IR 05000254/2024010
| ML24296A089 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 10/28/2024 |
| From: | Karla Stoedter NRC/RGN-III/DORS/EB1 |
| To: | Rhoades D Constellation Energy Generation, Constellation Nuclear |
| References | |
| EA-24-098 IR 2024010 | |
| Download: ML24296A089 (1) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION - AGE-RELATED DEGRADATION INSPECTION REPORT 05000254/2024010 AND 05000265/2024010 AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION
Dear David P. Rhoades:
On September 17, 2024, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station and discussed the results of this inspection with Joe Haluska, Senior Engineering Manager, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
The enclosed report discusses a violation associated with a finding of very low safety significance (Green). The NRC evaluated this violation in accordance Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, which can be found at http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html. We determined that this violation did not meet the criteria to be treated as a non-cited violation because you did not restore compliance within a reasonable period of time after receiving Non-Cited Violation 05000254/2023010-03; 05000265/2023010-03. You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. If you have additional information you believe the NRC should consider, you may provide it in your response to the Notice of Violation. The NRCs review of your response will also determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure your compliance with regulatory requirements.
Additionally, one finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report.
This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or the significance of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station.
October 28, 2024 If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Karla K. Stoedter, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000254 and 05000265 License Nos. DPR-29 and DPR-30
Enclosures:
1. Notice of Violation 2. Inspection Report Nos.
05000254/2024010 and 05000265/2024010
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000254 and 05000265
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000254/2024010 and 05000265/2024010
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2024-010-0054
Licensee:
Constellation Nuclear
Facility:
Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station
Location:
Cordova, IL
Inspection Dates:
August 05, 2024, to September 17, 2024
Inspectors:
M. Abuhamdan, Reactor Inspector
J. Corujo-Sandin, Senior Reactor Inspector
C. Padilla, Reactor Inspector
Approved By:
Karla K. Stoedter, Chief
Engineering Branch 1
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an Age-Related degradation inspection at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Classify Components as Critical in Accordance with the Preventive Maintenance Program Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000254,05000265/2024010-01 Open/Closed
[H.13] -
Consistent Process 71111.21N.04 The inspectors identified a Green finding and an associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a on August 23, 2024, when the licensee failed to implement procedures required by Section 9, Procedures for Performing Maintenance, of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, dated February 1978. Specifically, the licensee failed to classify various components and/or sub-components for which a single equipment failure results in the complete loss of a Maintenance Rule High Safety-Significant (HSS)or risk-significant function as Critical. This was contrary to Procedures ER-AA-200,
Preventive Maintenance Program, Revision 7, and ER-AA-200-1001, Revision 8,
Equipment Classification, Attachment 1, Critical Component Classification Determination.
Failure To Identify and Correct Conditions Adverse To Quality Regarding The Installation Of The Safety-Related 125 And 250 VDC Batteries Inter-Tier Jumper Cables.
Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NOV 05000254,05000265/2024010-02 Open EA-24-098
[H.14] -
Conservative Bias 71111.21N.04 The inspectors identified a Green finding and an associated Notice of Violation (NOV) of Title 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,
Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to promptly identify and correct conditions adverse to quality regarding the incorrect installation of the safety-related 125 and 250 VDC batteries. Specifically, the licensee failed to: (1) identify both Unit 1 and Unit 2 250 VDC batteries had inter-tier jumper cables below the required minimum bend radius; and (2) failed to correct a previously identified nonconforming installation of the Unit 1 125 VDC Battery inter-tier jumper cables, which were also below the minimum required bend radius established by the licensees implementing drawings and standards.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs)in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.21N.04 - Age-Related Degradation Age-Related Degradation
Note: An item regarding the design-bases mission time of the High-Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was identified during this inspection. That portion of the review was separated from this inspection report and will be completed as part of NRC Inspection Report 05000254/2024005; 05000265/2024004.
- (1) Unit 0 (Common) - Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) Filters (0-7510-A & 0-7510-B)and Charcoal Absorbers (0-7509-A & 0-7509-B)
- (3) Unit 1 & 2 - Station Blackout (SBO) Batteries (1-8330-6A & 2-8330-7A)
2-8330)
- (5) Unit 1 & 2 - SBO Inverters and Isolimiters (1-8150-6B & 2-8150-7B)
- (6) Unit 1 & 2 - Electrical portions of the SBO Exhaust Fans (1-5790-6001, 1-5790-6002, 1-5790-6003, 2-5790-6001, 2-5790-6002, & 2-5790-6003)
- (7) Unit 1 & 2 - SBO Air Start Flex Hoses (1-4600, Air Lines, M-3032 Drawing Hoses 1-7, 9-10, 13-15, 17-23)
- (8) Unit 1 & 2 - Outside portions of the SBO Jacket Water Piping (M-3029 Drawing Components 1-6620209A, 1-6620211A, 1-6620212A, 1-6620213A, 1-6620221A, 2-6620209A, 2-6620211A, 2-6620212A, 2-6620213A, 2-6620221A, 1-6620209B, 1-6620211B, 1-6620212B, 1-6620213B, 1-6620221B, 2-6620209B, 2-6620211B, 2-6620212B, 2-6620213B, & 2-6620221B)
- (9) Unit 1 & 2-Safety-Related 250 VDC Batteries (1-8350-B04 & 2-8350-B04)
- (10) Unit 0, 1 & 2-Safety-Related 250 VDC Chargers (0-8350-B05, 1-8350-B05, &
2-8350-B05)
- (11) Unit 1 & 2-Safety-Related 250 VDC Battery to Main Bus Feed Breakers (1-8351-1-A1 & 2-8351-2-A1)
- (12) Unit 1 & 2-Safety-Related 125 VDC Batteries (1-8300 & 2-8300)
- (13) Unit 1 & 2-Safety-Related 125 VDC Chargers (1-8300-1, 1-8300-1A, 2-8300-2, &
2-8300-2A)
- (14) Unit 1 & 2-High-Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Gland Seal Condenser Subsystem, with a focus on the Hotwell Limit Switches (1-2341-8201, 1-2341-8202, 1-2341-8203, 2-2341-8201, 2-2341-8202, & 2-2341-8203)
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Classify Components as Critical in Accordance with the Preventive Maintenance Program Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000254,05000265/2024010-01 Open/Closed
[H.13] -
Consistent Process 71111.21N.04 The inspectors identified a Green finding and an associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a on August 23, 2024, when the licensee failed to implement procedures required by Section 9, Procedures for Performing Maintenance, of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, dated February 1978. Specifically, the licensee failed to classify various components and/or sub-components for which a single equipment failure results in the complete loss of a Maintenance Rule High Safety-Significant (HSS) or risk-significant function as Critical. This was contrary to Procedures ER-AA-200, Preventive Maintenance Program, Revision 7, and ER-AA-200-1001, Revision 8, Equipment Classification, Attachment 1, Critical Component Classification Determination.
Description:
Between August 5 and 23, 2024, the inspectors reviewed preventive maintenance templates and preventive maintenance schedules associated with components in the Unit 1 and 2 high-pressure coolant injection (HPCI) systems, the 250 VDC system, standby gas treatment (SBGT) system, and station blackout (SBO) diesel generators.
The maintenance review process included a review of ER-AA-200, Revision 7, Preventive Maintenance Program, which describes key elements of the Preventive Maintenance Program, including establishing component classification and vulnerability determination, as well as Performance Centered Maintenance (PCM) Template development and change process that provides standardized generic preventive maintenance (PM) tasks and frequencies based on the criticality of the component, how often its used, and the environment in which it operates. Procedure ER-AA-200, Revision 7, defines PCM templates as, Generic component or system templates that identify the specific tasks (condition monitoring, condition directed, time directed, or surveillances) and frequencies recommended for components to minimize consequential failures based on the criticality of the component, how often its used, and the environment in which it operates. The PCM templates can be used as a baseline comparison to an existing maintenance strategy or to create a new maintenance strategy where none currently exists. Additionally, ER-AA-200 defines Critical as, Equipment considered necessary for reactor safety or power production. As a result of the review of these processes, the inspectors identified the following examples of misclassifications for the following systems.
HPCI:
Procedure ER-AA-200-1001, Attachment 4, Component Classification Guidance and Examples, Example 34 states, in part, sub-components that are required to support the function of the main component should be classified no lower (critical or non-critical)than the main component and evaluated based on its specific duty cycle and operating environment. The inspectors identified that while the HPCI Condensate Pump Assemblies 1(2)-2304-PMPA-2304 and the HPCI Gland Exhauster Assemblies 1(2)-2306-PMPA-2306 were classified as Critical with mild service condition, the following pump sub-components were classified as Non-critical with severe service condition:
HPCI Condensate Pump Assemblies Motors 1(2)-2304-PMPA-2304-M10, HPCI Condensate Pump Assemblies Pumps 1(2)-2304-PMPA-2304-P30, HPCI Gland Seal Condenser (GSC)
Hotwell Level Switches LS 1(2)-2341-8202, HPCI GSC Hotwell Level Switches LS 1(2)-2341-8201, HPCI GSC Hotwell Level Switches LS 1(2)-2341-8203, HPCI GSC Exhauster Fans 1(2)-2306-PMPA-2306-P35, and HPCI GSC Exhauster Motors 1(2)-2306-PMPA-2306-M10. All of these sub-components are required to ensure HPCI can perform its intended function.
SBO Diesel Generators:
The Emergency Diesel Generator PCM Template, which is utilized as a baseline for the SBO diesel generator preventive maintenance strategy, designates a 12-month inspection and a 12-year replacement for non-metallic flexible hoses for critical components. However, non-critical and Run-to-Maintenance designated components do not have a specific inspection or non-metallic flexible hose replacement frequency. During walkdowns of the SBO diesel generators, the inspectors identified flexible hoses in the jacket water system which did not appear to have been replaced recently. The inspectors questioned when the jacket water flexible hoses were inspected last and found the jacket water flexible hoses were classified as non-critical. As such, they were not assigned a specific replacement periodicity. Instead, the hoses were to be pressure tested every 2 years to check if any of the hoses needed to be replaced. However, upon further questioning, failure of the jacket water flexible hoses was determined meet the critical criteria of ER-AA-200-1001, 1, Step 1.4.1.D, which states, a single equipment failure that results in the complete loss of a Maintenance Rule High Safety-Significant (HSS) or risk-significant function. As a result, the jacket water flexible hoses were required to be classified as critical and required a more prescriptive maintenance inspection and replacement strategy.
250 VDC System:
During inspection of the Units 1 and 2 250 VDC batteries, the inspectors questioned the non-critical classification of battery to Main Bus Feed Breakers 1-8351-1-A1 and 2-8351-2-A1. The components were reclassified from critical to non-critical in 2017 as part of a Value Based Maintenance Initiative. However, the licensee was unable to provide the inspectors with the specific bases for the changes. A failure of the breaker to the open position results in the loss of HPCI to the respective Unit and a loss of reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) to the opposite Unit, in addition to a loss of the DC supply to the essential service (ESS) bus. Since the HPCI, RCIC, ESS, and 250 VDC functions are HSS Maintenance Rule functions, ER-AA-200-1001, Attachment 1, Step 1.4.1.D required the Battery to Main Bus Feed Breakers 1-8351-1-A1 and 2-8351-2-A1 to be classified as critical components and have a corresponding maintenance strategy established.
Standby Gas Treatment:
The inspectors also questioned the classification of the SBGT common discharge piping (0-7508-P20) as Run-to-Maintenance (RTM). Procedure ER-AA-200-1001, Attachment 4, Example 30 states, in part, Piping - Piping that is susceptible to failure (e.g., chemical, two phase flow, service water, underground, etc.) is periodically inspected as part of an Engineering Program (e.g., Boric Acid, Flow Accelerated Corrosion, Cathodic Protection, etc.)
and as such, an assessment is not required. Piping is inherently reliable and not expected to fail. Therefore, it is acceptable to classify as RTM and perform no PM. However, a root cause analysis following failure of both trains of SBGT to perform their required safety function when called upon in July 2022 identified a potential flaw in the pipe wall as a possible cause of the failure. An inspection of the pipe, required by the Buried Pipe Aging Management Program, was originally deferred and inadvertently removed from the Buried Pipe program in 2021 due to the unique configuration of the common discharge pipe.
As a corrective action resulting from the July 2022 failure, the SBGT common discharge piping has been added back into the Buried Pipe Aging Management Program. However, the licensee is still in the process of determining a method of inspecting the pipe. Currently, there is no identified method of inspecting or draining the common discharge pipe. A failure of the SBGT common discharge pipe would not only meet the critical criteria of ER-AA-200-1001, 1, Step 1.4.1.D, but would also force the plant to shut down both Units within 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br /> due to failure to meet Technical Specification LCO 3.6.4.3. This information, combined with the licensees inability to inspect the pipe and current operating experience, led the inspectors to conclude the SBGT discharge piping was required to be classified as Critical, Low Duty Cycle with a Mild Environment, to allow engineering to review the current SBGT tests, operations and maintenance strategy.
Corrective Actions: The licensee has initiated corrective actions to update the classifications of the components listed above to critical in accordance with ER-AA-200-1001. Additionally, the licensee is performing extent of condition evaluations and plans to update the associated preventive maintenance strategies.
Corrective Action References:
AR 4792422, NRC ARDI SBGT Discharge Pipe Component Reclassification AR 4792999, NRC ARDI HPCI GSC Subcomponent Reclassification AR 4793387, NRC ARDI ID: DC Component Classification Issue AR 4794215, NRC ARDI SBO Jacket Water Component Reclassification AR 4794216, NRC ARDI HPCI Gland Seal Exhstr Component Reclassification
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensee failed to classify the following components and/or sub-components as critical even though a single equipment failure results in the complete loss of a Maintenance Rule HSS or risk-significant function. This was contrary to the definition, criteria and examples provided in Procedures ER-AA-200, ER-AA-200-1001, and the requirements of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a which constituted a performance deficiency:
- HPCI Condensate Pump Assemblies Motors 1(2)-2304-PMPA-2304-M10;
- HPCI Condensate Pump Assemblies Pumps 1(2)-2304-PMPA-2304-P30;
- HPCI GSC Exhauster Fans 1(2)-2306-PMPA-2306-P35;
- HPCI GSC Exhauster Motors 1(2)-2306-PMPA-2306-M10;
- 250 VDC Battery to Main Bus Feed Breakers 1-8351-1-A1 and 2-8351-2-A1;
- SBO Jacket Water Flexible Hoses;
- SBGT Common Discharge Pipe 0-7508-P20.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensee failed to classify components for which a single equipment failure results in the complete loss of a Maintenance Rule HSS or risk-significant function as critical. Incorrect categorization of equipment components removes programmatic safeguards provided by the Preventive Maintenance Program and the PCM templates to ensure equipment reliability.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because they answered No to all the questions in Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.13 - Consistent Process: Individuals use a consistent, systematic approach to make decisions. Risk insights are incorporated as appropriate. Specifically, the licensee was unable to provide justification bases for the current component maintenance categorizations reviewed by the inspectors and failed to ensure the approach for flexible hose inspection and replacement was consistent for all high-safety-and risk-significant components.
Enforcement:
Violation: Technical Specification 5.4.1.a requires, in part, written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978.
Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, Section 9b, Procedures for Performing Maintenance, states, preventive maintenance schedules should be developed to specify lubrication schedules, inspections of equipment, replacement of such items as filters and strainers, and inspection or replacement of parts that have a specific lifetime such as wear rings.
ER-AA-200, Preventive Maintenance Program, Revision 7, Section 1.2, Purpose, describes in part, key elements of the Preventive Maintenance Program, including establishing component classification and vulnerability determination, as well as Performance Centered Maintenance Template development and change process that provides standardized generic preventive maintenance tasks and frequencies based on the criticality of the component, how often it is used, and the environment in which it operates.
Additionally, Section 2.4 defines Critical as Equipment considered necessary for reactor safety or power production. Although equipment may be categorized as Critical, not all its components need to be categorized as Critical. Only those components that upon failure, contribute to the loss of a Critical function, should be categorized as Critical. (Refer to ER-AA-200-1001 for determination of Criticality).
ER-AA-200-1001, Equipment Classification, Revision 8, Attachment 1, Step 1.4.1.D requires, a single equipment failure that results in the complete loss of a Maintenance Rule High Safety-Significant (HSS) or risk-significant function, be classified as Critical.
Additionally, ER-AA-200-1001, Attachment 4, Component Classification Guidance and Examples, Example 34 states, in part, sub-components that are required to support the function of the main component should be classified no lower (critical or non-critical) than the main component and evaluated based on its specific duty cycle and operating environment.
Contrary to the above, as of August 23, 2024, the licensee failed to implement written procedures covered by the applicable procedures recommended in Section 9.b of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Specifically, contrary to the definition of critical, and the criteria and examples provided in Procedures ER-AA-200 and ER-AA-200-1001, the licensee failed to classify the following components and/or sub-components as critical and establish the required preventive maintenance schedule even though a single equipment failure results in the complete loss of a Maintenance Rule HSS or risk-significant function:
- HPCI Condensate Pump Assemblies Motors 1(2)-2304-PMPA-2304-M10;
- HPCI Condensate Pump Assemblies Pumps 1(2)-2304-PMPA-2304-P30;
- HPCI GSC Exhauster Fans 1(2)-2306-PMPA-2306-P35;
- HPCI GSC Exhauster Motors 1(2)-2306-PMPA-2306-M10;
- 250 VDC Battery to Main Bus Feed Breakers 1-8351-1-A1 and 2-8351-2-A1;
- SBO Jacket Water Flexible Hoses;
- SBGT Common Discharge Pipe 0-7508-P20.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Identify and Correct Conditions Adverse to Quality Regarding the Installation of the Safety-Related 125 and 250 VDC Batteries Inter-Tier Jumper Cables.
Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NOV 05000254,05000265/
2024010-02 Open EA-24-098
[H.14] -
Conservative Bias 71111.21N.04 The inspectors identified a Green finding and an associated Notice of Violation (NOV)of Title 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to promptly identify and correct conditions adverse to quality regarding the incorrect installation of the safety-related 125 and 250 VDC batteries. Specifically, the licensee failed to:
- (1) identify both Unit 1 and Unit 2 250 VDC batteries had inter-tier jumper cables below the required minimum bend radius; and
- (2) failed to correct a previously identified nonconforming installation of the Unit 1 125 VDC Battery inter-tier jumper cables, which were also below the minimum required bend radius established by the licensees implementing drawings and standards.
Description:
The inspectors for the Age-Related Degradation Inspection (ARDI) performed a walkdown of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 125 and 250 VDC safety-related battery rooms on August 6, 2024, and noticed the bend radius of various inter-tier jumper cables appeared smaller than required.
The inspectors asked the licensee to validate if the installed jumper cables were within the design requirements.
The 125 VDC jumper cables are 350 MCM and the 250 VDC jumper cables are 250 MCM.
The MCM refers to the wires gauge in thousands of circular mils. The Unit 1 and Unit 2 125 and 250 VDC batteries were installed using implementation Drawings 4E-1067F and 4E-2067F, respectively. These drawings provided the minimum required bend radius for the jumper cables. The purpose of specifying a minimum required bend radius is to prevent damage over time to the cable jacket and insulation due to a tight bend of the cable.
Based upon the inspectors questions following the walkdown, the licensee evaluated the batteries and identified multiple examples of inter-tier jumper cables which were below the minimum required bend radius. The licensee documented these conditions adverse to quality (CAQ) in the following ARs:
AR 4792378, NRC ARDI - 250 VDC Battery Inter-Tier Jumper Cables (initiated on 08/07/2024)
This AR documented some of the Unit 1 250 VDC Battery inter-tier jumper cables between cells 33 and 34 were below their minimum bend radius and did not conform to the U-Shape configuration shown on the details of drawing 4E-1067F.
The cables were longer than they needed to be and made several bends to reach the cell terminal plates which contributed to the smaller bend radius.
AR 4792386, NRC ARDI - U2 250 VDC Battery Inter-Tier Jumper Cables (initiated on 08/07/2024)
This AR documented the Unit 2 250 VDC Battery inter-tier jumper cables between cells 68-69, 72-73, and 104-105 were at or slightly below their minimum bend radius and did not conform to the U-Shape configuration shown on the details of drawing 4E-2067F. The cables were longer than they needed to be and made several bends to reach the cell terminal plates which contributed to the smaller bend radius.
AR 4792364, NRC ARDI - 125 and 250 VDC Battery Inter-Tier Jumper Cables (initiated on 08/07/2024)
This AR documented the Unit 1 125 VDC Battery was found with cable bend radius measurements below the minimum 3.5 inches requirement for the inter-tier jumper cables between cells 29 and 30. The AR also recognized this specific cable issue had been previously identified by the NRCs Comprehensive Engineering Team Inspection (CETI) in 2023. Lastly, the AR recognized the licensees corrective actions to address the CETIs issue had been closed without correcting the bend radius concern.
As referenced in AR 4792364, on December 20, 2023, the results of the 2023 CETI were documented in NRC Inspection Report 05000254/2023010; 05000265/2023010 (ML23352A198). The CETI inspectors identified, dispositioned, and documented a non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to install 350 MCM jumper cables for the Unit 1 125 VDC battery as prescribed in Drawing 4E-1067F and Standard N-EM-0035. Based on the result of the CETI Criterion V NCV, at least two ARs related to the bend radius concern were generated.
AR 04711264, NRC CETI 2023 - U1 125 VDC Battery Jumper Bend Radius (initiated on 10/20/2023)
This AR documented the results of the CETI inspectors walkdown of the Unit 1 125 and 250 VDC Battery room on October 18, 2023. As part of the walkdown, the inspectors questioned the bend radius of the inter-tier jumper cables for the observed Unit 1 125 and 250 VDC batteries. Additionally, the inspectors requested the bend radius requirements for said inter-tier jumper cables.
The licensee stated Standard N-EM-0035 (sheet 4 of 19) established the requirements for minimum bend radius for 250 MCM and 350 MCM cables. The requirement was four times the cable outside diameter.
The licensee performed field measurements of all the jumper cables in the Unit 1 battery room and found these were satisfactory, with the exception of the four paralleled 350 MCM cables at the north end of the Unit 1 125 VDC Battery.
These jumpers were measured in the field to be approximately 2.75 inches, which was below the 3.5" minimum requirement.
As part of this AR, Assignment 2, an ACIT (AT 04711264-02), was generated to Inspect the jumper cable bend radius on all station safety-related 125 VDC and 250 VDC batteries. Following inspection, initiate an IR for any deficiencies identified and recommend actions for replacement if required.
This ACITs notes documented that on November 22, 2023, The Unit 1
- (2) 125 and 250 VDC Safety-Related Battery inter-rack and inter-tier jumper cables were walked down to verify proper cable bend radius. All bend radius values were within limits per N-EM-0035 with the exception of the jumpers previously identified in this IR (4711264). No further actions required. The licensee then closed AR 04711264.
During the ARDI, the inspectors found there were no other actions generated as part of AR 04711264 to correct the bend radii of the four paralleled 350 MCM cables at the north end of the Unit 1 125 VDC Battery. The ARDI inspectors also noted the licensee failed to identify the nonconforming jumper cable bend radius on the Unit 2 250 VDC Battery during the completion of AT 04711264-02.
AR 04746848, NRC NCV 2023-010-03 Failure to Follow Instructions Batteries (initiated on 02/06/2024)
This AR was generated to document the issuance of the CETIs Criterion V NCV associated with the failure to install the Unit 1 125 VDC Battery inter-tier jumper cables with the bend radius as required by the prescribed drawings. The licensee concluded the cable bend radius issue occurred due to weaknesses in the work package instructions used to ensure workers installed the cables with an appropriate bend radius. The AR also referenced the actions documented in ACIT 04711264-02 and apparently misunderstood these actions as accepting the existing configuration. The licensee generated Assignment 11, (CA 04746848-11), for the Planning group to include guidance to reference N-EM-0035, Sheet 4 for cable bend radius work packages supporting corrective actions This corrective action was completed and used during the Unit 1 250 VDC Battery change out completed in May 2024. However, as discussed above, the ARDI inspectors found the bend radii of some inter-cell jumper cables installed in May 2024 were also nonconforming with the bend radius requirements specified in N-EM-0034, Sheet 4.
In an effort to understand why the CETI NCV was not corrected, the ARDI inspectors reviewed procedure PI-AA-125, Corrective Action Program (CAP) Procedure, Revision 9, and noted the following definitions:
- Condition Adverse to Quality (CAQ): An all-inclusive term used in reference to any of the following: failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, defective items, and nonconformances.
- Corrective Action (CA): An action taken or planned that restores a CAQ to an acceptable condition or capability.
- Action Tracking Item (ACIT): Action items that are completed to improve performance or correct minor problems that do not represent CAQs. These actions are captured as ACIT-type assignments.
As discussed in the summary below, the ARDI inspectors concluded the licensees classification of the CAP actions for AR 4711264 contributed to the licensees failure to identify and correct nonconforming cable bend radius issues on the Unit 2 250 VDC Battery and the failure to correct cable bend radius issues on the Unit 1 125 VDC Battery identified by the 2023 CETI team.
In summary, based on the information above, the ARDI inspectors identified the following concerns:
- The licensee did not create a CA to correct the NRC (CETI) identified nonconforming inter-tier jumpers bend radius on the Unit 1 125 VDC Battery. This nonconforming condition was a CAQ, hence a CA assignment was required per procedure PI-AA-125.
- The ACIT (AT 04711264-02) generated, which performed the extent of condition on the remaining 125 and 250 VDC Safety-Related Batteries, failed to identify the nonconforming inter-tier jumpers bend radius on the Unit 2 250 VDC Battery and recognized this nonconforming condition as a CAQ.
- After completing and closing the actions provided in AR 04711264, the licensee failed to correct the Unit 1 125 VDC Battery inter-tier jumpers bend radius nonconformances described in NRC NCV 05000254/2023010-03; 05000265/2023010-03.
- The CA (CA 04746848-11) generated to improve the available guidance for future cable bend radius installations did not prevent the occurrence of new nonconformances of inter-tier jumper cables below the required minimum bend radii when the Unit 1 250 VDC battery was installed in May 2024. The licensee failed to identify this CAQ.
Corrective Actions: The licensee entered these issues into their Corrective Action Program and evaluated the as-found condition of the batteries to ensure they remained capable of performing their safety function. The licensee planned to correct the deficiencies identified and is planning to inspect both units safety-related 125 and 250 VDC Battery cables and restore compliance in the upcoming months.
Corrective Action References:
AR 4792378, NRC ARDI - 250 VDC Battery Inter-Tier Jumper Cables AR 4792386, NRC ARDI - U2 250 VDC Battery Inter-Tier Jumper Cables
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensee failed to promptly identify and correct conditions adverse to quality related to the safety-related 125 and 250 VDC batteries. Specifically, the licensee failed to:
- (1) identify both Unit 1 and Unit 2 250 VDC batteries had inter-tier jumper cables below the required minimum bend radius; and
- (2) failed to correct a previously identified nonconforming installation of the Unit 1 125 VDC Battery inter-tier jumper cables, which were also below the minimum required bend radius. These were contrary to implementation drawings 4E-1067F / 4E-2067F, Standard N-EM-0035, 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions. Therefore, this was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to restore compliance of the safety-related inter-tier jumper cables in both units 125 and 250 VDC batteries, the closure of previously identified conditions adverse to quality with no corrective action, and the failure to correctly install the safety-related 125 and 250 VDC batteries inter-tier jumper cables in a manner to ensure the cable bend radius design requirements were met affects the availability, reliability, and capability of the systems which rely on these batteries to respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power.
Specifically, the inspectors determined this finding was of very low safety significance (Green)because although the finding was a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system or components (SSC), the SSC maintained its operability and probabilistic risk assessment functionality.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.14 - Conservative Bias: Individuals use decision-making practices that emphasize prudent choices over those that are simply allowable. A proposed action is determined to be safe in order to proceed, rather than unsafe in order to stop. Specifically, as documented in AR 04792364, since the licensee believed there was no immediate safety concern with the existing bend radius documented in AR 04711264, an ACIT was created for performing a system walkdown and providing a recommendation for when the cable should be replaced versus a CA to correct the condition adverse to quality through the work control process. The inspectors determined that such a tracking item could be completed and closed per the Corrective Action Program (CAP) procedure without correcting the condition adverse to quality. Additionally, assigning an ACIT would allow the closeout to be completed without the additional management oversite that at CA would receive per the CAP procedure.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, requires, in part, that measures be established to assure conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected.
Title 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, requires, in part, that activities affecting quality be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings of a type appropriate to the circumstances and be accomplished in accordance with those instructions, procedures, or drawings.
The licensee established drawing 4E-1067F as the implementing (installation) drawing for the Unit 1 125 and 250 VDC batteries connection layout, which included the minimum required bend radius. Respectively, drawing 4E-2067F was the implementing drawing for the Unit 2 250 VDC Battery connection layout.
Standard N-EM-0035, Cable Standards, Revision 6, was used by the licensee to establish the required minimum static bend radius for 250 and 350 MCM cable used on Drawings 4E-1067F and 4E-2067F. The standard requires the minimum bend radius to be four times the outside cable diameter.
Contrary to the above, as of August 23, 2024, the licensee failed to establish measures to assure conditions adverse to quality regarding the incorrect installation of the safety-related 125 and 250 VDC batteries were promptly identified and corrected. Specifically, the licensee:
1. failed to identify both Unit 1 and Unit 2 250 VDC batteries had inter-tier jumper cables
below their required minimum bend radius as required by installation drawings 4E-1067F / 4E-2067F (respectively), and Standard N-EM-0035; and;
2. failed to correct a previously identified CAQ with the Unit 1 125 VDC Battery,
as documented in NRC Non-Cited Violation 05000254/2023010-03; 05000265/2023010-03, which also had inter-tier jumper cables below the minimum bend radius required by installation Drawing 4E-1067F and standard N-EM-0035.
This occurred when the licensee closed AR 04711264 without establishing any actions to resolve the nonconformance.
In addition, the licensee failed to accomplish activities affecting quality as prescribed by instructions, procedures and drawings appropriate to the circumstance. Specifically, the licensee failed to install the 350 MCM jumper cables for the Unit 1 125 VDC Battery with a minimum bend radius of four times the outside cable diameter as prescribed in Drawing 4E-1067F and Standard N-EM-0035.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being cited because the licensee failed to restore compliance within a reasonable period of time after the violation was identified consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On September 17, 2024, the inspectors presented the Age-Related degradation inspection results to Joe Haluska, Senior Engineering Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On August 22, 2024, the inspectors presented the Technical Debrief inspection results to Valentine Ezugha, Director of Organizational Effectiveness and Regulatory, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On August 23, 2024, the inspectors presented the Interim Exit Meeting inspection results to Drew Griffiths, Plant Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
2014-05860
Battery and Charger Room Temperature for Flex
Evaluation
Calculations
QDC-8350-E-
2348
250 VDC System Analysis Using DC ETAP
000A
2586612
U1 HPCI Condensate Pump Motor Overload
11/13/2015
04310554
U1 SBO Isolimiter Fire
01/16/2020
04321442
NOS ID: Paint on Galvanized Conduit Flaking Off in
Battery Room
2/25/2025
04427470
U1 HPCI QCOS 2300-27 Failed Acceptance Criteria (G.6)
06/03/2021
04464185
U1 HPCI Gland Exhauster Tripped
2/01/2021
04464484
HPCI Condensate Pump 1-2304 Failed to Start
2/03/2021
04554743
U2 SBO Breaker to Bus 23-1 Failed to Close
2/15/2023
04682831
U2 250 VDC Battery Failure
06/05/2023
04692550
U1 Battery Room Temperature is High Out of Spec
07/25/2023
04696801
U2 250 VDC Battery Below Minimum Required Voltage
08/16/2023
04699810
HPCI Condensate Pump Did Not Auto Start
08/31/2023
04700076
High Amps Measured Across U2 HPCI GSC Exhauster
Motor
09/01/2023
04711264
NRC CETI 2023-U1 125 VDC Battery Jumper Bend
Radius
10/20/2023
04715425
Unit 1 SBO Exhaust Fan#1 Fail
11/05/2023
04746848
NRC NCV 2023-010-03 Failure to Follow Instructions
Batteries
2/06/2024
04764526
PSU U2 HPCI Condensate Pump Did Not Auto Stop
as Required
04/09/2024
04764853
HPCI Gland Seal Exhauster 2-2306 Failed to Start
04/09/2024
04764918
U2 HPCI Gland Exhauster 2-2306 Motor Running
Currents High
04/10/2024
04769124
U1 SBO Battery 2D Corrosion Intercell Resistance
Readings
04/24/2024
04779487
EOID High Unit 1 Battery Room Temperature
06/08/2024
71111.21N.04
Corrective Action
Documents
04780311
U2 HPCI Gland Exhauster Fan Motor 2-2306 Motor
06/12/2024
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Currents High
04791014
NOS ID: Reinforce HK Standards Around U1 Batteries
FMEP
07/31/2024
1699878
(LR) License Renewal Flex Hose Inspection Had
Degraded Hoses
09/04/2014
1699884
(LR) License Renewal Flex Hose Inspection Had
Degraded Hoses
09/14/2014
216076
B Train SBGT License Renewal WO Steps Marked as NA
01/31/2019
250943
1/2A SBGT System Charcoal Sample Not Obtained
During 5-20 Wk
05/22/2019
4482485
WO Needed for Replacement of U2 HPCI GSC LS
03/04/2022
4509198
Both Trains of SBGT Not Producing Required Flow
07/04/2022
4509395
Engineering Benchmark of LAS SBGT Design and Best
Practices
07/05/2022
4510365
WO Needed for Draining of Main Chimney
07/11/2022
4511520
SBGT Discharge Piping Unable to Inspect
07/18/2022
4541934
HPIC Gland Seal Drain High Pressure
04/24/2023
4541952
PCV 1-2301-46 Found Full Closed
2/10/2022
4673441
HPCI GSC Valve Replacement
2/10/2022
24782
HPCI Condensate Pump LS Replacement
2/20/2023
4787776
NRC ID: Housekeeping Issues in SBO Building (U1 Side)
07/17/2024
4787782
NRC ID: Housekeeping Issues in SBO Building (U2 Side)
07/17/2024
4789185
NRC ID: U1A SBO Jacket Water Inlet Piping Needs
Maintenance
07/24/2024
4789187
NRC ID: U1A SBO Jacket Water Outlet Piping Needs
Maintenance
07/24/2024
4789189
NRC ID: U1B SBO Jacket Water Inlet Piping Needs
Maintenance
07/24/2024
4789190
NRC ID: U1B SBO Jacket Water Outlet Piping Needs
Maintenance
07/24/2024
4789193
NRC ID: USA SBO Jacket Water Inlet Piping Needs
Maintenance
07/24/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
4789195
NRC ID: U2A SBO Jacket Water Outlet Piping Needs
Maintenance
07/24/2024
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
4789199
NRC ID: U2B SBO Jacket Water Inlet Piping Needs
Maintenance
07/24/2024
4789202
NRC ID: U2B SBO Jacket Water Outlet Piping Needs
Maintenance
07/24/2024
4792004
ARDI NRC - IR Not Generated U1 SBO Battery Intercell
Res
08/06/2024
4792015
ARDI NRC - SBO Charger Torque Verification
08/06/2024
4792347
NRC ID: Junction Box Door Needs Replaced
08/07/2024
4792364
NRC ARDI - 125 and 250 VDC Battery Inter-Tier Jumper
Cables
08/07/2024
4792378
NRC ARDI-250 VDC Battery Inter-Tier Jumper Cables
08/07/2024
4792386
NRC ARDI - U2 250 VDC Battery Inter-Tier Jumper
Cables
08/07/2024
4792407
NRC ARDI - Ladder and Buckets Staged in U2 SBO
Battery Room
08/07/2024
4792411
NRC ARDI - Paint Flaking in U1 Battery Room
08/07/2024
4792412
NRC ARDI - Poor Lighting in U1 and U2 Battery Rooms
08/07/2024
4792414
NRC ARDI - U1 SBO Broken Cable Ties
08/07/2024
4792422
NRC ARDI SBGT Discharge Pipe Component Needs
Reclassification
08/07/2024
4792999
NRC ARDI HPCI GSC Subcomponent Reclassification
08/09/2024
4793387
NRC ARDI ID - DC Component Classification Issue
08/12/2024
4794215
NRC ARDI SBO Jacket Water Component
Reclassification
08/15/2024
4794216
NRC ARDI HPCI Gland Seal Exhstr Component
Reclassification
08/15/2024
4794966
NRC ARDI ID: STI QC-18-003 Performance Monitoring
08/19/2024
4795822
NRC ARDI: IRs Not Generated for Corrosion
08/21/2024
4797078
NRC ARDI ID: HPCI 10 Minute Mission Time Basis
08/27/2024
Connection Layout 125V DC and 250V DC Battery Cells
J
240V DC Battery Cell Connection Layout
E
Drawings
Key Diagram Turbine Building Essential Service 480V
Motor Control Centers 28-2, 29-2, 29-3
BL
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
4E-2317 Sheet 3
Key Diagram 250V DC Motor Control Centers
T
Wiring Diagram 250V DC Battery Charger 2-8350
H
One-Line Diagram Station Blackout Electrical Distribution
B
Schematic Diagram Station Blackout 15 KVA Inverter 6B
B
M-3029
Diagram of SBO DG Engine Jacket Water Piping and
Instrumentation
B
M-3032
Diagram of SBO DG Starting Air and Instrumentation
D
M-44
Diagram of Standby Gas Treatment
AQ
M-46 Sh.1
Diagram of High Pressure Coolant Injection - HPCI Piping
357611
HPCI Inputs Validated for LOCA Analysis
Engineering
Changes
DCP 9800115
Support Installation Mod - HPCI Gland Seal Condenser
System
04/29/1998
93C2806-03.A46
USNRC USI A-46 Resolution Seismic Evaluation Report
Quad Cities Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2
06/19/1996
Engineering
Evaluations
STI-QC-18-003
Surveillance Test Interval (STI) Evaluation Form,
QC-18-003
01/28/2019
4509198
Root Cause Investigation Report: Both Trains of SBGT
Not Producing Required Flow
09/06/2022
4509198
(a)(1) Action Plan: Both Trains of SBGT Not Producing
Required Flow
03/16/2023
C0231
Standby Gas Treatment VETIP Manual
001
FR# 442047-00
Vendor Manual: Series 123/125 Boiler Water Level
Control
Manual No. 95-
100018-00
(C0278 Vol3
Tab4)
Vendor Solid-state Controls Operation Manual (Battery
Charger/Rectifier)
A
N-EM-0035
Cable Standards
Miscellaneous
SBO6620
SBO Diesel Generators Performance Monitoring Plan
2/05/2023
NDE Reports
20141231
11/06/2014
Operability
Evaluations
637081
SBGT Surveillance Flowrate Note Below Expected
Values
Dynamic (Seismic) Qualification of Equipment
Procedures
Closed Cooling Water Chemistry
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Preventive Maintenance Program
Equipment Classification
Maintenance Strategy Analysis
Conduct of Equipment Reliability Manual
Standard Approach on How to Evaluate and Inspect
Outside Diameter (OD) Corrosion on Piping
Implementation of the Technical Specification
Surveillance Frequency Control Program
Monitoring the Effects of Changes to the Surveillance
Frequency Control Program (SFCP)
MA-AA-1000-
1001
Key Step Process
Maintenance Planning
035
Station Housekeeping/ Material Condition Program
MA-QC-716-026-
1001
Seismic Housekeeping
MA-QC-716-026-
1002
Permanent Staging of Tools and Equipment in Critical
Buildings
Corrective Action Program (CAP) Procedure
QCEM 0100-06
Station Battery Systems Charger Adjustments
QCEM 0200-04
Molded Case Circuit Breaker Inspection and Test for
Non-EQ Breakers
QCEMS 0210-01
Battery Charger Testing for Safety-Related
250 VDC Batteries
14B
QCEMS 0250-11
480/208 VAC Motor Control Center Cubicle Maintenance
and Surveillance
QCEMS 0250-20
480/208 VAC Motor Control Center Maintenance and
Surveillance
QCEPM 0100-01
Station Battery Systems Preventive Maintenance
QCMMS 6620-03
Unit 1(2) Station Blackout Diesel Generator (SBO)
Periodic Preventative Maintenance Inspection
QCOA 6100-04
Station Blackout
QCOS 2300-15
HPCI Drain Pot/Steam Line Drain Level Switch, Valve,
and Alarm Functional Verification (J.7.a, b, c)
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
QCOS 6900-01
Station Battery Weekly Surveillance
Preventive Maintenance (PM) Database Revision
Requirements
Self-
Assessments
Periodic Evaluation: May 2022 - May 2024
08/01/2024
00901935
Replace Capacitors on Isolimiter on SBO #1 UPS
11/11/2008
01108221
U1 125 VDC Battery Near End of Service Life
04/10/2009
01159790
U2 125 VDC Battery Approaching End of Life
2/18/2011
255504
05/29/2011
01462161
03/11/2015
01526938
EM MCC 19-2 Cubicle Inspection Battery Charger #1
06/24/2014
01624168
SBO UPS/ Replace Cooling Fans
09/02/2014
01626572
Replacement of PCM Template Recommended
Circuit Cards
11/13/2014
01626573
Replacement of PCM Template Recommended
Circuit Cards
09/24/2014
01643411
SBO UPS/ Replace Cooling Fans
11/06/2014
01715051
MCC 28-2 Cubicle D4 250V Battery Charger 1/2
2/09/2016
01730258
SBO Battery Charger 2-8330 Inspection
09/01/2015
01788735
MCC 18-2 CUB D3 1/2 250 VDC Battery Charger
05/09/2006
01804025
Inspect MCC 28-2
03/24/2016
01912708
MCC 29-2 Cubicle B4 250 VDC Battery Charger #2
06/09/2021
01916376
Replace Capacitors on Isolimiter on SBO#1 UPS
01/27/2021
01944063
Performance Test of the SBO Batteries
08/15/2017
01955738
Troubleshoot Unit 2 SBO 15KVA Inverter
09/30/2016
01961073
Inspect U1 SBO Battery Charger 1-8330
11/03/2017
01961075
Inspect U2 SBO Battery Charger 2-8330
11/30/2017
29515
Replace Breaker
2/21/2002
0356267
Replace Breaker
11/02/2002
04613965-05
EM Inspect Level Switch (LS 1-2341-8203)
03/29/2019
04719273-01
MM U1 HPCI GSC Hotwell Level Switch Replacement
04/07/2019
04730645
Performance Test of the SBO Batteries
10/25/2022
Work Orders
04759619-01
MM HPCI GSC Hotwell Level Switch 2-2341-8203
04/15/2020
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
04821209-01
SBO #1 Battery (Non Equalize Mode)
10/29/2020
04855580
250V Battery Charger 4 Hour Load Test
05/07/2020
04918421-05
EM Inspect Level Switch (LS 1-2341-8203)
11/28/2023
04920258
11/27/2021
04920540
250 VDC Battery Charger #1 4 HR Load Test
2/18/2020
04929276
11/17/2020
04942599-01
MM U1 GSC Hotwell Level Switch Replacement
2/27/2024
04951758-01
OP QCOS 2300-27 HPCI Pump Flow Rate
Comprehensive Test
06/09/2021
04978074
04/29/2021
04978708
05/05/2021
04978709
05/05/2021
04999430
U-1 SBO Isolimiter Transformer Replacement
2/05/2020
05038548
SBO 150A Maint Battery Charger Inspection
01/25/2022
05039131
SBO Battery Charger Inspection 1-8330
04/28/2022
05047980
SBO Battery Charger 2-8330 Inspection
2/16/2022
05098299
250V Battery Charger 4 Hour Load Test
08/05/2022
05162977
250 VDC Battery Charger #2 4 HR Load Test
06/08/2023
05165267
250 VDC Battery Charger #1 4 HR Load Test
03/16/2023
05176929
Cycle 250 VDC Battery Charger #1/2 FLT/EQ Toggle
Switch
2/01/2022
05184133
2/15/2023
05193049-01
CE-Perform U-1 Safety-Related Motor Lubrication
(1-2304)
03/28/2023
228200
(LR) Fire Damper Visual Inspection
11/11/2023
228517
Cycle 250 VDC Battery Charger #1/2 FLT/EQ Toggle
Switch
08/01/2022
237553-01
03/26/2022
255080
01/23/2024
263275
SBO Remote/ Local/ PLC Bypass Emergency Start Test
11/15/2023
281119
Cycle 250 VDC Battery Charger #1/2 FLT/EQ Toggle
Switch
01/30/2023
05331775-01
OP QCOS 2300-15 HPCI Drain Pot Level Switch/Drain
03/27/2023
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Valve Test
05349643
Replacement of PCM Template Recommend Circuit
Cards
11/22/2023
05490711
SBO 125 VDC Battery Surveillance
05/14/2024
05550824
Station Battery Surveillance
07/09/2024
4757126-01
(LR) Inspect U2 A SBO Starting Air Flex Hoses
05/22/2020
4757127-01
(LR) Inspect U2 B SBO Starting Air Flex Hoses
05/20/2020
4784379-01
(LR) Inspect U1 A SBO Starting Air Flex Hoses
10/27/2020
4784380-01
(LR) Inspect U1 B SBO Starting Air Flex Hoses
10/26/2020
5012264-01
(LR) SBGT Removal of Charcoal Adsorber Test
Canister - Train A
11/17/2021
5012265-01
(LR) SGTS In-Place DOP Leak Test of
HEPA Filters - Train A
11/18/2021
5065731-01
(LR) SBGT Removal of Charcoal Adsorber
Test Canister - Train B
05/04/2022
5065886-01
(LR) SGTS In-Place DOP Leak Test of HEPA
Filters - Train B
05/05/2022
5065887-01
(LR) SGTS In-Place Charcoal Adsorber Freon Leak
Test - Train B
05/05/2022
262853-01
(LR) SGTS In-Place Charcoal Adsorber Freon Leak
Test - Train A
11/14/2023
5507220-01
(LR) Unit 2 SBO DG 1(2) Quarterly Load Test
Surveillance
05/14/2024
5534548-01
(LR) Unit 1 SBO DG 1(2) Quarterly Load Test
Surveillance
07/24/2024
5541707
SBGT Operability (B Train) Monthly Surveillance
06/27/2024
5550819
SBGT Operability (A Train) Monthly Surveillance
07/16/2024