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| ML17124A163 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 05/03/2017 |
| From: | Karla Stoedter NRC/RGN-III/DRP/B1 |
| To: | Bryan Hanson Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear |
| References | |
| IR 2017001 | |
| Download: ML17124A163 (57) | |
See also: IR 05000265/2017001
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
2443 WARRENVILLE RD. SUITE 210
LISLE, IL 60532-4352
May 3, 2017
Mr. Bryan C. Hanson
Senior VP, Exelon Generation Company, LLC
President and CNO, Exelon Nuclear
4300 Winfield Road
Warrenville, IL 60555
SUBJECT: QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2NRC
INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000254/2017001 AND
Dear Mr. Hanson:
On March 31, 2017, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an integrated
inspection at your Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2. On April 11, 2017, the
NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. S. Darin and other members of
your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has identified one issue that was evaluated
under the risk significance determination process as having very low safety significance
(Green). The NRC has also determined that one violation is associated with this issue.
Because the licensee initiated condition reports to address this issue, this violation is being
treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV), consistent with Section 2.3.2a of the Enforcement
Policy. The NCV is described in the subject inspection report.
If you contest the violation or significance of the NCV, you should provide a response within
30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with
copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the
NRC Resident Inspector at the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment or a finding not associated with a
regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date
of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the
Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Quad Cities Nuclear
Power Station.
B. Hanson -2-
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection
and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document
Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, and Requests for
Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Karla Stoedter, Chief
Branch 1
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos. 50-254; 50-265
Enclosure:
IR 05000254/2017001; 05000265/2017001
cc: Distribution via LISTSERV
B. Hanson -3-
Letter to Bryan C. Hanson from Karla Stoedter dated May 3, 2017
SUBJECT: QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2NRC
INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000254/2017001 AND
DISTRIBUTION:
RidsNrrDorlLpl3
RidsNrrPMQuadCities Resource
RidsNrrDirsIrib Resource
Cynthia Pederson
DRPIII
DRSIII
ROPreports.Resource@nrc.gov
ADAMS Accession Number: ML17124A163
OFFICE RIII
NAME KStoedter:bw
DATE 05/03/2017
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Docket Nos: 50-254; 50-265
Report No: 05000254/2017001; 05000265/2017001
Licensee: Exelon Generation Company, LLC
Facility: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2
Location: Cordova, IL
Dates: January 1 through March 31, 2017
Inspectors: R. Murray, Senior Resident Inspector
K. Carrington, Resident Inspector
M. Garza, Emergency Preparedness Inspector
A. Dahbur, Fire Protection Inspector
J. Neurauter, Reactor Engineer
M. Domke, Reactor Engineer
J. Cassidy, Senior Health Physicist
V. Meyers, Senior Health Physicist
C. Mathews, Illinois Emergency Management Agency
Approved by: K. Stoedter, Chief
Branch 1
Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................... 2
REPORT DETAILS ....................................................................................................................... 4
Summary of Plant Status ........................................................................................................... 4
1. REACTOR SAFETY ............................................................................................ 4
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01) .............................................................. 4
1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04) ........................................................................ 5
1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05) ................................................................................... 6
1R06 Flooding (71111.06) ............................................................................................. 6
1R07 Annual Heat Sink Performance (71111.07) ......................................................... 7
1R08 Inservice Inspection Activities (71111.08) ............................................................ 7
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11) ...................................... 9
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12) .............................................................. 11
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13) ........ 11
1R15 Operability Determinations and Functional Assessments (71111.15) ............... 12
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19) ............................................................... 13
1R20 Outage Activities (71111.20) .............................................................................. 14
1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22) ........................................................................ 14
1EP2 Alert and Notification System Evaluation (71114.02) ......................................... 16
1EP3 Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System
(71114.03).......................................................................................................... 16
1EP5 Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness (71114.05) ..................................... 17
1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06)................................................................................. 17
2. RADIATION SAFETY ........................................................................................ 18
2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (71124.01) .............. 18
2RS2 Occupational As-Low-As-Reasonably-Achievable Planning and Controls
(71124.02).......................................................................................................... 22
2RS3 In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation (71124.03) .................... 23
2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment (71124.04) ...................................................... 25
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES .......................................................................................... 27
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151) ....................................................... 27
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152) ............................................ 30
4OA3 Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153) ............... 33
4OA5 Other Activities ................................................................................................... 34
4OA6 Management Meetings ...................................................................................... 37
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION............................................................................................ 1
Key Points of Contact ................................................................................................................ 1
List of Items Opened, Closed, and Discussed........................................................................... 2
List of Documents Reviewed ..................................................................................................... 3
List of Acronyms Used ............................................................................................................ 15
2
SUMMARY
Inspection Report 05000254/2017001, 05000265/2017001; 01/01/2017-03/31/2017;
Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2; Identification and Resolution of Problems.
This report covers a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced
baseline inspections by regional inspectors. One Green finding was identified by the inspectors.
The finding involved a Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) requirements. The significance of inspection findings is indicated by their
color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, Red) and determined using Inspection
Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process," dated April 29, 2015.
Cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0310, "Aspects within the Cross-Cutting
Areas," dated December 4, 2014. All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in
accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy, dated November 1, 2016. The NRC's program
for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in
NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 6.
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
Green. A finding of very low safety significance and an associated NCV of 10 CFR 50,
Appendix B, Criterion V was self-revealed on January 27, 2017, when the Unit 1C
residual heat removal service water (RHRSW) pump was started for a routine
surveillance evolution and all expected annunciators and equipment failed to operate
properly, which led to the licensee declaring the Unit 1C RHRSW pump inoperable.
Specifically, the licensee failed to establish a procedure for the mechanism operated
contact (MOC) switch linkage arm that was appropriate to the circumstances to ensure
the component would continue to perform its function. Immediate corrective actions
included reconnecting the MOC switch linkage arm assembly and testing it by starting
the 1C RHRSW pump prior to declaring the pump operable. In addition, the licensee
planned procedure revisions to QCEPM 0200-11 that would specify a torque value to
ensure the MOC switch linkage arm was adequately secured and could perform its
function. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Issue
Report 3967424.
The finding was determined to be more than minor because the finding was associated
with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and
affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of
systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.
Specifically, the failure to ensure the MOC switch linkage arm was adequately fastened
led to the failure of the component and its associated Unit 1C RHRSW pump during
breaker operation on January 27, 2017. The finding was determined to be of very low
safety significance (Green), because the inspectors answered No to all of the
questions in IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for
Findings at Power, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, Section A,
Mitigating SSCs and Functionality. The inspectors determined this finding affected the
cross-cutting area of human performance, in the aspect of avoid complacency, which
states, Individuals recognize and plan for the possibility of mistakes, latent issues, and
inherent risk, even while expecting successful outcomes. Specifically, the licensee
failed to recognize a potential risk and inherent latent issue for a condition identified in
2015 at Quad Cities, when a MOC switch failed to perform its function due to a missing
nut in a different breakers linkage assembly. The licensee identified and corrected the
2
condition but failed to evaluate the cause of the missing nut because it did not impact the
operability of the component. In the 2015 instance, the MOC switch issue only affected
indications for the component and had no adverse impact on the ability of the
component to perform its function [H.12]. (Section 4OA2)
3
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Unit 1
With the exception of planned power reductions for turbine testing, control rod pattern
adjustments, and power changes as requested by the transmission system operator, the unit
remained at or near full power from January 1 to January 18, 2017. On January 18, the unit
began coasting down for Refueling Outage Q1R24. On March 27, 2017, the unit shut down for
Q1R24 and remained shut down through the end of the inspection period.
Unit 2
The unit operated at or near full power for the entire inspection period with the exception of
planned power reductions for turbine testing, control rod pattern adjustments, control rod drive
maintenance, and power changes as requested by the transmission system operator.
1. REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01)
.1 Winter Seasonal Readiness Preparations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted a review of the licensees preparations for winter conditions to
verify that the plants design features and implementation of procedures were sufficient
to protect mitigating systems from the effects of adverse weather. Documentation for
selected risk-significant systems was reviewed to ensure that these systems would
remain functional when challenged by inclement weather. During the inspection, the
inspectors focused on plant specific design features and the licensees procedures used
to mitigate or respond to adverse weather conditions. Additionally, the inspectors
reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and performance
requirements for systems selected for inspection, and verified that operator actions were
appropriate as specified by plant specific procedures. Cold weather protection, such as
heat tracing and area heaters, was verified to be in operation where applicable. The
inspectors also reviewed corrective action program (CAP) items to verify that the
licensee was identifying adverse weather issues at an appropriate threshold and
entering them into their CAP in accordance with station corrective action procedures.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report. The inspectors reviews
focused specifically on the following plant systems due to their risk significance or
susceptibility to cold weather issues:
- 345 kilo-volt system; and
- Units 1 and 2 standby liquid control systems.
This inspection constituted one winter seasonal readiness preparation sample as
defined in Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.01-05.
4
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)
.1 Quarterly Partial System Walkdowns
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed partial system walkdowns of the following risk-significant
systems:
- Unit 1 and Unit 2 emergency diesel generator (EDG) systems during Unit 1/2 EDG
surveillance testing;
- Unit 2 reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system during Unit 2 high pressure
coolant injection system planned maintenance;
- Unit 2 C and D residual heat removal service water (RHRSW) pump systems
during A and B RHRSW systems planned maintenance; and
- Unit 1 fuel pool cooling system during Unit 1 Q1R24 alternate decay heat removal
operations.
The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk significance relative to the
Reactor Safety Cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors attempted
to identify any discrepancies that could impact the function of the system and, therefore,
potentially increase risk. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures,
system diagrams, UFSAR, Technical Specification (TS) requirements, outstanding work
orders (WOs), condition reports, and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant
trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have rendered the systems
incapable of performing their intended functions. The inspectors also walked down
accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment
were aligned correctly and operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of
the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there
were no obvious deficiencies. The inspectors also verified that the licensee had properly
identified and resolved equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events
or impact the capability of mitigating systems or barriers and entered them into the CAP
with the appropriate significance characterization. Documents reviewed are listed in the
Attachment to this report.
These activities constituted four partial system walkdown samples as defined in
IP 71111.04-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
5
1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)
.1 Routine Resident Inspector Tours (71111.05Q)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted fire protection walkdowns which were focused on availability,
accessibility and the condition of firefighting equipment in the following risk-significant
plant areas:
- Fire zone (FZ) 11.2.1, Unit 1 reactor building, elevation 554'-0", southwest corner
room, 1B core spray;
- FZ 8.2.6.B, Unit 1 turbine building, elevation 595-0, low pressure heater bay;
- FZ 8.2.7.B, Unit 1 turbine building, elevation 615-6, low Pressure and D heater
bay; and
- FZ 8.2.7.C, Unit 1/2 turbine building, elevation 611, mezzanine floor.
The inspectors reviewed areas to assess if the licensee had implemented a fire
protection program that adequately controlled combustibles and ignition sources within
the plant, effectively maintained fire detection and suppression capability, maintained
passive fire protection features in good material condition, and implemented adequate
compensatory measures for out-of-service, degraded or inoperable fire protection
equipment, systems, or features in accordance with the licensees fire plan.
The inspectors selected fire areas based on their overall contribution to internal fire risk
as documented in the plants Individual Plant Examination of External Events with later
additional insights, their potential to impact equipment which could initiate or mitigate a
plant transient, or their impact on the plants ability to respond to a security event.
Using the documents listed in the Attachment to this report, the inspectors verified that
fire hoses and extinguishers were in their designated locations and available for
immediate use; that fire detectors and sprinklers were unobstructed; that transient
material loading was within the analyzed limits; and fire doors, dampers, and penetration
seals appeared to be in satisfactory condition. The inspectors also verified that minor
issues identified during the inspection were entered into the licensees CAP.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
These activities constituted four quarterly fire protection inspection samples as defined in
IP 71111.05-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R06 Flooding (71111.06)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed selected risk important plant design features and licensee
procedures intended to protect the plant and its safety-related equipment from internal
flooding events. The inspectors reviewed flood analyses and design documents,
including the UFSAR, engineering calculations, and abnormal operating procedures to
6
identify licensee commitments. The specific documents reviewed are listed in the
Attachment to this report. In addition, the inspectors reviewed licensee drawings to
identify areas and equipment that may be affected by internal flooding caused by the
failure or misalignment of nearby sources of water, such as the fire suppression or the
circulating water systems. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees corrective action
documents with respect to past flood-related items identified in the corrective action
program to verify the adequacy of the corrective actions. The inspectors performed a
walkdown of the following plant area to assess the adequacy of watertight doors and
verify drains and sumps were clear of debris and were operable, and that the licensee
complied with its commitments:
- Units 1 and 2 RHRSW vaults.
Documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report.
This inspection constituted one internal flooding sample as defined in IP 71111.06-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R07 Annual Heat Sink Performance (71111.07)
.1 Heat Sink Performance
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees testing of the B control room emergency
ventilation system refrigeration condensing unit heat exchanger to verify that potential
deficiencies did not mask the licensees ability to detect degraded performance, to
identify any common cause issues that had the potential to increase risk, and to ensure
that the licensee was adequately addressing problems that could result in initiating
events that would cause an increase in risk. The inspectors reviewed the licensees
observations as compared against acceptance criteria, the correlation of scheduled
testing and the frequency of testing, and the impact of instrument inaccuracies on test
results. Inspectors also verified that test acceptance criteria considered differences
between test conditions, design conditions, and testing conditions. Documents reviewed
for this inspection are listed in the Attachment to this document.
This annual heat sink performance inspection constituted one sample as defined in
IP 71111.07-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R08 Inservice Inspection Activities (71111.08)
From March 27-31, 2017, the inspectors conducted a review of the implementation
of the licensees Inservice Inspection (ISI) Program for monitoring degradation of the
Unit 1 reactor coolant system, risk-significant piping and components, and containment
systems.
7
The inspections described in Sections 1R08.1 and 1R08.5 below constituted one sample
as defined in IP 71111.08-05.
.1 Piping Systems Inservice Inspection
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors either observed or reviewed the following Non-Destructive
Examinations (NDE) mandated by the American Society of Mechanical
Engineers (ASME),Section XI Code to evaluate compliance with the ASME Code
Section XI and Section V requirements, and if any indications and defects were detected
to determine if these were dispositioned in accordance with the ASME Code or a NRC
approved alternative requirement:
steam system (WO No. 01831310-01);
steam system (WO No. 01831310-01);
- Magnetic particle examination (MT) of collar-torus shell (component 1025-50) in
emergency core cooling system (WO 01831310);
- MT of weldsvariable spring can with four lugs welded to pipe (component
1401-W-201A) in core spray system (WO 01831310);
- MT of weldseight guide lugs welded to pipe (component 2304-W-204A) in the
high pressure coolant injection system (WO No. 01831310);
- General visual examination of a sample of metallic containment surface area
examinations: Penetrations X-016A, X-020, X-025, X-042, X-08, and X-109;
X-025 MC piping at elevations 647, 623, and 595 (WO No. 01831711-02);
- Visual examination (VT-1) of weldsfour lugs welded to pipe (component
1005A-W-304.5A) in RHRSW system (WO 01831310);
- VT-3 of pipe restraintbox guide (component 1005A-W-304.5) in RHRSW
system (WO 01831310);
- VT-3 of pipe supporttwo variable spring cans (component 1401-W-201 A&B)
in core spray system (WO 01831310); and
- VT-3 of flued head anchor (component 1202-M-108.1) in the reactor water
clean-up system (WO No. 01831310).
The inspectors reviewed one surface examination from the previous outage with a
relevant indication that was evaluated and accepted by the licensee for continued
service. The inspectors verified that the licensees removal of the piping flange
indications without a weld repair did not impact compliance with ASME Standard B16.5
for flange design and Standard B31.1 for piping design.
- Reactor head vent line indications found during liquid penetrant examinations
The inspectors reviewed records for the following pressure boundary weld repairs
completed for risk-significant systems during the last outage to determine whether
the licensee applied the pre-service NDE and acceptance criteria required by the
Construction Code, and/or the NRC-approved Code relief request. Additionally, the
inspectors reviewed the welding procedure specifications and supporting weld
procedure qualification records to determine whether the weld procedures were
8
qualified in accordance with the requirements of the Construction Code and the
ASME Code, Section IX:
head vent line 1-0215-2-B (WO No. 01636433-01); and
- high pressure coolant injection piping rerouteweld map #1 fillet welds at socket
welds 2, 3, 8, 9, 16, and 17 on line 1-2318-2-LX (WO No. 1877257-11).
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Reactor Pressure Vessel Upper Head Penetration Inspection Activities (Not Applicable)
.3 Boric Acid Corrosion Control (Not Applicable)
.4 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Activities (Not Applicable)
.5 Identification and Resolution of Problems
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a review of ISI-related problems entered into the licensees
CAP, and conducted interviews with licensee staff to determine if:
- the licensee had established an appropriate threshold for identifying ISI-related
problems;
- the licensee had performed a root cause (if applicable), and taken appropriate
corrective actions; and
- the licensee had evaluated operating experience, and industry generic issues
related to ISI and pressure boundary integrity.
The inspectors performed these reviews to evaluate compliance with Title 10, Code of
Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action,
requirements. The corrective action documents reviewed by the inspectors are listed
in the Attachment to this report.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11)
.1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Requalification (71111.11Q)
a. Inspection Scope
On February 7, 2017, the inspectors observed a crew of licensed operators in the plants
simulator during licensed operator requalification training. The inspectors verified that
operator performance was adequate, evaluators were identifying and documenting crew
performance problems, and that training was being conducted in accordance with
licensee procedures. The inspectors evaluated the following areas:
9
- licensed operator performance;
- crews clarity and formality of communications;
- ability to take timely actions in the conservative direction;
- prioritization, interpretation, and verification of annunciator alarms;
- correct use and implementation of abnormal and emergency procedures;
- control board manipulations;
- oversight and direction from supervisors; and
- ability to identify and implement appropriate TS actions and Emergency Plan
actions and notifications.
The crews performance in these areas was compared to pre-established operator action
expectations and successful critical task completion requirements. Documents reviewed
are listed in the Attachment to this report.
This inspection constituted one quarterly licensed operator requalification program
simulator sample as defined in IP 71111.11-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Resident Inspector Quarterly Observation during Periods of Heightened Activity or Risk
a. Inspection Scope
On March 26, 2017, the inspectors observed control room operators on Unit 1 perform a
planned shutdown for refueling outage Q1R24. This was an activity that required
heightened awareness and was related to increased risk. The inspectors evaluated the
following areas:
- licensed operator performance;
- crews clarity and formality of communications;
- ability to take timely actions in the conservative direction;
- prioritization, interpretation, and verification of annunciator alarms;
- correct use and implementation of abnormal and emergency procedures;
- control board manipulations;
- oversight and direction from supervisors; and
- ability to identify and implement appropriate TS actions and Emergency Plan
actions and notifications.
The performance in these areas was compared to pre-established operator action
expectations, procedural compliance and task completion requirements. Documents
reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
This inspection constituted one quarterly licensed operator heightened activity/risk
sample as defined in IP 71111.11-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
10
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12)
.1 Routine Quarterly Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated degraded performance issues involving the following
risk-significant systems:
- Z6600: emergency diesel generator systems; and
- Z8300: 125 volt direct current (VDC) battery systems.
The inspectors reviewed events such as where ineffective equipment maintenance had
resulted in valid or invalid automatic actuations of engineered safeguards systems and
independently verified the licensee's actions to address system performance or condition
problems in terms of the following:
- implementing appropriate work practices;
- identifying and addressing common cause failures;
- scoping of systems in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(b) of the maintenance rule;
- characterizing system reliability issues for performance;
- charging unavailability for performance;
- trending key parameters for condition monitoring;
- ensuring 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2) classification or re-classification; and
- verifying appropriate performance criteria for structures, systems, and
components (SSCs)/functions classified as (a)(2), or appropriate and adequate
goals and corrective actions for systems classified as (a)(1).
The inspectors assessed performance issues with respect to the reliability, availability,
and condition monitoring of the system. In addition, the inspectors verified maintenance
effectiveness issues were entered into the CAP with the appropriate significance
characterization. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
This inspection constituted two quarterly maintenance effectiveness samples as defined
in IP 71111.12-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)
.1 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's evaluation and management of plant risk for the
maintenance and emergent work activities affecting risk-significant and safety-related
equipment listed below to verify that the appropriate risk assessments were performed
prior to removing equipment for work:
11
- Work week 17-02-05: Unit 1 RCIC system planned maintenance and online risk
change to yellow, B train of control room emergency heating, ventilation, and air
conditioning system heat exchanger planned maintenance, 1A core spray pump
planned maintenance and Unit 1 online risk change to yellow;
- Emergent work on the Unit 2 3E automatic depressurization system electromatic
relief valve light indication on February 3, 2017;
- Work week 17-09-12: Unit 2 125 VDC planned maintenance and both units
unplanned online risk change to yellow due to tornado warnings in Rock Island
County; and
- Work week 17-13-03: Unit 2 online risk change to yellow and Unit 1 shutdown
safety risk yellow during refueling outage Q1R24Week 1.
These activities were selected based on their potential risk significance relative to the
Reactor Safety cornerstones. As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified that
risk assessments were performed as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and were accurate
and complete. When emergent work was performed, the inspectors verified that the
plant risk was promptly reassessed and managed. The inspectors reviewed the scope
of maintenance work, discussed the results of the assessment with the licensee's
probabilistic risk analyst or shift technical advisor, and verified plant conditions were
consistent with the risk assessment. The inspectors also reviewed TS requirements and
walked down portions of redundant safety systems, when applicable, to verify risk
analysis assumptions were valid and applicable requirements were met.
Documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report.
These maintenance risk assessments and emergent work control activities constituted
four samples as defined in IP 71111.13-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R15 Operability Determinations and Functional Assessments (71111.15)
.1 Operability Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following issues:
- Issue Report (IR) 2709786: DGCWP [diesel generator cooling water
pump]/RHRSW Common Suction Piping Degradation;
- IR 3968961: Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Thermal Performance Testing Using
Fluke Model 45;
- IR 3967424: Unit 1C RHRSW Pump Abnormal Indications; and
- IR 3971856: 1D RHRSW Trip Fuses Worked Out of Fuse Holder.
The inspectors selected these potential operability issues based on the risk significance
of the associated components and systems. The inspectors evaluated the technical
adequacy of the evaluations to ensure that TS operability was properly justified and the
subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in
risk occurred. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the
12
appropriate sections of the TS and UFSAR to the licensees evaluations to determine
whether the components or systems were operable. Where compensatory measures
were required to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures
in place would function as intended and were properly controlled. The inspectors
determined, where appropriate, compliance with bounding limitations associated with the
evaluations. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sampling of corrective action
documents to verify that the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies
associated with operability evaluations. Documents reviewed are listed in the
Attachment to this report.
This operability inspection constituted four samples as defined in IP 71111.15-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19)
.1 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following post-maintenance testing (PMT) activities to verify
that procedures and test activities were adequate to ensure system operability and
functional capability:
- WO 1961658 for the Unit 1 RCIC system following planned maintenance;
- WO 1846331 for the Unit 2 125 VDC battery system following battery terminal
board and potentiometer installation under Engineering Change (EC) 402467; and
- WO 4612395 for the Unit 1 EDG cooling water pump following emergent work and
unplanned maintenance.
These activities were selected based upon the structure, system, or component's ability
to impact risk. The inspectors evaluated these activities for the following (as applicable):
the effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed; testing was adequate
for the maintenance performed; acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated
operational readiness; test instrumentation was appropriate; tests were performed as
written in accordance with properly reviewed and approved procedures; equipment was
returned to its operational status following testing (temporary modifications or jumpers
required for test performance were properly removed after test completion); and test
documentation was properly evaluated. The inspectors evaluated the activities against
TSs, the UFSAR, 10 CFR Part 50 requirements, licensee procedures, and various
NRC generic communications to ensure that the test results adequately ensured that the
equipment met the licensing basis and design requirements. In addition, the inspectors
reviewed corrective action documents associated with post-maintenance tests to
determine whether the licensee was identifying problems and entering them in the CAP
and that the problems were being corrected commensurate with their importance to
safety. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
This inspection constituted three PMT samples as defined in IP 71111.19-05.
13
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R20 Outage Activities (71111.20)
.1 Refueling Outage Activities
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the Outage Safety Plan (OSP) and contingency plans for the
Unit 1 refueling outage (RFO), that began on March 27, 2017, and continued through the
end of this inspection period, to confirm that the licensee had appropriately considered
risk, industry experience, and previous site-specific problems in developing and
implementing a plan that assured maintenance of defense-in-depth. During the RFO,
the inspectors observed portions of the shutdown and cooldown processes and
monitored licensee controls over the outage activities listed below:
- licensee configuration management, including maintenance of defense-in-depth
commensurate with the OSP for key safety functions and compliance with the
applicable TS when taking equipment out of service;
- installation and configuration of reactor coolant pressure, level, and temperature
instruments to provide accurate indication, accounting for instrument error;
- controls over the status and configuration of electrical systems to ensure that
TS and OSP requirements were met, and controls over switchyard activities;
- monitoring of decay heat removal processes, systems, and components;
- controls to ensure that outage work was not impacting the ability of the operators
to operate the spent fuel pool cooling system;
- reactor water inventory controls including flow paths, configurations, and
alternative means for inventory addition, and controls to prevent inventory loss;
- controls over activities that could affect reactivity;
- maintenance of secondary containment as required by TS;
- refueling activities; and
- licensee identification and resolution of problems related to RFO activities.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
This inspection constituted a partial RFO sample and continued into the next inspection
period.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)
.1 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the test results for the following activities to determine whether
risk-significant systems and equipment were capable of performing their intended safety
14
function and to verify testing was conducted in accordance with applicable procedural
and TS requirements:
- QCIS 1000-09: RHR Pump Discharge Pressure Calibration and Functional Test
(Routine);
- QCOS 6600-37(39): Unit 1(2) EDG Largest Load Reject Surveillance (Routine);
- QCOS 6600-44: Unit 1 EDG Timed Start Test (Routine)
- QCOS 1000-43: Unit 2 A Loop Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) and
Containment Cooling Modes of RHRs Non-Outage Logic Test (Routine);
- QCOS 1400-16: Unit 1 Division II Core Spray Logic Functional Test (Routine);
and
- QCOS 1400-09: Core Spray Pressure Isolation Valve Seat Leakage Test
(In-service Test).
The inspectors observed in-plant activities and reviewed procedures and associated
records to determine the following:
- did preconditioning occur;
- the effects of the testing were adequately addressed by control room personnel or
engineers prior to the commencement of the testing;
- acceptance criteria were clearly stated, demonstrated operational readiness, and
were consistent with the system design basis;
- plant equipment calibration was correct, accurate, and properly documented;
- as-left setpoints were within required ranges; and the calibration frequency was in
accordance with TSs, the USAR, procedures, and applicable commitments;
- measuring and test equipment calibration was current;
- test equipment was used within the required range and accuracy; applicable
prerequisites described in the test procedures were satisfied;
- test frequencies met TS requirements to demonstrate operability and reliability;
tests were performed in accordance with the test procedures and other applicable
procedures; jumpers and lifted leads were controlled and restored where used;
- test data and results were accurate, complete, within limits, and valid;
- test equipment was removed after testing;
- where applicable for inservice testing activities, testing was performed in
accordance with the applicable version of Section XI, American Society of
Mechanical Engineers code, and reference values were consistent with the
system design basis;
- where applicable, test results not meeting acceptance criteria were addressed
with an adequate operability evaluation or the system or component was declared
- where applicable for safety-related instrument control surveillance tests, reference
setting data were accurately incorporated in the test procedure;
- where applicable, actual conditions encountering high resistance electrical
contacts were such that the intended safety function could still be accomplished;
- prior procedure changes had not provided an opportunity to identify problems
encountered during the performance of the surveillance or calibration test;
- equipment was returned to a position or status required to support the
performance of its safety functions; and
- all problems identified during the testing were appropriately documented and
dispositioned in the CAP.
15
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report. This inspection
constituted five routine surveillance testing samples, and one in-service test sample as
defined in IP 71111.22, Sections-02 and-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1EP2 Alert and Notification System Evaluation (71114.02)
.1 Alert and Notification System Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed documents and held discussions with Emergency
Preparedness (EP) staff regarding the operation, maintenance, and periodic testing
of the primary and backup Alert and Notification System (ANS) in the plume pathway
Emergency Planning Zone. The inspectors reviewed monthly trend reports and siren
test failure records from July 2015 to February 2017. Information gathered during
document reviews and interviews were used to determine whether the ANS equipment
was maintained and tested in accordance with Emergency Plan commitments and
procedures. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
This ANS evaluation inspection constituted one sample as defined in IP 71114.02-06.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1EP3 Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System (71114.03)
.1 Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed and discussed with plant EP management and staff the
Emergency Plan commitments and procedures that addressed the primary and alternate
methods of initiating an Emergency Response Organization (ERO) activation to augment
the on-shift staff as well as the provisions for maintaining the plants ERO team and
qualification lists. The inspectors reviewed reports and a sample of CAP records of
unannounced off-hour augmentation drills, which were conducted from July 2015 to
February 2017, to determine the adequacy of the drill critiques and associated corrective
actions. The inspectors also reviewed a sample of the training records of approximately
six ERO personnel, who were assigned to key and support positions, to determine the
status of their training as it related to their assigned ERO positions. Documents
reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
This ERO augmentation testing inspection constituted one sample as defined in
IP 71114.03-06.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
16
1EP5 Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness (71114.05)
.1 Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the nuclear oversight staffs April 2016 audit of the Quad Cities
Nuclear Power Stations Emergency Preparedness Program to determine that the
independent assessments met the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(t). The inspectors
reviewed samples of CAP records associated with the 2016 biennial exercise, as well as
various EP drills conducted in 2016, in order to determine whether the licensee fulfilled
drill commitments and to evaluate the licensees efforts to identify and resolve identified
issues. The inspectors reviewed a sample of EP items and corrective actions related to
the stations EP program, and activities to determine whether corrective actions were
completed in accordance with the sites CAP. Documents reviewed are listed in the
Attachment to this report.
This maintenance of EP inspection constituted one sample as defined in
IP 71114.05-06.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06)
.1 Emergency Preparedness Drill Observation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the conduct of a routine licensee emergency drill on
February 15, 2017, to identify any weaknesses and deficiencies in classification,
notification, and protective action recommendation development activities. The
inspectors observed emergency response operations in the technical support center and
operations support center to determine whether the event classification, notifications,
and protective action recommendations were performed in accordance with procedures.
The inspectors also attended the licensee drill critique to compare any
inspector-observed weakness with those identified by the licensee staff in order to
evaluate the critique and to verify whether the licensee staff was properly identifying
weaknesses and entering them into the corrective action program. As part of the
inspection, the inspectors reviewed the drill package and other documents listed in the
Attachment to this report.
This EP drill inspection constituted one sample as defined in IP 71114.06-06.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
17
2. RADIATION SAFETY
2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (71124.01)
.1 Radiological Hazard Assessment (02.02)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors assessed the licensees current and historic isotopic mix, including alpha
emitters and other hard-to-detect radionuclides. The inspectors evaluated whether
survey protocols were reasonable to identify the magnitude and extent of the radiological
hazards.
The inspectors determined if there have been changes to plant operations since the last
inspection that may have resulted in a significant new radiological hazard for onsite
individuals. The inspectors evaluated whether the licensee assessed the potential
impact of these changes and implemented periodic monitoring, as appropriate, to detect
and quantify the radiological hazard. The inspectors reviewed the last two radiological
surveys from selected plant areas and evaluated whether the thoroughness and
frequency of the surveys were appropriate for the given radiological hazard.
The inspectors conducted walkdowns of the facility, including radioactive waste
processing, storage, and handling areas to evaluate material conditions and performed
independent radiation measurements as needed to verify conditions were consistent
with documented radiation surveys.
The inspectors assessed the adequacy of pre-work surveys for select radiologically
risk-significant work activities.
The inspectors evaluated the radiological survey program to determine if hazards were
properly identified. The inspectors discussed procedures, equipment, and performance
of surveys with radiation protection staff and assessed whether technicians were
knowledgeable about when and how to survey areas for various types of radiological
hazards.
The inspectors reviewed work in potential airborne areas to assess whether air samples
were being taken appropriately for their intended purpose and reviewed various survey
records to assess whether the samples were collected and analyzed appropriately. The
inspectors also reviewed the licensees program for monitoring contamination which has
the potential to become airborne.
These inspection activities constituted one complete sample as defined in
IP 71124.01-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
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.2 Instructions to Workers (02.03)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed select radiation work permits used to access high radiation
areas and evaluated the specified work control instructions or control barriers. The
inspectors also assessed whether workers where made aware of the work instructions
and area dose rates.
The inspectors reviewed electronic alarming dosimeter dose and dose rate alarm
setpoint methodology. For selected electronic alarming dosimeter occurrences, the
inspectors assessed the workers response to the alarm, the licensees evaluation of the
alarm, and any follow-up investigations.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees methods for informing workers of changes in
plant operations or radiological conditions that could significantly impact their
occupational dose.
The inspectors reviewed the labeling of select containers of licensed radioactive material
that could cause unplanned or inadvertent exposure to workers.
These inspection activities constituted one complete sample as defined in
IP 71124.01-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.3 Contamination and Radioactive Material Control (02.04)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed locations where the licensee monitors material leaving the
radiologically controlled area and assessed the methods used for control, survey, and
release of material from these areas. As available, the inspectors observed health
physics personnel surveying and releasing material for unrestricted use.
The inspectors observed workers leaving the radiologically controlled area and assessed
their use of tool and personal contamination monitors and reviewed the licensees
criterial for use of the monitors.
The inspectors assessed whether instrumentation was used at its typical sensitivity
levels based on appropriate counting parameters or whether the licensee had
established a de facto release limit.
The inspectors selected several sealed sources from the licensees inventory records
and assessed whether the sources were accounted for and verified to be intact. The
inspectors also evaluated whether any transactions, since the last inspection, involving
nationally tracked sources were reported in accordance with 10 CFR 20.2207.
These inspection activities constituted one complete sample as defined in
IP 71124.01-05.
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b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.4 Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (02.05)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated ambient radiological conditions during tours of the facility.
The inspectors assessed whether the conditions were consistent with applicable posted
surveys, radiation work permits, and worker briefings.
The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of radiological controls, such as required
surveys, radiation protection job coverage, and contamination controls. The inspectors
evaluated the licensees use of electronic alarming dosimeters in high noise areas as
high radiation area monitoring devices.
The inspectors assessed whether radiation monitoring devices were placed on the
individuals body consistent with licensee procedures. The inspectors assessed whether
the dosimeter was placed in the location of highest expected dose or that the licensee
properly employed a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission approved method of
determining effective dose equivalent.
The inspectors reviewed the application of dosimetry to effectively monitor exposure to
personnel in work areas with significant dose rate gradients.
For select airborne area radiation work permits, the inspectors reviewed airborne
radioactivity controls and monitoring, the potential for significant airborne levels,
containment barrier integrity, and temporary filtered ventilation system operation.
The inspectors examined the licensees physical and programmatic controls for highly
activated or contaminated materials stored within pools and assessed whether
appropriate controls were in place to preclude inadvertent removal of these materials
from the pool.
These inspection activities constituted one complete sample as defined in
IP 71124.01-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.5 High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls (02.06)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed posting and physical controls for high radiation areas and very
high radiation areas to assess adequacy.
The inspectors conducted a selective inspection of posting and physical controls for high
radiation areas and very high radiation areas to assess conformance with performance
indicators.
20
The inspectors reviewed procedural changes to assess the adequacy of access controls
for high and very high radiation areas to determine whether procedural changes
substantially reduced the effectiveness and level of worker protection.
The inspectors assessed the controls the high radiation areas greater than 1 rem/hour
and areas with the potential to become high radiation areas greater than 1 rem/hour for
compliance with TS and procedures.
The inspectors assessed the controls for very high radiation areas and areas with the
potential to become very high radiation areas. The inspectors also assessed whether
individuals were unable to gain unauthorized access to these areas.
These inspection activities constituted one complete sample as defined in
IP 71124.01-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.6 Radiation Worker Performance and Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency (02.07)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed radiation worker performance and assessed their performance
with respect to radiation protection work requirements, the level of radiological hazards
present and radiation work permit controls.
The inspectors assessed worker awareness of electronic alarming dosimeter set points,
stay times or permissible dose for radiologically significant work as well as expected
response to alarms.
The inspectors observed radiation protection technician performance and assessed
whether the technicians were aware of the radiological conditions and radiation work
permit controls and whether their performance was consistent with training and
qualifications for the given radiological hazards.
The inspectors observed radiation protection technician performance of radiation
surveys and assessed the appropriateness of the instruments being used, including
calibration and source checks.
These inspection activities constituted one complete sample as defined in
IP 71124.01-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.7 Problem Identification and Resolution (02.08)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors assessed whether problems associated with radiological hazard
assessment and exposure controls were being identified at an appropriate threshold and
21
were properly addressed for resolution. For select problems, the inspectors assessed
the appropriateness of the corrective actions. The inspectors also assessed the
licensees program for reviewing and incorporating operating experience.
The inspectors reviewed select problems related to human performance errors and
assessed whether there was a similar cause and whether corrective actions taken
resolve the problems.
The inspectors reviewed select problems related to radiation protection technician error
and assessed whether there was a similar cause and whether corrective actions taken
resolve the problems.
These inspection activities constituted one complete sample as defined in
IP 71124.01-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
2RS2 Occupational As-Low-As-Reasonably-Achievable Planning and Controls (71124.02)
.1 Implementation of As-Low-As-Reasonably-Achievable and Radiological Work Controls
(02.04)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted observations of in-plant work activities and assessed whether
the licensee had effectively integrated the planned administrative, operational, and
engineering controls into the actual field work to maintain occupational exposure
As-Low-As-Reasonably-Achievable (ALARA). The inspectors observed pre-job briefings
and determined if the planned controls were discussed with workers. The inspectors
evaluated the placement and use of shielding, contamination controls, airborne controls,
radiation work permit controls and other engineering work controls against the ALARA
plans.
These inspection activities supplemented those documented in NRC Integrated
Inspection Report 05000254/2016002 and 05000265/2016002 and constituted a partial
sample as defined in IP 71124.02-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Radiation Worker Performance (02.05)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed radiation worker and radiation protection technician
performance during work activities being performed in radiation areas, airborne
radioactivity areas, or high radiation areas to assess whether workers demonstrated
the ALARA philosophy in practice and followed procedures. The inspectors observed
radiation worker performance to evaluate whether the training and skill level was
sufficient with respect to the radiological hazards and the work involved.
22
The inspectors interviewed individuals from selected work groups to assess their
knowledge and awareness of planned and/or implemented radiological and ALARA
work controls.
These inspection activities supplemented those documented in NRC Integrated
Inspection Report 05000254/2016002 and 05000265/2016002 and constituted a partial
complete sample as defined in IP 71124.02-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
2RS3 In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation (71124.03)
.1 Engineering Controls (02.02)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed procedural guidance for use of ventilation systems and
assessed whether the systems were used, to the extent practicable, during high-risk
activities to control airborne radioactivity and minimize the use of respiratory protection.
The inspectors assessed whether installed ventilation airflow capacity, flow path, and
filter/charcoal unit efficiencies for selected systems were consistent with maintaining
concentrations of airborne radioactivity in work areas below the concentrations of an
airborne area to the extent practicable. The inspectors also evaluated whether selected
temporary ventilation systems used to support work in contaminated areas were
consistent with licensee procedural guidance and ALARA.
These inspection activities supplemented those documented in NRC Integrated
Inspection Report 05000254/2016002 and 05000265/2016002 and constituted one
complete sample as defined in IP 71124.03-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Use of Respiratory Protection Devices (02.03)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed records of air testing for supplied-air devices and self-contained
breathing apparatus (SCBA) bottles to assess whether the air used met or exceeded
Grade D quality. The inspectors evaluated whether plant breathing air supply systems
satisfied the minimum pressure and airflow requirements for the devices.
The inspectors reviewed training curricula for use of respiratory protection devices to
assess whether individuals are adequately trained on donning, doffing, function checks,
and how to respond to a malfunction.
23
The inspectors observed the physical condition of respiratory protection devices ready
for issuance and reviewed records of routine inspection for selected devices. The
inspectors reviewed records of maintenance on the vital components for selected
devices and assessed whether onsite personnel assigned to repair vital components
received vendor-provided training.
These inspection activities supplemented those documented in NRC Integrated
Inspection Report 05000254/2016002 and 05000265/2016002 and constituted one
complete sample as defined in IP 71124.03-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.3 Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus for Emergency Use (02.04)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the status and surveillance records for select SCBAs. The
inspectors evaluated the licensees capability for refilling and transporting SCBA air
bottles to and from the control room and operations support center during emergency
conditions.
The inspectors assessed whether control room operators and other emergency
response and radiation protection personnel were trained and qualified in the use of
SCBAs and evaluated whether personnel assigned to refill bottles were trained and
qualified for that task.
The inspectors assessed whether appropriate mask sizes and types were available for
use. The inspectors evaluated whether on-shift operators had no facial hair that would
interfere with the sealing of the mask and that appropriate vision correction was
available.
The inspectors reviewed the past two years of maintenance records for selected
in service SCBA units used to support operator activities during accident conditions.
The inspectors assessed whether maintenance or repairs on an SCBA units vital
components were performed by an individual certified by the manufacturer of the device
to perform the work. The inspectors evaluated the onsite maintenance procedures
governing vital component work to determine whether there was any inconsistencies
with the SCBA manufacturers recommended practices. The inspectors evaluated
whether SCBA cylinders satisfied the hydrostatic testing required by the
U.S. Department of Transportation.
These inspection activities constituted one complete sample as defined in
IP 71124.03-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
24
.4 Problem Identification and Resolution (02.05)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors assessed whether problems associated with the control and mitigation of
in-plant airborne radioactivity were being identified by the licensee at an appropriate
threshold and were properly addressed for resolution. Additionally, the inspectors
evaluated the appropriateness of the corrective actions for selected problems involving
airborne radioactivity documented by the licensee.
These inspection activities constituted one complete sample as defined in
IP 71124.03-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment (71124.04)
.1 External Dosimetry (02.03)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the calibration of active dosimeters. The inspectors assessed
the bias of the active dosimeters compared to passive dosimeters and the correction
factor used. The inspectors also assessed the licensees program for comparing active
and passive dosimeter results, investigations for substantial differences, and recording
of dose. The inspectors assessed whether there were adverse trends for active
dosimeters.
These inspection activities supplemented those documented in NRC Integrated
Inspection Report 05000254/2016003 and 05000265/2016003 and constituted one
complete sample as defined in IP 71124.04-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Internal Dosimetry (02.04)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed procedures used to determine internal dose using in vitro
analysis to assess the adequacy of sample collection, determination of entry route and
assignment of dose.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's program for dose assessment based on air
sampling, as applicable, and calculations of derived air concentration. The inspectors
determined whether flow rates and collection times for air sampling equipment were
adequate to allow lower limits of detection to be obtained. The inspectors also reviewed
the adequacy of procedural guidance to assess internal dose if respiratory protection
was used.
25
These inspection supplemented those documented in NRC Integrated Inspection Report
05000254/2016003 and 05000265/2016003 and constituted one complete sample as
defined in IP 71124.04-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.3 Special Dosimetric Situations (02.05)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors assessed whether the licensee informs workers of the risks of radiation
exposure to the embryo/fetus, the regulatory aspects of declaring a pregnancy, and the
specific process to be used for declaring a pregnancy. The inspectors selected
individuals who had declared pregnancy during the current assessment period and
evaluated whether the monitoring program for declared pregnant workers was
technically adequate to assess the dose to the embryo/fetus. The inspectors assessed
results and/or monitoring controls for compliance with regulatory requirements.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's methodology for monitoring external dose in
nonuniform radiation fields or where large dose gradients exist. The inspectors
evaluated the licensee's criteria for determining when alternate monitoring was to
be implemented. The inspectors reviewed dose assessments performed using
multibadging to evaluate whether the assessment was performed consistently with
licensee procedures and dosimetric standards.
The inspectors evaluated the licensees methods for calculating shallow dose equivalent
from distributed skin contamination or discrete radioactive particles.
The inspectors evaluated the licensees program for neutron dosimetry, including
dosimeter types and/or survey instrumentation. The inspectors reviewed select neutron
exposure situations and assessed whether dosimetry and/or instrumentation was
appropriate for the expected neutron spectra, there was sufficient sensitivity, and
neutron dosimetry was properly calibrated. The inspectors also assessed whether
interference by gamma radiation had been accounted for in the calibration and whether
time and motion evaluations were representative of actual neutron exposure events.
For the special dosimetric situations reviewed in this section, the inspectors assessed
how the licensee assigned dose of record. This included an assessment of external and
internal monitoring results, supplementary information on individual exposures, and
radiation surveys and/or air monitoring results when dosimetry was based on these
techniques.
These inspection activities constituted one complete sample as defined in
IP 71124.04-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
26
.4 Problem Identification and Resolution (02.06)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors assessed whether problems associated with occupational dose
assessment were being identified by the licensee at an appropriate threshold and were
properly addressed for resolution. The inspectors assessed the appropriateness of the
corrective actions for a selected sample of problems documented by the licensee
involving occupational dose assessment.
These inspection constituted one complete sample as defined in IP 71124.04-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency
Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, and
Security
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)
.1 Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical
Hours performance indicator (PI) for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2,
for the period from the first quarter 2016 through the fourth quarter 2016. To determine
the accuracy of the PI data reported during those periods, PI definitions and guidance
contained in the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Document 99-02, Regulatory
Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, dated August 31, 2013, were
used. The inspectors reviewed the licensees operator narrative logs, IRs, event reports,
and NRC integrated inspection reports for the period of January 1, 2016, through
December 31, 2016, to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors also
reviewed the licensees IR database to determine if any problems had been identified
with the PI data collected or transmitted for this indicator, and none were identified.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
This inspection constituted two unplanned scrams per 7000 critical hours samples as
defined in IP 71151-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
27
.2 Unplanned Scrams with Complications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Unplanned Scrams with
Complications PI for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2, for the period
from the first quarter 2016 through the fourth quarter 2016. To determine the accuracy of
the PI data reported during those periods, PI definitions and guidance contained in the
NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline,
Revision 7, dated August 31, 2013, were used. The inspectors reviewed the licensees
operator narrative logs, IRs, event reports, and NRC integrated inspection reports for the
period of January 1, 2016 through December 31, 2016, to validate the accuracy of the
submittals. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees IR database to determine if any
problems had been identified with the PI data collected or transmitted for this indicator,
and none were identified. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this
report.
This inspection constituted two unplanned scrams with complications samples as
defined in IP 71151-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.3 Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Unplanned Transients per
7000 Critical Hours PI for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2, for the
period from the first quarter 2016 through the fourth quarter 2016. To determine the
accuracy of the PI data reported during those periods, PI definitions and guidance
contained in the NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator
Guideline, Revision 7, dated August 31, 2013, were used. The inspectors reviewed the
licensees operator narrative logs, IRs, maintenance rule records, event reports, and
NRC integrated inspection reports for the period of January 1, 2016 through
December 31, 2016 to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors also
reviewed the licensees issue report database to determine if any problems had been
identified with the PI data collected or transmitted for this indicator, and none were
identified. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
This inspection constituted two unplanned transients per 7000 critical hours samples as
defined in IP 71151-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
28
.4 Drill and Exercise Performance
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Drill and Exercise
Performance (DEP) Indicator for the fourth quarter 2016. To determine the accuracy
of the PI data reported during that period, PI definitions and guidance contained in the
NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment PI Guideline, Revision 7, were used.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees records associated with the PI to verify that the
licensee accurately reported the DEP indicator, in accordance with relevant procedures
and NEI guidance. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed licensee records and
processes, including procedural guidance on assessing opportunities for the PI;
assessments of PI opportunities during pre-designated control room simulator training
sessions; performance during the 2016 biennial exercise; and performance during other
drills. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
This inspection constitutes one DEP sample as defined in IP 71151-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.5 Emergency Response Organization Drill Participation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the ERO Drill Participation PI for the
fourth quarter of 2016. To determine the accuracy of the PI data reported during that
period, PI definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory
Assessment PI Guideline, Revision 7, were used. The inspectors reviewed the
licensees records associated with the PI to verify that the licensee accurately reported
the indicator, in accordance with relevant procedures and NEI guidance. Specifically,
the inspectors reviewed licensee records and processes, including procedural guidance
on assessing opportunities for the PI; participation during the 2016 biennial exercise and
other drills; and revisions of the roster of personnel assigned to key ERO positions.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
This inspection constitutes one ERO drill participation sample as defined in
IP 71151-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.6 Alert and Notification System Reliability
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the ANS PI for the fourth quarter
of 2016. To determine the accuracy of the PI data reported during that period, PI
definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment
PI Guideline, Revision 7, were used. The inspectors reviewed the licensees records
associated with the PI to verify that the licensee accurately reported the indicator, in
29
accordance with relevant procedures and NEI guidance. Specifically, the inspectors
reviewed licensee records and processes, including procedural guidance on
assessing opportunities for the PI and results of periodic ANS operability tests.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
This inspection constitutes one ANS sample as defined in IP 71151-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152)
.1 Routine Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program
a. Inspection Scope
As discussed in previous sections of this report, the inspectors routinely reviewed issues
during baseline inspection activities and plant status reviews to verify they were being
entered into the licensees CAP at an appropriate threshold, adequate attention was
being given to timely corrective actions, and adverse trends were identified and
addressed. Some minor issues were entered into the licensees CAP as a result of the
inspectors observations; however, they are not discussed in this report.
These routine reviews for the identification and resolution of problems did not constitute
any additional inspection samples. Instead, by procedure they were considered an
integral part of the inspections performed during the quarter.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors selected the following issues and condition reports for in-depth review:
- IR 3967424, Unit 1C RHRSW Pump Abnormal Indications;
- Aggregate review of operator burdens; and
- IR 3985153, Core Spray Keep Fill Valve 1-1402-64B, Stuck.
As appropriate, the inspectors verified the following attributes during their review of the
licensee's corrective actions for the above condition reports and other related condition
reports:
- complete and accurate identification of the problem in a timely manner
commensurate with its safety significance and ease of discovery;
- consideration of the extent of condition, generic implications, common cause, and
previous occurrences;
- evaluation and disposition of operability/functionality/reportability issues;
30
- classification and prioritization of the resolution of the problem commensurate with
safety significance;
- identification of the root and contributing causes of the problem; and
- identification of corrective actions, which were appropriately focused to correct the
problem;
- completion of corrective actions in a timely manner commensurate with the safety
significance of the issue;
- effectiveness of corrective actions taken to preclude repetition;
- evaluate applicability for operating experience and communicate applicable
lessons learned to appropriate organizations.
The inspectors discussed the corrective actions and associated evaluations with
licensee personnel.
This review constituted three in-depth problem identification and resolution inspection
samples as defined in IP 71152.
b. Findings
(1) Failure to Ensure Hardware Secure for Breaker Mechanism Operated Contact Switch
Linkage
Introduction: A finding of very low safety significance and an associated NCV of
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, was self-revealed on January 27, 2017, when the
Unit 1C RHRSW pump was started for a routine surveillance evolution and all expected
annunciators and equipment failed to operate properly. This led to the licensee
declaring the Unit 1C RHRSW pump inoperable. Specifically, the licensee failed to
establish a procedure for the mechanism operated contact (MOC) switch linkage arm
that was appropriate to the circumstances (i.e. ensure the component would continue to
perform its function).
Description: On January 27, 2017, the licensee started the Unit 1C RHRSW pump to
support a RHR pump surveillance. Upon starting the pump, the control room received
an RHRSW pump trip alarm. Equipment operators in the field reported that the 1C
RHRSW pump was running; however, room cooler fans for the pump were not operating
and the breaker light indication for the pump at Bus 14 was not lit. The licensee then
verified the breakers for the pump room cooler fans were closed. Consequently, the
licensee secured the RHR and RHRSW pumps, declared the Unit 1C RHRSW pump
inoperable, and began troubleshooting the issue.
The licensees troubleshooting revealed that the linkage for the Unit 1C RHRSW pump
breaker MOC switch had become disconnected. This prevented the MOC switch, which
controls other component functions (e.g. alarms and room cooler fan operation) through
the use of auxiliary contacts, from functioning as expected.
The licensees equipment CAP evaluation identified that the licensees procedure for
periodic inspection of the breaker cubicle lacked specific guidance to ensure the MOC
switch linkage assembly hardware was adequately fastened. Specifically, the licensees
procedures for performing maintenance and inspections of 4 kilo-volt (kV) breakers
lacked appropriate acceptance criteria or instructions that would ensure the linkage arm
for the MOC switch would not come loose during repeated breaker cycling. The
31
procedure, QCEPM 0200-11, Inspection and Maintenance of Horizontal 4kV Cubicles,
Section 4.5.9.1, directed the user to Verify MOC switch linkage hardware is in place and
tight. The procedure did not specify a method for ensuring the hardware was tight. The
licensee implemented corrective actions to establish appropriate instructions (i.e.
mechanically verify tightness by using a tool, etc.) to ensure the MOC switch linkage
would remain properly secured.
Analysis: The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to establish a procedure
for the MOC switch linkage arm that was appropriate to the circumstances (i.e. ensure
the component would continue to perform its function) was contrary to 10 CFR 50,
Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, and was a
performance deficiency.
The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because the finding
was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of equipment
performance and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability,
reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent
undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to ensure the MOC switch linkage
arm was adequately fastened led to the failure of the component and its associated
1C RHRSW pump during breaker operation on January 27, 2017.
Using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of
Findings, and IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for
Findings at Power, issued June 19, 2012, the finding was screened against the
Mitigating Systems cornerstone and determined to be of very low safety significance
(Green), because the inspectors answered No to all of the questions in Exhibit 2,
Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, Section A, Mitigating SSCs and
Functionality.
The inspectors determined this finding affected the cross-cutting area of human
performance, in the aspect of avoid complacency, which states, Individuals recognize
and plan for the possibility of mistakes, latent issues, and inherent risk, even while
expecting successful outcomes. Specifically, the licensee failed to recognize a potential
risk and inherent latent issue for a condition identified in 2015 at Quad Cities, when a
MOC switch failed to perform its function due to a missing nut in a different breakers
linkage assembly. The licensee identified and corrected the condition, but failed to
evaluate the cause of the missing nut because it did not impact the operability of the
component. In the 2015 instance, the MOC switch issue only affected indications for the
component and had no adverse impact on the ability of the component to perform its
function [H.12].
Enforcement: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures,
and Drawings, requires, in part, that activities affecting quality be prescribed by
documented procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances and be
accomplished in accordance with these procedures. The licensee established
QCEPM 0200-11, Inspection and Maintenance of Horizontal 4kV Cubicles,
Revision 37, as the implementing procedure for performing inspections and maintenance
on 4kV safety-related breaker cubicles, an activity affecting quality.
Contrary to the above, prior to January 27, 2017, licensee procedure QCEPM 0200-11
failed to be of a type appropriate to the circumstances. Specifically, procedure
32
QCEPM 0200-11 did not contain instruction to ensure that the MOC switch linkage
arm was adequately fastened and would continue to perform its function. On
January 27, 2017, during operation of the 1C RHRSW pump breaker, the MOC switch
linkage arm became disconnected, preventing the MOC switch from performing its
function, and led the licensee to declare the 1C RHRSW pump inoperable.
The licensees corrective actions included reconnecting the MOC switch linkage arm
assembly and testing it by starting the 1C RHRSW pump prior to declaring the pump
operable. In addition, the licensee planned procedure revisions to QCEPM 0200-11 that
would specify a torque value to ensure the MOC switch linkage arm was adequately
secured and could perform its function. Because the violation was of very low safety
significance and was entered into the licensees CAP as IR 3967424, this violation is
being treated as a NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
(NCV 05000254/2017001-01; 05000265/2017001-01; Failure to Ensure Hardware
Secure for Breaker MOC Switch Linkage)
4OA3 Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153)
.1 Unit 2 Alert Declared Following a Fire that Caused Damage to E Automatic
Depressurization System Indication and Control Circuitry
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the plants response to a small fire in the Unit 2 control room
panel that caused damage to the E automatic depressurization system (ADS)
electromatic relief valve (ERV) indication and control circuitry.
At approximately 7:29 p.m. on February 1, 2017, a reactor operator was changing the
closed-light indication light bulb on Unit 2 E ADS valve, 2-0203-3E. After inserting the
new bulb with a bulb tool (a rubber sleeve that holds the small bulb), the operator
noticed sparking, and attempted to remove the bulb. When he removed the light, the
bulb had separated from the base, leaving the base in the light socket. The reactor
operator noticed arcing continued and went to the back of the control panel and
identified a flame in the underside of the panel. Another operator in the control room
retrieved a fire extinguisher and discharged a short burst to extinguish the flame, the
flame was out at 7:32 p.m. No equipment operated and no annunciators were received.
The Unit 2 supervisor declared the E ADS valve inoperable and the licensee entered
Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) 3.4.3, RCS Safety and Relief Valves,
Condition A, for one relief valve inoperable and LCO 3.5.1, ECCS [Emergency Core
Cooling Systems]Operating, Condition H, for one ADS valve inoperable. The
licensee subsequently declared an ALERT at 7:38 p.m. for Emergency Action
Level MA5, Hazardous event affecting a SAFETY SYSTEM required for the current
operating mode. Specifically, the Emergency Action Level conditions present were: a
FIRE AND the event caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to a SAFETY SYSTEM component or
structure required by TS for the current operating mode.
Following visual inspections of the control panel and verifications that there were no
other equipment issues impacting plant operations, the licensee terminated from the
event at 11:36 p.m on February 1, 2017.
33
Licensee corrective actions included replacing the light sockets and wiring for the open
and closed indications for the E ADS valve, in addition to replacing the fuses for both
the normal and alternate power supplies for the control circuitry. The licensee declared
the E ADS valve operable on February 2, 2017. Both units remained at full power
throughout the event.
The licensee entered this issue into their CAP as IR 3969324, Light Socket for 2-203-3E
Damaged during Bulb Change, and their root cause evaluation was in-progress at the
end of this inspection period. This event follow-up review, including inspection of the
licensees evaluation of the event and planned corrective actions was in-progress at the
end of this inspection period and continued into the next inspection period.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
This event follow-up review constituted a partial sample and continued into the next
inspection period.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 05000254/2017-001-00: Secondary Containment
Interlock Doors Opened Simultaneously
On January 24, 2017, the licensee identified that both doors in the secondary
containment interlock on the 595 elevation between the reactor building and the Unit 2
reactor feed pump room were opened simultaneously for approximately 3 seconds. This
resulted in the licensee making an unplanned entry into LCO 3.6.4.1, Condition A, for an
inoperable secondary containment. The licensee immediately closed the interlock doors
to reestablish secondary containment and administratively controlled personnel entry
and egress through the doors thereafter. The inspectors determined this issue was
minor because secondary containment pressure remained negative throughout the
condition, although the event resulted in an unplanned entry into the licensees TS. The
cause of the event was a dirty contact that caused the interlock relay to stick. Corrective
actions taken by the licensee included inspecting and cleaning of the interlock relay
contacts.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee event report (LER). No findings or violations of
NRC requirements were identified. This LER is closed.
This event follow-up review constituted one sample as defined in IP 71153-05.
4OA5 Other Activities
.1 (Closed) NRC Temporary Instruction 2515/192, Inspection of the Licensees Interim
Compensatory Measures Associated with the Open Phase Condition Design
Vulnerabilities in Electric Power Systems
a. Inspection Scope
The objective of this performance based Temporary Instruction is to verify
implementation of interim compensatory measures associated with an open phase
34
condition (OPC) design vulnerability in electric power system for operating reactors. The
inspectors conducted an inspection to determine if the licensee had implemented the
following interim compensatory measures. These compensatory measures are to
remain in place until permanent automatic detection and protection schemes are
installed and declared operable for OPC design vulnerability. The inspectors verified the
following:
- The licensee had identified and discussed with plant staff the lessons-learned
from the OPC events at the US operating plants, including the Byron station OPC
event and its consequences. This included conducting operator training for
promptly diagnosing, recognizing consequences, and responding to an OPC
event.
- The licensee had updated plant operating procedures to help operators promptly
diagnose and respond to OPC events on off-site power sources credited for safe
shutdown of the plant.
- The licensee had established and continues to implement periodic walkdown
activities to inspect switchyard equipment such as insulators, disconnect
switches, and transmission line and transformer connections associated with the
offsite power circuits to detect a visible OPC.
- The licensee had ensured that routine maintenance and testing activities on
switchyard components have been implemented and maintained. As a part of
the maintenance and testing activities, the licensee assessed and managed plant
risk in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) requirements.
a. Findings and Observations
No findings of significance were identified. The inspectors verified the criteria were met.
.2 (Closed) Unresolved Item 05000254/2013003-02; 05000265/2013003-02: Question
Concerning Licensing Bases of the Ultimate Heat Sink
a. Inspection Scope
During the 2013 Triennial Heat Sink Inspection, the inspectors identified an unresolved
item (URI) concerning the current licensing bases with respect to failure of Lock and
Dam No. 14 on the Mississippi River. Specifically, the inspectors were concerned that
the licensee had revised its licensing basis as a result of a 1998 UFSAR change without
NRC approval. The licensees historical documents stated the loss of river event was
from a loss of Dam No. 14, whereas the current UFSAR discusses the loss of river event
as damage to the lock. However, there was no discussion in the historical documents as
to what caused Dam No. 14 failure or the extent of the failure. Although both causes
result in the river being disconnected from the plant, there would be a significant time
difference as to how long it would be before the river was no longer available to cool
plant equipment and the amount of time available for the plant staff to identify and take
appropriate actions to address the failure at the dam.
The licensee revised the UFSAR to clarify the loss of river event based on the Ashton
Study, Study of Mississippi River Water Stage at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Plant,
dated April 24, 1998, which was performed to resolve a previous NRC URI with the loss
of dam event. This issue concerned the effects of the ultimate heat sink (UHS)
temperature being above the design temperature limit for several plant components
35
cooled by the service water systems. This issue was documented in NRC Inspection
Report 05000254/1998201; 05000265/1998201 (ML9805180380) and subsequently
closed in NRC Inspection Report 05000254/1998019; 05000265/1998019
(ML9812290041). The closure of the 1998 URI was based on the results of the Ashton
study, which concluded that the most likely failure of the dam was a navigation event
that would result in the loss of the dam lock. The study concluded that it would take 48
hours for the river level to lower to the point it disconnected from the UHS. In addition,
the study concluded based on the assumed low seismic region where the dam was
located, a seismic event would not cause a failure of the dam, but result in the inability to
operate the dams rolling and miter gates. In addition, subsequent to the UFSAR
change, the NRC granted Quad Cities an amendment for an extended power uprate,
dated December 21, 2001. The Safety Evaluation Report associated with this
amendment (ML013540222) discussed the loss of dam event using the clarified UFSAR
wording of the lock failure as a basis for its approval.
Based on the review of historical records and discussions with the Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation, the inspectors did not identify a concern with the current licensing
basis with respect to the failure of Mississippi River Lock and Dam No. 14. As a result,
this URI is closed.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.3 (Closed) Unresolved Item 05000254/2013003-04; 05000265/2013003-04: Question
Concerning Availability of Dam Following a Seismic Event
a. Inspection Scope
During the 2013 Triennial Heat Sink Inspection, the inspectors identified a URI
concerning the assumed availability of Mississippi River Lock and Dam No.14 following
a design bases earthquake event. Discussion in the UFSAR implied the river was
considered available during a Design Basis Event (DBE) even though the downstream
dam was not designed or constructed to remain functional during the assumed DBE.
Although the site appeared to be within their licensing bases (assume availability of the
river during a DBE), the inspectors questioned whether this assumption considered
actual potential consequences, i.e., the need to assume a loss of dam during a seismic
event.
The NRC issued Order EA-12-049, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to
Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond Design-Basis External Events,
dated March 12, 2012, which is being addressed by licensees based on the guidance of
NEI 12-06, Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide. Per
Section 5 of the guidance document, the licensee was to address impact on the
availability of the UHS that relies on a non-seismically robust downstream dam to
contain water used as the source of water for the UHS. The licensee submitted their
response in a letter, Overall Integrated Plan in Response to March 12, 2012,
Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation
Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049),
dated February 28, 2013. The NRC reviewed the licensee plan and issued Quad Cities
Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2Interim Staff Evaluation Relating to Overall
36
Integrated Plan in Response to Order EA-12-049 (Mitigation Strategies), dated
November 22, 2013. The evaluation stated the integrated plan to address the order did
not provide sufficient information to evaluate conformance with NEI 12-06,
Consideration 3. As a result, the NRC established Open Item 3.1.1.2.B for licensees to
assess a postulated downstream dam failure from a seismic event. In a letter, Fifth
Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying
Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond Design-Basis
External Events (Order Number EA-12-049), dated August 28, 2015, the licensee
documented its proposed actions to address this scenario from a FLEX standpoint. This
included designing and installing a single deep well as a seismically qualified source of
water for the FLEX mitigation strategy. This single deep well would be fully capable of
supplying both Unit 1 and Unit 2 FLEX requirements simultaneously. The alternate
approach discussed in the letter consisted of a FLEX pump and portable submersible
pump that would take suction from the discharge canal. The discharge canal would
supply the necessary backup water supply. Although the discharge canal has not been
seismically evaluated, there is reasonable assurance that this water supply will remain
available as a source of water following a seismic event effecting the downstream dam
due to the size of the two diffuser pipes which connect to the main channel of the
These actions will be reviewed by the NRC in a safety evaluation to assess the
licensees response to the order. Since this URI is being addressed by NRC Order
EA-12-049, this URI is closed.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA6 Management Meetings
.1 Exit Meeting Summary
On April 11, 2017, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. S. Darin, and
other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented.
The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was
considered proprietary.
.2 Interim Exit Meetings
Interim exits were conducted for:
- The results of the ultimate heat sink URI inspection was conducted by phone with
Mr. T. Petersen, Regulatory Assurance Lead, on February 27, 2017.
- The results of the Emergency Preparedness Program inspection were presented
to Mr. K. Ohr, Plant Manager, on March 9, 2017.
- The results of the Radiation Safety Program review were presented to
Mr. S. Darin, Site Vice President, on March 31, 2017.
- The results of the ISI inspection were presented to Mr. S. Darin, Site Vice
President, and other members of the licensee staff on March 31, 2017.
37
The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was
considered proprietary. Proprietary material received during the inspection was returned
to the licensee.
ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
38
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee
S. Darin, Site Vice President
W. Beck, Regulatory Assurance Manager
J. Bries, Operations Support and Services Senior Manager
J. Colgan, Chemistry Supervisor
D. Collins, Radiation Protection Manager
R. Craddick, Performance Improvement Manager
H. Dodd, Operations Director
G. Harris, Fleet Assessment
R. Hight, Maintenance Director
D. Luebbe, Work Control Manager
T. Petersen, Regulatory Assurance Lead
R. Sieprawski, Training Support Manager
T. Wojcik, Engineering Manager
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
K. Stoedter, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 1
R. Murray, Senior Resident Inspector
K. Carrington, Resident Inspector
Illinois Emergency Management Agency
C. Mathews, IEMA
C. Settles, IEMA
Attachment
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
05000254/2017001-01; NCV Failure to Ensure Hardware Secure for Breaker MOC
05000265/2017001-01 Switch Linkage (Section 4OA2.3)
Closed
05000254/2017001-01; NCV Failure to Ensure Hardware Secure for Breaker MOC
05000265/2017001-01 Switch Linkage (Section 4OA2.3)05000254/2017001-00 LER Secondary Containment Interlock Doors Opened
Simultaneously (Section 4OA3.2)
2515/192 TI Inspection of the Licensee Interim Compensatory
Measures Associated with the Open Phase Condition
Design Vulnerabilities in Electric Power Systems
(Section 4OA5.1)05000254/2013003-02; URI Question Concerning Licensing Bases of the Ultimate
05000265/2013003-02 Heat Sink (Section 4OA5.2)05000254/2013003-04; URI Question Concerning Availability of Dam Following a
05000264/2013003-04 Seismic Event (Section 4OA5.3)
Discussed
None.
2
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
The following is a partial list of documents reviewed during the inspection. Inclusion on this list
does not imply that the NRC inspector reviewed the documents in their entirety, but rather that
selected sections or portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection
effort. Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or
any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report.
Section Document Description or Title Revision or
Number Number Date
Section 1R01
1R01 WC-A-107: Seasonal ReadinessRevision 18
Summary of Changes
1R01 2016 Site Winter Readiness Challenge Meeting
1R01 SVP 16-072 2016-2017 Quad Cities Certification Letter for 11/18/2016
Winter Readiness
1R01 WC-AA-107 Seasonal Readiness 17
Section 1R04
1R04 QCOP 6600-23 Unit 1 Diesel Generator Preparation for Standby 2
Operation
1R04 QCOP 6600-24 Unit 2 Diesel Generator Preparation for Standby 2
Operation
1R04 QOM 2-1300-01 RCIC Valves on Rack 2202-58 Checklist (RCIC 4
Room)
1R04 QOM 2-1300-02 Unit 2 RCIC Valve Checklist 11
1R04 GEK-9597 Chapter 27
1R04 QOM 2-6900-12 250 Vdc Reactor Building MCC 2B Breaker 7
Checklist
1R04 QCOS 1000-26 RHR Valve Position Verification 23
1R04 QCOP 1900-23 Unit 1 Fuel Pool Cooling System Startup and 13
Shutdown
Section 1R05
1R05 FZ 11.2.1 Quad Cites Generating Station Pre-Fire Plan: July 2009
Unit 1 RB 554-0 Elev. SW Corner Room1B
1R05 Fire Hazards Analysis Methodology and Revision 21
Assumptions
1R05 FZ 8.2.6.B Unit 1 Turbine Bldg, El. 595-0 L.P. Heater Bay October
2013
1R05 FZ 8.2.7.B Unit 1 Turbine Bldg. El. 615-6 LP Heater Bay October
(East)/D Heater Bay 2013
1R05 FZ 8.2.7.C Unit 1/2 Turbine Bldg Mezzanine Floor
Section 1R06
1R06 IR 2207744 Pan 125 1D RHRSW Vault Penetration LLRT 09/11/2014
Exceeds 50 SCFH
1R06 IR 2386350 High Leakage Rate on 2D RHRSW Vault 09/25/2014
1R06 IR 2386366 High Leakage Rate on 2D RHRSW Vault 09/25/2014
1R06 IR 2711786 Water in Cable Vaults 09/02/2016
3
1R06 IR 3943664 MK-504 1D RHRSW Vault Penetration Exceeds 11/21/2016
50 SCFH
1R06 IR 3953663 MK-478 1D RHRSW Vault Penetration Exceeds 11/21/2016
50 SCFH
1R06 IR 3974107 NRC ID: Corroded Piping Penetration 02/14/2017
1R06 IR 3974108 NRC ID: Mounting Plate Corroded 02/14/2017
1R06 IR 3974132 NRC ID: 2D RHR SW Pump Oil Bubbler Darker 02/14/2017
Than Others
1R06 IR 3974143 NRC ID: 1B/C RHRSW Vault Door Seal Worn 02/14/2017
1R06 Drawing FL-1 Flood Barriers Basement Floor D
1R06 QCOS 0100-01 Unit 1 RHR Service Water Vault Flood Seal 1
Leakage Testing
1R06 QCOS 0100-02 Unit 2 RHR Service Water Vault Flood Seal 1
Leakage Testing
1R06 QCTP 0130-14 Evaluation of RHRSW Vault Flood Protection
Leakage Test Results
1R06 QCTP 0130-14, 1A RHRSW VaultEvaluation for Condensate 08/07/2015
Attachment A Pump Room
1R06 QCTP 0130-14, 1B/C RHRSW VaultEvaluation for 06/06/2016
Attachment B Condensate Pump Room Flood
1R06 QCTP 0130-14, Evaluation of Flood Barriers Between 1A and 08/07/2015
Attachment D 1B/C RHRSW Vaults
1R06 QCOS 0100-01, 1D and 1B/C RHR Service Water Vault Wall 11/18/2016
Attachment E
1R06 QCOS 0100-01, 1D RHR Service Water Vault Condensate Pump 11/18/2016
Attachment C Room Wall
1R06 QCTP 0130-14, 2A RHRSW VaultEvaluation for Condensate 06/08/2016
Attachment F Pump Room Flood
1R06 QCOS 0100-02, 2B/C RHR Service Water Vault Condensate 09/24/2016
Attachment B Pump Room Wall
1R06 QCOS 0100-02, Evaluation of Flood Barriers Between 2A and 06/07/2016
Attachment I 2B/C RHRSW Vaults
1R06 QCOS 0100-02, 2D and 2B/C RHR Service Water Vault Wall 11/18/2016
Attachment E
1R06 QDC-0030-M- Determination of Allowable Leakage Rates for 12/01/1998
0772 RHRSW Vaults Flood Protection
Section 1R07
1R07 ER-AA-340- Service Water Heat Exchanger Inspection 6
1002 Guide
1R07 WO 1757717 Clean/Inspect Heat Exchanger Control Room 01/11/2017
1R07 EC 39054 Request Torque on End Caps for RCU 0-9400- 00
102
1R07 IR 3962368 B Control Room HVAC Inspection Results 01/12/2017
Section 1R08
1R08 IR 2464920 Indications Found during NDE on Reactor Head 03/07/2015
Vent Piping
1R08 IR 2465233 PSUIVVI New Indication on Core Spray Weld 03/08/2015
2P4D
4
1R08 IR 2465734 FME1 x 1/2 Diameter Round Stock Found in 03/09/2015
1R08 IR 2466464 FME Historical 3/8 Steel Flat Washer on Top of 03/10/2015
Tie Rod
1R08 IR 2267257 FME PSU Ball Bearing Case Found in RPV 03/12/2015
1R08 IR 2467669 PSU Q1R23 IVI Jet Pump 2 & 7 AD-3 Weld 03/12/2015
Indications
1R08 IR 2467887 Flange on Piping Is Damaged and Needs 03/13/2015
Repair
1R08 IR 2468353 FME Q1R23 Manual Core Spray Injection Tool 03/13/2016
Failure
1R08 IR 2545901 Unit 1 Shroud Weld IVVI Exams Not in 08/25/2015
Compliance with BRWVIP
1R08 IR 2682384 Foreign Material Identified in Spent Fuel Pool 06/16/2016
1R08 EC 400050 Evaluation of Q1R23 IVVI Inspection Findings 0
1R08 ER-AA-335-003 Magnetic Particle Examination 7
1R08 ER-AA-335-010 Guidelines for ASME Code Allowable Flaw 6
Evaluation and ASME Code Coverage
Calculations
1R08 ER-AA-335- VT-1 Visual Examination in Accordance with 0
014-2008 ASME 2007 Edition, 2008 Addenda
1R08 ER-AA-335-016 VT-3 Visual Examination of Component 10
Supports, Attachments and Interiors of Reactor
Vessels
1R08 ER-AA-335-018 Visual Examination of ASME IWE Class MC and 12
Metallic Liners of IWL Class CC Components
1R08 ER-AA-335- Code Acceptance & Recording Criteria for 4
1008 Nondestructive (NDE) Surface Examination
1R08 ER-AA-335-F- PDI Generic Procedure for the Ultrasonic 1
02 Examination of Ferritic Pipe Welds
1R08 GEH-PDI-UT-1 PDI Generic Procedure for the Ultrasonic 10
Examination of Ferritic Pipe Welds
1R08 NDE Report Elbow-Pipe Weld 30A-S11 03/30/2017
1R08 NDE Report Elbow-Pipe Weld 30B-S10 03/30/2017
1R08 NDE Report Guide with 8 Lugs Welded to Pipe 03/29/2017
1R08 NDE Report Variable Spring Can with 4 Lugs Welded to Pipe 03/29/2017
1R08 NDE Report Collar-Torus Shell 03/28/2017
1R08 NDE Report 17- General Visual Examination: ASME IWE (Class 04/10/2017
VT3-024 MC) Containment and IWL (Class CC) Metallic
Liners
1R08 NDE Report Flued Head Anchor 03/29/2017
1R08 NDE Report Box Guide 03/28/2017
5
1R08 NDE Report 4 Lugs Welded to Pipe 03/29/2017
1R08 NDE Report 2 Variable Spring Cans 03/29/2017
1R08 PQR 1-50C 01/03/1984
1R08 PQR A-001 10/19/1998
1R08 PQR A-002 03/09/1999
1R08 WO 1636433-01 MM Upgrade U1 Head Vent Line Socket Welds 03/12/2015
1R08 WO 1636433-07 MM ContingentRepair Indication(s) Found 03/11/2015
During PT Exams
1R08 WO 1877257-01 MM Re-route Piping as Required to Support 11/20/2015
New Motor Install
1R08 WPQ ID No. Record No. WPQ22427 11/12/2013
V9896
1R08 WPQ ID No. 50 Record No. WPQ12116 07/30/2003
1R08 WPQ ID No. Record No. WPQ14848 01/23/2007
N1206
1R08 WPQ ID No. Record No. WPQ22292 03/15/2012
T2733
1R08 WPQ ID No. Record No. WPQ21376 03/07/2012
T2733
1R08 WPS 1-1- 2
GTSM-PWHT
1R08 IR 3990603 NRC IdentifiedDocumentation Issue in Q1R23 03/28/2017
90-Day Report
1R08 IR 3991149 LL Q1R24NRC In-Office Preparation Week 03/29/2017
Document Request
1R08 IR 3991531 Q1R24 ISI Inspection: Issue with ECR 418116 03/30/2017
on Material Removed
1R08 IR 3991743 Q1R24 ISI Inspection: Observation on 03/30/2017
Procedure CC-AA-407
Section 1R11
1R11 QCGP 2-1 Normal Unit Shutdown 87
1R11 QCOP 1000-05 Shutdown Cooling Operation 53
1R11 Reactor Shutdown JITT March 2017
1R11 Reactor Start-up JITT March 2017
Section 1R12
1R12 Maintenance Rule Criteria Exceeded
Spreadsheet for DC 8300-01 and DC 8300-02
1R12 System Report Details (Units 1 and 2)125
Vdc
1R12 Unit 1, DC8300, System Health Report 01/01/2016-
03/31/2016
1R12 Unit 2, DC8300, System Health Report 01/01/2016-
03/31/2016
1R12 EACE 2736223 1A 125 Vdc Charger Ripple Voltage Step
Change During the 4 Hour Load Test
1R12 IR 1646354 901-8 A9 125 Vdc Battery Charger Trip Alarm. 04/11/2014
1A Charger On
6
1R12 IR 1653585 U1 125 Vdc Charger 1A Failed to Meet 125 Vdc 04/30/2014
& 200 Amps
1R12 IR 2732501 1A Charger Has a Step Change in AC Ripple 10/25/2016
Volts
1R12 IR 2736593 1A 125 Vdc Battery Would Not Load up to 200 11/03/2016
Amps
1R12 IR 2511446 Received Unexpected Alarm 901-8 A-7, Diesel 06/07/2015
Gen 1 Trouble
1R12 IR 2516072 NRC Question Posed on U-2 EDG Operability 06/17/2015
1R12 IR 2532957 U1 EDG Trouble Alarm Received 07/26/2015
1R12 IR 2591780 Unit 2 EDG Oil Pump Issue 11/24/2015
1R12 IR 2594097 IST Unfavorable Trend: U0 EDG Fuel Oil 12/01/2015
Transfer Pump Flow
1R12 IR 2646558 Spurious 1/2 EDG Engine High Temp Alarm After 03/28/2016
S/D
1R12 IR 2654576 Replace Engine Protective Relays on Unit 1/2 04/12/2016
1R12 IR 2655056 Replace Field Flash Cutout Relay on Unit 1 04/13/2016
1R12 IR 2655063 Replace Field Flash Cutout Relay on Unit 1/2 04/13/2016
1R12 IR 2713622 Re-Evaluate DGCW Operability/EDG HX Flow 09/08/2016
Rate Requirements
1R12 IR 3965676 Received Momentary 1/2 EDG High Temperature 01/23/2017
Section 1R13
1R13 Work Week 17-02-05 Safety Profile
1R13 Work Week 17-09-12 Safety Profile
1R13 OU-QC-104, Q1R24 Risk Factor ChartMode 4, 5 and 03/27-
Attachment 1 Defueled 03/31/2017
1R13 Q1R24 Shutdown Safety Report 03/26-
03/31-2017
Section 1R15
1R15 IR 3968961 QCOS 1000-29 Not Completed as Scheduled 02/01/2017
due to M&TE Issue
1R15 IR 469542 IM Shop Unaware of Inaccuracies Associated 03/22/2006
with Fluke 45 Use
1R15 OE 180293 Calibration Methods Result in Non-Linearity of 05/29/1999
Rosemount 1154H Transmitters
1R15 OE 11896 Test Instrument High Input Impedance Causes 05/25/2000
Non-Linearity In Transmitter Calibration at
Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 1
1R15 IR 3971856 1D RHRSW Trip Fuses Worked Out of Fuse 02/08/2017
Holder
1R15 IR 3967424 1C RHRSW Pump Abnormal Indications 01/27/2017
1R15 IR 3970782 Extent of Condition for IR 3967424 (Cubicle 1- 02/06/2017
6705-13-1-1)
1R15 IR 3969273 Extent of Condition for IR 3967424 (MOC 02/01/2017
Switch Hardware Insp)
7
1R15 IR 3970964 Extent of Condition for IR 3967424 (Cubicle 1- 02/06/2017
6703-13-1)
1R15 ECAP 3971856 1D RHRSW Trip Fuses Worked Out of Fuse 03/31/2017
Holder
Section 1R19
1R19 WO 1961658 RCIC Pump Operability (IST) 01/11/2017
1R19 QCEMS 0210- Battery Charger Testing for Safety Related 15
02 125 Vdc Batteries
1R19 WO 1846331 2-125 Battery Charger Terminal Board and 01/18/2017
1R19 QCOS 6600-06 Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump Flow 45
Rate Test
Section 1R20
1R20 QDC-0200-N- Q1R24 Decay Heat and Related Calculations 0
2257
1R20 QCGP 2-1 Normal Unit Shutdown 87
1R20 Q1R24 Shutdown Safety Plan 0
1R20 Q1R24 Raw Water Management Plan
1R20 QCOP 0201-13 Reactor Level Upper Wide Range Reference 10
Leg Extension Use and Control
1R20 QCOP 0201-14 Reactor Vessel Level Control Using a Local 11
Pressure Gauge
1R20 QCOP 1000-05 Shutdown Cooling Operation 53
1R20 QCOP 1000-44 Alternate Decay Heat Removal 24
1R20 QCOP 6100-33 Unit 1 Main Power Transformer Backfeed 8
Operation
1R20 QCTS 0600-05 Main Steam Isolation Valve Local Leak Rate 17
Test (AO-1(2)-203-1A/B/C/D, AO-1(2)-203-
2A/B/C/D)
1R20 IR 3989801 PSU Unit 1 SRM 23 Not Tracking 03/27/2017
1R20 IR 3990176 PSU Q1R24 NRC ID Oil Leak in U1 DW 03/27/2017
1R20 IR 3990198 PSU 1-0203-3D ERV Steady Stream of Water 03/27/2017
Leakage
1R20 IR 3990244 Q1R24 PSU MSIV 1-0203-1A LLRT Exceeded 03/27/2017
TS Limit
1R20 IR 3990246 Q1R24 PSUINBD MSIV 1-0203-1D 03/27/2017
Exceeded TS Limit
1R20 IR 3990247 PSU Q1R24 OUTBD MSIV 1-0203-2C 03/27/2017
Exceeded TS Limit
1R20 IR 3990255 PSU Q1R24: 1-0203-3D ERV Pilot Valve 03/28/2017
Leaking
1R20 IR 3990285 PSU Unexpected Rod Block from SDV High 03/28/2017
Level
1R20 IR 3990393 PSU Q1R24 1C RHR Pump Seal Cooler Piping 03/28/2017
Clogged
1R20 IR 3990758 PSU Q1R24 2C Outboard MSIV Found Outside 03/29/2017
of 9.8%
1R20 IR 3990885 PSU Q1R24 1-0220-105B Failed Outage PM 03/29/2016
Opening Force Check
8
1R20 IR 3991086 PSU Q1R24 1A MSIV PMT Leakage Exceeds 03/29/2017
TS Limit
1R20 SPOG: 1-3-C System Planning Operating Guide 11
Section 1R22
1R22 QCIS 1000-09 RHR Pump Discharge Pressure Calibration and 9
Functional Test
1R22 IR 3964960 PS 1-1053e Valve Had Slow Leakby 01/20/2017
1R22 QCOS 6600-37 Unit 1 EDG Largest Load Reject Surveillance 31
1R22 QCOS 6600-39 Unit 2 EDG Largest Load Reject Surveillance 29
1R22 QCOS 6600-44 Unit Diesel Generator Timed Start Test 22
1R22 IR 3950031 1/2 EDG Coolant Temperature Switch Alarmed 12/06/2016
Below Setpoint
1R22 IR 3949824 1/2 EDG Did Not Start During QCOP 6600-58 12/06/2016
Hot Fast Restart
1R22 IR 3943740 2nd LVL UV Relay 2-6706-1274-B241 11/21/2016
Contacts Found Degraded
1R22 QCOS 1000-43 Unit 2 A Loop Low Pressure Coolant Injection 26
(LPCI) and Containment Cooling Modes of
RHRs Non-Outage Logic Test
1R22 Drawing 4E- Schematic Diagram Core Spray Systems I and BD
1430 II
1R22 Drawing 4E- Schematic Diagram Core Spray Motor Operated Y
1431 Valves
1R22 Drawing 4E- Schematic Diagram Core Spray Motor Operated U
1432 Valves
1R22 QCOS 1400-16 Unit 1 Division II Core Spray Logic Functional 7
Test
1R22 QCOP 0201-18 Hydro Test Pump Operation 1
1R22 QCOS 1400-19 Core Spray Pressure Isolation Valve Seat 0
Leakage Test
Section 1EP2
1EP2 FEMA ANS Design Basis Report May 2013
1EP2 FEMA ANS Letter for Backup ANS 12/10/2012
1EP2 Siren Testing and Maintenance Data July 2015-
February
2017
1EP2 IR 2533243 EPSiren Failure (QC37) 07/27/2015
1EP2 IR 2534053 Potential Site Wide Trend in EP Facilities & 07/28/2015
Equipment
1EP2 IR 2543847 EPSiren Failure (QC37) 08/19/2017
1EP2 IR 2558312 EPSiren Failure (QC05) 09/21/2015
1EP2 IR 2565873 EPInvestigation of Siren Failures (QC37, 10/05/2015
QC39)
1EP2 IR 2581456 EPSiren Failure (QC05) 11/03/2015
1EP2 IR 2724917 EP1st Half 2016 MW ANS Siren Trend 10/06/2016
1EP2 IR 3983549 EPSiren Design Report Approval Letter Not 03/07/2017
Provided to NRC
9
Section 1EP3
1EP3 2015 Station Off-hours Drive-in Augmentation 09/30/2015
and Performance Indicator Drills Findings and
Observation Report
1EP3 First Quarter of 2016 ERO Augmentation Drill 03/02/2016
Report
1EP3 Fourth Quarter of 2015 ERO Augmentation Drill 12/05/2015
Report
1EP3 Fourth Quarter of 2016 ERO Augmentation Drill 10/20/2016
Report
1EP3 Second Quarter of 2016 ERO Augmentation 06/25/2016
Drill Report
1EP3 Selected Station Emergency Response
Personnel Training Records
1EP3 Third Quarter of 2016 ERO Augmentation Drill 09/23/2016
Report
1EP3 IR 2715584 MA/MW ERO Notification System Delayed 09/13/2016
Notifications
1EP3 IR 2716129 Everbridge Delay in ERO Notification For Call-In 09/13/2016
Drill
Section 1EP5
1EP5 EP-QC-1000 Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Radiological 0
1EP5 EP-AA-1006 Radiological Emergency Plan Annex For Quad 38
Cities Station
1EP5 EP-AA-1006, Emergency Action Levels For Quad Cities 2
Addendum 3 Station
1EP5 EP-AA-122 Drills and Exercise Program 18
1EP5 EP-AA-125 Emergency Preparedness Self Evaluation 10
Process
1EP5 NOSA-QDC- Emergency Preparedness Audit Report 04/20/2016
16-03
1EP5 Quad Cities Alert Event Report February 1, 03/01/2017
2017
1EP5 Pre-2017 NRC EP Routine/Program PI 01/17/2017
Verification Inspection
1EP5 Apparent Cause Investigation Report 901-54 12/09/2016
C1 Offgas Condenser Hi Level Unexpected
Alarm
1EP5 IR 3970216 Observations from the MCR During E-Plan 02/01/2017
Execution
1EP5 IR 3979009 QDC-EP-2017-MA5ALERT-TSC-OTHER 02/27/2017
Issues
1EP5 IR 3970213 ENS Line Communication Issue During E-Plan 02/01/2017
Execution
1EP5 IR 3970242 EP-REAL Event (QDC Alert)-EOF-FAILED 02/01/2017
Objective
1EP5 IR 3970210 Bridge Line Issue Identified During E-Plan 02/01/2017
Execution
10
1EP5 IR 3972155 EP-REAL EVENT (QDC ALERT)-EOF- 02/01/2017
FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT Issues
1EP5 IR 2655742 NOS ID: 5 of 13 Forms Were Not Initialed, 04/14/2016
Signed, or Checked
1EP5 IR 2733875 Potential Trend in EP Facilities & Equipment 10/28/2016
1EP5 IR 2742255 QC EP NRC Graded Exercise OSC 11/16/2016
Performance
1EP5 IR 2742262 QC EP NRC Graded Exercise TSC 11/16/2016
Performance
1EP5 IR 2742202 QC EP NRC Graded Exercise CR/SIM 11/16/2016
Performance
1EP5 IR 2737679 SJAE Rad Monitors Reading Low 11/05/2016
1EP5 IR 3949032 QDC-EP-2016-NRC-TSC-OTHER Issues 11/16/2016
1EP5 IR 3970920 Reinforce Expectations for EP Event Response 02/01/2017
1EP5 Most current review of Letters of Agreement
with: St. Joseph Medical Center, General
Electric, Rock Island County Sheriff, Cordova
Fire Protection District, Trinity Medical Center,
Silvis Campus Hospital
Section 1EP6
1EP6 1Q17 PI Drill 2017 1st Qtr PI DrillQuad Cities Generating 02/15/2017
Station
Section 2RS1
2RS1 IR 3964145-04 Check-In: NRC RPExposure Controls 02/26/2017
Inspection
2RS1 Quad Cities Radiation Protection; 2015 Alpha 12/29/2015
Assessment
2RS1 Quad Cities Radiation Protection; 2016 Alpha 12/27/2016
Assessment
2RS1 Radioactive Source Inventory 08/31/2016
2RS1 Radioactive Source Inventory 02/23/2017
2RS1 Semi-Annual Source Leak Test Report 08/31/2016
2RS1 Semi-Annual Source Leak Test Report 02/24/2017
2RS1 RP-AA-210 Dosimetry Issue, Usage, and Control 27
2RS1 RP-AA-300 Radiological Survey Program 14
2RS1 RP-QC-300- Radiological Survey Surveillance Program 11
1001
2RS1 RP-AA-301 Radiological Air Sampling Program 10
2RS1 RP-AA-302 Determination of Alpha Levels and Monitoring 8
2RS1 RP-AA-350- Response to Guardhouse Portal Monitor Alarms 2
1001
2RS1 RP-AA-460 Controls for High and Locked Radiation Areas 29
2RS1 RP-QC-460- High Radiation Area Inspections 7
1002
2RS1 RWP QC-01- Radiation Work Permit and Associated ALARA 1
17-00510 File; DW Main Steam Safety Relief Valve
Activities (Q1R24)
2RS1 RWP QC-01- Radiation Work Permit and Associated ALARA 0
17-00519 File; DW Insulation Activities (Q1R24)
11
2RS1 RWP QC-01- Radiation Work Permit and Associated ALARA 0
17-00541 File; DW I/B MSIV Over Haul (Q1R24)
2RS1 RWP QC-01- Radiation Work Permit and Associated ALARA 0
17-00901 File; FF Rx Disassembly/Reassembly Activities
(Q1R24)
Section 2RS2
2RS2 RP-AA-403 Administration of the Radiation Work Permit 9
Program
2RS2 RP-QC-552 Source Term External System/Component 1
Flushing
Section 2RS3
2RS3 RP-AA-440 Respiratory Protection Program 13
2RS3 RP-AA-825- Operation of the MSA Optimair MM 2K Mask 2
1033 Mounted Air Purifying Respirator
2RS3 RP-QC-835 Operation, Inspection, and Use of the MSA 4
Firehawk M7XT Air Mask Self-Contained
Breathing Apparatus
2RS3 RP-AA-825- Operation and Inspection of the 3M Versaflo 3
1014 TR-300 PAPR System
2RS3 RP-AA-825- Operation and Use of Air Line Supplied 1
1020 Respirators
2RS3 RP-AA-441 Evaluation and Selection Process for 6
Radiological Respirator Use
2RS3 RP-AA-440, Review of Contractor Respiratory Protection 03/21/2017
Attachment 2 Program
2RS3 RP-QC-835, Flow Testing and Overhauls Various
Attachment 7 Dates
2RS3 RP-QC-835, MSA Firehawk M7XT Air Mask Inspection Various
Attachment 3 Dates
2RS3 Generic Respiratory Protection Classroom 08/22/2016
Training
2RS3 Respiratory Protection Training Level I January
2013
2RS3 Respiratory Protection Training Level II 01/16/2016
2RS3 Respiratory Protection Qualification Reports Various
Dates
2RS3 Quarterly Service Air and Self Contained 03/24/2017
Breathing Apparatus
2RS3 IR 3990963 MRC SCBA Manifold Fitting Size Incorrect 03/29/2017
Section 2RS4
2RS4 RP-AA-203- Personnel Exposure Investigations 9
1001
2RS4 RP-AA-220 Bioassay Program 12
2RS4 RP-AA-210 Dosimetry Issue, Usage, and Control 27
2RS4 RP-AA-203- Personnel Exposure Investigation Various
1001, Dates
Attachment 1
2RS4 RP-AA-214, Area Dosimetry Worksheet Various
Attachment 2 Dates
12
2RS4 IR 3982939 Correct Dose in Sentinel, but not Printing on 03/07/2017
Form 4
Section 4OA1
4OA1 Explanation for Performance Indicator P.8.1.2 January-
December
2016
4OA1 Operator Narrative Logs January-
December
2016
4OA1 NRC Performance Indicator Data, Emergency October-
PreparednessDrill/Exercise Performance December
2016
4OA1 NRC Performance Indicator Data, Emergency October-
PreparednessERO Readiness December
2016
4OA1 NRC Performance Indicator Data, Emergency October-
PreparednessAlert and Notification System December
Reliability 2016
Section 4OA2
4OA2 IR 3959913 CO2 Released into Turbine Building 01/05/2017
4OA2 IR 3964028 A AFU [Air Filtration Unit] Fan Failed to Start 01/18/2017
4OA2 IR 3965646 NRC ID: Pipe Unsupported Feed Pump Suction 01/23/2017
Press A
4OA2 EACE 3956145 Feedwater Heater Trip and Emergency Power 02/13/2017
Reduction
4OA2 IR 3977123 Unit 1 Essential Service Inverter Input Breaker 02/22/2017
Trip
4OA2 IR 3981113 Received 902-5 H6 Alarm 03/03/2017
4OA2 IR 3979804 U2 Turbine Oil Reservoir Level Rising 02/28/2017
4OA2 IR 3980721 2A Turbine Oil Cooler Tube Leak Identified 03/02/2017
4OA2 IR 3981972 2B ASD Backup PLC Failure 03/06/2017
4OA2 IR 3981671 Received 901-7 B5 and DEHC S1-P312 03/05/2017
4OA2 ECAP 3967424 1C RHRSW Pump Abnormal Indications 03/20/2017
4OA2 Drawing M-36 Diagram of Core Spray Piping BI
4OA2 IR 3985153 Core Spray Keep Fill Check Valve 1-1402-64B,
Stuck
4OA2 IR 3983951 2-8802-A Valve Failed to Open During Return 03/10/2017
to Service
4OA2 IR 3984062 1B RPS MG Generator Voltage Out of Spec 03/10/2017
4OA2 IR 3984303 RPS B 1/2 ScramSDV High Level (Blown 03/12/2017
Safety Related Fuse)
4OA2 IR 3983620 1B RPS EPAs Tripped Following MG Set Start 03/09/2017
4OA2 IR 3984044 2A Turbine Oil Cooler Tube Leak Still Leaking 03/10/2017
4OA2 IR 3981835 U1 SDV Drain Valves Failed to Open During 03/06/2017
Surveillance
4OA2 IR 3990038 PSU MSIV As Found Closure Timing Out of 03/27/2017
Band
4OA2 IR 3990217 Received 902-5 H-6, SBLC Squib Valve Circuit 03/27/2017
AlarmA Squib
13
4OA2 First Quarter 2017 Operator Burdens List for
Units 1 and 2
4OA2 IR 3991293 IEMA Identified, Scaffold in Contact with 1B 03/30/2017
RHR Room Cooler
4OA2 IR 3983983 1A RFP FME Impeller Pieces Found Missing 03/10/2017
During Maintenance
4OA2 EC 618850 Lost Parts Evaluation Per ER-AA-2008 for the 0
Lost Parts Missing from 1A Reactor Feed Pump
1-3201-A Prior to Q1R24 During Maintenance
Under WO 1842789
4OA2 CY-QC-170- Quad Cities Offsite Dose Calculation Manual January
301 (ODCM ) 2013
4OA2 CY-QC-120- Main Chimney & Reactor Vent Noble Gas 04/15/2016
735, Release RateNoble Gas Release Rates
Attachment 1
4OA2 GEK-27808A Calculation of Alarm and Trip Setpoints for the
Reactor Building Vent Stack Noble Gas Monitor
Section 4OA3
4OA3 Drawing 4E- Internal Schematic and Device Location N
1654C Diagram 4160V Switchgear Bus 14 Cubicles
1,3,7,8,10, 12 and 14
4OA3 EN 52527 Fire in Unit 2 MCR Panel 902-3 02/01/2017
4OA3 IR 3969324 Light Socket for 2-203-3E Damaged During 02/01/2017
Bulb Change
4OA3 IR 3971265 Remove Fuse and Send to Power LabsRoot 02/07/2017
Cause 3969324
4OA3 IR 3971834 Safety Related Fuse Replacement in 2-2202- 02/08/2017
32 Panel
4OA3 OP-AA-101- Human Performance Issue Verbal Report 36
113-1004 Format
Section 4OA5
4OA5 IR 3952808 Check-in Self-Assessment: Interim 01/31/2017
Compensatory Measures Associated with the
Open Phase Condition Design Vulnerabilities in
Electric Power Systems
4OA5 LN 6500 4KV/480V Distribution 27
4OA5 Standing Order Single Open Phase Detection 03/16/2012
S12-06
4OA5 STN 12-021 Switchyard VulnerabilitySingle Open Phase
Detection Operability Evaluation Compensatory
Measure
4OA5 QCAN 902-8 F- Reserve Auxiliary Transformer 22 Open Phase 2
4 Detection Low Load/Trouble
4OA5 EC 0000387740 Switchyard VulnerabilitySingle Open Phase 5
Detection
14
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
ALARA As-Low-As-Reasonably-Achievable
ADAMS Agencywide Document Access Management System
ADS Automatic Depressurization System
ANS Alert and Notification System
ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers
CAP Corrective Action Program
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
DBE Design Basis Event
DEP Drill and Exercise Performance
DGCWP Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump
DRP Division of Reactor Projects
EC Engineering Change
EDG Emergency Diesel Generator
ERO Emergency Response Organization
ERV Electromatic Relief Valve
FZ Fire Zone
HPCI High Pressure Coolant Injection
IMC Inspection Manual Chapter
IP Inspection Procedure
IR Issue Report
ISI Inservice Inspection
LCO Limiting Condition for Operation
LER Licensee Event Report
LPCI Low Pressure Coolant Injection
MOC Mechanism Operated Contact
MT Magnetic Particle Examination
NCV Non-Cited Violation
NDE Non-Destructive Examination
NEI Nuclear Energy Institute
NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OSP Outage Safety Plan
PARS Publicly Available Records System
PI Performance Indicator
PMT Post-Maintenance Testing
RCIC Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
RFO Refueling Outage
RHRSW Residual Heat Removal Service Water
SCBA Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus
SSCs Structures, Systems, and Components
TS Technical Specification
UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
URI Unresolved Item
VDC Voltage Direct Current
VT Visual Examination