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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARML20217J3141999-10-15015 October 1999 Requests Emergency Publication of Document Entitled South Carolina Electric & Gas Co;Vc Summer Nuclear Station,Environ Assessment Transmitted on 991015 to Ofc of Fr for Publication ML20217J3281999-10-15015 October 1999 Forwards Copy of Environ Assessment & Finding of No Significant Impact Re Application for Exemption from Requiremets of 10CFR50,Section 50.60(a) for VC Summer Nuclear Station ML20217F8851999-10-0808 October 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-395/99-06 on 990801-0911.One Violation Occurred Being Treated as NCV RC-99-0192, Forwards Updated 1999 ECCS Evaluation Model Revs Rept for VC Summer Nuclear Station.Rept Is Being Submitted Pursuant to 10CFR50.46,which Requires Licensees to Notify NRC of Corrections to or Changes in ECCS Evaluation Models1999-09-28028 September 1999 Forwards Updated 1999 ECCS Evaluation Model Revs Rept for VC Summer Nuclear Station.Rept Is Being Submitted Pursuant to 10CFR50.46,which Requires Licensees to Notify NRC of Corrections to or Changes in ECCS Evaluation Models RC-99-0181, Forwards Anticipated Schedule for Operator Licensing Examinations.Sce&G Requests That NRC Prepare Examinations Stated on Attachment1999-09-21021 September 1999 Forwards Anticipated Schedule for Operator Licensing Examinations.Sce&G Requests That NRC Prepare Examinations Stated on Attachment ML20212C5091999-09-15015 September 1999 Forwards Anticipated Schedule for Operator Licensing Exams for Sce&G.Util Requests That NRC Prepare Exams on Encl RC-99-0184, Submits Seven Requests for Using Alternatives to Requirements of ASME Code,Section XI Re Subsection IWE & Iwl Insps to Be Performed at Vsns.Proposed Alternatives Will Provide Acceptable Level of Quality & Safety1999-09-15015 September 1999 Submits Seven Requests for Using Alternatives to Requirements of ASME Code,Section XI Re Subsection IWE & Iwl Insps to Be Performed at Vsns.Proposed Alternatives Will Provide Acceptable Level of Quality & Safety ML20212A8341999-09-0909 September 1999 Requests That Licensees Affected by Kaowool Fire Barriers Take Issue on Voluntary Initiative & Propose Approach for Resolving Subj Issues.Staff Plans to Meet with Licensees to Discuss Listed Topics ML20212A6951999-09-0909 September 1999 Requests That Licensees Affected by Kaowool Fire Barriers Take Issue on Voluntary Initiative & Propose Approach for Resolving Subj Issues.Staff Plans to Meet with Licensees to Discuss Listed Topics ML20211N4301999-09-0808 September 1999 Discusses Proposed Meeting to Discuss Kaowool Fire Barriers. Staff Requesting That Affected Licensees Take Issue on Voluntary Initative & Propose Approach for Resolving Issues ML20211Q8911999-09-0101 September 1999 Sumbits Summary of Training Managers Conference on Recent Changes to Operator Licensing Program.Meeting Covered Changes to Regulations,Exam Stds,New Insp Program & Other Training Issues.List of Attendees Encl RC-99-0177, Forwards Rev 2 to VC Summer Nuclear Station,Colr for Cycle 12, IAW Section 6.9.1.111999-08-31031 August 1999 Forwards Rev 2 to VC Summer Nuclear Station,Colr for Cycle 12, IAW Section 6.9.1.11 RC-99-0173, Requests That Info Listed in Rvid,Version 2,be Amended to Reflect Date for VC Summer Nuclear Station,As Marked in Encl to Ltr1999-08-31031 August 1999 Requests That Info Listed in Rvid,Version 2,be Amended to Reflect Date for VC Summer Nuclear Station,As Marked in Encl to Ltr ML20211L5181999-08-30030 August 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-395/99-05 on 990620-0731.One Violation Identified & Being Treated as non-cited Violation Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy ML20211H2481999-08-25025 August 1999 Forwards Four Controlled Copies of Amend 43 to Physcial Security Plan. Summary of Plan Changes, Are Included as Part of Each Controlled Copy.Encls Withheld Per 10CFR73.21 05000395/LER-1999-004, Submits Suppl 1 to LER 99-004-00 Re Discovery of Several Fuel Assembly Top Nozzle Holdown Screws Which Had Failed. Root Cause Will Not Be Completed by 990829,as Committed.W Analysis Will Be Issued After Fall Outages Are Complet1999-08-24024 August 1999 Submits Suppl 1 to LER 99-004-00 Re Discovery of Several Fuel Assembly Top Nozzle Holdown Screws Which Had Failed. Root Cause Will Not Be Completed by 990829,as Committed.W Analysis Will Be Issued After Fall Outages Are Completed RC-99-0171, Notifies NRC of Intent Re Submittal of Application to Renew OL of Vcs.Preparatory Work Has Begun to Develop Application for License Renewal to Be Submitted After 020806 Contingent Upon Final Approval of Board of Directors1999-08-23023 August 1999 Notifies NRC of Intent Re Submittal of Application to Renew OL of Vcs.Preparatory Work Has Begun to Develop Application for License Renewal to Be Submitted After 020806 Contingent Upon Final Approval of Board of Directors RC-99-0152, Seeks Exemption Under 10CFR0.12a(2)ii from 10CFR50,App G Requirements to Establish pressure-temperature Limits Curves Using Methodology Presented in 1989 ASME Section Xi,App G1999-08-19019 August 1999 Seeks Exemption Under 10CFR0.12a(2)ii from 10CFR50,App G Requirements to Establish pressure-temperature Limits Curves Using Methodology Presented in 1989 ASME Section Xi,App G RC-99-0164, Forwards semi-annual Fitness for Duty Rept from 990101 to 990630 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Iaw 10CFR26.71(d)1999-08-17017 August 1999 Forwards semi-annual Fitness for Duty Rept from 990101 to 990630 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Iaw 10CFR26.71(d) ML20210Q4851999-08-0505 August 1999 Informs That NRC Plans to Administer Gfes of Written Operator Licensing Exam on 991006 at VC Summer.Requests Info Re Individuals Who Will Take Exam,Personnel Who Will Have Access to Exam.Sample Registration Ltr Encl ML20210R5501999-08-0505 August 1999 Ack Receipt of 990707 Response to NCVs Identified on 990607 Re Activities Conducted at VC Summer.Informs That After Consideration of Basis for Denial of NCV 50-395/99-03, Concluded,For Reasons Stated,That NCV Occurred RC-99-0156, Forwards Rev 1 to VC Summer Nuclear Station COLR for Cycle 12, IAW TS Section 6.9.1.11.Sections 2.1 & 3.0 Were Added to Include Beacon Tsm1999-08-0404 August 1999 Forwards Rev 1 to VC Summer Nuclear Station COLR for Cycle 12, IAW TS Section 6.9.1.11.Sections 2.1 & 3.0 Were Added to Include Beacon Tsm RC-99-0147, Submits Attached Request for Relief from Performing SG PORV Strike Time Testing to Acceptance Criteria of Asme/Ansi OMa-19881999-07-26026 July 1999 Submits Attached Request for Relief from Performing SG PORV Strike Time Testing to Acceptance Criteria of Asme/Ansi OMa-1988 ML20210B7451999-07-22022 July 1999 Informs That as Result of Staff Review of Licensee Responses to GL 92-01,rev 1 & Rev 1,suppl 1,staff Revised Info in Reactor Vessel Integrity Database & Releasing Database as Rvid Version 2 ML20210E3771999-07-16016 July 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-395/99-04 on 990509-0619.One Violation Being Treated as Noncited Violation RC-99-0127, Estimates Submittal of Eleven Licensing Actions in Fy 2000. Based on Statistical Estimates of Past Licensing Actions, Number of Licensing Actions in Fy 2001 Should Be Approx Ten, in Response to AL 99-021999-07-0707 July 1999 Estimates Submittal of Eleven Licensing Actions in Fy 2000. Based on Statistical Estimates of Past Licensing Actions, Number of Licensing Actions in Fy 2001 Should Be Approx Ten, in Response to AL 99-02 RC-99-0129, Provides Response to non-cited Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-395/99-03.C/As:concluded That Cask Loading Pit Inaccessible & Duration of Dose Rates on Operating Floor of Fhb So Short That High Radiation Area Did Not Exist1999-07-0707 July 1999 Provides Response to non-cited Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-395/99-03.C/As:concluded That Cask Loading Pit Inaccessible & Duration of Dose Rates on Operating Floor of Fhb So Short That High Radiation Area Did Not Exist RC-99-0131, Forwards Rev 9 to VC Summer Nuclear Station Safeguards Contingency Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Encl Withheld1999-07-0707 July 1999 Forwards Rev 9 to VC Summer Nuclear Station Safeguards Contingency Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Encl Withheld ML20210B7111999-07-0606 July 1999 Provides Summary of 990701 Meeting with Sce&G in Atlanta, Georgia Re Recent Virgil C Summer Refueling Outage & Other Items of Interest.List of Meeting Attendees & Licensee Presentation Handouts Encl RC-99-0114, Submits Response to GL 98-01,Suppl 1, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Npps, Under Oath or Affirmation1999-06-30030 June 1999 Submits Response to GL 98-01,Suppl 1, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Npps, Under Oath or Affirmation ML20195H5861999-06-0707 June 1999 Confirms 990604 Telcon Between J Proper & R Haag Re Meeting Scheduled for 990701 in Atlanta,Ga,To Discuss Plant Refueling Outage & Items of Interest ML20207H5241999-06-0707 June 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-395/99-03 on 990328-0508.Six Violations of NRC Requirements Occurred & Being Treated as non-cited Violations,Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy ML20207D1881999-05-28028 May 1999 Informs That Effective 990524,K Cotton Assigned as Project Manager,Project Directorate II-1,for Virgil C Summer Nuclear Station 05000395/LER-1999-006, Forwards LER 99-006-00,describing Identified Safety Hazard with GE 7.2kV Magne-Blast Circuit Breakers.Event Is Being Reported Per 10CFR21.21a(1)1999-05-17017 May 1999 Forwards LER 99-006-00,describing Identified Safety Hazard with GE 7.2kV Magne-Blast Circuit Breakers.Event Is Being Reported Per 10CFR21.21a(1) RC-99-0104, Forwards Amend 17 to Training & Qualification Plan, Under Provisions of 10CFR50.54(p).Summary of Plan Changes Is Included as Part of Controlled Copy1999-05-13013 May 1999 Forwards Amend 17 to Training & Qualification Plan, Under Provisions of 10CFR50.54(p).Summary of Plan Changes Is Included as Part of Controlled Copy RC-99-0105, Forwards Copy of Sce&G Co 1998 Annual Financial Rept & Sc Public Service Authority 1998 Annual Financial Rept, for VC Summer Nuclear Station1999-05-13013 May 1999 Forwards Copy of Sce&G Co 1998 Annual Financial Rept & Sc Public Service Authority 1998 Annual Financial Rept, for VC Summer Nuclear Station 05000395/LER-1999-005, Forwards LER 99-005-00 for VC Summer Nuclear Station.Rept Describes Potential Condition for Exceeding Vsns Plant Design Basis Due to Submergence Qualification Issues for Certain ESF Components1999-05-12012 May 1999 Forwards LER 99-005-00 for VC Summer Nuclear Station.Rept Describes Potential Condition for Exceeding Vsns Plant Design Basis Due to Submergence Qualification Issues for Certain ESF Components ML20206L5121999-05-11011 May 1999 Informs That NRC Reorganized,Effective 990328.Reorganization Chart Encl ML20206P5771999-05-0707 May 1999 Informs That During 980519 Telcon Between T Matlosz & G Hopper,Arrangements Were Made for Administration of Licensing Exam at Virgil C Summer Nuclear Station During Wk of 990927 RC-99-0080, Submits Supplemental Info Re 970128 Response to NRC GL 96-06 Assurance of Equipment Operability & Containment Integrity During Design-Basis Accident Conditions. Addl Analysis & Manpower Expenditure Involved Not Cost Effective1999-05-0606 May 1999 Submits Supplemental Info Re 970128 Response to NRC GL 96-06 Assurance of Equipment Operability & Containment Integrity During Design-Basis Accident Conditions. Addl Analysis & Manpower Expenditure Involved Not Cost Effective RC-99-0097, Forwards Sce&G Cycle 12 COLR, IAW TS Section 6.9.1.111999-05-0606 May 1999 Forwards Sce&G Cycle 12 COLR, IAW TS Section 6.9.1.11 RC-99-0092, Informs That Util Has Reviewed Proposed Notice of Rulemaking & Fully Endorse Comments Prepared & Submitted on Behalf of Commercial Nuclear Power Industry by NEI1999-05-0303 May 1999 Informs That Util Has Reviewed Proposed Notice of Rulemaking & Fully Endorse Comments Prepared & Submitted on Behalf of Commercial Nuclear Power Industry by NEI RC-99-0090, Submits Special Rept (Spr 1999-003) Re Completion of ISI of SG Tubes,Indicating Number of Tubes Plugged or Repaired in Each Generator,Per TS 4.4.5.5.a & Section 4.4.5.5.b1999-04-29029 April 1999 Submits Special Rept (Spr 1999-003) Re Completion of ISI of SG Tubes,Indicating Number of Tubes Plugged or Repaired in Each Generator,Per TS 4.4.5.5.a & Section 4.4.5.5.b ML20206E1681999-04-29029 April 1999 Informs That FERC & NRC Will Conduct Category I Svc Water Pond (Swp) Dam Insp at Facility on 990610 ML20206P5021999-04-26026 April 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-395/99-02 on 990214-0327.One Violation of NRC Requirements Occurred & Being Treated as non-cited Violation,Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy ML20205M0431999-04-13013 April 1999 Eighth Partial Response to FOIA Request for Records.App Q & R Records Encl & Being Made Available in PDR 05000395/LER-1999-002, Forwards LER 99-002-00 Re Condition for Exceeding Vsns Design Basis During Surveillance Testing Utilizing Certain ECCS Valves.Simplified Flow Diagram Included to Identify Configurations Discussed by Rept Encl1999-04-12012 April 1999 Forwards LER 99-002-00 Re Condition for Exceeding Vsns Design Basis During Surveillance Testing Utilizing Certain ECCS Valves.Simplified Flow Diagram Included to Identify Configurations Discussed by Rept Encl ML20205T2311999-04-0909 April 1999 Informs That on 990318,A Koon & Ho Christensen Confirmed Initial Operator Licensing Exam Scheduled for Y2K.Initial Exam Date Schedules for Wk of 000807 for Approx Eight Candidates ML20205G4181999-04-0101 April 1999 Advises That 970725 Application & Affidavit Which Submitted, WCAP-14932, Probabilistic & Economic Evaluation of Reactor Vessel Closure Head Penetration Integrity for Plant, Will Be Withheld from Public Disclosure,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(4) RC-99-0078, Submits Summary of Present Levels of Property Insurance & Cash Flow Statement for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Per 10CFR50.54(w)(3) & 10CFR140.21(e)1999-04-0101 April 1999 Submits Summary of Present Levels of Property Insurance & Cash Flow Statement for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Per 10CFR50.54(w)(3) & 10CFR140.21(e) 1999-09-09
[Table view] Category:INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARRC-99-0192, Forwards Updated 1999 ECCS Evaluation Model Revs Rept for VC Summer Nuclear Station.Rept Is Being Submitted Pursuant to 10CFR50.46,which Requires Licensees to Notify NRC of Corrections to or Changes in ECCS Evaluation Models1999-09-28028 September 1999 Forwards Updated 1999 ECCS Evaluation Model Revs Rept for VC Summer Nuclear Station.Rept Is Being Submitted Pursuant to 10CFR50.46,which Requires Licensees to Notify NRC of Corrections to or Changes in ECCS Evaluation Models RC-99-0181, Forwards Anticipated Schedule for Operator Licensing Examinations.Sce&G Requests That NRC Prepare Examinations Stated on Attachment1999-09-21021 September 1999 Forwards Anticipated Schedule for Operator Licensing Examinations.Sce&G Requests That NRC Prepare Examinations Stated on Attachment ML20212C5091999-09-15015 September 1999 Forwards Anticipated Schedule for Operator Licensing Exams for Sce&G.Util Requests That NRC Prepare Exams on Encl RC-99-0184, Submits Seven Requests for Using Alternatives to Requirements of ASME Code,Section XI Re Subsection IWE & Iwl Insps to Be Performed at Vsns.Proposed Alternatives Will Provide Acceptable Level of Quality & Safety1999-09-15015 September 1999 Submits Seven Requests for Using Alternatives to Requirements of ASME Code,Section XI Re Subsection IWE & Iwl Insps to Be Performed at Vsns.Proposed Alternatives Will Provide Acceptable Level of Quality & Safety RC-99-0177, Forwards Rev 2 to VC Summer Nuclear Station,Colr for Cycle 12, IAW Section 6.9.1.111999-08-31031 August 1999 Forwards Rev 2 to VC Summer Nuclear Station,Colr for Cycle 12, IAW Section 6.9.1.11 RC-99-0173, Requests That Info Listed in Rvid,Version 2,be Amended to Reflect Date for VC Summer Nuclear Station,As Marked in Encl to Ltr1999-08-31031 August 1999 Requests That Info Listed in Rvid,Version 2,be Amended to Reflect Date for VC Summer Nuclear Station,As Marked in Encl to Ltr ML20211H2481999-08-25025 August 1999 Forwards Four Controlled Copies of Amend 43 to Physcial Security Plan. Summary of Plan Changes, Are Included as Part of Each Controlled Copy.Encls Withheld Per 10CFR73.21 05000395/LER-1999-004, Submits Suppl 1 to LER 99-004-00 Re Discovery of Several Fuel Assembly Top Nozzle Holdown Screws Which Had Failed. Root Cause Will Not Be Completed by 990829,as Committed.W Analysis Will Be Issued After Fall Outages Are Complet1999-08-24024 August 1999 Submits Suppl 1 to LER 99-004-00 Re Discovery of Several Fuel Assembly Top Nozzle Holdown Screws Which Had Failed. Root Cause Will Not Be Completed by 990829,as Committed.W Analysis Will Be Issued After Fall Outages Are Completed RC-99-0171, Notifies NRC of Intent Re Submittal of Application to Renew OL of Vcs.Preparatory Work Has Begun to Develop Application for License Renewal to Be Submitted After 020806 Contingent Upon Final Approval of Board of Directors1999-08-23023 August 1999 Notifies NRC of Intent Re Submittal of Application to Renew OL of Vcs.Preparatory Work Has Begun to Develop Application for License Renewal to Be Submitted After 020806 Contingent Upon Final Approval of Board of Directors RC-99-0152, Seeks Exemption Under 10CFR0.12a(2)ii from 10CFR50,App G Requirements to Establish pressure-temperature Limits Curves Using Methodology Presented in 1989 ASME Section Xi,App G1999-08-19019 August 1999 Seeks Exemption Under 10CFR0.12a(2)ii from 10CFR50,App G Requirements to Establish pressure-temperature Limits Curves Using Methodology Presented in 1989 ASME Section Xi,App G RC-99-0164, Forwards semi-annual Fitness for Duty Rept from 990101 to 990630 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Iaw 10CFR26.71(d)1999-08-17017 August 1999 Forwards semi-annual Fitness for Duty Rept from 990101 to 990630 for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Iaw 10CFR26.71(d) RC-99-0156, Forwards Rev 1 to VC Summer Nuclear Station COLR for Cycle 12, IAW TS Section 6.9.1.11.Sections 2.1 & 3.0 Were Added to Include Beacon Tsm1999-08-0404 August 1999 Forwards Rev 1 to VC Summer Nuclear Station COLR for Cycle 12, IAW TS Section 6.9.1.11.Sections 2.1 & 3.0 Were Added to Include Beacon Tsm RC-99-0147, Submits Attached Request for Relief from Performing SG PORV Strike Time Testing to Acceptance Criteria of Asme/Ansi OMa-19881999-07-26026 July 1999 Submits Attached Request for Relief from Performing SG PORV Strike Time Testing to Acceptance Criteria of Asme/Ansi OMa-1988 RC-99-0129, Provides Response to non-cited Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-395/99-03.C/As:concluded That Cask Loading Pit Inaccessible & Duration of Dose Rates on Operating Floor of Fhb So Short That High Radiation Area Did Not Exist1999-07-0707 July 1999 Provides Response to non-cited Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-395/99-03.C/As:concluded That Cask Loading Pit Inaccessible & Duration of Dose Rates on Operating Floor of Fhb So Short That High Radiation Area Did Not Exist RC-99-0131, Forwards Rev 9 to VC Summer Nuclear Station Safeguards Contingency Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Encl Withheld1999-07-0707 July 1999 Forwards Rev 9 to VC Summer Nuclear Station Safeguards Contingency Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Encl Withheld RC-99-0127, Estimates Submittal of Eleven Licensing Actions in Fy 2000. Based on Statistical Estimates of Past Licensing Actions, Number of Licensing Actions in Fy 2001 Should Be Approx Ten, in Response to AL 99-021999-07-0707 July 1999 Estimates Submittal of Eleven Licensing Actions in Fy 2000. Based on Statistical Estimates of Past Licensing Actions, Number of Licensing Actions in Fy 2001 Should Be Approx Ten, in Response to AL 99-02 RC-99-0114, Submits Response to GL 98-01,Suppl 1, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Npps, Under Oath or Affirmation1999-06-30030 June 1999 Submits Response to GL 98-01,Suppl 1, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Npps, Under Oath or Affirmation 05000395/LER-1999-006, Forwards LER 99-006-00,describing Identified Safety Hazard with GE 7.2kV Magne-Blast Circuit Breakers.Event Is Being Reported Per 10CFR21.21a(1)1999-05-17017 May 1999 Forwards LER 99-006-00,describing Identified Safety Hazard with GE 7.2kV Magne-Blast Circuit Breakers.Event Is Being Reported Per 10CFR21.21a(1) RC-99-0104, Forwards Amend 17 to Training & Qualification Plan, Under Provisions of 10CFR50.54(p).Summary of Plan Changes Is Included as Part of Controlled Copy1999-05-13013 May 1999 Forwards Amend 17 to Training & Qualification Plan, Under Provisions of 10CFR50.54(p).Summary of Plan Changes Is Included as Part of Controlled Copy RC-99-0105, Forwards Copy of Sce&G Co 1998 Annual Financial Rept & Sc Public Service Authority 1998 Annual Financial Rept, for VC Summer Nuclear Station1999-05-13013 May 1999 Forwards Copy of Sce&G Co 1998 Annual Financial Rept & Sc Public Service Authority 1998 Annual Financial Rept, for VC Summer Nuclear Station 05000395/LER-1999-005, Forwards LER 99-005-00 for VC Summer Nuclear Station.Rept Describes Potential Condition for Exceeding Vsns Plant Design Basis Due to Submergence Qualification Issues for Certain ESF Components1999-05-12012 May 1999 Forwards LER 99-005-00 for VC Summer Nuclear Station.Rept Describes Potential Condition for Exceeding Vsns Plant Design Basis Due to Submergence Qualification Issues for Certain ESF Components RC-99-0097, Forwards Sce&G Cycle 12 COLR, IAW TS Section 6.9.1.111999-05-0606 May 1999 Forwards Sce&G Cycle 12 COLR, IAW TS Section 6.9.1.11 RC-99-0080, Submits Supplemental Info Re 970128 Response to NRC GL 96-06 Assurance of Equipment Operability & Containment Integrity During Design-Basis Accident Conditions. Addl Analysis & Manpower Expenditure Involved Not Cost Effective1999-05-0606 May 1999 Submits Supplemental Info Re 970128 Response to NRC GL 96-06 Assurance of Equipment Operability & Containment Integrity During Design-Basis Accident Conditions. Addl Analysis & Manpower Expenditure Involved Not Cost Effective RC-99-0092, Informs That Util Has Reviewed Proposed Notice of Rulemaking & Fully Endorse Comments Prepared & Submitted on Behalf of Commercial Nuclear Power Industry by NEI1999-05-0303 May 1999 Informs That Util Has Reviewed Proposed Notice of Rulemaking & Fully Endorse Comments Prepared & Submitted on Behalf of Commercial Nuclear Power Industry by NEI RC-99-0090, Submits Special Rept (Spr 1999-003) Re Completion of ISI of SG Tubes,Indicating Number of Tubes Plugged or Repaired in Each Generator,Per TS 4.4.5.5.a & Section 4.4.5.5.b1999-04-29029 April 1999 Submits Special Rept (Spr 1999-003) Re Completion of ISI of SG Tubes,Indicating Number of Tubes Plugged or Repaired in Each Generator,Per TS 4.4.5.5.a & Section 4.4.5.5.b 05000395/LER-1999-002, Forwards LER 99-002-00 Re Condition for Exceeding Vsns Design Basis During Surveillance Testing Utilizing Certain ECCS Valves.Simplified Flow Diagram Included to Identify Configurations Discussed by Rept Encl1999-04-12012 April 1999 Forwards LER 99-002-00 Re Condition for Exceeding Vsns Design Basis During Surveillance Testing Utilizing Certain ECCS Valves.Simplified Flow Diagram Included to Identify Configurations Discussed by Rept Encl RC-99-0078, Submits Summary of Present Levels of Property Insurance & Cash Flow Statement for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Per 10CFR50.54(w)(3) & 10CFR140.21(e)1999-04-0101 April 1999 Submits Summary of Present Levels of Property Insurance & Cash Flow Statement for VC Summer Nuclear Station,Per 10CFR50.54(w)(3) & 10CFR140.21(e) RC-99-0066, Submits Rept of Status of Decommissioning Funding (RR-1950), for Vsns Per 10CFR50.751999-03-31031 March 1999 Submits Rept of Status of Decommissioning Funding (RR-1950), for Vsns Per 10CFR50.75 ML20205B9981999-03-29029 March 1999 Informs That Authority & Sce&G Has Ownership Interests of one-third & two-thirds,respectively in VC Summer Nuclear Station.Operating License Scheduled to Expire in 2022.Rept Addresses Decommissioning Cost Estimates & Financing RC-99-0054, Forwards Rev 2 to VC Summer Nuclear Station Training Simulator Quadrennial Certification Rept,1996-99, Per 10CFR55.45(b)(5)(ii)1999-03-22022 March 1999 Forwards Rev 2 to VC Summer Nuclear Station Training Simulator Quadrennial Certification Rept,1996-99, Per 10CFR55.45(b)(5)(ii) RC-99-0053, Requests That Implementation Date of Proposed TS Change Request Re Best Estimate Analyzer for Core Operations - Nuclear (Beacon) Be Extended. Util Requests 120 Day Time Frame to Perform Initial Beacon Calibrs During Cycle 121999-03-22022 March 1999 Requests That Implementation Date of Proposed TS Change Request Re Best Estimate Analyzer for Core Operations - Nuclear (Beacon) Be Extended. Util Requests 120 Day Time Frame to Perform Initial Beacon Calibrs During Cycle 12 RC-99-0048, Informs That Util Has Implemented Policy That Requires All Personnel Granted Unescorted Access to Vsns Satisfactorily Complete Test on Site Specific Info1999-03-10010 March 1999 Informs That Util Has Implemented Policy That Requires All Personnel Granted Unescorted Access to Vsns Satisfactorily Complete Test on Site Specific Info ML20207J5661999-02-16016 February 1999 Requests That Proprietary Rev 1 to WCAP-14932 Re Rv Closure Head Penetrations Integrity for VC Summer Nuclear Plant,Be Withheld from Public Disclosure,Per 10CFR2.790(b)(4) RC-99-0026, Provides Response to NRC RAI Re TS Change Request Re Best Estimate Analyzer for Core Operations - Nuclear1999-02-0505 February 1999 Provides Response to NRC RAI Re TS Change Request Re Best Estimate Analyzer for Core Operations - Nuclear RC-99-0023, Informs That in Response to GL 97-06,SCE&G Informed NRC of Plan to Perform Secondary Side Examination Scheduled for Refueling Outage RF-11.SCE&G Has Decided to Defer Secondary Side Insp of Sg.Reasons for Change of Plan Listed1999-02-0101 February 1999 Informs That in Response to GL 97-06,SCE&G Informed NRC of Plan to Perform Secondary Side Examination Scheduled for Refueling Outage RF-11.SCE&G Has Decided to Defer Secondary Side Insp of Sg.Reasons for Change of Plan Listed 05000395/LER-1998-009, Forwards LER 98-009-01 for VC Summer Nuclear Station.Rept Describes Unanalyzed Condition for non-safety Related Component for Which All Failure Mechanisms Had Not Been Evaluated1999-01-28028 January 1999 Forwards LER 98-009-01 for VC Summer Nuclear Station.Rept Describes Unanalyzed Condition for non-safety Related Component for Which All Failure Mechanisms Had Not Been Evaluated RC-99-0015, Forwards Amend 16 to Training & Qualification Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Summary of Changes,Encl1999-01-22022 January 1999 Forwards Amend 16 to Training & Qualification Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Summary of Changes,Encl RC-99-0005, Responds to 980908 RAI Re GL 97-01, Degradation of Control Rod Drive Mechanism Nozzle & Other Vessel Closure Head Penetrations1999-01-15015 January 1999 Responds to 980908 RAI Re GL 97-01, Degradation of Control Rod Drive Mechanism Nozzle & Other Vessel Closure Head Penetrations RC-98-0225, Forwards Rev 41 to EP-100, Radiation Emergency Plan. List of Changes by Page Number Affected by Rev 41 Also Encl1998-12-14014 December 1998 Forwards Rev 41 to EP-100, Radiation Emergency Plan. List of Changes by Page Number Affected by Rev 41 Also Encl RC-98-0226, Forwards Amend 42 to Psp.Changes Do Not Degrade Safeguards Effectiveness in PSP or Safeguards Contingency Plan,As Described in 10CFR50.54(p).Without Encl1998-12-14014 December 1998 Forwards Amend 42 to Psp.Changes Do Not Degrade Safeguards Effectiveness in PSP or Safeguards Contingency Plan,As Described in 10CFR50.54(p).Without Encl RC-98-0216, Requests Extension of Response Period to 990115 to Respond to NRC 980908 RAI Re GL 97-01, Degradation of CRDM Nozzle & Other Vessel Closure Head Penetrations. Util Intends to Utilize Industry Generic RAI Response1998-12-0404 December 1998 Requests Extension of Response Period to 990115 to Respond to NRC 980908 RAI Re GL 97-01, Degradation of CRDM Nozzle & Other Vessel Closure Head Penetrations. Util Intends to Utilize Industry Generic RAI Response RC-98-0189, Provides Assessment Results of GL 98-02, Loss of Rc Inventory & Associated Potential for Loss of Emergency Mitigation Functions While in Shutdown Condition, Per 10CFR50.54f1998-11-24024 November 1998 Provides Assessment Results of GL 98-02, Loss of Rc Inventory & Associated Potential for Loss of Emergency Mitigation Functions While in Shutdown Condition, Per 10CFR50.54f RC-98-0207, Forwards 120-day Response to NRC GL 98-04, Potential for Degradation of ECCS & CSS After LOCA Because of Construction & Protective Coating Deficiencies & Foreign Matl in Containment1998-11-11011 November 1998 Forwards 120-day Response to NRC GL 98-04, Potential for Degradation of ECCS & CSS After LOCA Because of Construction & Protective Coating Deficiencies & Foreign Matl in Containment RC-98-0177, Informs That Sce&G Will Classify as Moderate Any Stratification Condition That Results in Total Cuf,Based on Design Basis Values Plus Any Contribution from Stratification,Of Between 0.1 & 0.71998-11-0909 November 1998 Informs That Sce&G Will Classify as Moderate Any Stratification Condition That Results in Total Cuf,Based on Design Basis Values Plus Any Contribution from Stratification,Of Between 0.1 & 0.7 RC-98-0194, Provides Response to RAI Re GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of SR Movs1998-11-0202 November 1998 Provides Response to RAI Re GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of SR Movs RC-98-0202, Forwards Response to RAI Re Response to GL 96-06, Assurance of Equipment Operability & Containment Integrity During Design-Basis Accident Conditions1998-10-30030 October 1998 Forwards Response to RAI Re Response to GL 96-06, Assurance of Equipment Operability & Containment Integrity During Design-Basis Accident Conditions RC-98-0186, Expresses Appreciation for Opportunity to Present Topical Rept TR-104965, On-Line Monitoring of Instrument Channel Performance1998-10-26026 October 1998 Expresses Appreciation for Opportunity to Present Topical Rept TR-104965, On-Line Monitoring of Instrument Channel Performance RC-98-0185, Forwards non-proprietary Trs,Including Rev 0 to WCAP-15101, Analysis of Capsule W from Sce&G VC Summer Unit 1 Rv Radiation Surveillance Program & Rev 0 to WCAP-15103, Evaluation of PTS for VC Summer Unit 11998-10-0909 October 1998 Forwards non-proprietary Trs,Including Rev 0 to WCAP-15101, Analysis of Capsule W from Sce&G VC Summer Unit 1 Rv Radiation Surveillance Program & Rev 0 to WCAP-15103, Evaluation of PTS for VC Summer Unit 1 RC-98-0182, Responds to 980402 RAI Re GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Movs1998-10-0808 October 1998 Responds to 980402 RAI Re GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Movs RC-98-0178, Provides Comments on SALP Insp Rept 50-395/98-99.Util Ack That Station Can Enhance Future Performance Further with More Focus & Attention on Change Mgt Practices Re Plant & Procedure Changes1998-10-0505 October 1998 Provides Comments on SALP Insp Rept 50-395/98-99.Util Ack That Station Can Enhance Future Performance Further with More Focus & Attention on Change Mgt Practices Re Plant & Procedure Changes 1999-09-28
[Table view] Category:UTILITY TO NRC
MONTHYEARML20059K4071990-09-17017 September 1990 Advises That Author Succeeded Os Bradham as vice-president, Nuclear Operations,Effective 900915.All Correspondence to Util Should Be Sent to Listed Address ML20059J9141990-09-14014 September 1990 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-395/90-21. Violation Occured,However Description of Violation in Error. Corrective Action:Valve XVT02803B Placed in Proper Position & Verification of Emergency Feedwater Sys Lineup Completed ML20059E2821990-08-30030 August 1990 Advises That Programmed Enhancements Per Generic Ltr 88-17 Re Loss of DHR Implemented & Mods Operable ML20059D6911990-08-29029 August 1990 Forwards Technical Rept 90-02, Seismic Activity Near VC Summer Nuclear Station for Apr-June 1990 ML20059B9541990-08-28028 August 1990 Forwards Semiannual Effluent & Waste Disposal Rept for Jan-June 1990, Per 10CFR50.36a & Sections 6.9.1.8 & 6.9.1.9 of Tech Spec ML20056B4901990-08-22022 August 1990 Discusses NRC Bulletin 88-004, Potential Safety-Related Pump Loss. Decision on Future Insp Frequency &/Or Sys Mods Should Be Deferred Until Internal Components Could Be Inspected ML20059A2041990-08-16016 August 1990 Forwards First Semiannual fitness-for-duty Rept from 900103- 0630.Util Pleased W/Program,However,Concerned About Incorrect Test Results for Blind Performance Specimens Received from Roche Labs ML20058P6581990-08-15015 August 1990 Forwards Monthly Operating Rept for Jul 1990 & Rev 13 to ODCM for Virgil C Summer Nuclear Station.Rev Implements Changes Necessary to Permit Removal of Radiological Effluent Specs from Tech Specs as Recommended by Generic Ltr 89-01 ML20058P7681990-08-13013 August 1990 Forwards Mods to 900516 Tech Spec Change Request Re Pressurizer Code Safety Valve Setpoint Tolerance & Mode 3 Exception,Per 900713 Telcon.Changes Do Not Affect Technical Intent of 900516 Submittal Nor Alter Safety Evaluation ML20058N6961990-08-10010 August 1990 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-395/90-18. Corrective Action:Personnel Counseled on Procedural Compliance & Importance of Independent Verification in Maintaining Proper Sys Alignment ML20056A3441990-08-0101 August 1990 Responds to NRC Request for Further Justification Re Relocating Emergency Operations Facility to Corporate Headquarters ML20059A3691990-07-30030 July 1990 Ack Receipt of SALP Rept 50-395/90-11 & Forwards Comments on Rept ML20056A0201990-07-27027 July 1990 Provides Notification That All Actions Re Generic Ltr 88-14, Instrument Air Supply Sys Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment, Completed ML20055H9821990-07-20020 July 1990 Forwards Amend 28 to Physical Security Plan.Amend Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21) ML17305B7681990-07-19019 July 1990 Responds to NRC NRC Bulletin 90-001, Loss of Fill Oil in Transmitters Mfg by Rosemount. No Transmitters Identified in Item 1 from Suspect Lots Identified by Rosemount ML20044B0241990-07-11011 July 1990 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-395/90-15. Corrective Actions:Relay Rewired & Verified Against Design Drawings ML20055F3631990-07-10010 July 1990 Forwards Rev 1 to Plant Core Operating Limits Rept Cycle 6, as Result of Typo ML20055E0341990-07-0505 July 1990 Forwards Technical Rept 90-1, Seismic Activity Near VC Summer Nuclear Station for Period Jan-Mar 1990 ML20055D4661990-07-0303 July 1990 Forwards Amend 4 to Updated Virgil C Summer Nuclear Station Fire Protection Evaluation Rept, Effective 900301 ML20058K4421990-06-29029 June 1990 Forwards Response to Generic Ltr 90-04 Re Status of Licensee Implementation of Generic Safety Issues Resolved W/Imposition of Requirements or Corrective Actions ML20043F6621990-06-0707 June 1990 Requests for Change in QA Program 10CFR50.54 & FSAR Biennial Reviews of Plant Procedures Based on Justification Contained in Proposed Change to FSAR.SAP-139 Will Be Revised Immediately Following Approval of Request ML20043D5861990-06-0101 June 1990 Forwards LERs 90-004 & 90-006 Which Respond to Violation Noted in Insp Rept 50-395/90-12.Corrective Actions:Training Conducted & Tech Spec Instruments Evaluated for Adequate Testing ML20043C5001990-05-29029 May 1990 Forwards marked-up Pages to Util 900410 Tech Spec Change Request Indicating Location of Incorrect Std Refs,Per 900419 Telcon W/Jj Hayes ML20043B7351990-05-23023 May 1990 Forwards Rev 0 to Core Operating Limits Rept,Cycle 6. ML20043A9181990-05-17017 May 1990 Forwards List Detailing Tubes in Which F* Criteria Applied During Steam Generator Tube Insp Subsequent to Fifth Inservice Eddy Current Exam.Location of Degradation Measured from Tube End on Hot/Cold Leg Up to Degradation ML20043G4621990-05-0303 May 1990 Advises That Util Will Control Operations to Abide by More Restrictive Required Shutdown Margin Curve While Awaiting NRC Approval to Place Revised Curve in Tech Specs ML20042G4741990-05-0101 May 1990 Special Rept Spr 90-003 Listing Number of Steam Generator Tubes Plugged or Repaired During Fifth Refueling Outage ML20042E1931990-04-11011 April 1990 Forwards Seismic Activity Near VC Summer Nuclear Station, Oct-Dec 1989. Several Seismic Monitoring Stations Inoperable During Reporting Period & Also During First Quarter 1990 ML20012F3551990-04-0303 April 1990 Withdraws 900321 Request for Relief from Testing RHR Containment Isolation Valves Xvg 08701 A/B at Frequency Specified in ASME Section XI Code.Meeting Requested to Discuss Util Interpretation of Testing in 10CFR50,App J ML20012E9061990-03-23023 March 1990 Submits Supplemental Response to Station Blackout Re Proper Documentation & Consistent Implementation of NUMARC 87-00 Guidance.Plant Currently Maintains Targeted Emergency Diesel Generator Reliability by Ensuring Compliance W/Tech Specs ML20012E0431990-03-23023 March 1990 Forwards Corrected Pages to Rev 26 to Radiation Emergency Plan. ML20012D9691990-03-23023 March 1990 Forwards, Sante Cooper 1989 Annual Financial Rept, South Carolina Gas & Electric 1989 Annual Financial Rept Summary of Present Levels of Property Insurance & Cash Flow Statement for VC Summer Nuclear Plant ML20012E5881990-03-21021 March 1990 Forwards Corrected Slide to Clarify Util Current Plans Re Steam Generator Insp Plan,Per 900312 Meeting W/Nrc ML20012D8271990-03-21021 March 1990 Requests Relief from Testing RHR Containment Isolation Valves Xvg 08701 A/B at Frequency Specified in ASME Section XI Code.Valves Will Be Tested at Frequency Specified for Type a Valves in 10CFR50,App J ML20012D0371990-03-19019 March 1990 Responds to Generic Ltr 89-19 Re Design of Steam Generator Overfill Protection.Util Does Not Plan to Implement Physical Mods or Administrative Changes Since Overfill Protection Sys Meets or Exceeds Guidance in Generic Ltr ML20012D4781990-03-16016 March 1990 Forwards First Annual ECCS Evaluation Model Revs Rept,Per 881017 Rev to 10CFR50.46.Rept Identifies Several Mods to Large & Small Break LOCA Evaluation Models Used at Facility & Provides Estimated Effects of Changes on ECCS Analyses ML20012C0661990-03-0909 March 1990 Forwards Addl Info Re Natural Circulation Evaluation Program Rept,Per 900208 Telcon Request ML20012A0921990-03-0101 March 1990 Forwards Response to Generic Ltr 90-01,consisting of Completed NRC Regulatory Impact Survey Questionnaire Sheets Containing Estimates of Time Spent by Managers on Insps & Audits ML20006E3411990-02-0606 February 1990 Forwards Proprietary Addl Info,Per NRC 900104 Request,Re Util Tech Spec Change Request for Elimination of Resistant Temp Detector Bypass Manifold sys,marked-up Tech Spec Pages & Block Diagrams.Encls Withheld ML20006D1241990-02-0101 February 1990 Requests Approval,Per 10CCFR50.55a,for Use of Alloy 690 Matl in Fabricating/Use of Steam Generator Plugs During Upcoming Refueling Outage.Alloy 690 Currently code-approved Matl for Steam Generator Tubing Based on Corrosion Resistance ML20011E1211990-01-31031 January 1990 Forwards Response to Generic Ltr 89-13, Svc Water Sys Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment. Util Currently Performs Visual Insps & Dredgings of Svc Water & Circulating Water Intake Structures Once Each Refueling Cycle ML20006D2951990-01-26026 January 1990 Forwards WCAP-12464, VC Summer Nuclear Station Natural Circulation Evaluation Program Rept. Rept Provides Info to Resolve Branch Technical Position Rsb 5-1, Design Requirements for RHR Sys for Facility,Per 890719 Telcon ML20006B1211990-01-24024 January 1990 Forwards Technical Rept 89-3, Seismic Activity Near VC Summer Nuclear Station for Period Jul-Sept 1989. ML20006A7191990-01-19019 January 1990 Provides Update of long-term Corrective Action for 890711 Loss of Offsite Power.Installation of Voltage Regulator on 230/7.2 Kv Emergency Auxiliary Transformer Neither Required Nor Any Appreciable Benefit Derived from Installation ML20006A5521990-01-16016 January 1990 Advises That Util Will Validate Adequacy of Any Sys Used for Periodic Inservice Insp & Will Upgrade,As Required,Eddy Current Test Methods Used as Better Methods Developed & Validated for Commercial Use,Per 900111 Discussion ML20005H0791990-01-12012 January 1990 Advises That Response to NRC Request for Addl Info Re L* Implementation Will Be Submitted by 900801 Due to Refueling Outage Schedule ML20005F1191990-01-0505 January 1990 Forwards Description of F* Application at Plant & Sample Eddy Current Lissajous Figures for 12 Steam Generator Tubes, Per 891218 Request for Extension of Application of F* Tube Plugging Criterion for Life of Steam Generators ML20005G4921990-01-0505 January 1990 Responds to NRC Bulletin 89-003, Potential Loss of Required Shutdown Margin During Refueling Operations. Bulletin & Core Shuffle Procedure Will Be Discussed Among Core Engineering Personnel in Documented Training Session ML20005F4531990-01-0404 January 1990 Forwards Application for Approval to Incinerate Oil Contaminated W/Very Low Levels of Licensed Radioactive Matls within Site Boundary of Facility ML20005F0601990-01-0303 January 1990 Forwards Justification for Continued Operation Re Pressurizer Surge Line Thermal Stratification,Per NRC Bulletin 88-011.Util Believes That Plant Can Continue Operation for at Least 20 Addl Heatup/Cooldown Cycles 1990-09-17
[Table view] |
Text
South Carolina Electric & Gas Company Dan A. Nauman Co m 29218 Nuc a tions SCE&G March 24, 1988 Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
SUBJECT:
Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Docket No. 50/395 Operating License No. NPF-12 Implementation of ATWS Rule (10CFR50.62)
I Gentlemen:
In accordance with your February 18, 1988 letter, attached are the South .
Carolina Electric & Gas Company ATWS Mitigation System Actuation 1 Circuitry (AMSAC) Safety Evaluation Report Response. Westinghouse WCAP-8687, Supplement 2-E68A (Proprietary Class 2) and EQDP-ESE-68A (Non-Proprietary), "Qualification of ATWS Mitigating System Actuation Circuitry in Standard Seismic Cabinet." l As WCAP-8687 contains information proprietary to Westinghouse Electric Corporation, it is supported by an affidavit signed by Westinghouse, the ,
owner of the information. The affidavit sets forth the basis on which the information may be withheld from public disclosure by the Cummission and addresses with specificity the considerations listed in paragraph (b)(4) of Section 2.790 of the Commission's regulations.
Accordingly, it is respectfully requested that the information which is proprietary to Westinghouse be withheld from public disclosure in
- accordance with 10CFR Section 2.790 of the Commission's regulations.
Correspondence with respect to the proprietary aspects of the Application for Withholding or the supporting Westinghouse Affidavit should reference CAW-88-021 and should be addressed to R. A. Wiesemann, Manager of Regulatory & Legislative Affairs. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 1 P. O. Box 355, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230-0355.
Should you have any further questions, please call at your convenience.
Very truly yours, 4 - DI D. A. Nauman MDB:0AN/ led h l Attachment I pc: See Page 2 CHA W6 %
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pc: J. G. Connelly, Jr./0. W. Dixon, Jr./T. C. Nichols, Jr.
E. C. Roberts W. A. Williams, Jr. J. C. Snelson J. N. Grace G. O. Percival J. J. Hayes, Jr. R. L. Prevatte General Managers J. B. Knotts, Jr.
C. A. Price M. D. Blue R. B. Clary T. L. Wessner '
W. R. Higgins NSRC R. M. Campbell, Jr. RTS (LTR000620) ,
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AMSAC SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT RESPONSE FOR VIRGIL C. SUPNER NUCLEAR STATION UNIT 1 South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (SCE&G) has selected and will implement an ATWS Mitigation System Actuation Circuitr,h (AMSAC) actuation logic which detects a loss of heatsink by monitoring the level in'each of the steam generators. This actuation logic incorporates an automatic arming and block circuitry based upon turbine load by monitoring the first-stage turbine pressure. This signal, referred to as the C-20 signal, blocks AMSAC actuation at low power levels to prevent spurious trips during plant startups. This actuation logic is depicted in Figure 1.
The following is the response to the items requested in the NRC Safety Evaluation (SE) of the Westinghouse Owners Group Topical Report WCAP-10858, "AMSAC Generic Design Package," dated February 23, 1987. ,
Diversity The basis for diversity of the ATWS Litigation systen: from the existing reactor trip system (RTS) is to minimize be potential of common mode failures. This diversity is required from sensor output to, but not including, the final actuation device. The ATWS mitigation system for V. C.
Summer Nuclear Station will utilize the existing transmitters, transmitter power supplies, isolators associated with the first-stage turbine pressure, and the narrow range steam generator level from the 7300 process protection 4
system. This in accordance with the NRC rule which states that the mitigation system instrument channel components (excluding sensors and I isolation devices) must be diverse from the existing RTS. The Westinghouse l AMSAC design is a microprocessor-based system with the capability to incorporate three different actuation logic schemes; V. C. Summer Nuclear Station employs actuation on low steam generator level. The RTS utilizes an l
\
analog-based process protection system with a discrete component logic j system; therefore, V. C. Summer Nuclear Station fulfills the requirement of 1
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diversity through the types of technology (analog vs. digital).
Additionally, diversity is accomplished through the hardware utilized. Where '
similt.r components are utilized for the same function in both AMSAC and the RTS, the components used in AMSAC are provided from a different manufacturer.
For example, relays are utilized in both systems for interfacing with the final actuation circuits. At V. C. Summer Nuclear Station Westinghouse Potter-Brumfield relays are utilized within RTS while Struthers-Dunn relays are used within AMSAC for this function.
Logic Power SuDDlies According to the NRC final rule, the AMSAC logic power supply is not required (
to be safety-related. However, the logic power supply should be from an instrument power supply that is independent from the reactor protection system (RPS) power supplies. Logic power to AMSAC is provided from a non-class 1E computer inverter XIT-5905. The inverter is a dual input inverter which operates in the same manner as do the class 1E inverters. Normal power to the inverter is from the 480 volt AC balance of plant electrical system with a non-class 1E 125 volt DC system as a backup. Figure 6 depicts the
\ power supply system for AMSAC. The inverter provides uriinterruptible 120 volt AC power by transferring to the 125 volt DC system on loss of normal power. The 125 volt DC system utilizes a full capacity 125 volt lead calcium battery and solid state battery chargers. During normal operation, the 125 ,
volt DC load is supplied from the battery chargers with the batteries ;
floating on the system. Upon loss of station AC power, the entire load is powered from the batterias until the power is restored by the emergency diesel ge.erators. Each battery is sized to carry the associated continuous l emergency load for a minimum one hour period in addition to supplying power for the operation of rromentary loads during that period.
Safety-Related Interface The AMSAC inputs for measuring turbine impulse chamber pressure and narrow range steam generator water level are derived from existing transmitte,*s and 4
channels within the process protection system. Connections to these channels are made downstream of class 1E isolation devices which are located within
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the procesi protection cabinets. These isolation devices ensure that the existing protection system continues to meet all applicable safety criteria by providing isolation as demonstrated by tests, which are described in .
Appendix A of this submittal.
Buffering of the AMSAC outputs from the safety-related final act'uation device circuits is achieved through qualified relays. The relays selected for this application are widely used throughout the industry in both safety-related and non-safety-related applications. To demonstrue the capability of these I isolation devices, the devices will be qualified.in a' manner coniistent with the requiremen's of cr,endix A of the NRC SE; details of this can be found in Appendix A of this document.
4 These output buffering relays are normany de-energized and as a result will not initiate actuationic upon a loss of powen to the relays or upon a relay coil failing to open. Cha?le w s to the existiri safety systems are minimized through this approach and the use of redundsot hardware with a majority vote to energize the relay coils. In the unlikely event of a random failure vbere a relay contact would operate spuriously, starting of an emergero ftedwater pump or tripping of the turbine could occur.
Quality Assuranc_e Generic letter 85-06, "Quality Ac.ssrance Guidance For ATWS Equipment That Is Not Safety-Related," provided the explicit quality assurance (QA) guidance for non-safety-related ATWS equipment as required by 10CFR50.62. The generic letter specifically states that the QA program for the non-safety-related ATUS equiprent does not need to meet 10CFR50 Appendix B requirements nor would compliance bq judged in terms of the Appendix. Detailed QA guidance is provided in the enf;?osure to the generic letter. For manufacturing, the Westinghouse prograrrl exceeds the above requirement.
The SCE&G program provides controls For the AMSAC system in'accordance with the requirefnents specif ied in Generic Letter 85-06. Thesystemdillbe installed and controlled under a safety-related modification package, utilizing cpplicable safety-related procedures. The system will be Page 3 L .. _- -
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maintained through the use of a quality related plan (QRP). The technical requirement package section of the QRP will specify the applicable technical criteria, procurement of replacement parts, and maintenance associated with this system. Design criteria will be controlled by the use of the engineering design control program.
Test / Maintenance Mode Test / Maintenance at power is accomplished by positioning the permanently installed bypass switch to bypass and selecting the Test / Maintenance mode.
This method complies with the ilRC SE by not involving lifting leads, pulling fuses, tripping breakers or physically blocking relays. Placement of the AMSAC bypass switch to the bypass position inhibits operation of the system's output relays which operate the final actuation devices. Status outputs to the plant computer and main control board, indicating that a general warning condition exists with AMSAC, are initiated when the bypass switch is placed in the bypass postion.
Operating Bypass The V. C. Summer Nuclear Station AMSAC design includes an operating bypass which indicates on a main control board status light when below the C-20 setpoint. Westinghouse Owners Group letter OG-87-10, dated February 26, 1987, has been submitted to the NRC providing the basis for the C-20 setpoint. Although short term protection against high reactor coolant system pressures is not required until 70% of nominal power, AMSAC will operate at or above 40% of nominal power. The C-20 setpoint was a compromise between minimizing the amount of reactor coolant system voiding during an ATWS and preventing spurious AMSAC actuations during start-up at the lower power leveis. The C-20 permissive signal uses the existing turbine impulse chamber pressure sensors. The indication of the bypass status is consistent with existing control room design philosophy; an annunciator window in the control room is provided. For guidance in diversity and independence for the process equipment and logic power supplies see those specific sectMns.
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y tem 8:!aass S
The means for bypassing AMSAC is accomplished with a permanently installed bypass switch which includes human factor design practices. It does not involve lifting leads, pulling fuses, tripping breakers or physically blocking relays.
Manual Initiation Manual initiation of the emergency feedwater system and tripping of the main turbine are achieved through existing plant controls and circuits for V. C.
Summer Nuclear Station. The addition of AMSAC to V. C. Summer Nuclear Station will not result in any changes to the emergency operating procedures or to manual emergency feedwater initiation criteria.
Electrical Independence Electrical independence from the existing RTS is required from the sensor output to, but not including, the final actuation device. This is to separate safety-related circuits from non-safety-related circuits. The V. C.
Summer Nuclear Station AMSAC design fulfills this requirement. For the turbine impulse chamber pressure inputs, SCE&G has elected to use the existing pressure transmitters, loop power supplies and isolation devices within the 7300 system process protection system cabinets. In a like manner, existing narrow range level transmitters, loop power supplies and isolation devices (existing and new) within the process prctection system cabinets are utilized for measuring level in each steam generator. Electrical independence between the non-class IE AMSAC circuitry and the class 1E process protection system cabinet circuits is provided through isc'ation devices which have been tested as described in Appendix A of this document.
Moreover, the non-class lE logic circuitry and outputs are isolated from class lE circuits.
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Physical Separation The AMSAC equipment needs to be physically separated from the existing protection system hardware. This requires that the cable routing be independent of protection system cable routing and the location of the AMSAC equipment cabinets in such a place that there is no interaction with the protection set cabinets. The basis of this requirement is IEEE Standard 279-1971, "Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations." The AMSAC actuation outputs to the redundant turbine trip and emergency feedwater pump start circuits are provided from separate relay panels within the AMSAC cabinet. Separation of the train A and B circuits within the AMSAC cabinet is achieved through a combination of metal barriers, conduit, and distance. Additionally, the isolation fault tests mentioned in Appendix A will demonstrate that credible faults will not disable channels associated with other protection sets. All non-class 1E AMSAC inputs and status outputs will be routed separately in the logic cabinet and, therefore, will be separate from the 1E actuation circuits. Figure 2 depicts the system block diagram along with the cable separation groups.
Environmental Qualificatior!
The SE requires that only the isolation devices comply with environmental qualification (10CFR50.49) and with seismic qualification. These are addressed in Appendix A. The remaining portion of the ATWS mitigation system is neither required to be safety-related nor required to meet IEEE-279-1971.
This portion of the AMSAC equipment is located outside containment in a mild environment and follows the same design standard that currently exists for non-class 1E control grade equipment. No Additional equipment is being added inside containment since this modification is using the existing qualified steam generator narrow range transmitters.
Testability at Power The non-safety-related AMSAC circuitry is testable with the plant on-line.
In addition, testing of the AMSAC outputs to the final actuation devices may be performed with the plant on-line. The ATWS mitigation system for V. C.
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Summer Nuclear Station provides for periodic testing, which is performed with the AMSAC outputs bypassed. This bypass is accomplished through a permanently installed bypass switch alleviating the requirement to lift leads, pull fuses, trip breakers or physically block relays. Status outputs to the plant computer and main control board, indicating that a general warning condition exists with AMSAC, are initiated when the system's outputs are bypassed. Once the system bypass is established, a series of overlapping tests are performed to verify analog channel accuracy, setpoint (bistable trip) accuracy, coincidence logic operation (operation and accuracy of all timers), and continuity through the output relay coils. Switches are provided for each output relay to perform testing of AMSAC outputs through the final actuation devices. A simplified block diagram is shown in Figure 3 reflecting the test overlaps for the periodic on-line tests. A sununary of ,
each of the tests follows.
Analog Input Channel Testing The field input to each analog channel is replaced with a variable test reference which is used to confirm accuracy of the channel gain and offset. The test reference is then ramped up and down throughout a portion of the channel range to verify accuracy of the channel setpoint and associated deadband. This test confirms operation of the input channel signal conditioning circuitry, analog-to-digital converters, and processor operation.
Processor Logic Testing The second sequence of testing verifies that each actuation logic processor performs the proper coincidence logic, including timing l functions, and generates the proper outputs. In this test, the field !
input to each input channel for the processor under test is replaced with test references. These test references simulate the channel values as j either above or below the setpoint which verifies all combinations of coincidence logic and generation of the proper processor outputs to the majority voting modules. This test also confirms operation of the input Page 7
channel signal conditioning circuitry and the analog-to-digital converters.
Majority Voter and Output Relay Tests Each majority voting module and associated output relays are tested to verify operation of the majority vote (2 out of 3) and continuity for each of the output relay coils. Integrity of the relay coils along with associated wiring is verified while exercising the voting logic.
Completion of Mitigative Action Completion of mitigative actions in response to AMSAC actuation is performed through existing plant circuits for emergency feedwater system actuation and for turbine trip. Signals from the AMSAC output relays for actuation of the emergency feedwater system and turbine trip tie in at the output termination cabinets for the solid state protection system (SSPS).
All signals from AMSAC act as a redundant signal for the RPS for low steam generator level reactor trips, thereby providing a backup if RPS fails to actuate. Steam generator blowdown and sample lines are isolated by a interlock from the emergency feedwater pump start circuits. This circuitry was part of the initial system design and requires no additional design to meet the ATWS rule.
Technical Specifications The Westinghouse Owners Group is on record (reference WOG letter 0G-171, dated February 10,1986) that Technical Specifications for AMSAC are unnecessary. SCE&G concurs that the Technical Specifications for AMSAC are unnecessary. In addition, SCE&G believes that the quality related program and normal nuclear plant aaministrative controls are sufficient to control AMSAC.
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APPENDIX A - AMSAC ISOLATION DEVICE Electrical indepeadence of AMSAC from the existing RPS is provided through several means for V. C. Summer Nuclear Station . A block diagram showing the relationship of AMSAC to the existing RPS is provided in Figure 4, which dete.ils the AMSAC/RPS connections and points of isolation.
The steam generator narrow range level inpts to AMSAC are derived from existing isolated signals from the process protection system. These signals are provided from differential pressure transmitters to the process protection cabinet and then from the protection cabinet to the control cabinets and AMSAC. This arrangement does not require the use of new isolators to provide electrical independence of these instrument channels from the existing RPS. However, to prevent overloading of the existing current loops, several isolators of the existing type were added.
For measuring turbine load at the first stage, SCE&G has elected to utilize the existing pressure transmitters. As with the narrow range steam generator inputs, the isolated signals are from the RPS which have been routed to the control cabinets and AMSAC.
Isolation is provided in the process protection cabinet for the signals used as input for AMSAC. As reported in WCAP-8892A, "Westinghouse 7300 Series Process Control System Noise Tests," these isolation devices, which are powered by a class 1E source, have been tested to demonstrate that the device is acceptable for this application. The purpose of the tests was to determine whether or not protection circuitry could be perturbated to the extent that protective action would be prevented by the pick-up or presence of credible interference on control wiring in close proximity to protection wiring within the process control racks. Isolation devices are used in the Process Control Systems 7300 Series equipment to electrically isolate the protection circuits inside the process control racks from control circuits Page 1 of 3
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l outside the cabinets. The system was subjected to tests that included magnetic noise tests, output cable voltage faults (maximum credible voltages:
550 volts AC, 250 volts DC), cross talk, random noise, and others. The acceptance criteria for these tests were that the postulated fault should not prevent required protective action and that spurious protective action caused by the postulated fault should be acceptable. Since AMSAC is separate from the reactor protection system and the cable is not routed in an area that exceeds the 550 volts AC 250 volts DC test limits, any interference from AMSAC would not affect the reactor protection system.
Under all tested conditions, the protection circuitry operated as intended.
The tests showed conclusively that electrical interference imposed onto the isolator output wiring (control wiring) is not a consideration for the proper operation of the perturbated channel nor any adjacent channels. The magnitude of the electrical interference introduced into the system and the stringent testing procedures far exceeded any conditions that would be present in actual plant operations.
Relays are provided at the output of AMSAC for isolating the non-class 1E AMSAC circuits from the class 1E final actuator circuits. For V. C. Summer Nuclear Station, the AMSAC outputs are provided from separate relay panels within the AMSAC cabinet. Separation of the Train A and B circuits within the AMSAC cabinet is achieved through a combination of metal barriers, conduit, and distance. These relays were tested with the maximum credible faults applied to the relay coil in the transverse mode. Tests were performed with the relay coil operating contact in both the open and closed postion. Figure 4 depicts the simplified diagram of this output isolation circuit, and point of application for the maximum credible faults. Details of the actual tests, fault levels and their origin, test data, and the pass / fail acceptance criteria are included in the attached Westinghouse WCAP-8687, Supplement 2-E68A, "Qualification of ATWS Mitigating System Actuation Circuitry In Standard Seismic Cabinet."
Additionally, the SE requires that the isolation devices comply with the environmental qualifications (10CFR50.49) and with the seismic qualifications which were the basis for plant licensing. The isolation device at the output Page 2 of 3
of AMSAC is the boundary between safety-related and non-safety-related circuits and, therefore, must be qualified. For V. C. Summer Nuclear Station configuration, the AMSAC output isolation device will be qualified in accordance with the current Westinghouse seismic qualification program. The program development and implemention were based on the requirements of IEEE-344-1975, "IEEE Standard for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E Electrical Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations." The isolation provided at the protection system have been seismically qualified. Environmental Qualifiction Reports, however, are not applicable to the AMSAC output relays since these are located in a mild environment. The methodology for qualification is contained in WCAP 8587 Rev. 6-A, "Methodology for Qualifying Westinghous WRD Supplied NSSS Safety Related Electrical Equipment."
The class 1E loads operated by the isolation relay contacts are powered from a class 1E source. The plant specific details of the wiring configuration can be found on the SCE&G elementary drawing if needed.
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LOW-LOW STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL HIGH TURBINE LOAD LOOP 1 LOOP 2 LOOP 3 CH. 1 CH.2 i Noor Tor 2/3 2/2 0-60 SEC N y N y 180-420 SEC TIME DELAY ON TIME DELAY ON ENERGlZING g 7 DE-ENERGlZING C-20 V V 2/2 TRIP TURBINE INITIATE AFW v ISOLATE S/G SAMPLE AND BLOWDOWN LINES
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I AMENDMENT 3 I I 3 s .. ...
AUGUST,1987 r:-
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19 I i VIRGIL ".. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION 0 it il !! !. ! I I!! # li"'
Balance of Plant Vital AC.DC System (GAI Dwg. No. E.206-061, $h.1)
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