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| {{#Wiki_filter:Enclosurelpiigrim"riclearPowerStationRockyHillRoaoriirnc!r.Vassacnvsetts02360RalphG.BirdSe~orviceliesoe"'.-4u<<-earU.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionDocumentControlDeskWashington,DC20555BECo88-126Augustk8,1988LicenseOPR-35Docket50-293REVISEDINFORHATIONREGARDINGPILGRIMSTATIONAFTYNHANHNTPRRAH | | {{#Wiki_filter:Enclosure lpiigrim"riclearPowerStationRockyHillRoaoriirnc!r.Vassacnvsetts 02360RalphG.BirdSe~orviceliesoe"'.-4u<<-earU.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission DocumentControlDeskWashington, DC20555BECo88-126Augustk8,1988LicenseOPR-35Docket50-293REVISEDINFORHATION REGARDING PILGRIMSTATIONAFTYNHANHNTPRRAH |
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| ==DearSir:== | | ==DearSir:== |
| EnclosedisadescriptionofareviseddesignfortheDirectTorusVentSystem(OTVS)thatwasdescribedinthe"ReportonP1lgrimStationSafetyEnhancements"datedJuly1,1987andtransmittedtotheNRCwithMr.Bird'letter(BECo87-ill)toMr.VargadatedJuly8,1987.Thisrevisionsupersedesin1tsentiretytheSection3.21ncludedintheJulyl,1987report.OnMarch7,1988BostonEdisonCompany(BECo)personnelmetwithOr.Hurley,Hr.Russell,andOr.Thadaniandprov1dedatourofSEPmodif1cationsandaninformalpresentationofthequantificationofcompetingr1sksassociatedwithventingthecontainmentandconclus1onsdrawnfromtheseresults.Th1spresentationprovidedBECotheopportunitytorespondtoquest1onsposedunderItem1Section3,2-"Installat1onofA01rectTorusVentSystem(OTVS)"inHr.Varga'slettertoHr.81rdofAugust2l,1987"InitialAssessmentofPilgrimSafetyEnhancementProgram".ThematerialpresentedwasmadeavailabletotheresidentinspectorandwasincludedasAttachmentIIinNRCInspectionReport488-12,datedMay31,1988.AsyouareawarefromplantinspectionswehaveinstalledtheDTVSp1pingandport1onsofrelatedcontrolwiring.Currently.theDTVSisisolatedfromtheStandbyGasTreatmentSystem(SBGTS)bybl1ndflangesinstalledinplaceofValveAO-5025andtheDTVSrupturedisk.ThisconfigurationwasinspectedbyNRR1ntheperformanceofatechnicalreviewwhichfocusedonSystem,Hechan1calDesignandStructuralDes1gnissues.ThereviewtookplaceonHarch2-3,1988asdocumentedinNRCInspectionReport488-07,datedHay6,l988anddeterminedtheinstallationconfigurat1ontobeacceptable.WenowplantoremovetheseblindflangesandproceedwithinstallationofValveAO-5025andtheDTVSrupturedisk.Weconcludethevalveandrupturediskprov1deequivalentphysicalisolationoftheDTVSp1pingfromtheSBGTSandappropriatelyensuretheoperationalintegrityoftheSBGTSunderdesignbasisaccidentconditions.Followingcompletionofthiswork,wewillperformalocalleakratetesttoverifythatValveAO-5025isacceptablyleaktightusingthesamemethodpreviouslyutilizedintestingthebl1ndflange.Wealsoplantocompleteallremain1ngelectricalworkontheOTVS1naccordancewith=----~h~evi.seddesign.jvppJ,;,"itv rIir'll>>
| | Enclosedisadescription ofareviseddesignfortheDirectTorusVentSystem(OTVS)thatwasdescribed inthe"ReportonP1lgrimStationSafetyEnhancements" datedJuly1,1987andtransmitted totheNRCwithMr.Bird'letter(BECo87-ill)toMr.VargadatedJuly8,1987.Thisrevisionsupersedes in1tsentiretytheSection3.21ncludedintheJulyl,1987report.OnMarch7,1988BostonEdisonCompany(BECo)personnel metwithOr.Hurley,Hr.Russell,andOr.Thadaniandprov1dedatourofSEPmodif1cations andaninformalpresentation ofthequantification ofcompeting r1sksassociated withventingthecontainment andconclus1ons drawnfromtheseresults.Th1spresentation providedBECotheopportunity torespondtoquest1ons posedunderItem1Section3,2-"Installat1on ofA01rectTorusVentSystem(OTVS)"inHr.Varga'slettertoHr.81rdofAugust2l,1987"InitialAssessment ofPilgrimSafetyEnhancement Program". |
| BOSTONFOISONPANYAugust1&,1988U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionPage2Qnthebas1softherevisedSection3.2,weconcludethattheDTVSdesignasdescribed1ntheenclosuredoesnotrequireanychangetotheTechr.'.calSpecificationsandthatwecanproceedwithinstallationwithoutpriorNRCapproval.PleasefeelfreetocontactmeorMr.3.E.Howard,ofmystaffat(617)849-89001fyouhaveanyquestionspertainingtothedesigndeta11softheDTVS. | | Thematerialpresented wasmadeavailable totheresidentinspector andwasincludedasAttachment IIinNRCInspection Report488-12,datedMay31,1988.Asyouareawarefromplantinspections wehaveinstalled theDTVSp1pingandport1onsofrelatedcontrolwiring.Currently. |
| | theDTVSisisolatedfromtheStandbyGasTreatment System(SBGTS)bybl1ndflangesinstalled inplaceofValveAO-5025andtheDTVSrupturedisk.Thisconfiguration wasinspected byNRR1ntheperformance ofatechnical reviewwhichfocusedonSystem,Hechan1cal DesignandStructural Des1gnissues.ThereviewtookplaceonHarch2-3,1988asdocumented inNRCInspection Report488-07,datedHay6,l988anddetermined theinstallation configurat1on tobeacceptable. |
| | Wenowplantoremovetheseblindflangesandproceedwithinstallation ofValveAO-5025andtheDTVSrupturedisk.Weconcludethevalveandrupturediskprov1deequivalent physicalisolation oftheDTVSp1pingfromtheSBGTSandappropriately ensuretheoperational integrity oftheSBGTSunderdesignbasisaccidentconditions. |
| | Following completion ofthiswork,wewillperformalocalleakratetesttoverifythatValveAO-5025isacceptably leaktightusingthesamemethodpreviously utilizedintestingthebl1ndflange.Wealsoplantocompleteallremain1ng electrical workontheOTVS1naccordance with=----~h~evi.sed design.jvppJ,;,"itv rIir'll>> |
| | BOSTONFOISONPANYAugust1&,1988U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Page2Qnthebas1softherevisedSection3.2,weconcludethattheDTVSdesignasdescribed 1ntheenclosure doesnotrequireanychangetotheTechr.'.cal Specifications andthatwecanproceedwithinstallation withoutpriorNRCapproval. |
| | PleasefeelfreetocontactmeorMr.3.E.Howard,ofmystaffat(617)849-89001fyouhaveanyquestions pertaining tothedesigndeta11softheDTVS. |
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| ==Attachment:== | | ==Attachment:== |
| Section3.2Rev1s1on1"InstallationOfADirectTorusVentSystem(DTVS)"3EH/amm/2282CC:Hr.0.HcOonald,Pro)ectHanager01visionofReactorPro]ectsI/IIOfficeofNuclearReactorRegulationU.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommiss1onHa11Stat1onPl-137Washington,D.C.20555U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommiss1onRegionI475AllendaleRoadKingofPrussia,PA19406SeniorNRCResidentInspectorPilgrimNuclearPowerStat1on I4~4 AttachmenttoBECoLetter88-126Section3.2Revision1"Installat)onOfADirectTorusVentSystem(OTVS)"page"14,15,16,17,18,19,19A,198 IPI4$)gt+I 32NTATNFARTTR3.2.13,2.2ivfhnThisdesignchangeprovidestheabilityfordirectventingofthetorustothemainstack.ContainmentventingisonecoredamagepreventionstrategyutilizedtntheBHROwnersGroupEmergencyProcedureGuidelines(EPGs}aspreviouslyapprovedbytheNRCandfsrequiredinplant-specificEmergencyOperatingProcedures(EOPs}.Thetorusventlineconnectingthetorustothemainstackwf11provideanalternateventpathforimplementingEOPrequirementsandrepresentsasignificantimprovementrelativetoexlstlngplantventcapability.For56psisaturatedsteamconditionslnthetorus,apporoximately1'ldecayheatcanbevented.nhnThisdesignchange(Figure3.2-1)providesadirectventpathfromthetorustothemainstackbypassingtheStandbyGasTreatmentSystem(SBGTS).Thebypasslsan8"linewhoseupstreamendlsconnectedtothepipebetweenprimarycontainmentisolationvalvesAO-5042A5B.Thedownstreamendofthebypassisconnectedtothe20"mainstacklinedownstreamofSBGTSvalvesAON-108andAON-112.An8"butterflyvalve(A0-5025),whichcanberemotelyoperated'romthemaincontrolroom,lsaddeddownstreamof8"valveAO-50428.ThisvalveactsastheprimarycontainmentoutboardisolationvalveforthedirecttorusventlineandwillconformtoNRCrequirementsforsealedclosedisolationvalvesasdefinedinNUREG0800SRP6.2.4.ThenewpipeisASMEIIIClass2uptoandinclusiveofvalveAO-5025.TestconnectionsareprovidedupstreamanddownstreamofA0-5025.ThedesignchangereplacestheexlstlngACsolenoidvalveforAO-5042BwfthaDCsolenoidvalve(poweredfromessential125voltDC)toensureoperabilitywithoutdependenceonACpower.Thenewisolationvalve,AO-5025,lsalsoprovidedwithaDCsolenoidpoweredfromtheredundant125voltDCsource.Bothofthesevalvesarenormallyclosedandfallclosedonlossofelectricalandpneumaticpower.OneinchnitrogenlinesareaddedtoprovidenitrogentovalvesAO-5042BandAO-5025.NewvalveAO-5025willbecontrolledbyaremotemanualkey-lockedcontrolswitch.Duringnormaloperation,powertotheAO-5025DCsolenoidwillalsobedisabledbyremovaloffuseslnthewlrlngtothesolenoidvalve.ThissatisfiesNUREG0800SRP6.2.4,ContainmentIsolationSystemacceptancecriteriaforasealedclosedbarrier.AnadditionalfusewillbeinstalledandremaininplacetopowervalvestatusindicationforAO-5025lnthemaincontrolroom.-14-Rev.1(7/25/88) | | |
| | Section3.2Rev1s1on1"Installation OfADirectTorusVentSystem(DTVS)"3EH/amm/2282 CC:Hr.0.HcOonald, Pro)ectHanager01visionofReactorPro]ectsI/IIOfficeofNuclearReactorRegulation U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commiss1on Ha11Stat1onPl-137Washington, D.C.20555U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commiss1on RegionI475Allendale RoadKingofPrussia,PA19406SeniorNRCResidentInspector PilgrimNuclearPowerStat1on I4~4 Attachment toBECoLetter88-126Section3.2Revision1"Installat)on OfADirectTorusVentSystem(OTVS)"page"14,15,16,17,18,19,19A,198 IPI4$)gt+I 32NTATNFARTTR3.2.13,2.2ivfhnThisdesignchangeprovidestheabilityfordirectventingofthetorustothemainstack.Containment ventingisonecoredamageprevention strategyutilizedtntheBHROwnersGroupEmergency Procedure Guidelines (EPGs}aspreviously approvedbytheNRCandfsrequiredinplant-specific Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs}.Thetorusventlineconnecting thetorustothemainstackwf11provideanalternate ventpathforimplementing EOPrequirements andrepresents asignificant improvement relativetoexlstlngplantventcapability. |
| | For56psisaturated steamconditions lnthetorus,apporoximately 1'ldecayheatcanbevented.nhnThisdesignchange(Figure3.2-1)providesadirectventpathfromthetorustothemainstackbypassing theStandbyGasTreatment System(SBGTS).Thebypasslsan8"linewhoseupstreamendlsconnected tothepipebetweenprimarycontainment isolation valvesAO-5042A5B.Thedownstream endofthebypassisconnected tothe20"mainstacklinedownstream ofSBGTSvalvesAON-108andAON-112.An8"butterfly valve(A0-5025), |
| | whichcanberemotelyoperated'rom themaincontrolroom,lsaddeddownstream of8"valveAO-50428. |
| | Thisvalveactsastheprimarycontainment outboardisolation valveforthedirecttorusventlineandwillconformtoNRCrequirements forsealedclosedisolation valvesasdefinedinNUREG0800SRP6.2.4.ThenewpipeisASMEIIIClass2uptoandinclusive ofvalveAO-5025.Testconnections areprovidedupstreamanddownstream ofA0-5025.ThedesignchangereplacestheexlstlngACsolenoidvalveforAO-5042BwfthaDCsolenoidvalve(poweredfromessential 125voltDC)toensureoperability withoutdependence onACpower.Thenewisolation valve,AO-5025,lsalsoprovidedwithaDCsolenoidpoweredfromtheredundant 125voltDCsource.Bothofthesevalvesarenormallyclosedandfallclosedonlossofelectrical andpneumatic power.OneinchnitrogenlinesareaddedtoprovidenitrogentovalvesAO-5042BandAO-5025.NewvalveAO-5025willbecontrolled byaremotemanualkey-locked controlswitch.Duringnormaloperation, powertotheAO-5025DCsolenoidwillalsobedisabledbyremovaloffuseslnthewlrlngtothesolenoidvalve.Thissatisfies NUREG0800SRP6.2.4,Containment Isolation Systemacceptance criteriaforasealedclosedbarrier.Anadditional fusewillbeinstalled andremaininplacetopowervalvestatusindication forAO-5025lnthemaincontrolroom.-14-Rev.1(7/25/88) |
| CI~ll( | | CI~ll( |
| NUREG0800,SRP6.2.4,ItemII.6.Fallowstheuseofsealedclosedbarriersinplaceofautomatic1solationvalves.Sealedclosedbarriersincludebl1ndflangesandsealedclosed1solationvalveswhichmaybeclosedremote-manualvalves.SRP6.2.4callsforadministrativecontroltoassurethatsealedclosed1solat1onvalvescannotbe1nadvertentlyopened.This1ncludesmechanicaldevicestosealor'iockthevalveclosed,ortopreventpowerfrombeingsuppliedtothevalveoperator.ConsistentwithSRP6.2.4,valveAO-5025willbeasealedclosedremotemanualvalveunderadministrativecontroltoassurethatitcannotbeinadvertentlyopened.Administrat1vecontrolwillbemaintainedbyakey-lockedremotemanualcontrolswitchandafuseremovedtopreventpowerfrombeingsuppliedtothevalveoperator.InaccordancewithNUREG0737,ItemII.E.4.2.7Position6,AO-5025willbesealedclosedandverif1edassuchatleastevery31days.A20"pipewillreplacetheexisting20"d1ameterductbetweenSBGTSvalvesAON-108,AON-112'andtheexisting20"pipetothemainstack.Theexisting20"d1ameterductdownstreamofAO-5042A1sshortenedtoallowfitupofthenewventlinebranchconnection.Arupturediskwillbeincludedinthe8"pip1ngdownstreamofvalveAO-5025.Therupturediskw111provideasecondleakagebarr1er.Therupturediskisdes1gnedtoopenbelowcontainmentdesignpressure,butwillbeintactuptopressuresequaltoorgreaterthanthosewhichcauseanautomat1ccontainment1solationduringanyaccidentconditions.ThetwoPr1maryContainmentIsolationValves(PCIVs)AO-50428andAO-5025areplacedinser1eswiththerupturedisk.Nos1ngleoperator,errorinvalveoperat1oncanactivatetheDTVS.Therupturediskhasarupturepressureabovetheautomaticconta1nmenthighpressuretrippo1nt.Thus,theinboardPCIV(AO-50428)willreceiveanautomatic1solationpr1ortod1skrupture.TheinboardPCIV(AO-5042B)requiresphys1calelectr1cal)umper1nstallationtoopenatpr1maryconta1nmentpressureabovetheautomatich1ghpressuretrippo1nt.ValveAO-5025willbeclosedwheneverprimaryconta1nmentintegrity1srequiredandDCpowertoitssolenoidcontrolvalvewillbedisconnected.Indicationofvalvepositionwillbeprovidedinthemaincontrolroomevenw1ththevalvepowerremoved.Useofthedirecttorusventw1llbeinaccordancew1thapprovedEPGrequirementsandcontrolledbyEOPsinthesamewannerasotherex1stingconta1nmentventpaths.Pr1ortoopeningtheventvalvestheSBGTsystemwillbeshutdownandvalvesAON-108andAON-ll2(theoutletofSBGT)placed1naclosedposition.-15-Rev.l(7/25/88) h~i, 1New8"ventpipe(8"-H88-44),nclud1ngvalveAO-5025issafetyrelated.Ventpip1ngdownstreamofAO-5025,includingS8GTSdischargepipingtomainstack,isalsosafetyrelated.AllsafetyrelatedpipingwillbesupportedasClassI.Nitrogenpiping1snon-safetyrelatedandwillbesupportedasClassII/I.TheinterpretationoftheClassII/Idesignationthroughthisreportisg1venbelow:AllClassIIitemswhichhavethepotentialtodegradetheintegrityofaClassIitemareanalyzed.SuchClassIIitemsdonotrequiredependablemechanicalorelectr1calfunct1onalitydur1ngSSE,onlythatallofthefollowingconditionsprevail:l.TheClassIIitemscreatenomissileswh1chimpactunprotectedClassIitemssafetyfunctions.2.TheClassIIitemdoesnotdeforminawaywhichwoulddegradeaClassIitem.3.IftheClassIIitemfails,thentheClassIitemisprotectedagainstthefullimpactofallm1ss1lesgeneratedbytheassumedfailureofClassII1tems.Allelectricalportionsofthisdes1gnaresafetyrelatedexceptfortheind1catingl1ghtsontheMIMICpanelC904,thetie-instotheannunciator,andinterfacewiththeplantcomputer.1nhnv3.2.3.1m/mnnAfninmnAhThetoruspurgeexhaustline1nboardisolationvalveAO-50428andtheassociated8"pipearethecomponentsoftheCACSaffectedbythedes1gnmodificat1on.Withincorporationofthesub)ectmodification,theCACSwilldependonbothessent1alAC(forvalveAO-5042A)andessent1alOC(forAO-50428)toperform1tspurg1ngfunct1on.Thenew8"torusventlinewillbeconnectedtoexist1ng8"CACSpipingbetweenvalvesAO-5042BandA0-5042A.-16-Rev.1(7/25/88) lk'Igl TheSBGTSfanoutletvalves(AON-108andAON-112>,ductworkfromthesevalvestothe20"lineleadingtothemainstack,andthe20"11neleadingtothemainstackarethecomponentsofthissystemaffectedbytheproposedchange.ValveAON-108isnormallyclosed,fall-open.ValveAON-1121snormallyclosed,fail-closed,andthesevalvesareprovidedwithessent1alOCpo~erandlocalsafetyrelateda1rsupplies.imrmnmPValveAO-5042BisaffectedbythechangefromACtoOCpowerforthesolenoidandbyreplacementoftheex1stingairsupplywithn1trogen.Theadd1tionofcontainmentoutboardisolationvalve(AO-5025)willnotaffectthePCIS.ValveAO-5025actsasthepr1maryconta1nmentoutboard1solationvalveforthedirecttorusventl1neandwillconformtoNRCrequirementsforsealedclosedisolat1onvalvesasdefinedinNUREG0800SRP6.2.4.ffffm/mnnThissystemhasthesafetyfunctionofreducingthepossib111tyofanenergyreleasewithinthepr1marycontainmentfromaHydrogen-Oxygenreactionfollow1ngapostulatedLOCAcombinedw1thdegradedCoreStandbyCoolingSystem.Thissystemfiltersexhaustairfromthereactorbuild1ngandd1schargestheprocessedairtothemainstack.Thesystemf1ltersparticulatesandiod1nesfromtheexhauststreaminordertoreducethelevelofa1rbornecontam1nationreleasedtotheenv1ronsv1athema1nstack.TheSBGTScanalsof1lterexhaustairfromthedrywellandthesuppressionpool.-17-Rev.l(7/25/88) k\QI4~H1~f~1Ir Thissystemprovidestimelyprotectionagainsttheonsetandconsequencesofdesignbasisaccidentsinvolvingthegrossreleaseofradioactivematerialsfromtheprimarycontainmentbyinitiatingautomaticisolationofappropriatepipelineswhichpenetratetheprimarycontainmentwhenevermonitoredvariablesexceedpre-selectedoperationallimits.imninmnmTheprimarycontainmentsystem,incon3unctionwithothersafeguardfeatures,limitsthereleaseoffissionproductslntheeventofapostulateddesignbasisaccidentsothatoffsitedosesdonotexceedtheguidelinevaluesof10CFR100.3,2.3.3P11ffnf3.2.3.4TheimprovementschangetheAO-5042BsolenoidcontrolfromACtoOCenablingittoopen(fromitsnormallyclosedposition)withnodependenceonACpoweravailability.Theexistingairsupplyto-AO-5042Blsbeingreplacedbynitrogen.DuctworkattheoutletoftheSBGTSlsreplacedwithpipeandthenewventlinelsconnectedtothe20"lineattheoutletoftheSBGTS,Additionofanew8"ventlinewithcontainmentisolationvalveAO-5025off.theexistingtorusventlinecouldintroduceaflowpathunderdesignbasiscond>tlonsthatcouldventthecontainmentdirectlytothestackbypassingtheSBGTS.AnanalysisoftheeffectsonthesafetyfunctionsofCACS,SBGTS,PCISandPCSforthelnstallatlonofthedirecttorusventlsdescribedasfollows:ThechangefromACtoOCcontrolandthereplacementsofairwithnitrogenonAO-50428doesnotadverselyaffecttheabilitytoopenAO-50428whenthecontainmentlsbeingpurged,ortoisolateunderaccidentconditions.-18-Rev.1(7/25/88) | | NUREG0800,SRP6.2.4,ItemII.6.Fallowstheuseofsealedclosedbarriersinplaceofautomatic 1solation valves.Sealedclosedbarriersincludebl1ndflangesandsealedclosed1solation valveswhichmaybeclosedremote-manual valves.SRP6.2.4callsforadministrative controltoassurethatsealedclosed1solat1on valvescannotbe1nadvertently opened.This1ncludesmechanical devicestosealor'iockthevalveclosed,ortopreventpowerfrombeingsuppliedtothevalveoperator. |
| | Consistent withSRP6.2.4,valveAO-5025willbeasealedclosedremotemanualvalveunderadministrative controltoassurethatitcannotbeinadvertently opened.Administrat1ve controlwillbemaintained byakey-locked remotemanualcontrolswitchandafuseremovedtopreventpowerfrombeingsuppliedtothevalveoperator. |
| | Inaccordance withNUREG0737,ItemII.E.4.2.7 Position6,AO-5025willbesealedclosedandverif1edassuchatleastevery31days.A20"pipewillreplacetheexisting20"d1ameterductbetweenSBGTSvalvesAON-108,AON-112'and theexisting20"pipetothemainstack.Theexisting20"d1ameterductdownstream ofAO-5042A1sshortened toallowfitupofthenewventlinebranchconnection. |
| | Arupturediskwillbeincludedinthe8"pip1ngdownstream ofvalveAO-5025.Therupturediskw111provideasecondleakagebarr1er.Therupturediskisdes1gnedtoopenbelowcontainment designpressure, butwillbeintactuptopressures equaltoorgreaterthanthosewhichcauseanautomat1c containment 1solation duringanyaccidentconditions. |
| | ThetwoPr1maryContainment Isolation Valves(PCIVs)AO-50428andAO-5025areplacedinser1eswiththerupturedisk.Nos1ngleoperator, errorinvalveoperat1on canactivatetheDTVS.Therupturediskhasarupturepressureabovetheautomatic conta1nment highpressuretrippo1nt.Thus,theinboardPCIV(AO-50428) willreceiveanautomatic 1solation pr1ortod1skrupture.TheinboardPCIV(AO-5042B) requiresphys1calelectr1cal |
| | )umper1nstallation toopenatpr1maryconta1nment pressureabovetheautomatic h1ghpressuretrippo1nt.ValveAO-5025willbeclosedwheneverprimaryconta1nment integrity 1srequiredandDCpowertoitssolenoidcontrolvalvewillbedisconnected. |
| | Indication ofvalvepositionwillbeprovidedinthemaincontrolroomevenw1ththevalvepowerremoved.Useofthedirecttorusventw1llbeinaccordance w1thapprovedEPGrequirements andcontrolled byEOPsinthesamewannerasotherex1stingconta1nment ventpaths.Pr1ortoopeningtheventvalvestheSBGTsystemwillbeshutdownandvalvesAON-108andAON-ll2(theoutletofSBGT)placed1naclosedposition. Rev.l(7/25/88) h~i, 1New8"ventpipe(8"-H88-44), |
| | nclud1ngvalveAO-5025issafetyrelated.Ventpip1ngdownstream ofAO-5025,including S8GTSdischarge pipingtomainstack,isalsosafetyrelated.Allsafetyrelatedpipingwillbesupported asClassI.Nitrogenpiping1snon-safety relatedandwillbesupported asClassII/I.Theinterpretation oftheClassII/Idesignation throughthisreportisg1venbelow:AllClassIIitemswhichhavethepotential todegradetheintegrity ofaClassIitemareanalyzed. |
| | SuchClassIIitemsdonotrequiredependable mechanical orelectr1cal funct1onality dur1ngSSE,onlythatallofthefollowing conditions prevail:l.TheClassIIitemscreatenomissileswh1chimpactunprotected ClassIitemssafetyfunctions. |
| | 2.TheClassIIitemdoesnotdeforminawaywhichwoulddegradeaClassIitem.3.IftheClassIIitemfails,thentheClassIitemisprotected againstthefullimpactofallm1ss1lesgenerated bytheassumedfailureofClassII1tems.Allelectrical portionsofthisdes1gnaresafetyrelatedexceptfortheind1cating l1ghtsontheMIMICpanelC904,thetie-instotheannunciator, andinterface withtheplantcomputer. |
| | 1nhnv3.2.3.1m/mnnAfninmnAhThetoruspurgeexhaustline1nboardisolation valveAO-50428andtheassociated 8"pipearethecomponents oftheCACSaffectedbythedes1gnmodificat1on. |
| | Withincorporation ofthesub)ectmodification, theCACSwilldependonbothessent1al AC(forvalveAO-5042A) andessent1al OC(forAO-50428) toperform1tspurg1ngfunct1on. |
| | Thenew8"torusventlinewillbeconnected toexist1ng8"CACSpipingbetweenvalvesAO-5042BandA0-5042A. Rev.1(7/25/88) lk'Igl TheSBGTSfanoutletvalves(AON-108andAON-112>, |
| | ductworkfromthesevalvestothe20"lineleadingtothemainstack,andthe20"11neleadingtothemainstackarethecomponents ofthissystemaffectedbytheproposedchange.ValveAON-108isnormallyclosed,fall-open. |
| | ValveAON-1121snormallyclosed,fail-closed, andthesevalvesareprovidedwithessent1al OCpo~erandlocalsafetyrelateda1rsupplies. |
| | imrmnmPValveAO-5042BisaffectedbythechangefromACtoOCpowerforthesolenoidandbyreplacement oftheex1stingairsupplywithn1trogen. |
| | Theadd1tionofcontainment outboardisolation valve(AO-5025) willnotaffectthePCIS.ValveAO-5025actsasthepr1maryconta1nment outboard1solation valveforthedirecttorusventl1neandwillconformtoNRCrequirements forsealedclosedisolat1on valvesasdefinedinNUREG0800SRP6.2.4.ffffm/mnnThissystemhasthesafetyfunctionofreducingthepossib111ty ofanenergyreleasewithinthepr1marycontainment fromaHydrogen-Oxygen reactionfollow1ng apostulated LOCAcombinedw1thdegradedCoreStandbyCoolingSystem.Thissystemfiltersexhaustairfromthereactorbuild1ngandd1scharges theprocessed airtothemainstack.Thesystemf1ltersparticulates andiod1nesfromtheexhauststreaminordertoreducethelevelofa1rbornecontam1nation releasedtotheenv1ronsv1athema1nstack.TheSBGTScanalsof1lterexhaustairfromthedrywellandthesuppression pool.-17-Rev.l(7/25/88) k\QI4~H1~f~1Ir Thissystemprovidestimelyprotection againsttheonsetandconsequences ofdesignbasisaccidents involving thegrossreleaseofradioactive materials fromtheprimarycontainment byinitiating automatic isolation ofappropriate pipelines whichpenetrate theprimarycontainment whenevermonitored variables exceedpre-selected operational limits.imninmnmTheprimarycontainment system,incon3unction withothersafeguard |
| | : features, limitsthereleaseoffissionproductslntheeventofapostulated designbasisaccidentsothatoffsitedosesdonotexceedtheguideline valuesof10CFR100.3,2.3.3P11ffnf3.2.3.4Theimprovements changetheAO-5042BsolenoidcontrolfromACtoOCenablingittoopen(fromitsnormallyclosedposition) withnodependence onACpoweravailability. |
| | Theexistingairsupplyto-AO-5042B lsbeingreplacedbynitrogen. |
| | DuctworkattheoutletoftheSBGTSlsreplacedwithpipeandthenewventlinelsconnected tothe20"lineattheoutletoftheSBGTS,Additionofanew8"ventlinewithcontainment isolation valveAO-5025off.theexistingtorusventlinecouldintroduce aflowpathunderdesignbasiscond>tlons thatcouldventthecontainment directlytothestackbypassing theSBGTS.Ananalysisoftheeffectsonthesafetyfunctions ofCACS,SBGTS,PCISandPCSforthelnstallatlon ofthedirecttorusventlsdescribed asfollows:ThechangefromACtoOCcontrolandthereplacements ofairwithnitrogenonAO-50428doesnotadversely affecttheabilitytoopenAO-50428whenthecontainment lsbeingpurged,ortoisolateunderaccidentconditions. Rev.1(7/25/88) |
| JI1't'ff%'LcIr,rSh.~lt~ | | JI1't'ff%'LcIr,rSh.~lt~ |
| Themodtftcattonstheductworkand20"1incleadingtothemainstackdonotaffectthedesignbasissafetyfunctionofanyofthesafetyrelatedsystems.Dur1ngnormalplantoperattons,theCACSandtheSBGTSdanotusethetorus20"purgeandventlinetoperformthe1rsafetyfunct1ons.Thecontainmentisolat1onvalvesaretntheirnormallyclosedposition,thusmatntatntngprimarycontainmentboundary1ntegrtty.TherearenoadverseaffectsantheprimarycontainmentsystembytheadditionoftheOTVS.ValveAO-5025willconformtoNRCcriteriaforsealedclosedtsolattonvalvesasdefinedtnNURfG0800SRP6.2.4andwillnotaffectdesignbasisaccidents.UseoftheOTVSwillbeinaccordancewtththecontainmentventingprovisionsofEPGsasapprovedbytheNRCandcontrolledbyEOPstnthesamemannerasotherexistingcontainmentventpaths.Theeffectsonthetorusofthenew8"pipingandAO-5025havebeenevaluatedforHarkIprogramloadtngs,usingASHEBPVCSectionIIIcriteria.Theremainingp1ptngincludingtherupturedtskwasevaluatedusingANSIB31.1requ1rements.Our1ngplantstartupandshutdown(non-emergencycondttton)whenthepurgeandventlineis1nuse,valveAO-5025remainsclosed.Inaddition,theruptured1skdownstreamafvalveAO-5025willprovtdeasecondpositivemeansofpreventingleakageandpreventdirectreleaseuptothestackduringconta1nmentpurgeandventatplantstartuparshutdown.Ouringconta1nmenthighpressurecond1ttons,thetorusma1nexhaust11neisautoeattcally1solatedbythePCIS.Thereisnochangetotheexistingprimarycontainment1solattonsystemfunctionforAO-5042AorAO-50428.ThesealedclosedpositionofvalveAO-5025andtheaddtttanalassuranceaddedbytherupturediskdownstreamwillpreventanyinadvertentdischargeupthestackforalldesignbasisaccidentconditions.InstallationoftheOTVSdoesnotadverselyaffectthesafetyfuncttansoftheCACS,SBGTS,PCISortheintegrityofprimarycontainmentoranyothersafetyrelatedsystems.~-19-Rev.1(7/25/88)
| | Themodtftcattons theductworkand20"1incleadingtothemainstackdonotaffectthedesignbasissafetyfunctionofanyofthesafetyrelatedsystems.Dur1ngnormalplantoperattons, theCACSandtheSBGTSdanotusethetorus20"purgeandventlinetoperformthe1rsafetyfunct1ons. |
| ~.JI UseoftheDTVSw111naccordancev1ththeconta1nmentvent1ngprov1s1onsofKPGsasapprovedbytheNRCandcontrolledbyKOPs1nthesamemannerasotherex1st1ngconta1nment,ventpaths.TheOTVSprov1desan1mprovedconta1nmentvent1ngcapab111tyfordecayheatremovalwh1chreducespotent1alons1teandoffs1te1mpactsrelativetotheex1st1ngconta1nmentvent1ngcapab111ty.Rev.1(7/25/88) | | Thecontainment isolat1on valvesaretntheirnormallyclosedposition, thusmatntatntng primarycontainment boundary1ntegrtty. |
| | Therearenoadverseaffectsantheprimarycontainment systembytheadditionoftheOTVS.ValveAO-5025willconformtoNRCcriteriaforsealedclosedtsolatton valvesasdefinedtnNURfG0800SRP6.2.4andwillnotaffectdesignbasisaccidents. |
| | UseoftheOTVSwillbeinaccordance wtththecontainment ventingprovisions ofEPGsasapprovedbytheNRCandcontrolled byEOPstnthesamemannerasotherexistingcontainment ventpaths.Theeffectsonthetorusofthenew8"pipingandAO-5025havebeenevaluated forHarkIprogramloadtngs, usingASHEBPVCSectionIIIcriteria. |
| | Theremaining p1ptngincluding therupturedtskwasevaluated usingANSIB31.1requ1rements. |
| | Our1ngplantstartupandshutdown(non-emergency condttton) whenthepurgeandventlineis1nuse,valveAO-5025remainsclosed.Inaddition, theruptured1skdownstream afvalveAO-5025willprovtdeasecondpositivemeansofpreventing leakageandpreventdirectreleaseuptothestackduringconta1nment purgeandventatplantstartuparshutdown. |
| | Ouringconta1nment highpressurecond1ttons, thetorusma1nexhaust11neisautoeattcally 1solatedbythePCIS.Thereisnochangetotheexistingprimarycontainment 1solatton systemfunctionforAO-5042AorAO-50428. |
| | ThesealedclosedpositionofvalveAO-5025andtheaddtttanal assurance addedbytherupturediskdownstream willpreventanyinadvertent discharge upthestackforalldesignbasisaccidentconditions. |
| | Installation oftheOTVSdoesnotadversely affectthesafetyfuncttans oftheCACS,SBGTS,PCISortheintegrity ofprimarycontainment oranyothersafetyrelatedsystems.~-19-Rev.1(7/25/88) |
| | ~.JI UseoftheDTVSw111naccordance v1ththeconta1nment vent1ngprov1s1ons ofKPGsasapprovedbytheNRCandcontrolled byKOPs1nthesamemannerasotherex1st1ngconta1nment, ventpaths.TheOTVSprov1desan1mprovedconta1nment vent1ngcapab111ty fordecayheatremovalwh1chreducespotent1al ons1teandoffs1te1mpactsrelativetotheex1st1ngconta1nment vent1ngcapab111ty. |
| | Rev.1(7/25/88) |
| I'tf' IRTQRUvNTSYTMFiGUAE3.2-IREMOTEMANUALSWAUPTUREDISKFDUCTPIP/ | | I'tf' IRTQRUvNTSYTMFiGUAE3.2-IREMOTEMANUALSWAUPTUREDISKFDUCTPIP/ |
| e'cv' GenericLetterNo.89-1688-20SUPPLEMENT1Sub'ectDateofIssuanceINSTALLATIONOFAHARDENED09/01/89WETWELLVENT(GENERICLETTER89-16)GENERICLETTER88-20SUPPLEMENTNO.1(INITIATIONOFTHEINDIVIDUALPLANTEXAMINATIONFORSEVEREVULNERABILITIES10CFR50.54(f))08/29/89LISTOFRECENTLYISSUEDGENERICLETTERSEnc1osure2IssuedToALLGEPLANTSALLLICENSEESHOLDINGOPERATINGLICENSESANDCONSTRUCTIONPERMITSFORNUCLEARPOWERREACTORFACILITIES89-15EMERGENCYRESPONSEDATASYSTEMGENERICLETTERNO.89-1508/21/89ALLHOLDERSOFOPERATINGLICENSESORCONSTRUCTIONPERMITSFORNUCLEARPOWERPLANTS89-0789-14CORRECTACCESSIONNUMBERIS8908220423SUPPLEMENT1TOGENERIC08/21/89LETTER89-07,"POWERREACTORSAFEGUARDSCONTINGENCYPLANNINGFORSURFACEVEHICLEBOMBS"LINE-ITEMSTECHNICALSPECIFI-08/21/89CATIONIMPROVEMENT-REMOVALOF3.25LIMITONEXTENDINGSURVEILLANCEINTERVALS(GENERICLETTER89-14)ALLLICENSEESOFOPERATINGPLANTS,APPLICANTSFOROPERATINGLICENSES,ANDHOLDERSOFCONSTRUCTIONPERMITSALLLICENSEESOFOPERATINGPLANTS,APPLICANTSFOROPERATINGLICENSES,ANDHOLDERSOFCONSTRUCTIONPERMITS89-1389-12GENERICLETTER89-13SERVICEWATERSYSTEMSPROBLEMSAFFECTINGSAFETY-RELATEDEQUIPMENTGENERICLETTER89-12:OPERATORLICENSINGEXAMINATIONS7/18/897/6/89LICENSEESTOALLPOWERREACTORSBWRS,PWRS,ANDVENDORSINADDITIONTOGENERALCODESAPPLICABLETOGENERICLETTERSLICENSEESTOALLPOWERREACTORSBWRS,PWRS,ANDVENDORSINADDITIONTOGENERALCODESAPPLICABLETOGENERICLETTERS lt~fgo"}} | | e'cv' GenericLetterNo.89-1688-20SUPPLEMENT 1Sub'ectDateofIssuanceINSTALLATION OFAHARDENED09/01/89WETWELLVENT(GENERICLETTER89-16)GENERICLETTER88-20SUPPLEMENT NO.1(INITIATION OFTHEINDIVIDUAL PLANTEXAMINATION FORSEVEREVULNERABILITIES 10CFR50.54(f)) |
| | 08/29/89LISTOFRECENTLYISSUEDGENERICLETTERSEnc1osure 2IssuedToALLGEPLANTSALLLICENSEES HOLDINGOPERATING LICENSESANDCONSTRUCTION PERMITSFORNUCLEARPOWERREACTORFACILITIES 89-15EMERGENCY RESPONSEDATASYSTEMGENERICLETTERNO.89-1508/21/89ALLHOLDERSOFOPERATING LICENSESORCONSTRUCTION PERMITSFORNUCLEARPOWERPLANTS89-0789-14CORRECTACCESSION NUMBERIS8908220423 SUPPLEMENT 1TOGENERIC08/21/89LETTER89-07,"POWERREACTORSAFEGUARDS CONTINGENCY PLANNINGFORSURFACEVEHICLEBOMBS"LINE-ITEMS TECHNICAL SPECIFI-08/21/89CATIONIMPROVEMENT |
| | -REMOVALOF3.25LIMITONEXTENDING SURVEILLANCE INTERVALS (GENERICLETTER89-14)ALLLICENSEES OFOPERATING PLANTS,APPLICANTS FOROPERATING |
| | : LICENSES, ANDHOLDERSOFCONSTRUCTION PERMITSALLLICENSEES OFOPERATING PLANTS,APPLICANTS FOROPERATING |
| | : LICENSES, ANDHOLDERSOFCONSTRUCTION PERMITS89-1389-12GENERICLETTER89-13SERVICEWATERSYSTEMSPROBLEMSAFFECTING SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT GENERICLETTER89-12:OPERATORLICENSING EXAMINATIONS 7/18/897/6/89LICENSEES TOALLPOWERREACTORSBWRS,PWRS,ANDVENDORSINADDITIONTOGENERALCODESAPPLICABLE TOGENERICLETTERSLICENSEES TOALLPOWERREACTORSBWRS,PWRS,ANDVENDORSINADDITIONTOGENERALCODESAPPLICABLE TOGENERICLETTERS lt~fgo"}} |
|
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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARML20217N8911999-10-15015 October 1999
Forwards Rept of Changes,Tests & Experiments at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station for Period of 970422-990621,IAW 10CFR50.59(b).List of Changes Effecting Fsar,Encl
ML20217D3951999-10-13013 October 1999
Forwards Request for Addl Info Re Util 990806 Submittal on USI A-46, Implementation Methodology Used at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Per GL 87-02
ML20217E1581999-10-0808 October 1999
Forwards Insp Rept 50-293/99-05 on 990726-0905.Three Violations Noted & Being Treated as Ncvs.Violations Include Failure to Assure That Design Bases Correctly Translated Into Specifications
ML20217C3151999-10-0606 October 1999
Forwards Scenario Package for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Nrc/Fema Evaluated Exercise Scheduled for 991207.Without Encl
ML20217D5591999-10-0505 October 1999
Documents Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Five Yr Survey of Main Breakwater.Survey Has Determined That Pilgrim Main Breakwater Is Intact & Remains Adequately Constructed to Perform Designed Safety Function
ML20217C8051999-10-0505 October 1999
Forwards Proprietary Results of Audiologic Evaluations for Jp Giar,License SOP-10061-3.Attachment Clearly Shows Requirements for Operator Hearing Ability Are Met. Proprietary Info Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6)
ML20212J8301999-09-30030 September 1999
Informs of Completion of mid-cycle PPR of Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.Staff Conducts Reviews for All Operating NPPs to Integrate Performance Info & to Plan Insp Activities at Facility Over Next Six Months
ML20216J9961999-09-29029 September 1999
Forwards Resume of Person Identified as Acting RPM in Licensee to NRC Re Notification That Person Named in License Condition 11 of 20-07626-02,is No Longer Employed at Pilgrim Station.Resume Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790
ML20212F7871999-09-24024 September 1999
Advises That Util 990121 Application for Amend Being Treated as Withdrawn.Proposed Changes Would Have Modified Facility UFSAR Pertaining to Values for post-accident Containment Pressure Credited in Pilgrim Net Positive Head Analyses
ML20212H1381999-09-23023 September 1999
Submits Info in Support of Request Filed on 990730 to Grant one-time Exemption from 10CFR50,App E,Authorizing Biennial Full Participation Emergency Preparedness Exercise to Be Conducted in 2002 Instead of 2001
ML20212H1441999-09-23023 September 1999
Withdraws 990121 Request for License Change Re Emergency Core Cooling Sys Net Positive Suction Head,Due to Incorrect Datum Preparation
ML20216F3451999-09-16016 September 1999
Forwards Summary Rept Providing Results of ISI Conducted at PNPS on-line & Refueling Outage (RFO 12)
ML20212C2861999-09-16016 September 1999
Forwards SER Accepting Licensee 981123 Request for Relief RR-E1,RR-E5,RR-E6 Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) & Request for Relief RR-E2,RR-E3 & RR-E4 Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(ii)
ML20216E7111999-09-0909 September 1999
Forwards License Renewal Application Including Form NRC-398 & Form NRC-396 for Jp Giar,License SOP-10061-3.Without Encls
ML20216E5891999-09-0707 September 1999
Forwards Copy of Pilgrim Station Organization Structure. Encl Refelcts Changes in Upper Mgt Level Structure.Changes Were Effective 990901
ML20211M4501999-09-0303 September 1999
Informs That Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Plans to Conduct Full Participation Emergency Preparedness Exercise with Commonwealth of Ma on 991207,IAW 10CFR50,App E,Section IV.F.2
ML20211M9161999-08-31031 August 1999
Submits Review & Correction of Info in Reactor Vessel Integrity Database (Rvid),Version 2,re Pilgrim Station
ML20211J8391999-08-30030 August 1999
Forwards Rev 1 to Provisional Decommissioning Trust Agreement for Plant,Changing Portions of Agreement to Permit Up to Two Distributions & Clarify Formula for Distribution
ML20211H5701999-08-27027 August 1999
Forwards Insp Rept 50-293/99-04 on 990610-0725.Two Violations Identified Being Treated as non-cited Violations
ML20211C3381999-08-19019 August 1999
Provides semi-annual LTP Update,Including Schedule, Commitment Descriptions,Progress Since Last Update & Summary of Changes.Rev Bars Indicate Changes in Status Since Last Submittal
ML20210U5761999-08-18018 August 1999
Responds to Opposing Merger of Bec Energy & Commonwealth Energy Sys in Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Informs That for Sale,Nrc Responsible for Only Ensuring That Entergy Technically & Financially Qualified to Operate NPP
ML20210U6691999-08-18018 August 1999
Forwards from Massachusetts State Senator T Murray Opposing Merger Between Bec Energy & Commonwealth Energy Systems
ML20210U7521999-08-18018 August 1999
Forwards from Massachusetts State Senator T Murray Opossing Merger Between Bec Energy & Commonwealth Energy Systems
ML20210U5151999-08-17017 August 1999
Forwards Notice of Withdrawal of Application for Approval of Indirect Transfer of FOL for Pilgrim in Response to .Approval No Longer Needed Since Beco Sold Interest in Pilgrim to EOI on 990713
ML20211B3841999-08-16016 August 1999
Forwards Response to NRC Second RAI Re Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of SR power-operated Gate Valves
ML20210U4831999-08-13013 August 1999
Forwards fitness-for-duty Program Performance Data Sheets for Period of 990101-0630,per 10CFR26.71(d)
ML20210S0891999-08-0909 August 1999
Forwards Amend 11 to Indemnity Agreement B-48 Signed by Boston Edison Co & Entergy Nuclear Generation Co
ML20210R6251999-08-0606 August 1999
Provides Supplementary Info on USI A-46 Implementation Methodology at Pilgrim Station,To Enable NRC to Perform Evaluation & Issuance of Plant Specific SER for Plant
ML20210M9411999-08-0202 August 1999
Requests That NRC Treat Pending Actions Requested by Beco Prior to 990713,as Requests Made by Entergy.Ltr Requests That Minor Administrative Changes to License Amend 182 & Associated Ser, ,reflect 990713 Transfer
ML20210H8761999-07-30030 July 1999
Requests That NRC Grant Exemption from Requirements of 10CFR50,App E,Section IV F,Which Would Authorize Rescheduling of 2001 Biennial Full Participation Emergency Preparedness Exercise for Pilgrim Station to 2002
ML20210H8661999-07-29029 July 1999
Provides Revised Response to GL 96-06 & Addresses NRC Insp Concern for Containment Penetration X-12.Info Submitted to Facilitate NRC Review & Closeout of Subject GL for Plant
ML20216E2321999-07-26026 July 1999
Discusses GL 92-01,rev 1,suppl 1, Rv Structural Integrity. NRC Revised Info in Rvid & Releasing as Rvid Version 2
ML20216D4131999-07-22022 July 1999
Informs That J Conlon,License OP-11040-1,terminated Employment with Beco on 990703,per 10CFR50.74.Individual Will Not Participate in Util Licensed Operator Requalification Training Program
ML20210E2231999-07-20020 July 1999
Discusses Arrangements Made by Dennis & M Santiago During 990615 Telephone Conversation for NRC to Inspect Licensed Operator Requalification Program at Pilgrim During Wk of 991004
ML20210C4151999-07-19019 July 1999
Informs That Util Intends to Submit Approx Eight Licensing Actions in FY00 & Eight in FY01,in Response to Administrative Ltr 99-02.Actions Are Not Expected to Generate Complex Reviews
ML20210F3711999-07-14014 July 1999
Informs NRC That Effective 990713,listed Pilgrim Station Security Plans Have Been Transferred from Boston Edison to Entergy & Are Still in Effect
ML20210A9441999-07-14014 July 1999
Responds to Re Changes to Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Physical Security Plan Identified as Issue 2,rev 14, Addendum 1,respectively.No NRC Approval Is Required IAW 10CFR54(p)
ML20209G2251999-07-0909 July 1999
Forwards Insp Rept 50-293/99-03 on 990419-0609.Five Severity Level IV Violations of NRC Requirements Identified & Being Treated as non-cited Violations,Consistent with App C. Several Individual Tagging Errors Occurred
ML20209C4661999-07-0707 July 1999
Forwards SE Accepting Addendum on Proposed Change in Corporate Ownership Structure Involving Entergy Nuclear Generation Co
ML20209C7761999-07-0606 July 1999
Submits Annual Summary Rept of Changes Made to QAP Description as Described in QA Manual,Vol Ii.Rept Covers Period of Jul 1998 Through June 1999.No Changes Made During Period
ML20209C3851999-07-0606 July 1999
Forwards Redacted Draft of Decommissioning Trust Agreement Re Transfer of PNPS & NRC Operating License & Matls License from Boston Edison Co to Entergy Nuclear Generating Co
ML20196J7251999-07-0101 July 1999
Informs of Completion of Licensing Action for GL 96-01, Testing of Safety-Related Logic Circuits, for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
ML20209B9411999-06-30030 June 1999
Discusses Deferral of IGSCC Welds to RFO 13.Deferral of Welds to Refueling Outage 13 Does Not Impact Acceptable Level of Quality & Safety Per 10CFR50.55(a)(3)(i) Since Plant in Compliance W/Exam Percentage Requirements
ML20209B9431999-06-30030 June 1999
Provides Formal Notification That Closing Date for Sale & Transfer of Pilgrim Station Scheduled to Occur on 990713. a Wang Will Be Verbally Notified of Time of Sale Closing
ML20209B9791999-06-29029 June 1999
Forwards Rev 13A to Pilgrims COLR for Cycle 13,IAW TS 5.6.5 Requirements.Rev 13A Provides cycle-specific Limits for Operating Pilgrim During Remainder of Cycle 13
ML20196H2381999-06-29029 June 1999
Forwards SER Denying Licensee 980820 Request for Alternative Under PRR-13,rev 2 for Use of Code Case N-522 During Pressure Testing of Containment Penetration Piping
ML20209A8761999-06-28028 June 1999
Forwards SER Authorizing Licensee 990317 Relief Request to Use ASME Code Case N-573 as Alternative to ASME Code Section XI Article IWA-4000 for Remainder of 10-year Interval Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i)
ML20209A8701999-06-25025 June 1999
Responds to NRC Request for Info Re Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants. Y2K Readiness Disclosure for Plant,Reporting Status of Facility Y2K Readiness Encl
ML20210U5901999-06-25025 June 1999
Opposes Merger of Bec Energy & Commonwealth Energy Sys in Commonwealth of Massachusetts.Expresses Skepticism Re Claim by Companies That Consumers Will Benefit from Proposed Consolidation & four-year Freeze in Base Rates
ML20209C3431999-06-22022 June 1999
Forwards Addendum 1,Rev 14 to Pilgrim Station Security Plan,Iaw 10CFR50.54(p)(2).Changes Proposed Have Been Implemented & Constitute Increase in Plant Defense Plan Commitments.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21
1999-09-09
[Table view]
Category:INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARML20217N8911999-10-15015 October 1999
Forwards Rept of Changes,Tests & Experiments at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station for Period of 970422-990621,IAW 10CFR50.59(b).List of Changes Effecting Fsar,Encl
ML20217C3151999-10-0606 October 1999
Forwards Scenario Package for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Nrc/Fema Evaluated Exercise Scheduled for 991207.Without Encl
ML20217C8051999-10-0505 October 1999
Forwards Proprietary Results of Audiologic Evaluations for Jp Giar,License SOP-10061-3.Attachment Clearly Shows Requirements for Operator Hearing Ability Are Met. Proprietary Info Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6)
ML20217D5591999-10-0505 October 1999
Documents Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Five Yr Survey of Main Breakwater.Survey Has Determined That Pilgrim Main Breakwater Is Intact & Remains Adequately Constructed to Perform Designed Safety Function
ML20216J9961999-09-29029 September 1999
Forwards Resume of Person Identified as Acting RPM in Licensee to NRC Re Notification That Person Named in License Condition 11 of 20-07626-02,is No Longer Employed at Pilgrim Station.Resume Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790
ML20212H1441999-09-23023 September 1999
Withdraws 990121 Request for License Change Re Emergency Core Cooling Sys Net Positive Suction Head,Due to Incorrect Datum Preparation
ML20212H1381999-09-23023 September 1999
Submits Info in Support of Request Filed on 990730 to Grant one-time Exemption from 10CFR50,App E,Authorizing Biennial Full Participation Emergency Preparedness Exercise to Be Conducted in 2002 Instead of 2001
ML20216F3451999-09-16016 September 1999
Forwards Summary Rept Providing Results of ISI Conducted at PNPS on-line & Refueling Outage (RFO 12)
ML20216E7111999-09-0909 September 1999
Forwards License Renewal Application Including Form NRC-398 & Form NRC-396 for Jp Giar,License SOP-10061-3.Without Encls
ML20216E5891999-09-0707 September 1999
Forwards Copy of Pilgrim Station Organization Structure. Encl Refelcts Changes in Upper Mgt Level Structure.Changes Were Effective 990901
ML20211M4501999-09-0303 September 1999
Informs That Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Plans to Conduct Full Participation Emergency Preparedness Exercise with Commonwealth of Ma on 991207,IAW 10CFR50,App E,Section IV.F.2
ML20211M9161999-08-31031 August 1999
Submits Review & Correction of Info in Reactor Vessel Integrity Database (Rvid),Version 2,re Pilgrim Station
ML20211J8391999-08-30030 August 1999
Forwards Rev 1 to Provisional Decommissioning Trust Agreement for Plant,Changing Portions of Agreement to Permit Up to Two Distributions & Clarify Formula for Distribution
ML20211C3381999-08-19019 August 1999
Provides semi-annual LTP Update,Including Schedule, Commitment Descriptions,Progress Since Last Update & Summary of Changes.Rev Bars Indicate Changes in Status Since Last Submittal
ML20211B3841999-08-16016 August 1999
Forwards Response to NRC Second RAI Re Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of SR power-operated Gate Valves
ML20210U4831999-08-13013 August 1999
Forwards fitness-for-duty Program Performance Data Sheets for Period of 990101-0630,per 10CFR26.71(d)
ML20210S0891999-08-0909 August 1999
Forwards Amend 11 to Indemnity Agreement B-48 Signed by Boston Edison Co & Entergy Nuclear Generation Co
ML20210R6251999-08-0606 August 1999
Provides Supplementary Info on USI A-46 Implementation Methodology at Pilgrim Station,To Enable NRC to Perform Evaluation & Issuance of Plant Specific SER for Plant
ML20210M9411999-08-0202 August 1999
Requests That NRC Treat Pending Actions Requested by Beco Prior to 990713,as Requests Made by Entergy.Ltr Requests That Minor Administrative Changes to License Amend 182 & Associated Ser, ,reflect 990713 Transfer
ML20210H8761999-07-30030 July 1999
Requests That NRC Grant Exemption from Requirements of 10CFR50,App E,Section IV F,Which Would Authorize Rescheduling of 2001 Biennial Full Participation Emergency Preparedness Exercise for Pilgrim Station to 2002
ML20210H8661999-07-29029 July 1999
Provides Revised Response to GL 96-06 & Addresses NRC Insp Concern for Containment Penetration X-12.Info Submitted to Facilitate NRC Review & Closeout of Subject GL for Plant
ML20216D4131999-07-22022 July 1999
Informs That J Conlon,License OP-11040-1,terminated Employment with Beco on 990703,per 10CFR50.74.Individual Will Not Participate in Util Licensed Operator Requalification Training Program
ML20210C4151999-07-19019 July 1999
Informs That Util Intends to Submit Approx Eight Licensing Actions in FY00 & Eight in FY01,in Response to Administrative Ltr 99-02.Actions Are Not Expected to Generate Complex Reviews
ML20210F3711999-07-14014 July 1999
Informs NRC That Effective 990713,listed Pilgrim Station Security Plans Have Been Transferred from Boston Edison to Entergy & Are Still in Effect
ML20209C3851999-07-0606 July 1999
Forwards Redacted Draft of Decommissioning Trust Agreement Re Transfer of PNPS & NRC Operating License & Matls License from Boston Edison Co to Entergy Nuclear Generating Co
ML20209C7761999-07-0606 July 1999
Submits Annual Summary Rept of Changes Made to QAP Description as Described in QA Manual,Vol Ii.Rept Covers Period of Jul 1998 Through June 1999.No Changes Made During Period
ML20209B9411999-06-30030 June 1999
Discusses Deferral of IGSCC Welds to RFO 13.Deferral of Welds to Refueling Outage 13 Does Not Impact Acceptable Level of Quality & Safety Per 10CFR50.55(a)(3)(i) Since Plant in Compliance W/Exam Percentage Requirements
ML20209B9431999-06-30030 June 1999
Provides Formal Notification That Closing Date for Sale & Transfer of Pilgrim Station Scheduled to Occur on 990713. a Wang Will Be Verbally Notified of Time of Sale Closing
ML20209B9791999-06-29029 June 1999
Forwards Rev 13A to Pilgrims COLR for Cycle 13,IAW TS 5.6.5 Requirements.Rev 13A Provides cycle-specific Limits for Operating Pilgrim During Remainder of Cycle 13
ML20209A8701999-06-25025 June 1999
Responds to NRC Request for Info Re Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants. Y2K Readiness Disclosure for Plant,Reporting Status of Facility Y2K Readiness Encl
ML20210U5901999-06-25025 June 1999
Opposes Merger of Bec Energy & Commonwealth Energy Sys in Commonwealth of Massachusetts.Expresses Skepticism Re Claim by Companies That Consumers Will Benefit from Proposed Consolidation & four-year Freeze in Base Rates
ML20209C3431999-06-22022 June 1999
Forwards Addendum 1,Rev 14 to Pilgrim Station Security Plan,Iaw 10CFR50.54(p)(2).Changes Proposed Have Been Implemented & Constitute Increase in Plant Defense Plan Commitments.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21
ML20195G3721999-06-0707 June 1999
Informs That Proposed Indicators Failed QA Assessments for Digital Verification,Validation & Control of Software. Proposed Mod Can Be Completed on-line
ML20195B5021999-05-27027 May 1999
Provides Suppl Info to 990203 Request of Beco That NRC Consent to Indirect Transfer of Control of Util Interest in License DPR-35.Request Described Proposed Merger of Bec Energy with Commonwealth Energy Sys
ML20207D4681999-05-24024 May 1999
Provides Addl Info to That Included in Beco Ltr 98-123 Dtd 981001,addressing NRC Concerns Described in GL 96-06, Concerning Waterhammer in Reactor Bldg Closed Cooling Water Sys
ML20195B9051999-05-20020 May 1999
Forwards Completed Renewal Applications for Listed Operators.Without Encls
ML20206J4901999-05-0606 May 1999
Forwards Completed License Renewal Application,Including Forms NRC-398 & 396 for Sc Power,License OP-6328-3
ML20206P0711999-05-0606 May 1999
Forwards NRC Form 396, Certification of Medical Exam by Facility Licensee, for K Walz,License SOP-10886-1.Encl Withheld IAW 10CFR2.790(a)(6)
ML20206D3621999-04-27027 April 1999
Informs NRC That Final Five Sys self-assessments Required to Fulfill Commitment Made in 980828 Response to Insp Rept 50-293/98-04 Were Completed on 990422.Completion Was Delayed by High Priority Refueling Outage 12 Preparatory Work
ML20205R9871999-04-21021 April 1999
Forwards Affidavit of JW Yelverton of Entergy Nuclear Generation Co Supporting Request for Withholding Info from Rept on Audit of Financial Statements for Year Ended 971231. Pages 16 & 18 of Subj Rept Also Encl
ML20207B0891999-04-20020 April 1999
Forwards e-mail Message from Constituent,J Riell Re Y2K Compliance of Nuclear Power Plant in Plymouth,Massachusetts. Copy of Article Entitled Nuke Plants May Not Be Y2K Ready Also Encl
ML20206A2741999-04-16016 April 1999
Dockets Encl Ltr Which Was Sent to AL Vietti-Cook Re Condition of Approval of Transfer of License & License Condition for DPR-35.Encl Resolves Issues Between Attorney General of Commonwealth of Massachusetts & Applicants
ML20205P9131999-04-16016 April 1999
Submits Applicant Consent to Listed Condition of Approval of Transfer of License & License Condition for License DPR-35 & Affirmatively Request That NRC Adopt Listed Language in Order
ML20205P9271999-04-16016 April 1999
Withdraws Motion for Leave to Intervene & Petition for Summary Or,In Alternative,For Hearing.Requests That NRC Adopt Condition of Approval of Transfer of License & License Condition Agreed to Beco & Entergy Nuclear Generation Co
ML20205Q9231999-04-15015 April 1999
Forwards Proprietary & non-proprietary Addl Info in Support of Request to Transfer of Plant FOL & Matls License to Entergy Nuclear Generation Co.Proprietary Info Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790
ML20205P9631999-04-15015 April 1999
Provides Attachments a & B in Support of Request for Transfer of Plant Operating License & NRC Matl License from Beco to Entergy Nuclear Generation Co as Submitted in Ref 1. Info Provided in Response to Request at 990413 Meeting
ML20205H9281999-04-0707 April 1999
Requests Withdrawal of Uwua Locals 369 & 387 Unions Joint Intervention in Listed Matter
ML20205F3731999-04-0202 April 1999
Submits Addl Info Provided in Support of Request for Transfer of Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Operating License & Matls License.State of Ma Order Authorizing Divestiture & Copy of Financial Arrangement Encl
ML20204H3771999-03-26026 March 1999
Informs That Local 387,Utility Workers Union of America,AFL- Cio Voted to Approve New Contract with Entergy Nuclear Generation Co & Voted to Accept Boston Edison Divestiture Agreement
ML20205D4231999-03-24024 March 1999
Forwards Decommissioning Funding Rept for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station,In Accordance with 10CFR50.75(f)(1)
1999-09-09
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Category:UTILITY TO NRC
MONTHYEARBECO-90-108, Forwards Anticipated Operator Licensing Exam Schedule Requested by Generic Ltr 90-07, Operator Licensing Natl Exam Schedule,1990-09-12012 September 1990
Forwards Anticipated Operator Licensing Exam Schedule Requested by Generic Ltr 90-07, Operator Licensing Natl Exam Schedule,
ML20059D6641990-08-30030 August 1990
Forwards Revised Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures,Per 10CFR50,App E,Section V.W/O Encl
ML20059D6791990-08-30030 August 1990
Notifies That Two Remaining Actions for Implementation of SPDS at Plant Complete,Per .Spds Procedures Modified,Identifying Sampling Panel C-19 Return Valves to Operator
BECO-90-100, Advises That Valve MO-1001-50 Cannot Be Shown to Meet 30-day Mission for PASS in post-accident Environ Due to Elevated Radiation Dose Rates.Util Currently Developing Solution to Allow PASS to Meet 30-day Availability Requirement1990-08-27027 August 1990
Advises That Valve MO-1001-50 Cannot Be Shown to Meet 30-day Mission for PASS in post-accident Environ Due to Elevated Radiation Dose Rates.Util Currently Developing Solution to Allow PASS to Meet 30-day Availability Requirement
BECO-90-102, Forwards Fitness for Duty Program Performance Data for Jan- June 19901990-08-23023 August 1990
Forwards Fitness for Duty Program Performance Data for Jan- June 1990
BECO-90-095, Informs That Kn Taylor Permanently Reassigned to Nuclear Training Dept as of 900717.Taylor Will Remain in Position Which Does Not Require License Certification1990-08-0808 August 1990
Informs That Kn Taylor Permanently Reassigned to Nuclear Training Dept as of 900717.Taylor Will Remain in Position Which Does Not Require License Certification
BECO-90-092, Forwards, Decommissioning Funding Rept, Per 10CFR50.33(k) & 50.75(b)1990-07-26026 July 1990
Forwards, Decommissioning Funding Rept, Per 10CFR50.33(k) & 50.75(b)
ML20044B3111990-07-11011 July 1990
Responds to NRC Bulletin 90-001, Loss of Fill-Oil in Transmitters Mfg by Rosemount. Corrective Actions Include Replacement of Transmitters Identified in Suspect Lots & Implementation of Surveillance Program
ML20044A7891990-06-19019 June 1990
Responds to Generic Ltr 90-04, Request for Info on Status of Licensee Implementation of Generic Safety Issues Resolved W/Imposition of Requirements or Corrective Actions. Table Listing Status of Each Issue Encl
ML20043D7181990-05-31031 May 1990
Advises That Response to NRC 900426 Safety Evaluation Re Util 880804 & 890619 Responses to Generic Ltr 88-01 Will Be Sent on 901115
ML20043A8211990-05-15015 May 1990
Notifies of Change of Senior Operator Status for Cj Martin, Per 10CFR50.74.CJ Martin Will No Longer Participate in Licensed Operator Requalification Training Program
ML20042F2211990-05-0101 May 1990
Advises That Scheduled Completion of SPDS Human Factors Validation Activities Scheduled for 900630 & Sys Availability Test by 900731
ML20043B3881990-05-0101 May 1990
Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-293/90-05. Corrective actions:82 Excess Flow Check Valves Installed & Operability of Valves Verified by Performing Surveillance Testing
ML20012F5601990-04-0202 April 1990
Responds to Generic Ltr 89-13 Re Svc Water Sys Problems Affecting safety-related Equipment.Util Instituted Biofouling Control Program in 1982 & Program Has Been Effectively Implemented at Plant & Complies W/Generic Ltr
ML20012F3631990-03-30030 March 1990
Requests Temporary Waiver of Compliance from Requirements of Tech Spec Table 3.2.C-1, APRM Upscale Rod Block in Startup & Refuel Modes to Avoid Unnecessary Delay in Critical Path Surveillance Testing
ML20012C6501990-03-15015 March 1990
Responds to Generic Ltr 90-01 Re Request for Voluntary Participation in NRC Regulatory Impact Survey.Completed Questionnaire for Applicable Areas Delineated in Survey Encl
ML20012D1931990-03-15015 March 1990
Forwards Proposed Scope & Objectives of Annual Exercise 90-04-B Scheduled for 900618 Per Lazarus 890609 Ltr, Emergency Exercise Objective & Scenerio Guidelines. Exercise Will Test & Evaluate Util EPIPs
ML20012C7191990-03-14014 March 1990
Forwards Explanation of Errors in 890707 Application Re Corrective Action Plan & Advises That Errors Do Not Affect Technical Basis on Which Exemption Granted.Util Corrective Action Plan Remains Unchanged
ML20011F5381990-02-26026 February 1990
Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-293/89-12 on 891002-1119.Corrective Actions:On 891109,operations Personnel Directed,Via Night Orders,To Be More Diligent W/ Tagout Documentation & Boundary Tagging Clarified
ML20011F2301990-02-23023 February 1990
Notifies of Change in Status of Senior Licensed Operator. DW Gerlits Terminated Senior Reactor Operator License on 900201 But Will Retain Position as Senior Sys & Safety Analysis Engineer
ML20006G1411990-02-23023 February 1990
Advises That Tj Mcdonough Reassigned Effective 900126. Individual Will No Longer Participate in Licensed Operator Requalification Training Program
ML20011F6521990-02-21021 February 1990
Forwards Inservice Insp Plan for 1990 mid-cycle Spring Outage for Facility.Augmented Insp Will Be Performed for Three IGSCC Category a Welds Using Guidance in Generic Ltr 88-01 & Criteria in NRC Bulletin 88-08,Suppl 3
ML20011F4481990-02-20020 February 1990
Forwards Revised Operability Evaluation of Salt Svc Water Pumps for Plant.Evaluation Concludes That Salt Svc Water Pumps Operable & Requirements of Tech Spec 3.5.B.1 for Pumps Met
ML20006G0051990-02-20020 February 1990
Forwards Update to long-term Plan,In Accordance W/Section V.A of Plan for Long-Term Program. Util Implementing Plant Betterment Mods & Activities
ML20011E7551990-02-0909 February 1990
Requests Temporary Relief from Tech Spec 4.7.A.2.b.1.d, Limiting Condition for Operation.
ML19354E7661990-01-23023 January 1990
Responds to NRC Bulletin 89-002, Stress Corrosion Cracking of High Hardness Type 410 Stainless Steel Bolting in Anchor Darling.... Review Determined That No Subj Anchor Darling Swing Check Valves or Similar Valves Installed at Facility
ML20011F4441990-01-19019 January 1990
Forwards Operability Evaluation Re Salt Svc Water Pumps P208 B,C,D & E,Per 900117 Telcon.Evaluation Concluded That Salt Svc Water Pumps P208 B,C,D & E Operable & Tech Spec 3.5.B.1 Requirements Met
ML20006A0761990-01-15015 January 1990
Forwards Executed Amend 10 to Indemnity Agreement B-48
ML20006A2591990-01-15015 January 1990
Responds to Generic Ltr 89-10, Safety-Related Motor- Operated Valve Testing & Surveillance. Util Will Develop Program to Enhance Maint,Analysis & Testing Already Conducted on motor-operated Valves
ML20005G7701990-01-11011 January 1990
Discusses Revised Schedule for Operability & Availability of Spds,Per 891221 Notification to Nrc.Rev Necessitated by Software Problems Affecting 891231 Schedule Projected in Util 890710 Ltr
ML20005G7451990-01-11011 January 1990
Provides Bases for Environ Qualification of Instrumentation Monitoring Effluent Radioactivity & Status of Standby Power Per Reg Guide 1.97,Rev 3 & Generic Ltr 82-33
ML20005G8061990-01-11011 January 1990
Advises That Commitment to Complete Enhancements of Control Panels as Part of Dcrdr,Per NUREG-0737,Item I.D.1 by Oct 1989 Not Met.All Three Panels at Simulator Enhanced & Installation of Revised Meter Scales in Progress
ML20005F0761990-01-0404 January 1990
Forwards Revised Inservice Test Program in Response to Generic Ltr 89-04.List of Inservice Test Program Relief Requests Previously Submitted & Acceptable,Per Generic Ltr 89-04,encl
ML20005E5601989-12-29029 December 1989
Certifies That Util Has Established Fitness for Duty Program That Meets Requirements of 10CFR26.Drug & Alcohol Level Screening Match Rule Imposition & Implementation Will Be Effective on 900103
ML20042D4821989-12-26026 December 1989
Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-293/89-10. Corrective Action:Radiological Section Standing Order 89-09 Issued Allowing Only Radiological Supervisors to Exercise Locked High Radiation Area Door & Key Control
ML20011D6851989-12-14014 December 1989
Forwards Response to Generic Ltr 89-21, Request for Info Re Status of Implementation of USI Requirements.
ML20011D1631989-12-14014 December 1989
Forwards Pilgrim Nuclear Plant Station Final Assessment Rept, Summarizing Results of self-assessments & Evaluations Conducted Throughout Implementation of Plant Restart Plan & Power Ascension Program
ML19325F2751989-11-10010 November 1989
Responds to NRC Bulletin 88-010,Suppl 1, Nonconforming Molded-Case Circuit Breakers. Util Installed H2/02 Analyzers Procured in 1980 & Therefore Exempt from Bulletin Requirements
ML19327C0911989-11-0606 November 1989
Forwards Response to Suppl 3 to NRC Bulletin 88-008, Thermal Stresses in Piping Connected to Rcs. Since cyclic- Thermal Heatup/Cooldown Not Present in Piping,Failure Due to Cyclic Thermal Fatigue Will Not Occur
ML19325E8581989-11-0101 November 1989
Discusses Litigation Before FERC Re Plant.Util Will Undertake Review of Matls Developed by Opposing Parties in Proceedings.Required Repts Will Be Submitted to NRC After Reportability Has Been Determined
ML19325E5251989-10-27027 October 1989
Responds to Generic Ltr 88-20,Suppl 1,describing Plan for Completing Individual Plant Exam for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities.Performance of Level 1 PRA Based on Current Plant Design & Operation Intended
ML19325E5661989-10-27027 October 1989
Response to Generic Ltr 89-04, Guidance on Developing Acceptable Inservice Testing Programs. Revised Inservice Testing Program Which Will Include Statement of Conformance to Technical Positions Will Be Submitted by 891215
ML19324B8191989-10-25025 October 1989
Informs That C Leonard & J Stokes Reassigned to Positions Which Do Not Require License Certification Effective 891003 & 891020,respectively
ML19327B2291989-10-20020 October 1989
Responds to Generic Ltr 89-07 Re Power Reactor Safeguards Contingency Planning for Surface Vehicle Bombs.Changes Made to Contingency Plan,Per 10CFR50.54.Plan Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21)
ML19325E0981989-10-20020 October 1989
Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-293/89-07.Corrective Actions:Terminal Block Replaced, post-work Functional Test of Ref Temp Switches Performed & Procedure Tp 88-78 Revised to Correct Relay Numbers
BECO-89-142, Responds to NRC Re Violations & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty from Insp Rept 50-293/89-95. Corrective Action:Two Responsible Util Operators Suspended Because Breakers Incorrectly Positioned for Test1989-09-22022 September 1989
Responds to NRC Re Violations & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty from Insp Rept 50-293/89-95. Corrective Action:Two Responsible Util Operators Suspended Because Breakers Incorrectly Positioned for Test
BECO-89-144, Requests Interim Approval for Relief from Testing of RHR Sys Valves 63 & 64 Until Refueling Outage 8 Scheduled for 9103151989-09-22022 September 1989
Requests Interim Approval for Relief from Testing of RHR Sys Valves 63 & 64 Until Refueling Outage 8 Scheduled for 910315
BECO-89-135, Forwards Util Anticipated OL Exam Schedule,Per 890706 Generic Ltr 89-12 Request1989-09-11011 September 1989
Forwards Util Anticipated OL Exam Schedule,Per 890706 Generic Ltr 89-12 Request
BECO-89-131, Forwards Tech Spec Figures 6.2-2 & 6.2-1,replacing Title of Director of Nuclear Engineering W/Title of Station Director & Adding New Title of Vice President of Nuclear Engineering1989-09-0505 September 1989
Forwards Tech Spec Figures 6.2-2 & 6.2-1,replacing Title of Director of Nuclear Engineering W/Title of Station Director & Adding New Title of Vice President of Nuclear Engineering
BECO-89-129, Submits Addl Info Re 890707 Request for Exemption from Certain Containment Leakage Testing Requirements of 10CFR50. Plant mid-cycle Maint Outage,Previously Scheduled for Oct 1989,has Been Rescheduled for Spring 19901989-09-0101 September 1989
Submits Addl Info Re 890707 Request for Exemption from Certain Containment Leakage Testing Requirements of 10CFR50. Plant mid-cycle Maint Outage,Previously Scheduled for Oct 1989,has Been Rescheduled for Spring 1990
1990-09-12
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Text
Enclosure lpiigrim"riclearPowerStationRockyHillRoaoriirnc!r.Vassacnvsetts 02360RalphG.BirdSe~orviceliesoe"'.-4u<<-earU.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission DocumentControlDeskWashington, DC20555BECo88-126Augustk8,1988LicenseOPR-35Docket50-293REVISEDINFORHATION REGARDING PILGRIMSTATIONAFTYNHANHNTPRRAH
DearSir:
Enclosedisadescription ofareviseddesignfortheDirectTorusVentSystem(OTVS)thatwasdescribed inthe"ReportonP1lgrimStationSafetyEnhancements" datedJuly1,1987andtransmitted totheNRCwithMr.Bird'letter(BECo87-ill)toMr.VargadatedJuly8,1987.Thisrevisionsupersedes in1tsentiretytheSection3.21ncludedintheJulyl,1987report.OnMarch7,1988BostonEdisonCompany(BECo)personnel metwithOr.Hurley,Hr.Russell,andOr.Thadaniandprov1dedatourofSEPmodif1cations andaninformalpresentation ofthequantification ofcompeting r1sksassociated withventingthecontainment andconclus1ons drawnfromtheseresults.Th1spresentation providedBECotheopportunity torespondtoquest1ons posedunderItem1Section3,2-"Installat1on ofA01rectTorusVentSystem(OTVS)"inHr.Varga'slettertoHr.81rdofAugust2l,1987"InitialAssessment ofPilgrimSafetyEnhancement Program".
Thematerialpresented wasmadeavailable totheresidentinspector andwasincludedasAttachment IIinNRCInspection Report488-12,datedMay31,1988.Asyouareawarefromplantinspections wehaveinstalled theDTVSp1pingandport1onsofrelatedcontrolwiring.Currently.
theDTVSisisolatedfromtheStandbyGasTreatment System(SBGTS)bybl1ndflangesinstalled inplaceofValveAO-5025andtheDTVSrupturedisk.Thisconfiguration wasinspected byNRR1ntheperformance ofatechnical reviewwhichfocusedonSystem,Hechan1cal DesignandStructural Des1gnissues.ThereviewtookplaceonHarch2-3,1988asdocumented inNRCInspection Report488-07,datedHay6,l988anddetermined theinstallation configurat1on tobeacceptable.
Wenowplantoremovetheseblindflangesandproceedwithinstallation ofValveAO-5025andtheDTVSrupturedisk.Weconcludethevalveandrupturediskprov1deequivalent physicalisolation oftheDTVSp1pingfromtheSBGTSandappropriately ensuretheoperational integrity oftheSBGTSunderdesignbasisaccidentconditions.
Following completion ofthiswork,wewillperformalocalleakratetesttoverifythatValveAO-5025isacceptably leaktightusingthesamemethodpreviously utilizedintestingthebl1ndflange.Wealsoplantocompleteallremain1ng electrical workontheOTVS1naccordance with=----~h~evi.sed design.jvppJ,;,"itv rIir'll>>
BOSTONFOISONPANYAugust1&,1988U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Page2Qnthebas1softherevisedSection3.2,weconcludethattheDTVSdesignasdescribed 1ntheenclosure doesnotrequireanychangetotheTechr.'.cal Specifications andthatwecanproceedwithinstallation withoutpriorNRCapproval.
PleasefeelfreetocontactmeorMr.3.E.Howard,ofmystaffat(617)849-89001fyouhaveanyquestions pertaining tothedesigndeta11softheDTVS.
Attachment:
Section3.2Rev1s1on1"Installation OfADirectTorusVentSystem(DTVS)"3EH/amm/2282 CC:Hr.0.HcOonald, Pro)ectHanager01visionofReactorPro]ectsI/IIOfficeofNuclearReactorRegulation U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commiss1on Ha11Stat1onPl-137Washington, D.C.20555U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commiss1on RegionI475Allendale RoadKingofPrussia,PA19406SeniorNRCResidentInspector PilgrimNuclearPowerStat1on I4~4 Attachment toBECoLetter88-126Section3.2Revision1"Installat)on OfADirectTorusVentSystem(OTVS)"page"14,15,16,17,18,19,19A,198 IPI4$)gt+I 32NTATNFARTTR3.2.13,2.2ivfhnThisdesignchangeprovidestheabilityfordirectventingofthetorustothemainstack.Containment ventingisonecoredamageprevention strategyutilizedtntheBHROwnersGroupEmergency Procedure Guidelines (EPGs}aspreviously approvedbytheNRCandfsrequiredinplant-specific Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs}.Thetorusventlineconnecting thetorustothemainstackwf11provideanalternate ventpathforimplementing EOPrequirements andrepresents asignificant improvement relativetoexlstlngplantventcapability.
For56psisaturated steamconditions lnthetorus,apporoximately 1'ldecayheatcanbevented.nhnThisdesignchange(Figure3.2-1)providesadirectventpathfromthetorustothemainstackbypassing theStandbyGasTreatment System(SBGTS).Thebypasslsan8"linewhoseupstreamendlsconnected tothepipebetweenprimarycontainment isolation valvesAO-5042A5B.Thedownstream endofthebypassisconnected tothe20"mainstacklinedownstream ofSBGTSvalvesAON-108andAON-112.An8"butterfly valve(A0-5025),
whichcanberemotelyoperated'rom themaincontrolroom,lsaddeddownstream of8"valveAO-50428.
Thisvalveactsastheprimarycontainment outboardisolation valveforthedirecttorusventlineandwillconformtoNRCrequirements forsealedclosedisolation valvesasdefinedinNUREG0800SRP6.2.4.ThenewpipeisASMEIIIClass2uptoandinclusive ofvalveAO-5025.Testconnections areprovidedupstreamanddownstream ofA0-5025.ThedesignchangereplacestheexlstlngACsolenoidvalveforAO-5042BwfthaDCsolenoidvalve(poweredfromessential 125voltDC)toensureoperability withoutdependence onACpower.Thenewisolation valve,AO-5025,lsalsoprovidedwithaDCsolenoidpoweredfromtheredundant 125voltDCsource.Bothofthesevalvesarenormallyclosedandfallclosedonlossofelectrical andpneumatic power.OneinchnitrogenlinesareaddedtoprovidenitrogentovalvesAO-5042BandAO-5025.NewvalveAO-5025willbecontrolled byaremotemanualkey-locked controlswitch.Duringnormaloperation, powertotheAO-5025DCsolenoidwillalsobedisabledbyremovaloffuseslnthewlrlngtothesolenoidvalve.Thissatisfies NUREG0800SRP6.2.4,Containment Isolation Systemacceptance criteriaforasealedclosedbarrier.Anadditional fusewillbeinstalled andremaininplacetopowervalvestatusindication forAO-5025lnthemaincontrolroom.-14-Rev.1(7/25/88)
CI~ll(
NUREG0800,SRP6.2.4,ItemII.6.Fallowstheuseofsealedclosedbarriersinplaceofautomatic 1solation valves.Sealedclosedbarriersincludebl1ndflangesandsealedclosed1solation valveswhichmaybeclosedremote-manual valves.SRP6.2.4callsforadministrative controltoassurethatsealedclosed1solat1on valvescannotbe1nadvertently opened.This1ncludesmechanical devicestosealor'iockthevalveclosed,ortopreventpowerfrombeingsuppliedtothevalveoperator.
Consistent withSRP6.2.4,valveAO-5025willbeasealedclosedremotemanualvalveunderadministrative controltoassurethatitcannotbeinadvertently opened.Administrat1ve controlwillbemaintained byakey-locked remotemanualcontrolswitchandafuseremovedtopreventpowerfrombeingsuppliedtothevalveoperator.
Inaccordance withNUREG0737,ItemII.E.4.2.7 Position6,AO-5025willbesealedclosedandverif1edassuchatleastevery31days.A20"pipewillreplacetheexisting20"d1ameterductbetweenSBGTSvalvesAON-108,AON-112'and theexisting20"pipetothemainstack.Theexisting20"d1ameterductdownstream ofAO-5042A1sshortened toallowfitupofthenewventlinebranchconnection.
Arupturediskwillbeincludedinthe8"pip1ngdownstream ofvalveAO-5025.Therupturediskw111provideasecondleakagebarr1er.Therupturediskisdes1gnedtoopenbelowcontainment designpressure, butwillbeintactuptopressures equaltoorgreaterthanthosewhichcauseanautomat1c containment 1solation duringanyaccidentconditions.
ThetwoPr1maryContainment Isolation Valves(PCIVs)AO-50428andAO-5025areplacedinser1eswiththerupturedisk.Nos1ngleoperator, errorinvalveoperat1on canactivatetheDTVS.Therupturediskhasarupturepressureabovetheautomatic conta1nment highpressuretrippo1nt.Thus,theinboardPCIV(AO-50428) willreceiveanautomatic 1solation pr1ortod1skrupture.TheinboardPCIV(AO-5042B) requiresphys1calelectr1cal
)umper1nstallation toopenatpr1maryconta1nment pressureabovetheautomatic h1ghpressuretrippo1nt.ValveAO-5025willbeclosedwheneverprimaryconta1nment integrity 1srequiredandDCpowertoitssolenoidcontrolvalvewillbedisconnected.
Indication ofvalvepositionwillbeprovidedinthemaincontrolroomevenw1ththevalvepowerremoved.Useofthedirecttorusventw1llbeinaccordance w1thapprovedEPGrequirements andcontrolled byEOPsinthesamewannerasotherex1stingconta1nment ventpaths.Pr1ortoopeningtheventvalvestheSBGTsystemwillbeshutdownandvalvesAON-108andAON-ll2(theoutletofSBGT)placed1naclosedposition. Rev.l(7/25/88) h~i, 1New8"ventpipe(8"-H88-44),
nclud1ngvalveAO-5025issafetyrelated.Ventpip1ngdownstream ofAO-5025,including S8GTSdischarge pipingtomainstack,isalsosafetyrelated.Allsafetyrelatedpipingwillbesupported asClassI.Nitrogenpiping1snon-safety relatedandwillbesupported asClassII/I.Theinterpretation oftheClassII/Idesignation throughthisreportisg1venbelow:AllClassIIitemswhichhavethepotential todegradetheintegrity ofaClassIitemareanalyzed.
SuchClassIIitemsdonotrequiredependable mechanical orelectr1cal funct1onality dur1ngSSE,onlythatallofthefollowing conditions prevail:l.TheClassIIitemscreatenomissileswh1chimpactunprotected ClassIitemssafetyfunctions.
2.TheClassIIitemdoesnotdeforminawaywhichwoulddegradeaClassIitem.3.IftheClassIIitemfails,thentheClassIitemisprotected againstthefullimpactofallm1ss1lesgenerated bytheassumedfailureofClassII1tems.Allelectrical portionsofthisdes1gnaresafetyrelatedexceptfortheind1cating l1ghtsontheMIMICpanelC904,thetie-instotheannunciator, andinterface withtheplantcomputer.
1nhnv3.2.3.1m/mnnAfninmnAhThetoruspurgeexhaustline1nboardisolation valveAO-50428andtheassociated 8"pipearethecomponents oftheCACSaffectedbythedes1gnmodificat1on.
Withincorporation ofthesub)ectmodification, theCACSwilldependonbothessent1al AC(forvalveAO-5042A) andessent1al OC(forAO-50428) toperform1tspurg1ngfunct1on.
Thenew8"torusventlinewillbeconnected toexist1ng8"CACSpipingbetweenvalvesAO-5042BandA0-5042A. Rev.1(7/25/88) lk'Igl TheSBGTSfanoutletvalves(AON-108andAON-112>,
ductworkfromthesevalvestothe20"lineleadingtothemainstack,andthe20"11neleadingtothemainstackarethecomponents ofthissystemaffectedbytheproposedchange.ValveAON-108isnormallyclosed,fall-open.
ValveAON-1121snormallyclosed,fail-closed, andthesevalvesareprovidedwithessent1al OCpo~erandlocalsafetyrelateda1rsupplies.
imrmnmPValveAO-5042BisaffectedbythechangefromACtoOCpowerforthesolenoidandbyreplacement oftheex1stingairsupplywithn1trogen.
Theadd1tionofcontainment outboardisolation valve(AO-5025) willnotaffectthePCIS.ValveAO-5025actsasthepr1maryconta1nment outboard1solation valveforthedirecttorusventl1neandwillconformtoNRCrequirements forsealedclosedisolat1on valvesasdefinedinNUREG0800SRP6.2.4.ffffm/mnnThissystemhasthesafetyfunctionofreducingthepossib111ty ofanenergyreleasewithinthepr1marycontainment fromaHydrogen-Oxygen reactionfollow1ng apostulated LOCAcombinedw1thdegradedCoreStandbyCoolingSystem.Thissystemfiltersexhaustairfromthereactorbuild1ngandd1scharges theprocessed airtothemainstack.Thesystemf1ltersparticulates andiod1nesfromtheexhauststreaminordertoreducethelevelofa1rbornecontam1nation releasedtotheenv1ronsv1athema1nstack.TheSBGTScanalsof1lterexhaustairfromthedrywellandthesuppression pool.-17-Rev.l(7/25/88) k\QI4~H1~f~1Ir Thissystemprovidestimelyprotection againsttheonsetandconsequences ofdesignbasisaccidents involving thegrossreleaseofradioactive materials fromtheprimarycontainment byinitiating automatic isolation ofappropriate pipelines whichpenetrate theprimarycontainment whenevermonitored variables exceedpre-selected operational limits.imninmnmTheprimarycontainment system,incon3unction withothersafeguard
- features, limitsthereleaseoffissionproductslntheeventofapostulated designbasisaccidentsothatoffsitedosesdonotexceedtheguideline valuesof10CFR100.3,2.3.3P11ffnf3.2.3.4Theimprovements changetheAO-5042BsolenoidcontrolfromACtoOCenablingittoopen(fromitsnormallyclosedposition) withnodependence onACpoweravailability.
Theexistingairsupplyto-AO-5042B lsbeingreplacedbynitrogen.
DuctworkattheoutletoftheSBGTSlsreplacedwithpipeandthenewventlinelsconnected tothe20"lineattheoutletoftheSBGTS,Additionofanew8"ventlinewithcontainment isolation valveAO-5025off.theexistingtorusventlinecouldintroduce aflowpathunderdesignbasiscond>tlons thatcouldventthecontainment directlytothestackbypassing theSBGTS.Ananalysisoftheeffectsonthesafetyfunctions ofCACS,SBGTS,PCISandPCSforthelnstallatlon ofthedirecttorusventlsdescribed asfollows:ThechangefromACtoOCcontrolandthereplacements ofairwithnitrogenonAO-50428doesnotadversely affecttheabilitytoopenAO-50428whenthecontainment lsbeingpurged,ortoisolateunderaccidentconditions. Rev.1(7/25/88)
JI1't'ff%'LcIr,rSh.~lt~
Themodtftcattons theductworkand20"1incleadingtothemainstackdonotaffectthedesignbasissafetyfunctionofanyofthesafetyrelatedsystems.Dur1ngnormalplantoperattons, theCACSandtheSBGTSdanotusethetorus20"purgeandventlinetoperformthe1rsafetyfunct1ons.
Thecontainment isolat1on valvesaretntheirnormallyclosedposition, thusmatntatntng primarycontainment boundary1ntegrtty.
Therearenoadverseaffectsantheprimarycontainment systembytheadditionoftheOTVS.ValveAO-5025willconformtoNRCcriteriaforsealedclosedtsolatton valvesasdefinedtnNURfG0800SRP6.2.4andwillnotaffectdesignbasisaccidents.
UseoftheOTVSwillbeinaccordance wtththecontainment ventingprovisions ofEPGsasapprovedbytheNRCandcontrolled byEOPstnthesamemannerasotherexistingcontainment ventpaths.Theeffectsonthetorusofthenew8"pipingandAO-5025havebeenevaluated forHarkIprogramloadtngs, usingASHEBPVCSectionIIIcriteria.
Theremaining p1ptngincluding therupturedtskwasevaluated usingANSIB31.1requ1rements.
Our1ngplantstartupandshutdown(non-emergency condttton) whenthepurgeandventlineis1nuse,valveAO-5025remainsclosed.Inaddition, theruptured1skdownstream afvalveAO-5025willprovtdeasecondpositivemeansofpreventing leakageandpreventdirectreleaseuptothestackduringconta1nment purgeandventatplantstartuparshutdown.
Ouringconta1nment highpressurecond1ttons, thetorusma1nexhaust11neisautoeattcally 1solatedbythePCIS.Thereisnochangetotheexistingprimarycontainment 1solatton systemfunctionforAO-5042AorAO-50428.
ThesealedclosedpositionofvalveAO-5025andtheaddtttanal assurance addedbytherupturediskdownstream willpreventanyinadvertent discharge upthestackforalldesignbasisaccidentconditions.
Installation oftheOTVSdoesnotadversely affectthesafetyfuncttans oftheCACS,SBGTS,PCISortheintegrity ofprimarycontainment oranyothersafetyrelatedsystems.~-19-Rev.1(7/25/88)
~.JI UseoftheDTVSw111naccordance v1ththeconta1nment vent1ngprov1s1ons ofKPGsasapprovedbytheNRCandcontrolled byKOPs1nthesamemannerasotherex1st1ngconta1nment, ventpaths.TheOTVSprov1desan1mprovedconta1nment vent1ngcapab111ty fordecayheatremovalwh1chreducespotent1al ons1teandoffs1te1mpactsrelativetotheex1st1ngconta1nment vent1ngcapab111ty.
Rev.1(7/25/88)
I'tf' IRTQRUvNTSYTMFiGUAE3.2-IREMOTEMANUALSWAUPTUREDISKFDUCTPIP/
e'cv' GenericLetterNo.89-1688-20SUPPLEMENT 1Sub'ectDateofIssuanceINSTALLATION OFAHARDENED09/01/89WETWELLVENT(GENERICLETTER89-16)GENERICLETTER88-20SUPPLEMENT NO.1(INITIATION OFTHEINDIVIDUAL PLANTEXAMINATION FORSEVEREVULNERABILITIES 10CFR50.54(f))
08/29/89LISTOFRECENTLYISSUEDGENERICLETTERSEnc1osure 2IssuedToALLGEPLANTSALLLICENSEES HOLDINGOPERATING LICENSESANDCONSTRUCTION PERMITSFORNUCLEARPOWERREACTORFACILITIES 89-15EMERGENCY RESPONSEDATASYSTEMGENERICLETTERNO.89-1508/21/89ALLHOLDERSOFOPERATING LICENSESORCONSTRUCTION PERMITSFORNUCLEARPOWERPLANTS89-0789-14CORRECTACCESSION NUMBERIS8908220423 SUPPLEMENT 1TOGENERIC08/21/89LETTER89-07,"POWERREACTORSAFEGUARDS CONTINGENCY PLANNINGFORSURFACEVEHICLEBOMBS"LINE-ITEMS TECHNICAL SPECIFI-08/21/89CATIONIMPROVEMENT
-REMOVALOF3.25LIMITONEXTENDING SURVEILLANCE INTERVALS (GENERICLETTER89-14)ALLLICENSEES OFOPERATING PLANTS,APPLICANTS FOROPERATING
- LICENSES, ANDHOLDERSOFCONSTRUCTION PERMITSALLLICENSEES OFOPERATING PLANTS,APPLICANTS FOROPERATING
- LICENSES, ANDHOLDERSOFCONSTRUCTION PERMITS89-1389-12GENERICLETTER89-13SERVICEWATERSYSTEMSPROBLEMSAFFECTING SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT GENERICLETTER89-12:OPERATORLICENSING EXAMINATIONS 7/18/897/6/89LICENSEES TOALLPOWERREACTORSBWRS,PWRS,ANDVENDORSINADDITIONTOGENERALCODESAPPLICABLE TOGENERICLETTERSLICENSEES TOALLPOWERREACTORSBWRS,PWRS,ANDVENDORSINADDITIONTOGENERALCODESAPPLICABLE TOGENERICLETTERS lt~fgo"