjunction withWestinghouse.
~~0t~.ThesmallbreakanalysisforCook1doesnotusethelatestNRCapprovedWsmallLOCAEvaluationModel.ThecurrentsmallbreakLOCAEMwouldcalculateaPCTofapproximately1200oF,reducedfrom1493F,predictedbytheanalysisintheFSAR.ThisnewPCTisestablishedfromanalysisofasubstantiallyequivalentplant(3250MWt,4Loop,sameSISdesign)analyzedinHCAP-8970-P-A,,"WestinghouseEmergencyCoreCo'olingSystemSmall8reakOctober,1975Model",andappliestoCook.Additionally,creditforconservativeassumptionsinthesmallLOCAFSARanalysiscanmitigatethePCTpenalty.Also,thecurrentsmallLOCAFSARanalysisisperformedat100%powerwhileduringtheperiodoftimeforwhichweareseekingT/Sreliefthereactorwillnotexceed5%power.Thelowerpower.levelof5%versus100%wouldmorethanoffsettheconsequencesofreducedECCSflow.Inconclusion,operationofCook1withasafetyinjectionpumpoutofserviceandamaximumpowerlevelof5%forabrief'periodoftimeisstillboundedbythesmallLOCAFSARanalysis.Inaddition,thefactthatthepresentanalysishassignificantmarginto10CFR50.46PCTlimitsindicatesthatstartupoftheplantfromthisrefuelingoutageisnotasafetyconcern.}}
Theconclusion isthatevenifweweretolosetheoperable1SSafetyInjection Pumpsufficient marginKP wy,@5"-&~9'M
~-'a wrMr.H.R.Dent.AEP:NRC:0739wouldstillexisttothelimitsspecified in10CFR50.46.Thus,thisreliefisnotdetrimental tothehealthandsafetyofthepublic.IWewouldappreciate theexpeditious handlingofthisrequestbyyourStaff.AEPSCinterprets 10CFR170.22asrequiring thataClassIIIAmendment Feebepaidforthechange.Acheckintheamountof$4,000willbetransmitted toyouinafutureletter.hThisTechnical Specification reliefrequesthasbeenreviewedbytheCookPlantPNSRC.ItwillbereviewedbyAEPSC'sNSDRCatthenext~scheduled meeting.Duetothisletterbeingwrittenonshortnotice,ithasnotbeenpreparedfollowing ourstanda"dCorporate Procedures forsuchletters.Weshall,however,reviewtheletteraccording toourCorporate Procedures andwil'nform youifanymodification isrequired.
Verytrulyyours,/emcAttachment cc:JohnE.Dolan-ColumbusR.S.HunterM.P.AlexichW.G.Smith,Jr.-BridgmanR.C.CallenG.CharnoffJoeWilliams, Jr.NRCResidentInspector atCookPlant-Bridgman'~~
Attachment toAEP:NRC:0739 LOCAEvaluation forD.C.CookUnit1withOneSafetInectionPumOutofServiceThepurposeofthisevaluation istoassesstheeffectofonesafetyinjection pumpoutofservicefortheCookUnit1NuclearPlantonLossofCoolantAccident(LOCA)consequences.
Presently, theplantisfueledbyExxonNuclearCompany.However,theevaluation providedbelowisjudgedtobeapplicable tothenon'Westinghouse fuel,sincetherearenoknownmajordesigndifferences thatwouldhaveasignificant impactontheLOCAbehaviorimportant forthisevaluation.
LareBreakLOCASafetyinjection pumpflowprovidesaninsignificant proportion ofthetotalECCSflowduringalargebreakaccident, whereRCSpressurerapidlydropstonearatmospheric.
Accumulator andlowheadsafetyinjection (RHR)flowareimportant forthisaccident.
Therefore, thelossofasafetyinjection pumphasanegligible effectonlargeLOCAcalculated peakcladtemperature.
SmallBreakLOCATheplant'sprotection againstsmallLOCAscomesfromatwotrainsystemincluding atotaloftwosafetyinjection pumpsandtwohighheadchargingpumps.SmallLOCAFSARlicensing analysesassumetheworstsinglefailuretobelossofatrain,leavingoneintermediate headSIpumpandonechargingpump.ThesmallLOCAanalysisyieldscladtemperatures wellbelow10CFR50.46limits.Thisanalysisassumption boundsthepresentplantconfiguration withonesafetyinjection pumpoutofserviceandnosinglefailure.Iftheworstsinglefailureassumption isconsidered inadditiontothe;lossofthesafetyinjection pump,andfurther,thetrainlostisassumed'tohavetheoperational safetyinjection pump,ECCSflowisdelivered fromonlythehighheadchargingpump.Thefollowing paragraphs evaluatethisscenario.
Reduction ofECCSflowintherangeof600to1200psiahasanadverse--"effect oncalculated cladtemperature forarangeofsmallLOCAbreaksizes.Thelossofasafetyinjectionpumphastheeffectofreducingdelivered ECCSflowinthatimportant pressurerange.TotalECCSflowwillbedegradedbyapproximately 56%averagedoverthispressureinterval.
Established sensitivity studieshaveindicated thatsuchadegradation resultsinasmuchasa550oFsmallLOCAPCTincrease.  
~~0t~.ThesmallbreakanalysisforCook1doesnotusethelatestNRCapprovedWsmallLOCAEvaluation Model.ThecurrentsmallbreakLOCAEMwouldcalculate aPCTofapproximately 1200oF,reducedfrom1493F,predicted bytheanalysisintheFSAR.ThisnewPCTisestablished fromanalysisofasubstantially equivalent plant(3250MWt,4Loop,sameSISdesign)analyzedinHCAP-8970-P-A,
,"Westinghouse Emergency CoreCo'olingSystemSmall8reakOctober,1975Model",andappliestoCook.Additionally, creditforconservative assumptions inthesmallLOCAFSARanalysiscanmitigatethePCTpenalty.Also,thecurrentsmallLOCAFSARanalysisisperformed at100%powerwhileduringtheperiodoftimeforwhichweareseekingT/Sreliefthereactorwillnotexceed5%power.Thelowerpower.levelof5%versus100%wouldmorethanoffsettheconsequences ofreducedECCSflow.Inconclusion, operation ofCook1withasafetyinjection pumpoutofserviceandamaximumpowerlevelof5%forabrief'periodoftimeisstillboundedbythesmallLOCAFSARanalysis.
Inaddition,thefactthatthepresentanalysishassignificant marginto10CFR50.46PCTlimitsindicates thatstartupoftheplantfromthisrefueling outageisnotasafetyconcern.}}

Revision as of 07:42, 29 June 2018

Documents Discussions on Request for License Amend Granting Relief from Requirements of Tech Spec 3.5.2 Re Safety Injection Pump Out of Svc.Safety Evaluation Prepared in Conjunction W/Westinghouse Supports Relief Request
ML17334A425
Person / Time
Site: Cook American Electric Power icon.png
Issue date: 09/07/1982
From: JURGENSEN R W
AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORP.
To: DENTON H R, VARGA S A
NRC, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
AEP:NRC:0739, AEP:NRC:739, NUDOCS 8209130234
Download: ML17334A425 (5)


Text

~~ANEPICANELECTR1CPGWERSe>viceCorpo~etio)s2Broadu:ay.

Xeu:Pork,.l.}.Ir)00.t(2/2p.S>0.9000September 7,1982AEP:NRC:0739 DonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnitNo.1DocketNo.50-315LicenseNo.DPR-58REQUESTFORRELIEFFROMTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.5.2Mr.HaroldR.Denton,DirectorOfficeofNuclearReactorRegulation U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555Attention:

Mr.StevenA.'Varga

DearMr.Denton:

Thisletterdocuments thediscussions heldwithmembersofyourStaffconcerning ourrequestforalicenseamendment grantingrelieffromtherequirements of.Technical Specification 3.5.2.EachUnitoftheCookNuclearPlanthastwoSafetyInjection PumpsplustwoCentrifugal ChargingPumpsandtwoResidualHeatRemovalPumps.Inpreparation fortheblackouttestperformed onAugust14,1982,UnitNo.1'sNorthSafetyInjection Pumpsufferedseveredamage.We",haveproceeded torepairthepumpexpeditiously buthavenotbeenabletocompletetherepairsasofthetimeofthisletter.UnitNo.1Technical Specification (T/S)No.3.5.2requires, amongotherthings,thattwoSafetyInjection (SI)PumpsbeoperableinModes1,2and3.UnitNo.1iscurrently

'completing itsrefueling outageandthereturntoModes3,2and1isprevented bytheinoperability oftheSIpumpandtheT/Smentioned above.Inordertoproceedwiththelowpowerphysicstesting,werequestawaiveroftherequirement tohavetwoSIpumpsoperableinModes2(reactorthermalpowerlessthanorequalto5%)and3foraperiodofoneweekbeginning atthetimetheUnitentersMode3.TheSouthSIpumpwillbedemonstrated operablepriortoenteringMode3.Allremaining technical specification requirements willbemet.Attachment 1tothislettercontainsthesafetyevaluation preparedbyusinconjunction withWestinghouse.

Theconclusion isthatevenifweweretolosetheoperable1SSafetyInjection Pumpsufficient marginKP wy,@5"-&~9'M

~-'a wrMr.H.R.Dent.AEP:NRC:0739wouldstillexisttothelimitsspecified in10CFR50.46.Thus,thisreliefisnotdetrimental tothehealthandsafetyofthepublic.IWewouldappreciate theexpeditious handlingofthisrequestbyyourStaff.AEPSCinterprets 10CFR170.22asrequiring thataClassIIIAmendment Feebepaidforthechange.Acheckintheamountof$4,000willbetransmitted toyouinafutureletter.hThisTechnical Specification reliefrequesthasbeenreviewedbytheCookPlantPNSRC.ItwillbereviewedbyAEPSC'sNSDRCatthenext~scheduled meeting.Duetothisletterbeingwrittenonshortnotice,ithasnotbeenpreparedfollowing ourstanda"dCorporate Procedures forsuchletters.Weshall,however,reviewtheletteraccording toourCorporate Procedures andwil'nform youifanymodification isrequired.

Verytrulyyours,/emcAttachment cc:JohnE.Dolan-ColumbusR.S.HunterM.P.AlexichW.G.Smith,Jr.-BridgmanR.C.CallenG.CharnoffJoeWilliams, Jr.NRCResidentInspector atCookPlant-Bridgman'~~

Attachment toAEP:NRC:0739 LOCAEvaluation forD.C.CookUnit1withOneSafetInectionPumOutofServiceThepurposeofthisevaluation istoassesstheeffectofonesafetyinjection pumpoutofservicefortheCookUnit1NuclearPlantonLossofCoolantAccident(LOCA)consequences.

Presently, theplantisfueledbyExxonNuclearCompany.However,theevaluation providedbelowisjudgedtobeapplicable tothenon'Westinghouse fuel,sincetherearenoknownmajordesigndifferences thatwouldhaveasignificant impactontheLOCAbehaviorimportant forthisevaluation.

LareBreakLOCASafetyinjection pumpflowprovidesaninsignificant proportion ofthetotalECCSflowduringalargebreakaccident, whereRCSpressurerapidlydropstonearatmospheric.

Accumulator andlowheadsafetyinjection (RHR)flowareimportant forthisaccident.

Therefore, thelossofasafetyinjection pumphasanegligible effectonlargeLOCAcalculated peakcladtemperature.

SmallBreakLOCATheplant'sprotection againstsmallLOCAscomesfromatwotrainsystemincluding atotaloftwosafetyinjection pumpsandtwohighheadchargingpumps.SmallLOCAFSARlicensing analysesassumetheworstsinglefailuretobelossofatrain,leavingoneintermediate headSIpumpandonechargingpump.ThesmallLOCAanalysisyieldscladtemperatures wellbelow10CFR50.46limits.Thisanalysisassumption boundsthepresentplantconfiguration withonesafetyinjection pumpoutofserviceandnosinglefailure.Iftheworstsinglefailureassumption isconsidered inadditiontothe;lossofthesafetyinjection pump,andfurther,thetrainlostisassumed'tohavetheoperational safetyinjection pump,ECCSflowisdelivered fromonlythehighheadchargingpump.Thefollowing paragraphs evaluatethisscenario.

Reduction ofECCSflowintherangeof600to1200psiahasanadverse--"effect oncalculated cladtemperature forarangeofsmallLOCAbreaksizes.Thelossofasafetyinjectionpumphastheeffectofreducingdelivered ECCSflowinthatimportant pressurerange.TotalECCSflowwillbedegradedbyapproximately 56%averagedoverthispressureinterval.

Established sensitivity studieshaveindicated thatsuchadegradation resultsinasmuchasa550oFsmallLOCAPCTincrease.

~~0t~.ThesmallbreakanalysisforCook1doesnotusethelatestNRCapprovedWsmallLOCAEvaluation Model.ThecurrentsmallbreakLOCAEMwouldcalculate aPCTofapproximately 1200oF,reducedfrom1493F,predicted bytheanalysisintheFSAR.ThisnewPCTisestablished fromanalysisofasubstantially equivalent plant(3250MWt,4Loop,sameSISdesign)analyzedinHCAP-8970-P-A,

,"Westinghouse Emergency CoreCo'olingSystemSmall8reakOctober,1975Model",andappliestoCook.Additionally, creditforconservative assumptions inthesmallLOCAFSARanalysiscanmitigatethePCTpenalty.Also,thecurrentsmallLOCAFSARanalysisisperformed at100%powerwhileduringtheperiodoftimeforwhichweareseekingT/Sreliefthereactorwillnotexceed5%power.Thelowerpower.levelof5%versus100%wouldmorethanoffsettheconsequences ofreducedECCSflow.Inconclusion, operation ofCook1withasafetyinjection pumpoutofserviceandamaximumpowerlevelof5%forabrief'periodoftimeisstillboundedbythesmallLOCAFSARanalysis.

Inaddition,thefactthatthepresentanalysishassignificant marginto10CFR50.46PCTlimitsindicates thatstartupoftheplantfromthisrefueling outageisnotasafetyconcern.