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Forwards Summary of 890720 & 0815 Enforcement Conferences Re Findings in Insp Repts 50-413/89-19 & 50-414/89-19 on Inoperability of Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation Sys. List of Attendees & Viewgraphs Also Encl
	ML20247A178
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	08/29/1989
From:	Ebneter S; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	Tucker H; DUKE POWER CO.
References
	NUDOCS 8909120057
	Download: ML20247A178 (88)
	v • d • e

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Dock 6t Nos. 50-413, 50-414

License Nos. NPF-35, NPF-S2

Duke Power Company

ATTN: Mr. H. B. Tucker, Vice President

Nuclear Production Department -

422 South Church Street

Charlotte, NC 28242

Gentlemen:

SUBJECT: ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE SUMMARY

(NRC INSPECTION REPORT N05. 50-413/89-19 AND 50-414/89-19)

This letter refers to the Enforcement Conference held at our request on

July.20, 1989, and the Enforcement Conference followup meeting held on

August 15, 1989. These meetings concerned activities authorized for your

Catawba' facility.

The issues d'scussed at the conference and the followup meeting related to

inoperability of the Unit 2 Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation System.

l A list of attendees, meeting summaries, and a copy of your handouts are

-enclosed. We are continuing our review of these issues to determine the

appropriate enforcement action.

In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2,

!

Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclosures

l will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact us.

Sincerely,

wcd Do '

OQ A m( C b C. E h t.

Stewart D. Ebneter

Regional Administrator

,i

Enclosures:

l

'

1. List of Attendees

2. ' Enforcement Conference Summary

3. Enforcement Conference followup

Meeting Summary

4. Handout (s) dated July 20, 1989

l 5. Handout (s) dated August 15, 1989

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cc w/encls:

T. B. Owen, Station Manager

Senior Resident Inspector - McGuire

l State of South Carolina

bec w/encls: (See page 2) * ;g

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AUG 2 S 1989

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NRC Resident Inspector '

Document Control Desk

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ENCLOSURE 1

l

LIST OF ATTENDEES

I

July 20, 1989

U.S. Nuclear Reculatory Commission

L M. L. Ernst. Deputy Regional Administrator

l P. K. Grimes. Acting Deputy Regional Administrator

C. W. Hehl, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)

E. W. Merschoff, Deputy Dirertor, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)

G. R. Jenkins, Director Enforcement and Investigation Coordination Staff

(EICS)

A. R. Herdt, Branch Chief DRP

M. B. Shymlock, Section Chief, CRP

K. N. Jabbour, Project Manager, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)

W. T. Orders, Senior Resident Inspector, Catawba, DRP

M. S. Lesser, Resident Inspector, Catawba, DRP

B. R. Bonser, Project Engineer, DRP

R. J. Goddard, Regional Counsel

F. Jape Section Chief. DRS

B. Uryc, Enforcement Coordinator, EICS

L. Phillips, Section Chief NRR

J. Leuhman, Dffice of Enforcement

Duke Power Company

H. B. Tucker, Vice President, Nuclear Production Department

T. B. Owen, Station Manager, Catawba

P. G. Leroy, Catawba Support Engineer, Compliance

R. M. Glover, Compliance Engineer, Catawba

W. R. McCollum, Maintenance Superintendent, Catawba

J. M. Stackley, ISE Group Manager, Catawba

'

H. J. Lee, Design Engineering

l

.

,. -_ _ -- _ _ .

.

..

Enclosure 1 2

LIST OF ATTENDEES

August 15, 1989

l

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

B. K. Grimes, Acting Deputy Regional Administrator

A. F. Gibson, Director, Division of Reactor _ Safety (DRS)

G. R. Jenkins, Director, Enforcement and Investigation Coordina^ ion Staff

(EICS)

A. R. Herdt, Branch Chief, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)

l M. B. Shymlock, Section Chief, DRP

1 K. N. Jabbour, Project Manager, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)

! M. S. Lesser, Resident Inspector, Catawba, DRP

B. R. Bonser, Project Engineer, DRP

F. Jape, Section Chief, DRS

B. Uryc, Enforcement Coordinator, EICS

L. Phillips, Section Chief, NRR

J. Leuhman, Office of Enforcement

Duke Power Company

T. L Owen, ' Station Manager, Catawba

R. M. Glover, Compliance Engineer, Catawba

W. R. McCollum, Maintenance Superintendent, Catawba

H. J. Lee, Design Engineering

F. N. Mack, Jr., Project Manager, Catawbc

R. N. Casler, Operations Superintendent, Catawba

J. Forbes, Technical Services Superintendent, Catawba

W. F. Beaver, Performance Manager, Catawba

l J. Kammer, Test Engineer, Catawba

l

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ENCLOSURE 2

ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE SUMMARY

On July 20, 1989, representatives from Duke Power Company (DPC) met with the

NRC in the Region II Office in Atlanta, Getrgia, to discuss inoperability of-

both . trains of' the Reactor Vessel' Level Instrumentation System (RVLIS) Upper

,

Railge lon Catawba. Unit ?.

Following opening remarks by M. Ernst, NRC RII Deputy Regional Administrator.

DPC gave a presentation (Enclosure 4) on the RVLIS inoperability. T. B. Owen,

Catawba Station Manager, introduced DPCs presentation by stating that Duke had

identified the RVLIS problem, reported it promptly to the NRC, and that

contrary to1what was stated in a courtesy Licensee Event Report submitted

= June 26, 1989, the RVLIS Technical Specification had beeri violated. He also

~ stated that DPC felt the root cause of the problem was the failure of the

Catawba . supervisor to use qualified personnel in the task of restoring RVLIS

and that a contributing factor had been the poor direction and guidance given

in N/A'ing procedure steps. The presentation that followed covered a system

' description, sequence ~of events, root cause/ corrective actions, safety

significance, summary and concluding remarks.

A significant number of NRC questions and discussion during the conference were

centered ' around the supervisory error, qualifications of maintenance and

supervisory. personnel, how the error of assigning an unqualified maintenance

worker to the job occurred, and the adequacy ~of the post maintenance test

perforn.ed.

Duke ended the meeting by giving their corrective actions and stating their

conclusions. - Duke . reiterated that they had identified the inoperability,

immediately taken corrective actions, communicated the situation promptly to

the NRC, and issued a courtesy LER before all the facts were fully known. They

also stated that they believed the contributing factors to this event were'not

recurring. That is the surveillance problems resulting from N/A'ing procedural

-

steps, assignment of unqualified personnel to tasks requiring qualifications,

and performance of post-maintenance testing by unqualified personnel. Also,

with-regard to safety significance, Duke felt the safety ramifications of this

event were not significant.

The URC closed the meeting by stating that it had served to enhance Region II's

understanding of the issues and DPC's corrective actions.

1

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...

ENCLOSURE 3 ,

ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE FOLLOWUP MEETING

On August 15, 1989, representatives from Duke Power Company met with the NRC

in the Region II Office in Atlanta, Georgia, for a followup meeting to the -

enforcement conierence held on July 20. The purpose of the meetirg was to

discuss in greater depth subjects which DPC felt would enhance the NRCs

understanding of the significance and circumstances surrounding the RVLIS

inoperability on Unit 2.

l Following opening remarks by B. Grimes, NRC RII Acting Deputy Regional

Administrator, DPC gave two presentations (Enclosure 5). The first

presentation covered Post Modification Testing (PMT). The PMT presentation

included a - discussion of the Nuclear Station Modification (NSM) process, a

description of the System Expert program, and a description of the PMT program.

The second presentation covered the safety significance of the RVLIS

inoperability, outstanding questions from the enforcement conference, and a

summary. Duke opened by stating that they had violated the RVLIS Technical

Specification (TS) and that RVLIS was important to safety; however, they did

not consider it as significant as some other systems in TS. DPC went on to

explain how they reached their conclusions on safety significance.

The safety significance discussion was followed by answering outstanding

.

questions from the enforcement conference. This presentation covered a sun. mary

l

of the event and managements expectations, the venting of the RVLIS line

following reconaection, and supervisor qualifications. Duke ended the meeting

by reiterating their conclusions which they had stated at the enforcement

conference.

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AUG 2 9193g

Docket Nos. 50-41*i,53-414

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'l.icense Nos. NPF-36. NPF-52

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Duke Power Ccmpany i

ATTN: Mr. A B. Tucker, Vice President I

<Nur, lear Production Department

422 South Church Street

Charlotte, NC 28242.

Gentlemen:

SUBJECT: ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE SUMMARY

(NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-413/89-19 AND 50-414/89-19)

This letter refers to the Enforcement Conference held at our request on

July.20, 1989, and the Enforcement Conference followup meeting held on

August 15, 1989. These meetings concerned activities authorized for your

Catawba facility.

The issu'es discussed at the conference and the followup meeting related to

inoperability of the Unit 2 Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation System.

A list of attendees, meeting summaries, and a copy of your handouts are

, enclosed. We are continuing our review of these issues to determine the-

appropriate enforcement action.

lIn accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2,

Title 10 Code-of Federal Regulations, a copy. of this letter and its enclosures

will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

1

Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please conta'ct us.

Sincerely,

pm

l

'

&& -

Stewart D. Ebneter

Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1 1.' -List of Attendees

2.- Enforcement Conference Sumary

l

3. Enforcement Conference Followup

Meeting Sumary

4. Handout (s) dated July 20, 1989

5. Handout (s) dated August 15, 1989

cc w/encls: i

T. B. Owen', Station Manager

Senior Resident Inspector - McGuire

State of South Carolina 3

!

,

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l

ENCLOSURE 1

LIST OF ATTENDEES

July.20, 1989

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

.

M.,L. Ernst. Deputy Regional Administrator

B.'K. Grimes,' Acting Deputy Regional Administrator

C. W.'Hehl, Deputy Director, Division of Rerctor Projects (DRP)

E. W. Merschoff, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)

.G. R. Jenkins, Director, Enforcement and Investigation Coordination Staff

(EICS)

A. R. Herdt, Branch Chief, DRP

M. B. Shymlock, Section Chief DRP

K. N. Jabbour, Project Manager, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)

W. T. Orders, Senior. Residerat Inspector, Catawba, DRP

M. S. Lesser, Resident Inspector, Catawba, DRP

B.-R. Bonser, Project Engineer, DRP

R. J. Goddard, Regional Counsel'

F. Jape, Section Chief, DRS

B. Uryc, Enforcement Coordinator, EICS

L., Phillips, Section Chief, NRR

J. Leuhman, Office of Enforcement.

Duke Power Company

H. B. Tucker, Vice President, Nuclear Prodcttion Department

T. B. Owen, Station Manager, Catawba

P. G. Leroy, Catawba Support Engineer, Compliance

'R. M. Glover, Compliance Engineer, Catawba

W. R. McCollum, Maintenance Superintendent, Catawba

J. M. Stackley, I&E Group Mam qer, Catawba

H. J. Lee, Design Engineering

l

i

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ENCLOSURE 1

LIST OF ATTENDEES

July 20, 1989

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

M. L. Ernst Deputy Regional Administrator

B. K. Grimes, Acting Deputy Regional Administrator

C. W. Hehl,. Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)

E. W. Merschoff, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)

G. R.'Jenkins, Director, Enforcement and Investigation Coordination Staff

(EICS)

A. R. Herdt, Branch Chief, DRP

.M. B. Shymiock, Section Chief, DRP

K. N. Jabbour, Project Manager, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)

W. T. Orders Senior Resident' Inspector, Catawba, DRP

M. S. Lesser, Resident Inspectcr. Catawba, DRP

B. R. Bonser, Project Engineer, DRP

R. J. Goddard, Regional Counsel

F. Jape, Section Chief. DRS

B. Uryc, Enforcemer,t Coordinator, EICS

L. Phillips, Section Chief, NRR

- J. Leuhman, Office of Enforcement

Duke Power Company

H. B. Tucker, Vice President, Nuclear Production Department

T. B. Owen, Station Manager, Catawba

P. G. Leroy, Catawba Support Engineer, Compliance

R. M. Glover, Compliance Engineer, Catawba

W. R. McCollum, Maintenance Superintendent, Catawba

J. M. Stackley, I&E Group Manager, Catawba

H. J. Lee, Design Engineering

_ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - _ . . _ .

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" Enclosure 1

-

2

LIST OF ATTENDEES l

August 15, 1989 l

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

B..K. Grimes, Acting Deputy Regional Administrator

A. F._Gibson, Director. Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)

G. R. Jenkins, Director, Enforcement and Investigation Coordination Staff

(EICS)'

A. R. Herdt, Branch Chief, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)

M. B. Shym1ock, Section Chief, DRP

K. N. Jabbour, Project Manager, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)

M. S. Lesser, Resident Inspector, Catawba, DRP

B. R. Bonser, Project Engineer, DRP

F. Jape; Section Chief, DRS

8. Uryc,' Enforcement Coordinator, EICS

L. Phillips, Section Chief, NRR

J. Leuhman, Office of Enforcement

Duke' Power Company

T. B. Owen, Station Manager, Catawba

1R. M. Glover, Compliance Engineer, Catawba

W. R. McCollum, Maintenance Superintendent, Catawba

H. J. Lee, Design Engineering

.

F. N. Mack, Jr., . Project Manager, Cstawba

R. N. Casler, Operations Superintendent,' Catawba

J. Forbes, Technical Services Superintendent. Catawba

W. F. Beaver, Performance Manager, Catawba .

J. Kamrter, Test Engineer, Catawba

i

- - - _ . . - _ - - . _ . . _ _ . _ - . - - . _ _ _ - - - . _ . - . - - .

,

, .s

-.

ENCLOSURE 2

ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE SUMMARY

On July 20, 1989, representatives from Dui e '"w4 e Company (DPC) met with the

NRC in the Region II Office in Atlanta, Geor s:a, .o discuss inoperability of

both trains of the Reactor Vessel Level Ins .vi+ ;tation System (RVLIS) Upper

Range on Catawba Unit 2.

Following opening remarks by M. Ernst, NRC RI! Deputy Regional Administrator,

DPC gave a presentation (Enclosure 4) on the RVLIS inoperability. -T. B. Owen,

Catawba Station Manager, introduced DPCs presentation by stating that Duke had

identified the RVLIS problem, reported it promptly to the NRC, and that

contrary to what was stated in a courtesy Licensee Event Report submitted

June 26, 1989, the RVLIS Technical Specification had been violated. He also

stated that DPC felt the root cause of the problem was the failure of the

Catawba supervisor to use qualified personnel in the task of restoring RVLIS

and that a contributing factor had been the poor direction and guidance given

in N/A'ing procedure steps. The presentation that followed covered a system

description, sequence of events, root cause/ corrective actions, safety

significance, summary and concluding remarks.

A significant number of NRC questions and discussion during the conference were

centered around the supervisory error, qualifications of maintenance and

supervisory personnel, how the error of assigning an unqualified maintenance

worker to the job occurred, and the adequacy of the post maintenance test

performed.

Duke ended the meeting by giving their corrective actions and stating their

conclusions. Duke reiterated that they had identified - the inaperability,

immediately taken corrective actions, communicated the situation promptly. to

the NRC, ano issued a courtesy LER before all the facts were fully known. They

also stated that they believed the contributing factors to this event were not

recurring. That is the surveillance problems resulting from N/A'ing procedural

steps, assignment of unqualified personnel to tasks requiring qualifications,

and performance of post-maintenance testing by unqualified personnel. Also,

with regard to safety significance, Duke felt the safety ramifications of this

event were not significant.

The NRC closed the meeting by stating that it had served to enhance Region II's

understanding of the issues and DPC's corrective actions.

- _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -

. - - - - _ _-_

, . t

L

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I

ENCLOSURE 3

ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE FOLLOWUP MEETING

On August 15, 1989, representatives from Duke Power Company met with' the NRC

in the Region II Office in Atlanta, Georgia, for a followup meeting to the

enforcement conference held on July 20. The purpose of the meeting was to

discuss in greater depth subjects which DPC felt would enhance the NRCs

understanding of the significance and circumstances surrounding the RVLIS

inoperability on Unit 2.

1

Following opening remarks by B.

Administrator, DPC gave two presentations Grines, NRC RII Acting)

(Enclosure S . Deputy

The Regional

first

presentation covered Post Modification Testing (PMT). The PMT presentation

includedt a discussion of the Nuclear Station Modification (NSM) process, a

description of the System Expert program, and a description of the PMT progsam.

The 'second presentation covered the safety significance of the RVLIS

inoperability, outstanding questions from the enforcement conference, and a

summary. Duke opened by stating that they had violated the RVLIS Technical

Specification (TS) and that RVLIS was important to safety; however, they did

not consider it as significant as some other systems in TS. DPC went on to

explain how.they reached their conclusions on safety significance.

The safety significance discussion was followed by answering outstanding

questions from the enforcement conference. This presentation covered a summary

of the event and managements expectations, the veiccing of the RVLIS line

following reconnection, and supervisor qualifications. Duke ended the meeting

by reiterating their conclusions which they had stated at the enforcement

conference.

- - _ - _-_ _ _ - _ _ .--

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_

.

'~*

ENCt.05URE 4

Enforcement Conference Agenda

Duke Power' Company

Catawba Nuclear Station

10:30 AM, July 20, 1989

Atlanta, Georgia

Both Trains of-. Upper Range RVLIS Isolated

Introduction T. B. Owen

Station Manager

System Description J. M. Stackley

Sequence of Events I&E Group Manager

Root Cause/ W. R. McCollum

Corrective Actions Maintenance Supt.

.

-Safety Significance H. J. Lee

Design Engineering

I

Summary T. B. Owen

Station Manager

l

Concluding Remarks H. B. Tucker

Vice President

Nuclear Production

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. .

.l (ll L lll[ l[if l J , I I :l I

_ _ , _ _ _ _

. . . .

.

4

!

i

Significance

-

RVLIS Upper Range is not needed to. mitigate

an Inadequate Core Cooling event (NUREG

0737,. Supplement.1)

-

RVLIS Upper Range-does.not meet the " split"

criteria of the Technical Specification

Improvement Program

- A shutdown transient is more significant-

than havin RVLIS Upper Range out of-

service.

- Duke Power intends to move the requirements

l for RVLIS Upper Range to Catawba's Selected

Licensee Commitment document.

l'

.

i

(

1

,. ..

_ _ _ - - _ - __ ___- __-

_

- . - _ . _ _ _ _ .

- -

. ,

.

. , ENCLOSURE 5

1, .

<

OUKE POWER COMP ANY

CATAWBA NUCLEAR STAT 1ON

RVLiS ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE FOLLOWUP

AUGUST 15- 1989

OVERVIEW T. 'B. OWEN

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

- OPERATOR PERSPECTIVE AbD OPTIONS R. N. C'ASLER

- RVLIS DES!GN BASIS & TECH SPEC. PLAftJING H J LEE

OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS W. R. McCOLLUM

- EVENT SLMAARY Ato MAtuGENOJT EXPECTATIONS

- VENTING RVLIS LibE FOL1.OWING RECortECTION

- SLPERVISOR QUALIFICATIONS

o-

l

L

- _ - - - . _ _ . _

p' -

!

. .

.,

.-

,

<

'

-

l

NUREG-0737 ITEM II.F.2 REQUIREMENTS i

e LR RVLIS INDICATES STAGNANT BOILOFF WHILE DHR RVLIS

INDICATES HIGH VOID FRACTION PUMPED FLOW

e BOTH RANGES COVER THE FULL RANGE FROM NORMAL OPERATION J

(ZERO VOID FRACTION) TO COMPLETE CORE UNC0VERY

e LR RVLIS DOES NOT ERR 0NE0USLY INDICATE ICC BECAUSE OF THE

PRESENCE OF AN UNRELATED PHENOMENON, E.G., VOIDING IN THE

REACTOR VESSEL UPPER HEAD DURING A NATURAL CIRCULATION

DEPRESSURIZATION WITH SUBC00 LED LOOP FLOW

-

e BOTH RANGES GIVE ADVANCED WARNING 0F THE APPROACH OF ICC IN

THAT V0IDING IS INDICATED ON EACH RANGE WELL BEFORE REACHING

A VOID FRACTION INDICATIVE OF C,0RE UNC0VERY

!

,

--m------u-----, - - - - - - - . - - -----------_a. - - -

_

- - _ , _ _ _ . ._, __ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

[,;.. -

7

}-:.

l

-

1

LR RVLIS WARNING'0F A.PPR0ACH'.'0F ICC

. . .

TIME FROM' REACTOR TRIP TIME FROM LR UNC0VERY (64%).

TO LR UNC0VERY-(64%) T0: CORE.UNC0VERY (39%)

..

'"

14.7 PSIA 1000 PSIA'

[

p

,

5 20 9-

10 ,. 22 10

'

15 -

v 23 11

30 28 14

60 . 33 17

.

ALL' TIMES IN MINUTES

1

L._-_~l-..-- _ - - - . - . _ - _ _ . . - _ . . . . - . - _ . _ . - - _ _ . _ - - - _ . _ . . - . . , . . - - - - . _ - - _ . . . _ . - . . _ . . . _ _ - - . . --. - . . _ _ -

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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SPLIT CRITERIA

e INSTALLED INSTRUMENTATION THAT IS USED TO DETECT, AND

INDICATE IN THE CONTROL ROOM, A SIGNIFICANT ABNORMAL

DEGRADATION OF THE REACTOR COOLANT PRESSURE B0UNDARY OR;

e A PROCESS VARIABLE THAT IS AN INITIAL CONDITION OF A DESIGN

BASIS ACCIDENT'(DBA) OR TRANSIENT ANALYSES THAT EITHER

ASSUMES THE FAILURE OF OR PRESENTS A CHALLENGE TO THE

INTEGRITY OF A FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER OR:

e A STRUCTURE, SYSTEM OR COMPONENT THAT IS PART OF THE PRIMARY

SUCCESS PATH AND WHICH FUNCTIONS OR ACTUATES TO MITIGATE A

DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT OR TRANSIENT THAT EITHER ASSUMES THE

FAILURE OF OR PRESENTS A CHALLENGE TO THE INTEGRITY OF A

i . FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER,

1

l

i

__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - -

.

. . ._ . _ . _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ _ ___ _ -

- -

.

}

.-

o

l

CASE I - VOID EXISTS AND RVLIS INDICATES NO V0ID

A. POSSIBLE DELAYED OPERATOR AWARENESS OF VOID

B. OPERATORS ARE TRAINED ON HOW PARAMETERS REACT WHEN A VOID

EXISTS

1, ABNORMAL PRESSURIZER LEVEL RESPONSE

2. ABNORMAL NATURAL CIRCULATION PARAMETERS

3. SUBC00 LING-MARGIN DECREASING / ALARM

C. LOWER RANGE RVLIS INSTRUMENTS WILL ALERT OPERATOR PRIOR TO

CORE UNC0VERY - CSF WILL DIRECT OPERATOR TO PROPER RECOVERY

PROCEDURE

D. UPPER RANGE RVLIS IS NOT AN INPUT TO THE ICC CRITICAL SAFETY

FUNCTION NOR IS IT USED IN THE INADEQUATE OR DEGRADED CORE

COOLING EP's

_ _ __- .

- - _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _

,

. . , .

.

.. .. :

F

CASE II - VOID DOES NOT EXIST AND RVLIS INDICATES A VOID

,

A. 'POTENTIALLY LEAD TO UNNECESSARY STEPS TO REMOVE THE VOID

B. AFTER A SHORT TIME, THE OPERATOR WOULD REALIZE UPPER RANGE

RVLIS INDICATION IS UNRELIABLE

'

1. PRESSURIZER LEVEL RESPONSE

2. -UPPER RANGE RVLIS NO RESPONSE

3. SUBC00 LING MARGIN MONITOR RESPONSE

4. NATURAL CIRCULATION PARAMETERS RESPONSE

C. COULD DELAY POST LOCA C00LDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION UNTIL

OPERATOR DETERMINES A VOID DOES NOT EXIST - NOT A SAFETY

J

CONCERN

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'

. h

., r

+

'

EXPECTATION

e Post-MAINTENANCE TESTING WILL BE SUFFICIENT IN

SCOPE TO VERIFY OPERABILITY OF COMPONENTS AND

SYSTEMS PRIOR TO RETURN TO SERVICE

e PMT WILL BE STRENGTHENED TO INCLUDE SPECIFIC

' CRITERIA FOR MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES

e PMT HAS NOT BEEN A RE-CURRING PROBLEM

IN I&E

-

,

i

1

-

,,wma--- - - _ - . _ , - - - -----mx-_------------a - - - -

_ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --

.

.. .

...

CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION i

,

Rick Mack

Projects Manager l

1

Purpose:

Discuss the Nuclear Station Modification l

(NSM) process with special emphasis on Post !

Modification Testing. ;

,

I

_ _ - - - - - - - - _ - - !

E. . ..

.

CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION

NUCLEAR STATION MODIFICATION

i'NSM)

,

PROCESS

Origination

Design

Planning

Implementation

I

)

.

. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

l: ...

.

CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION

NUCLEAR STATION MODIFICATION

l',NSM)

PROCESS

Origination

problem identified at any level in the station,

General Office, or Design Engineering

,

reviewed for need, benefit / cost, alternatives,

regulatory commitment

compared with other problems to determine l

greatest benefit

l

o approved by Station Manager l

l

NSM request to Design Engineering w/ interface ]

Activities form {

!

l

- - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

.

%3mmm INTERFACE ACTIVITIES REQUEST

1. NSM # Rev.#

2. Scope Meeting Required O Yes O No

O Review problem to be resolved (reasons for irMTs'ui).

O Revew options available to resolve problem including similar completed modifications.

O Review nuclear safety aspects of modificatbn.

O Review QA aspects of modification.

O Review design options to reduce personnel exposure.

O Revew potential operability or maintainability concems.

O Revewconstructabdityconcems.

O Post,TMrs'si testing requirements.

O Other

3. Pre-Design Survey Required O Yes O No

Area of Station to be surveyed

O Walk down for potential interferences with existing equiprcent (constructability).

O Wak down to optimize equipment locations (operability and maintainability).

O Wak down to confirm as budt configuration

O Wak down to optimize ALARA desgn.

O Wak down to mnmize personnel safety phiis.

O Wak down to minimize nuclear security problems.

O Specal considerations for post-modficaton testing.

O Other

4. Conceptuel Client /CMD Revew Needed (20% to 40% Desgned) O Yes ONo

Reviewis needed of: O Post-irMTG'hi testing equirenents

O Operabdity O Design enwy for intender! rnoGificaSon

O MainP'~bility O ALARAdesgn

O Constructabdity O Safetycoskiere^hs

O Other -_

Spec 4c design nwiewis requested of

drawings.

5. Detailed Clont/CMD Review Needed (60% to 80% Desgned) O Yes O No

i Revewis needed of: O Post,TMTG^& testingrequirements

' O Operabdity O ALARA design

O Maintanabilrty O Safety corr.Jderations

O Constructability O Other

Specific design review is requested of

drawings.

6. CMD Contact

7. Completed by: Date:

_ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _-__ _ -

_

.

4

CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION

NUCLEAR STATION MODIFICATION

(NSM)

PROCESS

Design

Initial scope review

designers, originator, affected station groups

discuss Post Modification Testing (PMT) expected

develop draft PMT Plan

a detail design performed

provide instrumentation needed for PMT

for design basis change or when documetita-

tion of dealgn basis is unclear, specify !

S

test o')}setives

test acceptanca criteria {

l

Final Scope Document j

PMTAC summary l

functional description of mod.

I

- _-- -- - - - - -

-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - _ - - - -

. y

.

"""**

PMT PLAN

l

l O DRAFT PMT Plan O FINAL PMT Plan Rev * Paos of I1 l

NSM #/ Exempt Change #

Rev.#

Part #

Unit #

I2

BRIEF NSM DESCRIPTION

l

I3

NSTALLATON TESTS

Type of Test Documentation Performed by

-_

l

_ i4

VERIFICATION TESTS

Typeof Test Documentation Performed by

<

-

(

.__

_.

_, I5

RE1ESTS

--

Typeof Tey l

Documentation Performed by

- _

-

. __

-

l

-

I6

PMT Plan Comoisted By Ome- l7l

Distribution: '

l l _

! I

I I

I i

i I i

i l I

I I i 8

1

.

- _ _ _ _ _ _ . -_ _ - _ t

.

. .

.

CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION

NUCLEAR STATION MODIFICATION

(NSM)

PROCESS

Planning

Planning Meeting

discuss system / plant impact during instsilation, Isola-

tion requirements (e.g. %' train vs. 'B' train, etc.) and

PMT requirement with all affected station groups

finalize PMT Plan

'

write implementation procedure (TN)

controlling procedure

all parts of mod included

!solations and effect on plant

l

PMT & responsibility for performing

! *

PMT Summary Letter discussing thought

process and conclu.slons reached on determin-

ing appropriate Post Mod Testing

review and approve TN

m2.___aw-__.-m_-.__m______m_ - .___.

- __

.

l

CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION

NUCLEAR STATION MODIFICATION

(NSM) 4

PROCESS

'

Implementation

follow TN

perform PMT as directed

review documentation of PMT results prior to

return to service

l

I

i

!

l

_ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _

- _ - - _ -

.

.. .

s

CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION

NUCLEAR STATION MODIFICATION

(NSM,'l !

PROCESS

Summary

a definite, structured process during Design and

planning stages to identify PMT

appropriate station and Design Engineering

groups are involved in determining PMT

controlled process for performing PMT and

determining that results are satisfactory. l

,

1

j ,

l

!

- _ _ - _ _ _ - -

_ - --

.

. .

.

CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION

SYSTEM EXPERT

DEFINrnON

A System Expert is "an individual with an

engineering degree or a strong

demonstrable technical background who is

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assigned the responsibility of maintaining

expertise in a designated plant system (s)

and/or area (s).

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CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION :

SYSTEM EXPERT

PURPOSE

The purpose of the System Expert Program

is to maximize the performance, avaliability, I

and reliability of station systems and the

station as a whole. 4

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Catawba Nuclear Station !

System Expert

Qualifications '

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Four year engineering or physical science degree or a strong l

demonstrable technical background

At least one year nuclear power plant experience

Exemplary knowledge of systems assigned

Training

Systems

Components

Technical Specifications

Design Basis

Operational Understanding

Codes

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Case Studies

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Catawba Nuclear Station i

System Expert Program

Systems

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Steam Generator Browdown Recycle System Ice Condenser Refdgeration System

Auxiliary Feedwater System Safety injection System

Main Condenser Containment Spray System

Feedwater dystem Chemical & Volume Control System

Condensate Syrtem Containment Penetration Valve Inj Water System

Trace Heating System Condenser Circu! sting Water System

Loose Parts Monitoring (Unit) Fire Protection System

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Radiation Monitoring (Unit) Conventional Low Press Service Water System

incore Instrumentation Nuclear Service Water System

Out of-Core Instrumentation Exterior Fire Protection System

Diesel Load Sequencing System Main Steam Supply to Auxiliary Equipment

Diese! ControlSystem Main Steam Bypass to Condenser

Refueling Water System Main Steam

Heater Drain System Main Steam Vent to Atmosphere

Containment Personnel Air Lock System Auxiliary Ventilation System

Containment leak Testing System Control Room Area HVAC System

Operator Aid Computer System Annulus Ventilation System

Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Fuel PoolVentilation System

Transient Monitoring System Instrument AirSystem

IWP/IVN Containment Purge

Component Cooling System Containment Air Return & Hydrogen Skimmer System

Diesel Generator Engine Cooling Water System Reactor

Generator Stator Cooling Water System Fuel

Recirculated Cooling Water System Special Nuclear Materials

Reactor Coolant System Appendix J

Residual Heat Removal System

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Catawba Nuclear Station

System Expert l

Responsibilities

Detail System Understanding -

Scheduling

System Walkdown

System Monitoring

Reliability Review

Operating Experience Program

ALARA .

Problem Resolver

Information Review

Modification Review

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Catawba Nuclear Station

System Expert

Program Development

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August Work Plan

September Modifications

October Design Basis, Technical

Documentation

December Information Review

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Catawba Nuclear Station

Idystem Expert

Skills in Perspective '

Systerns Understanding . 66%

Component Understanding 33 %

Tech Spec Understanding 90%

Code Understanding 85 %

Design Basis Understanding 50 %

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Catawba Nuclear Station

NSM Program

System ExpertInvolvement

SPR

SE counsels superintendent

NSM approval

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Scope meeting

PMT Plan 30 days after scope document

Planning meeting

Commitment meeting

l PMT summary letter

TN approval

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Retest Activities

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July 12,1989 -

INTRASTATION LETTER

CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION

TO: T. B. Owen

SUBJECT: Catawba Nuclear St:. tion

. NSM CN-11045, Rev. 0 & NSM CN-20432, Rev. O

Keywords: NSM Retest

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The above referenced NSM's will modify the VP System controls such that all isolation val-

ves can be electrically sealed closed during Modes 1 through 4 without the use of a TSM to

remove power. The modification also provides for a time delay bypass of the high relative

humidity isolation and trip function during startup of the VP System.

The functional that will be conducted as part ofimplementation procedures

TNIA10450001A & 02A, and TN2A04320001A & 02A fully demonstrate the adequacy of

the NSM to meet its intended purpose. The ability of the time delay relay to allow start of

VP with a simulated high humidity for the required time intervalis tested along with the

ability to start without a high humidity. In addition the new " BLOCK /CLOSE" function is

verified to isolate all VP valves when placed in the required position. As an added as-

surance that the required safety function of the affected circuits is not adversely altered, al-

though the functional does test all such circuits, Performance will conduct

IrTI(2)A420041C upon completion of the modi 5 cation prior to return to service. This is re-

quired by the applicable TNs.

Therefore, the proposed NSM implementation plan including functional and retests as out-

lined above fully challenge the modification to function in both normal and design basis

conditions.

C

.X

Z. Ldaylor

Test Engineer

For Approval:

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Perfromance Manager

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Catawba Nuclear Station

Post Modification Testing Program

Introduction

Post Modification Testing Philosophy

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Case Studies

Summary

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Catawba Nuclear Station

Post Modification Testing Philosophy

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Historical Perspective

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Post Modification Testing Standard

Testing Limitation Considerations

Summary of Changes in Philosophy

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Catawba Nuclear Station

Post Modification Testing Philosophy

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Historical Perspective

Performed Code Required Retests,IWP/IWV

Performed Post Modification Testing on Modifica- ;

tions which changed a Design Basis or created a new ;

Design Basis j

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Assumed thatInstallationVerifications sufficient for

ensuring Design Basis not affected by Modification

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Example - VX Modification I

An HED modification which relocated test circuit

controls from the Control Room to a panel in the

Auxiliary Building.

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No Chapter 15 Design Basis were affected by this

modification.

Assumed. that installation verifications ensured I

proper wiring. j

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A Post Mod Test was performed however to ensure i

that the test switches still worked NOT to verify

t design basis were intact.

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Catawba Nuclear Station

Post Modification Testing Philosophy

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Testi.ng to Ensure Design Basis Intact

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Design Basis - Definition

FSAR Chapter 15

Individual System Design Basis as specified in

FSAR

Scope of Post Modification Testing

Fully challenge design basis in accident mode l

configuration

System Expert Responsibilities '

Example - VX Modification

This philosophy would require the performance of

the Auxiliary Safeguards Test to ensure that the

Chapter 15 Design Basis was not affected by this

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Catawba Nuclear Station

Post Modification Tasting Philosophy

Testing to Ensure Design Intent Met and

Functionally Operable

Design. Intent - Definition

Those design requirements over and beyond

FSAR Chapter 15 requirements

Scope

Each modification is to have its design intent

fully challenged to ensure that the modifica-

tion performs as intended by design and that

the modification was properly installed

System Expert Responsibilities

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Examples

ForVX Modification the performance of the VX peri-

odic test would now be required.

Proper CheckValve Operation

InterlockVerification

FlowTests

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Catawba Nuclear Station

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Post Modification Testing Philosophy

Testing Limitation Consid.erations

Risk to Station Equipment

Impact to Station Operation

Cost of Performing Test

Deviation Documentation

Any deviation from performing the most conservative

testing to verify Design Basis or design intent is to be

documented in the Post Modification Testing Sum-

mary Letter to Station Man'agement

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Catawba Nuclear Station

Post Modification Testing Philosophy

Summary of Significant Changes

Focused Responsibility - System Expert is now

responsible for approval of Post Modification Test-

ing Program for each modification

FSAR Chapter 15 Design Basis will be verified intact

after modification if work performed could have af-

fected them

No Credit taken for Installation Verifications

All modifications will be verified to have met design

intent and that the system is functionally operable

after the modification

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Catawba Nuclear Station l

Case Study 1

S/G PORV Modification

Reason for Modification )

Description of Modification i

S/G PORV Design Basis

Main Steam Isolation Signal l

Manual Open for S/G Tube Rupture Event

Post Modification Testing ;

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RVV- No Differential l

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Manual Open - Normal DP, Operator DP Adjusted

Summary i

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Catawba Nuclear Station

Case Study 1

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Case Study 1

S/G PORV Modification

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Catawba Nuclear Station

Case Study 1 i

S/G PORVModification I

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S/G PORV Post Modification Testing Plan

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Catawba Nuclear Station 1

l Case Study 2

Nuclear Service Water Pond Swap Logic

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Reason for Modification

Description of Modification .

Swap Logic Design Basis. l

Post Modification Testing

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Summary

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Case Study 2 !

Nuclear Service Water Pond Swap Logic {

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Catawba Nuclear Station

Case Study 2

Nuclear Service Water Pond Swap Logic

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Catawba Nuclear Station ,

Case Study 3 l

2NS 12B Cable Ground

Reason for Modification i

Description of Modification

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2NS 12B Design Basis

Post Modification Testing

Summary

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Critical Path Test

Design Basis Verified not Affected ,

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Case Study 3

2NS 12B Cable Ground

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Catawba Nuclear Station

Post Modification Testing Program

Summary

Intent of Post Modification Testing Program

Verify any affected Design Basis is Intact after

Modification work is complete

Verify each modification functions as in-

tended by design and the system is functional-

Iy operable after modification is complete

Ensure Station Management is aware of any

Post Modification Test which does not fully

challenge the design basis or intent of the

modification.

System ExpertInvolvement

The System Expert is responsible for the Post

Modification Testing of his assigned systems

Station Commitment

Station Resources

Critical Path Schedule Time

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Post Modification Tbsting

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Summary

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NSM Process Structured

Specific Stages for Post Modification Testing Deter-

mination

Involvement from Station and Design Engineering

Personnel

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Responsibility

Defined Responsibility - System Expert

Logical Placement of Responsibility

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Catawba Nuclear Station

Post M' modification Testing

Summary

Current Philosophy

Test to ensure FSAR Chapter 15 Design Basis Intact

No Credit for installation verifications toward final

operability ,

Test to ensure modification meets design intent and

that the system is operationally functional (Beyond

Chapter 15 requirements) {

Previous Philosophy

Tests to ensure Design Basis intact were required to ,

be conducted only if Design B' asis changed

Took credit for installation verifications toward sys- l

tem operability

Testing Criteria to ensure system operationally func-

tional was not clearly defined beyond code testing

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Catawba Nuclear Station

Post Modification Testing

Agenda

August 15,1989

Opening Comments Tony Owen

NSM Process Rick Mack

System Expert Presentation Bill Beaver

PMT Philosophy / Case Studies Jim Kammer

Summary JeffForbes

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