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NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000254/2017001 and 05000265/2017001
	ML17124A163
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	05/03/2017
From:	Karla Stoedter; NRC/RGN-III/DRP/B1
To:	Bryan Hanson; Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear
References
	IR 2017001
	Download: ML17124A163 (57)
	v • d • e

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

2443 WARRENVILLE RD. SUITE 210

LISLE, IL 60532-4352

May 3, 2017

Mr. Bryan C. Hanson

Senior VP, Exelon Generation Company, LLC

President and CNO, Exelon Nuclear

4300 Winfield Road

Warrenville, IL 60555

SUBJECT: QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2NRC

INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000254/2017001 AND

05000265/2017001

Dear Mr. Hanson:

On March 31, 2017, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an integrated

inspection at your Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2. On April 11, 2017, the

NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. S. Darin and other members of

your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has identified one issue that was evaluated

under the risk significance determination process as having very low safety significance

(Green). The NRC has also determined that one violation is associated with this issue.

Because the licensee initiated condition reports to address this issue, this violation is being

treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV), consistent with Section 2.3.2a of the Enforcement

Policy. The NCV is described in the subject inspection report.

If you contest the violation or significance of the NCV, you should provide a response within

30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with

copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the

NRC Resident Inspector at the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment or a finding not associated with a

regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date

of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the

Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Quad Cities Nuclear

Power Station.

B. Hanson -2-

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection

and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document

Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, and Requests for

Withholding.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Karla Stoedter, Chief

Branch 1

Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 50-254; 50-265

License Nos. DPR-29; DPR-30

Enclosure:

IR 05000254/2017001; 05000265/2017001

cc: Distribution via LISTSERV

B. Hanson -3-

Letter to Bryan C. Hanson from Karla Stoedter dated May 3, 2017

SUBJECT: QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2NRC

INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000254/2017001 AND

05000265/2017001

DISTRIBUTION:

Jeremy Bowen

RidsNrrDorlLpl3

RidsNrrPMQuadCities Resource

RidsNrrDirsIrib Resource

Cynthia Pederson

DRPIII

DRSIII

ROPreports.Resource@nrc.gov

ADAMS Accession Number: ML17124A163

OFFICE RIII

NAME KStoedter:bw

DATE 05/03/2017

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Docket Nos: 50-254; 50-265

License Nos: DPR-29, DPR-30

Report No: 05000254/2017001; 05000265/2017001

Licensee: Exelon Generation Company, LLC

Facility: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2

Location: Cordova, IL

Dates: January 1 through March 31, 2017

Inspectors: R. Murray, Senior Resident Inspector

K. Carrington, Resident Inspector

M. Garza, Emergency Preparedness Inspector

A. Dahbur, Fire Protection Inspector

J. Neurauter, Reactor Engineer

M. Domke, Reactor Engineer

J. Cassidy, Senior Health Physicist

V. Meyers, Senior Health Physicist

C. Mathews, Illinois Emergency Management Agency

Approved by: K. Stoedter, Chief

Branch 1

Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................... 2

REPORT DETAILS ....................................................................................................................... 4

Summary of Plant Status ........................................................................................................... 4

1. REACTOR SAFETY ............................................................................................ 4

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01) .............................................................. 4

1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04) ........................................................................ 5

1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05) ................................................................................... 6

1R06 Flooding (71111.06) ............................................................................................. 6

1R07 Annual Heat Sink Performance (71111.07) ......................................................... 7

1R08 Inservice Inspection Activities (71111.08) ............................................................ 7

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11) ...................................... 9

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12) .............................................................. 11

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13) ........ 11

1R15 Operability Determinations and Functional Assessments (71111.15) ............... 12

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19) ............................................................... 13

1R20 Outage Activities (71111.20) .............................................................................. 14

1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22) ........................................................................ 14

1EP2 Alert and Notification System Evaluation (71114.02) ......................................... 16

1EP3 Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System

(71114.03).......................................................................................................... 16

1EP5 Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness (71114.05) ..................................... 17

1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06)................................................................................. 17

2. RADIATION SAFETY ........................................................................................ 18

2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (71124.01) .............. 18

2RS2 Occupational As-Low-As-Reasonably-Achievable Planning and Controls

(71124.02).......................................................................................................... 22

2RS3 In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation (71124.03) .................... 23

2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment (71124.04) ...................................................... 25

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES .......................................................................................... 27

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151) ....................................................... 27

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152) ............................................ 30

4OA3 Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153) ............... 33

4OA5 Other Activities ................................................................................................... 34

4OA6 Management Meetings ...................................................................................... 37

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION............................................................................................ 1

Key Points of Contact ................................................................................................................ 1

List of Items Opened, Closed, and Discussed........................................................................... 2

List of Documents Reviewed ..................................................................................................... 3

List of Acronyms Used ............................................................................................................ 15

2

SUMMARY

Inspection Report 05000254/2017001, 05000265/2017001; 01/01/2017-03/31/2017;

Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2; Identification and Resolution of Problems.

This report covers a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced

baseline inspections by regional inspectors. One Green finding was identified by the inspectors.

The finding involved a Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) requirements. The significance of inspection findings is indicated by their

color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, Red) and determined using Inspection

Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process," dated April 29, 2015.

Cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0310, "Aspects within the Cross-Cutting

Areas," dated December 4, 2014. All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in

accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy, dated November 1, 2016. The NRC's program

for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in

NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 6.

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green. A finding of very low safety significance and an associated NCV of 10 CFR 50,

Appendix B, Criterion V was self-revealed on January 27, 2017, when the Unit 1C

residual heat removal service water (RHRSW) pump was started for a routine

surveillance evolution and all expected annunciators and equipment failed to operate

properly, which led to the licensee declaring the Unit 1C RHRSW pump inoperable.

Specifically, the licensee failed to establish a procedure for the mechanism operated

contact (MOC) switch linkage arm that was appropriate to the circumstances to ensure

the component would continue to perform its function. Immediate corrective actions

included reconnecting the MOC switch linkage arm assembly and testing it by starting

the 1C RHRSW pump prior to declaring the pump operable. In addition, the licensee

planned procedure revisions to QCEPM 0200-11 that would specify a torque value to

ensure the MOC switch linkage arm was adequately secured and could perform its

function. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Issue

Report 3967424.

The finding was determined to be more than minor because the finding was associated

with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and

affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of

systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.

Specifically, the failure to ensure the MOC switch linkage arm was adequately fastened

led to the failure of the component and its associated Unit 1C RHRSW pump during

breaker operation on January 27, 2017. The finding was determined to be of very low

safety significance (Green), because the inspectors answered No to all of the

questions in IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for

Findings at Power, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, Section A,

Mitigating SSCs and Functionality. The inspectors determined this finding affected the

cross-cutting area of human performance, in the aspect of avoid complacency, which

states, Individuals recognize and plan for the possibility of mistakes, latent issues, and

inherent risk, even while expecting successful outcomes. Specifically, the licensee

failed to recognize a potential risk and inherent latent issue for a condition identified in

2015 at Quad Cities, when a MOC switch failed to perform its function due to a missing

nut in a different breakers linkage assembly. The licensee identified and corrected the

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condition but failed to evaluate the cause of the missing nut because it did not impact the

operability of the component. In the 2015 instance, the MOC switch issue only affected

indications for the component and had no adverse impact on the ability of the

component to perform its function [H.12]. (Section 4OA2)

3

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1

With the exception of planned power reductions for turbine testing, control rod pattern

adjustments, and power changes as requested by the transmission system operator, the unit

remained at or near full power from January 1 to January 18, 2017. On January 18, the unit

began coasting down for Refueling Outage Q1R24. On March 27, 2017, the unit shut down for

Q1R24 and remained shut down through the end of the inspection period.

Unit 2

The unit operated at or near full power for the entire inspection period with the exception of

planned power reductions for turbine testing, control rod pattern adjustments, control rod drive

maintenance, and power changes as requested by the transmission system operator.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01)

.1 Winter Seasonal Readiness Preparations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a review of the licensees preparations for winter conditions to

verify that the plants design features and implementation of procedures were sufficient

to protect mitigating systems from the effects of adverse weather. Documentation for

selected risk-significant systems was reviewed to ensure that these systems would

remain functional when challenged by inclement weather. During the inspection, the

inspectors focused on plant specific design features and the licensees procedures used

to mitigate or respond to adverse weather conditions. Additionally, the inspectors

reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and performance

requirements for systems selected for inspection, and verified that operator actions were

appropriate as specified by plant specific procedures. Cold weather protection, such as

heat tracing and area heaters, was verified to be in operation where applicable. The

inspectors also reviewed corrective action program (CAP) items to verify that the

licensee was identifying adverse weather issues at an appropriate threshold and

entering them into their CAP in accordance with station corrective action procedures.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report. The inspectors reviews

focused specifically on the following plant systems due to their risk significance or

susceptibility to cold weather issues:

345 kilo-volt system; and

Units 1 and 2 standby liquid control systems.

This inspection constituted one winter seasonal readiness preparation sample as

defined in Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.01-05.

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b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)

.1 Quarterly Partial System Walkdowns

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial system walkdowns of the following risk-significant

systems:

Unit 1 and Unit 2 emergency diesel generator (EDG) systems during Unit 1/2 EDG

surveillance testing;

Unit 2 reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system during Unit 2 high pressure

coolant injection system planned maintenance;

Unit 2 C and D residual heat removal service water (RHRSW) pump systems

during A and B RHRSW systems planned maintenance; and

Unit 1 fuel pool cooling system during Unit 1 Q1R24 alternate decay heat removal

operations.

The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk significance relative to the

Reactor Safety Cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors attempted

to identify any discrepancies that could impact the function of the system and, therefore,

potentially increase risk. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures,

system diagrams, UFSAR, Technical Specification (TS) requirements, outstanding work

orders (WOs), condition reports, and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant

trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have rendered the systems

incapable of performing their intended functions. The inspectors also walked down

accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment

were aligned correctly and operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of

the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there

were no obvious deficiencies. The inspectors also verified that the licensee had properly

identified and resolved equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events

or impact the capability of mitigating systems or barriers and entered them into the CAP

with the appropriate significance characterization. Documents reviewed are listed in the

Attachment to this report.

These activities constituted four partial system walkdown samples as defined in

IP 71111.04-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

5

1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)

.1 Routine Resident Inspector Tours (71111.05Q)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted fire protection walkdowns which were focused on availability,

accessibility and the condition of firefighting equipment in the following risk-significant

plant areas:

Fire zone (FZ) 11.2.1, Unit 1 reactor building, elevation 554'-0", southwest corner

room, 1B core spray;

FZ 8.2.6.B, Unit 1 turbine building, elevation 595-0, low pressure heater bay;

FZ 8.2.7.B, Unit 1 turbine building, elevation 615-6, low Pressure and D heater

bay; and

FZ 8.2.7.C, Unit 1/2 turbine building, elevation 611, mezzanine floor.

The inspectors reviewed areas to assess if the licensee had implemented a fire

protection program that adequately controlled combustibles and ignition sources within

the plant, effectively maintained fire detection and suppression capability, maintained

passive fire protection features in good material condition, and implemented adequate

compensatory measures for out-of-service, degraded or inoperable fire protection

equipment, systems, or features in accordance with the licensees fire plan.

The inspectors selected fire areas based on their overall contribution to internal fire risk

as documented in the plants Individual Plant Examination of External Events with later

additional insights, their potential to impact equipment which could initiate or mitigate a

plant transient, or their impact on the plants ability to respond to a security event.

Using the documents listed in the Attachment to this report, the inspectors verified that

fire hoses and extinguishers were in their designated locations and available for

immediate use; that fire detectors and sprinklers were unobstructed; that transient

material loading was within the analyzed limits; and fire doors, dampers, and penetration

seals appeared to be in satisfactory condition. The inspectors also verified that minor

issues identified during the inspection were entered into the licensees CAP.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

These activities constituted four quarterly fire protection inspection samples as defined in

IP 71111.05-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R06 Flooding (71111.06)

.1 Internal Flooding

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed selected risk important plant design features and licensee

procedures intended to protect the plant and its safety-related equipment from internal

flooding events. The inspectors reviewed flood analyses and design documents,

including the UFSAR, engineering calculations, and abnormal operating procedures to

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identify licensee commitments. The specific documents reviewed are listed in the

Attachment to this report. In addition, the inspectors reviewed licensee drawings to

identify areas and equipment that may be affected by internal flooding caused by the

failure or misalignment of nearby sources of water, such as the fire suppression or the

circulating water systems. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees corrective action

documents with respect to past flood-related items identified in the corrective action

program to verify the adequacy of the corrective actions. The inspectors performed a

walkdown of the following plant area to assess the adequacy of watertight doors and

verify drains and sumps were clear of debris and were operable, and that the licensee

complied with its commitments:

Units 1 and 2 RHRSW vaults.

Documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted one internal flooding sample as defined in IP 71111.06-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R07 Annual Heat Sink Performance (71111.07)

.1 Heat Sink Performance

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees testing of the B control room emergency

ventilation system refrigeration condensing unit heat exchanger to verify that potential

deficiencies did not mask the licensees ability to detect degraded performance, to

identify any common cause issues that had the potential to increase risk, and to ensure

that the licensee was adequately addressing problems that could result in initiating

events that would cause an increase in risk. The inspectors reviewed the licensees

observations as compared against acceptance criteria, the correlation of scheduled

testing and the frequency of testing, and the impact of instrument inaccuracies on test

results. Inspectors also verified that test acceptance criteria considered differences

between test conditions, design conditions, and testing conditions. Documents reviewed

for this inspection are listed in the Attachment to this document.

This annual heat sink performance inspection constituted one sample as defined in

IP 71111.07-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R08 Inservice Inspection Activities (71111.08)

From March 27-31, 2017, the inspectors conducted a review of the implementation

of the licensees Inservice Inspection (ISI) Program for monitoring degradation of the

Unit 1 reactor coolant system, risk-significant piping and components, and containment

systems.

7

The inspections described in Sections 1R08.1 and 1R08.5 below constituted one sample

as defined in IP 71111.08-05.

.1 Piping Systems Inservice Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors either observed or reviewed the following Non-Destructive

Examinations (NDE) mandated by the American Society of Mechanical

Engineers (ASME),Section XI Code to evaluate compliance with the ASME Code

Section XI and Section V requirements, and if any indications and defects were detected

to determine if these were dispositioned in accordance with the ASME Code or a NRC

approved alternative requirement:

Ultrasonic examination of elbow-to-pipe weld (component 30A-S11) in the main

steam system (WO No. 01831310-01);

Ultrasonic examination of elbow-to-pipe weld (component 30B-S10) in the main

steam system (WO No. 01831310-01);

Magnetic particle examination (MT) of collar-torus shell (component 1025-50) in

emergency core cooling system (WO 01831310);

MT of weldsvariable spring can with four lugs welded to pipe (component

1401-W-201A) in core spray system (WO 01831310);

MT of weldseight guide lugs welded to pipe (component 2304-W-204A) in the

high pressure coolant injection system (WO No. 01831310);

General visual examination of a sample of metallic containment surface area

examinations: Penetrations X-016A, X-020, X-025, X-042, X-08, and X-109;

X-025 MC piping at elevations 647, 623, and 595 (WO No. 01831711-02);

Visual examination (VT-1) of weldsfour lugs welded to pipe (component

1005A-W-304.5A) in RHRSW system (WO 01831310);

VT-3 of pipe restraintbox guide (component 1005A-W-304.5) in RHRSW

system (WO 01831310);

VT-3 of pipe supporttwo variable spring cans (component 1401-W-201 A&B)

in core spray system (WO 01831310); and

VT-3 of flued head anchor (component 1202-M-108.1) in the reactor water

clean-up system (WO No. 01831310).

The inspectors reviewed one surface examination from the previous outage with a

relevant indication that was evaluated and accepted by the licensee for continued

service. The inspectors verified that the licensees removal of the piping flange

indications without a weld repair did not impact compliance with ASME Standard B16.5

for flange design and Standard B31.1 for piping design.

Reactor head vent line indications found during liquid penetrant examinations

(WO 01636433-07).

The inspectors reviewed records for the following pressure boundary weld repairs

completed for risk-significant systems during the last outage to determine whether

the licensee applied the pre-service NDE and acceptance criteria required by the

Construction Code, and/or the NRC-approved Code relief request. Additionally, the

inspectors reviewed the welding procedure specifications and supporting weld

procedure qualification records to determine whether the weld procedures were

8

qualified in accordance with the requirements of the Construction Code and the

ASME Code, Section IX:

installation of a 2-to-1 fillet weld at socket welds 1 through 23 on the Unit 1 reactor

head vent line 1-0215-2-B (WO No. 01636433-01); and

high pressure coolant injection piping rerouteweld map #1 fillet welds at socket

welds 2, 3, 8, 9, 16, and 17 on line 1-2318-2-LX (WO No. 1877257-11).

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Reactor Pressure Vessel Upper Head Penetration Inspection Activities (Not Applicable)

.3 Boric Acid Corrosion Control (Not Applicable)

.4 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Activities (Not Applicable)

.5 Identification and Resolution of Problems

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a review of ISI-related problems entered into the licensees

CAP, and conducted interviews with licensee staff to determine if:

the licensee had established an appropriate threshold for identifying ISI-related

problems;

the licensee had performed a root cause (if applicable), and taken appropriate

corrective actions; and

the licensee had evaluated operating experience, and industry generic issues

related to ISI and pressure boundary integrity.

The inspectors performed these reviews to evaluate compliance with Title 10, Code of

Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action,

requirements. The corrective action documents reviewed by the inspectors are listed

in the Attachment to this report.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11)

.1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Requalification (71111.11Q)

a. Inspection Scope

On February 7, 2017, the inspectors observed a crew of licensed operators in the plants

simulator during licensed operator requalification training. The inspectors verified that

operator performance was adequate, evaluators were identifying and documenting crew

performance problems, and that training was being conducted in accordance with

licensee procedures. The inspectors evaluated the following areas:

9

licensed operator performance;

crews clarity and formality of communications;

ability to take timely actions in the conservative direction;

prioritization, interpretation, and verification of annunciator alarms;

correct use and implementation of abnormal and emergency procedures;

control board manipulations;

oversight and direction from supervisors; and

ability to identify and implement appropriate TS actions and Emergency Plan

actions and notifications.

The crews performance in these areas was compared to pre-established operator action

expectations and successful critical task completion requirements. Documents reviewed

are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted one quarterly licensed operator requalification program

simulator sample as defined in IP 71111.11-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Resident Inspector Quarterly Observation during Periods of Heightened Activity or Risk

(71111.11Q)

a. Inspection Scope

On March 26, 2017, the inspectors observed control room operators on Unit 1 perform a

planned shutdown for refueling outage Q1R24. This was an activity that required

heightened awareness and was related to increased risk. The inspectors evaluated the

following areas:

licensed operator performance;

crews clarity and formality of communications;

ability to take timely actions in the conservative direction;

prioritization, interpretation, and verification of annunciator alarms;

correct use and implementation of abnormal and emergency procedures;

control board manipulations;

oversight and direction from supervisors; and

ability to identify and implement appropriate TS actions and Emergency Plan

actions and notifications.

The performance in these areas was compared to pre-established operator action

expectations, procedural compliance and task completion requirements. Documents

reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted one quarterly licensed operator heightened activity/risk

sample as defined in IP 71111.11-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

10

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12)

.1 Routine Quarterly Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated degraded performance issues involving the following

risk-significant systems:

Z6600: emergency diesel generator systems; and

Z8300: 125 volt direct current (VDC) battery systems.

The inspectors reviewed events such as where ineffective equipment maintenance had

resulted in valid or invalid automatic actuations of engineered safeguards systems and

independently verified the licensee's actions to address system performance or condition

problems in terms of the following:

implementing appropriate work practices;

identifying and addressing common cause failures;

scoping of systems in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(b) of the maintenance rule;

characterizing system reliability issues for performance;

charging unavailability for performance;

trending key parameters for condition monitoring;

ensuring 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2) classification or re-classification; and

verifying appropriate performance criteria for structures, systems, and

components (SSCs)/functions classified as (a)(2), or appropriate and adequate

goals and corrective actions for systems classified as (a)(1).

The inspectors assessed performance issues with respect to the reliability, availability,

and condition monitoring of the system. In addition, the inspectors verified maintenance

effectiveness issues were entered into the CAP with the appropriate significance

characterization. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted two quarterly maintenance effectiveness samples as defined

in IP 71111.12-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)

.1 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's evaluation and management of plant risk for the

maintenance and emergent work activities affecting risk-significant and safety-related

equipment listed below to verify that the appropriate risk assessments were performed

prior to removing equipment for work:

11

Work week 17-02-05: Unit 1 RCIC system planned maintenance and online risk

change to yellow, B train of control room emergency heating, ventilation, and air

conditioning system heat exchanger planned maintenance, 1A core spray pump

planned maintenance and Unit 1 online risk change to yellow;

Emergent work on the Unit 2 3E automatic depressurization system electromatic

relief valve light indication on February 3, 2017;

Work week 17-09-12: Unit 2 125 VDC planned maintenance and both units

unplanned online risk change to yellow due to tornado warnings in Rock Island

County; and

Work week 17-13-03: Unit 2 online risk change to yellow and Unit 1 shutdown

safety risk yellow during refueling outage Q1R24Week 1.

These activities were selected based on their potential risk significance relative to the

Reactor Safety cornerstones. As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified that

risk assessments were performed as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and were accurate

and complete. When emergent work was performed, the inspectors verified that the

plant risk was promptly reassessed and managed. The inspectors reviewed the scope

of maintenance work, discussed the results of the assessment with the licensee's

probabilistic risk analyst or shift technical advisor, and verified plant conditions were

consistent with the risk assessment. The inspectors also reviewed TS requirements and

walked down portions of redundant safety systems, when applicable, to verify risk

analysis assumptions were valid and applicable requirements were met.

Documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report.

These maintenance risk assessments and emergent work control activities constituted

four samples as defined in IP 71111.13-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R15 Operability Determinations and Functional Assessments (71111.15)

.1 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following issues:

Issue Report (IR) 2709786: DGCWP [diesel generator cooling water

pump]/RHRSW Common Suction Piping Degradation;

IR 3968961: Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Thermal Performance Testing Using

Fluke Model 45;

IR 3967424: Unit 1C RHRSW Pump Abnormal Indications; and

IR 3971856: 1D RHRSW Trip Fuses Worked Out of Fuse Holder.

The inspectors selected these potential operability issues based on the risk significance

of the associated components and systems. The inspectors evaluated the technical

adequacy of the evaluations to ensure that TS operability was properly justified and the

subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in

risk occurred. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the

12

appropriate sections of the TS and UFSAR to the licensees evaluations to determine

whether the components or systems were operable. Where compensatory measures

were required to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures

in place would function as intended and were properly controlled. The inspectors

determined, where appropriate, compliance with bounding limitations associated with the

evaluations. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sampling of corrective action

documents to verify that the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies

associated with operability evaluations. Documents reviewed are listed in the

Attachment to this report.

This operability inspection constituted four samples as defined in IP 71111.15-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19)

.1 Post-Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following post-maintenance testing (PMT) activities to verify

that procedures and test activities were adequate to ensure system operability and

functional capability:

WO 1961658 for the Unit 1 RCIC system following planned maintenance;

WO 1846331 for the Unit 2 125 VDC battery system following battery terminal

board and potentiometer installation under Engineering Change (EC) 402467; and

WO 4612395 for the Unit 1 EDG cooling water pump following emergent work and

unplanned maintenance.

These activities were selected based upon the structure, system, or component's ability

to impact risk. The inspectors evaluated these activities for the following (as applicable):

the effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed; testing was adequate

for the maintenance performed; acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated

operational readiness; test instrumentation was appropriate; tests were performed as

written in accordance with properly reviewed and approved procedures; equipment was

returned to its operational status following testing (temporary modifications or jumpers

required for test performance were properly removed after test completion); and test

documentation was properly evaluated. The inspectors evaluated the activities against

TSs, the UFSAR, 10 CFR Part 50 requirements, licensee procedures, and various

NRC generic communications to ensure that the test results adequately ensured that the

equipment met the licensing basis and design requirements. In addition, the inspectors

reviewed corrective action documents associated with post-maintenance tests to

determine whether the licensee was identifying problems and entering them in the CAP

and that the problems were being corrected commensurate with their importance to

safety. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted three PMT samples as defined in IP 71111.19-05.

13

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R20 Outage Activities (71111.20)

.1 Refueling Outage Activities

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the Outage Safety Plan (OSP) and contingency plans for the

Unit 1 refueling outage (RFO), that began on March 27, 2017, and continued through the

end of this inspection period, to confirm that the licensee had appropriately considered

risk, industry experience, and previous site-specific problems in developing and

implementing a plan that assured maintenance of defense-in-depth. During the RFO,

the inspectors observed portions of the shutdown and cooldown processes and

monitored licensee controls over the outage activities listed below:

licensee configuration management, including maintenance of defense-in-depth

commensurate with the OSP for key safety functions and compliance with the

applicable TS when taking equipment out of service;

installation and configuration of reactor coolant pressure, level, and temperature

instruments to provide accurate indication, accounting for instrument error;

controls over the status and configuration of electrical systems to ensure that

TS and OSP requirements were met, and controls over switchyard activities;

monitoring of decay heat removal processes, systems, and components;

controls to ensure that outage work was not impacting the ability of the operators

to operate the spent fuel pool cooling system;

reactor water inventory controls including flow paths, configurations, and

alternative means for inventory addition, and controls to prevent inventory loss;

controls over activities that could affect reactivity;

maintenance of secondary containment as required by TS;

refueling activities; and

licensee identification and resolution of problems related to RFO activities.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted a partial RFO sample and continued into the next inspection

period.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)

.1 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the test results for the following activities to determine whether

risk-significant systems and equipment were capable of performing their intended safety

14

function and to verify testing was conducted in accordance with applicable procedural

and TS requirements:

QCIS 1000-09: RHR Pump Discharge Pressure Calibration and Functional Test

(Routine);

QCOS 6600-37(39): Unit 1(2) EDG Largest Load Reject Surveillance (Routine);

QCOS 6600-44: Unit 1 EDG Timed Start Test (Routine)

QCOS 1000-43: Unit 2 A Loop Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) and

Containment Cooling Modes of RHRs Non-Outage Logic Test (Routine);

QCOS 1400-16: Unit 1 Division II Core Spray Logic Functional Test (Routine);

and

QCOS 1400-09: Core Spray Pressure Isolation Valve Seat Leakage Test

(In-service Test).

The inspectors observed in-plant activities and reviewed procedures and associated

records to determine the following:

did preconditioning occur;

the effects of the testing were adequately addressed by control room personnel or

engineers prior to the commencement of the testing;

acceptance criteria were clearly stated, demonstrated operational readiness, and

were consistent with the system design basis;

plant equipment calibration was correct, accurate, and properly documented;

as-left setpoints were within required ranges; and the calibration frequency was in

accordance with TSs, the USAR, procedures, and applicable commitments;

measuring and test equipment calibration was current;

test equipment was used within the required range and accuracy; applicable

prerequisites described in the test procedures were satisfied;

test frequencies met TS requirements to demonstrate operability and reliability;

tests were performed in accordance with the test procedures and other applicable

procedures; jumpers and lifted leads were controlled and restored where used;

test data and results were accurate, complete, within limits, and valid;

test equipment was removed after testing;

where applicable for inservice testing activities, testing was performed in

accordance with the applicable version of Section XI, American Society of

Mechanical Engineers code, and reference values were consistent with the

system design basis;

where applicable, test results not meeting acceptance criteria were addressed

with an adequate operability evaluation or the system or component was declared

inoperable;

where applicable for safety-related instrument control surveillance tests, reference

setting data were accurately incorporated in the test procedure;

where applicable, actual conditions encountering high resistance electrical

contacts were such that the intended safety function could still be accomplished;

prior procedure changes had not provided an opportunity to identify problems

encountered during the performance of the surveillance or calibration test;

equipment was returned to a position or status required to support the

performance of its safety functions; and

all problems identified during the testing were appropriately documented and

dispositioned in the CAP.

15

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report. This inspection

constituted five routine surveillance testing samples, and one in-service test sample as

defined in IP 71111.22, Sections-02 and-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1EP2 Alert and Notification System Evaluation (71114.02)

.1 Alert and Notification System Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed documents and held discussions with Emergency

Preparedness (EP) staff regarding the operation, maintenance, and periodic testing

of the primary and backup Alert and Notification System (ANS) in the plume pathway

Emergency Planning Zone. The inspectors reviewed monthly trend reports and siren

test failure records from July 2015 to February 2017. Information gathered during

document reviews and interviews were used to determine whether the ANS equipment

was maintained and tested in accordance with Emergency Plan commitments and

procedures. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This ANS evaluation inspection constituted one sample as defined in IP 71114.02-06.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1EP3 Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System (71114.03)

.1 Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed and discussed with plant EP management and staff the

Emergency Plan commitments and procedures that addressed the primary and alternate

methods of initiating an Emergency Response Organization (ERO) activation to augment

the on-shift staff as well as the provisions for maintaining the plants ERO team and

qualification lists. The inspectors reviewed reports and a sample of CAP records of

unannounced off-hour augmentation drills, which were conducted from July 2015 to

February 2017, to determine the adequacy of the drill critiques and associated corrective

actions. The inspectors also reviewed a sample of the training records of approximately

six ERO personnel, who were assigned to key and support positions, to determine the

status of their training as it related to their assigned ERO positions. Documents

reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This ERO augmentation testing inspection constituted one sample as defined in

IP 71114.03-06.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

16

1EP5 Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness (71114.05)

.1 Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the nuclear oversight staffs April 2016 audit of the Quad Cities

Nuclear Power Stations Emergency Preparedness Program to determine that the

independent assessments met the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(t). The inspectors

reviewed samples of CAP records associated with the 2016 biennial exercise, as well as

various EP drills conducted in 2016, in order to determine whether the licensee fulfilled

drill commitments and to evaluate the licensees efforts to identify and resolve identified

issues. The inspectors reviewed a sample of EP items and corrective actions related to

the stations EP program, and activities to determine whether corrective actions were

completed in accordance with the sites CAP. Documents reviewed are listed in the

Attachment to this report.

This maintenance of EP inspection constituted one sample as defined in

IP 71114.05-06.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06)

.1 Emergency Preparedness Drill Observation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the conduct of a routine licensee emergency drill on

February 15, 2017, to identify any weaknesses and deficiencies in classification,

notification, and protective action recommendation development activities. The

inspectors observed emergency response operations in the technical support center and

operations support center to determine whether the event classification, notifications,

and protective action recommendations were performed in accordance with procedures.

The inspectors also attended the licensee drill critique to compare any

inspector-observed weakness with those identified by the licensee staff in order to

evaluate the critique and to verify whether the licensee staff was properly identifying

weaknesses and entering them into the corrective action program. As part of the

inspection, the inspectors reviewed the drill package and other documents listed in the

Attachment to this report.

This EP drill inspection constituted one sample as defined in IP 71114.06-06.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

17

2. RADIATION SAFETY

2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (71124.01)

.1 Radiological Hazard Assessment (02.02)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed the licensees current and historic isotopic mix, including alpha

emitters and other hard-to-detect radionuclides. The inspectors evaluated whether

survey protocols were reasonable to identify the magnitude and extent of the radiological

hazards.

The inspectors determined if there have been changes to plant operations since the last

inspection that may have resulted in a significant new radiological hazard for onsite

individuals. The inspectors evaluated whether the licensee assessed the potential

impact of these changes and implemented periodic monitoring, as appropriate, to detect

and quantify the radiological hazard. The inspectors reviewed the last two radiological

surveys from selected plant areas and evaluated whether the thoroughness and

frequency of the surveys were appropriate for the given radiological hazard.

The inspectors conducted walkdowns of the facility, including radioactive waste

processing, storage, and handling areas to evaluate material conditions and performed

independent radiation measurements as needed to verify conditions were consistent

with documented radiation surveys.

The inspectors assessed the adequacy of pre-work surveys for select radiologically

risk-significant work activities.

The inspectors evaluated the radiological survey program to determine if hazards were

properly identified. The inspectors discussed procedures, equipment, and performance

of surveys with radiation protection staff and assessed whether technicians were

knowledgeable about when and how to survey areas for various types of radiological

hazards.

The inspectors reviewed work in potential airborne areas to assess whether air samples

were being taken appropriately for their intended purpose and reviewed various survey

records to assess whether the samples were collected and analyzed appropriately. The

inspectors also reviewed the licensees program for monitoring contamination which has

the potential to become airborne.

These inspection activities constituted one complete sample as defined in

IP 71124.01-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

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.2 Instructions to Workers (02.03)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed select radiation work permits used to access high radiation

areas and evaluated the specified work control instructions or control barriers. The

inspectors also assessed whether workers where made aware of the work instructions

and area dose rates.

The inspectors reviewed electronic alarming dosimeter dose and dose rate alarm

setpoint methodology. For selected electronic alarming dosimeter occurrences, the

inspectors assessed the workers response to the alarm, the licensees evaluation of the

alarm, and any follow-up investigations.

The inspectors reviewed the licensees methods for informing workers of changes in

plant operations or radiological conditions that could significantly impact their

occupational dose.

The inspectors reviewed the labeling of select containers of licensed radioactive material

that could cause unplanned or inadvertent exposure to workers.

These inspection activities constituted one complete sample as defined in

IP 71124.01-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Contamination and Radioactive Material Control (02.04)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed locations where the licensee monitors material leaving the

radiologically controlled area and assessed the methods used for control, survey, and

release of material from these areas. As available, the inspectors observed health

physics personnel surveying and releasing material for unrestricted use.

The inspectors observed workers leaving the radiologically controlled area and assessed

their use of tool and personal contamination monitors and reviewed the licensees

criterial for use of the monitors.

The inspectors assessed whether instrumentation was used at its typical sensitivity

levels based on appropriate counting parameters or whether the licensee had

established a de facto release limit.

The inspectors selected several sealed sources from the licensees inventory records

and assessed whether the sources were accounted for and verified to be intact. The

inspectors also evaluated whether any transactions, since the last inspection, involving

nationally tracked sources were reported in accordance with 10 CFR 20.2207.

These inspection activities constituted one complete sample as defined in

IP 71124.01-05.

19

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.4 Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (02.05)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated ambient radiological conditions during tours of the facility.

The inspectors assessed whether the conditions were consistent with applicable posted

surveys, radiation work permits, and worker briefings.

The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of radiological controls, such as required

surveys, radiation protection job coverage, and contamination controls. The inspectors

evaluated the licensees use of electronic alarming dosimeters in high noise areas as

high radiation area monitoring devices.

The inspectors assessed whether radiation monitoring devices were placed on the

individuals body consistent with licensee procedures. The inspectors assessed whether

the dosimeter was placed in the location of highest expected dose or that the licensee

properly employed a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission approved method of

determining effective dose equivalent.

The inspectors reviewed the application of dosimetry to effectively monitor exposure to

personnel in work areas with significant dose rate gradients.

For select airborne area radiation work permits, the inspectors reviewed airborne

radioactivity controls and monitoring, the potential for significant airborne levels,

containment barrier integrity, and temporary filtered ventilation system operation.

The inspectors examined the licensees physical and programmatic controls for highly

activated or contaminated materials stored within pools and assessed whether

appropriate controls were in place to preclude inadvertent removal of these materials

from the pool.

These inspection activities constituted one complete sample as defined in

IP 71124.01-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.5 High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls (02.06)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed posting and physical controls for high radiation areas and very

high radiation areas to assess adequacy.

The inspectors conducted a selective inspection of posting and physical controls for high

radiation areas and very high radiation areas to assess conformance with performance

indicators.

20

The inspectors reviewed procedural changes to assess the adequacy of access controls

for high and very high radiation areas to determine whether procedural changes

substantially reduced the effectiveness and level of worker protection.

The inspectors assessed the controls the high radiation areas greater than 1 rem/hour

and areas with the potential to become high radiation areas greater than 1 rem/hour for

compliance with TS and procedures.

The inspectors assessed the controls for very high radiation areas and areas with the

potential to become very high radiation areas. The inspectors also assessed whether

individuals were unable to gain unauthorized access to these areas.

These inspection activities constituted one complete sample as defined in

IP 71124.01-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.6 Radiation Worker Performance and Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency (02.07)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed radiation worker performance and assessed their performance

with respect to radiation protection work requirements, the level of radiological hazards

present and radiation work permit controls.

The inspectors assessed worker awareness of electronic alarming dosimeter set points,

stay times or permissible dose for radiologically significant work as well as expected

response to alarms.

The inspectors observed radiation protection technician performance and assessed

whether the technicians were aware of the radiological conditions and radiation work

permit controls and whether their performance was consistent with training and

qualifications for the given radiological hazards.

The inspectors observed radiation protection technician performance of radiation

surveys and assessed the appropriateness of the instruments being used, including

calibration and source checks.

These inspection activities constituted one complete sample as defined in

IP 71124.01-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.7 Problem Identification and Resolution (02.08)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed whether problems associated with radiological hazard

assessment and exposure controls were being identified at an appropriate threshold and

21

were properly addressed for resolution. For select problems, the inspectors assessed

the appropriateness of the corrective actions. The inspectors also assessed the

licensees program for reviewing and incorporating operating experience.

The inspectors reviewed select problems related to human performance errors and

assessed whether there was a similar cause and whether corrective actions taken

resolve the problems.

The inspectors reviewed select problems related to radiation protection technician error

and assessed whether there was a similar cause and whether corrective actions taken

resolve the problems.

These inspection activities constituted one complete sample as defined in

IP 71124.01-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2RS2 Occupational As-Low-As-Reasonably-Achievable Planning and Controls (71124.02)

.1 Implementation of As-Low-As-Reasonably-Achievable and Radiological Work Controls

(02.04)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted observations of in-plant work activities and assessed whether

the licensee had effectively integrated the planned administrative, operational, and

engineering controls into the actual field work to maintain occupational exposure

As-Low-As-Reasonably-Achievable (ALARA). The inspectors observed pre-job briefings

and determined if the planned controls were discussed with workers. The inspectors

evaluated the placement and use of shielding, contamination controls, airborne controls,

radiation work permit controls and other engineering work controls against the ALARA

plans.

These inspection activities supplemented those documented in NRC Integrated

Inspection Report 05000254/2016002 and 05000265/2016002 and constituted a partial

sample as defined in IP 71124.02-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Radiation Worker Performance (02.05)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed radiation worker and radiation protection technician

performance during work activities being performed in radiation areas, airborne

radioactivity areas, or high radiation areas to assess whether workers demonstrated

the ALARA philosophy in practice and followed procedures. The inspectors observed

radiation worker performance to evaluate whether the training and skill level was

sufficient with respect to the radiological hazards and the work involved.

22

The inspectors interviewed individuals from selected work groups to assess their

knowledge and awareness of planned and/or implemented radiological and ALARA

work controls.

These inspection activities supplemented those documented in NRC Integrated

Inspection Report 05000254/2016002 and 05000265/2016002 and constituted a partial

complete sample as defined in IP 71124.02-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2RS3 In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation (71124.03)

.1 Engineering Controls (02.02)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed procedural guidance for use of ventilation systems and

assessed whether the systems were used, to the extent practicable, during high-risk

activities to control airborne radioactivity and minimize the use of respiratory protection.

The inspectors assessed whether installed ventilation airflow capacity, flow path, and

filter/charcoal unit efficiencies for selected systems were consistent with maintaining

concentrations of airborne radioactivity in work areas below the concentrations of an

airborne area to the extent practicable. The inspectors also evaluated whether selected

temporary ventilation systems used to support work in contaminated areas were

consistent with licensee procedural guidance and ALARA.

These inspection activities supplemented those documented in NRC Integrated

Inspection Report 05000254/2016002 and 05000265/2016002 and constituted one

complete sample as defined in IP 71124.03-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Use of Respiratory Protection Devices (02.03)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed records of air testing for supplied-air devices and self-contained

breathing apparatus (SCBA) bottles to assess whether the air used met or exceeded

Grade D quality. The inspectors evaluated whether plant breathing air supply systems

satisfied the minimum pressure and airflow requirements for the devices.

The inspectors reviewed training curricula for use of respiratory protection devices to

assess whether individuals are adequately trained on donning, doffing, function checks,

and how to respond to a malfunction.

23

The inspectors observed the physical condition of respiratory protection devices ready

for issuance and reviewed records of routine inspection for selected devices. The

inspectors reviewed records of maintenance on the vital components for selected

devices and assessed whether onsite personnel assigned to repair vital components

received vendor-provided training.

These inspection activities supplemented those documented in NRC Integrated

Inspection Report 05000254/2016002 and 05000265/2016002 and constituted one

complete sample as defined in IP 71124.03-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus for Emergency Use (02.04)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the status and surveillance records for select SCBAs. The

inspectors evaluated the licensees capability for refilling and transporting SCBA air

bottles to and from the control room and operations support center during emergency

conditions.

The inspectors assessed whether control room operators and other emergency

response and radiation protection personnel were trained and qualified in the use of

SCBAs and evaluated whether personnel assigned to refill bottles were trained and

qualified for that task.

The inspectors assessed whether appropriate mask sizes and types were available for

use. The inspectors evaluated whether on-shift operators had no facial hair that would

interfere with the sealing of the mask and that appropriate vision correction was

available.

The inspectors reviewed the past two years of maintenance records for selected

in service SCBA units used to support operator activities during accident conditions.

The inspectors assessed whether maintenance or repairs on an SCBA units vital

components were performed by an individual certified by the manufacturer of the device

to perform the work. The inspectors evaluated the onsite maintenance procedures

governing vital component work to determine whether there was any inconsistencies

with the SCBA manufacturers recommended practices. The inspectors evaluated

whether SCBA cylinders satisfied the hydrostatic testing required by the

U.S. Department of Transportation.

These inspection activities constituted one complete sample as defined in

IP 71124.03-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

24

.4 Problem Identification and Resolution (02.05)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed whether problems associated with the control and mitigation of

in-plant airborne radioactivity were being identified by the licensee at an appropriate

threshold and were properly addressed for resolution. Additionally, the inspectors

evaluated the appropriateness of the corrective actions for selected problems involving

airborne radioactivity documented by the licensee.

These inspection activities constituted one complete sample as defined in

IP 71124.03-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment (71124.04)

.1 External Dosimetry (02.03)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the calibration of active dosimeters. The inspectors assessed

the bias of the active dosimeters compared to passive dosimeters and the correction

factor used. The inspectors also assessed the licensees program for comparing active

and passive dosimeter results, investigations for substantial differences, and recording

of dose. The inspectors assessed whether there were adverse trends for active

dosimeters.

These inspection activities supplemented those documented in NRC Integrated

Inspection Report 05000254/2016003 and 05000265/2016003 and constituted one

complete sample as defined in IP 71124.04-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Internal Dosimetry (02.04)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed procedures used to determine internal dose using in vitro

analysis to assess the adequacy of sample collection, determination of entry route and

assignment of dose.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's program for dose assessment based on air

sampling, as applicable, and calculations of derived air concentration. The inspectors

determined whether flow rates and collection times for air sampling equipment were

adequate to allow lower limits of detection to be obtained. The inspectors also reviewed

the adequacy of procedural guidance to assess internal dose if respiratory protection

was used.

25

These inspection supplemented those documented in NRC Integrated Inspection Report

05000254/2016003 and 05000265/2016003 and constituted one complete sample as

defined in IP 71124.04-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Special Dosimetric Situations (02.05)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed whether the licensee informs workers of the risks of radiation

exposure to the embryo/fetus, the regulatory aspects of declaring a pregnancy, and the

specific process to be used for declaring a pregnancy. The inspectors selected

individuals who had declared pregnancy during the current assessment period and

evaluated whether the monitoring program for declared pregnant workers was

technically adequate to assess the dose to the embryo/fetus. The inspectors assessed

results and/or monitoring controls for compliance with regulatory requirements.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's methodology for monitoring external dose in

nonuniform radiation fields or where large dose gradients exist. The inspectors

evaluated the licensee's criteria for determining when alternate monitoring was to

be implemented. The inspectors reviewed dose assessments performed using

multibadging to evaluate whether the assessment was performed consistently with

licensee procedures and dosimetric standards.

The inspectors evaluated the licensees methods for calculating shallow dose equivalent

from distributed skin contamination or discrete radioactive particles.

The inspectors evaluated the licensees program for neutron dosimetry, including

dosimeter types and/or survey instrumentation. The inspectors reviewed select neutron

exposure situations and assessed whether dosimetry and/or instrumentation was

appropriate for the expected neutron spectra, there was sufficient sensitivity, and

neutron dosimetry was properly calibrated. The inspectors also assessed whether

interference by gamma radiation had been accounted for in the calibration and whether

time and motion evaluations were representative of actual neutron exposure events.

For the special dosimetric situations reviewed in this section, the inspectors assessed

how the licensee assigned dose of record. This included an assessment of external and

internal monitoring results, supplementary information on individual exposures, and

radiation surveys and/or air monitoring results when dosimetry was based on these

techniques.

These inspection activities constituted one complete sample as defined in

IP 71124.04-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

26

.4 Problem Identification and Resolution (02.06)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed whether problems associated with occupational dose

assessment were being identified by the licensee at an appropriate threshold and were

properly addressed for resolution. The inspectors assessed the appropriateness of the

corrective actions for a selected sample of problems documented by the licensee

involving occupational dose assessment.

These inspection constituted one complete sample as defined in IP 71124.04-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency

Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, and

Security

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)

.1 Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical

Hours performance indicator (PI) for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2,

for the period from the first quarter 2016 through the fourth quarter 2016. To determine

the accuracy of the PI data reported during those periods, PI definitions and guidance

contained in the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Document 99-02, Regulatory

Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, dated August 31, 2013, were

used. The inspectors reviewed the licensees operator narrative logs, IRs, event reports,

and NRC integrated inspection reports for the period of January 1, 2016, through

December 31, 2016, to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors also

reviewed the licensees IR database to determine if any problems had been identified

with the PI data collected or transmitted for this indicator, and none were identified.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted two unplanned scrams per 7000 critical hours samples as

defined in IP 71151-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

27

.2 Unplanned Scrams with Complications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Unplanned Scrams with

Complications PI for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2, for the period

from the first quarter 2016 through the fourth quarter 2016. To determine the accuracy of

the PI data reported during those periods, PI definitions and guidance contained in the

NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline,

Revision 7, dated August 31, 2013, were used. The inspectors reviewed the licensees

operator narrative logs, IRs, event reports, and NRC integrated inspection reports for the

period of January 1, 2016 through December 31, 2016, to validate the accuracy of the

submittals. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees IR database to determine if any

problems had been identified with the PI data collected or transmitted for this indicator,

and none were identified. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this

report.

This inspection constituted two unplanned scrams with complications samples as

defined in IP 71151-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Unplanned Transients per

7000 Critical Hours PI for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2, for the

period from the first quarter 2016 through the fourth quarter 2016. To determine the

accuracy of the PI data reported during those periods, PI definitions and guidance

contained in the NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator

Guideline, Revision 7, dated August 31, 2013, were used. The inspectors reviewed the

licensees operator narrative logs, IRs, maintenance rule records, event reports, and

NRC integrated inspection reports for the period of January 1, 2016 through

December 31, 2016 to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors also

reviewed the licensees issue report database to determine if any problems had been

identified with the PI data collected or transmitted for this indicator, and none were

identified. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted two unplanned transients per 7000 critical hours samples as

defined in IP 71151-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

28

.4 Drill and Exercise Performance

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Drill and Exercise

Performance (DEP) Indicator for the fourth quarter 2016. To determine the accuracy

of the PI data reported during that period, PI definitions and guidance contained in the

NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment PI Guideline, Revision 7, were used.

The inspectors reviewed the licensees records associated with the PI to verify that the

licensee accurately reported the DEP indicator, in accordance with relevant procedures

and NEI guidance. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed licensee records and

processes, including procedural guidance on assessing opportunities for the PI;

assessments of PI opportunities during pre-designated control room simulator training

sessions; performance during the 2016 biennial exercise; and performance during other

drills. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constitutes one DEP sample as defined in IP 71151-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.5 Emergency Response Organization Drill Participation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the ERO Drill Participation PI for the

fourth quarter of 2016. To determine the accuracy of the PI data reported during that

period, PI definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory

Assessment PI Guideline, Revision 7, were used. The inspectors reviewed the

licensees records associated with the PI to verify that the licensee accurately reported

the indicator, in accordance with relevant procedures and NEI guidance. Specifically,

the inspectors reviewed licensee records and processes, including procedural guidance

on assessing opportunities for the PI; participation during the 2016 biennial exercise and

other drills; and revisions of the roster of personnel assigned to key ERO positions.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constitutes one ERO drill participation sample as defined in

IP 71151-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.6 Alert and Notification System Reliability

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the ANS PI for the fourth quarter

of 2016. To determine the accuracy of the PI data reported during that period, PI

definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment

PI Guideline, Revision 7, were used. The inspectors reviewed the licensees records

associated with the PI to verify that the licensee accurately reported the indicator, in

29

accordance with relevant procedures and NEI guidance. Specifically, the inspectors

reviewed licensee records and processes, including procedural guidance on

assessing opportunities for the PI and results of periodic ANS operability tests.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constitutes one ANS sample as defined in IP 71151-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152)

.1 Routine Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program

a. Inspection Scope

As discussed in previous sections of this report, the inspectors routinely reviewed issues

during baseline inspection activities and plant status reviews to verify they were being

entered into the licensees CAP at an appropriate threshold, adequate attention was

being given to timely corrective actions, and adverse trends were identified and

addressed. Some minor issues were entered into the licensees CAP as a result of the

inspectors observations; however, they are not discussed in this report.

These routine reviews for the identification and resolution of problems did not constitute

any additional inspection samples. Instead, by procedure they were considered an

integral part of the inspections performed during the quarter.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors selected the following issues and condition reports for in-depth review:

IR 3967424, Unit 1C RHRSW Pump Abnormal Indications;

Aggregate review of operator burdens; and

IR 3985153, Core Spray Keep Fill Valve 1-1402-64B, Stuck.

As appropriate, the inspectors verified the following attributes during their review of the

licensee's corrective actions for the above condition reports and other related condition

reports:

complete and accurate identification of the problem in a timely manner

commensurate with its safety significance and ease of discovery;

consideration of the extent of condition, generic implications, common cause, and

previous occurrences;

evaluation and disposition of operability/functionality/reportability issues;

30

classification and prioritization of the resolution of the problem commensurate with

safety significance;

identification of the root and contributing causes of the problem; and

identification of corrective actions, which were appropriately focused to correct the

problem;

completion of corrective actions in a timely manner commensurate with the safety

significance of the issue;

effectiveness of corrective actions taken to preclude repetition;

evaluate applicability for operating experience and communicate applicable

lessons learned to appropriate organizations.

The inspectors discussed the corrective actions and associated evaluations with

licensee personnel.

This review constituted three in-depth problem identification and resolution inspection

samples as defined in IP 71152.

b. Findings

(1) Failure to Ensure Hardware Secure for Breaker Mechanism Operated Contact Switch

Linkage

Introduction: A finding of very low safety significance and an associated NCV of

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, was self-revealed on January 27, 2017, when the

Unit 1C RHRSW pump was started for a routine surveillance evolution and all expected

annunciators and equipment failed to operate properly. This led to the licensee

declaring the Unit 1C RHRSW pump inoperable. Specifically, the licensee failed to

establish a procedure for the mechanism operated contact (MOC) switch linkage arm

that was appropriate to the circumstances (i.e. ensure the component would continue to

perform its function).

Description: On January 27, 2017, the licensee started the Unit 1C RHRSW pump to

support a RHR pump surveillance. Upon starting the pump, the control room received

an RHRSW pump trip alarm. Equipment operators in the field reported that the 1C

RHRSW pump was running; however, room cooler fans for the pump were not operating

and the breaker light indication for the pump at Bus 14 was not lit. The licensee then

verified the breakers for the pump room cooler fans were closed. Consequently, the

licensee secured the RHR and RHRSW pumps, declared the Unit 1C RHRSW pump

inoperable, and began troubleshooting the issue.

The licensees troubleshooting revealed that the linkage for the Unit 1C RHRSW pump

breaker MOC switch had become disconnected. This prevented the MOC switch, which

controls other component functions (e.g. alarms and room cooler fan operation) through

the use of auxiliary contacts, from functioning as expected.

The licensees equipment CAP evaluation identified that the licensees procedure for

periodic inspection of the breaker cubicle lacked specific guidance to ensure the MOC

switch linkage assembly hardware was adequately fastened. Specifically, the licensees

procedures for performing maintenance and inspections of 4 kilo-volt (kV) breakers

lacked appropriate acceptance criteria or instructions that would ensure the linkage arm

for the MOC switch would not come loose during repeated breaker cycling. The

31

procedure, QCEPM 0200-11, Inspection and Maintenance of Horizontal 4kV Cubicles,

Section 4.5.9.1, directed the user to Verify MOC switch linkage hardware is in place and

tight. The procedure did not specify a method for ensuring the hardware was tight. The

licensee implemented corrective actions to establish appropriate instructions (i.e.

mechanically verify tightness by using a tool, etc.) to ensure the MOC switch linkage

would remain properly secured.

Analysis: The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to establish a procedure

for the MOC switch linkage arm that was appropriate to the circumstances (i.e. ensure

the component would continue to perform its function) was contrary to 10 CFR 50,

Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, and was a

performance deficiency.

The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because the finding

was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of equipment

performance and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability,

reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent

undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to ensure the MOC switch linkage

arm was adequately fastened led to the failure of the component and its associated

1C RHRSW pump during breaker operation on January 27, 2017.

Using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of

Findings, and IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for

Findings at Power, issued June 19, 2012, the finding was screened against the

Mitigating Systems cornerstone and determined to be of very low safety significance

(Green), because the inspectors answered No to all of the questions in Exhibit 2,

Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, Section A, Mitigating SSCs and

Functionality.

The inspectors determined this finding affected the cross-cutting area of human

performance, in the aspect of avoid complacency, which states, Individuals recognize

and plan for the possibility of mistakes, latent issues, and inherent risk, even while

expecting successful outcomes. Specifically, the licensee failed to recognize a potential

risk and inherent latent issue for a condition identified in 2015 at Quad Cities, when a

MOC switch failed to perform its function due to a missing nut in a different breakers

linkage assembly. The licensee identified and corrected the condition, but failed to

evaluate the cause of the missing nut because it did not impact the operability of the

component. In the 2015 instance, the MOC switch issue only affected indications for the

component and had no adverse impact on the ability of the component to perform its

function [H.12].

Enforcement: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures,

and Drawings, requires, in part, that activities affecting quality be prescribed by

documented procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances and be

accomplished in accordance with these procedures. The licensee established

QCEPM 0200-11, Inspection and Maintenance of Horizontal 4kV Cubicles,

Revision 37, as the implementing procedure for performing inspections and maintenance

on 4kV safety-related breaker cubicles, an activity affecting quality.

Contrary to the above, prior to January 27, 2017, licensee procedure QCEPM 0200-11

failed to be of a type appropriate to the circumstances. Specifically, procedure

32

QCEPM 0200-11 did not contain instruction to ensure that the MOC switch linkage

arm was adequately fastened and would continue to perform its function. On

January 27, 2017, during operation of the 1C RHRSW pump breaker, the MOC switch

linkage arm became disconnected, preventing the MOC switch from performing its

function, and led the licensee to declare the 1C RHRSW pump inoperable.

The licensees corrective actions included reconnecting the MOC switch linkage arm

assembly and testing it by starting the 1C RHRSW pump prior to declaring the pump

operable. In addition, the licensee planned procedure revisions to QCEPM 0200-11 that

would specify a torque value to ensure the MOC switch linkage arm was adequately

secured and could perform its function. Because the violation was of very low safety

significance and was entered into the licensees CAP as IR 3967424, this violation is

being treated as a NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

(NCV 05000254/2017001-01; 05000265/2017001-01; Failure to Ensure Hardware

Secure for Breaker MOC Switch Linkage)

4OA3 Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153)

.1 Unit 2 Alert Declared Following a Fire that Caused Damage to E Automatic

Depressurization System Indication and Control Circuitry

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the plants response to a small fire in the Unit 2 control room

panel that caused damage to the E automatic depressurization system (ADS)

electromatic relief valve (ERV) indication and control circuitry.

At approximately 7:29 p.m. on February 1, 2017, a reactor operator was changing the

closed-light indication light bulb on Unit 2 E ADS valve, 2-0203-3E. After inserting the

new bulb with a bulb tool (a rubber sleeve that holds the small bulb), the operator

noticed sparking, and attempted to remove the bulb. When he removed the light, the

bulb had separated from the base, leaving the base in the light socket. The reactor

operator noticed arcing continued and went to the back of the control panel and

identified a flame in the underside of the panel. Another operator in the control room

retrieved a fire extinguisher and discharged a short burst to extinguish the flame, the

flame was out at 7:32 p.m. No equipment operated and no annunciators were received.

The Unit 2 supervisor declared the E ADS valve inoperable and the licensee entered

Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) 3.4.3, RCS Safety and Relief Valves,

Condition A, for one relief valve inoperable and LCO 3.5.1, ECCS [Emergency Core

Cooling Systems]Operating, Condition H, for one ADS valve inoperable. The

licensee subsequently declared an ALERT at 7:38 p.m. for Emergency Action

Level MA5, Hazardous event affecting a SAFETY SYSTEM required for the current

operating mode. Specifically, the Emergency Action Level conditions present were: a

FIRE AND the event caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to a SAFETY SYSTEM component or

structure required by TS for the current operating mode.

Following visual inspections of the control panel and verifications that there were no

other equipment issues impacting plant operations, the licensee terminated from the

event at 11:36 p.m on February 1, 2017.

33

Licensee corrective actions included replacing the light sockets and wiring for the open

and closed indications for the E ADS valve, in addition to replacing the fuses for both

the normal and alternate power supplies for the control circuitry. The licensee declared

the E ADS valve operable on February 2, 2017. Both units remained at full power

throughout the event.

The licensee entered this issue into their CAP as IR 3969324, Light Socket for 2-203-3E

Damaged during Bulb Change, and their root cause evaluation was in-progress at the

end of this inspection period. This event follow-up review, including inspection of the

licensees evaluation of the event and planned corrective actions was in-progress at the

end of this inspection period and continued into the next inspection period.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This event follow-up review constituted a partial sample and continued into the next

inspection period.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 05000254/2017-001-00: Secondary Containment

Interlock Doors Opened Simultaneously

On January 24, 2017, the licensee identified that both doors in the secondary

containment interlock on the 595 elevation between the reactor building and the Unit 2

reactor feed pump room were opened simultaneously for approximately 3 seconds. This

resulted in the licensee making an unplanned entry into LCO 3.6.4.1, Condition A, for an

inoperable secondary containment. The licensee immediately closed the interlock doors

to reestablish secondary containment and administratively controlled personnel entry

and egress through the doors thereafter. The inspectors determined this issue was

minor because secondary containment pressure remained negative throughout the

condition, although the event resulted in an unplanned entry into the licensees TS. The

cause of the event was a dirty contact that caused the interlock relay to stick. Corrective

actions taken by the licensee included inspecting and cleaning of the interlock relay

contacts.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee event report (LER). No findings or violations of

NRC requirements were identified. This LER is closed.

This event follow-up review constituted one sample as defined in IP 71153-05.

4OA5 Other Activities

.1 (Closed) NRC Temporary Instruction 2515/192, Inspection of the Licensees Interim

Compensatory Measures Associated with the Open Phase Condition Design

Vulnerabilities in Electric Power Systems

a. Inspection Scope

The objective of this performance based Temporary Instruction is to verify

implementation of interim compensatory measures associated with an open phase

34

condition (OPC) design vulnerability in electric power system for operating reactors. The

inspectors conducted an inspection to determine if the licensee had implemented the

following interim compensatory measures. These compensatory measures are to

remain in place until permanent automatic detection and protection schemes are

installed and declared operable for OPC design vulnerability. The inspectors verified the

following:

The licensee had identified and discussed with plant staff the lessons-learned

from the OPC events at the US operating plants, including the Byron station OPC

event and its consequences. This included conducting operator training for

promptly diagnosing, recognizing consequences, and responding to an OPC

event.

The licensee had updated plant operating procedures to help operators promptly

diagnose and respond to OPC events on off-site power sources credited for safe

shutdown of the plant.

The licensee had established and continues to implement periodic walkdown

activities to inspect switchyard equipment such as insulators, disconnect

switches, and transmission line and transformer connections associated with the

offsite power circuits to detect a visible OPC.

The licensee had ensured that routine maintenance and testing activities on

switchyard components have been implemented and maintained. As a part of

the maintenance and testing activities, the licensee assessed and managed plant

risk in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) requirements.

a. Findings and Observations

No findings of significance were identified. The inspectors verified the criteria were met.

.2 (Closed) Unresolved Item 05000254/2013003-02; 05000265/2013003-02: Question

Concerning Licensing Bases of the Ultimate Heat Sink

a. Inspection Scope

During the 2013 Triennial Heat Sink Inspection, the inspectors identified an unresolved

item (URI) concerning the current licensing bases with respect to failure of Lock and

Dam No. 14 on the Mississippi River. Specifically, the inspectors were concerned that

the licensee had revised its licensing basis as a result of a 1998 UFSAR change without

NRC approval. The licensees historical documents stated the loss of river event was

from a loss of Dam No. 14, whereas the current UFSAR discusses the loss of river event

as damage to the lock. However, there was no discussion in the historical documents as

to what caused Dam No. 14 failure or the extent of the failure. Although both causes

result in the river being disconnected from the plant, there would be a significant time

difference as to how long it would be before the river was no longer available to cool

plant equipment and the amount of time available for the plant staff to identify and take

appropriate actions to address the failure at the dam.

The licensee revised the UFSAR to clarify the loss of river event based on the Ashton

Study, Study of Mississippi River Water Stage at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Plant,

dated April 24, 1998, which was performed to resolve a previous NRC URI with the loss

of dam event. This issue concerned the effects of the ultimate heat sink (UHS)

temperature being above the design temperature limit for several plant components

35

cooled by the service water systems. This issue was documented in NRC Inspection

Report 05000254/1998201; 05000265/1998201 (ML9805180380) and subsequently

closed in NRC Inspection Report 05000254/1998019; 05000265/1998019

(ML9812290041). The closure of the 1998 URI was based on the results of the Ashton

study, which concluded that the most likely failure of the dam was a navigation event

that would result in the loss of the dam lock. The study concluded that it would take 48

hours for the river level to lower to the point it disconnected from the UHS. In addition,

the study concluded based on the assumed low seismic region where the dam was

located, a seismic event would not cause a failure of the dam, but result in the inability to

operate the dams rolling and miter gates. In addition, subsequent to the UFSAR

change, the NRC granted Quad Cities an amendment for an extended power uprate,

dated December 21, 2001. The Safety Evaluation Report associated with this

amendment (ML013540222) discussed the loss of dam event using the clarified UFSAR

wording of the lock failure as a basis for its approval.

Based on the review of historical records and discussions with the Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation, the inspectors did not identify a concern with the current licensing

basis with respect to the failure of Mississippi River Lock and Dam No. 14. As a result,

this URI is closed.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 (Closed) Unresolved Item 05000254/2013003-04; 05000265/2013003-04: Question

Concerning Availability of Dam Following a Seismic Event

a. Inspection Scope

During the 2013 Triennial Heat Sink Inspection, the inspectors identified a URI

concerning the assumed availability of Mississippi River Lock and Dam No.14 following

a design bases earthquake event. Discussion in the UFSAR implied the river was

considered available during a Design Basis Event (DBE) even though the downstream

dam was not designed or constructed to remain functional during the assumed DBE.

Although the site appeared to be within their licensing bases (assume availability of the

river during a DBE), the inspectors questioned whether this assumption considered

actual potential consequences, i.e., the need to assume a loss of dam during a seismic

event.

The NRC issued Order EA-12-049, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to

Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond Design-Basis External Events,

dated March 12, 2012, which is being addressed by licensees based on the guidance of

NEI 12-06, Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide. Per

Section 5 of the guidance document, the licensee was to address impact on the

availability of the UHS that relies on a non-seismically robust downstream dam to

contain water used as the source of water for the UHS. The licensee submitted their

response in a letter, Overall Integrated Plan in Response to March 12, 2012,

Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation

Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049),

dated February 28, 2013. The NRC reviewed the licensee plan and issued Quad Cities

Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2Interim Staff Evaluation Relating to Overall

36

Integrated Plan in Response to Order EA-12-049 (Mitigation Strategies), dated

November 22, 2013. The evaluation stated the integrated plan to address the order did

not provide sufficient information to evaluate conformance with NEI 12-06,

Consideration 3. As a result, the NRC established Open Item 3.1.1.2.B for licensees to

assess a postulated downstream dam failure from a seismic event. In a letter, Fifth

Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying

Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond Design-Basis

External Events (Order Number EA-12-049), dated August 28, 2015, the licensee

documented its proposed actions to address this scenario from a FLEX standpoint. This

included designing and installing a single deep well as a seismically qualified source of

water for the FLEX mitigation strategy. This single deep well would be fully capable of

supplying both Unit 1 and Unit 2 FLEX requirements simultaneously. The alternate

approach discussed in the letter consisted of a FLEX pump and portable submersible

pump that would take suction from the discharge canal. The discharge canal would

supply the necessary backup water supply. Although the discharge canal has not been

seismically evaluated, there is reasonable assurance that this water supply will remain

available as a source of water following a seismic event effecting the downstream dam

due to the size of the two diffuser pipes which connect to the main channel of the

Mississippi River.

These actions will be reviewed by the NRC in a safety evaluation to assess the

licensees response to the order. Since this URI is being addressed by NRC Order

EA-12-049, this URI is closed.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA6 Management Meetings

.1 Exit Meeting Summary

On April 11, 2017, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. S. Darin, and

other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented.

The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was

considered proprietary.

.2 Interim Exit Meetings

Interim exits were conducted for:

The results of the ultimate heat sink URI inspection was conducted by phone with

Mr. T. Petersen, Regulatory Assurance Lead, on February 27, 2017.

The results of the Emergency Preparedness Program inspection were presented

to Mr. K. Ohr, Plant Manager, on March 9, 2017.

The results of the Radiation Safety Program review were presented to

Mr. S. Darin, Site Vice President, on March 31, 2017.

The results of the ISI inspection were presented to Mr. S. Darin, Site Vice

President, and other members of the licensee staff on March 31, 2017.

37

The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was

considered proprietary. Proprietary material received during the inspection was returned

to the licensee.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

38

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

S. Darin, Site Vice President

W. Beck, Regulatory Assurance Manager

J. Bries, Operations Support and Services Senior Manager

J. Colgan, Chemistry Supervisor

D. Collins, Radiation Protection Manager

R. Craddick, Performance Improvement Manager

H. Dodd, Operations Director

G. Harris, Fleet Assessment

R. Hight, Maintenance Director

D. Luebbe, Work Control Manager

T. Petersen, Regulatory Assurance Lead

R. Sieprawski, Training Support Manager

T. Wojcik, Engineering Manager

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

K. Stoedter, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 1

R. Murray, Senior Resident Inspector

K. Carrington, Resident Inspector

Illinois Emergency Management Agency

C. Mathews, IEMA

C. Settles, IEMA

Attachment

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

05000254/2017001-01; NCV Failure to Ensure Hardware Secure for Breaker MOC

05000265/2017001-01 Switch Linkage (Section 4OA2.3)

Closed

05000254/2017001-01; NCV Failure to Ensure Hardware Secure for Breaker MOC

05000265/2017001-01 Switch Linkage (Section 4OA2.3)05000254/2017001-00 LER Secondary Containment Interlock Doors Opened

Simultaneously (Section 4OA3.2)

2515/192 TI Inspection of the Licensee Interim Compensatory

Measures Associated with the Open Phase Condition

Design Vulnerabilities in Electric Power Systems

(Section 4OA5.1)05000254/2013003-02; URI Question Concerning Licensing Bases of the Ultimate

05000265/2013003-02 Heat Sink (Section 4OA5.2)05000254/2013003-04; URI Question Concerning Availability of Dam Following a

05000264/2013003-04 Seismic Event (Section 4OA5.3)

Discussed

None.

2

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

The following is a partial list of documents reviewed during the inspection. Inclusion on this list

does not imply that the NRC inspector reviewed the documents in their entirety, but rather that

selected sections or portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection

effort. Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or

any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report.

Section Document Description or Title Revision or

Number Number Date

Section 1R01

1R01 WC-A-107: Seasonal ReadinessRevision 18

Summary of Changes

1R01 2016 Site Winter Readiness Challenge Meeting

1R01 SVP 16-072 2016-2017 Quad Cities Certification Letter for 11/18/2016

Winter Readiness

1R01 WC-AA-107 Seasonal Readiness 17

Section 1R04

1R04 QCOP 6600-23 Unit 1 Diesel Generator Preparation for Standby 2

Operation

1R04 QCOP 6600-24 Unit 2 Diesel Generator Preparation for Standby 2

Operation

1R04 QOM 2-1300-01 RCIC Valves on Rack 2202-58 Checklist (RCIC 4

Room)

1R04 QOM 2-1300-02 Unit 2 RCIC Valve Checklist 11

1R04 GEK-9597 Chapter 27

1R04 QOM 2-6900-12 250 Vdc Reactor Building MCC 2B Breaker 7

Checklist

1R04 QCOS 1000-26 RHR Valve Position Verification 23

1R04 QCOP 1900-23 Unit 1 Fuel Pool Cooling System Startup and 13

Shutdown

Section 1R05

1R05 FZ 11.2.1 Quad Cites Generating Station Pre-Fire Plan: July 2009

Unit 1 RB 554-0 Elev. SW Corner Room1B

Core Spray

1R05 Fire Hazards Analysis Methodology and Revision 21

Assumptions

1R05 FZ 8.2.6.B Unit 1 Turbine Bldg, El. 595-0 L.P. Heater Bay October

2013

1R05 FZ 8.2.7.B Unit 1 Turbine Bldg. El. 615-6 LP Heater Bay October

(East)/D Heater Bay 2013

1R05 FZ 8.2.7.C Unit 1/2 Turbine Bldg Mezzanine Floor

Section 1R06

1R06 IR 2207744 Pan 125 1D RHRSW Vault Penetration LLRT 09/11/2014

Exceeds 50 SCFH

1R06 IR 2386350 High Leakage Rate on 2D RHRSW Vault 09/25/2014

Penetration

1R06 IR 2386366 High Leakage Rate on 2D RHRSW Vault 09/25/2014

Penetration

1R06 IR 2711786 Water in Cable Vaults 09/02/2016

3

1R06 IR 3943664 MK-504 1D RHRSW Vault Penetration Exceeds 11/21/2016

50 SCFH

1R06 IR 3953663 MK-478 1D RHRSW Vault Penetration Exceeds 11/21/2016

50 SCFH

1R06 IR 3974107 NRC ID: Corroded Piping Penetration 02/14/2017

1R06 IR 3974108 NRC ID: Mounting Plate Corroded 02/14/2017

1R06 IR 3974132 NRC ID: 2D RHR SW Pump Oil Bubbler Darker 02/14/2017

Than Others

1R06 IR 3974143 NRC ID: 1B/C RHRSW Vault Door Seal Worn 02/14/2017

1R06 Drawing FL-1 Flood Barriers Basement Floor D

1R06 QCOS 0100-01 Unit 1 RHR Service Water Vault Flood Seal 1

Leakage Testing

1R06 QCOS 0100-02 Unit 2 RHR Service Water Vault Flood Seal 1

Leakage Testing

1R06 QCTP 0130-14 Evaluation of RHRSW Vault Flood Protection

Leakage Test Results

1R06 QCTP 0130-14, 1A RHRSW VaultEvaluation for Condensate 08/07/2015

Attachment A Pump Room

1R06 QCTP 0130-14, 1B/C RHRSW VaultEvaluation for 06/06/2016

Attachment B Condensate Pump Room Flood

1R06 QCTP 0130-14, Evaluation of Flood Barriers Between 1A and 08/07/2015

Attachment D 1B/C RHRSW Vaults

1R06 QCOS 0100-01, 1D and 1B/C RHR Service Water Vault Wall 11/18/2016

Attachment E

1R06 QCOS 0100-01, 1D RHR Service Water Vault Condensate Pump 11/18/2016

Attachment C Room Wall

1R06 QCTP 0130-14, 2A RHRSW VaultEvaluation for Condensate 06/08/2016

Attachment F Pump Room Flood

1R06 QCOS 0100-02, 2B/C RHR Service Water Vault Condensate 09/24/2016

Attachment B Pump Room Wall

1R06 QCOS 0100-02, Evaluation of Flood Barriers Between 2A and 06/07/2016

Attachment I 2B/C RHRSW Vaults

1R06 QCOS 0100-02, 2D and 2B/C RHR Service Water Vault Wall 11/18/2016

Attachment E

1R06 QDC-0030-M- Determination of Allowable Leakage Rates for 12/01/1998

0772 RHRSW Vaults Flood Protection

Section 1R07

1R07 ER-AA-340- Service Water Heat Exchanger Inspection 6

1002 Guide

1R07 WO 1757717 Clean/Inspect Heat Exchanger Control Room 01/11/2017

HVAC Train B RCU Condenser

1R07 EC 39054 Request Torque on End Caps for RCU 0-9400- 00

102

1R07 IR 3962368 B Control Room HVAC Inspection Results 01/12/2017

Section 1R08

1R08 IR 2464920 Indications Found during NDE on Reactor Head 03/07/2015

Vent Piping

1R08 IR 2465233 PSUIVVI New Indication on Core Spray Weld 03/08/2015

2P4D

4

1R08 IR 2465734 FME1 x 1/2 Diameter Round Stock Found in 03/09/2015

RPV Annulus

1R08 IR 2466464 FME Historical 3/8 Steel Flat Washer on Top of 03/10/2015

Tie Rod

1R08 IR 2267257 FME PSU Ball Bearing Case Found in RPV 03/12/2015

1R08 IR 2467669 PSU Q1R23 IVI Jet Pump 2 & 7 AD-3 Weld 03/12/2015

Indications

1R08 IR 2467887 Flange on Piping Is Damaged and Needs 03/13/2015

Repair

1R08 IR 2468353 FME Q1R23 Manual Core Spray Injection Tool 03/13/2016

Failure

1R08 IR 2545901 Unit 1 Shroud Weld IVVI Exams Not in 08/25/2015

Compliance with BRWVIP

1R08 IR 2682384 Foreign Material Identified in Spent Fuel Pool 06/16/2016

1R08 EC 400050 Evaluation of Q1R23 IVVI Inspection Findings 0

1R08 ER-AA-335-003 Magnetic Particle Examination 7

1R08 ER-AA-335-010 Guidelines for ASME Code Allowable Flaw 6

Evaluation and ASME Code Coverage

Calculations

1R08 ER-AA-335- VT-1 Visual Examination in Accordance with 0

014-2008 ASME 2007 Edition, 2008 Addenda

1R08 ER-AA-335-016 VT-3 Visual Examination of Component 10

Supports, Attachments and Interiors of Reactor

Vessels

1R08 ER-AA-335-018 Visual Examination of ASME IWE Class MC and 12

Metallic Liners of IWL Class CC Components

1R08 ER-AA-335- Code Acceptance & Recording Criteria for 4

1008 Nondestructive (NDE) Surface Examination

1R08 ER-AA-335-F- PDI Generic Procedure for the Ultrasonic 1

02 Examination of Ferritic Pipe Welds

1R08 GEH-PDI-UT-1 PDI Generic Procedure for the Ultrasonic 10

Examination of Ferritic Pipe Welds

1R08 NDE Report Elbow-Pipe Weld 30A-S11 03/30/2017

Q1R24-UT-016

1R08 NDE Report Elbow-Pipe Weld 30B-S10 03/30/2017

Q1R24-UT-017

1R08 NDE Report Guide with 8 Lugs Welded to Pipe 03/29/2017

Q1R24-MT-001

1R08 NDE Report Variable Spring Can with 4 Lugs Welded to Pipe 03/29/2017

Q1R24-MT-004

1R08 NDE Report Collar-Torus Shell 03/28/2017

Q1R24-MT-005

1R08 NDE Report 17- General Visual Examination: ASME IWE (Class 04/10/2017

VT3-024 MC) Containment and IWL (Class CC) Metallic

Liners

1R08 NDE Report Flued Head Anchor 03/29/2017

Q1R24-VT-001

1R08 NDE Report Box Guide 03/28/2017

Q1R24-VT-015

5

1R08 NDE Report 4 Lugs Welded to Pipe 03/29/2017

Q1R24-VT-016

1R08 NDE Report 2 Variable Spring Cans 03/29/2017

Q1R24-VT-022

1R08 PQR 1-50C 01/03/1984

1R08 PQR A-001 10/19/1998

1R08 PQR A-002 03/09/1999

1R08 WO 1636433-01 MM Upgrade U1 Head Vent Line Socket Welds 03/12/2015

to EPRI 2: 1 Welds

1R08 WO 1636433-07 MM ContingentRepair Indication(s) Found 03/11/2015

During PT Exams

1R08 WO 1877257-01 MM Re-route Piping as Required to Support 11/20/2015

New Motor Install

1R08 WPQ ID No. Record No. WPQ22427 11/12/2013

V9896

1R08 WPQ ID No. 50 Record No. WPQ12116 07/30/2003

1R08 WPQ ID No. Record No. WPQ14848 01/23/2007

N1206

1R08 WPQ ID No. Record No. WPQ22292 03/15/2012

T2733

1R08 WPQ ID No. Record No. WPQ21376 03/07/2012

T2733

1R08 WPS 1-1- 2

GTSM-PWHT

1R08 IR 3990603 NRC IdentifiedDocumentation Issue in Q1R23 03/28/2017

90-Day Report

1R08 IR 3991149 LL Q1R24NRC In-Office Preparation Week 03/29/2017

Document Request

1R08 IR 3991531 Q1R24 ISI Inspection: Issue with ECR 418116 03/30/2017

on Material Removed

1R08 IR 3991743 Q1R24 ISI Inspection: Observation on 03/30/2017

Procedure CC-AA-407

Section 1R11

1R11 QCGP 2-1 Normal Unit Shutdown 87

1R11 QCOP 1000-05 Shutdown Cooling Operation 53

1R11 Reactor Shutdown JITT March 2017

1R11 Reactor Start-up JITT March 2017

Section 1R12

1R12 Maintenance Rule Criteria Exceeded

Spreadsheet for DC 8300-01 and DC 8300-02

1R12 System Report Details (Units 1 and 2)125

Vdc

1R12 Unit 1, DC8300, System Health Report 01/01/2016-

03/31/2016

1R12 Unit 2, DC8300, System Health Report 01/01/2016-

03/31/2016

1R12 EACE 2736223 1A 125 Vdc Charger Ripple Voltage Step

Change During the 4 Hour Load Test

1R12 IR 1646354 901-8 A9 125 Vdc Battery Charger Trip Alarm. 04/11/2014

1A Charger On

6

1R12 IR 1653585 U1 125 Vdc Charger 1A Failed to Meet 125 Vdc 04/30/2014

& 200 Amps

1R12 IR 2732501 1A Charger Has a Step Change in AC Ripple 10/25/2016

Volts

1R12 IR 2736593 1A 125 Vdc Battery Would Not Load up to 200 11/03/2016

Amps

1R12 IR 2511446 Received Unexpected Alarm 901-8 A-7, Diesel 06/07/2015

Gen 1 Trouble

1R12 IR 2516072 NRC Question Posed on U-2 EDG Operability 06/17/2015

1R12 IR 2532957 U1 EDG Trouble Alarm Received 07/26/2015

1R12 IR 2591780 Unit 2 EDG Oil Pump Issue 11/24/2015

1R12 IR 2594097 IST Unfavorable Trend: U0 EDG Fuel Oil 12/01/2015

Transfer Pump Flow

1R12 IR 2646558 Spurious 1/2 EDG Engine High Temp Alarm After 03/28/2016

S/D

1R12 IR 2654576 Replace Engine Protective Relays on Unit 1/2 04/12/2016

EDG

1R12 IR 2655056 Replace Field Flash Cutout Relay on Unit 1 04/13/2016

EDG

1R12 IR 2655063 Replace Field Flash Cutout Relay on Unit 1/2 04/13/2016

EDG

1R12 IR 2713622 Re-Evaluate DGCW Operability/EDG HX Flow 09/08/2016

Rate Requirements

1R12 IR 3965676 Received Momentary 1/2 EDG High Temperature 01/23/2017

Section 1R13

1R13 Work Week 17-02-05 Safety Profile

1R13 Work Week 17-09-12 Safety Profile

1R13 OU-QC-104, Q1R24 Risk Factor ChartMode 4, 5 and 03/27-

Attachment 1 Defueled 03/31/2017

1R13 Q1R24 Shutdown Safety Report 03/26-

03/31-2017

Section 1R15

1R15 IR 3968961 QCOS 1000-29 Not Completed as Scheduled 02/01/2017

due to M&TE Issue

1R15 IR 469542 IM Shop Unaware of Inaccuracies Associated 03/22/2006

with Fluke 45 Use

1R15 OE 180293 Calibration Methods Result in Non-Linearity of 05/29/1999

Rosemount 1154H Transmitters

1R15 OE 11896 Test Instrument High Input Impedance Causes 05/25/2000

Non-Linearity In Transmitter Calibration at

Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 1

1R15 IR 3971856 1D RHRSW Trip Fuses Worked Out of Fuse 02/08/2017

Holder

1R15 IR 3967424 1C RHRSW Pump Abnormal Indications 01/27/2017

1R15 IR 3970782 Extent of Condition for IR 3967424 (Cubicle 1- 02/06/2017

6705-13-1-1)

1R15 IR 3969273 Extent of Condition for IR 3967424 (MOC 02/01/2017

Switch Hardware Insp)

7

1R15 IR 3970964 Extent of Condition for IR 3967424 (Cubicle 1- 02/06/2017

6703-13-1)

1R15 ECAP 3971856 1D RHRSW Trip Fuses Worked Out of Fuse 03/31/2017

Holder

Section 1R19

1R19 WO 1961658 RCIC Pump Operability (IST) 01/11/2017

1R19 QCEMS 0210- Battery Charger Testing for Safety Related 15

02 125 Vdc Batteries

1R19 WO 1846331 2-125 Battery Charger Terminal Board and 01/18/2017

Potentiometer EC 402467

1R19 QCOS 6600-06 Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump Flow 45

Rate Test

Section 1R20

1R20 QDC-0200-N- Q1R24 Decay Heat and Related Calculations 0

2257

1R20 QCGP 2-1 Normal Unit Shutdown 87

1R20 Q1R24 Shutdown Safety Plan 0

1R20 Q1R24 Raw Water Management Plan

1R20 QCOP 0201-13 Reactor Level Upper Wide Range Reference 10

Leg Extension Use and Control

1R20 QCOP 0201-14 Reactor Vessel Level Control Using a Local 11

Pressure Gauge

1R20 QCOP 1000-05 Shutdown Cooling Operation 53

1R20 QCOP 1000-44 Alternate Decay Heat Removal 24

1R20 QCOP 6100-33 Unit 1 Main Power Transformer Backfeed 8

Operation

1R20 QCTS 0600-05 Main Steam Isolation Valve Local Leak Rate 17

Test (AO-1(2)-203-1A/B/C/D, AO-1(2)-203-

2A/B/C/D)

1R20 IR 3989801 PSU Unit 1 SRM 23 Not Tracking 03/27/2017

1R20 IR 3990176 PSU Q1R24 NRC ID Oil Leak in U1 DW 03/27/2017

1R20 IR 3990198 PSU 1-0203-3D ERV Steady Stream of Water 03/27/2017

Leakage

1R20 IR 3990244 Q1R24 PSU MSIV 1-0203-1A LLRT Exceeded 03/27/2017

TS Limit

1R20 IR 3990246 Q1R24 PSUINBD MSIV 1-0203-1D 03/27/2017

Exceeded TS Limit

1R20 IR 3990247 PSU Q1R24 OUTBD MSIV 1-0203-2C 03/27/2017

Exceeded TS Limit

1R20 IR 3990255 PSU Q1R24: 1-0203-3D ERV Pilot Valve 03/28/2017

Leaking

1R20 IR 3990285 PSU Unexpected Rod Block from SDV High 03/28/2017

Level

1R20 IR 3990393 PSU Q1R24 1C RHR Pump Seal Cooler Piping 03/28/2017

Clogged

1R20 IR 3990758 PSU Q1R24 2C Outboard MSIV Found Outside 03/29/2017

of 9.8%

1R20 IR 3990885 PSU Q1R24 1-0220-105B Failed Outage PM 03/29/2016

Opening Force Check

8

1R20 IR 3991086 PSU Q1R24 1A MSIV PMT Leakage Exceeds 03/29/2017

TS Limit

1R20 SPOG: 1-3-C System Planning Operating Guide 11

Section 1R22

1R22 QCIS 1000-09 RHR Pump Discharge Pressure Calibration and 9

Functional Test

1R22 IR 3964960 PS 1-1053e Valve Had Slow Leakby 01/20/2017

1R22 QCOS 6600-37 Unit 1 EDG Largest Load Reject Surveillance 31

1R22 QCOS 6600-39 Unit 2 EDG Largest Load Reject Surveillance 29

1R22 QCOS 6600-44 Unit Diesel Generator Timed Start Test 22

1R22 IR 3950031 1/2 EDG Coolant Temperature Switch Alarmed 12/06/2016

Below Setpoint

1R22 IR 3949824 1/2 EDG Did Not Start During QCOP 6600-58 12/06/2016

Hot Fast Restart

1R22 IR 3943740 2nd LVL UV Relay 2-6706-1274-B241 11/21/2016

Contacts Found Degraded

1R22 QCOS 1000-43 Unit 2 A Loop Low Pressure Coolant Injection 26

(LPCI) and Containment Cooling Modes of

RHRs Non-Outage Logic Test

1R22 Drawing 4E- Schematic Diagram Core Spray Systems I and BD

1430 II

1R22 Drawing 4E- Schematic Diagram Core Spray Motor Operated Y

1431 Valves

1R22 Drawing 4E- Schematic Diagram Core Spray Motor Operated U

1432 Valves

1R22 QCOS 1400-16 Unit 1 Division II Core Spray Logic Functional 7

Test

1R22 QCOP 0201-18 Hydro Test Pump Operation 1

1R22 QCOS 1400-19 Core Spray Pressure Isolation Valve Seat 0

Leakage Test

Section 1EP2

1EP2 FEMA ANS Design Basis Report May 2013

1EP2 FEMA ANS Letter for Backup ANS 12/10/2012

1EP2 Siren Testing and Maintenance Data July 2015-

February

2017

1EP2 IR 2533243 EPSiren Failure (QC37) 07/27/2015

1EP2 IR 2534053 Potential Site Wide Trend in EP Facilities & 07/28/2015

Equipment

1EP2 IR 2543847 EPSiren Failure (QC37) 08/19/2017

1EP2 IR 2558312 EPSiren Failure (QC05) 09/21/2015

1EP2 IR 2565873 EPInvestigation of Siren Failures (QC37, 10/05/2015

QC39)

1EP2 IR 2581456 EPSiren Failure (QC05) 11/03/2015

1EP2 IR 2724917 EP1st Half 2016 MW ANS Siren Trend 10/06/2016

1EP2 IR 3983549 EPSiren Design Report Approval Letter Not 03/07/2017

Provided to NRC

9

Section 1EP3

1EP3 2015 Station Off-hours Drive-in Augmentation 09/30/2015

and Performance Indicator Drills Findings and

Observation Report

1EP3 First Quarter of 2016 ERO Augmentation Drill 03/02/2016

Report

1EP3 Fourth Quarter of 2015 ERO Augmentation Drill 12/05/2015

Report

1EP3 Fourth Quarter of 2016 ERO Augmentation Drill 10/20/2016

Report

1EP3 Second Quarter of 2016 ERO Augmentation 06/25/2016

Drill Report

1EP3 Selected Station Emergency Response

Personnel Training Records

1EP3 Third Quarter of 2016 ERO Augmentation Drill 09/23/2016

Report

1EP3 IR 2715584 MA/MW ERO Notification System Delayed 09/13/2016

Notifications

1EP3 IR 2716129 Everbridge Delay in ERO Notification For Call-In 09/13/2016

Drill

Section 1EP5

1EP5 EP-QC-1000 Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Radiological 0

Emergency Plan

1EP5 EP-AA-1006 Radiological Emergency Plan Annex For Quad 38

Cities Station

1EP5 EP-AA-1006, Emergency Action Levels For Quad Cities 2

Addendum 3 Station

1EP5 EP-AA-122 Drills and Exercise Program 18

1EP5 EP-AA-125 Emergency Preparedness Self Evaluation 10

Process

1EP5 NOSA-QDC- Emergency Preparedness Audit Report 04/20/2016

16-03

1EP5 Quad Cities Alert Event Report February 1, 03/01/2017

2017

1EP5 Pre-2017 NRC EP Routine/Program PI 01/17/2017

Verification Inspection

1EP5 Apparent Cause Investigation Report 901-54 12/09/2016

C1 Offgas Condenser Hi Level Unexpected

Alarm

1EP5 IR 3970216 Observations from the MCR During E-Plan 02/01/2017

Execution

1EP5 IR 3979009 QDC-EP-2017-MA5ALERT-TSC-OTHER 02/27/2017

Issues

1EP5 IR 3970213 ENS Line Communication Issue During E-Plan 02/01/2017

Execution

1EP5 IR 3970242 EP-REAL Event (QDC Alert)-EOF-FAILED 02/01/2017

Objective

1EP5 IR 3970210 Bridge Line Issue Identified During E-Plan 02/01/2017

Execution

10

1EP5 IR 3972155 EP-REAL EVENT (QDC ALERT)-EOF- 02/01/2017

FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT Issues

1EP5 IR 2655742 NOS ID: 5 of 13 Forms Were Not Initialed, 04/14/2016

Signed, or Checked

1EP5 IR 2733875 Potential Trend in EP Facilities & Equipment 10/28/2016

1EP5 IR 2742255 QC EP NRC Graded Exercise OSC 11/16/2016

Performance

1EP5 IR 2742262 QC EP NRC Graded Exercise TSC 11/16/2016

Performance

1EP5 IR 2742202 QC EP NRC Graded Exercise CR/SIM 11/16/2016

Performance

1EP5 IR 2737679 SJAE Rad Monitors Reading Low 11/05/2016

1EP5 IR 3949032 QDC-EP-2016-NRC-TSC-OTHER Issues 11/16/2016

1EP5 IR 3970920 Reinforce Expectations for EP Event Response 02/01/2017

1EP5 Most current review of Letters of Agreement

with: St. Joseph Medical Center, General

Electric, Rock Island County Sheriff, Cordova

Fire Protection District, Trinity Medical Center,

Silvis Campus Hospital

Section 1EP6

1EP6 1Q17 PI Drill 2017 1st Qtr PI DrillQuad Cities Generating 02/15/2017

Station

Section 2RS1

2RS1 IR 3964145-04 Check-In: NRC RPExposure Controls 02/26/2017

Inspection

2RS1 Quad Cities Radiation Protection; 2015 Alpha 12/29/2015

Assessment

2RS1 Quad Cities Radiation Protection; 2016 Alpha 12/27/2016

Assessment

2RS1 Radioactive Source Inventory 08/31/2016

2RS1 Radioactive Source Inventory 02/23/2017

2RS1 Semi-Annual Source Leak Test Report 08/31/2016

2RS1 Semi-Annual Source Leak Test Report 02/24/2017

2RS1 RP-AA-210 Dosimetry Issue, Usage, and Control 27

2RS1 RP-AA-300 Radiological Survey Program 14

2RS1 RP-QC-300- Radiological Survey Surveillance Program 11

1001

2RS1 RP-AA-301 Radiological Air Sampling Program 10

2RS1 RP-AA-302 Determination of Alpha Levels and Monitoring 8

2RS1 RP-AA-350- Response to Guardhouse Portal Monitor Alarms 2

1001

2RS1 RP-AA-460 Controls for High and Locked Radiation Areas 29

2RS1 RP-QC-460- High Radiation Area Inspections 7

1002

2RS1 RWP QC-01- Radiation Work Permit and Associated ALARA 1

17-00510 File; DW Main Steam Safety Relief Valve

Activities (Q1R24)

2RS1 RWP QC-01- Radiation Work Permit and Associated ALARA 0

17-00519 File; DW Insulation Activities (Q1R24)

11

2RS1 RWP QC-01- Radiation Work Permit and Associated ALARA 0

17-00541 File; DW I/B MSIV Over Haul (Q1R24)

2RS1 RWP QC-01- Radiation Work Permit and Associated ALARA 0

17-00901 File; FF Rx Disassembly/Reassembly Activities

(Q1R24)

Section 2RS2

2RS2 RP-AA-403 Administration of the Radiation Work Permit 9

Program

2RS2 RP-QC-552 Source Term External System/Component 1

Flushing

Section 2RS3

2RS3 RP-AA-440 Respiratory Protection Program 13

2RS3 RP-AA-825- Operation of the MSA Optimair MM 2K Mask 2

1033 Mounted Air Purifying Respirator

2RS3 RP-QC-835 Operation, Inspection, and Use of the MSA 4

Firehawk M7XT Air Mask Self-Contained

Breathing Apparatus

2RS3 RP-AA-825- Operation and Inspection of the 3M Versaflo 3

1014 TR-300 PAPR System

2RS3 RP-AA-825- Operation and Use of Air Line Supplied 1

1020 Respirators

2RS3 RP-AA-441 Evaluation and Selection Process for 6

Radiological Respirator Use

2RS3 RP-AA-440, Review of Contractor Respiratory Protection 03/21/2017

Attachment 2 Program

2RS3 RP-QC-835, Flow Testing and Overhauls Various

Attachment 7 Dates

2RS3 RP-QC-835, MSA Firehawk M7XT Air Mask Inspection Various

Attachment 3 Dates

2RS3 Generic Respiratory Protection Classroom 08/22/2016

Training

2RS3 Respiratory Protection Training Level I January

2013

2RS3 Respiratory Protection Training Level II 01/16/2016

2RS3 Respiratory Protection Qualification Reports Various

Dates

2RS3 Quarterly Service Air and Self Contained 03/24/2017

Breathing Apparatus

2RS3 IR 3990963 MRC SCBA Manifold Fitting Size Incorrect 03/29/2017

Section 2RS4

2RS4 RP-AA-203- Personnel Exposure Investigations 9

1001

2RS4 RP-AA-220 Bioassay Program 12

2RS4 RP-AA-210 Dosimetry Issue, Usage, and Control 27

2RS4 RP-AA-203- Personnel Exposure Investigation Various

1001, Dates

Attachment 1

2RS4 RP-AA-214, Area Dosimetry Worksheet Various

Attachment 2 Dates

12

2RS4 IR 3982939 Correct Dose in Sentinel, but not Printing on 03/07/2017

Form 4

Section 4OA1

4OA1 Explanation for Performance Indicator P.8.1.2 January-

December

2016

4OA1 Operator Narrative Logs January-

December

2016

4OA1 NRC Performance Indicator Data, Emergency October-

PreparednessDrill/Exercise Performance December

2016

4OA1 NRC Performance Indicator Data, Emergency October-

PreparednessERO Readiness December

2016

4OA1 NRC Performance Indicator Data, Emergency October-

PreparednessAlert and Notification System December

Reliability 2016

Section 4OA2

4OA2 IR 3959913 CO2 Released into Turbine Building 01/05/2017

4OA2 IR 3964028 A AFU [Air Filtration Unit] Fan Failed to Start 01/18/2017

4OA2 IR 3965646 NRC ID: Pipe Unsupported Feed Pump Suction 01/23/2017

Press A

4OA2 EACE 3956145 Feedwater Heater Trip and Emergency Power 02/13/2017

Reduction

4OA2 IR 3977123 Unit 1 Essential Service Inverter Input Breaker 02/22/2017

Trip

4OA2 IR 3981113 Received 902-5 H6 Alarm 03/03/2017

4OA2 IR 3979804 U2 Turbine Oil Reservoir Level Rising 02/28/2017

4OA2 IR 3980721 2A Turbine Oil Cooler Tube Leak Identified 03/02/2017

4OA2 IR 3981972 2B ASD Backup PLC Failure 03/06/2017

4OA2 IR 3981671 Received 901-7 B5 and DEHC S1-P312 03/05/2017

4OA2 ECAP 3967424 1C RHRSW Pump Abnormal Indications 03/20/2017

4OA2 Drawing M-36 Diagram of Core Spray Piping BI

4OA2 IR 3985153 Core Spray Keep Fill Check Valve 1-1402-64B,

Stuck

4OA2 IR 3983951 2-8802-A Valve Failed to Open During Return 03/10/2017

to Service

4OA2 IR 3984062 1B RPS MG Generator Voltage Out of Spec 03/10/2017

4OA2 IR 3984303 RPS B 1/2 ScramSDV High Level (Blown 03/12/2017

Safety Related Fuse)

4OA2 IR 3983620 1B RPS EPAs Tripped Following MG Set Start 03/09/2017

4OA2 IR 3984044 2A Turbine Oil Cooler Tube Leak Still Leaking 03/10/2017

4OA2 IR 3981835 U1 SDV Drain Valves Failed to Open During 03/06/2017

Surveillance

4OA2 IR 3990038 PSU MSIV As Found Closure Timing Out of 03/27/2017

Band

4OA2 IR 3990217 Received 902-5 H-6, SBLC Squib Valve Circuit 03/27/2017

AlarmA Squib

13

4OA2 First Quarter 2017 Operator Burdens List for

Units 1 and 2

4OA2 IR 3991293 IEMA Identified, Scaffold in Contact with 1B 03/30/2017

RHR Room Cooler

4OA2 IR 3983983 1A RFP FME Impeller Pieces Found Missing 03/10/2017

During Maintenance

4OA2 EC 618850 Lost Parts Evaluation Per ER-AA-2008 for the 0

Lost Parts Missing from 1A Reactor Feed Pump

1-3201-A Prior to Q1R24 During Maintenance

Under WO 1842789

4OA2 CY-QC-170- Quad Cities Offsite Dose Calculation Manual January

301 (ODCM ) 2013

4OA2 CY-QC-120- Main Chimney & Reactor Vent Noble Gas 04/15/2016

735, Release RateNoble Gas Release Rates

Attachment 1

4OA2 GEK-27808A Calculation of Alarm and Trip Setpoints for the

Reactor Building Vent Stack Noble Gas Monitor

Section 4OA3

4OA3 Drawing 4E- Internal Schematic and Device Location N

1654C Diagram 4160V Switchgear Bus 14 Cubicles

1,3,7,8,10, 12 and 14

4OA3 EN 52527 Fire in Unit 2 MCR Panel 902-3 02/01/2017

4OA3 IR 3969324 Light Socket for 2-203-3E Damaged During 02/01/2017

Bulb Change

4OA3 IR 3971265 Remove Fuse and Send to Power LabsRoot 02/07/2017

Cause 3969324

4OA3 IR 3971834 Safety Related Fuse Replacement in 2-2202- 02/08/2017

32 Panel

4OA3 OP-AA-101- Human Performance Issue Verbal Report 36

113-1004 Format

Section 4OA5

4OA5 IR 3952808 Check-in Self-Assessment: Interim 01/31/2017

Compensatory Measures Associated with the

Open Phase Condition Design Vulnerabilities in

Electric Power Systems

4OA5 LN 6500 4KV/480V Distribution 27

4OA5 Standing Order Single Open Phase Detection 03/16/2012

S12-06

4OA5 STN 12-021 Switchyard VulnerabilitySingle Open Phase

Detection Operability Evaluation Compensatory

Measure

4OA5 QCAN 902-8 F- Reserve Auxiliary Transformer 22 Open Phase 2

4 Detection Low Load/Trouble

4OA5 EC 0000387740 Switchyard VulnerabilitySingle Open Phase 5

Detection

14

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

ALARA As-Low-As-Reasonably-Achievable

ADAMS Agencywide Document Access Management System

ADS Automatic Depressurization System

ANS Alert and Notification System

ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers

CAP Corrective Action Program

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

DBE Design Basis Event

DEP Drill and Exercise Performance

DGCWP Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump

DRP Division of Reactor Projects

EC Engineering Change

EDG Emergency Diesel Generator

EP Emergency Preparedness

ERO Emergency Response Organization

ERV Electromatic Relief Valve

FZ Fire Zone

HPCI High Pressure Coolant Injection

IMC Inspection Manual Chapter

IP Inspection Procedure

IR Issue Report

ISI Inservice Inspection

LCO Limiting Condition for Operation

LER Licensee Event Report

LPCI Low Pressure Coolant Injection

MOC Mechanism Operated Contact

MT Magnetic Particle Examination

NCV Non-Cited Violation

NDE Non-Destructive Examination

NEI Nuclear Energy Institute

NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

OPC Open Phase Condition

OSP Outage Safety Plan

PARS Publicly Available Records System

PI Performance Indicator

PMT Post-Maintenance Testing

RCIC Reactor Core Isolation Cooling

RFO Refueling Outage

RHR Residual Heat Removal

RHRSW Residual Heat Removal Service Water

SCBA Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus

SSCs Structures, Systems, and Components

TS Technical Specification

UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report

UHS Ultimate Heat Sink

URI Unresolved Item

VDC Voltage Direct Current

VT Visual Examination

WO Work Order 15

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