IR 05000254/2020011
| ML20314A140 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 11/09/2020 |
| From: | Karla Stoedter NRC/RGN-III/DRS/EB2 |
| To: | Bryan Hanson Exelon Generation Co |
| References | |
| IR 2020011 | |
| Download: ML20314A140 (15) | |
Text
November 9, 2020
SUBJECT:
QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION - DESIGN BASIS ASSURANCE INSPECTION (TEAMS) INSPECTION REPORT 05000254/2020011 AND 05000265/2020011
Dear Mr. Hanson:
On September 28, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station and discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. K. Ohr, Site Vice President and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Karla K. Stoedter, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety
Docket Nos. 05000254 and 05000265 License Nos. DPR-29 and DPR-30
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000254 and 05000265
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000254/2020011 and 05000265/2020011
Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-011-0028
Licensee:
Exelon Generation Company, LLC
Facility:
Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station
Location:
Cordova, IL
Inspection Dates:
August 31, 2020 to September 28, 2020
Inspectors:
J. Benjamin, Senior Reactor Inspector
M. Domke, Reactor Inspector
W. Hopf, Contractor
B. Jose, Senior Reactor Inspector
J. Neurauter, Senior Reactor Inspector
V. Petrella, Reactor Inspector
Approved By:
Karla K. Stoedter, Chief
Engineering Branch 2
Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a design basis assurance inspection (teams) inspection at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Calculation of Surveillance Test Acceptance Criteria Non-conservative Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000265,05000254/2020011-01 Open/Closed None (NPP)71111.21M The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III when the licensee failed to correctly translate the applicable regulatory requirements and design basis into procedures or instructions.
Specifically, the licensee failed to consider the effects of bounding differential pressure test conditions and torque wrench instrument uncertainty in engineering evaluation EC 361212,
Document the Conclusions of Letters RJW-91-24 and RJW-92-014 - Torque Testing Requirements for Reactor Building to Torus, and Torus to Drywell Vacuum Breakers,
Revision 0, which calculated the acceptance criteria for Procedure QCOS 1600-10, Torus Vacuum Breaker Manual Operability Test. As a result, the acceptance criteria were not appropriate to demonstrate vacuum breaker valves 1(2)-1601-31A/B would perform their safety function.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), regional inspectors were directed to begin telework. Regional based inspections were evaluated to determine if all or a portion of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. For the inspection documented below portions of the IP were completed remotely and all the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP were met.
REACTOR SAFETY
===71111.21M - Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Teams)
The inspectors evaluated the following components and listed applicable attributes, permanent modifications, and operating experience:
Design Review - Risk-Significant/Low Design Margin Components (IP Section 02.02)
=
- (1) Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger 1B, Residual Heat Removal Service Water Outlet Flow Control Motor Operated Valve 1-1001-5B
- Normal, Abnormal, and Emergency Operating Procedures
- Minimum Voltage Available at the Motor Operated Valve Terminals Corresponding to the Degraded Voltage Setpoint and Available Torque/Thrust Margin
- Vendor Manual
- Maximum Short Circuit Current at the Load Side of the Supply Breaker and Its Interrupting Rating
- Breaker Coordination and Thermal Overload Setpoints
- Seismic Qualification
- Maintenance Procedures
- Preventative Maintenance
- Weak Link Analysis Calculation
- Required Thrust Calculation
- Maximum Differential Pressure Calculation
- Inservice Testing Surveillance
- Test Procedure Review
- Inservice Testing Results
- (2) Motor Control Center 19-1
- Electrical Ratings and Testing Procedures
- Configuration Control
- Surveillance and Testing Procedures
- Maintenance History and Effectiveness
- Short Circuit Calculation
- Voltage Drop Calculation
- Cable Protection Calculations
- Protective Devices Coordination
- (3) Service Water Pump, 1-3901-B
- Service Water Design Basis Flow Rate Calculation
- Aging Management Commitments
- Corrective Action History
- Permanent Modifications
- Predictive Maintenance Trending for Pump Vibrations & Oil Analyses
- Vendor Manual
- Electrical Supply and Protection
- (4) Service Water Pump 1A Discharge Check Valve, 3999-4
- Maintenance History and Effectiveness
- Aging Management Commitments
Design Review - Large Early Release Frequency (LERFs) (IP Section 02.02) (2 Samples)
(1)1-6706-14-1; 4kV Essential Bus 14-1
- Normal, Abnormal, and Emergency Operating Procedures
- Load Flow, Short Circuit and Voltage Drop Calculations
- Breaker Coordination
- Maximum Fault Current and Breaker Interrupting Ratings
- Protective Relay Settings
- 125 Vdc Breaker Control Scheme and Available 125 Vdc Capacity Margin
(2)1-1601-31A; Torus/Reactor Building Outboard Vacuum Breaker Check Valve
- Licensing Basis Requirements
- Maintenance Procedures
- Preventative Maintenance
- Appendix J Tests
- Test Procedure Review
- Inservice Testing Results
- Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements
Modification Review - Permanent Mods (IP Section 02.03) (6 Samples)
- (1) EC 404539; Unit 1 Replacement of Merlin Gerin Breakers in Bus 14
Cubicle for Isolated Phase Bus Duct Blower 1A
- (3) EC 624474; Automate the Flow of Service Water to the 0-5792-A and 0-5792-B Chillers for A Train Control Room Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning
- (4) EC 402298; Unit 1 Core Spray Pipe Repairs In-Vessel
- (5) EC 381968; Replacement of Reach Rod with Single Cable Drive Design for Remote Operation of Valve 1-1279-22B and 2-1279-17B
Review of Operating Experience Issues (IP Section 02.06) (1 Sample)
- (1) IN 2019-02; Emergency Diesel Generator Excitation System Diode Failures
INSPECTION RESULTS
Calculation of Surveillance Test Acceptance Criteria Non-conservative Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems
Green NCV 05000265,05000254/2020011-01 Open/Closed None (NPP)71111.21M The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III when the licensee failed to correctly translate the applicable regulatory requirements and design basis into procedures or instructions.
Specifically, the licensee failed to consider the effects of bounding differential pressure test conditions and torque wrench instrument uncertainty in engineering evaluation EC 361212, Document the Conclusions of Letters RJW-91-24 and RJW-92-014 - Torque Testing Requirements for Reactor Building to Torus, and Torus to Drywell Vacuum Breakers, Revision 0, which calculated the acceptance criteria for Procedure QCOS 1600-10, Torus Vacuum Breaker Manual Operability Test. As a result, the acceptance criteria were not appropriate to demonstrate vacuum breaker valves 1(2)-1601-31A/B would perform their safety function.
Description:
The design function of the reactor building to suppression chamber vacuum breaker system is to limit the suppression chamber, also known as the torus, vacuum pressure relative to the reactor building pressure. When the torus pressure is below reactor building pressure, the negative differential pressure is limited by air flow through the reactor building to torus vacuum breaker system. The vacuum breaker system design includes two trains with two valves in series, a mechanical vacuum breaker, similar to a check valve, and an air operated valve (AOV).
The mechanical vacuum breaker is self-actuating and counter-balanced and designed to open at a pressure difference no greater than 0.5 psid. In addition, the mechanical vacuum breaker valve has a design feature that allows the valve to be locally opened manually during the performance of surveillance testing. The licensee performs Procedure QCOS 1600-10, Torus Vacuum Breaker Manual Operability Test, to verify the ability to locally open the valve manually, verify the mechanical vacuum breakers will open at a pressure difference no greater than 0.5 psid and to demonstrate compliance with Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements 3.6.1.7.2 and 3.6.1.7.3.
To demonstrate that the mechanical vacuum breaker will open at a pressure difference no greater than 0.5 psid, the licensee performed an engineering evaluation, Engineering Change (EC) 361212. The EC calculated the required locally applied torque to fully open the valve that equated to a pressure difference of 0.5 psid across the valve. To demonstrate Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.7.3, the licensee specified the locally applied torque calculated in EC 361212 as the acceptance limit in Procedure QCOS 1600-10. Using a calibrated torque wrench, the licensee measured the locally applied torque required to fully open the valve and compared the applied torque to the acceptance limit, i.e., a measured applied torque no greater than the acceptance limit would demonstrate the mechanical vacuum breaker will open at a pressure difference no greater than 0.5 psid.
During the review of EC 361212, the inspectors found the licensee had not considered the potential for an existing differential pressure to be present across the mechanical vacuum breaker valve prior to performing the test. Specifically, the inspectors identified that if QCOS 1600-10 was performed at a time when the reactor building was at a higher pressure than the torus, the existing differential pressure could assist in opening the corresponding mechanical vacuum breaker. The inspectors also identified that the acceptance criteria calculated in EC 361212 failed to consider torque wrench instrument uncertainty. As a result, the measured torque needed to open the valve may be less than the actual torque required and could cause the licensee to incorrectly conclude the mechanical vacuum breaker remained operable and functional.
Corrective Actions: The licensee recommended that Procedure QCOS 1600-10 be revised to open the corresponding pressure tap between the 1601-31A/B check valve and 1601-20A/B AOV prior to performing the valve opening torque check.
In addition, the licensee will revise EC 361212 and Procedure QCOS 1600-10 to address torque wrench instrument uncertainty.
Corrective Action References:
AR 04369739, NRC DBAI: Possible Non-Conservatism in QCOS 1600-10, dated September 16, 2020
AR 04370343, DBAI 2020 Instrument Uncertainties for EC 361212, dated September 18, 2020
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the failure to correctly translate the applicable regulatory requirements and design basis into procedures or instructions was a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III and was a performance deficiency.
Specifically, when calculating test acceptance criteria for Procedure QCOS 1600-10, the licensee failed to consider the potential for an existing differential pressure across the mechanical vacuum breaker valve to be present and also failed to consider the effect of torque wrench instrument uncertainty in EC 361212. As a result, the design requirement for the opening setpoint of valves 1(2)-1601-31A/B to not exceed 0.5 psid, as required by Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.7.3 was not assured.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, if left uncorrected, the failure to consider the effect of surveillance test initial differential pressure conditions and torque wrench instrument uncertainty could allow the opening setpoint of the reactor building-to-suppression chamber mechanical vacuum breaker valve 1(2)-1601-31A/B to exceed 0.5 psid.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Specifically, the inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the inspectors answered YES to question A.1 in Exhibit 2.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, requires in part, measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis, as defined in § 50.2 and as specified in the license application, for those structures, systems, and components are correctly translated into procedures and instructions.
Contrary to the above, on June 5, 2006, the licensee failed to correctly translate the applicable regulatory requirements and design basis into procedures or instructions.
Specifically, in EC 361212, Revision 0, the licensee failed to consider the effects of the surveillance test initial differential pressure conditions and torque wrench instrument uncertainty into the calculated test acceptance criteria for Procedure QCOS 1600-10. As a result, the design requirement for the opening setpoint of valves 1(2)-1601-31A/B to not exceed 0.5 psid, as specified by Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.7.3 and verified by Procedure 1600-10 was not assured.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On September 28, 2020, the inspectors presented the design basis assurance inspection (teams) inspection results to Mr. K. Ohr, Site Vice President and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
71111.21M Calculations
QDC-4100-M-
0691
Combustible Loading Calculation for the Power Block,
Station Blackout Building and Crib House
004-E-003-1402
Motor Operated Valve Terminal Voltage Calculation
004-E-003-2399
Motor Operated Valve Terminal Voltage Calculation
23-60-19-1
Sizing and Setting of General Electric Type TEC Breaker
8913-69-19-1
Quad Cities I/II Safety Related Continuous Running/Starting
Voltages
NED-E-EIC-0055
Thermal Overload Heater Sizing for MOVs 1(2)-1001-5A/5B
at Quad Cities
QDC-0000-E-
206
MOV Terminal Voltage Calculation
QDC-0000-E-206
Motor Operated Valve Terminal Voltage Calculation
QDC-1000-M-
1318
Residual Heat Removal System Combined DBD and DP
Calculation
0E
QDC-1000-S-
27
Review of Flowserve Seismic and Maximum Thrust Analysis
Report RAL-20588 for Flowserve 12" Class 300 Carbon
Steel Globe Valve with SMB-0-25
QDC-3900-M-
0891
Service Water Design Basis Flow Rate Requirements
QDC-6700-E-
1503
Analysis of Load Flow, Short Circuit and Motor Starting
Using ETAP Power Station Part 8 of 8
QDC-6700-E-
1503
Analysis of Load Flow, Short Circuit and Motor Starting
Using ETAP
QDC-6700-E-
2116
Protective Relay Setting Calculation for 4kV Switchgear 13,
14, 13-1 and 14-1
QDC-6700-E-
2116
Protective Relay Setting Calculation
QUA-1-1402-25B
Alternating Current Motor Operated GL96-05 Gate Valve
QUA-1-1402-3B
Alternating Current Motor Operated GL96-05 Gate Valve
QUA-1-1402-4B
Alternating Current Motor Operated GL96-05 Globe Valve
QUA-1-2301-4
Alternating Current Motor Operated GL96-05 Gate Valve
QUA-1-2399-40
Alternating Current Motor Operated GL96-05 Gate Valve
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
1334048
Results of Q1R21 Snubber Failure Analysis
2/29/2012
1607447
FUK: Seismic, Bolt Loose in Back of MCC 19-1 Cub. G
2/12/2014
23377
Replace CR120A Control Relay with GE CR 2810A
2/10/2014
2466706
New Molded Case Circuit Breaker from Stores Failed Bench
Test
04/10/2015
2640839
MCC 19-1 D1 Door Mounted Overload Relay Reset Arm Too
Short
2/17/2017
2716107
Need Summer Contingency Work Order to Adjust/Replace
Service Water Pump Packing
09/15/2016
233539
Two MCC Thermal Overload Relays Did Not Meet Test
Criteria
04/26/2019
256117
TOLR Failed During Bucket Inspection
07/11/2019
23263
Need FIN Work Order to Replace 1B Service Water Pump
Guard
03/03/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
4366474
NRC DBAI: ESS UPS Panel 901(2)-63 Documentation
Discrepancies
08/31/2020
4367494
NRC DBAI: EQ-24D/Q Administrative Typos
09/04/2020
4368108
NRC DBAI Inspection: SLICE Database Cable
Inconsistencies
09/09/2020
4368256
NRC DBAI: 2 Typographical Errors Identified in
OP-QC-102-106
09/09/2020
4368796
NRC DBAI: MIDA Calculation Voltage for MOV 1-2399-40
09/11/2020
4369739
NRC DBAI: Possible Non-Conservatism in QCOS 1600-10
09/16/2020
4369740
NRC DBAI: Possible Non-Conservatism in QCOS 1600-10
09/16/2020
4369831
NRC DBAI: QDC-4100-M-0691 Rev. 8 EDMS Record
Missing
09/16/2020
4370343
DBAI 2020: Instrument Uncertainties for EC 361212
09/18/2020
4371507
NRC DBAI: Torus to Reactor Building Vacuum Breaker
Design Bases
09/23/2020
Drawings
20741-H
IN. 50# Vacuum Breaker Valve W/Outside Lever &
Weights
A
Key Diagram Reactor Building 480V Motor Control Centers
18-1A, 18-3 and 19-1
Schematic Diagram RHR System MOVs, Division II
AE
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
M-34
Diagram of Pressure Suppression Pipping
BI
Engineering
Changes
18515
Reactor Building to Torus Vacuum Breaker Counter Weight
Arm
18600
Reactor Building to Torus Vacuum Breaker Counter Weight
Arm
361212
Document the Conclusions of Letters RJW-91-24 and
RJW-92-014 - Torque Testing Requirements for Reactor
Building to Torus, and Torus to Drywell Vacuum Breakers
000
381968
Replacement of Reach Rod with Single Cable Drive Design
for Remote Operation of Valve 1-1279-22B and 2-1279-17B
2
381968
Replacement of Reach Rod with Single Cable Drive Design
for Remote Operation of Valve 1-1279-22B and 2-1279-17B
001
381968
Replacement of Reach Rod with Single Cable Drive Design
for Remote Operation of Valve 1-1279-22B & 2-1279-17B
000
397007
Modify Support M-994D-22 to Increase Clearance Between
Snubbers and Line 1-1025-20
001
397007
Modify Support M-994D-22 to Increase Clearance Between
Snubbers and Line 1-1025-20
000
2298
U1 Core Spray Pipe Repairs In-Vessel
404539
Unit 1 Replacement of Merlin Gerin Breakers in Bus 14
24474
Automate the Flow of Service Water to the 0-5792-A and
0-5792-B Chillers for A Train of Control Room HVAC
2577
Operability Evaluation, Components 1(2)-1501-31A/B, Torus
Vacuum Breaker Check Valve
000
Miscellaneous
MOV PVT Interval Performance Review Data Collection and
MOV-Post-Test Engineering Review Trend Evaluation
Summary Report
07/19/2011
MOV PVT Interval Performance Review Data Collection and
MOV-Post-Test Engineering Review Trend Evaluation
Summary Report
06/04/2018
MOV PVT Interval Performance Review Data Collection and
MOV-Post-Test Engineering Review Trend Evaluation
Summary Report
06/05/2017
AQR-67368
ASCO Solenoid Qualification Test Report
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
Snubber Service Life Monitoring
OP-QC-102-106
Operator Response Time Program at Quad Cities
QCEMS 0250-11
480/208 VAC Motor Control Center Cubicle Maintenance
and Surveillance
QCOA 3900-01
Service Water System Failure
QCOA 4700-06
Loss of Instrument Air
QCOA 6100-03
QCOA 6100-04
Station Blackout
QCOA 6500-03
4kV Bus 12(23) Failure
QCOP 3900-01
Service Water System Operation
QCOP 6620-13
Energizing Bus 13-1 from SBO DG 1
QCOP 6700-09
De-Energizing MCC 19-1 For Maintenance
QCOS 1600-10
Torus Vacuum Breaker Manual Operability Test
QCOS 6600-37
Unit One Emergency Diesel Generator Largest Load Reject
Test
QEMS-250-20
480/208 VAC Motor Control Maintenance and Surveillance
WC-QC-8003-
1008
Quad Cities Station Units 1 and 2 Nuclear Plant Interface
Requirements (NPIRs) Interface Procedure
Work Orders
00836395
Disassemble, Inspect & Refurbish as Needed (CVP)
05/16/2007
008856568
00022053-01, PMSR, Replace Check Valve, E: 1-3999-4,
CHVA, V25
10/19/2009
255761
MO 1-1001-5B Replace Valve
05/22/2011
01625116
Q1R22 PSU - A01-1601-31A LLRT Exceeded Admin Alert
Limit
03/24/2013
01635231
03/12/2015
01671279
00036279-01, PMSR, GE Model L7700 MCC Insp,
E: 1-7800-19-1, MCCA
04/29/2019
01671279-01
03/15/2019
01781674
Contingency For 1-1601-31A as a Potential LLRT Failure
03/18/2019
017935518
Unwire CR120A Relay with CR2810A
11/18/2015
01819428
04/02/2017
01882145-01
MOV Post-Test Data Review Worksheet
05/17/2017
01918315-01
00022053-01, PMNS, Replace Check Valve,
03/08/2018
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
E: 1-3999-4, CHVA, V25
04601577
RHR System Valve Timing Test (IST)
05/17/2017
04626312-01
Install 1A IPBD Motor Contactor in Diff MCC Per EC 399289
04/24/2019
04626312-05
EM PRE Outage Bench Test New MCC 19-1 Cub E5
2/18/2019
04631705
03/29/2019
04641068
Pressure Suppression Vacuum BKR Operability (IST)
08/16/2017
04649380
MM Perform Stem Nut Inspection on MOV 1-1001-5B
05/16/2018
04649380-01
MM Perform Stem Nut Inspection on MOV 1-1001-5B
05/18/2018
04649380-04
MOV Post-Test Data Review Worksheet
05/16/2018
04675828
Pressure Suppression Vacuum BKR Operability (IST)
11/15/2017
04678194
C RHR Service Water Pump Comprehensive Test (IST)
2/13/2019
04713474
Pressure Suppression Vacuum BKR Operability (IST)
2/14/2018
04747183
Pressure Suppression Vacuum BKR Operability (IST)
05/16/2018
04786189
Pressure Suppression Vacuum BKR Operability (IST)
08/15/2018
04819488
Pressure Suppression Vacuum BKR Operability (IST)
11/14/2018
04854622
Pressure Suppression Vacuum BKR Operability (IST)
2/13/2019
04887981-01
MM Automate the Flow of SW to the 0-5792-B EC 624474
11/08/2019
04889599
Pressure Suppression Vacuum BKR Operability (IST)
03/29/2019
04904880
Pressure Suppression Vacuum BKR Operability (IST)
06/26/2019
04913065
C RHR Service Water Pump Comprehensive Test (IST)
04/15/2019
04935780
Pressure Suppression Vacuum BKR Operability (IST)
09/25/2019
04964084
Pressure Suppression Vacuum BKR Operability (IST)
2/26/2019
04993678
Pressure Suppression Vacuum BKR Operability (IST)
03/23/2020
04996109-01
ES Unit 1/2 Service Water System Walkdown by System
Engineer
04/29/2020
05023450
Pressure Suppression Vacuum BKR Operability (IST)
06/24/2020
210394-01
MOV Post-Test Data Review Worksheet
05/26/2011