ML19317F492

RO 270/76-09:on 760809,low Pressure Injection Train a Out of Svc for Maint W/O Verifying Train B Operability. Caused by Failure to Follow Tech Spec Requirements. Operational Procedure Being Written

ML19317F492
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	08/23/1976
From:	DUKE POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML19317F490	List: ML19317F489 ML19317F492
References
RO-270-76-09, RO-270-76-9, NUDOCS 8001140722
Download: ML19317F492 (1)

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hh DUKE POWER COMPANY OCONEE UNIT 2 Report No.: R0-270/76-9 Report Datc; Au gus t 2 3, 19; ',

Occurrence Date:_ August 9, 1976 Facility: Oconee Unit 2, Seneca, South Carolina Identification of Occurrence: Low Pressure Injection Train "A" taken out of service for maintenance without verifying operability of Train "B" h

l Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Unit at 100 percent full power Descriptica of Occurrence:

On August 9, 1976, the Low Pressure Injection Train "A" was taken out of service for valve maintenance without assuring the operability of LP Injection Train "B" as required by Technical Specification 3.3.7.

Approxi-mately three hours later, during shift turnover, the failure to assure the "B" was operability of Train "B" was discovered. The operability of Train then verified by successfully cycling the low pressure injection cooler outlet valve for Train "B."

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

The apparent cause of this incident was a failure to follow Technical Specification requirements when initiating maintenante on the Low Pressure Injection System. While reviewing shift occurrences prior to turnover to next shift, the shif t supervisor realized the error and immediately began steps to assure Train "B" operability.

Analysis of Occurrence-Even though the cooler outlet valve for LPI Train "B" was not tested to assure operability, the normal Engineered Safeguard valve position is open, therefore, the valve would not have deterred the ES function of the "B," on July 29, 1976, train. Also, at the last performance test of LPI Train the train was demonstrated operable. It can therefore be concluded that it would have functioned properly if needed, and that the health and safety of the public was not affected by this incident.

Corrective Action:

An operational procedure, " Removal and Restoration of the Station Equipment,"

has been written and will be approved by Septenber 1, 1976. This procedure should climinate future recurrence of this incident. Also, all Operations Supervisors will review this incident.to assure that all licensed personnel q

are aware of Technical Specifications concerning the removal of any component or flow path in the Emergency Core Cooling System.

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