ML20153G460
| ML20153G460 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 09/30/1998 |
| From: | DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML15113A547 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-GTECI-A-46, REF-GTECI-SC, TASK-A-46, TASK-OR NUDOCS 9809300080 | |
| Download: ML20153G460 (650) | |
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OCOXEE NUCLEAR STATION USI A-46 SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT 4
h Duke EdPower.
A Duke Energy Company
- September 1998 l'r y P DO O 00 69 PDR a
Revision Status Revision Summarv of Revision Date 0 Initial Issue 12/15/97 1 Revised to Include Service 09/15/98 Water Additions O
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.v CONTENTS 1 Section h EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
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- 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 Purpose 1-1 1.2 Scope 1-1 1.3 Plant Description 1-1 l
- 1.4 Background ?-3 J 1.5 Report Organization 1-4 t
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- 2. SAFE SHUTDOWN EARTHQUAKE 4 2.1 Ground Response Spectra 2-1 j -
2.2 In-Structure Response Spectra ?.-1
- 3. PROJECT TEAM 3.1 Duke Power Company Representatives :1-1 i
3.2 Seismic Capability Engineers 1-1 3.3 Third-Party Auditor (s)' li-2 l
- 4. SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL) 4.1 Safe Shutdown Path Selection 4-1 4.1.1 Safe Shutdown Systems 4-1 4.1.2 Supporting Systems 4-9 4.2 Operations Department Review of SSEL 4-14 4.3 Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List and Subsets 4-15 O
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f bq CONTENTS (cont.)
Section PJ!LEt
- 5. MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL EQUIPhENT REVIEW 5.1 Summary of Review 5-1
, 5.1.1 Seismic Capacity vs. Demand 5-2 5.1.2 Equipment Class Descriptions 5-4 5.1.3 Equipment Anchorage 5-4 5.1.4 Seismic Interaction 5-10 5.1.5 Relay Walkdown 5-12 5.2 Instances ofIntent but Not Letter of Caveat Met 5-12 5.3 Summary of Outliers 5-12
( 6. TANKS AND HEAT EXCHANGER REVIEW
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6.1 Summary of Review 6-1 6.2 Summary of Outliers 6-4 I
- 7. CABLE TRAY, CABLE TRENCH, CONDUIT, AND HVAC REVIEW 7.1 Cable and Conduit Raceway Review for Oconee Nuclear Station 7-1 7.1.1 Summary of Raceway Review 7-1 7.1.2 Evaluation of Bounding Samples 7-3 7.1.3 Summary of Outliers 7-4 7.1.4 Conclusion for Reactor Building and Plant 7-5 Tray System 7.2 Cable Trench Review 7-15 7.2.1 Summary of Cable Trench Review 7-15 7.2.2 Summary of Cable Trench Installations 7-15
(-] 7.2.3 Methodology 7-15 7.2.4 Conclusion 7-15 iii
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C NTENTS (cont.)
O Section Pm 7.3 Control Room Ventilation System (CRVS) Review 7-16 7.3.1 Summary of CRVS Review 7-16 7.3.2 Evaluation of Bounding Samples 7-17 7.3.3 Summary of Outliers & Conclusions 7-18
- 8. DISPOSITIONING OF OUTLIERS 8.1 Introduction / Summary 8-1 8.2 Outlier Tables 8-2 8.3 OutlierResolution Action 8-3
'^ 9. SIGNIFICANT OR PROGRAMMATIC DEVIATIONS FROM 9-1
, THE GIP.
- 10. THIRD-PARTY AUDIT
SUMMARY
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- 11. REFERENCES 11-1 l
'Annendices APPENDIX A R6 sum 6s for Seismic Capability Engineers APPENDIX B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) 1 APPENDIX C Safe Shutdown Equipment List APPENDIX D Screening Verification Data Sheets (SVDS)
APPENDIX E Third-Party Audit Close-Out Letter iV
O V CONTENTS (cont.)
TABLES Table Title Page 4-1 List of Procedures Used for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Review. 4-15 5-1 Equipment Walkdown Category Summary 5-13 5-2 Intent But Not Letter of Caveat Summary. 5-14 5-3 Response Spectrum Exceedances for Building Elevations 5-15 Containing SSEL Equipment.
6-1 Description of Tanks and Heat Exchangers 6-1 6-2 Tank and Heat Exchanger Outlier Description and Resolution 6-4 Summary 7-1 Cable Tray Analytical Review Outlier Description and Resolution 7-5 Summary (Reactor Building & Plant Tray System) 7-2 Cable Tray Walkdown Outlier Description and Resolution Summary 7-8 (Reactor Building & Plant Tray System).
7-3 HVAC Duct System Bounding Analysis Candidates and Evaluation 7-17 Results 7-4 Duct and Duct Support Outlier Description and Proposed Resolutien 7-18 Summary 8-1 Equipment Outlier Description and Resolution - 8-4 Oconee Units 1,2,& 3 82 Equipment Outlier Description and Pronosed Resolution - 8-5 Oconee Units 1,2,& 3 v
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EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
In December 1980, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Staff initiated Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46, " Seismic Quali#ication of Equipment in Operating Plants," related to seismic adequacy of mechanical and electrical equipment in older nuclear plants. USI A-46 resolution addresses the seismic adequacy, at a licensing basis safe shutdown earthquake level, of equipment designed and installed prior to implementation of the more restrictive standards of the mid - 1970's. After substantial technical research by both the Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG) and the NRC regarding this issue, the Staff published Ger2eric Letter 87-02, " Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors, Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46", on February 19,1987. This generic letter provided a detailed approach for resolving the USI A-46.
A Generic Implementation Procedure has been ceveloped by SQUG and accepted by the NRC. This procedure establishes the methods by which the USI A-46 issue can be resolved to the satisfaction of the NRC. The NRC ctaffissued Supplement I to Generic Letter 87-02 on May 22,1992 which included Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report No. 2 (SSER No. 2) on the Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP), Revision 2 i
(corrected February 14,1992 ) (Reference #1). The resolution of USI A-46 using the GIP is based on equipment qualification using seismic experience data. This method
- requires a walkdown of the selected equipment. Also, as part of the equipment s evaluation, circuits ofinterest require a chatter review for either chatter acceptability or chatter vulnerability.
l Oconee Nuclear Station provided infonnation in support of Generic Letter 87-02 to the
- NRC in a letter dated Septembe* 21,1992 (Reference #4). On November 19,1992, the l NRC responded to the Oconee Nuclear Station with a letter of request for additional l information. Also, the NRC requested clarification as to the Oconee Nuclear Station's commitment to the Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP), Revision 2, as corrected on February 14,1992 and the associated Supplemental Safety Evaluation (SSER) No. 2.
Duke responded wiLS a letter dated January 15, 1993 clarifying the Oconee Nuclear Station's commitment to the GIP and providing the requested additional information >
the NRC. The NRC's letter dated April 5,1993 to Duke Power provides the Staff's evaluations and conclusions of the additional information (Reference #5).
l In a letter dated October 3,1995, Duke power updated the NRC Staff on the progress of
! the resolution to USI A-46 and revised the submittal date for the USI A-46 report to l December 31,1996. A partial USI A-46 report was submitted as an attachment to a i letter dated December 30,1996. The partial submittal covered the emergency power
- equipment which is located at the Keowee Hydro Units and in the Oconee Switchyard.
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l In a letter dated December 30,1996, Duke Power indicated that an expected date for !
! submittal of the remaining ponion of the USI A-46 repon would be provided to the NRC i
by March 31,1997. Duke Power's letter to the NRC dated March 31,1997, stated the balance of the USI A-46 submittal would be made by December 15,1997. On December !
15,1997, Duke Power did submit the balance of the Oconee Nuclear Station repon to the NRC.
As a result of discussions between the Staff and Duke Power's Oconee Nuclear Station regarding the modifications associated with upgrading the ECCW System, Technical l Specification Change #96-09, and its relationship to the USI A-46 effort, Duke Power agreed to resubmit the USI A-46 repon. The resubmittal of the report, revision 1, was for the purpose ofincorporating the ECCW system upgrades for Unit 2 as they affect the scope of USI A-46. This commitment is outlined in a letter dated March 19,1998 to the Staff regarding the referenced Technical Specification Change.
1 Revision 1 of this submittal incorporates the modifications associated with the ECCW upgrade as they impact the USI A-46 project. In addition, the entire submittal was i
updated to reflect the current status of outliers and the progress made on the resolution of outliers identified in the December 15,1997 submittal. Therefore, all the information contained within this submittal, both the Seismic (walkdown) and Relay Evaluation Reports, has been updated and reflects the current status of the project. This submittal ,
O revision 1, replaces the original submittal in its entirety.
In addition to the above stated correspondence, the NRC visited the Oconee Nuclear Station during the month of April 1995 for an In-Progress Audit. The primary intent was to observe and assess the effectiveness ofidentifying seismic concerns per the GIP and general implementation of the GIP with respect to the walkdowns and field astc3ments.
The NRC's evaluation of this audit was provided to Duke Power in a letter dated June 15,1995.
Oconee Nuclear Station is the only Duke Power Company nuclear station responsible for addressing the Usl A-46 issue. The assessment documented here considers operating the plant from a nonnal-state condition to safe shutdown in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> coincident with the site specific safe shutdown eanhquake. The scope of this assessment includes all three Oconee nuclear units, the onsite emergency power, and any necessary support systems. :
, The scope of this submittal addresses te three Oconee units. The USI A-46 evaluation for Oconee's Emergency Power System was submitted to the NRC staffin December, 1996.
This document addresses' the scope of equipment required for review, defined applications of the GIP, project team qualifications, dispositionings of GIP Outliers, and Third-Party Audit assessments. These topics will be addressed for both the walkdown and relay chatter areas of work.
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The walkdown results and related evaluations veri 6ed most items as being satisfactory ,
and also identiGed recommen'ded improvements. Of the 1515 items requiring a '
walkdown,1128 of those met the GIP criteria as currently installed. Of the 387 GIP Outliers (excludes cable tray and HVAC due: work outliers),177 are resolved. The 210 remaining Outlics have issues requiring minor physical enhancements or require a i detailed analyticm swiew.
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There were 22 cable tray analytical review outliers not meeting the requirements of the GIP. Of the 22 analytical review outliers,7 have been resolved by analysis with the remaining 15 requiring modi 6 cations (this involved 55 supports). In addition, there were 1 75 cable tray walkdown outliers that can be divided into three groups: 32 of the cable
' tray outliers are resolved, 22 of the outliers involved block walls which need seismic quali6 cation, and the remaining 21 cable tray outliers, involving 37 supports, requirt physical enhancements.
The relay chatter assessment for ONS has identified the relays for which either testing ,
and/or replacement is required. A total of 5031 devices have been subjected to the !
chatter review in support to the ONS Safe Shutdown Equipment List. 4941 of these items have been found acceptable per the guidelines set forth in the' GIP. Of the 90 l (including 24 low ruggedness relays) relays not screening per the GIP,6 of these have l been resolved. The 24 low ruggedness relays are to be replaced. The other 60 relays
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outliers are scheduled for either testing and/or replacement. These outliers are distributed among various relay manufacturers and have unknown capacities.
Each Outlier is planned to be resolved to meet the intents and concerns for which the GIP is founded. Equipment / relay adequacy will be demonstrated by such methods as: testing, analytical efforts, demonstration of similarity to existing experience data beyond the SQUG Experience Data base of equipment and events, and other methods deemed j appropnate for Outlier resolution per the GIP.
l All SQUG outliers were evaluated to determine if the existing station Licensing Basis was challenged. In the event an Outlier finding did potentially challenge the Licensing Basis, the' associated equipment / item / concern was logged into the appropriate station
-process for evaluation. Operability and compliance was addressed within the station's established procedures for such evaluations.
An individual schedule for the resolution of each Outlier will not be included within the text of this report. In a letter dated June 30,1998, Duke Power advised the Staff of the l expected completion date for the resolution of all USI A-46 Outliers. The j aforementioned letter states the required USI A-46 Program Completion letter will b2 submitted to the NRC within 120 days after the end of Innage 73. The scheduled date, at l the time of the referenced letter, for the end of Innage 73 was June 2, 2002. The
!' A individual- prioritization of each Outlier Resolution accounts for such factors as:
(> So'ubilistic Risk Assessment signi6cance, accessibility, and associated or dependent j m addication projects.
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Section 1 INTRODUCTION .
1.1 PURPOSE The purpose of this repon is to document the Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46 seismic adequacy ' evaluations for the Oconee Nuclear Station. These seismic evaluations were performed to address NRC Generic Letter 87-02, " Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment in Opemting Reactors, Unresolved Safety Issue (USI),
A-46." These seismic evaluations were performed using the Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) which was developed by the Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG). The associated relay evaluations are documented in a separate report being submitted simultaneously entitled, "Oconee Nuclear Station , USI-A46 Relay Evaluation Report."
1.2 SCOPE O This report addresses the equipment which was included in the seismic walkdown Safe Shutdown Equipment List. The majority of this equipment is located in the following major structures: the Turbine Building, the Auxiliary Buildings, and the Reactor Buildings. This report also addresses items included in the Safe Shutdown Equipment List which are associated with the Emergency Circulating Cooling Water (ECCW) upgrade. All associated relay evaluations are documented in a separate report being submitted simultaneously entitled, "USI A-46 Relay Evalotion Report, Oconee Nuclear Station." l The Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46 report which discussed the scope, methods, and results of the seismic adequacy review for the equipment included in the Emergency Power Path Safe Shutdown Equipment List was submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in December, ;
1996. That report encompassed the Keowee Hydro Station; the Overhead Power Path through the 230 kV Switchyard and terminating at the high voltage side of the CTl, 2, and 3
- transformers. Also included was the underground power path which terminates at the high voltage side of the CT4 transformer.
1.3 PLANT DESCRIPTION Ocone.e Nuclear Station is located in Oconee County in northwestern South Carolina. The station is sited on the shore of Lake Keowee, a Duke impoundment on the Keowee river, a tributary of the Savannah River. The station was built during the 1967 to 1974 period. Unit I began commercial operation in 1973, and the last Unit (Unit 3) began commercial operation in 1-1
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i 1974. The station consists of three Babcock & Wilcox pressurized water reactors, each designed to generate approximately 890 MWe. The balance of plant was designed and constructed by Duke Power Company, with Bechtel Corporation designing the Reactor Buildings and C.T.
Main, Inc. designing the Intake Structure.
1 j The station consists of three reactor buildings, a single turbine building (each Unit is seismically .
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. isolated) and two auxiliary buildings, one servicing Units 1 and 2, and the other servicing Unit 3. l The nuclear steam supply system has two loops with two cold legs each. Each Unit has two "once-through" steam generators that produce superheated steam at constant pressure. The i
reactor and nuclear steam supply system are contained within the reactor building, a post-
- tensioned reinforced concrete cylinder and dome with a steel liner.
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] A reliable source of emergency onsite power is provided by the two-unit Keowee Hydroelectric a
Station, which is located at the Keowee Dam, about a mile away from the plant. Emergency {
power is supplied via two separate and independent paths, one of which is the Overhead Power '
Path through the 230 kV Switchyard and the second is the underground power path to transformer CT4 and the standby busses. In addition to a large grid network, backup power is
- also available through a dedicated line from three combustien turbine Units et the Lee Steam l
Station, approximately 30 miles away. 1
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j Within ONS, this power is distributed through 4.16 kV switchgear TC, TD and TE. This switchgear provides power for major pumps, 600V Load Centers as well as 600 and 208V Motor
- O Control Centers. 600 and 208V Motor Control Centers provide power to the various AC power loads. 120V AC power is provided by various power panel panelboards within the plant. DC
- power is supplied by 600V Battery Chargers and 125/250V DC Battery Systems and i Distribution Centers which provide power to instrumentation and controls that are needed during
. loss of power conditions. Emergency lighting is also provided through the 125/250V DC Battery System and associated lighting panelboards.
l The plant design incorporates the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF), a totally independent means
- of achieving and maintaining safe shutdown conditions if the normal plant safety systems are unavailable.
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L4 BACKGROUND O Due to the extent of the changes in the requirements for seismic qualification of equipment over the years, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) initiated USI A-46, " Seismic Qualification of Equipment in Operating Nuclear Plants," in December 1980. The purpose of USI A-46 is to verify the seismic adequacy of essential equipment in operating plants which had not been qualificd in accordance with more recent criteria.
In 1982, the Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG) was formed to develop a practical approach for seismic qualification of equipment in operating plants. The approach developed by SQUG was to use experience with the performance of power plant and industrial equipment in actual earthquakes as the primary basis for evaluating the seismic ruggedness and functionality of essential equipment in nuclear power plants. In 1983, the NRC issued NUREG 1018 widch includes a general endorsement of the use of experience data for verification of the seismic adequacy of equipment in nuclear plants.
In early 1987, the NRC issued Generic Letter (GL) 87-02 to owners of operating nuclear plants I which were licensed prior to development of modem seismic qualification standards. The recipients of GL 87-02 are referred to as A-46 plants and include the Oconee Nuclear Station.
Essentially, all owners of A-46 plants, including Duke Power Company, are SQUG members.
GL 87-02 requires owners to take action to verify the seismic adequacy of important equipment l q in their plants. The SQUG approach, embodied in the Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP),
Q is explicitly recognized by the NRC as the preferred method for accomplishing this objective.
In 1992, the NRC issued Supplement No. I to GL 87-02 (Reference #2) which transmitted Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report No. 2 on SQUG GIP, Revision 2. as corrected on Februaq 14,1992 (Reference #1). References #1 and #2 are the basis for the seismic evaluations described in this report.
Oconee Nuclear Station provided information in support of Generic Letter 87-02 to the NRC in a letter dated September 21,1992 (Reference #4). On November 19,1992, the NRC responded to the econee Nuclear Station with a letter of request for additional information. Also, the NRC requested clarification as to the Oconee Nuclear Station's commitment to the Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP), Revision 2, as corrected on Febmary 14, 1992 and the associated Supplemental Safety Evaluation (SSER) No. 2. Duke responded with a letter dated January 15,1993 clarifying the Oconee Nuclear Station's commitment to the GIP and providing the requested additional information to the NRC. The NRC's letter dated April 5,1993 to Duke Power provides the Staffs evaluations and conclusions of the additional information (Reference
- 5).
In a letter dated October 3,1995, Duke Power updated the NRC Staff on the progre:ss of the resolution to USI . A6 and revised the submittal date for the USI A-46 report to December 31, 1996. A partial USI A-46 repon was submitted as an attachment to a letter dated December 30, O 1996. The partial submittal covered the emergency power equipment which is located at the Keowee Hydro Units and in the Oconee Switchyard.
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In a letter dated December 30,1996, Duke Power indicated that an expected date for submittal of the remaining portion of the USI A-46 report would be provided to the NRC by March 31,1997. Duke Power's letter to the NRC dated March 31,1997, stated the balance of the USI A-46 submittal would be made by December 15,1997 On December 15,1997, Duke Power did submit the balance of the Oconee Nuclear Station report to the NRC.
As a result of discussions between the Staff and Duke Power's Oconee Nuclear Station regarding the modifications associated with upgrading the ECCW System, Technical Specification Change
- 96-09, and its relationship to the USI A-46 effort, Duke Power agreed to resubmit the USI A-46 report. The resubmittal of the report, rev.1, was for the purpose of incorporating the ECCW system upgrades for Unit 2 as they affect the scope of USI A-46. This commitment is outlined in a letter dated March 19, 1998 to the Staff regarding the referenced Technical Specification Change.
In addition to the above stated correspondence, the NRC visited the Oconee Nuclear Station 2 during the month of April 1995 for an In-Progress Audit. The primary intent was to observe and !
assess the effectiveness ofidentifying seismic concerns per the GIP and general implementation
{
of the GIP with respect to the walkdowns and field assessments. The NRC's evaluation of this i audit was provided to Duke Power in a letter dated June 15,1995. l p 1.5 REPOR'1 ORGANIZATION ,
i The remaining sections of this report are organized in accordance with Section 11.9.4 of the GIP (Reference #1). These sections include the following:
Section 2, " Safe Shutdown Earthquake"-The Oconee Ground Response Spectra (GRS) and In-Structure Response Spectra (IRS) are described. The bases for determining how seismic demand is determined for each equipment are provided in Section 5, and documented on the Screening Verification Data Sheet (SVDS) forms in Appendix D of this report.
Section 3, " Project Team"- The Duke project team is discussed. Seismic Capability l Engineers (SCEs) involved with equipment walkdowns are listed. R6sumss for (SCEs) are )
included in Appendix A. The credentials of the third party audit group are also discussed. 1 Section 4, " Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL)"-This section contains information from the SSEL report recommended for submittal to the NRC, per Section 11.9.2 of the GIP.
Descriptions of the safe shutdown path selection, plant operation procedures used, and Oconee Nuclear Operations Department review of the SSEL are discussed. Lists of equipment on the Composite SSEL and Seismic Review SSEL are included in Appendices B and C of this report. The list of equipment included on the Relay Review SSEL is included in the Relay Report (Reference #3).
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- Section 5, " Mechanical and Electrical Equipment Review"--Screening Verification and
- Walkdown result s for mechanical and electrical equipment are discussed, in addition to the SVDS forms provided in Appendix D. Instances in which the intent of a caveat is met without meeting the specific wording of the caveat rule are identified. A summary of outliers and their resolution is provided.
~ Section 6, " Tanks and Heat Exchanger Review"-Results of the tanks and heat exchangers
- review are discussed, including instances in which the intent, but not the letter, of a caveat is ,
met. A summary of outliers and their resolution is provided. l l
l Section 7, " Cable Tray, Cable Trench, Conduit and HVAC Review"-Results of the l raceway review, including bounding samples and outliers, are summarized.
l Section 8, "Dispositioning of Outhers"- A summary of the GIP Outliers is presented along with current resolutions for those with a Resolved status, or proposed resolutions for those l
with Unresolved status.
Section 9, "Significant or Programmatic Deviations from the GIP"-A statement is made that no significant or' programmatic deviations from the GIP are made in the Oconee Nuclear Station USI A-46 Implementation Program.
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- . Section 10, " Third-Party Audit Summary"-The Third-Party Audits are summarized,
(, including resolution of recommendations made by the Auditors during the initial Audit.
The Peer Review Team close-out letter is included as Appendix E.
- Section 11," References" 4
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' /9 Q Section 2 SAFE SHUTDOWN EARTHQUAKE 2.1 GROUND RESPONSE SPECTRA 4
The Oconee Nuclear Station maximum hypothetical earthquake (MHE) acceleration value is 0.10 g for Class 1 structures founded on bedrock and 0.15 g for structures founded on overburden (Ref. # 6, Section 2.5.2.6) . The design basis earthquake (DBE) acceleration value is 0.05 g for both vertical and horizontal ground acceleration (Reference #6, Section 2.5.2.7). The CT transformers 1-4, radwaste facility, Essential Siphon Vacuum Building, and miscellaneous MCC's & outdoor equipment are the only SSEL equipment (included in this report) which are founded on overburden. All other structures are founded on bedrock.
3 2.2 IN-STRUCTURE RESPONSE SPECTRA
. The ONS in-structure response spectra were generated using the time history rnethodology as described in section 3.7.1 and 3.7.2 of the UFSAR. The time history p reco'd of the N-S, May 1940 El Centro earthquake, scaled to 0.lg peak ground V acceleratica was used for input motion. Structural damping used for the Turbine Building model ws 2% of critical damping and for the Auxiliary and Reactor Building models,5% of critical damping was used.
A letter dated September 21,1992 from Duke Power Company (Reference #4) to the j USNRC discussed the generation of the requested in-structure response for the USI A-46 Program. This letter includes a description of methodology and miscellaneous plots of i the in-:;aucture response for several buildings and locations. In its response to Duke l Power Company (Reference #5), the USNRC defined the Oconee Nuclear Station IRS as
" Realistic, Median-Centered" per GIP Section II.4.2 (Reference #1).
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j Section 3 P.ROJECT TEAM A primary SQUG project team was established at Duke Power in 1992 to address issues relating to USI A-46. This multidiscipline team was responsible for overall project coordination, perfonning relay evaluations and seismic walkdowns, and cowdiation of contractor activities.
A team of on-site mechanical and electrical systems engineers wt2 responsible for development of the SSEL and provided guidance, as needed, to the core project team. All of the above was perfonned with in-house engineering staff. A contractor, EQE Inc., assisted with seismic walkdown of miscellaneous SSEL items and outlier resolution ofitems which were determined to be outside the scope of the GIP.
3.1 UTILITY REPRESENTATIVES The core A-46 project team included engineers involved with structural, and electrical and control systems disciplines. The team also employed a contract employee who had retired from Oconee Nuclear Station as a electrical equipment craft supervisor, with over twenty five years experience. This contractor assisted the Seismic Capability Engineers (SCE) in many ways p including locating equipment, safe electrical equipment access, Plant Operations /SQUG team d liaison, and advising the SCE's concerning original equipment installation techniques. A team of mechanical systems engineers provided information to the Seismic Capability Engineers l
(described below) performing the seismic evaluations. The project team consulted site Licensing l and Operations personnel, as needed. The Utility Representative to the SQUG Membership is Raymond L. McCoy. Jim E. Thomas served as the Utility Member Representative earlier in the SQUG program n well as serving as a SQUG Steering Committee Member for 14 years, to date.
3.2 SEISMIC CAPABILITY ENGINEERS The majority of the equipment seismic evaluations we:r performed by Seismic Capability l Engineers who were assigned to the USI A-46 project team and based at the Oconee Nuclear Station. The remainder of the seismic evaluations were performed by offsite SCEs based within Duke Power Company, Duke Engineering and Services, Inc., or EQE Inc. Resumes for each walkdown Seismic Capability Engineer are contained in Appendix A. Ead SCE has been I trained in accordance with the expectations of the GIP.
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V The Seismic Capability Enginess who were involved with this project are listed below:
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Raymond L. McCoy, PE Lead Froject Coordinator Duke Power Company (Oconee Nuclear Station)
Russell P. Childs, PE "
Walkdown Coordinator /
Seismic Capability Engineer I Lawrence B. Elrod, PE "
Seismic Capability Engineer Robert V.- Hester, PE "
Seismic Capability Engineer Darryl A. Kelley, PE Seismic Capability Engineer
- Robert W. Mc Auley, PE Seismic Capability Engineer Duke Power Company John M. Richards, PE Seismic Capability Engineer '
Gerald L. Green, PE Seismic Capability Engineer Duke Engineering and Services, Inc.
Richard W. Hough, PE Seismic Capability Engineer Ron Polivka, PE EQE Project Manager EQE, Inc.
Steve Eder, PE EQE Walkdown Coordinator i Gayle Johnson, PE Seismic Capability Engineer Leo J. Bragagnolo, PE Seismic Capability Engineer p Farzin Beigi, PE (See Note 1) Seismic Capability Engineer "
( Brantley Buenger, PE Seismic Capability Engineer "
Jim White, PE Seismic Capability Engineer Jim Disser, PE Seismic Capability Engineer Carl Nelman, PE Seismic Capability Engineer Rick Augustine, PE Seismic Capability Engin"-
John Dizon, PE Seismic Capability Engines ,
Bascilio N. Sumobodobila, PE Seismic Capability Engineer l Note 1. Professional Engineering Registration obtained after equipment walkdown.
1 3.3 - THIRD-PARTY AUDITOR (S)
The initial Oconee Nuclear Station A-46 Peer Revierv effort was combined with the IPEEE Peer Review. The A-46 efforts often were enhanced to address IPEEE concerns, as well as A-46, thus supporting a combine <1 implementation. The efforts were combined in the interest of
- overall cost efficiency and cousistency of technical review.
In the interest of conducting a solid technical review, our third-party auditor team was formed from various resources from Duke Power Company and EQE. We sought the high level expertise of EQE due to their consistent and long-term role in the development of SQUG
' methodologies. In addition, we sought out internal expertise having familiarity with Oconee's s - technical design issues to compliment this team. Together, our third-party audit team consisted of highly trained, experienced engineers who were familiar with the Oconee Nuclear Station, the GIP and were able to critique the core A-46 project team's application of SQUG methodologies.
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O raira eartv ioaiters Duke Power
Participants:
William B. Shoemaker (Chairperson of Temn) is a senior engineer with twenty-one years experience at Duke Company in stmciural analysis and design and is a Registered Professional Engineer. He has a BS and MS in engineering and is a member of ASCE. Mr. Shoemaker led and coordinated the IPEEE and EPRI seismic margin assessment efforts at Duke Power's :
Catawba Nuclear Station, and provided input into the development of the EPRI procedures. l Experienced in seismic plant walkdowns. he was a member of the observer team at Zion Nuclear i Station for the SQUG trial walkdown. i 1
James E. Thomas has over twenty-six years of experience as an electrical engineer and is a l Registered Professional Engineer. He has been manager of the electrical section of the Design Engineering Department at Duke Power's Catawba Nuclear Station. He was responsible for ,
electrical eagineering and design work necessary to support the operation of Catawba, including l electrical and instrumentation and control design engineering for modifications, upgrades, '
operability evaluations and test acceptance criteria. He also represents the company as a member of the SQUG Steering Committee. in addition, he has provided electrical and electronic l
engineering for nuclear station modifications, supervised and managed various electrical i engineering groups, and developed company programs for establishing and maintaining l k environmental qualifications of electrical equipment.
Dr. P. M. Abraham is the manager of the Severe Accident Analysis section in the Nuclear Engineering Division of Duke Power Company and a Registered Professional Engineer. He has a MS in Nuclear Engineering as well as a Ph.D in Nuclear Physics. Dr. Abraham is responsible for analysis of severe accidents including PRA and severe accident thermal-hydraulic and consequence analysis for Duke's nuclear power facilities. He has over twenty years experience in the Duke nuclear program, working in the areas of licensing, safety analysis and operating experience. Dr. Abraham is an alternate member of the Duke Nuclear Safety Review Board, where he served as a full member from 1993 till 1995. He is a member of the American Nuclear Society (ANS) and served on the ANS NRSD (Nuclear Reactc: Safety Division) program '
committee during 1982-1988.
Dnid R. Kulla is an engineering supervisor with Duke Power Company and a Registered Professional Engineer. He has extensive experience over the last twenty-four years in stmetural ant.!ysis and design for nuclear power plants. Mr. Kulla participated in the development of the EPRI seismic margin assessment procedure. He is a member of the ASME General Requirements Sub-Group.
R. Wayne Revels is a senior engineer with Duke Company. He has a BS in mechanical engineering and has more than thirty years of engineering experience. His career at Duke Power G began in 1974 and has involved a wide range of nuclear plant design, startup, and operation issues.
3-3
1 1
I em EQE
Participants:
U Ronald Polivka (Co-Chairperson) served as facilitator for the EQE portion of the team and did j tot actually particip ste technically as part of the Third-Party Audit Team.
J Dr. Mayasandra K. Ravindra, Paul D. Baughman and David L Moore of EQE International served as senior level participants on the peer review team in conjunction with Duke Power l Company personnel. l David L Moore has served as Project Manager, Program Manager, Management Consultant i and Senior Consultant for numerous Seismic evaluations including USI A-46, Seismic Margin Assessments, Probabilistic Risk Assessments an.: Probabilistic Safety Assessments for w 'eral ;
utilities. Mr. Moore has conducted numerous PRA courses for utilities, EPRI and the NRC.
Publications include PRA's for Salem Units 1&2 (co-author), Kewaunee Nuclear Power Auxiliary Feedwater System (co-author), and Bmnswick Steam Electric Plant (co-author);
" Seismic Margin Reviews of Nuclear Power Plants: Identification of Important Functions and l
Systems" (co-author), Reliability and System Safety 20 (1988) 263-275 and also Transactions of I I
the 9th International Conference on Structural Mechanics in Reactor Technology, Lausanne, Switzerland,17-21 August,1987; Seismic Margin Review of the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station (co-author), NUREG/CR-4826, Volume 2, March 1987. l p Mayasandra K. Ravindra has specialized in reliability analysis, seismic risk analysis, U probabilistic design development, and evaluation of natural and man-made hazards for critical facilities. He has over twenty-six years experience in research, design, construction, and teaching. He has served as Project Manager on programs for the Nuclear Regulatory
. Commission, and the Lawrence Livermore and Brookhaven National Labora+ories and on i previous IPEEE waldowns. Dr Ravindra is a present member of ASCE Committees on Nuclear Energy, Dynamic Analysis, and Minimum Design Loading Standard, and the Society of Risk Analysis and the Earthquake Engineering Research Institute. He is a former Chairman of the
, ASCE Committee on Safety of Nuclear Stmetures(19831989). Publications include
" Methodologies for Seismic Verification of Existing Nuclear Plants," " Seismic Fragilities for Nuclear Power Plant Risk Studies," " Seismic Risk Analysis" and " Analysis of External Events" Pad Baughman is a senior consultant with EQE Internttional and has over twenty-five years exprience in nuclear power plant seismic design and equipment qualification. He is EQE's project manager for the generic SQUG program and is one of the consultants to the SQUG Steering Committee. He has managed EQE's A-46 efforts at four plants, and he has participated in or acted as a peer reviewer for several other A-46 evaluations. He is a licensed professional engineer and attended the SQUG Walkdown and IPEEE add-on training courses.
f 9 (v ,
3-4
9 U
d Section 4
, SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL) i
- The Oconee Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) was prepared in accordance with Section II.3 and Appendix A of the GIP (Reference #1).
4.1 SAFE SHUTDOWN PATH SELECTION '
l Resolution of USI A-46 requires verification of the seismic adequacy of the equipment necessary 1 to achieve and maintain a safe shutdown condition for Oconee Nuclear Station during the first I i 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> following a Design Basis Earthquake (DBE). The key assumptions used in the USI A-46 review are:
- 1. The unit will be operating normally, with the reactor coolant system at or near nomial operating pressure and temperature, prior to the DBE; i l
- 2. The earthquake will not cause a loss of coolant accident (LOCA);
\
- 3. No other extraordinary event or accident; e.g. fire, flood, or LOCA will occur i simultaneously with the DBE. l
- 4. Loss of off-site power may or may not occur as a result of the earthquake; and
- 5. There is sufficient redundancy such that the failure of the active function of a single component will not prevent safe shutdown.
/
e 4.1.1 Safe Shutdown Systems The following sections describe the safe shutdown systems and main operating procedure steps necessary to meet USI A-46 requirements. The four basic functions of reactivity control, pressure control, inventory control, and decay heat removal are addressed. Each section describes the plant systems and main operator actions that are used to accomplish these safe shutdown functions.
4-1
I t
Reactivity Contro!. Reactivity control is accomplished by inserting negative reactivity after i j ' obtsining the signal to shutdown. Additional negative reactivity is needed some time later to
, compensate for the combined effects of Xenon-135 decay and reactor coolant temperature decreases.
- Primary Success Path Alternate Success Path l
Short Term:
- ' Control Rod Insertion Meets single failure
?
Lona Term:
l HPI System injection from Meets single failure l Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) 1 ,
- Letdown through RV Head Vents Letdown to spent fuel pool i Discussion
- .
. The selected SQUG alternative for short term reactivity control is control rod insertion. The singie active failure criteria is met since the failure of the most reactive rod to insert is acceptable. The 7- selected SQUG alternative for long term reactivity control is injection of borated water from the I; Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) using the High Pressure Injection (HPI) System R4mdancy j is ensured for the HPI System by identifying two trains of HPI. The BWST does not need a backup since active failure does not include structural integrity failure. Operators must manually align the 1 3PI pump suction to the BWST. The operators are directed by procedure to do this on low Letdown Storage Tank (LDST) level. For this reason the LDST and its level instrumentation is required to remain intact. Only the initial stored inventory in the LDST is assumed to be
~ available. No credit is'taken for letdown r: makeop to the LDST since the components necessary to provide this function require plant instrument air. Instrument air may or may not be available~during a seismic event. Worst case must be assumed.
The BWST will supply makeup water required due to thermal shrinkage of the reactor coolant and
. boron requirements to maintain a 1% subcriticality margin throughout the shutdown transient. After
==6= has replenished the RCS dae to thermal shrinkage, a letdown path must be established to allow continued inje.:: tion of borated water to maintain adequate subcriticality margin for subsequent plant cooldown. Sufficient letdown capability is ensured by eiGer use of the RV Head Vents or an alterr$e letdown path through 1,2,3HP-426 and 1,2,3HP-428 to the fuel transfer tube. The RV Head Vents discharge to the outlet of the Reactor Building Cooling Units (RBCUs) so that the steam / water mixture can be cooled / condensed by the cool air discharging from the RBCUs. ' Additionally, the reactor vessel head vents would be opened for a natural circulatien cool-down (See Decay Heat RemovalFunction Section).
42
The ability to sample for RCS Boron concentration is requi ed to allow RCS cool-down to cold O shutdown conditions. All normal sample paths are assumed isolated via closed containment isolation valves (loss ofInstrument Air). Manual sampling using a portable sample cooler and ice bath using the Post Accident Sample path from the B Steam Generator (through 1,2,3RC-162,1,2,3RC-163, 1,2,3RC-164,1,2,3RC-165,1,2,3RC-179 and manual valve 1,3LP-128/2RC-178) or the discharge of the LPI coolers (through 1,2,3LP-126 and manual valve 1,3LP-128/2RC-178) ensures the ability to confirm Bomn concentration. This method of RCS sampling is consistent with the sampling method identified for the Appendix R program.
Support System Requirements:
The Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) System is desigaed to supply cooling water throughout the plant during normal and emergency conditions. The Unit I and 2 LPSW Systems share three LPSW pumps which take suction off the CCW crossover header. The Unit 3 LPSW System has two LPSW pumps which take suction off the CCW crossover header. Separate flow paths and redundant components ensure that no single active failure will prohibit the systems from performing their safety function. For the reactivity control function, the LPSW System provides cooling water to the HPI pump motor bearing coolers and the Reactor Building Cooling Units (RBCUs).
l
, Support Systems:
l LPSW - Cooling to HPI pumps and RBC'U's CCW(including emergency vacuum p s) - Support for LPSW g AC Power - MOVs, pumps, fans DC Power - PORV, controls, mstmmentuon RPS Reactor Coolant Pressure Control - Pressure control of the reactor coolant system (RCS) is required to avoid exceeding RCS pressure-temperature limits. Giving the operator the ability to have some control over RCS pressure also provides operational flexibility while placing the plant in a safe stable condition. Different combinations of equipment can be used to raise or lower the RCS pressure L
and temperature.
Available Altematives:
- 1) Decrease Pressure a) Pressurizer Code Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) l b)Pressunzer PORV
' c) Auxiliary Pressurizer Spray from HPI System d) Secondary-Side heat removal (covered in Decay Heat Removal Function)
O 43
- 2) Increase Pressure a) Injection from the HPI System b) PressurizerHeaters Discussion:
RCS pressure can be decreased by operator action through either the use of the pressurizer PORV or the auxiliary pressurizer spray path (via HPI Syrtem). The pressunzer SRVs ensure RCS over-
, pressure protection is maintained. No credit is taken for the normal letdown path since this path may be unavailable ifinstrument air is lost. Additionally, the normal pressurizer spray path is unavailable since no credit is taken for the Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCPs) being available (non-essential power).
RCS pressure can be increased if required by utilizing the pressurizer heaters (Bank 2 Group B) or controlling the injection rate of the HPI System. In addition to the method described above, the emergency feedwater system (EFW) and steam generators provide some control of the RCS cool-down and depressunzation rate. However, these systems will be addressed in the Decay Heat Removal section.
Support System Requirements:
The Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) System is designed to supply cooling water throughout the
( plant during nonnal and emergency conditions. The Unit I and 2 LPSW Systems share three LPSW pumps which take suction off the CCW crossover header. The Unit 3 LPSW System has two LPSW pumps which take suction off the CCW crossover header. Separate flow paths and redundant
. components ensure that no single active failure will prohibit the system fmm performing its safety ,
function. For the pressure control function, the LPSW System provids cooling to the HPI pump )
motor bearing coolers. i Support Systems:
LPSW- Cooling to HPI pumps CCW (including emergency vacuum pumps) - Support for LPSW AC Power -MOVs, pumps DC Power - PORV, controls, instrumentation RPS i
4 i
. O 44
O i j Reactor Coolant Inventory Control - RCS inventory control is achieved by injecting water into
. the RCS and minimizing the loss of coolant from various openings or potential openings in the RCS.
RCS Makeuo/Iniection /Jtematives:
i
'HPI System Injection from BWST Meets single failure
. Maintain RCP Seal Assembly Integrity by HPI System SealInjection Meets single failure j Prevent RCS Losses in Following Paths:
RCS Letdown
]
PORV RCS Vents RCS Sampling Discussion:
. The selected SQUG alternative for RCS inventory control is the addition of water using injection n from the HPI System through the RCP seals. Should additional makeup capacity be required, the
() HPI normal and emergency makeup paths have been selected. The single active failure criterion is met by identifying two trains of HPI. The BWST does not need a backup since active failure is defined as the loss of function;.1 capability, not structural integrity. The structural integrity of the HPI pump recirculation line is only required through the block orifices due to the sufficient supply of BWST water.
Preventing potential RCP seal degradation is accomplished by maintaining normal HPI seal injection.
The RCP seal return path is assumed to be isolated since IA may not be available during a seismic event. IfIA were available and the seal return pathway was desired to be isolated,1/2/3 HP-20 and 1/2/3 HP-21 could be closed by the operator. Unit I a~ro requires taking credit for the closure of 1HP-275 and 1HP-276 to isolate the RCP seal return path due to the different arrangement of Unit l's RCP seals. Component Cooling (CC) supply to the RCP seal coolers is assumed to be unavailable. For this arrangement with an isolated seal return path and no CC cooling, RCP seal degradation is not expected to occur as long as HPI seal injection is maintained, and the RCP is secured (stopped).
Two active valves have been selected to secure the normal letdown paths, the RCS sample paths, PORV path, and RCS vent paths.
( \
%.)
4-5
. I l
i I Support System Requirements:
The Low Prmxe Service Water (LPSW) System is designed to supply cooling water throughout the ;
plant during nornal and emergency conditions. The Unit I and 2 LPSW Systems share three LPSW l pumps which take suction off the CCW crossover header. The Unit 3 LPSW System has two LPSW l pumps which take suction off the CCW crossover header. Separate flowpaths and redundant
)
components ensure that no single active failure will prohibit the system from performing its safety '
4 l
function. For the inventory control function, the LPSW System provides cooling to the HPI pump motor bearing coolers.
Support Systems:
LPSW - Cooling to HPI pumps CCW (including emergency vacuum pumps) - Support for LPSW ,
l O l 4
\
O 4-6
t i
1 Decay Heat Removal - Following the reactor shutdown, die plant must be able to reject decay heat generated within the core for at least 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. :
Primary Success Path, Alternate Success Path
- Short Term
1 MD EFW Pumps feeding SG(s) TDEFWP feeding SG(s)
- from UST and Hotwell from UST and Hotwell f
HPI System feed-and-bleed thrtugh PORVwith suedon from (i) BWST
. (ii) RB Emergency Sump via LPI i
^
Long Temt 4
LPI System in Residual Heat ASW System Removal (RHR) mode through SG atmospheric dump valves HPI System feed-and-bleed
'y through PORVwith suction from the RB Emergency Sump via LPI Discussion:
' The selected SQUG alternative for short term decay heat removal involves establishing natural chtulation' conditions and steaming the steam generators (SGs) via the main steam relief valves. The main steam relief valves are adequate for maintaining hot shutdown conditions. The atmospheric dump valves would be opened by the operator to establish a plant cooldown. The turbine bypass valves are assumed to be unavailable since plant instrument air may not be available following a seismic event. It is assumed the RCPs are not available. Adequate feedwater supply to the SGs is provided by either motor-driven (MD) Emergency Feedwater (EFW) pump. The Turbine Driven (TD) EFW pump and associated flow path is included as the short term backup method because ,
current operating procedures allow for much flexibility in the operation of the EFW system (i.e., any l of the three pumps may be used based on plant conditions). The EFW water sources include the Upper Surge Tanks and Condenser Hotwell (up to elevation 784' 7"). These water supplies ensure sufficient capacity while cooling down to LPI entry conditions. The combined normal inventory of the two sources of water for EFW is approximately 160,000 gal. However, these water supplies cannot provide long-term decay heat removal for the full 72 hr. since no credit is taken for recirc'dation of the steam cycle to the condenser. Therefore, methods for ensuring long-term (up to 72 hr) decay heat removal must be identified.
4-7
-. . . ~ - - - _ . - . . _ - . . - . _ - - _ - . - - - - - - - . _ -
i i
l 4
p Long-tenn decay heat removal can be accomplished by either (i) performing a natural circulation d cool-down using the main steam atmospheric dump valves to LPI entry conditions and maintaining the plant in cold shutdown condition, or (ii) establishing natural circulation in the RCS and steaming the steam generators utilizing the ASW System and the main steam atmospheric dump valves. Since ;
neither choice of long-term decay heat removal is single-failure proof, equipment to ensure both l methods are available has been selected.
1 l Another alternative available to the operators would be opening the pressurizer PORV and i
- establishing HPI " feed-and-bleed" core cooling. The equipment necessary for the feed-and-bleed
} method of decay heat removal has already been identified in the SQUG SSEL.
- For a natural circulation cool-down, the operators are directed tc open the RV head vent valves to i l
prevent a void from forming in the upper head region during the cool-down. The RV Head Vents i discharge to the outlet of the Reactor Building Cooling Units (RBCUs) so that the steam / water !
mixture can be cooled / condensed by the cool air discharging from the RBCUs. The core exit j thennocouples will be relied upon to ensure adequate heat removal is occurring.
} i Support System Requirements. j l
- The Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) System is designed to supply cooling water throughout the
- x . pumps which take suction off the CCW crossover header. Separate flow paths and redundant l components ensure that no single active failure will prohibit the system from performing its safety
, function. For the decay heat removal function, the LPSW System provides cooling to the HPI pump motor bearing coolers, the MD EFW pump motor air coolers, the TD EFW pump bearingjacket, LPI Coolers, and RBCUs.
] .
j The Condenser Circulating Water (CCW) System is designed to supply cooling water to the TDEFW ,
pump turbine oil cooler. CCW is the normal supply.
i Support Systems:
LPSW - Cooling to HPI pumps, EFW pumps, LPI coolers, RBCU's.
CCW (including emergency vacuum pumps) - Supply for LPSW, ASW pump; cooling to l TDEFWP turbine oil cooler.
4-8
_ . _ - . _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ ~ _ - _ _ _ _ _
1 i
4.1.2 Suncortine Systems j
O The following sections describe the supporting systems necessary to ensure that the basic safe j shutdown functions described above will be achieved. These systems do not directly perform a safe shutdown ftmetion, but must operate in order to support the safe shutdown systems.
Electrical Distribution - The station distribution system consists of various electrical systems 1 designed to provide reliable electrical power during all modes of station operation and shutdown
] conditions. The systems are designed with sufficient power sources, redundant buses, and
! required switching to accomplish this. Engineered safeguards equipment for each unit is
- arranged onto three load group buses such that the loss of a single bus section for any reason
- results in only the loss of equipment fed from that bus leaving redundant equipment to perform 4
the same function. In general, the equipment related to unit operation is connected to its !
j respective unit auxiliary electrical buses, whereas equipment common to and serving all units is distributed between the three unit auxiliary electrical buset The control of power sources and j switching for Unit I and 2 is accomplished from the Unit 1 ard 2 control room while control of l j power sources and switching for Unit 3 is from the Unit 3 control room. Each unit's 600 volt i i auxiliary system is similar and arranged into multiple bus sections. Each bus section is fed from l j a separate load center transformer which is connected to one of the three 4160 volt switchgear i bus sections. Various 600 volt non-engineered safeguards motor control centers are located i j throughout the station to supply power to equipment within the related area. The three !
- engineered safeguards load centers and associated motor control are redundant and are supplied I j ( independently from the three 4160 volt engineered safeguards load buses. Load center X8 and X9 have an alternate feeder with manual transfer to be used when the normal source of power is e available. Each engineered safeguards motor control center has an alternate feeder with mual transfer to be utilized only for maintenance. No common failure mode exists for this
., mm. For each unit, a system is provided to supply instmmentation, control, and power loads requiring unregulated 208V/120 volt ac power. It consists of motor control centers, distribution panels, and transformers fed from 600 volt motor control centers. Each of these motor control centers have redundant supply feeders from separate transformers and redundant 600 volt motor control centers. The feeder breakers have mechanical interlocks and manual transfers.
The 208 volt auxiliary system is similar in arrangement for each of the three units. The 125 volt dc instrumentation and control power system batteries of a unit are physically separated in ,
individual enclosures from batteries of another unit to minimize their exposure to any damage. 1 The battery chargers and associated de bus sections and switchgear of a unit are located in separate rooms from battery chargers and associated de bus sections of another unit in the auxiliary building and physical separation is maintained between redundant equipment.
For each unit, a separate 125/250 volt de power system is supplied. Each system consists of three 125/250 volt de power supply battery chargers, a three conductor, metalciad distribution center assembly, and two 125 volt dc batteries. This arrangement provides 125 volts from "P"
~ bus to "PN" bus,125 volts de from "PN" bus to "N" bus, and 250 volt de from "P" bus to "N" bus. Loads on this system are basically the 250 volt de powe loads of units. Each 125 volt de half of a bus section normally is supplied from one of the 125 volt de power supply battery 49
_ _ = _ _ __ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ .- _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ . _ _
4 chargers with the associated 125 volt de battery floating on the bus. The batteries supply the j load without interruption should the battery charger or the ac source fail. A bus tie with
- normally. open double breakers is provided between the three units' distribution center bus J
] sections to backup a battery when it is removed for servicing. One standby 125 volt de power !
supply battery charger is provided between each pair of the 125 volt de batteries for servicing
- and to " backup" the normal power supply battery chargers.
i i
l For each unit, four redundant 120 volt ac vital instrument power buses are provided to supply j power in a predetermined arrangement to vital power, instrumentation, and control loads under all operating conditions. Each bus is supplied separately from a static inverter connected to one of four 125 volt de control power panelboards. Upon loss of power from 125 volt de bus DCA
{ or DCB, the affected inverter is supplied power from a 125 volt de bus of another unit through
- de control power panelboards and transfer diodes of the affected 125 volt de panelboard. A tie
{ with breakers is provided to each of the 120 volt vital ac buses from the alternate 120 volt ac l regulated bus to provide backup for each vital bus and to permit servicing of the inverters. Each ,
inverter has the synchronizing capability to permit synchronization with the regulated buses. I 1
l f For each unit, each of the four redundant channels of the nuclear instrumentation and reactor protective system equipment is supplied from a separate bus of the four redundant buses. Also
, for each unit, each of the three redundant channels of the engineered safeguards protective system is supplied from a separate bus of the four redundant buses. The two engineered safeguards actuation power buses are supplied from separate vital power buses.
For each unit, four uninterruptible power systems are available to supply power.
They are:
)
- 1. The unit's Integrated Control System (ICS) power system, which is 120 volt ac, single phase.
- 2. The unit's Auxiliary Power System (APS) which is 120 volt ac, single phase.
- 3. Tbe unit's original design Computer Power System (CPS), which is 240/120 volt ac, single phase.
- 4. The units' new Computer Power System (KOAC), which is 240/120 volt ac, single phase.
Each of these first three systems consist of a static inverter, with redundant 125 volt dc j supplies from separate 125 volt de buses, circuit breakers and distribution panelboards. The -
fourth system consists of a static inverter with a 250 volt de supply from a single 250 volt de bus, circuit breaker, and distribution panelboard. Also, a static transfer switch is provided in each system as a means for automatic transfer of system loads to the alternate ac regulated power system should the inverter become unavailable. The output of each inverter is '
( synchronized with the ac regulated power system through the static switch in order to minimize transfer time from inverter to the regulated supply. In addition, an automatic transfer switch is 4-10
. . , . . . . . , < asi -
rimimi- si iii iuii i provided in the ICS power system as a means for automatic transfer of system loads to the alternate ac regulated power system should the static transfer switch become unavailable.
For each unit, a system is provided to supply instrumentation, control, and power loads requiring regulated ac power. It also serves as an alternate power source to both the vital power panelboards and to the unintemiptible power panel boards. The system consists of two distribution panels, two regulators and two transformers fed from separate motor control centers.
Service Water The Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) System is designed to supply cooling water throughout the plant during normal and emergency conditions. The Unit 3 LPSW System has two LPSW pumps which take soction off the CCW crossover header. Separate flow paths and redundant components ensure that no single active failure will prohibit the system from performing its safety function. The LPSW System provides cooling to the HPI pump motor bearing coolers, the MD EFW pump motor air coolers, the TD EFW pump bearing jacket, LPI Coolers, and RBCUs. The CCW System provides the suction source for the LPSW System. The CCW System works in the siphon mode with long term reliable operation assured by the new Essential Siphon Vacuum System modification.
The Condenser Circulating Water (CCW) System is designed to supply (as the normal supply)
LPSW, ASW pumps and cooling water to the TDEFW pump turbine oil cooler.
Eneineered Safety Feature Actuation System ESFAS)
The 4160 volt auxiliary system for each unit is arranged into a double bus-double circuit breaker switching arrangement. The three power sources, (1) the unit's auxiliary transformer, (2) the startup transformer and (3) the standby power buses, feed each of the main feeder buses by this double circuit breaker arrangement. Each of the two redundant main feeder buses provide power to each of the three redundant engineered safeguards switchgear bus sections that serve the engineered safeguards auxiliaries. The engineered safeguards auxiliaries are arranged so that a failure of any single bus section does not prevent the respective systems from fulfilling their protective functions.
Damtency Power Sunnort The Keowee Hydro Station contains two units rated 87,500 kVA each, which generate at 13.8 kV.
Upon loss of power from the Oconee generating unit and 230 kV switchyard, power is supplied from both Keowee units through two separate and independent routes. One route is a 4000 ft.
underground 13.8 kV cable feeder to 12/16/20 MVA Transformer CT4 which supplies the redundant .
4160 volt standby powcr buses. The underground emergency power feeder is arranged with double air circuit breakers so that it can be connected to either Keowee generator bus. The connection to the generator bus is made with metal-enclosed bus. This underground feeder is connected at all times to one hydroelectric generator on a predetermined basis and is energized along with Transformer CT4 whenever that generator is in service in either emergency or nonnal mode. The underground feeder and associated transformer are sized to cany full engineered safeguards auxiliaries of one unit plus auxiliaries for safe shutdown of the other two units.
4-11 l
,q The second route is a 230 kV transmission line to the 230 kV switching station at Oconee which Q supplies each unit's startup transformer. Each Keowee generator is connected to a common 230 kV step-up transformer through a 13.8 kV metal-enclosed bus and synchronizing air circuit breaker.
Each Keowee unit is provided with its own automatic startup equipment located in separate cubicles within the Keowee control room. The initiation of emergency startup is accomplished by control signals from either Oconee Control Room. Normal startup of either unit is by operator action - while emergency startup is automatic. Both units are started automatically and simultaneously and run on standby on either of three conditions: 1) extemal grid trouble protection system actuation,2) engineered safeguards actuation or 3) main feeder bus monitor undervoltage actuation. If the Keowee uni +s are already operating when either of the above conditions occur, they are separated from the network and continue to run on standby until needed. Each unit's voltage regulator is equipped with a volts-per-cycle limiting feature which permits it to accept full emergency power load as it accelerates fmm zero to full speed within 23 seconds from receipt of the emergency startup initiation signal.
On normal automatic startup, each unit is automatically connected and supplies power to the Oconee 230 kV switching station through the step-up transformer by its respective generator circuit breaker.
This is accomplished by the automatic synchronizing equipment of each unit. On emergency automatic startup, both units are started; the unit with the underground feeder connected to it supplies that feeder and the other unit is available to supply the 230 kV switching. If there is a system disturbance, this unit is connected automatically to the 230 kV Yellow Bus only after the 230 kV O Yellow Bus is isolated automatically from the system and the preset time delay has elapsed.
Redundant External Grid Trouble Protective Systems are provided to isolate the 230 kV switching station on failure of the external transmission network. Therefore, on loss of the extemal transmission network, both of the Keowee hydro units can provide emergency power to any of the Oconee units tiuough either the 230 kV switching station to the unit's respective startup transformer or the underground feeder and Transformer CT4.
For additional details regarding Keowee, refer to the USI A-46 EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM REPORT.
HVAC Oconee HVAC System Based on the assumption that all normal functioning HVAC is lost during a SQUG event, an ambient temperature analysis was conducted by a team of consultants to determine the maximum temperatures in the Turbine a.id Auxiliary Buildings at the end of the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> period. The consultants utilized a ccmputer model for their temperature analysis and calculated the heat loads on an area / room basis. Initial temperatures used in the analysis were derived from peak summertime temperature readings taken by Oconee Engineering.
Assumptions used in the control complex portion of the analysis included: 1) Selected doors in the equipment room, cable room and control room shall be opened to provide a method of heat p)
( dissipation during the time that ventilation is lost, and 2) the ope ation of the Control Room Ventilation System Booster Fans. (Only one fan will be operating for the Units 1 and 2 4-12
73 Control Room as well as the Unit 3 Control Room to allow for single active failure.) The 1
) results of the ambient temperature analysis were then compared with the SSEL equipmem temperature operating limits. Per engineering review, it was determined that the equipment temperature limits will not be significantly challenged to compromise the functionality of the equipment and that operator action will not be required to open electrical cabinet doors.
In addition to the mechanical equipment required to support the CRVS Booster Fans which is included in the SSF' the following actions will be required to assist in maintaining temperatures within tl Control, Cable, and Equipment Rooms. These actions are addressed in the appropriate procedure.
l a) Load Stripping: Unnecessary lighting in the Control Room area including OAC, office, and kitchen areas should be turned off following a loss of ventilation. Attachment #11 of OSC-6667 assumes that % of the Control Room overhead lighting load is removed. This will reduce heat load in the Control Room. In addition the TSC and OSC should relocate to their backup location in the Oconee Office Building. This will also reduce heat load in the Control Room.
b) Doors: Selected doors within the Control, Cable and Electrical Equipment Rooms should be blocked open to allow heat generated to dissipate into other areas of the plant if cooling to the room is lost. Although some of the doors are either pressure type or special purpose (ie n security) the SQUG scenario does not require that a security or high energy line break event Q be assumed to occui during the 72-hour period following the initiation of the SQUG event.
Therefore there are no postulated events which would prevent the doors from being blocked open.
c) CRVS Booster Fans: CRVS Booster Fans should be operated if Control Room temperatures exceed outdoor air temperatures to provide cooling to the Control Room.
An inventory of spare fans and motors is also being maintained in case of single active failure.
Power is not required for 1-AHU-11.1-AHU-12, 3-AHU-13, and 3-AHU-14 since they function only as a passive device to provide an air flow pathway.
The CRVS walkdown consisted of an extensive review of the ducts, duct suppons, and related attached equipment such as dampers and filters. The duct layout includes the outside air supply duct to the booster fans as well as the supply and return duct. to and from the Control Rooms.
The review of the supply duct in the Control Rooms was limited to the first air register within the control room. Areas of the plant which contained the ductwork are the Ventilation Rooms (El. 838'+0"), Control Rooms (El. 822'+0"), and the connecting duct shafts. Refer to Chapter 7 for a more detailed description of the equipment mounting and ductwork.
OG 4 13
e p4
_U_ nit 1 & 2 Block House The CT4 Ventilation Fans A & B in the Unit 1/2 Blockhouse are included in the SSEL to provide ventilation to transformer CT4. The fans are thermostatically controlled power supply is provided from a non-load shed source.
4.2 OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT REVIEW OF SSEL Once the Mechanical Systems Group completed generation of the SSE :r the GIP criteria, the ONS Operations group performed its independent review of the SSEL. The Oconee Operations Group's review included the SSELs for ONS Unit 1,2 and 3, and common equipment.
During the generation of the SSEL, the Mechanical Systems Group reviewed station procedures to anticipate the actions of the Operations group in selecting the systems and equipment to meet the conditions and criteria of the GIP. The Operations review focused primarily on the necessary mechanical equipment per the desired system function. Miscellaneous support equipment was also reviewed in detail in the Operations group.
V The method used involved analysis of the described equipment lists and defm' ed pathways to ensure Operations procedures included all listed pathways, and no listed pathway ended withou; accomplishing the Safe Shutdown objective. Normal, emergency, and abnormal procedures were used by the " Desk Top" method for this review. Pathways selected during the generation of the SSEL were not always the first choice of the Operation's procedures; However, all pathways were included or made available in the currently approved Operation's procedures.
The Operation's review concluded the listing to be both adequate and complete.
The procedures listed in Table 4-1 were considered in evaluating the completeness of the SSEL.
t 3
(a 4-14
1 n 4.3 COMPOSITE SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST ANd SUBSETS N] A printout of the Composite SSEL for Oconee is included in Appendix B.
l 1
Table 4-1 List of Procedures Used for )
Safe Shutdown Equipment List Review Emergency Operating Procedures:
EP/1/A/1800/01 EP/2/A/1800/01 EPS/A/1800/01 Low Pressure Service Water Procedures:
AP/1/A/1700/24 AP/2/A/1700/24 APS/A/1700/24 Following a reactor trip, the operators are directed to swap the Auxiliary Steam supply to another unit f* using the following procedures:
OP/1/A/1106/22 -
OP/2/A/l106/22 OPS /A/1106/22 The following procedures are used to align LPI system during unit cooldown:
OP/1/A/l104/04 i
OP/2/A/l104/04 '
OPS /A/l104/04 i
Loss of Main Feedwater Abnormal Procedure: l AP/1/A/1700/19 AP/2/A/1700/19 APS/A/1700/19 4
v 4-15
Section 5 y
MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT REVIEW 5.1
SUMMARY
OF REVIEW This section of the report presents information used in completing the walkdown assessment, general processes / procedures used, and the results of the walkdown for the equipment included within the scope of the GIP. Tanks and Heat Exchangers are evaluated in Section 6 of this report. Cable Tray and HVAC Review are evaluated in Section 7 of this report.
The review of the seismic adequacy of mechanical and electrical equipment on the Oconee !
Nuclear Station's Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) was performed in accordance with SectionII.4 of the Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) (Reference #1). Duke Power Company management made the decision in 1992 that resolution of USI-A46 (SQUG) would be performed primarily by Duke's in-house engineering staff. A dedicated on-site SQUG team consisting of Seismic Capability Engineers (SCE) and Relay Evaluation Personnel was established to address plant walkdowns, verification of seismic adequacy of equipment and cable / conduit raceway systems, and completion of relay screening and evaluation. SQUG team members average approximately 18 years of service with Duke Power Company in nuclear {
c power plant work. Each SCE was individually selected by management and exceeds the '
minimum requirements as described in Section 2 of the GIP (ref: Section 3 and Appendix A of this report). As discussed in section 4.0 of this submittal, selection of the Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) was performed by a team of ONS mechanical system engineers. These systems engineers were readily available to the SCEs at any time.
A. Equipment Screening Verification and Walkdown The Equipment Screening Verification and Walkdowns were performed by Seismic Review Teams (SRT) which consisted of a minimum of two Seism.ic Capability Engineers (SCE). All equipment walkdowns were performed between early 1993 and 1998. Nineteen of the twenty SRT members were registered professional civil engineers and possessed an average of 18 years of experience in nuclear plant design and walkdown. As a result of this experience, each SCE was familiar with nuclear design standards and seismic analysis / design. Each SCE completed the SQUG developed training course on seismic adequacy verification of nuclear power plant equipment.
B. Relay Functionality Review The relay evaluations were performed by a group of electrical eugineers who j were all members of the core SQUG project team. These engineers possessed an average of 15 years experience in electrical design and qualification of nuclear power plants. The Lead Relay Reviewer completed the SQUG developed relay 5-1
i
,q evaluation training course, as well as several of the relay reviewers within the
) relay review group.
l 5.1.1 Seismic Canacity vs. Demand !
I There are two primary means for comparing seismic capacity to seismic demand using the l SQUG methodology. The method for comparing equipment seismic capacity to seismic demand is discussed in detail in GIP Section 4.2. The application of these methods was performed as follows:
5.1.1.1 Method A: Comoarison of Seismic Capacity to SSE Ground Response Spectra 1
The SSE ground response spectrum can be used for comparison to the Bounding l Spectrum or the GERS when:
. Equipment is mounted below about 40 feet above effective grade, and
. Equipment has a natural frequency greater than about 8 Hz.
The Oconee Nuclear Station site ground response spectra, for structures founded on both soil and rock, is fully enveloped by the bounding spectrum. Primarily due to lack of available seismic testing information, GERS were used on a very limited basis for 73 comparison of seismic capacity to seismic demand.
L )
Effective Grede Determination:
Effective grade was determined based on the definition provided in GIP, Section 4.2.3.
Effective grade for each building which contains SSEL equipment was conservatively determined and is provided below:
BUILDING EFFECTIVE GRADE Auxiliary Building Elev. 771' (Basement)
Essential Siphon Vacuum Building Elev. 796' (Yard)
Intake Structure Elev. 760' (Bedrock)
Reactor Buildinst A. ShellWall Elev. 777'+6" (Basement -- Conservative)
B. Internal Structure (Shield Wall) Elev. 777'+6" (Basement)
Rad Waste Facility Elev. 796' - Founded on Overburden.
Safe Shutdown Facility (SSF) Elev. 796' (Yard) r3 Transformer and Switchgear Enclosure Elev. 796' (Yard)
() Turbine Building Elev. 775' (Basement)
Yard Elev. 796' (Yard) 5-2
.g h'atural Freauency Determination
' V The S-ismic Review Teams relied on experience and accepted methodology provided in SQUG training, various EPRI and engineering texts, and actual in-situ field testing to l estimate equipment natural frequency. All equipment was evaluated on a case-by-case basis due to large number of variables which can affect equipment natural frequency.
l Mechanical Eauioment: In general, the natural frequency of mechanical equipment l was determined to be greater tlian 8 Hz. This assumption is confirmed by available SQUG training materials rad EPRI documentation. Special attention was made to any unusual equipment cor;ti.gurations which could affect equipment natural frequency.
Electrical Eauioment: In general, the natural frequency of electrical equipment was determined to be less than 8 Hz. During initial equipment walkdows, this assumption was based on available SQUG training materials, various EPRI and engineering texts. Actual in-situ field testing was performed on approximately 15 l
" typical" floor-mounted electrical cabinets and the results confirmed the original assumption. The natural frequency of electrical equipment was only assumed to be greater than 8 Hz. for situations where the equipment was provided with significant top bracing, rigidly mounted to r. structural wall or column, and selected transformers and load centers.
The natural frequency determination for anchorage considered the overall structural i mode. The SRTs recognized and made special note of situations where electrical components were mounted to a door or panel where the panel mode was significantly less than the overall structural mode. As directed by GIP Table 6-2, an in-cabinet amplification factor of 7 was applied in these situations.
5.1.1.2 Method B: Comparison of Seismic Canacity to In-Structure Resoonse Soectra As discussed in GIP, Table 4-1, Method B shall be used for comparison of capacity to demand if either of the following apply:
l
- Equipment is mounted above about 40 feet above the effective grade.
e Equipment has a natural frequency ofless than about 8 hz.
I l
The applicable in-structure response spectrum is compared to 1.5 x Bounding Spectrum l (Reference Spectrum). The use of GERS is also an option in Method B, but was used only on a very limited basis. j lO j
5-3 l
- -w. * - -
y ,, - - . - - - . -
O Q The in-structure response spectra (IRS) for Oconee Nuclear Station were determined by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the evaluation of ONS response to generic letter 87-02 (Reference #5) to be median-centered in-structure response spectrum for the purposes of GIP implementation.
The ONS in-structure response spectra are fully bounded by the Reference spectra, at all frequencies, except as noted in Table 5.3. Table 5.3 provides detailed information relating to these specific exceedances. .
5.1.2 Equipment Class Descriptions Each SSEL item was evaluated to' verify it was adequately represented in the earthquake experience equipment class as defined in GIP, Appendix B. Items that did not meet the GIP Bounding Spectrum Caveats (or intent) were classified as outliers, and are discussed further in Section 8 of this report. In accordance with Section 3.1.2.6 of the GIP, passive items (filters, strainers, etc.) were included on the Composite SSEL, but no seismic evaluation was performed.
Table 5.1 provides a listing of all equipment classifications (category - 0,1-20 & Tanks and Heat Exchangers), the quantity of SSEL walkdown items within each classification, and the e number of resulting outliers (both resolved and unresolved). All equipment that could not meet l (l) equipment class descriptions for inclusion in categories 1-20 & Tanks and Heat Exchangers were ,
classified as Category 0 and considered outliers.
l 5.1.3 Eauipment Anchorage ,
Equipment anchorage was verified in accordance.with the methodology provided in GIP, Section 4.4 and Appendix C. As directed by the GIP, the screening approach for verifying the ;
seismic adequacy of equipment anchorage is based upon a combination of inspections, analyses, ;
and engineering judgment. The USI A-46 program was combined with the IPEEE effort. The accelerations from USI A-46 and IPEEE were enveloped e.J the maximum used for the anchorage evaluations or individual separate A-46 and/or IPEEE r aculations were performed.
Anchorage of all SSEL items was physically inspected. As directed by the GIP, Section 4.4, no L anchorage evaluations were performed for in-line valves or temperature sensors.
l l
k 5-4 I -. - , -. -- . - - .
Tvnical tvoes of anchors used for different cauioment were: ,
d.
Eauinment Class Anchorane Tvoes Motor Control Centers Expansion anchors, welds to embedded steel Low Voltage'Switchgear Expansion anchors, welds to embedded steel Medium Voltage Switchgear Expansion anchors, welds to embedded steel Transformers Expansion anchors, welds to embedded steel, bolts to structural frame Horizontal Pumps Cast-in-place bolts, grouted-in-place bolts Vertical pumps ' Cast-in-place bolts Distribution panels. Expansion anchors, welds to embedded steel, bolts to structural frame Batteries on Racks. Expansion anchors O . Battery Chargers and Inverters Expansion anchors, through-bolts Instruments on Racks Expansion anchors
'Instmmentation \ Control Panels Expansion anchors and Cabinets Tanks and Heat Exchangers Expansion anchors, cast-in-place bolts, bolts to stmetural steel 1 I
Field surveillance of equipment anchorage was performed in accordance with GIP, Section 11.4.4.1. The following provides additional details:
- 1. Equipment mass and location of center of gravity were determined from plant documentation or conservatively estimated in accordance with GIP Section C.1 of Appendix C. Weight of piping attached to pumps, tanks and heat exchangers was considered in the equipment mass.
Natural frequency was generally assumed to coincide with the applicable peak spectral j acceleration. Natural frequency is further discussed below.
- 2. Expansion anchors-shell and nonshell types,. cast-in-place bolts, cast-in-place J-bolts, through-bolts, grouted-in-place bolts, and welds to embedded and exposed steel were encountered and addressed in accordance with the GIP.
S-5
- 3. Sizes and locations of anchors were verified based on field inspections.
fc.)
- 4. Evaluation of anchorage installation and connection to base of equipment was perfomied by visual checks and measurements along with reviews of plant documentation and drawings, where necessary. All accessible anchorages were visually inspected. All accessible expansion anchors were also tested for tightness in accordance with GIP, Section C.2.3.
Inaccessible anchorages or those obstructed from view which were needed for strength to secure the item of equipment were verified through engineering judgment based on tightness checks on similar anchors elsewhere in the plant which showed consistently tight installation.
This method of verification was used after all other means to access the anchor had been exhausted. Methods of verification and anchorage types outside the GIP were considered outliers, and are discussed at the end of this section.
- 5. Embedment lengths of cast-in-place and grouted-in-place anchors were verified from reviews of as-built drawings. Nonshell-type expansion anchor embedment was determined ;
by subtracting the anchor projection from the anchor length. The majority of nonshell-type l anchors installed are Phillips Sleeve anchors and the anchor lengths are " stamped" into the end of these anchors. Shell-type anchors were visually spot-checked to assure the shell did I not protrude above the concrete surface nor touch the base of the equipment being anchored. l Questionable anchors were excluded from the anchorage capacity calculation. Capacity I reduction factors determined in accordance with Appendix C of the GIP were applied to o anchors not meeting minimum embedment requirements.
O 6. The presence and size of any gaps between the base and the item being anchored was determined by field inspections. Gaps greater than about 1/4 inch in the vicinity of threaded anchors were considered outliers. Shims in the vicinity of the anchors with inverted channel bases were considered to meet the intent of the GIP.
- 7. Anchor to anchor spacing was measured during field walkdowns. For anchors not meeting minimum spacing requirements given in Appendix C of the GIP, appropriate capacity reduction factors were applied .
- 8. The edge distance from anchor centerline to all free edges were measured during field walkdowns. For anchors not meeting minimum edge distances given in Appendix C of the GIP, appropriate capacity reduction factors were applied .
- 9. Concrete compressive strength (f',) was determined based on plant documentation (e.g.
construction drawings). Based on this information, nominal anchor capacities given in Table C.2-1 of Appendix C of the GIP were used. Higher concrete compressive strength was not used to justify greater anchor capacities. Any anchorage in concrete block walls was considered an outlier.
p 10. Checks for significant structural cracks in the concrete in the vicinity of installed anchors d were performed during field walkdowns of equipment. Where "significant" structural cracks were found, appropriate capacity reduction factors as given in Appendix C of the GIP Section C.2.8 were applied.
5-6
()
- 11. Essential relays were initially assumed to be present in all electrical equipment. Therefore, a capacity reduction factor of 0.75 for expansion anchors was used in accordance with GIP Section II 4.4.1 and Appendix C Section C.2.9. Where other reduction factors were required (gaps greater than 1/4 inch, etc.), and the composite reductions resulted in calculated anchorage capacity less than the seismic demand, further investigation of the equipment was performed to determine whether essential relays were, in fact, present. If essential relays were found to be present, the equipment was considered to be an outlier due to unacceptabh anchor margin. If essential relays were not found or if the subject relays were later determined to be chatter acceptable, the capacity reduction factor for essential relays was removed and a revised anchorage capacity was calculated.
- 12. The base and anchorage load path of the equipment was inspected during field walkdowns of equipment. Since peak spectral floor or ground response was generally assumed to determine seismic demand, the consequential effects of varying anchorage stiffness and the associated frequency dependent accelerations presented no new concerns. Equipment having essential relays was evaluated to demonstrate analytically that no uplift, and consequential impact, occurred during a seismic event. Where anchorage and load path could produce significant prying action, an analysis was performed in accordance with EPRI Document l
TR.-103960," Recommended Approaches for Resolving Anchorage Outliers". I 1
- 13. Equipment bases and the structural load paths of equipment were inspected during field !
(n~) walkdowns. Also, a review of manufacturer's drawings was frequently performed.
Analyses were peiformed to demonstrate seismic adequacy when the Seismic Capability Engineer determined judgment to be insufficient for proper documentation.
- 14. All load path considerations for equipment welded to embedded steel or mounted on grout pads or large concrete pads were evaluated. Embedments with headed studs were evaluated using the criteria in GIP Section 4.4.1 and GIP Appendix C, Section C.3. Where anchorage '
extended only into the large concrete pad or partially into the structural concrete beneath, construction drawings and photographs were consulted to verify monolithic behavior of the concrete. Anchorage for equipment installed on grout pads was investigated to ensure the minimum embedment was achieved in the structural concrete beneath.
Individual anchor capacity was determined in accordance with GIP Section II 4.4.2 and Appendix C by multiplying the nominal allowable capacities by the applicable capacity reduction factors. The nominal capacities and reduction factors were obtrined from GIP, Appendix C, based on the anchorage installation checks described above, and with consideration given to prying action as appropriate.
The NRC declared the Oconee Nuclear Station in-structure response spectrum to be a realistic, median-centered, in-stmeture response spectra for the implementation of the GIP (Reference g)s
( #5). As directed by GIP, Section 4.4.3, Table 4-3, the appropriate in-structure acceleration values were increased by a factor of conservatism of 1.25 for anchorage evaluations. GIP, Section 4.4.3, required that the vertical component of acceleration to be taken as either 2/3 of the 5-7
L l
3 largest horizontal component of acceleration, or 2/3 of the horizontal zero period acceleration (ZPA) if the equipment fundamental frequency in the vertical direction is determined to be in the rigid range. Venical accelerations used for equipment anchorage qualification equaled or exceeded this required value.
Equipment whose natural frequency was estimated to be below about 20 Hz, was generally assumed to have a frequency which coincided with the peak spectral acceleration for the spectra ofinterest. For equipment whose lowest natural frequency clearly exceeded about 20 Hz, when peak spectral acceleration yielded overly conservative results, the applicable ZPA was used. The center of rotation and damping were estimated based on guidance provided in Table C.1-1 of the ,
GIP, with rigid equipment bares considered to rotate about its outer edge, and flexible i equipment bases considered to rotate about the equipment base centerline.
Unbroadened response spectra were used for determining input accelerations. As stated above, the peak spectral acceleration (or ZPA when justified) was typically used for determining seismic demand accelerations. In those cases, broadening of spectra is not an issue. When j calculated frequencies were used to determine seismic demand accelerations, the calculated !
frequency was shifted +/- 5%.
Equipment damping ratio was taken as 5% for most of the anchorage evaluations addressed in this report. Vertical immersion and deep well pumps and motors.were assumed to have a damping ratio of 3%. For locations where in-structure spectra at 5% damping were not O
available(i.e. Unit 3 Auxiliary Building, and the Turbine Building), 5% damped peak spectral accelerations were estimated by using the relationship:
IE o
Sa =SaA) Do Where :
Sao = Peak spectral acceleration at the desired damping ratio SaA = Peak spectral acceleration at the available damping ratio pA " damp ng i ratio of available response spectrum po = damping ratio of desired response spectrum ZPA accelerations at 5% critical damping were assumed to be equal to these at 2% critical damping. ,
Alternatively, acceleration at the desired damping value was determined using power spectral density methods within the SPECTRA (version 1.1) seismic spectral analysis program developed by the consultant, Stevenson and Associates.
1 Seismic inertial equipment loads for each of the three directions of motion were computed using the equivalent static load method. In this method, the seismic analysis is performed statically by applying the inertial load at the center of gravity of the equipment. The inenial load in each O direction is equal to the input seismic accelerations, times an equivalent static coefficient, times the mass of the equipment. An equivalent static coefficient of 1.0 was used for this analysis in accordance with the GIP. The location of the center of gravity was taken as the geometric center of the equipment if the equipment was of uniform density, or was taken from manufacturer's 5-8
I 1
l l
r i
drawings, if available. If the SCE considered the mass of the equipment to be off-center, appropriate adjustments were made to the center of gravity location.
Anchor loads considered were:
a) Shear due to the lateral component of force caused by the seismic inertial equipment loads, including shear loads due to torsion.
I b) Pullout due to overturning moment caused by the seismic inertial equipment loads. l c) Pullout due to seismic inertial equipment loads in line with the axes of the anchors. l The anchor loads caused by the equipment's overturning-moment was based on the assumption that plane sections remain plane during loading and that the material in the equipment and the anchors behave in a linear-clastic manner.
Combined seismic loads on the anchorage were computed in accordance with Section 4.4.3 of the GIP, The seismic adequacy of anchorage was determined by comparing the seismic capacity of the anchors to the total applied anchor loads using the shear-tension interaction formulations given in Appendix C of the GIP for each of the anchor types covered by this procedure.
Bounding calculations were performed for equipment of similar geometry and weight, using the higher accelerations for multi-unit applications, and the least capable anchorage where capacity reduction factors 'or anchorage sizes differed. When bounding calculations resulted in equipment O not meeting seismic demand, separate calculations were performed on case-by-case bases using equipment specific parameters. Any equipment determined to be inadequate based on equipment specific parameters was determined to be an outlier based on anchorage.
Electrical equipment was typically evaluated using the EPRI/Blume Anchorage Computer Program (EBAC) described in EPRI report NP-5228-SL, Volume 3, Rev 1, the ANCHOR computer program, and less typically by hand calculations. Anchorage for tanks and heat exchangers was evaluated exclusively by hand calculations.
Horizontal pumps and motors on a common steel skid were evaluated using the screening criteria in EPRI Report NP-5228-SL, Vol 1, Rev 1, " Seismic Verification of Nuclear Plant Equipment Anchorage."
l O
5-9
l L
5.1.4 Seismic Interaction O. A seismic interaction evaluation is the fourth and final SQUG screening criteron which must be satisfied to verify seismic adequacy of SSEL equipment. The purpose of this investigation is to
. verify that there are no adverse seismic interactions with nearby equipment, systems, or structures which could cause the equipment to fail to perform its intended sa4 shutdown function.
Each Seismic Review Team evaluated' seismic interaction possibilities during the field walkdowns. As directed by GIP, Appendix D, interaction effects which were included and L
evaluated during SSEL equipment walkdowns included the following:
a) Proximity b) Structural Failure and Falling c) Flexibility of Attached Line and Cables l
Proximity Evaluation:
(- The Seismic Review Teams (SRTs), following guidance provided in GIP, Section 4.5, identified I only those items which were determined to be " credible and significant". The definition of
" credible and significant" was determined based on SRT engineering judgment and the past
- p. earthquake experience discussed during'the USI-A46 Walkdown Training. Also, the SRTs l1 recognized that interaction concerns determined to_ be " credible and significcat" for a fragile instmment might not be " credible and significant" for a large mechanical item. Hence, these items were not identified as interaction concerns within the SEWS forms. Mechanical items are generally considered rugged, with special attention provided to any " soft targets". j I
The SRTs paid special attention to electrical cabinets which were all assumed to contain " chatter L not acceptable" electrical contact devices. The SRTs adopted the broad, generic definition of L electrical contact devices (i.e. relays, motor starters and/or switches). The SRTs adhered to the L GIP philosophy that impact to my electrical cabinet is considered an unacceptable seismic interaction and cause for identifying the eh ical cabinet as a potential outlier. In these cases, L the lead relay reviewer was consulted to determine if contact devices present were considered to
- be "mgged" or " chatter acceptable" If the contact devices were determined by lead relay reviewer to be " rugged" or " chatter acceptable", and the electrical cabinet would not sustain L significant structural damage or become inoperable, the interaction concern was reclassified as I
acceptable. If the cabinet would sustain significant damage or be rendered inoperable, item remained as an outlier due to interaction concern.
The SRTs were careful to verify that all adjacent electrical cabinets containing contact devices i- were bolted together to prevent impact due to seismic motion The SRTs also noted and l
performed special deflection evaluations for those SSEL itema located in the vicinity of seismically qualified masonry walls or other stationary items. Any busekeeping issues discovered were noted on the SEWS form t.nd funher evaluation as described in the previous paragraph was performed.
l 5-10 )
l
Structural Failure and Falling Equipment included in the ONS SSEL are all housed in either Category 1 or 2 structures, or are located outside. All major structures are considered rugged and no problems were noted with major structures. With limited exceptions, the adjacent and surrounding non-safety items are well constructed, adequately spaced and anchored to preclude impact with Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) equipment.
GIP Appendix D, section D.3.3, states that "unreinforced, masonry block walls should be evaluated for possible failure and potential seismic interaction with safe shutdown equipment unless the wall has been seismically qualified as part of the IE Bulletin 80-11 program". Each block wall located near SSEL items was evaluated to verify that it was included in the IEB 80-11, masonry wall evaluation program. Approximately 75 masonry walls were located which needed a detailed review, primarily since these walls were not included in the IEB 80-11 block wall review program. These were not originally reauired to be included in the IEB 80-11 review since the subject walls were not located near any safety related items.
As of 08/15/98, the preliminary engineering wall review is complete. Approximately 65% of the original 75 walls have been seismically qualified, either by comparison to an existing calculation or a unique calculation. The remaining walls must now be addressed due to their proximity to non-safety related SSEL items or electrical cables which are all assumed to control an SSEL O item. Three options exist to resolve these concerns:
- 1) Relocate the existing SSEL item to a " safe" area. ( May involve cable and/or equipment relocation).
- 2) Install a protective structure around the SSEL item.
- 3) Seismically qualify the wall. j
~
- 4) In the case of electrical cable, trace the cable and verify cable actually controls an SSEL item. (Original, conservative assumption was that all cables controlled an SSEL item.)
In an effort to address potential seismic interaction, inspection teams noted all SSEL items which are within 2 inches of a wall which was previously seismically qualified. A block wall deflection calculation was subsequently performed and included with the calculations for the particular SSEL item. If seismic interaction was determined to be a potential problem, further evaluation was performed to verify that the equipment can withstand minor impact (chatter acceptable). In summarv. there were no interaction concerns due to deflection of an existing seismically aualified block wall. The wall deflection was 1) determined to be minimal and impact would not occur (existing gap exceeds calculated wall deflection) or 2) minor impact on the SSEL item was Aermined to acceptable (chatter acceptable).
Any special seismic interaction concerns are noted with the SEWS forms and in the outlier tables, as applicable.
O 5-11
- - - - . .. . - - - - - . = . - . .-
Flexibility of Attached Line and Cables.
/3 :
U The flexibilit, of attached lines and cables was evaluated for each SSEL item during the tield walkdowns. Considerable attention was given to items which could be affected by differential building movements, equipment deflection, and/or cable tray support deflection. The SRTs also evaluated electrical leads for motor operated valves to verify that sufficient flexibility is available to accommodate any significant piping movements.
5.1.5 RELAY WALKDOWN The field walkdown portion of the Relay Functionality review was performed in conjunction l with the Seismic walkdowns by the Seismic Review Teams. All SSEL relays found in a cabinet were assumed to be essential. Relay type, cabinet location and mounting were spot checked by the walkdown team with no discrepancies noted. Relay mountings were reviewed for proper mounting. Relay amplification factors were determined based on the equipment classification and the assumption that all relays were mounted at the highest point of the cabinet unless verified otherwise. Equipment classes were selected based on the guidance provided in the GIP and EPRI NP 7148-SL (Appendix I) & EPRI NP-7149-D .
5.2 INSTANCES OF INTENT BUT NOT LETTER OF CAVEAT MET In some cases, the SRTs may have determined that the Bounding Spectrum or GERS caveats met A the intent (and not the specific wording) of the caveat (s). The basis for the SRTs conclusion that V the caveat intent is met is documented in the memo field of the SEWS form. Instances ofintent but not letter of caveat met are identified in Table 5.2. Equipment is grouped by Equipment Class.
5.3
SUMMARY
OF OUTLIERS All SQUG outliers were evaluated to determine if the existing station Licensing Basis was challenged. In the event an Outlier finding did potentially challenge the Licensing Basis, the associated equipment / item / concern was logged into the appropriate station process for evaluation. Operability and compliance was addressed within the station's established procedures for such evaluations.
A total of 387 pieces of equipment were identified as outliers out of the 1515 ONS SSEL walkdown items. Some items are outliers for more than one reason (i.e. a single outlier may be due to capacity vs. demand, caveats, anchorage and interaction). Section 8.1 provides a breakdown ofindividual outlier issues. Tables 8.1 & 8.2 provide a list of equipment outliers, identified as seismic capacity vs. demand, bounding spectrum caveat, anchorage, and seismic interaction outliers. These tables also include a short description of each equipment outlier and its proposed resolution. Additionally, the results are summarized on the SVDS forms found in Appendix D.I.
/
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O Table 5.1 EQUIPMENT WALKDOWN CATEGORY
SUMMARY
O Oconee Nuciear station Units 1,2, & 3
- O 5-13 l
l l l Table 5-1 l Equipment Walkdown Category Summary I
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Number of items Number of Nnraber of Number of Category Outliers Outliers Walked Down Outliers l Resobed Unresolved 0 - Other 28 28 16 12 1 - Motor Control Centers 70 58 15 43 I 2 - Low Voltage Switchgear 28 19 14 5 3 - Medium Voltage Switchgear 14 9 3 6 4 - Transformers 57 17 4 13 5 - Horizontal Pumps 58 0 0 0 ,
l 6 - Vertical Pumps 30 15 15 0 i 7 - Fluid Operated Valves 193 32 24 8 8A - Motor Operated Valves 216 12 4 8 88 - Solenoid Operated valves 38 5 0 5 9 - Fans 17 8 0 8 10 - Air Handelers 31 8 0 8 11 - Chillers 0 0 0 0 n 12 - Air Compressors 0 0 0 0 13 - Motor Generators 0 0 0 0 14 - Distribution Panels 145 53 30 23 15 - Batteries on Racks 12 4 0 4 16 - Battery Chargers and Inverters 33 7 6 1 1 17 - Engine - Generators 0 0 0 0 18 -Instruments on Racks 271 25 0 25 19 - Temperature Sensors 31 0 0 0 20 - Instmmentation and Control Panels 165 43 5 38 and cabinets 21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers 78 44 41 3 Total 1515 387 177 210 l
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O Table 5.2 INTENT BUT NOT LETTER OF CAVEAT
SUMMARY
O Oconee Nuclear Station i Units 1,2, & 3 l
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O 5-14
TABLE 5-2 Intent But Not Letter of Caveat Summary i
(m Equipment Class: 01 - Motor Control centers Name: Misc Motor Control Centers Equipment ID's: I DP.1 XA .1 XA . A.1 XG A.1 XGB .2 DP.2 X A.2 XG A.2 XG B .3 DP.3 XA.3 XA-A.3 XG A.3 XGB f Bldg: E Floor Elev.: 796'+6" SVDS 21 Outfier Ref. _2,,1 Group No.: No.:
Letter of Caveat Not Met: Reason intent of Caveat Met:
MCC depth = 14.5" < 18" GIP minimum for equipment class Analytical review of shear flow in bolts verifies that individual shear loads per back to back bolt are very small. The MCC is determined to act effectively as a 29" MCC.
Name: Mise Motor Control Centers Equipment ID's: IXC.2XC.3 XC.lXE Bldg: E Floor Elev.: 775'+0" SVDS l Outfier Ref. ,4_0 Group ho.: No.:
Letter of Caveat Not Met: Reason intent of Caveat Met:
MCC depth = 14.5" < 18" GIP minimum for equipment class Analytical review of shear flow in bolts verifies that individual shear loads per back to back bolt are very small. The MCC is determined to act effectively as a 29" MCC.
Name: Mise. Motor Control Centers e Equipment ID's: I XO. l XP.1 XS t .1 XS2.2XO.2 XP.2XS I .2XS2.3XO.3 XP.3XS t .3XS2
/ )
( Bldg: AB. Floor Elev.: 796'+6" SVDS Group No.:
21 Outlier Ref.
No.:
4Z Letter of Caveat Not Met: Reason intent of Caveat Met:
MCC depth = 14.5" < 18" GIP minimum for equipment class Analytical review of shear flow in bolts verifies that individual shear loads per back to back bolt are very small. The MCC is determined to act effectively as a 29" MCC.
Name: 208V MCC XODI Equipment ID's: XODI Bldg: E Floor Elev.: 796'+6" SVDS .2 Outlier Ref. 160 Group No.: No.:
Letter of Caveet Not Met: Reason intent of Caveat Met:
MCC depth = 14.5" < 18" GIP minimum for equipment class Analytical review of shear flow in bolts verifies that individual shear loads per back to back bolt are very small. The MCC is determined to act effectively as a 29" MCC.
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TABLE 5-2 Intent But Not Letter of Caveat Summary Equipment Class: 02 - Low Voltage Switchgear Name: CRD SYSTEM AC BKR CAB Equipment ID's: I CRD ACB K R C A B.2CRD ACB KRC AB.3CRD ACB KRC AB Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 809'+0" SVDS 21 Outlier Ref. Fjd Group No.: No.:
Letter of Caveat Not Met: Reason Intent of Caveat Met:
Cabinets exceeds bounding height by i .1/2" and is less than Height dimension exceedance is < 2%.
minimum width by 4".
Name: 600V LC 3X05 & 3XO6 Equipment ID's: 3X05.3X06 Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 7%'+6" SVDS J.s Outlier Ref. F!3 Group No.: No.:
Letter of Caveat Not Met: Reason Intent of Caveat Met:
3 anchors turned ~1 tum during tightness check. Anchors are Phillips Self Drill. Setting force is independent of torque. Quality ofinstallation determined to be accep'a ble.
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TABLE 5-2 Intent But Not Letter of Caveat Summary Equipment Class: 07 Fluid-OperatedValves Name: SEAL SUPPLY REGULATING VALVES Equipment ID's: OHPSVA140,147&l54 j Bldg: E Floor Elev.: 27E SVDS f:! Outfier Ref. M l Group No.: No.:
Letter of Caveat Not Met: Reason Intent of Caveat Met:
Valve body is Cast Iron. Due to extremly small weight of the valve, the routing and the I support of the pipe and the low seismic input at this elevation, st. esses in the valve are deemed to be very small
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j Name: PRESS REG TD PUMP SEAL VLAVES Equipment ID's: 1 FDWVA0086.1 FDWV A0087.2 FDWVA0086.2FDWVA0087.3FDWVAO. %3FDWVA0087.1 FDWVA0 129.1 FDWV A0218.1 LPSV A0175. l LPSV A0182. l L PS V A0189.2 F DWVA01 J.2 FDWV A 0218.3 FDWV A 0129.3 FDWV A0218.3 LPS V A0196.3 LPSV A0203 Bldg: E Floor Elev.: 775'+0* SVDS it Outlier Ref. _N,/,6 Group No.: No.:
Letter of Caveat Not Met: Reason intent o' Caveat Met:
Valve body is Cast Iron. Due to the extrerrsy small weight of the valve, the routing and the support of the pipe and the low seismic input at this elevation, stresses in the valve are deemed to be very small.
Name: SO SAMPLE ISOLATION VALVES Equipment ID's: IFDWVA0106.2FDWVA0106 3FDWVA0106 Bldg: AB Floor Elev.: 809'+0* SVDS l_ Outlier Ref. EA, Group No.: No.:
Letter of Caveat Not Met: Reason Intent of Caveat Met:
Valve is mounted on 1/2" Diameter pipe. Piping analysis verifies acceptable stresses.
Name: PRZ WATER SAMPLE ISOLATION VALVES Equipment ID's: IRCVA0007.2RCVA0007.3RCVA0007 Bldg: _A.D. Floor Elev.: 809'+0* SVDS 12 Outlier Ref. E6 Group No.: No.:
Letter of Caveat Not Met: Reason Intent of Caveat Met:
Valve is mounted on 1/2" Diameter pipe. Piping analysis verifies acceptable stresses.
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TABLE 5-2 Intent But Not Letter of Caveat Summary Equipment Class: 07 Fluid-Operated Valves Name: SG SAMPLE THRO 1TLE VALVES Equipment ID's: 1RCVA0179.2RCVA0179.3RCVA0179 Bldg: AR Floor Elev.: 758'+0* SVDS .1 Outlier Ref. N/6 Group No.: No.:
Letter of Caveat Not Met: Reason Intent of Caveat Met:
Valve is installed in 1/2" tubing. Tubing is well supported and valve is extremely light (4#).
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Name: EFW PUMP TURBINE OIL PR VALVE Equipment ID's: ITOVA0059.2TOVA0059.3TOVA0059 Bldg: H Floor Elev.: 775'+0* SVDS 20 Outlier Ref. F]&
Group No.: No.: j Letter of Caveat Not Met: Reason intent of Cavest Met:
Diameter of pipe < 1" Valve deterrnined to be very light. No concern for pipe strss.
Name: SG SAMPLE ISOLATION VALVE Equipment ID's: 3FDWVA0108 n] Bldg: AR Floor Elev.: 809'+0* SVDS Group No.:
11 Outlier Ref.
No.:
F]A Letter of Caveat Not Met: Reason intent of Caveat Met:
Pipe and valve supported from seperate structures. Judged to be acceptable due to pipe flexibility.
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TABLE 5-2 Intent But Not Letter of Caveat Summary b
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Equipment Class: 08A - Motor-Operated Valves Name: MISC. VALVES Equipment ID's: 1 FDWVA0105. l RCVA 0006. l FDWVA0107.2 FDWV A0105.2 FDWVA 01073 FDWV A01053 FDWVA01 El i
Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 797'+0* SVDS 2). Outlier Ref. M Group No.: No.:
- Letter of Caveat Not Met
- Reason Intent of Caveat Met:
Pipe diameter is < !* Piping and valves were determined to be .<ctl supported.
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Name: LPI COOLER I A ISOLATION VALVE Equipment ID's: 1LPSVA0004 Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 783'+0" SVDS M Outlier Ref. E Group No.: No.:
Letter of Caveat Not Met: Reason intent of Caveat Met:
The valve stem is supported by two small spring cans. Spring support on operator will not significantly stress yoke because adjacent piping adequately supported.
l Name: LPI COOLER ISOLATION VALVES Equipment ID's: I LPVA0012. l LPVA 0014.2 LPVA0012.2LPV A0014 Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 771'+0* SVDS M Outlier Ref. E Group No.: No.:
l Letter of Cavest Not Met: Reason Intent of Caveat Met:
The valve operator is supported by a spring support. Spring support on operator will not significantly stress yoke because adjacent piping adequately supported.
Name: COND VACUUM BREAKER VALVES Equipment ID's: IVVA0186,2VVA01863VVA0186 l Bldg: IB_ Floor Elev.: 796'+6" SVDS 20 Outlier Ref. M i
Group No.: No.:
Letter of Caveat Not Met: Reason intent of Caveat Met:
Valve body is CastIron. Stress calculation verifies that stresses are low. l l
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TABLE 5-2
. Intent But Not Letter of Caveat Summary Equipment Class: 08A - Motor-Operated Valves J Name: A1.T LETDOWN PATH ISOLATION VALVE Equipment ID's: 2HPVA0426 Bldg: M. Floor Elev.: 777'+0* SVDS Outlier Ref.
J.0_ b26 Group No.: No.:
Letter of Caveat Not Met: Reauon Intent of Caveat Met:
The valve yoke is supported by a spring can support. Judged not to impose excessive loads on yoke.
Name: PRZ STEAM SAMPLE ISOLATION VALVES Equipment ID's: 2RCVA0005&6 Bidg: M Floor Elev.: 8].3' SVDS 60 Outlier Ref. N[4 Group No.: No.:
Letter of Caveat Not Met: Reason Intent of Caveat Met:
Valve is mounted on 1/2" Diameter pipe. Piping analysis verifies acceptable stresses.
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. _ _ . _ _ _.._.. _ _ _ __ _ - .._.~. _._. _._____-__. _ _. _ _
TABLE 5-2
, Intent But Not Letter of Caveat Summary Equipment Class: 09 -Fans Name: OUTSIDE AIR BOOSTER FANS Equipment ID's: IVSAH0026,lVSAH0027 Bldg: AE Floor Elev.: 838'+0" SVDS f.1 Outfier Ref. L78 Group No.: No.:
Letter of Caveat Not Met: Reason intent of Caveat Met:
Capacity is judged to exceed Demand due to use of vibation Demand spectrum at 838'+0" exceeds Reference Spectrum isolator <, and rugged configuration of equipment. See EQE between 9 Hz & 12.5 Hz.
HVAC equipment calculation.
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TABLE 5-2 Intent But Not Letter of Caveat Summary Oa Equipment Class: 14 - Distribution Panels Name: NB REG XFER SW & BKR Equipment ID's: l A/lB/SW.1 A/MCB.lB/MCB IKUSW/BP.lKU/SW/3P.lKX/SW/BP.2A/2B/SW.2A'MCB,2B/MCB.2KI/
l SW/BP.2KU/SW/BP.2KX/SW/BP.A/3B/SW 3A/MCB.3B/MCD.3Kl'SW/BP.3KU/SW/BP.3K.X/SW/BP i Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 796'+6" SVDS .2 Outfier Ref. _1 Group No.: No.:
Letter of Cavest Not Met: Reason Intent of Cavest Met:
Par.O are mounted on a unistrut frame. Frame isjudged to be sufficently rigid to meet the intent of a wall mounting.
Name: 600V PPB ID Equipment ID's: 1D
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Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 818'+0" SVDS E Outlier Ref. N.[/6 l
Group No.: No.:
8.etter of Caveat Not Met: Reason Intent of Caveat Met:
Doorlatch is damaged. Only non-vulnerable breakers are contained in this cabmet and no significant impact would result due to the door swinging.
Name: 120V PPB IKG & 3KG p Equipment ID's: IKG.3KG
( Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 83 8'+0" SVDS l Outlier Ref. 17 Group No.: No.:
Letter of Covest Not Met: Reason Intent of Cavest Met:
1 Panel exceeds bounding height by 12". Dimensionsjudged to be represented by experience database duc j to small weight of cabinet.
1 Name: REMOTE STARTER ENCLOSURES Equipment ID's: I RSC-l CCW-287/ ENCL 2 RSC-2CCW-287/ ENCL 3 R SC-3 CCW-287/ ENCL Bldg: $SF Floor Elev.: 75 8'+0" SVDS l Outlier Ref. F./.6 Group No.: No.:
Letter of Caveat Not Met: Reason Intent of Caveat Met:
Panels contain Motor Starters which are considered relays. Motor Starters will be evaluated seperatly in relay review.
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TABLE 5-2 Intent But Not Letter of Caveat Summary f Equipment Class: 14 - Distribution Panels Name: REMJTE STARTER ENCLOSURES Equipment ID's: I RSC-I FDW-368/ ENCL I RSC- 1 FDW-369/FNCL 1 RSC-l FDW-372/ ENCL I RSC-l FDW-374TNCLIRSC-lFDW-382/ENCLIRSC-lFDW-384TNCL..lRSC-IPR 59TNCLIRSC-IPR.
60TNCL2 RSC-2 FDW-368 'FNCL.2 RSC-2 FDW-369TNCL2 RSC-2 FDW-372TNCL2 RSC-2 FDW-374TNCL2RSC-2FDW 382/ ENCL 2RSC-2FDW-384TNCL2RSC-2PR-59 ENCL 2RSC-2PR-60/ ENCL 3RSC-3FDW-368' ENCL 3RSC-3FDW-369 ENCL.3RSC-3FDW 372NNCL3RSC-3FDW-374TNCl 3 SC-3 FDW-382TNCL3 RSC-3 FDW-384TNCL3 RSC-3 PR-59TNCL3 RSC-3 PR-60/ ENCL Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 800'+0* SVDS l Outlier Ref. 22 Group No.: No.:
Letter of Caveat Not Met: Reason Intent of Caveat Met:
Panels contain Motor Staners which are considered relays. Motor starter will be evaluated separately during relay review.
Name: REMOTE STARTER ENCLOSURES Equipment ID's: 1RSC-lHP-409'ENCLIRSC-1 ppd 10TNCL.1RSC ILPSW-565ENCLIRSC-ILPSW.
566TNCL2RSC-2HP-409TNCL'iRSC-2HP-410TNCL2 RSC-2 LPS W-565TNCL2 R SC-2 L PS W-566/ ENCL.3 RSC-3 HP-409 ENCL 3 RSC-3 HP-410TNCL 3 RSC-3 L PS W-565TNCL3 R$C-3 LPSW-566' ENCL Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 796'+6" SVDS l Outlier Ref. E Group No.: No.:
Letter of Caveat Not Met: Reason Intent of Caveat Met:
Panels contain Motor Starters which are considered relsys. Motor starter will be evaluated separately during relay review.
Name: REMOTE STARTER ENCLOSURE FOP 1LPSW 139 Equipment ID's: IRSC-ILPSW-139TNCL
\ Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 796'+6" SVDS 18 Outlier Ref. 19.l Group No.: No.:
Letter of Cavest Not Met: Reason Intent of Caveat Met:
Anchor size is smaller than that cover by the GIP, Panel is small and light weight. Calculations within SEWS verifiy anchorage to be adequate.
Name: 125V DC PPB 3DL2 Equipment ID's: 3DL2/ PPB Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 796'+6", SVDS l Outlier Ref. M Group No.: No.:
Latter of Cavent Not Met: Reason intent of Caveat Met:
Cabinet appears to be " shop built
- from galvanized sheet steel. Cabinet is well constructed with quality welds and material.
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TABLE 5-2 Intent But Not Letter of Caveat Summary
. Equipment Class: 14 -DistributionPanels
%d Name: PPB 3KA Equipment ID's: }fd Bldg: E Floor Elev.: 775'+0" SVDS f2 Outlier Ref. NL4 Group No.: No.:
Letter of Caveat Not Met: Reason Intent of C.avest Met:
Prael marginally exceeds equipment class size. Due to similiar construction with panels included in the equipment class, this is considered to meet the intent.
Name: 120V PPB 3KC Equipment ID's: }E Bldg: E Floor Elev.: 796'+6' SVDS l Outlier Ref. F14 Group No.: No.:
Letter of Caveat Not Met: Reason intent of Caveat Met:
Depth dimension exceeds bounding limit of 12' by 2*. Dimensionsjudged to be represented by experience database due to small weight ofcabinet.
Name: 120V PPB 3KTill Equipment ID's: 3KTHI i Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 771'+0" SVDS l Outlier Ref. El Group No.: No.:
Letter of Cavest Not Met: Reason intent of Caveat Met:
Panel exceeds max depth by 2" Dimensionsjudged to be represented by experience database due to small weight ofcabinet.
M Name: REMOW STARTER ENCLOSURE Equipment ID's: 3RSC-3LP.126/ ENCL Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 771'+0' SVDS l Outlier Ref. D2 Group No.: No.:
i Letter of Caveat Not Met: Reason intent of Caveat Met:
Panel contains motor starters which are considered to be relays. Motor starter will be evaluated separately during relay review.
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TABLE 5-2 Intent But Not Letter of Caveat Summary
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Equipment Class: 14 - Distribution Panels Name: CT4 FAN SPEED CABINETS Equipment ID's: CT4FSC.SGFSC Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 79646" SVDS l Outlier Ref. Fila Group No.: No.:
Letter of Caveat Not Met: Reason intent of Caveat Met:
Panels contain relay and temperature switches. Relays and temperature switches will be evaluated separately during relay review.
Name: REMOTE STARTER ENCLOSURE Equipment ID's: RSC-lKSG-01/ ENCL Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 796'+6" SVDS l Outlier Ref. N/A Group No.: No.:
Letter of Caveat Not Met: Reason Intent of Caveat Met:
Panel contains rnotor starter which are considered to be relays. Motor starter will be evaluated separately during relay review.
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TABLE 5-2 Intent But Not Letter of Caveat Summary m
Equipment Class: 18 -Instruments on Racks
, Name: AIR HANDLING UNITS 11 & 12 CONTROL PANEL i Equipment ID's: 1AHCC Bldg: 61! Floor Elev.: 83 8'+0* SVDS l Outlier Ref. J.fi Group No.: No.:
4 Letter of Caveat Not Met: Reason Intent of Caveat Met:
) Equipment differs from standard Instrument rack in that it has a Door is securely fastened. Frame consist of aluminum structure door closure. with acrylic inserts. Frame is considered to be at least as rugged as standard instrument Rack.
s Name: LOW HYDRAULIC Olt PRESS SW1TCH 1
Equipment ID's: I FDWPS0300.2 FDWPS0300,3 FDWPS0300 Bidg: IB Floor Elev.: 77 5'+0* SVDS l Outlier Ref. N/A i Group No.: No.:
Letter of Caveat Not Met: Reason intent of Caveat Met:
i Mounted to side ofTDEFWP oil tank. Oil tank is judged to be sufficiently rigid to approximate wall mounting.
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. TABLE 5-2 Intent But Not Letter of Caveat Summary Equipment Class: 20 -1 & C Panels & Cabinets Name: MISC. EOUIPMENT IN THE UNIT 1 VENT ROOM Equipment ID's: OVS MN0001.CD45 A.CD-0$ B .CD46 A.CD-06B.CD- 10 A.CD-10B Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 83 3'+0* SVDS 11 Outlier Ref. b'!A Group No.: No.:
Letter of Caveat Not Met: Reason intent of Caveat Met:
Demand spectrum at 838'+0" exceeds Reference Spectrum Capacity isjudged to exceed Demand due to lack of relay chatter between 9 Hz & 12.5 Hz. concems and rugged construction and mounting of equipment..
See EQE HVAC equipment calculation.
1 Name: ISOL DIODE ASSEMBLY I ADB '
Equipment ID's: 1ADB Bldg: M FI)or Elev.: 796'+6" SVDS LO Outlier Ref. Ifi !
Group No.: No.: j Letter of Cavest Not Met: Reason Intent of Caveat Met:
A 3/8* gap exist under the cabinet base. A analytical review was performed and the 3/8" gap was found to be acceptable.
l Name: TERM BOX 111 Equipment ID's: ITB-l il g Bldg: E Floor Elev.: 796'+6" SVDS j. Outlier Ref. 12).
Group No.: No.:
Letter of Caveat Not Met: Raason intent of Caveat Met:
Type of anchorage not covered by GIP Judged 3cceptable due to light weight of cabinet and rigidity of mounting I
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\J Table 5-3 Response Spectrum Exceedances for Buildine Elevations Containine SSEL Eauipment 4
Frequency Range where in-Building Floor Elevation stmeture response spectrum exceeds 1.5 x Bounding Spectrum (See Notes)
Aux. Building (Unit 1 & 2) 838' 8.5Hz. - 13hz. (1)
Turbine Building 796' 5.5Hz - 6.5Hz.(2) 822' l.8Hz - 2.4 Hz.(3)
Reactor Building NSSS Loop 849 9.5Hz - 15Hz. (4)
Safe Shutdown Facility 817' - E/W (along Col.#9) 5Hz - 25+Hz. (Note 5)
(SSF) 817' - N/S 11Hz. - 16Hz. (Note 5)
Notes:
- 1. All equipment located at elevation 838' in the auxiliary building is considered an outlier for
" capacity vs. demand".
- 2. All items with natural frequency less than approximately 8 hertz are considered an outlier.
, Resolution for these items discussed in ONS calculation OSC-5085.
- 3. There are no SSEL items receiving seismic input from elevation 822' which have a fundamental frequency less than 3Hz.-4Hz. As a result, capacity will always exceed demand (ref.: GIP, page 4-9, table 4-1, " method B").
- 4. This affects only valves which will all be considered outliers, pending further analytical review.
- 5. Existing seismic testing documentation exists for equipment at this elevation. This information was compared to the in-structure seismic response to evaluate capacity vs. demand.
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. _ = . _ -- - .. .- - . . -_-_ _ - , - -
p Section 6 V
TANKS AND HEAT EXCHANGER REVIEW 6.1
SUMMARY
OF REVIEW The tanks and heat exchangers on the Oconee SSEL were evaluated in accordance with Section 11.7 of the GIP [ Reference #1]. A total of 78 individual tanks & heat exchangers were evaluated for the A-46 program. Table 6-1 lists the 34 tanks and heat exchangers which were within the scope of the GIP and the seismic capacity of the tank exceeded the demand. The remaining 44 tanks & heat exchangers were classified as outliers and are addressed in section 6.2.
Table 6-1 Tanks and Heat Exchangers Meeting the GIP EQUIPMENT ID BLDG. FLOOR ELEV. SIZE (Dia. x L) SUPPORT / ANCHORAGE j NAME l
1CFTK000A RB 797'M" 9'-8 3/8" x 22'-5" J-BOLTS j CORE FLOOD TANK 1A 2CFTK000A RB 797'+6" 9'-8 3/8" x 22'-5" J-BOLTS (S CORE FLOOD Q TANK 2A 3CFTK000A RB 797'+6" 9'-8 3/8" x 22'-5" J-BOLTS CORE FLOOD TANK 3A ICFTK000B RB 818'+0" 9'-8 3/8" x 22'-5" J-BOLTS CORE FLOOD TANK IB 2CFTK000B RB 818'+0" 9' 8 3/8" x 22'-5" J-BOLTS CORE FLOOD TANK 2B 3CFTK000B RB 818'+0" 9'-8 3/8" x 22'-5" J-BOLTS CORE FLOOD TANK 3B ODJWHX000A SSF 777'+0" l'-2" x 12'-2 1/4" SADDLES / STRUCTURAL BOLTS SSF DJW HEAT EXCHANGER A ODJWHX000B SSF 777'+0" l'-2" x 12'-2 1/4" SADDLES / STRUCTURAL BOLTS SSF DJW HEAT EXCHANGER B lHPIHX000A RB 777'+6" 4'-01/2" x 2'-7 5/16" S5 ' jLES/CIP BOLTS LETDOWN COOLER 1A U
6-1
- - . . - _ - . - . - - . . . -- ~- _. - --- ---
p Table 6-1 (Cont.)
Tanks and Heat Exchangers Meeting the GIP EQUIPMENTID BLDG. FLOOR ELEV. SIZE (Dia. x L) SUPPORT / ANCHORAGE NAME 2HPIHX000A RB 777'+6" 4'-01/2" x 2*-7 5/16" SADDLES /CIP BOLTS LETDOWN COOLER 2A 3HPIHX000A RB 777'+6" 4'-01/2" x 2'-7 5/16" SADDLES /CIP BOLTS LETDOWN COOLER 3A IHPlHX000B RB 777'+6" 4'-01/2" x 2*-7 5/16" SADDLES /CIP BOLTS LETDOWN COOLER 1B 2HPIHX000B RB 777'+6" 4'-01/2" x 2*-7 5/16" SADDLES /CIP BOLTS LETDOWN COOLER 2B 3HPIHX000B RB 777'+6" 4'-01/2" x 2'-7 5/16" SADDLES /CIP BOLTS LETDOWN COOLER 3B ILPIHX000A AB 771'+0" 3*-11" x 19'-91/4" SADDLES /CIP BOLTS LPI COOLER 3A 2LPIHX000A AB 771'+0" 3'-11" x 19'-91/4" ~I3 ADDLES /CIP BOLTS LPI COOLER 2A 3LPIHX000A AB 77 l'+0" 3'-l1" x 19'-91/4" SADDLES /CIP BOLTS f
\
LPI COOLER 3A ILPIHX000B AB 771'+0" 3'-11" x 19'-91/4" SADDLES /CIP BOLTS LPI COOLER 3B 2LPlHX000B AB 77 l'+0" 3'-l1" x 19'-91/4" SADDLES /CIP I.0LTS LPI COOLER 2B 3LPlHX000B AB 771'+0" 3*-11" x 19' 91/4" SADDLES /CIP BOLTS LPI COOLER 3B ILPITK0001 YD 796'+6" 36' x 51' CONCRETE PAD /CIP BOLTS BWST 2LPITK0001 YD 796'+6" 36' x 51' CONCRETE PAD /CIP BOLTS BWST 3LPITK0001 YD 796'+6" 36' x 5l' CONCRETE PAD /CIP BOLTS BWST ILPSFLOOOA TB 775'+0" 4'-l 1/4" x 7'-31/2" CONCRETE PAD /CIP BOLTS LPSW PUMP A STRAINER 3LPSFLOOOA TB 775'+0" 4'-l 1/4" x 7'-31/2" CONCRETE PAD /CIP BOLTS LPSW PUMP A STRAINER ILPSFLOOOB TB 775'+0" 4'-l 1/4" x 7'-31/2" CONCRETE PAD /CIP BOLTS LPSW PUMP B STRAINER 3LPSFLOOOB TB 775'+0" 4'-l 1/4" x 7'-31/2" CONCRETE PAD /CIP BOLTS LPSW PUMP B m STRAINER I ILPSFLOOOC TB 775'+0" 4'-l 1/4" x 7*-31/2" CONCRETE PAD /CIP BOLTS LPSW PUMP C STRAINER 6-2
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Table 6-1 (Cont.)
Tanks and Heat Exchangers Meeting the GIP EQUIPMENT ID BLDG FLOOR ELEV. SIZE (Dia. I L) SUPPORT / ANCHORAGE l NAME l 1SCHX000A TB 775'+0" l'-10" x 12'-3 5/8" WELDS & ANCHOR BOLTS GENERATOR WATER COOLER l
1A l
2SCHX000A TB 775'+0" l'-10" x 12'-3 5/8" WELDS & ANCHOR BOLTS i GENERATOR !
WATER COOLER 2A 3SCHX000A TB 775'+0" l' 10" x 12'-3 5/8" WELDS & ANCHOR BOLTS GENERATOR i WATER COOLER 3A ISCHX000B TB 775'+0" l'-10" x 12'-3 5/8" WELDS & ANCHOR BOLTS GENERATOR WATER COOLER IB 2SCHX000B TB 775'+0" l'-10" x 12'-3 5/8" WELDS & ANCHOR BOLTS GENERATOR WATER COOLER 2B O\ 3SCHX000B TB 775'+0" l'-10" x LI3/8" WELDS & ANCHOR BOLTS b GENERATOR WATER COOLER 3B 6-3
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6.2
SUMMARY
OF OUTLIERS )
l A total of 78 individual tanks & heat exchangers were evaluated for the A-46 program. Of these, 44 were considered outliers. The majority of tank and heat exchanger outliers were due to support configurations considered not to be within the scope of the GIP. All of the tanks & heat exchangers outliers have been resolved. The final dispositions of these outliers are listed in Table 6.2 below. Tanks and heat exchangers supported on legs, vertical tanks not supported continuously over their bottoms and tanks not cylindrical in shape are considered outliers since these types of supports and shapes are not addressed within the scope of the GIP. For these tanks and heat exchangers, engineering analysis was performed using an approach similar to that described in Section 7 of the GIP. The six Upper Surge Tanks were found to have seismic capacities less than demand and have be upgraded. Table 6-2 lists tanks and heat exchangers I which are outliers due to support configuration and/or whose seismic capacity was found to be l less than the demand.
Table 6-2 Tank and Heat Exchanger Outlier Description and Resolution Summary EQUIPMENT ID BLDG. FLOOR OUTLIER TYPE OUTLIER RESOLUTION NAME ELEV.
1,2,3CIK000C TB 838'+0" TANKS ARE CALCULATION VERIFED
/,
l b) Upper Surge Tank Dome Tanks OUTLERS DUE TO COLUMN SUPPORTS.
SEISMIC ADEQUACY.
1,2,3 CTK0003 TB 775'+0" NOT CALCULATION VERIFED SLURRY TANKS CONTINUOUSLY SEISMIC ADEQUACY SUPPORTED ON BOTTOM 1,2,3SFIX0002 RB 816'+0" NOT CALCULATION VERIFED INCORE CONTINUOUSLY SEISMIC ADEQUACY l INSTRUhENTATIO SUPPORTED ON l N TANKS BOTTOM l 1,2,3CHX0002A,2B TB 775'+0" STACKED HEAT CALCULATION VERIFED l CONDENSATE EXCHANGERS SEISMIC ADEQUACY l COOLERS
! 1,2,3HPITK0001 TB 775'+0" VERTICAL TANKS CALCULATION VERIFIED LETDOWN ON LEGS SEISMIC ADEQUACY STORAGE TANKS l 1,2,3CTK000A,B TB 775'+0" HORIZONTAL MODIFICATION TO TANK l UPPER SURGE TANKS ON LECS SUPPORT STRUCTURE I TANKS COMPLETED.
1,2,3TOTK0002 TB 775 '+0" BOX SHAPED TANK SEISMIC ADEQUACY BASED ON EFW PUMP ENGINEERING JUDGEhENT TURBINE OIL TANK ICDM000A TB 775'+0" VERTICAL TANK ON CALCULATION VERIFIED
- POLISHING LEGS SEISMIC ADEQUACY (d DEMINERALIZER TANK 6-4
/
Table 6-2 (Cont.)
Tank and Heat Exchanger Outlier Description and Resolution Summary EQUIPMENT ID BLDG. FLOOR OUTLIER TYPE OUTLIER RESOLUTION NAME ELEV.
ICDM000B TB 775'+0" VERTICAL TANK ON CALCULATION VERIFIED POLISHING LEGS SEISMIC ADEQUACY DEMINERALIZER TANK ICDM000C TB 775'+0" VERTICAL TANK ON CALCULATION VERIFIED POLISHING LEGS SEISMIC ADEQUACY DEMINERALIZER TANK ICDM000D TB 775'+0" VERTICAL TANK CALCULATION VERIFED POLISHING ON LEGS SEISMIC ADEQUACY DEMINERALIZER TANK ICDM000E TB 775'+0" VERTICAL TANK CALCULATION VERIFED POLISHING ON LEGS SEISMIC ADEQUACY DEMINERALIZER TANK 2CDM000A TB 775'+0" VERTICAL TANK CALCULATION VERIFED POLISHING ON LEGS SEISMIC ADEQUACY DEMINERALIZER TANK
\ 2CDM000B TB 775'+0" VERTICAL TANK CALCULATION VERIFED V POLISHING ON LEGS SEISMIC ADEQUACY DEMINERALIZER l TANK 2CDM000C TB 775 '+0" VERTICAL TANK CALCULATION VERIFED POLISHING ON LEGS SEISMIC ADEQUACY DEMINEkALIZER TANK 2CDM000D TB 775'+0" VERTICAL TANK CALCULATION VERIFED POLISHING ON LEGS SEISMIC ADEQUACY DEMINERALIZER TANK l 2CDM00s TB 775'+0" VERTICAL TANK CALCULATION VERIFED POLISHINt ON LEGS SEISMIC ADEQUACY DEMINERALIZER TANK 3CDM000A TB 775'H)" VERTICAL TANK CALCULATION VERIFED l POLISHING ON LEGS SEISMIC ADEQUACY l DEMII'ERALIZER l
TANK 3CDM000B TB 775'+0" VERTICAL TANK CALCULATION VERIFIED POLISHING ON LEGS SEISMIC ADEQUACY DEMINERALIZER TANK 3CDM000C TB 775'+0" VERTICAL TANK CALCULATION VERIFIED i POLISHING ON LEGS SEISMIC ADEQUACY a DEMINERALIZER TANK I
6-5 s
Table 6-2 (Cont.)
Tank and Heat Exchanger Outlier Description and Resolution Summary EQUIPMENT ID BLDG. FLOOR OUTLIER TYPE OUTLIER RESOLUTION NAME ELEV.
3CDM000D TB 775'+0" VERTICAL TANK CALCULATION VERIFIED POLISHING ON LEGS SEISMIC ADEQUACY DEMINERALIZER TANK 3CDM000E TB 775 '+0" VERTICAL TANK CALCULATION VERIFIED POLISHING ON LEGS SEISMIC ADEQUACY l DEMINERALIZER j TANK l 2ESVTK0001 & 2 ESV 797'+6" VERTICAL TANK CALCULATION VER1FIED l ESV Receiver Tanks SUPPORTED ON SEISMIC ADEQUACY l SKIRT l
l l
l I
/ \
(_)
6-6
Section 7 ;
G CABLE TRAY, CABLE TRENCH, CONDUIT, AND HVAC REVIEW 7.1 CABLE AND CONDUIT RACEWAY REVIEW 7.1.1
SUMMARY
OF RACEWAY REVIEW The reviews of cable tray and conduit systems at Ocorae Nuclear Station were performed per the guidelines of Section 11.8 of the Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) (Reference #1).
The cable support systems in the Auxiliary Buildings, Turbine Buildings, Block Houses, Standby Shutdown Facility, and Intake Stmeture for Units 1,2 & 3, hereinafter referred to as
" Plant Tray System", were reviewed during March and April 1995 by an EQE consultant team of two SCEs, Mr. Jim White and Mr. Basilio Sumodabilia, both licensed Professional Engineers.
The Unit 1.2 & 3 Reactor Buildings were reviewed during December 1995, April 1996, and November 1994, respectively, by Mr. R.V. Hester and Mr. L. B. Elrod, both of whom are SCEs and Professional Engineers. Tech support was provided on all walkdowns by Mr. Tony Hathcock of the ONS USI A-46 site team. The decision was made to review all of the cable trays in the plant rather than determine which trays carried SSEL related cables. The cable support system walkdown consisted of an extensive review of each cable tray, electray, and !
p conduit support in the respective buildings with the exception of a few electray supports located
( in high radiation areas in the Auxiliary Building and Reactor Building basements. It was determined that these supports would consist of electray and/or conduit supports that would be enveloped by other similar supports. The cable tray system in the Radwaste Facility was not included in this review since all of the equipment is considered passive and does not require power or relay review. The cable tray system in the Emergency Siphon Vacuum Building was designed QAl and QA4 which met or exceed the A-46 criteria.
7.1.1.1
SUMMARY
OF INSTALLATIONS AT OCONEE The cable tray and conduit installations at Oconee are well designed and constmeted. All of the cable trays at Oconee were of the " ladder-type" design and utilized galvanized steel construction.
Supports were generally braced laterally and axially providing a rigid tray support system. Most of the system was reviewed from floor levels. In instances requiring a closer inspection, access was available via ladders and scaffolding. Some of the more typical support configurations along with a description of various cable tray types are provided below.
7.1.1.1.1 PLANT TRAY SYSTEM Typical cable tray mas in Units 1 & 2 are the Kurlock type manufactured by Unistrut and are 24 inches wide by 5 inches deep with an effective depth of 4 inches. The cable tray typically used p in Unit 3 was manufactured by Husky-Burndy and is 24 inches wide by 6 inches deep with an Q effective depth of 5 inches. Field-mn trays consist of 3,4, and 6 inch wide Electray channel sections. Cables are generally the metallic armored type and were assumed to be heavier than the cable types addressed in the GIP. Therefore, a weight of 35 pounds per square foot was used 7-1
l for a standard 24 inches tray with 100% fill instead of the 25 pounds per square foot as estimated j g in the GIP. This value resulted in 70 pounds per linear foot for a standard 24 inch Kurlock tray.
l Cable tray and conduit spans were generally between 5 feet and 6 feet with isolated spans of 7 l feet or more and were generally attached at every support. No spans greater than the GIP allowable of 10 feet were found with the exception of one 4 inch electray. The Kurlock trays were attached to supports with hold down clips, while the Husky-Burndy trays are normally attached with bolts. The widely used spring nuts were the Unistrut type and have teeth stamped into the nut. Considering the ruggedness of armored cable, conduit was generally used on a-limited basis primarily for cable support from the overhead raceways down to electrical equipment where maximum unsupported distances for the cable type exceeded the design criteria.
The majority of tray supports were the trapeze type and constructed from Unistmt channel material. A small number of trays in the Unit 3 Auxiliary Building Trench Area were supported from the floor and several supports in the Cable Rooms spanned from floor to ceiling.
, Cantilever type supports were mainly used in the Cable Shafts and for electray and conduit supports throughout the plant. Structural steel angles and light tube steel members were also used, primarily for bracing, and in a limited number of supports. Friction type beam clamps were not used except in some areas above the turbine operating floor. In all cases the clamps were oriented so that dead load was not resisted by the friction force. Rigid boot connection details, as discussed in GIP Section 8.2.2, were not used in any of the areas.
Supports were usually anchored to concrete using Phillips Red-Head shell anchors or Unistmt concrete inserts. Turbine building supports also connected to stmetural steel building members using welded steel angle connections. Single mas of conduit and cable were typically anchored directly to structural elements by finger clamps. Groups of conduit were typically clamped to a Unistrut section which was bolted directly to the structure.
7.1.1.1.2 REACTOR BUILDINGS Typical cable tray runs in Units 1,2 and 3 were the Kurlock type manufactured by Unistrut and were 18 or 24 inches wide by 5 inches deep with an effective depth of 4 inches. Field-run trays l consistr J of 3,4, and 6 inch wide Electray channel sections. Cables were generally the metallic L armore.1 type that are assumed to be heavier than the cable types addressed in the GIP.
l Therefor ( a weight of 35 pounds per square foot was used for 100% fill instead of the 25 L pounds per auare foot as estimated in the GIP. This value resulted in 53 pounds per linear foot for a standard 18 inch Kurlock tray and 70 pounds per linear foot for a standard 24 inch Kurlock tray. Cable tray and conduit spans were generally between 5 feet and 6 feet with isolated spans i of 7 feet or more and were generally attached at every support. No spans greater than the GIP allowable of 10 feet were found. The cable trays were attached to suppons with hold down clips.
The widely used spring nuts were the Unistmt type and have teeth stamped into the nut.
Considering the mggedness of annored cable, conduit was generally used on a limited basis primarily for cable support from the overhead raceways down to electrical equipment where g maximum unsupponed distances for the cable type exceeded the design criteria.
7-2
1
' i
(
n Tray supports consisted of trapeze, cantilever, car "t ~ r bracket and floor supported types l l
Q constmeted primarily from Unistmt channel material and Umstrut fittings. Structural steel angles and light tube steel members were used in limited applications. Use of friction type beam
)
clamps was limited and where used was oriented so that dead load was not resisted by the friction force. Rigid boot connection details, as discussed in GIP Section 8.2.2, was not used in any of the areas. I Reactor Building supports were either welded to the liner plate or internal structures, or anchored to concrete using Phillips Red-Head shell anchors. Single runs of conduit and cable were typically anchored directly to structural elements by " finger clamps". Groups of conduit were typically clamped to a Unistrut section which was bolted directly to the structure.
7.LI.2 EVALUATION METHODOLOGY The general approach taken in the raceway evaluation was based on the guidelines contained in Reference #1. The methodology implemented for Oconee was broken down into the following steps:
- 1. Visually review the general raceway configurations and develop an understanding of the l installation.
g 2. Visually review the type of hardware used to construct the raceways, including support ;
V and anchorage hardware, to ensure general conformance with the seismic experience database.
i
- 3. Walkdown the raceway installations to evaluate against the inclusion rules and other seismic performance concerns, check for interaction problems; and identify potential outliers.
- 4. Select representative worst cast bounding samples.
- 5. Perform Limited Analytical Reviews.
7.1.2 EVALUATION OF BOUNDING SAMPLES 7.1.2.1 PLANT TRAY SYSTEM Forty-five cable tray bounding samples were selected to encompass the diversity of the plant tray system's existing raceway support system. Supports were initially evaluated assuming cable trays are 100% filled with cable. If the supports did not pass, they were then evaluated for the actual fill weights. However, all Plant Tray System supports will be modified to meet 100%
loading requirements. The conduit installations at Oconee were obviously adequate from the walkdown. Therefore, selection of a bounding sample for conduit was not warranted.
A
_)
7-3
A U
7.1.2.2 REACTOR BUILDINGS Five hundred and thirty nine cable tray bounding samples were selected to encompass the diversity of the existing raceway support system. Supports were evaluated using actual tray fill.
Modifications will be required for those supports not meeting the actual loading requirements.
The conduit installations at Oconee were obviously adequate from the walkdown. Therefore, selection of a bounding sample for conduit was not warranted.
7.1.3
SUMMARY
OF OUTLIERS 7.1.3.1 PLANT TRAY SYSTEM ANALYTICAL REVIEW OUTLIERS:
A summary of the analytical review outliers R1 through R18 is provided in Table 7-1. Of the 45 supports selected for analytical review,18 did not pass the review process and are considered Analytical Review Outliers per the GIP. A total of 7 of the 18 analytical review outliers were resolved by EQE Calculation OC-05-01 to meet the GIP criteria. The remaining 11 analytical review selections involving 51 suppports require field modifications to upgrade the supports in order to pass the GIP criteria.
V 7.1.3.2 REACTOR BUILDING ANALYTICAL REVIEW OUTLIERS:
A summary of the analytical review outliers R19 through R22 is also provided in Table 7-1. Of the 539 supports selected for analytical review,4 supports did not pass the review process and will require modifications in order to pass the GIP criteria.
7.1.3.3 PLANT TRAY SYSTEM AND REACTOR BUILDING WALKDOWN OUTLIERS:
A summary of the walkdown outliers is provided in table 7-2. There were 75 outliers discovered during the walkdowns that displayed obvious problems such as those listed in the GIP Section 8.2 and were documented on Outlier Seismic Verification Sheets. Thirty-three of the 75 walkdown outliers have been resolved by minor field modifications or were judged to be structurally adequate in their present state per the GIP. The majority of the outliers (22) apply to masonry block walls and anchorage into masonry block walls. The remaining 20 raceway outliers involving 36 supports include instances of missing components, improperly installed hardware, overfilling of trays, potentially inadequate cable ties, raceways adversely affected by differential deflections, and broken or sagging components.. All walkdown outliers were cases affecting isolated raceways and are not typical of other raceways or supports beyond the areas identified.
7-4
- - . . -. . . ~ . _ _ - _ _ . -
1 l
l
. .(v) i 7.
1.4 CONCLUSION
FOR REACTOR BUILDING AND PLANT TRAY SYSTEM 1 Of the 584 supports that were selected for the Analytical Review process, 22 did not pass the GIP criteria and were documented on OSVS forms. Seven of those were resolved by analysis.
It is recommended that the remaining 15 outliers involving 55 supports be resolved by performing support modifications. Of the 75 walkdown outliers.1) 33 are resolved, 2) 22 involve block walls, and 3) 20 unresolved raceway outliers involving thirty-six suppons require modification.
Table 7-1 Cable Tray Analytical Review Outlier Description and Proposed Resolution Summary
_ Outlier Location Description Proposed Resolution No)
Anal.
Rev.#
R-1 Aux Bldg Lower Support Bracket - fails D.L. Modify the support to EL. 771' check from GIP Section 8.3.1 resolve the overstress AB771-1 Valve Galley Unresolved R-2 Aux Bldg Anchorage - fails the venical Observed condition EL. 771' capacity (3XdL) check from GIP shown to be adequate by AB771-2 Valve Galley Section 8.3.2 calculation for existing fill. Modify the support to meet vertical capacity for 100% tray fill.
R-3 Aux Bldg Cantilever Support - fails D.L. check Modify the support to ,
El. 796'6" from GIP Section 8.3.1 resolve the overstress.
AB7 M Cable Shaft i Unresolved 1 R-4 Aux Bldg Horizontal P1000 member, Lateral Modify the support to El. 796'6" Stability - fails D.L. check from GIP resolve the overstress and i AB796-10 Load Center Section 8.3.1 and fails lateralload provide lateral bracing.
Unresolved Area check from GIP Section 8.3.4 l l R-5 Aux Bldg Horizontal P1000 member, Lateral Modify the support to El. 796'6" Stability - fails D.L. check from GIP resolve the overstress and AB7 %11 Load Center Section 8.3.1 and fails lateralload provide lateral bracing.
U"'** I"d Area check from GIP Section 8.3.4 I
7-5 l
l l
Table 7-1 I
Cable Tray Analytical Review Outlier Description and Proposed Resolution Summary Outlier Location Description Proposed Resolution No1 l
Anal. '
Rev.#
R-6 Aux Bldg Overhead P1000 Member, Strut Modify the support by l El. 809'3" between HC-18 & HC fails adding anchorage and AB809-9 Cable Room D.L. check from GIP Section 8.3.1 removing connecting strut U"'*8 I"*d and fails the vertical capacity (3xDL) check from GIP Section 8.3.2 R-7 Aux Bldg Anchorage - fails the vertical Observed condition El. 809'3" capacity (3xDL) check from GIP shown to be adequate by AB809-11 East Pen. Section 8.3.2 calculation for existing Room fill. Modify the support to meet vertical capacity for 100% tray fill. ,
R-8 Aux Bldg Anchorage - fails the vertical Observed condition l El. 809'3" capacity (3xDL) check from GIP shown to be adequate by I
[] AB809-12 West Pen. Section 8.3.2 calculation for existing
'd Room fill. Modify the support to meet vertical capacity for 100% tray fill.
R-9 Aux Bldg Anchorage - fails D.L. check from Modify the support to El. "9'3" GIP Section 8.3.1. resolve the overstress.
AB809-13 East Pen.
Unresolved Room R-10 Aux Bldg Anchorage - fails the vertical Outlier is resolved by El. 809'3" capacity (3xDL) check from GIP EQE calc. Support passes AB809-14 East Pen. Section 8.3.2. Lateral Load Check and is Room acceptable for 100% fill.
R-11 Aux Bldg Anchorage - fails the vertical Outlier is resolved by El. 838' capacity (3xDL) check from GIP EQE calc. Support passes AB8384 Vent. Room Section 8.3.2. Lateral Lcad Check and is acceptable for 100% fill.
R-12 Turb Bldg 51chorage '- fails the vertical Outlier is resolved by El. 796'6" capacity (3xDL) check from GIP EQE calc. Support passes TB796-1 Mezz Floor Section 8.3.2. Lateral Load Check and is
(,) acceptable for 100% fill.
7-6
l l
l gm Table 7-1 b Cable Tray Analytical Review Outlier Description and Proposed Resolution Summary Outlier Location Description Proposed Resolution No)
Anal.
Rev.#
R-13 Turb Bldg Horizontal P1001 Member - fails Modify the support to El. 796'6" D.L. check from GIP Section 8.3.1. resolve the overstress.
TB796-2 Mezz Floor Unresolved R-14 Turb Bldg Anchorage - fails the vertical Observed condition l El. 796'6" capacity (3xDL) check from GIP shown to be adequate by TB7964 l Mezz Floor Section 8.3.2. calculation for existing fill. Modify the support to meet vertical capacity for 100% tray fill.
R-15 Turb Bldg Anchorage of Brace - fails the Modify the support to El. 796'6" venical capacity (3xDL) check from resolve the overstress.
TB796-5 Mezz Floor GIP Section 8.3.2 and fails the U"'*8 I**d lateralload check from GIP Section p 8.3.4.
tv R-16 Turb Bldg Horizontal P1001 Member- fails Modify the support to El. 796'6" D.L. check from GIP Section 8.3.1. resolve the overstress.
TB7964 Mezz Floor Unresched R-17 Turb Bldg P1000 Ceiling Beam - fails D.L. Modify the support to El. 796'6" check from GIP Section 8.3.1. resolve the overstress.
TB796-7 Mezz Floor Unresolved R-18 Turb Bldg Truss Members Overstressed - fails Modify the supports by El. 796'6" D.L. check from GIP Section 8.3.1 removing pipe support TB7%-8 Mezz Floor and fails lateral load check from GIP and re-supporting pipe U"'*S IV*d Section 8.3.4. using a different structure.
R-19 Unit 1 RB Fails Dead Load Check from GIP Modify the support to ISIlE2 150 DEG Section 8.3.1 resolve overstress Unresolved EL. 825 R-20 Unit 2 RB Fails Dead Load Check from GIP Modify the support to 2SIlE2 160 DEG Section 8.3.1 resolve overstress
- Unresolved EL. 825 R-21 Unit 3 RB Fails Dead Load Check from GIP Modify the support to l 3SIlE2 160 DEG Section 8.3.1 resolve overstress Unresolved EL.825 R-22 Unit 3 RB Fails Dead Load Check from GIP Modify the support to b(~N 3SO4E 270 DEG Section 8.3.1 resolve overstress Unresolved EL. 844+6 l
l 7-7 l
l I
l n
%d Table 7-2 Cable Tray Walkdown Outlier Description and Proposed Resolution Summary Outlier Location Description Proposed Resolution No.
l AB-1 Aux Bldg Block walls around room are non-seismic. Analyze walls or confm' n that El.838' affected raceways do not carry Unit 1,2 Rm. 602,603, cable for SSEL equipment.
604,605 AB-2 Aux Bldg Isolated cases of missing anchor bolts exists Install missing components El. 809'3" - spts HC-12. i Unit 2 Rm. 404 RESOLVED AB-3 Aux Bldg Block walls around room are non-seismic Analyze walls or conhn that l El. 838' affected raceways do not carry i
Unit 3 Rm. cable for SSEL equipment.
650,651,652
/N AB-4 Aux Bldg Annored Cable is supported with metal Analyze capacity vs. Demand l V El. 796'6" Rm. 311 bands "Panduit" 3/16" wide for 2" cable. Observed conditionjudged to Unit 2 be adequate.
I RESOLVED AB-5 Aux Bldg Armored Cable is supported with plastic Replace plastic tie with metal El. 796'6" ties off the underside of cable trays. band or cable clamp Unit 2 Rm. 311 RESOLVED AB-6 Aux Bldg Block wall at stair enclosure is non-seismic. Analyze walls or confinn that El. 809'3" affected raceways do not carry Unit 2 Rm. 404 cable for SSEL equipment.
AB-7 Aux Bldg Cables on tray L-231 are not adequately Provide adequate cable ties to El. 809'3" tied down and could fall during an tie cable to trays Unit 2 Rm. 410 earthquake.
RESOLVED AB-8 Aux Bldg Support HA3-306 has an anchor bolt with a Modify to correct spacing l
El. 809'3" spacing violation violation.
j Unit 3 Rm. 432
! RESOLVED AB-9 Aux Bldg Conduit from cabmet next to PZR heater Modify by adding supports or j El. 809'3" cabinet has overspan. bracing j Unit 1 Rm. 402 RESOLVED AB-10 Aux Bldg Block wall along column line 18 is non- Analyze walls or confirm that El. 809'3" seismic. affected raceways do not cany Unit 1 Rm. 400 cable for SSEL equipment.
i
') RESOLVED Observed conditionjudged to be adequate.
I l 7-8 l
1 i
l 1
n Table 7-2 U Cable Tray Walkdown Outlier Description and Proposed Resolution Summary Outlier Location Description Proposed Resolution No.
AB-11 Aux Bldg Block walls are non-seismic Analyze walls or confmn that El. 809'3" affected raceways do not carry Unit 2 Rm. 408 cable for SSEL equipment.
RESOLVED Observed conditionjudged to be adequate.
AB-12 Aux Bldg Cantilever tray supports HAS-12 & HAS- Modify support and/or El. 796'6" 13 are sagging. Judged inadequate due to anchorage.
Unit 3 Load Center connection detail.
Am AB-13 Aux Bldg Several supports anchored to north wall are Modify support and/or El. 796'6" deflected with anchors pulling out of wall. anchorage.
Unit 2 Rm. 349 RESOLVED AB-14 Aux Bldg Anchor for cantilever support 8'6" west of Modify support and/or El. 796'6" V90 on north wall is pulling out of block anchorage.
Unit 3 Rm. 376 wall.
RESOLVED AB-15 Aux Bldg Block walls are non-seismic. Analyze walls or confirm that Unit 3 El.838' affected raceways do not cany Q Rm. 669 cable for SSEL equipment.
D AB-16 Aux Bldg El.838' 4" electray from column W91 has an overspan.
Modify by adding supports of bracing.
Unit 3 Rm. 669 AB-17 Aux Bldg Block walls are non-seismic. Analyze walls or confirm that El. 838' affected raceways do not carry Unit 3 Rm. 657 cable for SSEL equipment.
AB-18 Aux Bldg Block walls are non-seismic. Analyze walls or confirm that El. 838' affected raceways do not carry Unit 2 Rm. 610 cable for SSEL equipment.
AB-19 Aux Bldg Block walls are non-seismic. Raceways are Analyze walls or confirm that El.796'6" supported on block walls or in falling path. affected raceways do not carry Unit 1 Corridors cable for SSEL equipment.
AB-20 Aux Bldg Block walls in corridors 312,328,346, & Analyze walls or confirm that El.796'6" 347 are non-seismic. affected raceways do not carry Unit 2 Corridors cable for SSEL equipment.
AB-21 Aux Bldg Block walls in corridors 356,368, & 377A Analyze walls or confirm that El.796'6" are non-seismic. affected raceways do not carry Unit 3 Corridors cable for SSEL equipment.
AB-22 Aux Bldg Raceway attached to non-seismic block Analyze walls or confirm that El. 838' wall. affected raceways do not carry Unit 1 Rm. 600 cable for SSEL equipment.
AB-23 Aux Bldg Raceway attached to non-seismic block Analyze walls or confirm that El.838' wall. affected raceways do not carry Unit 2 Rm. 618 cable for SSEL equipment.
AB-24 Aux Bldg Raceway attached to non-seismic block Analyze walls or confirm that El.838' wall. affected raceways do not cany Unit 3 Rm. 666 cable for SSEL equipment.
l 7-9 l
Table 7-2 Cable Tray Walkdown Outlier Description and Proposed Resolution Summary Outlier Location Description Proposed Resolution No.
AB-25 Aux Bldg Cable bundle from east end of tray J107 Modify by adding supports or El. 838' spans in excess of 15' without support. bracing l Unit 1 Rm. 600 I RESOLVED AB-26 Aux Bldg Horizontal P1000 support member has a Modify support and/or El. 809'3" P1026 clip which has deflected or slipped anchorage Unit 3 Rm.455 down.
RESOLVED AB-27 Aux Bldg Block wall raceway suppon anchors have a Determine anchort3pe and El. 796'6" potential of high tensile load. Capacity is evaluate for adequacy or i Unit 1,2,3 Corridors unknown, anchor not covered by the GIP, confirm that affected raceways to not cany cable for SSEL
]
equipment. !
AB-28 Aux Bldg Shell anchors for cable tray support are Modify suppon and/or El 771' pulling out of wall causing tray to sag. anchorage.
Unit 3 HPl/LPI Pump Hatch Area AB-29 Aux Bldg Support above MCC 3XN for tray @ Modify support and/or El.771' junction point 3876 inadequate due to small anchorage.
(;
Unit 3 LPl/RBS Hatch spot weld & long cantilever.
Area AB-30 Aux Bldg Cable in electray on NE wall is not tied to Provide adequate cable ties to El.771' tray. tie cable to trays Unit 1 Rm. I11 RESOLVED AB-31 Aux Bldg Overspan exists for 4" electray. Modify by adding supports El. 838' Unit 3 Rm. 666 RESOLVED TB-1 Tub Bldg Cantilever tray supports on N. wall have Modify support and/or El.775' deficient or failed anchorbolts. anchorage.
Unit 1 Basement F1.
TB-2 Turb Bldg Several electrays are overfilled Provide adequate cable ties to El.775' tie cable to trays Unit 1 Basement Fl.
RESOLVED TB-3 Turb Bldg Existing suppons do not adequately suppon Modify support and/or El.775' tray A102A. anchorage or add supports if Unit 1 Basement F1. needed.
TB-4 Tmb Bldg Tray is bent down and adjacent support is Modify support and/or El.775' rotated. anchorage.
Unit 1 Basement Fl.
TB-5 Tmb Bldg Bottom P1000 is not horizontal and tray is Modify support and/or El.775' sagging. P1026 fitting may have slipped. anchorage.
, V,q Unit 2 Basement Fl.
7 10
Table 7-2 3
Cable Tray Walkdown Outlier Description and Proposed Resolution Summary Outlier Location Description Proposed Resolution No.
TB-6 Turb Bldg Anchors for cantilever support have pulled Modify support and/or El.775' out of wall. anchorage Unit 3 Basement Fl.
RESOLVED TB-7 Turb Bldg Support is ineffective due to disconnected Modify support and/or El.775' or cut end. Tray overspan exists. anchorage.
Unit 3 Basement Fl.
TB-8 Turb Bldg Tray is bent or has buckled, and is missing Observt ' wnditionjudged to ,
El.775' at least two rungs. be adeq-e.
Unit 3 Basement Fl.
RESOLVED TB-9 Turb Bldg Cable Trays are attached to block walls Determine anchortype and El. 796'6" with unknown anchor type. evaluate for adequacy or Unit 1,2,3 Men Fl. confirm that affected raceways do not carry cable for SSEL equipment.
TB-10 Turb Bldg Vertical tray at column F 14 is overfilled. Provide adequate cable ties to El. 796'6" tie cable to trays Unit 1 Men F1.
[ RESOLVED p
b TB-11 Turb Bldg Tray above MCC IXGA is missmg tray rail Install aussmg components El. 796'6" & hold down clips. P1026 clip has slipped. and modify support and/or Unit 1 Men F1. anchorage RESOLVED TB-12 Turb Bldg Floor mounted hanger has low lateral Modify by addmg supports or El.796'6" resistance, potential instability due to p- bracing.
Unit 1 Men Fl. delta effect.
~ TB-13 Turb Bldg Vertical tray above MCC IXGC has cables Provide adequate cables ties to El. 796'6" not tied to the tray. tic cable to trays Unit 1 Men Fl.
RE80' VED TB-14 Tuib Bldg Raceways cross seismicjoints. Determine realistic deflections El. 796 6" Displacement could damage supports where and evaluate effects on Unit 1,2,3 Mezz Fl. insufficient strength / flexibility exists. raceways / supports.
TB-15 Turb Bldg Vertical tray above MCC 2XGC has cables Proside adequate cables ties to El. 796'6" not tied to the tray. tie cable to trays.
Unit 2 Men F1.
RESOLVED
, TB-16 Turb Bids vertical tray at col. K-31 is overfilled, tied Proside adequate cables ties to El. 796'6" with brittle plastic ties. tie cable to trays.
Unit 2 Men Fl.
RESOLVED TB-17 Turb Bldg Floor mounted hanger has low latcral Modify by adding supports or El. 796'6" resistance, potential instability due to p- bracing.
- Unit 2 Men Fl. delta effect.
7-11
Table 7-2 V Cable Tray Walkdown Outlier Description and Proposed Resolution Summary ,
Outlier Location Description Proposed Resolution No.
. TB-18 Turb Bldg Block walls along col. M are non-seismic. Analyze walls or confum that El.796'6" affected raceways do not carry Unit 1,2,3 Mezz Fl. cable for SSEL equipment. ,
TB-19 Turb Bldg Cable trays attached to non-seismic walls. Analyze walls or confum that El. 796'6" Unknown anchor type. affected raceways do not carry Unit 1,2,3 Mezz F1. cable for SSEL equipment and determine anchortype and ,
evaluate for adequacy. ,
TB Tsub Bldg Block walls on col.16 near M-16 have Analyze walls or confum that El.822' unknown seismic capacity, affected raceways do not carry Unit 1 Oper. F1. cable for SSEL equipment.
TB-21 Turb Bldg E-W block walls between J40 - M40 and Analyze walls or confum that El.822' J41- M41 have unknown seismic capacity, affected raceways do not carry Unit 2 Oper. Fl. cable for SSEL equipment.
TB Turb Bldg Block walls on col. 55 have unknown Analyze walls or confirm that El.822' seismic capacity, affected raceways do not cany Unit 3 Oper. Fl. cable for SSEL equipment.
TB-23 Turb Bldg Anchors forraceway supports with Determine anchor type and El.822' potential high loading are attached to block evaluate for adequacy or Unit 1 Oper. Fl. walls (near col. M22). Unknown anchor confirm that affected raceways capacity. Anchors not covered by GIP. do not carry cable for SSEL equipment.
TB-24 Turb Bldg Anchors for raceway supports with Determine anchor type and El.822' potential high loading are attached to block evaluate for adequacy or Unit 2 Oper. F1. walls (near col. M22). Unknown anchor confirm that affected raceways capacity. Anchors not covered by GIP, do not carry cable for SSEL equipment.
TB-25 Turb Bldg Anchors for raceway supports with Determine anchor type and El.822' potential high loading are attached to block evaluate for adequacy or Unit 3 Oper. Fl. walls (near col. M22). Unknown anchor confum that affected raceways capacity. Anchors not covered by GIP.
do not carry cable for SSEL equipment.
TB-26 Turb Bldg 3" cable is between two hard spots behind Relocate cable.
El.822' col. M22. Differential deflection could Unit 1 Oper. Fl. damage cable.
TB-27 Turb Bldg Vertical trays at col. M47 do not have Modify support and/or
.El.822' enough flexibility to accommodate anchorage, determineifitemis Unit 3 Oper. Fl. differential deflection. necessary for safe shutdown (if not, accept as is), determine realistic deflections and evaluate effects on raceways /
supports.
BH-1 Block House Two supports on top of switchgear have Modify supports and /or
/~ El. 796'6" qnestionable lateral adequacy and stability. anchorage.
Units 1,2 7-12
__ - = - ._. - .. ..
i m Table 7-2 l
[v 1 Cable Tray Walkdown Outlier Description and Proposed Resolution Summary ,
Outlier Location Description Proposed Resolution No. ,
1 1RB-1 Reactor Bldg Loose cable hanging unsupported over a Field to properly support the !
El.777' pipe. cable as required )
Unit 1 90 deg RESOLVED i 1RB-2 Reactor Bldg Cables not tied down in trays T-RBE-6,7, Provide adequate cable ties to l Unit 1 El. 797'6" & 8 along East side of Secondary Shield tie cables to tray 1 C-14 Wall.
l RESOLVED 1 l 1RB-3 Reactor Bldg Cables not tied down in electray along Provide adequate cable ties to
! Unit 1 El.797'6" Nonh side of Secondary Shield Wall. tle cables to tray I j RESOLVED C-14 l 1RB-4 Reactor Bldg Due to an overhead leak, there is a Obsen ed conditionjudged to !
Unit 1 El. 797'6" corrosion problem on an existing electray. be adequate. '
RESOLVED 60 deg 1RB-5 Reactor Bldg Cantilever cable tray support is sagging. Modify supports and replace !
El. 797'6" hardware as required per Unit 1 C-22 Minoe 9d.
1RB-6 1: wor Bldg cables not tied don in a long venical run Provide adequate cable ties to El.797'6" of tray T-RBE-3. tie cables to tray b Unit 1 C-13
'd RESOLVED 1RB-7 Reactor Bldg Cable Tray cantilever type support ISilE2 Modify support and/or El. 825'+0" is sagging. anchorage per Minor Mod Unit 1 Az.180 1RB-8 Reactor Bldg. Cable Tray cantilever type support ISB8C Modify suppon and/or i El. 777'4" is missing an anchor. anchorage per Minor Mod l Az. 300 Unit 1 1RB-9 Reactor Bldg. Cable Tray cantilever type support 1S81IE Modify suppon and/or i El.777'4" is sagging. anchorage I Az. 300 Unit 1 RESOLVED 2RB-1 Reactor Bldg. Cable Tray cantilever type supports # Modify support to correct l Unit 2 El.844'+6" 2S02E,2S06E, and 2S07E is sagging. saggingproblem perMinor C-15A Mod 2RB-2 Reactor Bldg. Cable Tray T-RBE 2 is missing hold down Replace missing hardware Unit 2 El.825'+0" clips.
RESOLVED C-16, Az. 270 2RB-3 Reactor Bldg. Cables in trays T-RBE-6,7,&8 are not tied Provide adequate cable ties to Unit 2 El. 797'+6" securely to trays. tie cables to tray RESOLVED C-14 Az. 270 l 2RB-4 Reactor Bldg. Corrosion on unistrut hanger material, cable Obsen ed conditionjudged to l Unit 2 El. 797'+6" tray, and armored cables. be adequate.
RESOLVED C-17, Az. 270 2RB-5 Reactor Bldg. Corrosion on unistrut hanger material,12" Obsen ed conditionjudged to l
k' Unit 2 El. 797'+6" cable tray, and armored cables. be adequate.
l RESOLVED Az. 60 7-13
Table 7-2 d Cable Tray Walkdown Outlier Description and Proposed Resolution Summary Outlier Location Description Proposed Resolution No.
2RB-6 Reactor Bldg. Cables in electray are not tied securely to Provide adequate cable ties to Unit 2 El. 777'+6" trays. tie cables to tray.
RESOLVED C-14, Az. 270 2RB-7 Reactor Bldg. Cable Tray Support 2SG6El has broken Modify support to coirect Unit 2 El. 817+0 hardware andis sagging saggingproblem perMinor B Cav @ Pzr Mod O
l l
l l
l 0
7-14
A Q 7.2 CABLE TRENCH REVIEW 7.2.1
SUMMARY
OF CABLE TRENCH REVIEW The cable trenches at Oconee were reviewed during July 1995 by a team of EQE engineers.
The review consisted of evaluating the impact of a IPEEE seismic event on essential control and power cables. The IPEEE demand seismic curve grossly envelopes the USI A-46 demand curve at all frequencies. The scope of the evaluation included the following:
- 1. Cables in covered trenches from the Standby Shutdown Facility to the various Reactor Buildings and the Security Building.
- 2. Cables in covered trenches from the intake structure to the intersection with the Standby Shutdown Facility trenches at a point north of the Steam Warehouse.
- 3. Cables in covered trenches from the 115 kV switchyard to the Unit 3 Auxiliary Building.
7.2.2
SUMMARY
OF CABLE TRENCH INSTALLATIONS Trenches are cast-in place concrete and constructed in sections as long as 40 feet. Cable pg trenches are flush with the ground surface and are rectangular in cross section. Trenches are V typically 3 feet tc 4 feet wide and 4 feet deep. Side walls are a minimum of 7 inches thick and the bottom slabs are a mimmum of 8 inches thick. Trench covers are generally shorter than 12 feet and are constructed from concrete or steel. Power cables are attached to unistrut racks which mount to embedded unistrut channels in the sidewalls of trenches while control cables are laid on the cable trench floor.
7.2.3 METHODOLOGY The seismic evaluation of the control and power cables involved assessing the potential magnitude of deformations caused by incoherence in seismic wave propagation. Simple upper-bound estimates were made of the maximum ground strain that can be produced by wave propagation.
7.
2.4 CONCLUSION
Cable trenches exceed the estimated strain associated with seismic wave propagation by factors of approximately 8 to 20. Therefore, seismic wave propagation is judged to have no impact on the performance of the instrumentation / control cables or power cables.
7-15
~
7.3 CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM (CRVS) REVIEW O 7.3.1
SUMMARY
OF CRVS REVIEW The review of the Control Room Ventilation System (CRVS) at Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1,2 & 3 was performed as part of the resolution to USI A-46. Even though the duct system is not explicitly required to be reviewed under 'USI A-46, it was included to ensure system integrity. The review was conducted during July,1996 by an EQE consultant team of two SCEs, Mr. John Dizon and Mr. Farzin Belgi. Technical support was provided on all walkdowns by Mr. Tony Hathcock of the ONS USI A-46 site team. With the assumption that all plant cooling capabilities are lost during a SQUG event, the ambient temperature rise of the control ;
rooms during the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> scenario is such that outside air circulation would be required in these i areas. The CRVS walkdown consisted of an extensive re"iew of the ducts, duct supports, and related attached equipment such as dampers and filters. The duct layout includes the outside air supply duct to the booster fans as well as the supply and return ducts to and from the Control Room. The review of the supply duct in the Control Room was limited to the first air register within the control room. Areas of the plant which contained the ductwork are the Ventilation Rooms (El. 838'+0"), Control Rooms (El. 822'+0"), and the connecting duct shafts. Refer to Section 8 of the report for the CRVS equipment outliers.
7.3.1.1
SUMMARY
OF INSTALLATIONS AT OCONEE The duct system at Oconee was installed during the 1970s and was built to SMACNA standards.
The majority of the duct is rectangular in shape with sizes ranging from 15 inches x 15 inches to 52 inches x 30 inches. There are a few sections of round duct in sizes ranging from 8 inches to 16 inches in diameter. The wall thickness of duct varied from 18 gauge for the round duct and from 20 gauge to 24 gauge for the rectangular duct. The majority of joints for the rectangular duct are the " pocket lock" type along with a few " flat-slip" and " flanged" type joints. Spacing was typically 48 inches on center. Joints for the round duct consisted of " bolted flange 4 connections" and were spaced 40 inches on center. The insulation in the supply ducts was manufactured by Cena with a weight of 6 pounds per cubic foot. The taajority of duct supports are the trapeze type and constructed with 3/8 inch diameter threaded rods. Supports were '
anchored to concrete with via shell anchors or attached to P3200 series Unistrut inserts and proved to be adequate for spans up to 20 feet. Support spans for both the rectangular and round ducts are typically 6 feet to 8 feet apart with the maximum noted being 11 feet.
O 7-16
7.3.1.2 EVALUATION METHODOLOGY The method used in determining the seismic adequacy verification of the CRVS HVAC ducting and supports is consistent with the Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) as developed by the Seismic qualification Utility Group (SQUG), and consisted of the following tasks:
- 1. Development of walkdown screening and analytical evaluation criteria based on industry codes and standards, past eanhquake performance data, and test results;
- 2. Comprehensive walkdown ofin-scope HVAC duct systems and supports;
- 3. Identification of potential outliers not meeting the walkdown screening guidelines;
- 4. Selection and evaluation of bounding configuration; and
- 5. Resolution of outliers.
7.3.2 EVALUATION OF BOUNDING SAMPLES -
As part of the in-plant review, five worst-case bounding samples of ductwork and duct supports were selected for funher analytical reviews. Bounding samples were selected to encompass the
. various sizes of duct and duct supports. The following table 7-3 presents a brief description of the sekcted bounding cases and the respective evaluation results.
Table 7-3
_O HVAC Duct System Bounding Analysis Candidates and Evaluation Results No. Bounding Case Category Proposed Bounding Analysis Evaluation Results 1 Stiffener Stress Validation Verify duct and stiffener stresses (Pocket Lock As-installed stiffener with SMACNA configuration @ 48" spacing) of a 46 x 27 duct configuration meets the section from the Unit 3 Return ducting system SMACNA r%eoments, against the SMACNA requirements.
2 Stiffener Stress Validation Verify duct and stiffener stresses (Pocket Lock As-installed stiffener with SMACNA configuration @ 40" spacing) of a 52 x 30 duct configuration meets the section from the Units 1&2 Return ducting system SMACNA requirements.
against the SMACNA r%ssments.
3 OverallDuct Stress Verify the seismic adequacy of the long horizontal The resulting duct Verification Supply header duct (Units I&2) for the combined stresses meetthe effects of gravity and seismic loads. SMACNA reqmrements.
l~ 4 Support Adequacy Verify the seismic adequacy of the heavily loaded Anchorage capacity (per Verification support configurations with multiple tiers oflarge GIP, Appendix C) ducts (Support R2) on Unit 2 Supply ducting. exceeds the demand.
5 Support Adequacy Verify the seismic adequacy of the heavily loaded Anchorage capacity (per Verification support configuration taking into consideration GIP, Appendix C)
O overhead anchor edge distance violations (Suppon RS). Support is located above the Unit 3 duct shaft (common support for Intake, Supply, and Return exceeds the demand.
ducting systems.
7-17
m 7.3.3
SUMMARY
OF OUTLIERS AND CONCLUSIONS Since the Walkdown and Analytical Review selections are identical, only the Analytical Review Outliers and Resolutions are listed in the summary provided in Table 7-4. Of the twenty-two ducts and duct supports selected, nine were resolved by EQE Calculation, six of the outiiers involve block wall interaction, three were resolved by Oconee Engineering, and four require further analysis or modifications. The table shows the recommended resolutions that when implemented, would render the corresponding HVAC systems to be seismically adequate.
Table 7-4 Duct and Duct Support Outlier Description and Proposed Resolution Summary Pkg. System Outlier Outlier Description Proposed Resolution No. Description No.
1 Units 1&2 CRVS 1-1 Stiffener spacing on a duct Acceptable by analysis Outside AirIntake section not within the screening guidelines.
1-2 Potential bolt bending due Acceptable by analysis to missing grout at in-line
~O filters l A and IB anchorage 1-3 Breaker equipment on ISSUE WORK REQUEST-wheels parked close to duct provide restraint to or creates proximity relocate the breaker interaction concern. equipment.
1-4 Stiffener spacing at the FURTHER 15"x15" duct not within the EVALUATION-screening guidelines engineering to verify that the actual negative pressure at the critical locations is -
3" water gauge or less.
RESOLVED - Oconee Mechanical Engineering determined the actual negative pressure is less than 3" water guage.
O 7-18
l Table 7-4 Duct and Duct Support Outlier Description and Proposed Resolution Summary l Pkg. System Outlier Outlier Description Proposed Resolution No. Description No.
1-5 Blockwall nearby is a FURTHER potentialinteraction EVALUATION-seismic concern with the ducting adequacy of the blockwall system. will be verified by Oconee Civil Engineering l
2 Units 1&2 CRVS 2-1 Differential movement MODIFICATION !
Supply between the header duct REQUIRED - provide new and the AHU's 1-11 & 1-12 flexible connections at the at the flexible connection AHU interfaces with a )
could be excessive minimum slack of 2" i especially that there is almost no slack at the flex joint 2-2 Blockwall nearby is a FLRTHER potentialinteraction EVALUATION-seismic ph concern with the ducting adequacy of the blockwall system will be verified by Oconee Civil Engineering 3 Units 1&2 CRVS 3-1 Stiffener spacing on 118x34 Acceptable by analysis Return duct section is not within the screening guidelines 3-2 Differential movetaent , Acceptable by analysis between the header duct and the fans F-22 & F-23 at the flexible connection need to be verified 3-3 In-line plenum is MODIFICATION unanchored REQUIRED provide positive anchorage or seismic stops to the filter 3 plenum.
O 7-19
Table 7-4 Duct and Duct Support Outlier Description and Proposed Resolution Summary Pkg. System Outlier i Outlier Description Proposed Resolution No. Description No.
3-4 Hard spot at the connection Acceptable by analysis of the flexible header duct to the in-line screening guidelines 3-5 Blockwall nearby is a FURTHER potentialinteraction EVALUATION-seismic concern with the ducting adequacy of the blockwall system will be verified by Oconee Civil Engineering 4 Units 3 CRVS 4-1 Stiffener spacing on a duct Acceptable by analysis Outside AirIntake section not within the screening guidelines O 4-2 Stiffener spacing at the 15"x15" duct not within the screening guidelines FURTHER EVALUATION-engineering to verify that the actual negative pressure at the criticallocations is -
3" water gauge or less.
RESOLVED - Oconee Mechanical Engineering determined the actual I
negative pressure is less than 3" water gauge.
4-3 Blockwall nearby is a FURTHER potentialinteraction EVALUATION-seismic concern with the ducting adequacy of the blockwall system will be verified by Oconee Civil Engineering 5 Unit 3 CRVS 5-1 Acceptable by analysis l Supply O
7-20
.- . .. - ._ - - . . - - - - . - - ~ .
l l
Table 7-4 O Duct and Duct Support Outlier Description and Proposed Resolution Summary Pkg. System Outlier Outlier Description Proposed Resolution No. Description No. '
5-2 Blockwall nearby is a FURTHER potentialinteraction EVALUATION-seismic concern with the ducting adequacy of the blockwall ,
system will be verified by Oconee l Civil Engmeermg 1 J
6 Unit 3 CRVS 6-1 Stiffener spacing on 96x18 FURTHER Supply duct section is not within EVALUATION-the screening guidelines engineering to verify that the actual negative pressure ,
at the critical locations is -
1" water gauge or less.
RESOLVED - Oconee l Mechanical Engineering l
determined the actual !
negative pressure is less i
(] than 1" water gauge. !
() l 6-2 Differential movement Acceptable by analysis ;
between the header duct and the fans F3-8 & F3-9 at the flexible connection need to be verified 6-3 In-line plenum is MODIFICATION unanchored REQUIRED - provide positive anchorage or seismic stops to the filter plenum 6-4 Hard spot at the connection Acceptable by analysis of the flexible header duct l to the in-line plenum !
.. 6-5 Blockwall nearby is a FURTHER potential interr-tion EVALUATION-seismic !
concern with the ducting adequacy of the blockwall system. will be verified by Oconee
'v Civil Engineering 7-21 i
i I
l Section 8 i V DISPOSITIONING OF OUTLIERS
8.1 INTRODUCTION
/
SUMMARY
I 1
"An Outlier is an item of equipment which does not comply with all of the screening guidelines provided in the Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP). The GIP screening guidelines are intended to be used as a generic basis for evaluating the seismic adequacy of equipment. If an item of equipment fails to pass these generic screens, it may still be shown to be adequate for seismic loading by additional evaluation". [ Reference #1, section 5.0]
All items not meeting the GIP are to be classified as Outliers. Therefore, any item in Class 0 according to the GIP, and any item not having " Seismically Adequate" on its respective SEWS form is classified as an Outlier. All Outliers from the Cable Tray, Cable Trench, Conduit and HVAC Duct Review are addressed in Section 7 of this report. Tank and Heat Exchanger Outliers are addressed in Section 6 of this report.
1 An item on the SSEL can be an Outlier for more than one cause. Shown below above is a summation of all the issues contributing to items on the SSEL being classified as an Outlier. 1 (The sum total of causes will exceed the total number of Outliers). The reason for such a presentation is that no item can or will meet the GIP until each and every issue relating to its p Outlier status is resolved. An Outlier can often have more than one cause contributing to the d Outlier status.
Of the 1515 items evaluated during the SQUG review of Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 ,387 of these i were Outliers. The Outliers can be collectively grouped for review as shown below. l Outlier Issues for equipment Classes 0 - 21 Total Outlier Issues Resolved Unresolved Outliers due to Class 0 Description 28 16 12 Outliers due to:
Capacity vs. Demand 83 21 62 Bounding Spectrum Caveats 182 57 125 Anchorage 176 71 105
, Seismic Interaction 65 7 58 TOTAL 534 172 362 8-1
For the purpose of this report, the Outliers and their current associated status will be presented in O two distinct groupings, Resolved Outliers and Unresolved Outliers:
RESOLVED OUTLIERS The Resolved Outliers are ones that did not meet the GIP, but through alternate or rigorous analytical methods, the Outlier was deemed to be seismically adequate, in compliance with the intents and concerns for which the GIP was generated.
However, an Outlier is considered resolved only when each and every Outlier concern identified has been resolved by either analytical efforts or physical repairs.
All the Resolved Outliers are described in table Table 8-1.
UNRESOLVED OUTLIERS .
Unresolved Outliers are ones that do not meet the GIP, and currently completed analytical efforts may not have sufficiently demonstrated seismic adequacy to meet the intent of the GIP. Additionally, an Unresolved Outlier is one where physical repairs may be necessay to meet the GIP criteria. This group may include items needing test data, intensive analytical methods, physical repairs, seismic interactions removed or restrained, etc.. Each item in this grouping of Outliers does have a proposed resolution involving some future effort.
All the Unresolved Outliers are described in table Table 8-2.
All Outliers were assigned a Outlier Reference Number. This reference number can be found in the Composite SSEL which is indexed by equipment ID and in the Outlier tables which are grouped by Equipment Class.
8.2 OUTLIERTABLES Table 8-1 Equipment Outlier Description and Resolution Table 8-2 Equipment Outlier Description and Proposed Resolutien Tables 8-1 & 8-2 address the Outliers as discussed above. Both tables are constructed the same.
Like equipment with similar outliers are grouped together. The Outliers are grouped by Equipment Class. Then the Outliers are listed in a progressive equipment ID order similar to the SSEL Composite Lists.
- A description ofissues associated with each Outlier and its proposed resolution, where it applies, O is contained in the columns " Resolution" and " Proposed Resolution", respectively. Equipment was considered an Outlier ifit did not meet one of the SEWS sections or was considered to be equipment Class 0 (Other). An asterisk (*) in the column of any these five screening criteria 8-2
p indicates the cause category for the Outlier. It is important to remember that equipment can be l
Q an Outlier for more than one issue and this table addresses every issue as described on the corresponding SEWS form. This multiple issue also applies to Class 0 equipment if another GIP
[ issues applies in addition to the equipment being outside the scope of the GIP's experience i
database. (e.g. a Class 0 item having seismic interactions concerns).
L f 8.3 OUTLIER RESOLUTION ACTIONS Resolution Efforts 1
[ Each Outlier is planned to be resolved to meet the intents and concerns for which the GIP is l
founded. Equipment adequacy will be demonstrated by such methods as: testing, analytical efforts, demonstration of similarity to existing experience data beyond the SQUG Experience Data base of equipment and events, and other methods deemed appropriate for Outlier resolution per the GIP.
Examples of anchorage resolution efforts may include, but not be limited to: Testing of non-
, GIP anchorage, in-field testing of anchorage embedment/ installation, detailed analytical l assessment of current anchorage, anchorage replacement, additional anchorage installed, and ,
i bracing or additional supports installed in addition to current anchorage.
b Q Seismic interaction resolutions will primarily be physical in-field modifications. Other options may include re-assessment of credibility and consequences ofimpact.
Schedule An individual schedule for the resolution of each Outlier will not be included within the text of this report. In a letter dated June 30,1998, Duke Power advised the Staff of the expected completion date for the resolution of all USI A-46 Outliers. The aforementioned letter states the required USI A-46 Program Completion letter will be submitted to the NRC within 120 days
- after the end of Innage 73. The scheduled date, at the time of the referenced letter, for the end
[ ofInnage 73 was June 2,2002. The individual prioritization of each Outlier Resolution accounts for such factors as: Probabilistic Risk Assessment significance, accessibility, and associated or l dependent modification projects.
l l
l 8-3 l
l i
O .
i i
I 1
J
',. Table 8-1 l
! I i
j Equipment Outlier Description and Resolution 1
l- Oconee Nuclear Station j
Q Units 1,2 & 3 4
1 a
?
s
- l .
i lO 8-4
l TABLE 8-1 )
Equipment Outlier Description and Resolution
/~' Oconee Units 1,2 and 3
( Equipment Class: 00 - Generic Input Fonn Name:
1 Equipment ID's: 3CCD000B.3CCD000C !
Bide:' H Floor Elev.: 775'+0" SVDS H Oudier Ref. M Group No.: No.:
W udon.
j Seismic adequacy verified per EQE calculation. Capacity:
BS Cavests:
~
Anchorage.
~
Interaction:
J- Category 0: '*
Name: CONDENSER HOTWELLS (Unit 1)
Equipment ID's: ICCD000A.lCCD000B.lCCD000C Bldg: E Floor Elev.: 775'+0* SVDS B Outlier Ref. !!],
wg. Group No.: No..
Seismic adequacy verified per EQE calculation. &,e. ;
~
. BS Cavests s
Anchorage. I interaction:
q Category 0:
- l Name: CONDENSER 110TWELLS (Unit 2) 4 j h ' .....; ID's: 2CCD000A.2CCD000B.2CCD000C
, B6de: H Floor Elev.: 775'+0" SVDS H Outlier Ref. .f0,,
1 wg. Group No.: No.: l 1 Seismic adequacy verified per EQE calculation. Capacity:
BS Cavests:
~
Anchorage
- l Category 0:
Name: CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY LIGHTS Equipment ID's: ICREL2CREL3CREL
]
4 Bldg: 6B Floor Elev.: 822'+0" SVDS .1 Outlier Ref. .H Group No.: No.:
~
Seismic evaluation contained within SEWS. Capacity:
~~~
BS Caveats:
i ~
Anchorage-
~~
interaction Category 0:
v Page1
TABLE 8-1 Equipment Outlier Description and Resolution
(] Equipment Class:
Oconee Units 1,2 and 3 00 -GenericInputForm Name: EMER. STEAM AIR EJECTORS Equipment ID's: IVAE0001.2VAE000t Bldg: E Floor Elev.: 775'+0" SVDS 20 Outlier Ref. ))6 wg. Group No.: No.:
Capacity > Demand verified within SEWS. Capacity-BS Cavents:
~~
Anchorage.
~~
interaccon.
Category 0: T c
!- Mr ESV FLOAT VALVES Equipment ID's: 2ESVVA00_0j,y Skig: E Floor Elev.: 22f' SVDS f4 Ou6ier Ref. 19),,
wg. Group No.: No.:
Resolved per seismic test report. CapacMy s8 Caveste-
~~
n sneerecuen.
l Category 0: T Name: N2 SUPPLY BOTTLES FOR FDW315316.MS87.12 Equipment 10'4: N2 AOV BOTTLES side: E Floor Elev.: 796'+6" SVDS 12 Ouuler Ref. 112
%g. Group No.: No.:
Seismic adequacy resolved within SEWS. CapocMy-BS Cavests:
~
Anchorage
~~~
interaction.
. Catsswy 0:
l t
Psge 2
TABLE 8-1 Equipment Outlier Description and Resolution i
i
( Equipment Class:
Oconee Units 1,2 and 3 01.Motorcontrof centers Name: I?5/250 VDC DISTRIBUTION CENTER 3DP Equipment ID's: D 1DP Bidg: H Floor Elev.: 79&+6" SVDS .]. Outlier Ref. 1H g Group No.: No.:
Exceedance of Reference Spectrum by Instructure Response Sectrum resolved in Duke calculation. Capacity. 7 BS Coveats:
~
Anchorage. l
~
Interaction l
~
Category 0: !
Name: 125/250 VDC DISTRIBUTION CENTERS "DP" i
Equipment ID's: IDP,$DP 1
Bldg: H Floor Elev.: 796+6" SVDS M Outlier Ref. E Group No.: No.:
Exceedance of Reference Spectrum by Instructure Response Sectrum resolved in Duke calculation. Capacity. T l
~
BS Caveats:
~
Anchorage.
~
Interaction l
0 Category 0:
Name: 250 VDC MCC 1MVC3 Equipment ID's: 1MVC3 Badg: H Floor Elev.: 775'+0" SVDS H Outlier Ref. E Group No.: No.:
Existing test report to be used to verify Capacity > Demand. See 14" MCC outlier resolution Capacity: T calculation contained in Miscellaneous section of A46/IPEEE calculation.
7
~
Anchorage.
~
Interaction, Category 0:
Name: DISTRIBUTION CENTER 2DCA Equipment ID's: 12C_d Bldg: 6B_ Floor Elev.: 796'+6" SVDS M Outlier Ref. 120 Group No.: No.:
~~
Existing test report used to verify Capacity > Demand. See 14" MCC outlier resolution calculation Capacity:
- contained in Miscellaneous section of A-46/IPEEE calculation. Gmund wire a*tachrnent to bus bar T repaired per station work request.. BS Cavesh:
~
Anchorage
~
Interaction:
(
i l
Page3
TABLE 8-1 1
Equipment Outlier Description and Resolution Q
Oconee Units 1,2 and 3 I V Equipment Class: 01 - Motor control Centers
- Name
- DISTRIBUTION CENTER 2DCB Equipment ID's: 2DCB 3
Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 7%'+6" SVDS M Outlier Ref. 189 j w. Group No.: No.:
.1 Existing test report to be used to verify Capacity > Demand. See 14" MCC outlier resolution Capacity T calculation contained in Miscellaneous section of A-4MPEEE calculation. -
BS Caveats:
i -
- Anchorage
~
interaction ,
Category 0:
Name: DISTRIBUTION CENTER 3DCA g
' Equipment ID's: LDCA
! Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 796'+6" SVDS M Outlier Ref. 1133
- ! Group No.
- No.:
, l
- Existing test report used to verify Capacity > Demand. See 14" MCC outlier resolution calculation Capacity
- T !
contained in Miscellaneous section of A-4MPEEE calculation.
Anchorage Interaction- l
- ( t% Category 0:
1 j
Name: DISTRIBUTION CENTER 3DCB Equipment 1D's: 3DCB l Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 796'+6" SVDS H Outlier Ref. IL4 Group No.: No.:
4 j Existing test report used to verify Capacity > Demand. See 14" MCC outlier resolution calculation Capacity: T contained in Miscellaneous section of A-4MPEEE calculation. -
3 Anchorage:
~
interaction 4
Category 0:
^
Name: MCC 1XS3 l Equipment ID's: 1XS3 Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 796'+6" SVDS H Outlier Ref. .S Group No.: No.:
Existing test report used to verify Capacity > Demand. See 14" MCC outlie. resolution calculation Capacity- T con:sined in Miscellaneous section of A-4MPEEE calculation. ,--
Anchorage.
~
Interaction:
Category 0:
a Page 4
TABLE 8-1 l 1
Equipment Outlier Description and Resolution i
.' Oconee Units 1,2 and 3 1
Equipment Class: 01 -Motorcontrof centers ;
Name: MCC 2XS3 l Equipment ID's: 2XS3 !
Badg: 6E Floor Elev.: 7%'+6" SVDS H Outlier Ref. %
Group No.: No.:
Existing test report used to verify Capacity > Demand. See 14* MCC outlier resolution calculation Capacity: I contained in Miscellaneous section of A 46/IPEEE calculation. -
- % ~
irmweetion.
~
Calepy 4:
~
Name: MCC 3XL & 3XN Equipment ID's: 7XL3XNi Bldg: AR Floor Elev.: 771'+0" SVDS l Outlier Ref. W Resoludon. Group No.: No.:
Existing test report used to verify Capacity > Demand. See 14" MCC outlier resolution calculation Caporaty: T contained in Miscellaneous section of A-46/IPEEE calculation. .
Anoisorage
~~
interaction
] Category 0: I Name: MCC 3XS3 Equipment ID's: 3XS3 Bido: AB_ Floor Elev.: 7%'+6- SvDS H Outlier Ref. J.8 g,,,,,gon. Group No.: No.:
Exicting test report used to verify Capacity > Demand. See 14' MCC outlier resolution calculation Capacity: T contained in Miscellaneous section of A-46/IPEEE calculation. Gap > 1/4" resolved in anchorage --
BS Caveats: :
alculation for 3XS3.
Anchorage: T Category 0:
Name: MCC's XB Equipment ID's: IXB.2XB.3XB Bldg: E Floor Elev.: 775'+0* SVDS J0 Outlier Ref. _8.6
, Group No.: No.: ,
Existing test report used to verify Capacity > Demand. See 14" MCC outlier resolution calculation Capacity- T contained in Miscellaneous section of A-46/IPEEE calculatioit A, ,,o,og..
~~'
Interaction:
Ca W 0:
Page5
TABLE 8-1 Equipment Outlier Description and Resolution Oconee Units 1,2 and 3 Equipment Class: . 02 - Low Voltage Switchgear Nome: LOAD CENTER IX8 Equipment ID s: 1X08 i Badg: da Floor Elev.: 7%'+6' GVDS M Outlier Ref. H1 wg. Group No.: No.:
Calculation perforrned to verify acceptability of gap > 1/4". Capacity-BS Cavests:
% T
~
Interaction
~
Category 0:
Nome: 1.OAD CENTER 3X4 Equipment ID's: 3XO4 Bldg: .TE Floor Elev.: 796 +6' SVDS M Outlier Ref. M wg. Group No.: No.:
Embedded studs are A108 instead of A307. Stud capacity verified per calculation. Capacity-Bs Cevents Anchorage T interaction.
~
Category 0:
Nome: LOAD CENTERS Equipment ID's: 1 X01.1 X02.1 X05.1 XO6.1 XO7.2 X03.2 X05.2 XO6.3X01.3 X02.3 X03 BMg: IR Floor Elev.: 796 +6' sVDS M Outlier Ref. M wg. Group No.: No.:
Embedded studs are A108 instead of A307. Stud capacity verified per calculation. Capacity-Bs Cavests:
w
% ~
interaction
~
Category 0:
s l
Page 6
_ _. .- _ _ . _ . . - . . . _ _ _ _ ._.~ ._ _ _._ _ _ . .. _ . ._ _ __.__ _
I i TABLE 8-1 Equipment Outlier Description and Resolution
] Equipment Class:
Oconee Units 1,2 and 3 03 Medium Voltage Switchgear Name: UNrr 3 4160V SWITCHGEAR l
Equipment ID's: 3TC.3TD.3TE
! Bide: H Floor Elev.: 796'+6" SVDS U Oudier Ref. M Resoludon, Group No.: No.:
~
i Exceedance of Reference Spectrum by Instructure Response Sectrum resolved in Duke calculation. Capacity:
. Seismic adequacy of flouresent light spring mechanism verified per Duke calculation. -
-,- e te- T Category 0:
l l
l l
O (J
Page 7
TABLE 8-1 Equipment Outlier Description and Resolution i
O Oconee Uldts 1,2 and 3
( Equipment Class: 04 -Tr<.nsformers Name: 600V TO 208V TRANSFORMERS Equipment ID's: IXS3A/XFMR,2XS3 A/XFMR
)
Bldg: A,B Floot Elev.: 79&+6" SVDS Outlier Ref.
).1 .Q i
- Grouo No.: No.:
Anchorage acuptability resolved within SEWS. Capacity:
- BS Cavents:
! Anchorese l Interaction.
i .
j cat cory 0: i l
Name: LOAD CENTER TRANSFORMERS 1X10 & 2X10 j
- Equipment ID's
- IX10/XFMR.2X10/XFMR
!- Bldg: H Floor Elev.: 796'+6" SVDS 10 Outlier Ref. 1 881 (
Mutim- Group No.- No.:
~~
Anchorage of equipment pad determined to be acceptable for A-46 per duke calculation. Capacity:
q BS Cavests: 7
%. T
'g interaction Caiegory c: l i
j i.
N 4
O O
Page 8
TABLE 8-1 Equipment Outlier Description and Resolution O Oconee Units 1,2 and 3
.N Equipment Class: 06 - Vertical Pumps Name: CCW PUMPS Equipment ID's: I CCWPU0001.2CCWPU0001.3 CCWPU0001. l CCWPU0002.2CCWPU0002.3COWPU0002. l CCWPUOO 03.2CCWPU0003.3CCWPU0003.1 CCWPU0004.2CCWPU0004.3CCW PU0004 Bade: E Floor Elev.: 810'+0* SVDS 2.0, Outlier Ref. J
%g Group No.: No.:
~~
Capacity > Demand and anchorage verified per EQE calculation. Capacity:
BS Cavents: T Anchorage T Interaction:
Category 0:
Name: HOTWELL PUMPS Equipment ID's: ICPU0010.1CPUO0ll.1 CPU 0012 Bldg: H. Floor Elev.: 775'+0" SVDS 20 Outlier Ref. J Group No.: No.:
~~
Anchorage evaluated per EQE calculation. Capacity:
BS h T Anchorage.
- Interaction.
k Category 0:
~
l t
Page 9
l r l TABLE 8-1 Equipment Outlier Description and Resolution
- D Oconee Units 1,2 and 3 l
' .G \
Equipment Class: 07 Fluid-Operated Valves ,
1 Name: MAIN STEAM CONTROL VALVES l
Equipment ID's: 3 MSVA0106.1 MSVA0106.2MSVA0106.1 MSVA0107.2MSVA01073MSVA0107.1 M SVA0108.2MSVA 0108. 3 M S VA0108.1 M S VA0109.2 M S VA 0109.3 M S VA0109 Bldg: TB_ Floor Elev.: 796'+6' SVDS M Outlier Ref. Hi Group No.: No.:
~~
Capacity > Demand verified per EQE calculation .
Capacity BS Caveats Y
~
Anchorage Interaction
~ l Category 0: l Name: TURBINE STOP VALVES Equipment ID's: 3 M SVA0102.1 M SVA0102.2MSVA0102. l M SV A0103.2 MSVA0103.3 MSVA0103.1 M SVA0104.2 MSVA 0104.3 MSV A0104. l M SVA 0105.2M SVA 01053 MSVA0105 Blog: TR
_ Floor Elev.: 796'+6' SVDS M Outlier Ref. JM Group No.: No.:
~
Capacity > Demand verified per EQE calculation . Capacity:
BS Cavests- ~*
f Anchorage:
Interaction.
Category 0:
l l
i i
i a
rage 10 i
l
TABLE 8-1 Equipment Outlier Description and Resolution IQ Equipment Class:
Oconee Units 1,2 and 3 08A - Motor-Operated Valves
! Name: AII LETDOWN PATH ISOLATION VALVES Equipment ID's: 1 HPVA0426,1 HPVA0428.2 HPVA04283 HPV A0428 '
Bldg: Floor Elev.: 777'+0" l BR SVDS M Oudier Ref. E i
Group No.: No.:
~
Outlier due to height and weight. Outlier resolved per maJufacture seismic test report. Valves are Cs nacity:
screened out per Table 2-4 EPRI NP4041 for IPEEE. -
Bf. Caveats: -*
Aide +.
t interaction: I Category 0:
t l
l N
-[O l
l l
t r
l 1-l
'h 1
di i
i
- Page11 i
TABLE 8-1 Equipment Outlier Description and Resolution
& Oconee Units 1,2 and 3
() Equipment Class: 14 - Distribution Panels Name: MISC. PANELS Equipment ID's: 2KD.2KG Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 809'+0" SVDS 9 Outlier Ref. 71
% Group No.: No.:
~
Anchorage acceptibilty verified by methods outside of the GIP. " Tug Test" performed in field verifies Capacity:
seismic acceptability of as found anchorage. -
g Anchorage. T
~
Interaction.
Category 0:
Name: MOTOR STARTER PANELS Equipment ID's: 1 RSC-I FDW-372NNCL I RSC-l FDW-368TNCL I RSC-l FDW-369 ENCL l RSC-I FDW-
,. 374TNCL l RSC-l FDW-382 ENCL I R$C-l FDW-384TNCL.1 RSC-1 PR-59TNCL. l RSC-l PR.
60TNCL2 RSC-2 FDW-368 ENCL.2 RSC-2 FDW-369TNCL2 RSC-2 FDW-372TNCL2 RSC-2 FDE 374TNCL2 RSC-2 FDW-382TNCL.2 RSC-2FDW-384TNCL2 RSC-2 PR-59TNCL2 RSC-2 PR-60TNCL3 RSC-3 PR-59&NCL.3 RSC-3 PR-60TNCL Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 809'+0" SVDS l Outlier Ref. .22
%, Group No.: No.:
~
Anchorage acceptibilty verified by methods outside of the GIP. " Tug Test" performed in field verifies Capacity:
scismic acceptability of as found anchorage.
)
v Anchorage
- Interaction
~
Category 0:
Name-. POWER PANEL BOARD IL2 Equipment ID's: ik.
Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 771'+0* SVDS 10 Outlier Ref. 18 Group No.: No:
~
Anchorage acceptibilty verified by methods outside of the GIP. ' Tug Test" performed in field verifies Capacity:
seismic acceptability of as found anchorage. -
Anchorage Y Interaction:
Category 0:
Name: P
. PPD IKG Equipment ID's: LK.G Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 838'+0" SVDS l Outfier Ref. J2 Group No.: No.:
~
Anchorage acceptibilty verified by methods outside of the GIP. ' Tug Test
- performed in field verifies Capacity:
) seismic acceptability of as found anchorage. -
[
i Anchorage, k interaction:
Category 0:
Page 12
TABLE 8-1 I Equipment Outlier Description and Resolution i Oconee Units 1,2 and 3 l J Equipment Class: 14 - Distribution Panels l Name: PPB 3KG E ?-
';...: 4 ID's: LKS Bldg: 'M Floor Elev.: 83 8'+0" SVDS l Outlier Ref. 1221 wg. Group No.: - No.:
~
l Anchorage acceptibilty verified by methods outside of the GIP. " Tug Test" performed in field verifies Capacity:
seismic acceptability of as found anchorage. -
l.
Anchorage T Category 0:
Name: PPB 3KTH1 Equipment ID's: 3KTHI Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 771'+0* SVb3 l Outlier Ref. 12J
%g Group No.: No.:
~
Anchorage acceptibilty verified by methods outside of the GIP. " Tug Test" performed in field verifies Capacity.
seismic acceptability of as found anchorage. -
s BS Caveats '
Anchorage. T
~
interaction O Name: PPB 3KU & 3KI Category 0:
Equipment ID's: JKUJK1 Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 809'+0* SVDS 227 Outlier Ref. lu RMh- Group No.: No.:
~
Anchorage acceptibilty verified by methods outside of the GIP " Tug Test" performed in field verifies Capacity seismic acceptability of as found anchorage. ~
SS ave Anchorage- 'T
~
interaction:
~
Category 0:
Name: REMOTE STARTER ENCLOSURE FOR ILPSW-139 Equipment ID's: 1RSC-ILPSW 139/ ENCL Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 796'+6" SVDS si Outlier Ref. 191 Group No.: No.:
Anchor size is less than GIP minimum. Paneljudged to be acceptable in SEWS. Capacity:
~
BS Caveats:
Anchorage j Interaction i
o i
i Page 13 l
l
l TABLE 8-1 Equipment Outlier Description and Resolution O Oconee Units 1,2 and 3 V Equipment Class: 14 - Distribution Panels Name: REMOTE STARTER ENCLOSURE FOR 3LP-126 Equipment ID's: 3RSC-3LP-126/ ENCL '
Badg: M Floor Elev.: 771'+F SVDS l Outlier Ref. j]l
% g. Group No.: No.:
~
Anchorage acceptibilty verified by methods outside of the GIP. " Tug Test
- performed in field verifies Capacity:
scismic acceptability of as found anchorage. -
% T
~
Interaction:
Category 0:
Name: REMOTE STARTER ENCLOSURES Equipment ID's: 3 RSC-3 HP-409/ ENCL 3 RSC-3 tF-410/ ENCL l
Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 7%'+6" SVDS l Outlier *tef. j)l Group No.: No.:
)
Anchor size is less than GIP minimum. Paneljudged to be acceptable in SEWS. Capacity: ,
~
BS Cavents: !
~
Interaction:
Category 0:
i Page 14
o TABLE 8-1 Equipment Outlier Description and Resolution Oconee Units 1,2 and 3 v(7 Equipment Class: 16 - Battery Chargers & Invertors Name: POWER BATERRY CHARGERS i
Equipment ID's: IPA /BC.2PA%C.lPBSC,2PBSC Bldg: H Floor Elev.: 796'+6" SVDS 10 Outlier Ref. 3 Group No.: No.:
Mution.
Exceedance of Reference Spectrum by Instructure Response Sectrum resolved in Duke calculation. Capacity-.
Bs Caveats
~
Anchorage
~
interaction
- j. Category 0:
Name: POWER BATTERY CHARGERS Equipment ID's: 3PA/BC.3PBSC Bldg: E Floor Elev.: 796 +6" SVDS 10 Outlier Ref. H8 Group No.: No.:
Resolution.
Exceedancr of Reference Spectrum by Instructure Response Sectrum resolved in Duke ca!culatior Capacity. Y -
BS Caveats Anchorage:
~
Interaction O
gy Category 0:
I i
(G J
l Page 15 I
TABLE 8-1 Equipment Outlier Description and Resolution Oconee Units 1,2 and 3 Equipment Class: 20-I & C Panels & Cabinets Name: AREA TERMINATION CABINET 3 Equipment ID's: 2AT3 Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 809'+0" SVDS fl Outlier Ref. .!l l gg. Group No.: No.-
~
Eye bolt removed per station work request. Capacity:
M be: I
~
Cnteraction: I*
Category 0:
Name: AREA TERMINATION CABINET 8 Equipment ID's: 2AT8 Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 809'+0" SVDS .J. Outlier Ref. .11
%g, Group No.: No.:
Cabletray trimed per station work request. CaprA:
BS Cavests:
~~
interaction Y C -
( Category 0:
Name: ATWS CONTROL PANEL Equipment ID's: 3ATWSCP 5' Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 838'+0" SVDS .1 Outlier Ref. Loi j
, Group No.: No.: l
~
Adequacy of anchorage verified per calculation. Outlier due to embedment less than GIP minimum. Capacity:
~
BS Cavests:
w Anchorage
~
Interaction:
Category 0:
Name: MISCELLANEOUS TERMINAL CABINETS Equipment ID's: 3MTC3A Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 809'+0" SVDS 10 Outlier Ref. L22 Group No.: No.:
~
Anp : leg adjacent to cabinets trimed per station work request. Capacity:
~
BS Cavests:
Anchorage interaction. Y Category 0:
Page 16
TABLE 8-1 Equipment Outlier Description and Resolution
{ Equipment Class:
Oconee Units 1,2 and 3 20-I & C Panels & Cabinets Name: ERMINAL CABINET I i Equipment ID's: 2TCP6 1
Bldg: E Floor Elev.: 7M+6" SVDS 10 Outlier Ref. IJ11 Group No.: No.:
i Loudspeaker mounted above 3TCPA relocated per station work request.
e Capacity: l l
, BS Cavests: j
~
Anchorage Interaction: Y
- f. -
Category 0:
l 4
l 1
t i
4
\
'Y:
l l
l 4
I l
l k
Page 17
i n
U Table 8-2 i Equipment Outlier Description and Proposed Resolution O Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1,2 & 3 O
8-5
l l
TABLE 8-2 Equipment Outlier Description and Proposed Resolution Oconee Units 1,2 and 3 O)
Equipment Class: 00 GenericInput Form Name: CONDENSER HOTWELLS (Unit 3)
Equipment ID's: 3CCD000A l
j Bidg: E Ficor Elev.: 775'+0" SVDS J1 Outlier Ref. M Group No.: No.:
~
Capacity > Demand verified per EQE calculation. Perform calculation to verify adequacy of 4"line Capacity:
connecting to 3CCD000A. -
l Anchorage
- Category 0: T Name: MAIN STEAM INSTRUMENTS l
Equipment ID's: 1MSPY0042.2MSPY0042 3MSPY0042
) -
esd9: M Floor Elev.: 7%'+6" SVDS 9 Outlier Ref. J2 Ofoup No.: No.:
Capacity > demand for IMSPY0042,2MSPY0042 to be verified per Duke calculation. Capacity vs Capacity:
l Demand applies to A46 only per
) Table 2-4 EPRI NP-6041. 88 Cave'
~
Anchorage interaction 1
Category 0; -*l Name: MAIN TURB. OIL TANK OIL COOLERS Equipment ID's: 3TOHX000A.3TOHX000B Bldg: H Floor Elev.: 7%'+6' SVDS l Outlier Ref. M Group No.: No.:
Analytical analysis of piping required to verify pressure boundriintergity for 3TOIDC000A, Capacity.
3TOHX000B . --
BS Cavests:
~
Anchorage:
interaction.
Category 0; Name: REGULATED POWER SUPPLY REGULATOR 3A Equipment ID's: 3A/ REG.3B/ REG l Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 796'+6' SVDS ll Outfier Ref. M p Group No.: No.:
( Capacity > Demand evaluation required for 3A/ REG & 3B/ REG. Add bracing to unistrut frame Capacity:
supporting 3A/3B/SW,3A/MCB,3B/MCB,3A/ REG,3B/ REG,3A/XFMR & 3B/XFMR . Capacity vs -
! Demand applies to A 46 only per Table 24 EPRI NP-6041. E **
l Ancnor oo l interaction
~~
Category 0: '
t t
l PageI
TABLE 8-2 Equipment Outlier Description and Proposed Resolution
(] Equipment Class:
Oconee Units 1,2 and 3 00 - Generic Input Form Namt: REGULATED POWER SUPPLY REGULATORC Equipment ID's: 1 A/ REG.1B/ REG Badg: M Floor Elev.: 796'+6" SVDS 10 Outlier Ref. 4 p Group No.: No.:
~
Capacity > Demand evaluation required for I A/ REG & IB/ REG. Add bracing to unistrut frame Capacity-supporting I A/lB/SW,l A/MCB,1B/MCB,l A/ REG,1B/ REG,1 A/XFMR & 1B/XfMR . Capacity vs -
Demand applies to A46 only per 88 Table 2-4 EPRI NP-6041.
Anchorage
- Interaction
- Category 0: T Name: REGULATED POWER SUPPLY REGULATORS E ? ', u 4 ID's: 2A/ REG.2B/ REG Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 796'+6" SVDS ll Outlier Ref. .f.9 p Grsup No.: No.:
~
Capacity > Demand evaluation required fur 2A/ REG & 2B/ REG. Add b:v:iw t *mistrut frame Capacity.
supporting 2A/2B/SW,2A/MCB,2B/MCB,2A/ REG,2B/ REG, -
2A/XFMR & 2B/XFMR. Capacity vs Demand applies to A46 ont, *c 7,, *. 2 4 JRI NP-6041. E
- Anc W ~
Interaction Category 0: Y
~
t Page 2
TABLE 8-2 Equipment Outlier Description and Proposed Resolution "e* U"it" ',2 and 3 O Equipment Class: 01 - Motor Control Centers Name: 250 VDC MCC IMVC2 E? ' :.;..^ ID's: IMVC2 Badg: IB Floor Elev.: 775'+0* SVDS M Outlier Ref. 14 Group No.: No.:
Existing test report to be used to verify Capacity > Demand. See 14" MCC outlier resolution Capacity: T calculation contained in Miscellaneous section of A-46/IPEEE calculation. Trim unistrut frame on top -
of IMVC2. BS M- *
~
Anchorage lnteraction I Category 0:
Name: 600V MCC 1XR Equipment ID's: JM Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 83 8'+0" SVDS l Outlier Ref. 4.,9 p wg Group No.: No.:
Existing test report to be used to verify Capacity > Demand. See 14" MCC outlier resolution Capecity. T calculation contained in Miscellaneous section of A 46/IPEEE calculation. Add top bracing or add -
washer plates to back row of anchors for IXR. SS Cavests: -*
Anchorage T interaction C
Category c:
Name: 600V MCC 2XR & 3XR Equipment ID's: 2M side: M Floor Elev.: 838'+0" SVDS l Ouuier Ref. H Group No.: No.:
w a Renotunon.
Existing test report to be used to verify Capacity > Demand. See 14" MCC outlier resolution Capacity. T calculation contained in Miscellaneous section of A-46/IPEEE calculation. Non-seismic block wall -
Eb*
- adjacent to 2XR to be braced or analytically qualified.
~
Anchorage Interaction T Category 0:
Name: 600V MCC 3XR Equipment ID's: 2M Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 83 8'+0* SVDS l Oudier Ref. JH
%. Group No.: No.:
Existing test report to be used to verify Capacity > Demand. See 14* MCC outlier resolution Capacity I calculation contained in Miscellaneous section of A-46/IPEEE calculation. Non-seismic block wall -
adjacent to 3XR to be braced or analytically qualified. BS h
- ini ,,,s , T Page 3
i i TABLE 8-2
. Equipment Outlier Description and Proposed R.esolution p0 Oconee Units 1,2 and 3 Equipment Class: 01 -MotoscontrolCenters Name: DISTRIBlmON CENTER IDCA Equipment ID's: IDCA Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 796'+6" SVDS H Outlier Ref. )),,
p %g Group No.: No.:
Existing test report to be used to verify Capacity > Demand. See 14" MCC outlier resolution Capacity: T calculation contained in Miscellaneous section of A-46/IPEEE calculation. Replace back right anchor -
for 1DCA. BS Cave *:
Anchorage
~
Interaction Category 0:
Name: DISTRIBtmON CENTER IDCB Equipment ID's: IDCB Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 796'+6" SVDS M Outlier Ref. 24 p , Group No.: No.:
Existing test report to be used to verify Capacity > Demand. See 14" MCC outlier resolution Capacity: T calculation contained in Miscellaneous section of A-46/IPEEE calculation. Compartment latch on 4E -
has been repaired per station WR. 88 Anchorage interaction (n Category 0:
Name: .MCCIXA Equipment ID's: J.XA j Bado: H Floor Elev.: 796'+6' SVDS .), Outlier Ref. J.!4 Group No.: No.:
Exceedance of Reference Spectrum by Instructure Response Sectrum rewived in Duke calculation. Capacity: T Bolt 2 south bays ofIXA back to back.
7 Anchorage Y interaction Category 0:
Name: MCC IXA-4 Equipment ID's: 1XA-A Bldg: H Floor Elev.: 796'+6" SVDS _l., Outlier Ref. 181 Group No.: No.:
Excee hce of Reference Spectrum by Instructure Response Sectrum resolved in Duke calculation. Capacity: T Enh.w tisting anchorage ofIXA-A to meet A-46 requirements. 7 Anchorage:
- Interaction Category 0:
(
- i. Q Page 4 l
t
TABLE 8-2 i Equipment Outlier Description and Proposed Resolution O
G Oconee Units 1,2 and 3 Equipment Class: 0t -MotorControlCenters Name: MCC1XC Equipment ID's: 1XC Bldg: E Floor Elev.: 775'+0" SVDS .1 Outlier Ref. 40 p w g. Group No.: No.:
~~
Add back to back bolting to IXC. Capacity.
88 Cavests T Anchorage Interaction !
Category 0: l Name: MCCIXGA Equipment ID's: 1X, g6 Bldg: H Floc < v.: 796'+6" SVDS H Outfier Ref. _4.1 l Proposed Resolution. Group Noa Noa l
Exceedance of Reference Spectrum by Instructs.t Response Sectrum resolved in Duke calculation. Capacity: T Enhance existing welds for IXGA to meet A-46. -
s8 Cavents-
- Anchorage T interaction !
Category 0:
Name: MCCIXGB Equipment ID's: JXQB side: H Floor Elev.: 796'+6" SVDS M Outlier Ref. S i PW Resolution, Group No.: No.:
Execedance of Reference Spectrum by instructr'e Response Sectrum resolved in Duke calculation . Capacity: T Add back to back botting to the 3 South most bays ofIXGB. Enhance existing anchorage for IXGB. --
Add restraint to fluorescent bulbs on West side of IXGB Add restraint to 55 gal. trash can adjacent to 88 Cavests:
IXGB. Anchorego. T interaction T Category 0:
Name: MCCIXK Equipment ID's: 129i Badg: 68. Floor Elev.: 809'+0* SVDS 9 Outfier Ref. .i!
p Group No.: No.:
Existing test report to be used to verify Capacity > Demand. See 14" MCC outlier resolution Capacity: T calculation contained in Miscellaneous section of A-46/IPEEE calculation. Add padding between --
brick wall and IXK. 88
- a Anchorage Interaction: T s
Category 0:
)
i 4
e Page 5
TABLE 8-2 Equipment Outlier Description and Proposed Resolution Q Equipment Class:
Oconee Units 1,2 and 3 01 -MotorControlCenters Name: MCC1XO Equipment ID's: LX,0 Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 796 +6' SVDS H Outlier Ref. 4_7 p %g, Group No.: No.:
~
Bolt 2 North bays of IXO together. Replace 3/8" anchor with external clip angle and anchor. Capacity:
BS Cavests. T 7
~
Interaction.
~
Category 0:
Name: MCC IXP Equipment ID's: 1X,P Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 796'+6" SVDS M Outlier Ref. 3 p g Group No.: No.:
Add padding between IXUA and IXP. Capacity:
BS Cavents:
interaction: T g Category 0:
Name: MCCIXS1 Equipment ID's: IXS1 Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 796 +6" SVDS JJi Outlier Ref. Jl p Group No.: No.:
~
Add padding between IXS1 and HVAC on East side. Capacity
~
BS Caveats
~
Anchorage Interaction. T
~
Category 0:
Name: MCC2XA Equipment ID's: 2M Bldg: IB. Floor Elev.: 799+6" SVDS l Outlier Ref. 1!6 Group No.: No.:
Exceedance of Reference Spectrum by Instructure Response Sectrum resolved in Duke calculation. Capacity: Y Develope analytical anaysis of-36' pipe on North side of 2XA. Restrain fire hose rack on North side --
of2XA,
~
Anchorage.
Category 0:
Page 6
___._ __._._ _. . _ . _ _ _ _ _ ._ _. . __ _ __ _ _ . _ . _ . . . . _ ~
TABLE 8-2 ;
Equipment Outlier Description and Proposed Resolution
' Oconee Units 1,2 and 3 I Equipment Class: 01 -Motorcontrolcenters Name: MCC 2XA-A l Equipment ID's: 2XA-A
- Bldg
- H Floor Elev.: 796'+6" SVDS l Outlier Ref. R
% wg. Group No.: No.:
l Exceedance of Reference Spectrum by Instructure Response Sectrum resolved in Duke calculation. Capacity:
, Enhance existing anchorage of 2XA-A. _
j BS Caveets:
Anchorage: T
~
Interaction
~
Category 0:
Name: MCC 2XC Equipment ID's: 2.XS Bldg: H Floo' Elev.: 775'+0* SVDS l Outlier Ref. 8,1 Group No.: No.:
m.
1
~~
Add back to back bolting to 2XC. Capacity:
BS h 7
~~
Anchorage *
~
l Interaction. i
_ l Category 0: l Name: MCC2XGA Equipment ID's: 2Kfti Bldg: H Floor Elev.: 796'+6" SVDS H Outlier Ref. 88 Proposed Resolution: ^
Exceedance of Reference Spectrum by Instructure Response Sectrum resolved in Duke calculation. Capacity: Y Enhance existing welds for 2XGA to meet A-46. p Anchorage *
~
Interaction Category 0:
Name: MCC 2XGB Equipment ID's: 2KQR Bldg: H Floor Elev.: 796'+6' SVDS M Outlier Ref. 90, Group No.: No.:
Exceedance of Reference Spectrum by instructure Response Sectrum resolved in Duke calculation. Capacity: T Add back to back *.olting to the bottom north end of 2XGB. Enhance existing anchorageof 2XGB. T Add restraint to fluorescent bulbs on West side of 2XGB. BS Cavests:
Anchorage T Interaction
- T i
Page 7
TABLE 8-2 Equipment Outlier Description and Proposed Resolution i Oconee Units 1,2 and 3 Equipment Class: 01. Motor control centers Name: MCC 2XI& 2XJ Equipment ID's: 22;Il2Q Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 800'+0* SVDS j0, Outfier Ref. $
% w g. Group No.: No.:
Existing test report to be used to verify Capacity > Demand. See 14" MCC outlier resolution Capacity
- T calculation contained in Miscellawous section of A-46/IPEEE calculation. Add padding or brace -
2XI,2XJ to block wall (required for 2XJ, good practice for 2XI). BS Cave
- Anchonsge: T Interaction I
~
Category 0:
Name: MCC 2XL & 2XN Equipment ID's: 2XL,2XN Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 771 '+0* SVDS .], Outlier Ref. S wg Group No.: No.:
~
Bolt back to back with 2XN or add top bracing to MCC. Trim cable tray and restrain horizontally Capacity above MCC. -
BS Cavests:
Anchorage g lateraction
~
Category 0:
Name: MCC2XO Equipment ID's: 22LQ Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 7%'+6" SVDS M Outlier Ref. R w g. Group No.: No.:
~'~
Add washer plates, tighten loose bolts and add shims to 2XO. Capacity.
BS Caveats T- l A,.%. T I
~
interaction ;
- i Category 0:
j Name: MCC 2XP '
Equ.pment ID's: 2R Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 7%'+6" SVDS H Outlier Ref. 3 Group No.: No.:
~
Add shims between inverted channel and concrete at all anchors were gaps exist for 2XP. Capacity:
BS Cavents: T Anchorage T
~
Interaction Category 0:
Page 8
TABLE 8-2 Equipment Outlier Description and Proposed Resolution
(] Equipment Class:
Oconee Units 1,2 and 3 01 -Motorcontrolcenters Name: MCC 2XSF & 3XSF (208%
Equipment ps: 2XSF(208W3XSFQOB i l
Bldg: ME Floor Elev.: O,+.0." SVDS l Oudier Ref. E Group No.: No.:
~
Add padding between 2XSF(208v) and 3XSF(208v). Capacity-BS Cavests interaction. T Category 0:
- Name: MCC 2XSF & 3XSF (600W j Equipment ID's: 2XSF(600W3XSF(600v).
Bade: .HE rioor Elev.: 817'+0* SVDS JO Oudier Ref. 3 l Group No.: No.:
P M udon.
Add padding between 2XSF(600v) and 3XSF(600v). Capacitj-88 Cavests- l
~
Anchorage interaction. T Category 0:
Name: MCC3XA Equipment ID's: )X.6 Badg: H Floor Elev.: 79e+6' SVDS J Our ter Ref. J.fi
%g Group No.: No.:
Exceedance of Reference Spectrum by Instructure Response Sectrum resolved in Duke calculation. Capacity' .T Enhance existing anchorage of 3XA. Develope analytical aaaysis of-36' pipe on North side of 3XA. -
7 Interaction. 7 Category 0:
Name: MCC 3XA-A Equipment ID's: 3XA-A Bidg: M Floor Elev.: 796 +6" SVDS l Outlier Ref. 4 j_45
%g, Group No.: No.:
Exceedance of Reference Spectrum by Instructure Response Sectrum resolved in Duke calculation. Capacity: T Replace missing bolt (back to back, bottom East) for 3XA-A. Enhance existing anchorage for 3XA-A. -
BS Cavents:
Interaction-Category 0:
Page 9
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ ._ _ _ _. . __ . _ ~ _ _
y TABLE 8-2 Equipment Outlier Description and Proposed Resolution
( Equipment Class:
Oconee Units 1,2 and 3 01 -MotorcontrolCenters Name: MCC 3XGA l Equipment ID's: 3XGA Bldg: H Floor Elev.: 796'+6" SVDS H Outlier Ref. J.H P60 posed Resolution. Group No.: No.:
Exceedance of Reference Spectrum by Instructure Response Sectrum resolved in Duke calculation. Capacity: Y Enhance existing welds for 3XGA to meet A.46. Restrain fluorescent light bulbs near 3XGA.
7 Anchotsp: T Interaction T Category 0:
Name: McC3XGB Equipment ID's: 3XGB Bldg
- H Floor Elev.: 796'+6" SVDS H OutNor Ref. M Proposed Resolution. Group No.: No.:
Exceedance of Reference Spectrum by Instructure Response Sectrum resolved in Duke calculation. Capacity: I Enhance existing anchorage of 3XGB. Trim 1" from Main Steam pipe insulation above 3XGB.
7
. Anchorage. T interaction- T
~
Category 0:
Name: MCC 3XI& 3XJ Equipment ID's: 3XIJXJ Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 809' 4 " SVDS H Oudier Ref. M Group N1.: No.:
W Resolunon
- Existing test report to be used to verify Capacity > Demand. See 14" MCC outlier resolution Capacity: Y calculation contained in Miscellaneous section of A.46/IPEEE calculation. Add padding or brace -
3XI,3XJ to block wall. SS Caveste- *-
j Anchorage Interaction. T Category 0:
Name: MCC 3XO Equipment ID's: ).XQ Bidg: M Floor Elev.: 796'+6" SVDS H Outlier Ref. J.H Group No.: No.:
Proposed Resolunon.
~
Add padding or move cable tray member to prohibit impact between conduit and cable tray adjacent Capacity:
to 3XO. Remove loose angle from top of MCC.
. ~
Interaction. T
]
i _
Category 0:
Page 10
l i
TABLE 8-2 Equipment Outlier Description and Proposed Resolution Oconee Units 1,2 and 3
{ Equipment Class: 01 -MotorControlCenters Name: hjCC 3XS]
Equipment ID's: 3XSI Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 796 +6" SVDS l Outlier Ref. 1M pg wm Group No.: No.:
~~
Repair latch to #4-D/E & Add washer plates for 3XSI- Capacity:
- BS Caveats- T Anchorage T
~
Interaction:
~
Category 0:
Name: MCC 3XT & XFMR 3XT (600V TO 208V)
Equipment ID's: 3XT.3XT/XFMR Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 83 8'+0* SVDS l Outlier Ref.}. I Group No.: No.: PPM Resoluuon-
~
Existing test report to be used to verify Capacity > Demand. See 14" MCC outlier resolution Capacity
- calculation contained in Miscellaneous section of A-46/IPEEE calculation. Add bracing to block wall 2 adjacent to 3XT and 3XT/XFMR. E8 *
- Anchorage-
~
interaction. [ j ( Category 0: ; Name: MCC XODI Equipment ID's: XQPl B6de: E Floor Elev.: 796'+6" SVDS 9 Outlier Ref. j,60
% g,,,gggen. Group No.: No.:
~
Replace existing clip angles on XODI with angles meeting minimum edge distance. Replace anchors Capacity: with corrosion resistant anchors. Provide protection for XODI from vehicle or equipment impact. ;-- Add padding between XODI exterior enclosure and XODI cabinet. 08 M*
- Anchorage T InteracWon T Category 0: l I
Name: MCC XSF.1 (UNITS 1.2 & 3) Equipment ID's: XSF l(1.2.&3) Bldg: SSE Floor Elev.: 797'+0* SVDS l Outlier Ref. 161 p Group No.: No.: Equipment in the SSF must be evaluated to determine the need for Safety Related tagging. The Capacity: equipment tray on the north side of XSF-1 must be moved. Ref. pip 4-096-1723 - Anchorage: Interaction: T 4 Page 11
TABLE 8-2 ' Equipment Outlier Description and Proposed Resolution Q Equipment Class: Oconee Units 1,2 and 3 01 -Motorcontrolcenters I Name: MCC*S XI& XJ Equipment ID's: IXI.1 XJ Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 800'+0" SVDS 10 Outlier Ref. S p gg. Group No.: No.: Existing test report to be used to verify Capacity > Demand. See 14" MCC outlier resolution Capacity: T calculation contained in Miscellaneous section of A-46/IPEEE calculation. Add padding or brace - IXI, IXJ to block wall. BS Caveats:
~
Anchorage Interaction T
~
Category 0: Name: MCC'S IXL & IXN j Equipment ID's: IXLlXN Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 771'+0" SVDS l Outlier Ref. & Group No.: No.:
~
Existing test report to be used to verify Capacity > Demand. Replace missing anchors in IXL & IXN. Capacity: Trim cable tray above MCC's IXN at cable shoe. Add rigid support to tray in E-W direction. Add -, padding between IXL & IXUB and IXN & IXUB. Bolt IXL & IXN back to back or add top bracing. E [ . Interaction. T Category 0: I \ Page 12
TABLE 8-2 Equipment Outlier Description and Proposed Resolution (] Equipment Class: Oconee Units 1,2 and 3 02 - Low Voltage Switchgear Name: CRD SYSTEM AC BREAKER CAB Equipment ID's: 3CRDACBKRCAB Badg: M Floor Elev.: 800'+0* SVDS M Ouuier Ref. $ w Resoeupon. Group No.: No.: Remove unistrut on south side of breaker panel. Capacity: BS Caver'.h:
~
Anchorage Interecdon Y
~
Category 0: Name: [OAD CENTER Equipment ID's: IXO4 , Bldg: H Floor Elev.: ]%'+6' SVDS M Outlier Ref. M0 G'oup No.: No.. W Resoluson-
~
Weld transformer section of Load Centers IXO4 to embedded angle. Et. bedded studs are A108 instead Capacity: of A307. Stud capacity verified per calculation. ;-- Anchores** 7
~
Interac6on
~
Category 0: Name: LOAD CEN1'ER IX9 Equipment ID's: 1XO9 Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 7%'+6" SVDS M Oudier Ref. M1
%g. Group No.: No.:
~
Add shims under load center at anchors on North side. Calculation performed to verify acceptability of Cspecity. 9/16" gap. _a BS Caveste .*! Anchornos. T
~
Interaction
~
Category 0: Name: LOAD CENTERS Equipment ID's: 2X01.2X02 Bldg: E Floor Elev.: 796'+6" SVDS M Oudier Ref. ,82 Group No.: No.: PW Resoludon.
~
Weld transformer section of Load Centers 2XO' & 2X02 to embedded angle. Embedded stads are Capacity: A108 instead of A307. Stud capacity verified per calculation. 7 Anchorage T Interaction: ,,s , Category 0: k Page 13
l TABLE 8-2 Equipment Outlier Description and Proposed Resolution (T Oconee Units 1,2 and 3 Equipment Class: 03 - Medium voltage switchgear Name: UNIT 14160V SWITCHGEAR Equipment ID's: ITC.lTD.1TE Bldg: H Floor Elev.: 796 +6" SVDS E Outlier Ref. .7.s p wg. Group No.: No.: Execedance of Reference Spectrum by Instructure Response Sectrum resolved in Duke calculation . Capacity: l Relocate ladder rack at column K26. Restrain Duorescent bulb fixture at XFMR IX12. Restrain -- I " Chemistry Spill Control Tanks * @ J26. Restrain fluorescent bulbs in overhead fixtures adjacent to BS Cave: j ITC, ITD, ITE. Anchorage
~
Interaction. Y
~
Category 0: j Name: UNIT 2 4160V $%TTCHGEAR Equipment ID's: 2TC.2TD.2TE Bldg: E Floor Elev.: 796'+6" SVDS E Outlier Ref. 3 p wg. Group No.: No.:
~
Exceedance of Reference Spectrum by Instructure Response Sectrum resolved in Duke calculation. Capacity:
. Relocate ladder rack at column K30. Restrain fluorescent bulbs in overhead fixtures adjacert to 2TC, ----
2TD,2TE. "IAE Battery Eq. Storage Cabinet
- must be moved or restrained (located on south end of M Cav e : '
~
2TC). Anchorage g interaction T
~
Category 0: i l l l i C t f l Page 14
TABLE 8-2 Equipment Outlier Description and Proposed Resolution f' Oconee Units 1,2 and 3 : Equipment Class: 04 -Transformers Name: (600V TO 208V) TRANSFORMERS l Equipment ID's: 2A/XFMR.2B/XFMR ! Skig: M Floor Elev.: 796'+6" SVDS M Outlier Ref. .!6 Group No.: No.: P Mution. Add bracing to unistrut frarne supporting 2A/IB/SW,2A/MCB.2B/MCB.2A/ REG,2B/ REG, Capacity: 2A/XFMR & 2B/XFMR . Add weld between 2B/XFMR and plate. - Anchorage T l 1 Interaction ;
~
Category 0-l Name: (600V TO 208V) TRANSFORMERS ) Equipment ID's: 3A/XFMR.3B/XFMR Skig: M Floor Elev.: 796'+6" SVDS H Outlier Ref. .LO2 a %,gg,,. Group No.: No.: Add bracing to unistrut frame supporting 3 A/lB/SW,3A/MCB.3B/MCB,3A/ REG,3B/ REG, Capacity: 3A/XFMR & 3B/XFMR . _ BS Caveats. Anchorage. T
~
interaction. Q
~~
Category 0: Name: 600V TO 208V TRANSFORMERS Equipment ID's: 2XGA/XFMR.2XGB/XFMR Bldg: H Floor Elev.: 79&+6' SVDS .1 Outlier Ref. 8.9 Group No.: No. Prapaaad Resolution: Enhance existing anchorage for 2XGA/XFMR & 2XGB/XFMR . Capacity;
'~
BS Caveats: Anchorage.
~
Interaction Category 0: Name: 600V TO 208V TRANSFORMFRS Equipment ID's: 3XGA/XFMR.3XGB/XFMR Bado: n Floor Elev.: 796 +6" SVDS .1 Outfier Ref. Jll Group No.: No.: PW Mution-Enhance existing anchorage for 3XGA/XFMR & 3XGB/XFMR . Capacity: BS Caveats: *~ Anchorage: *
~~
I interaction: Category 0: Page 15
TABLE 8-2
; Equipment Outlier Description and Proposed Resolution !
Oconee Units 1,2 and 3 1 Equipment Class: 04 -Transformers Name: 600V TO 240V TRANSFORMERS Equipment ID's: IA/XFMR l Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 7%'+6' SVDS 11 Outlier Ref. 6 163 pg_;_7 - Iflecolu6on. Group No.: No.:
~
Add bracing to unistrut frame supporting l A/IB/SW,l A/MCB,lB/MCB,l A/ REG,lB/ REG. Capacity: l A/XFMR & 1B/XFMR . _ BS Cavests:
- Anchorage- T
~
- Interaction Category 0:
Name: TRANSFORMER IB (600V TO 208V) Equipment ID's: 1B/XFMR side: M Floor Elev.: 7%'+6" SVDit 19 Oudier flef. M G'oup No.: No.: w w unon-d
~
Add bracing to unistrut frame supporting i A/lB/SW,1 A/MCB,1 B/MCB,1 A/ REG,1B/ REG, CapocMy-lA/XFMR & IB/XFMR . ._ , BS Cavests: Anchorage T
~
g interaction-
~
Category 0: e Name: XFMR IXGB Equipment IO's: IXGB/XFMR Bldg: R Floor Elev.: 7%'+6" SVDS l Oueler ftet. S wg. Group No.: No.:
~'~
Enhance existing anchorage of IXGB/XFMR to meet A-46 requirments. CapacMy. BS Cavests: T Anchorage T
~
Interaction
~
Category 0: Nanie: XFMR IXR (4160V TO 600V) Equipment ID's: IXR/XFMR Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 838'+0* SVDS .1 Outlier Ref. JO
%,g,. Group No.: No.:
- Add bracing to IXR/XFMR to increase Nat Freq. > 13.5 hz or analyticaly justify spectra exceedance. Capacity-BS Caveats
~
2 Anchorage Category 0: V Page 16
TABLE 8-2 ; Equipment Outlier Description and Proposed Resolution ! Q Equipment Cisss: Oconee Units 1,2 and 3 07 -Fluid-OperatedValves Name: MD EFW PUMP 2B ISOLATION VALVE I Equipment ID's: 2FDWVA0316 Bldg: de Floor Elev.: 809'+0* SVDS l Outlier Ref. ,69 p wg. Group No.: No.:
~
Remove hand wheel chain from 2FDWVA0316 and revise procedures as needed to ensure chaining of Capacity: hand whcci will not reoccur. - ;- Anchomge ,
~
interaction
~
Category 0: Na w: MS TO AS CONTROL VALVE Equipment ID'e: 1MSVA0129 Bido: IP Floor Elev.: 7M+6" SVDS 22 Outlier Ref. .])3 p gg Group No.: No.:
~
Remove the attached air line and support it from the wall per B31.1 requirments. Capacity: g3 % T
~
Anchorage r ( Category 0: Name: PRZ CODE SAFE 1Y VALVES Equipment ID's: 1RCVA0068.2RCVA0068.3RCVA0068 Bldg: RR Floor Elev.: 850'+0* SVDS Group No.: l Outlier Ref. I No.: m _. Outlier due to ISRS > Ref. Spectra from 9.5 Hz - 15 Hz. Analytical review required for 1RCVA0068, Capacity: Y 2RCVA0068,3RC7A0068 , Valves are screened out per Table 2-4 EPRI NP-6041 for IPEEE. , whorage
~
interaction. Ca*egory 0: l d V Page 17
TABLE 8-2 Equipment Outlier Description and Proposed Resolution 7 Oconee Units 1,2 and 3 (G Equipment Class: 08A - Motor-Operated Valves Name: LETDOWN INLET ISOLATION VALVES Equipment ID's: 2HPVA0001.2HPVA0002 Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 777'+0* SVDS .2 Outlier Ref. 7_0, p %g Group No.: No.:
~
Outlier due to height and weight. Possible solutions for 2HPVA0001 & 2HPVA0002 include locating Capacity: valve stress report, hand stress analysis of yoke stresses, location of stress report for a similiar valve at - another facility (CNS.MNS.TMI, Turkey Point etc). May need to investigate using GERS to qualify. 08
- Valves are screened out per Table 2-4 EPRI NP-6041 for IPEEE.
Anchorage. Interaction
~
Category 0: Name: PRZ SPRAY ISOLATION VALVES Equipment ID's: I RCVA0003.2 RCVALA>03.3RCVA0003. l RCV A0004.2 RCVA0004.3 RCVA0004 sade: M Floor Elev.: 85&+0" SVDS 1 Outlier Ref. l.9 Group No.: No.: Outlier due to height and weight. Possible solutions for IRCVA0003,2RCVA0003,3RCVA0003 Capacity. Y lRCVA0004,2RCVA0004,3RCVA0004 include locating valve stress report, hand stress analysis of -- l yoke stresses, location of stress report for a similiar valve at another facility (CNS,MNS TMI, Turkey MM
- {
Point etc). May need to investigate using GERS to qualify. Outlier due to ISRS > Ref. Spectra from Anchorage l 9.5 Hz 15 Hz. Analytical review required. Valves are screened out per Table 2-4 EPRI NP-6041 for - Interaction O t v IPEEE. Category 0: V l l 1 l l l
\
v Page 18
TABLE 8-2 Equipment Outlier Description and Proposed Resolution G Oconee Units 1,2 and 3 V Equipment Class: 08B - Solenoid-operated valves Name: AHU 11 & 12 INLET DAMPER Equipment ID's: CD-06A.CD-06B Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 838'+0" SVDS 11 Outlier Ref. ),J6 Group No.: No.: Mution. Evaluate adequacey of blockwall to which damper controls are mounted. " Capacity: BS Cweets: Y
~
Anchorage. l interaction T
~
Category 0: Name: PRESSURIZER RELIEF VALVES Equipment ID's: I R CVA0066.2 RCVA0066.3RCVA00661 RCVA0067.2 RCVA0067.3 RCVA0067 l Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 850*+0" SVDS .1 Outlier Ref. 20 wg. Group No.: No.: Outlier due to ISRS > Ref. Spectra from 9.5 Hz 15 Hz. Analytical review required for IRCVA0066, Capacity: Y 2RCVA0066,3RCVA00661RCVA0067,2RCVA0067,3RCVA0067. Valves are screened out per -- Table 2-4 EPRI NP-604i for IPEEE. BS h Anchorage
~
g interaction. l ~ J
) Category 0:
t
, V Page 19
l i TABLE 8-2 l Equipment Outlier Description and Proposed Resolution 1 ( Oconee Units 1,2 and 3 : Equipment Class: 09 - Fans Name: B1T.B2T.CT4 ENCLOSURE VENT FANS l l Equipment ID's: I VSAH-B I T-EV-A. I VSAH-B I T-EV-B. I VS AH-CT4-EV-A. l VS AHCT4-EV-B j Bldg: DB Floor Elev.: 796'+6" SVDS . l Outlier Ref. E ; g Group No.: No.: l
- l Equiprnent was inaccessible to SRT. Need to inspect fan anchorage and base isolation systems if any Capacity:
are present.Due to naccesibilty offans IVSAH-BIT-EV-A, lVSAH-BIT-EV-B, lVSAH-CT4-EV A, - IVSAH4T4-EV-B, a scaffold or ladder will have to be be brought inta the Blockhouse. A long BS Coveats:
~
enough ladder will not fit through the normal personel access door. intero.iion. l Category 0: Nome: OUTSIDE AIR BOOSTER FANS'A' & 'B' Equipment ID's: 3VSAH0026.3VSAH0027 Bldg: M. Floor Elev.: 83 8'+0* SVDS 51 Outlier Ref. 140 p Group No.: No.:
~
Provide lateral & vertical seismic steps or bumpers to 3VSAH0026,3VSAH0027. Provide redundant Capacity
- power supply to either 3VSAH0026 or 3VSAH0027. Resolve interaction concents associated with --
BS Cavesta:
- Unit 3 CRVS supply duct system.
% T Interaction. -Y
~
Cologory 0: ) l l O Page 20
TABLE 8-2 Equipment Outlier Description and Proposed Resolution l l , s Oconee Units 1,2 and 3 Equipment Class: Air Handlers Nome: AIR HANDIING UNITS 11.12. 26 & 21 Equipment ID's: I VS AH00 l l . l VS AH0012. I VS A H0026. I VS A H0027 Skig: M Floor Elev.: 83 8'+0* SVDS H Outiler Ref. 1H j
%g Group No.: No.: i Provide lateral seismic stops or bumpers to IVSAH00l l, IVbAH0012, IVSAH0026, IVSAH0027. Capacity: T Capacity VS Demand verification provided per EQE calculation. -
! i interaction.
~
Category 0: , l I Name: AIR HANDLING UNITS I3.14.26 & 27 ( Equipment ID's: 3VSAH0013.3VSAH0014 i INdg: M Floor Elev.: 838'+0* SVDS H Outlier Ref. jH g Group No.: No.:
~
Provide lateral & vertical seismic stops or bumpers to 3VSAH0013,3VSAH0014. Resolve interaction CapacMy concenrs associated with Unit 3 CRVS supply duct system. - Anchorage '*! l - interaction ! b 5 Category c: C v Name: AIR HANDLING UNITS O 14 & 0.15 l Equipment ID's: OVSAH0014.0VSAH0015 Bide: H Floor Elev.: 850'+0* SVDS M Outlier Ref. J ~ P Group No.: No.: Resolution. l Add anchorage to AHUs 14 & 15 Capechy*
~~
- I B3 Cavents: '
l Anchorage '*i l
~
interaction Category 0: Name: ALTERREX CAB. COOLING COILS Equipment ID's: 3VSAH0029 Bldg: H Floor Elev.: 822'+0* SVDS M Outfier Ref. 142 gg Group No.: No.:
~
1 A/$ S.chorage to 3VSAH0029- Capacky:
~~
BS Cavents: Anchorage T i
~
4~ Interaction. j
.% Category 0:
s i Page 21 l .
l TABLE 8-2 Equipment Outlier Description and Proposed Resolution l ;] Oconee Units 1,2 and 3 Equipment Class: 10 - Air Handlers Name: BATTERY RM. AIR CONDmONER l Equipment ID's: 3VSAH0017 Ski9: IE Floor Elev.: 822'+0* syns g0 Outlier Ref. 119 Group No.: No.: PW Resolution. Add anchorage to 3VSAH0017. Analyticaly qualify non-seismic blockwall adjacent to 3VSAH0017. Capacity: BS Caveats: Y Anchorage T l Interaction. Y
~
Category 0: l l l l l l l l %.) I l I i-i I I i F 4 V i Page 22
l l TABLE 8-2 ' Equipment Outlier Description and Proposed Resolution
]
Equipment Class: Oconee Units 1,2 and 3 14 Distribution Panels ' Name: 125V DC PPB's Equipment ID's: I L21/ PPB.2 L21/ PPB.3 L21/ PPB.3 L22/ PPB Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 822'+0" SVDS .1 Outlier Ref. .).9 Proposed Mudon. Group No.: No.:
~
3L21/PPP, IL21/ PPB,2L21/ PPB,3L22/ PPB panels are mounted in a plaster wall with metal studs. Capacity: The wall it a non- seismic, standard comercial partition. A detailed analysis of the wall stud system is required. BS Cave: Anchorage.
~
interaction
~
Category 0: Name: MOTOR STARTER PANELS Equipment ID's: 3 RSC-3 FDW-368.369.372.274.382& 384/ ENCL Bido: M Floor Elev.: 809'+ 0* SVDS l Oudier Ref. E pg wg Group No.: No.:
~
The unistrut needs to be cut at the blockwall/ concrete wall interface and additional anchorage added Capacity: as needed. BS Caveats: Anchorage ~T
~
2 Interaction. Category 0: Name: PPB IB Equipment ID's: IB,1 A& lD Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 818'+0" SVDS 14 Outlier Ref. 162 M udon, Group No.: No.:
~
} Replace missing or broken door latch on PPB 1B and adjacent PPB 1 A & ID. Capach: BS Cavests: Y
~
Anchorage:
~
Interaction Category 0: Name: PPB 3C &3D ^ Equipment ID's: 2GD i . Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 818'+0" SVDS 15 Outlier Ref. 10s
%g, Group No.: No.:
~
Add bracing to colmnn supporting Pressurizer Heater Cabinet platform. Capacity: 88 Caveats: T
~
Interaction Category 0:
*O Page 23 re
1 TABLE 8-2 i Equipment Outlier Description and Proposed Resolution 3 Oconee Units 1,2 and 3 J Equipment Class: 14 -Distribution Panels , Name: PPB 3KD Equipment ID's: LK.Q Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 771'+0" SVDS 9 Outlier Ref. J.10 Group No.: No.: PrW hlution.
~
Anchorage acceptibilty verified by methods outside of the GIP " Tug Test" perfonned in field verifies Capacity: j scismic acceptability of as found anchorage. Capacity vs Demand determination required due to panel - size exceeding GIP allowables. Capacity vs Demand applies to A-46 only per Table 2-4 EPRI NP- BS Cave
- 6041-Anchorage- Y
~
interaction Category 0: Name: REGULATOR OUTPUT BKRS & XFER SW Equipment ID's: 2 NIB /SW.2A/MCB.2B/MCB Bede: M Floor Elev.: 7%'+6" SVDS 9 Outfier Ref. E Group No.: No.:
~
Add bracing to unistrut frame supporting 2 NIB /SW,2NMCB,2B/MCB,2NREG,2B/ REG, Capacity: 2A/XFMR & 2B/XFMR . Add washers to bolts which bolt 2NMCB & 2B/MCB panel to unistrut 7 4 Anchorage
~
Interaction g Category 0: Name: REGULATOR OUTPUT BKRS & XFER SW Equepment ID's: 3N1B/SW.3A/MCB.3B/MCB Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 7%'+6" SVDS 9 Outlier Ref. j,90 g Group No.: No.:
~
Add bracing to unistrut frame supporting 3 NIB /SW,3A/MCB,3B/MCB.3NREG,3B/ REG, Capacity: 3NXFMR & 3B/XFMR. Add washers to bolts which bolt 3B/MCB panel to unistrut frame. 7 Anchorage Y
~
interaction Category 0: Name: REGULATOR OUTPUT BREAKERS & XFER SW Equipment ID's: 1 AllB/SW.I A/MCB.1B/MCB Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 796'+6" SVDS 9 Outlier Ref. J
, Group No.: No.:
Add bracing to unistrut frame supporting IN!B/SW,l A/MCB,lB/MCB,1NREG,lB/ REG, Capacity: INXFMR & 1B/XFMR . Add washers to bolts which bolt 2NMCB & 2B/MCB panel to unistrut Y frame. BS Caveets:
- Anchorage Interaction Category 0
1-; j Page 24
TABLE 8-2 l Equipment Outlier Description and Proposed Resolution Oconee Units 1,2 and 3 Equipment Class: 15 Batteries on Racks Name: CONTROL BATTERIES Equipment ID's: ICA/BB.1CB/BB Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 809'+0* SVDS 18, Outlier Ref. 2,. p Group No.: No.:
~
! Batteries are scheduled to be replaced per NSM ON.12998 in the Fall of 1998. Capacity: M he: T l Anchorage. Interaction: Category c: Name: CONTROL BATTERI15 Equipment ID's: 3CA/BB.3CB/BB Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 809'+0* SVDS 11 Outlier Ref. 101
%, Group No.: No.:
~
Add anchcrage to AHU 3-31. Capacity:
~
BS Cavents: l Anchorage. Interaction: T O.
~
Category 0: i I O Page 25 l
1 l 4 TABLE 8-2 Equipment Outlier Description and Proposed Resolution Q Equipment Class: Oconee Units 1,2 and 3 16 - Battery Chargers & Invertors l l Name: CONTROL BAlTERY CHARGER 3CA Equipment ID's: 3CA/BC Bldg: AB Floor Elev.: 796'+6" SVDS LQ Outlier Ref. Jog g pp we. Group No.: No.:
~
Add washer plate to NW anchor of 3CA/BC. Capacity
- BS Cavests I Anchorage- Y interaction Category 0:
l l l t l l I l l l
]
I l i i l l l !O f Page 26
TABLE 8-2 Equipment Outlier Description and Proposed Resolution Q Equipmerit Class: Oconee Units 1,2 and 3 18 -Instruments on Racks Name: AIR HANDLING UNITS 1i & 12 CONTROL PANEL Equipment ID's: 1AHCC INdg: 6B Floor Elev.: 83 8'+0* SVDS l Outlier Ref. 16}.
%g Group No.: No.:
Anchorage acceptibilty verified by methods outside of the GIP. " Tug Test" performed in field verifies Capacity: seismic acceptability of as found anchorage. Panel attaches to non-seismic blockwall. Seismic - qualification of blockwall required. BS Cave:
, Anchorage
- T
~
Interaction 4 Name: FWPT 2A BEARING OIL PRESS LOW SWITCH Equipment ID's: 2 TOPS 0176B f Badg: H Floor Elev.: 775'+0* SVDS .2 Outlier Ref. 19 , wg. Group No.: No.:
~
Replace missing bolts in 2 TOPS 0176B. Capacity. BS Cavests. Y __j Interaction Category 0: Name: HPSW PUMP AUX CONTROL RELAYS Equipment ID's: OHPSPS0164.165&l66 4 Bldg: H Floor Elev.: 8]32' SVDS 64 Outlier Ref. 194_
- j. gg Group No.: No.:
.j Secue loose conduit attaching to EWST access ladder. Capacity: M Camm:
~
Anchorage
, interaction T t Category 0:
+w.
Name: INSTRUMENT RACK 2MC.1 Equipment ID's: 2MC.I A Bldg: H Floor Elev.: 77 5'+0* SVDS l Outlier Ref. .22 p Group No.: No.: Add top bracing to instrument racks. Capacity: BS Caveats: T l
; interaction:
~
i Category 0: t
\
4 Page 27
TABLE 8-2 j Equipment Outlier Description and Proposed Resolution i f Oconee Units 1,2 and 3 Equipment Class: 18 -Instruments on Racks Name: INSTRUMENT RACK 2MC-12 I Equipment ps: 2MC-12 Bldg: H Floor Elev.: 796'+6" SvDS j Outlier Ref. 14 i Group No.: No.: W Resolution. i
- Exceedance of Reference Spectrum by Instructure Response Sectrum resolved in Duke calculation . Capacity- T I
! Add top bracing to instrument rack. - I l BS Cavents: t !
% u.
~
Interaction. Category 0: ' Name: INSTRUMENT RACK 3MC-25 Equipment ID's: }.,M,C,:25 Bldg: H Floor Elev.: 796'+6' SvDS J Outlier Ref. $ p,,,,,,o % ,n. Group No.: No.: Exceedance of Reference Spectrum by Instructure Response Sectrum resolved in Duke calculation. Capacity. T Add top bracing to instrument racks 3MC-25 . ---- BS Cavests-Anchorage Interaction- 7 r - l \ Category 0: Name: LOW HYDRAULIC PRESSURE S%TTCH Equipment Us: 3PS157AB/PS101 Bldg: H Floor Elev.: 775'+0* SVDS l Outlier Ref. M Group No.: No.:
- m. i
~
Add bracing to instrument rocks 3PS157AB/PS101 Capacity- , M be: I i Anchorage. T I Interaction. Category 0:
- Name: LOW HYDRAULIC PRESSURE SWITCH
- Equipment ID's
- 2PS157AB/PS101 l-l Bldg: H Floor Elev.: 775'+0* SVDS l Oudier Ref. 2 Group No.: No.:
~
Add bracing to instrument rocks 2PS157AB/PS101 Capacity: BS Caveats T An d s .y.; T [ ~ l Interaction Category 0: 1 t 4 i V Page 28
TABLE 8-2 Equipment Outlier Description and Proposed Resolution Q Equipment Class: Oconee Units 1,2 and 3 18 -Instruments on Racks Name: LOW HYDRAULIC PRESSURE SWITCHES j Equipment ID's: IPS157AB/PS101 I Bldg: H Floor Elev.: 775'+0* SVDS l Ouuier Ref. ,18 i PrW Resolu6on, Group No.: No.: )
~
Add bracing to instrument racks IPS157AB/PS101 Capacity: BS Caveets: T Anchorage. T
~
Intstaction Category 0: Name: REACTOR COOLANT PRESSURE S%TTCH - l l Equipment ID's: 3RCPS0364 ' Bldg: BE Floor Elev.: 5 825'19' SVDS 9 Outlier Ref. j]O Group No.: No.: Add Vert. & Lateral support 1" Dia. pipe adjacent to 3RCPS0364. Capacity: BS Cavests:
~
Anchorage interaction: T . Category 0: ' N Name: U3 AIR HANDLING CONTROL CENTER Equipment ID's: A 2,Aljf.Q Bldg: 6 11 Floor Elev.: 83 8'+0" SVDS l Oudier Ref. J.9], Group No.: No.:
~
A detailed evaluation of the rack / panel arrangement is required. Capacity: BS Caveats
- I Anchorage. Y
~
Interaction.
~
Category 0: I 1 Name: UST LEVEL CONTROLS & TRANSMTITERS J Equipment ID's: 1.2.3CLT0015 A:1.2.3CLT0036:1.2.3 CPS 0015:1.2.3 CPS 0036 Bado: H Floor Elev.: 838'+0* SVDS S Ouuier Ref. _1 p Group No.: No.: Analytically resolve Demand exceedance at El. 838'in TB. Capacity vs Ds aand applies to A46 only Capacity: T per Table 24 EPRI NP.6041. -
~
Anchorage Interaction. Category 0: Page 29
TABLE 8-2 Equipment Outlier Description and Proposed Resolution p/ Oconee Units 1,2 and 3 u Equipment Class: 20 -Instr. & Control Panels & Cabinets Name: STEAMGEN LOGICCABINETS Equipment ID's: ISGLC35GLC Bldg: 6B Floor Elev.: 809'+0* SVDS S Outfier Ref. lZ1 Group No.: No.:
~
Replace existing washer plates with thicker ones for ISGLC & 3SGLC. Capacity: BS Caveats: T Anchorage T
~
interaction Category 0: Name: UNIT 3 PO% VEX PANEL Equipment ID's: 3POWDEXPANEL Bldg: E Floor Elev.: 775'+0" SVDS S Outlier Ref. .22 p Group No.: No.:
~
Remove mise, loose items from cabinet floor. Install clip restrains for f'ouresent lights inside of Capacity' . cabinet and mounted to front hood. -
~
Anchorage O Interaction A Category 0: O Page 30
TABLE 8-2 Equipment Outlier Description and Proposed Resolution T Oconee Units 1,2 and 3 J Equipment Class: 20-I & C Panels & Cabinets Name: 125V ISOLATING TRANSFER DIODE E' 4 ID's: 1A,_p,B Bldg: Floor Elev.: 796'+6"
.AE SVDS 10 Outlier Ref. M Group No.: No.:
~~'
Add washer plates to the three north anchors of I ADB. Capacity: BS Caveats: Y Anchorage T
~ ~ ~
Interaction. Category 0: Name: AREA TERMINATION CABINET 3 Equipment HYs. IAT3 side: M Floor Elev.: 809'+0* SVDS S Outlier Ref. M
%. Group No.: No.:
~
Bolt I ATI,2,3 @ 4 together. Remove 4" cable tray spaning between IEPSLPI and 1 AT2. Capacity. 88 Cm T
~
Anchorage
-~
snteraction.
~
Category 0: Name: CONTROL BOARDS E' _ ;lD's: 3UB 1.2.3 ABl .2.2A.3.3 A.EB l-8 side: da Floor Elev.: H2'10" SVDS 8 Outlier Ref. j)32 p %, Group No.: No.:
~
Printer drawers in 3AB2 and 3AB2A are not restrained. These printers and drawers are being removed Capacity: as part of the Operator Aid Computer NSM. Modify the cabinet column penetration for 3AB3 to y' provide greater clearance. Move or anchor file cabinets located opposite 3EBI 3EB8 . The light 88 '
~~
fixtures opposite 3EBI-3EB8 need to have safety cables installed. The 1/4" gap at the base channels is Anchorage address in Duke calculations. Enhance existing anchorage or analytically qualify to meet IPEEE. -- Interaction- *-
~
Category 0: Name: CONTROL BOARDS Equipment ID's: 2UBl.2:2ABl.2 sade: AR Floor Elev.: E2'10" SVDS H Outlier Ref. 8.1
%. Group No.: No.:
A free standing printer next to 2AB2 is being removed as part of the Operator Aid Computer NSM. Capacity: Relocate drawing stick sets located behind 2UB2. 1/4" gaps are addressed in Duke calculation OSC- -- 3942. Enhance existing anchorage or analytically qualify to meet IPEEE. 88 '
~
Anchorage interaction: T l Category 0:
\
Page 31
TABLE 8-2 Equipment Outlier Description and Proposed Resolution Q Equipment Class: Oconec Units 1,2 and 3 20-I & C Panels & Cabinets Name: CONTROL BOARDS Equipment ID's: IUB1.2:1 AB1.2 Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 822'+0" SVDS M Outlier Ref. J.?.1 gg Group No.: No.:
~
A free standing printer next to I AB2 is not anchored and could impact the control boards. This Capacity: printer is being removed as part of the Operator Aid Computer NSM. Drawing stick sets located - behind I UB2 need to be relocated. The 1/4" gap is addressed in Duke calculations. Enhance existing BS Caveats:
~ l anchorage or analytically qualify to meet IPEEE.
Anchorage i
- m. T Category 0:
Name: EHC CONTROL CABINET IEHC1.2.3 Equipment ID's: jfHCl.2.3 Badg: M Floor Elev.: 809'+0" SVDS H Outlier Ref. 2.9 Group No.: No.:
~
Repair loose anchor in 1EHCs. Add compressible material between EHCs and ElfrC's and EHCs Capacity and MFBRP to prevent impact. - BS Cavests: *: Anchorage T-
~
Interaction:
~
Category 0:
)
Name: EHC CONTROL CABTNTTS Equipment ID's: 3EHCl.2.3 Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 809'+0" SVDS .M Outlier Ref. JJ1.s p Group No.: No.: Repair loose anchors on north side of 3EHCl. Add compressible material between EHTC cabinets Capacity: and EHC cabinets to prevent impact.
, V Anchorage T
~
Interaction Category 0: Name: EHC CONTROL CABINETS E- _.T ID's: 2EHCl .2.3 Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 809'+0" SVDS H Outlier Ref. _f4
, Group No.: No.:
~
Add compressibit material between 2EHTCl&2 and 2EHCl to prevent impact. Capacity: BS Caveats: T
~
Anchorage Category 0: i < \ Page 32 4
TABLE 8-2 Equipment Outlier Description and Proposed Resolution O Oconee Units 1,2 and 3 V Equipment Class: 20 -I & C Panels & Cabinets Name: EHC TERMINAL CABWET 1EHTCt Equipment ID's: IEHTCl Badg: M Floor Elev.: 809'+0" SVDS $ Outlier Ref. ).E p Group No.: No.: Add compressible material betweenlElfrCl and adjacent EHC cabinets to prevent impact. Capacity: BS Cavents: T
~
Anchoregr
~-
interaction. Category 0: Name: EHC TERMINAL CABINETS Equipment ID's: 2EHTCl.2EHTC2 Bidg: M Floor Elev.: 809'+0" SVDS B Outfier Ref. .91 p Group No.: No.:
~
Add compressible material between 2EFITCl&2 and 2EHCl to prevent impact. Capacity-BS Cavents T Anchorage interaction. ( Name: ELECTRICAL BOARDS Category 0: Equipment ID's: 2EBI-8.EF1-8 Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 822'+0" SVDS 19 Outlier Ref. .f2
%g. Group No.: No.:
~
A partition wall is approximately 1/8" from 2EF8. This wall must be relocated or modified to prevent Capacity: impact. 2EB8 needs to be riggidly attached to 2EB7 and a shock mounting system added to 2EB8 (OAC modification proposes gutting of 2EB8 attemative repair would be to remove 2EB8 and add M Caveats: side panel to 2EB7). Anchorage interaction. I Category 0: Name: ELECTRICAL BOARDS Equipment ID's: IEB1-8.EF1-8 Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 822'+0" SVDS 19 Outlier Ref. 21 p . Group No.: No.: IEB8 needs to be riggidly attached to IEB7 and a shock mounting system added to IEB8 (OAC Capacity. modification proposes gutting of IEB8. alternative repair would be to remove IEB8 and add side panel to 1EB7). r
~
Anchorage Interaction 7 Category 0: s Page 33
1 TABLE 8-2
^
Equipment Outlier Description and Proposed Resolution Q Equipment Class: Oconee Units 1,2 and 3 20 -I & C Panels & Cabinets Name: fPSLP CABNET Equipment ID's: 2EPSLP2 Bids: M Floor Elev.: 807+0" 3VDs J Outlier Ref. .fs p %g. Group No.: No.:
~
Bolt 2EPSLP2 to adjacent SUPERVISORY PANEL and disable shock mounts on 2EPSLP2. Capacity: Bs Cav.m. T
' Anchorage: i 1
Interaction
- 1 Category 0; i i
Name: EPSLP CARINETS , I Equipment ID's: }EPSLP2 Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 807+0" SVDS l_64 Outlier Ref. jl? Mutie- Group No.: No.: Revise drawings to reflect as-found anchor configuration. Cabinet is adequate but drawing revision is ~" Capacity: required. - Anchorage T , _ l interaction
- 1 Category 0:
Name: EPSLP NO 1 Equipment ID's: IEPSLP{ Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 807+0" SVDS l Outlier Ref. .).1
% Group No.: No.:
~
Relocate 4" cable tray spanning between I AT2 and I EPSLPI Capacity: B6 Caveats
~
Anchorage leraction- T Category 0: ; Name: ESFAS EVEN/ ODD TERMIN ATION CABNET ESTC) Equipment ID s: IESTC) Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 807+0" SVDS 1]. Outlier Ref. .)1 Group No.: No.:
~
Bolt IESTC3 to adjacent IRCPIA cabinet. Capacity BS Cavests T
~~
Anchorage.
~
Interaction Category 0: Page 34
TABLE 8-2 Equipment Outlier Description and Proposed Resolution O Oconee Units 1,2 and 3 V Equipment Class: 20-I & C Panels & Cabinets Name: ESFAS ODD CHANNEL CABINETS Equipment ID's: 71STCJ. Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 807+0* SVDS j.9 Outlier Ref. M p wg Group No.: No.:
~
Add plate washers to oversiud holes for 3ESTCl. Capacity: BS Cavests T
% T Interaction
~
Category 0: Name: ESFAS.RPS.ICS CABINETS Equipment ID's: 2ESFAS.21CS.2RPS Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 822'+0* SVDS H Outhor Ref. ,,6.,1 Group No.: No.: Mution.
~
Add hard washers to anchorage of all ESFASJCS,RPS & Auxilliary cabinets. Add padding between Capacity-- ICS,ESFAS & ES/ AUX /ICS cabinets and adjacent column and file cabinet. 7 Anchorage I'~ n f Interaction Category 0: Name: ESFAS.RPS.lCS CABINETS Equipment ID's: 3ESFAS.31CS.3RPS l Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 822'+0* SVDS L8 Outlier Ref. J.J 8 Group No.: No.:
~
Add hard washers to anchorage of all ESFAS,1CS,RPS & Auxilliary cabinets. Enhance existing Capacity- , anchorage capacity to meet IPEEE for 3RPS,31CS,3ESFAS & 3ES/ AUX /ICS. Add padding between E8
- 7' ICS,ESFAS & ES/ AUX /ICS cabinets and adjacent column and file cabinet. Relocate the following interaction concerns near ESFAS cabinets 8 & 9 - 1) small table and trash can located on North end, Anchorage Y and 2) emergency cart on wheels and OSC supply cabinet on South end. -
Interaction. Category 0: Name: ESTC CABibTTS Equipment ID's: 2ESTC1.2.3 Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 807+0" SVDS j.s Outlier Ref. .68 Group No.: No.:
' ~ . Conduit on North side of 2ESTC2 must be trimed to clear cabinet. Capacity:
Conduit coming out of top of 2ESTC3 must be modified to relieve impact concem with cable tray - above cabinets. Anchorage: 4 -
! Interaction 1 . _ _
- Category 0:
j Page 35 t
J I TABLE 8-2 ! Equipment Outlier Description and Proposed Resolution ; O Equipment Class: c "e* ""its ,2 eod 3 20 -1 & C Pancis & Cabinets Name: KEOWEE EMERGENCY START PANEL Equipment ID's: 2KESP Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 809'+0" SVDS l Outlier Ref. .3. ' Group No.: No.:
~
Cabinet mounted on shock mounts. Calculation performed to verify seismic adequacy. Bolt to or add Capacity: padding between RC Pump Motor Cabinet and 2KESP. Ifcabinets are bolted together, shock mounts - l BS Cave '* on KESP must be disabled.
~
Category 0: Name: MAIN FEEDER BUS MONITOR RELAY PANEL Equipment ID's: 2MFBMRP Bldg: M Floor Elev.: 809'+0" SVDS l Outlier Ref. .2), p %g Group No.: No.: Remove conduit attaching to 2MFBMP. Capacity: BS Caveats: Ard s .v.. Interaction. T b Category 0: Name: TERMINAL BOX 111 Equipment ID's: 1TB.111 Bldg: E Floor Elev.: 7%'+6' SVDS l Outlier Ref. 121 p % g. Group No.: No.:
~
Replace faceplat on Terminal Box 111. Capacity ) BS Cavests T
~
Anchorage
~
Interaction.
~
Category 0: Name: TURBINE TERMINAL CABINET 4 Equipment ID's: 3TTC4 Bldg: IB Floor Elev.: 796'+6" SVDS 1.0 Outlier Ref. 116 Group No.: No.: Exceedance of Reference Spectrum by Instructure Response Sectrum resolved in Duke calculation. Capecity Y Enhance existing anchorage for 3TTC4. 7 Anchorage
- T Interaction Category 0:
O-U Page 36
TABLE 8-2 Equipment Outlier Description and Proposed Resolution
] Equipment Class:
Oconee Units 1,2 and 3 20-I & C Panels & Cabinets Name: TURBINE TERMINAL CABINET 6 Equipment ID's: ITTC6 Bldg: E Floor Elev.: 796'+6" SVDS 19 Outlier Ref. ,2,,{ Group No.: No.: W Resolution. Exceedance of Reference Spectrum by Instructure Response Sectrum resolved in Duke calculation . Capacity: Y Enhance existing anchorage for ITIC6. 7 Anc W T
~
Interaction.
~
Category 0: Name: TURBINE TERMINAL CABINETS Equipment ID's: 2TTC4 Bldg: H Floor Elev.: 706'+6" SVDS 10 Outlier Ref. g0 __0 Group No.: No.: P Mution. Exceedance of Reference Spe:trum by Instructure Response Sectrum resolved in Duke calculation. Capacity- T Enhance existing anchorage for 2TTC4.
, , 7 An % T
~
p Interaction
~ -( Category 0:
1 Name: UNIT I ESFAS.RPC.ICS CABINETS Equipment ID's: IESFAS.llCS.1 RPS Bldg: AB Floor Elev.: 822'+0" SVDS 8 Outlier Ref. 3J Group No.: No.: Mution.
~
Add hard washers to anchorage of all ESFAS,1CS.RPS & Auxilliary cabinets. Enhance existing Capacity: anchorage capacity to meet IPEEE for IRPS,llCS,& I ES/ AUX /ICS. Enhance existing anchotage 7 capacity to meet A-46 for 11CS. Add padding between ICS,ESFAS & ES/ AUX /ICS cabinets and BS Caveats-adjacent column and file cabinet. Anchorage. interaction
~
Category 0: I Name: UNITS I & 2 POWDEX PANEL Equipment ID's: l&2PO%T)EXPANFL Bldg: TB _ Floor Elev.: 775'+0" SVDS B Outlier Ref. 1!7
%g Group No.: No.:
Remove misc. loose items from cabinet floor. Install clip restrains for flouresent lights inside of Capacity: cabinet and mounted to front hood. - Aridiw+ Interaction T n Category 0: I A N Page 37
4 i ' i i ( 1 4
- Section 9 a
i SIGNIFICANT OR PROGRAMMATIC DEVIATIONS FROM THE GIP t t i i No significant or programmatic deviations from the GIP have been made in the Oconee Nuclear j Station A-46 Program. s l i-d e i b s d i 4 4 t-I 4 i d ] 1 j l 1 l l 9-1
I O V Section 10 THIRD-PARTY AUDIT
SUMMARY
l As required by Section 1.2.2.7 of the GIP (Reference #1), a Third-Party Audit was performed by eight individuals who were nc part of the Seismic Review Teams. Documentation of the Third- i Party Audit close-out report is included in Appendix E of this report. A summary of peer review issues and respective resolutions is provided below. l The initial Third-Party Audit meeting began on June 6,1995 and lasted for two consecutive days. All of the team members were present for both days. The second Third-Party Audit meeting began on October 8,1996 and lasted for two consecutive days, also. All parties were present at the second meeting except for M. K. Ravindra whose primary role was more related to the IPEEE/PRA aspects of the combined A-46/IPEEE Peer Review Audit role. As explained in l Section 3.3 of this report, the audit team for the A-46 also served as the audit team for IPEEE since many features of the two programs were implemented simultaneously with the same workforce. (q) The initial Audit meeting in June 1995 addressed the following USI A-46 Issues:
- 1. Input Spectra.
- 2. SSEL Generation.
- 3. Data Management, Overall program implementation.
- 4. Relay status, methods of evaluation and management of relay information.
- 5. Field Walkdowns, Review of Calculations and completed SEWS forms., j The second Audit meeting in October 1996 addressed the balance of the USI A-46 Issues:
- 1. Relay Circuit Analysis.
- 2. Relay Walkdown Issues.
- 3. Operator actions to support the SSEL/ Outlier Resolution. l
- 4. SSEL Generation / Supporting Systems needed. l
- 5. Cable tray and blockwall scopes of review. l The final close-out of the Peer Review efforts was in October and November,1997. Review of i the project team's responses was done by Peer Review Team members. A brief review of the draft report was also done by the Peer Review Team members. The review and concurrence i with all the actions taken by the project team was determined to be complete. In general, the role of the Peer Review Team for the Oconee Nuclear Station SQUG Project exceeded the requirements of the GIP.
l t l LJ l 10-1
In general, the Third-Party Audit team found the results of the project to be satisfactory by ( meeting or exceeding the expectations as set forth in the GIP. The strengths noted by the audit team included: l
- 1. Excellent inter-group communication demonstrating a strong group effort.
l 2. Well qualified individuals for both Walkdowns and Relay Review.
- 3. Thorough and conservative applications of the GIP.
'4. Goodjudgment demonstrated in field assessments.
- 5. Thorough data management and record keeping.
- 6. Strong familiarity with the equipment and plant layout / operation.
I The majority of the overall peer review comments apply to the USI A-46 effort. Of these, i certain ones apply to the Oconee Nuclear Station Submittal and others apply to the Emergency Power System portion of the USI A-46 effort. Items relating to this portion of the total USI A- ;
- 46 project are highlighted below with their associated actions.
L
- 1. The issue ofidentifying r a in the vendor-supplied boxes was raised. The concern
! was how the relays are being c,atified and evaluated. Duke was aware of this concern and planned to look for poor performing relays and chatter consequences within a vendor ' supplied box. Action: [ The method cf evaluation for relays in " black boxes" is summarized below. The first step is to determine the function and chatter consequences of any relcys located in the cabinet. If the chatter consequences are acceptable, then the " black box" screens out as 'ok'. If chatter consequences are unacceptable, then the relays located within the l boundaries of the " black box" are evaluated per the vendor supplied drawings. From these drawings the project team gathers information such as b manufacturer and model number for the relay. The team then uses whatever evaluation techniques are available (capacity vs. demand, testing, etc. ) to complete the USI A-46/IPEEE requirements. l 2. Where relay chatter is acceptable, it is recommended that examples be given (perhaps l five or six) explaining why relay chatter is acceptable. Action: The resolution was that each and every relay having a chatter acceptable status would have a brief explanation tied to it elaborating why the chattering and the associated consequence of chatter is acceptable for the circuits desired functions. This infonnation is shown on the appropriate G4 forms. d 10-2 I l .. - _ . . . . _ , __ _. ,_
4 n 3. Spot checks in the field were done to verify that the installed relays are the 1 documented relays (i.e. what is there is as shown on the documents). This needs to be documented in the final report. Action: Section 5.1.5 of the f' mal report has been documented with appropriate wording to address the relay walkdown assessment regarding relay type, cabinet location and mounting.
- 4. The relay reviewer was not physically present on the relay walkdown because the SRT was trained in relay considerations. The intent of the GIP was met. The same may apply to system selection considerations. These situations need to be documented in the report so that it is clear that the intent of the GIP was met.
Action: ; Section 3.1 of the report states that the walkdown team included a retired electrical craft supervisor having in excess of 25 years experience. He was present during the seismic walkdown of each and every piece of equipment containing relays. Relay walkdowns were done simultaneously with the seismic walkdowns. His expertise was utilized in I identifying and locating relays and relay types. Although he did not perform circuit l analysis, he did function as a relay reviewer for the field work. Considering the GIP j does not require a relay reviewer to have the same credemials as the Lead Relay i Reviewer, requirements of the GIP are met directly. In addition, the Seismic Review Teams were trained in relay considerations by the Lead Relay Reviewer. Therefore, after reconsideration of this issue, the evaluation not only meets the intent of the GIP, but also the wording of the GIP. The submittal criteria only requires elaboration on areas where the intent is met or the actions deviate from the GIP.
- 5. Be sure there is a statement in the final report to the effect that the A-46 effort is actually verifying that all cable trays are seismically adequate (not just those cable trays with cables for SSEL equipment), and that this is conservative.
Action: Section 7.1.1 of the submittal has been modified to clearly address this. This was not a deficiency, but rather a point that deserved to be clearly identified to demonstrate the extent of the investigation. l O V 1 10-3
p) (
- 6. Based on a case reviewed by the Audit Team, more detail documented on the SEWS form would be beneficial for instances where the team reviewed an issue and concluded it not be a concern. The benefit of documenting issues that are judged acceptable is to prevent unnecessary re-assessment of previously evaluated issues.
Action: The documentation comment regarding completeness of the SEWS forms has been evaluated. This issue has been discussed with all the current walkdown engineers. All information relevant to the evaluation and pertinent issues are being incorporated on new and re-walked SSEL components. Existing SEWS are not being revised to include this increased level of detail unless a revision is needed in the review and consistency stage of the project. For the specific case of the Load Center and Transformer combined on the same SEWS form, a revision has been completed. The revision to the existing SEWS form states that the attached transformer has been reviewed against the appropriate caveats for its equipment class and found acceptable. The creation of an additional SEWS form, in addition to this statement, would conflict with the " Rule of the Box" approach and would not further the quality of the review of the equipment.
- 7. Improved documentation is warranted for the exclusion of HVAC as a necessary support system. Methods of analysis need to demonstrate the need or exclusion of
- p. HVAC.
Action: HVAC equipment has been added to the SQUG SSEL for the necessary cooling of essential equipment for the 72-hour period following the seismic event per the GIP. Air Handling equipment necessary to use the booster fans to bring fresh air into the Control Rooms has been added to the SSEL. Extensive thermal modeling of temperature sensitive equipment locations has been performed. The model included all relevant heat loads and included mitigating actions such as opening doors and using booster fans. Based on this, the ventilating of the Control Room with outside air was satisfactory. To complement this assessment, extensive efforts were employed to derive the critical temperature at which the equipment reliability would be reduced to an insufficient margin.
- 8. In regard to HVAC, the PRT felt that there should be more complete explanations. In the SSEL selection section these items should be covered: 1) Address other areas where HVAC is not needed and what actions are required.,2) Address ambient temperatures and in-cabinet temperatures (for electrical equipment).
l Action: The need for HVAC in the support of the entire SSEL at the Oconee Nuclear Station is n addressed in calculation OSC 5710. The identified areas of concern for temperature
'( ,) generation and/or temperature sensitivity were included in a thermal model as shown in calculation OSC 6667. This model is used to determine where actions regarding HVAC need to be taken and to what extent. In addition, the model incorporates any and all 10-4
.n actions taken and their consequential effects on the ambient temperatures. As far as the 'Q sensitivity of the equipment to the changing temperatures, this is addressed in calculation OSC 6579. No specific actions with regard to the equipment of concern is required to assure adequate cooling to assure continued performance.
- 9. One of the assumptions fundamental to establishing the SQUG scenario from which the SSEL is generated involved tripping the reactor. The question relates to the reliance on equipment not covered within the scope of the A-46 program.
Action: The. following is provided for clarification of an~ assumption stated in the SSEL l calculation OSC-5710 involving the manual tripping of the reactor following a seismic l event. ) The engineer currently responsible for the generation of the existing SSEL has assured , the SQUG group that the present station procedures give the Reactor Operator the option i of reactor trip in.accordance with the SSEL and GIP assumptions. (This may not be the Operator's first choice, but this option is sequenced into his options which provides the l plant conditions associated with the current SSEL.) The Reactor Protection System (RPS) is a fail-safe system initiating a trip in the event of system actuation. Although the
)
system is not explicitly identified on the current SSEL, a majority of the essential p components (system cabinets, cable tray, etc.) have been identified for other related ( operations to the satisfaction of the GIP. Actuation of the RPS (including manual or automatic trip of the reactor) will get you to the point where the SSEL is generated. i
- 10. Please see the J. E. Thomas PROFS note of January 9,1996. The Peer Review
- Team would like to see a more complete answer. The issue can also be viewed by l
- reference to these questions: A) Where is an automatic trip relied upon?, B) Where is a l l manual trip relied upon?, C) Are all situations covered? In a response please discuss how
- _ reactor trip is factored into SSEL selection. Explain how the intent of the GIP is met on this subject with regard to SSEL selection.
l Action: The SSEL selection calculation has been documented with the following information.
"The seismic event either results in an automatic reactor trip, or the operators manually trip the reactor based on plant conditions as directed by the Abnormal Procedures or the Emergency Procedures following the seismic event (i.e. loss of offsite power, loss of IA, LOCA for IPEEE). There is no time limit for initiation of the manual trip. As long as the plant remains stable then the operator could delaying tripping for an extended time. The equipment that, if allowed to deteriorate, would make the SSEL invalid, is the same equipment that the operator will be monitoring to determine if a plant trip is required."
O 10-5
[ 11. The reliance on the expected failure of the Instrument Air System was questioned. l (n) One cannot have a guaranteed failure involved in the generation of the SSEL. The SSEL needs to account for both the existence and the failure of the Instrument Air System in the generation of the SSEL. Action: l The SSEL has been revised to include both the failure and success of Instrument Air. l Additional equipment has been included to allow this potential failure to occur, but not make the list dependent on an assured failure of the system. In addition, all the associated controls, power, and any potential relay chatter concerns have ben ' ded commensurate with the generation of the original SSEL. t
- 12. More information is needed to be put in the report on operator actions. Make it clear what specific operator actions have been looked at and verified.
i Action: Calculation OSC 5710 addresses the actions taken by the operator. All the actions noted i in the discussion are either: 1) The result of following some established procedure for the event or symptom occumng., or 2) The actions for which the operators are formally trained to perform in a general sense. The point here is that all the actions taken by the l 9 operators are expected or predicted responses, and none of these are unique or out of the
.V ordinary.
Due to the fact that all the actions are either trained responses or procedure adherence related, no special mention of them is warranted within the report submitted to the NRC.
- What is expected to be included in the report are any operator actions unique to the l operation of the plant in order to secure the alignment of the SQUG defined Safe Shutdown Equipment List. Therefore, due to the classification of these operator actions, no report editing is needed to resolve this question.
l
- 13. For valve IMSVA0076 the PRT would like to see calculated pipe displacements that
- f. were used to verify that there would be no actual spatial interaction. It is also requested that these displacements be added to the SEWS form documentation.
Action: The appropriate SEWS form has been revised. The revision addresses the calculated pipe movements and the calculation of reference. This revision validates and reinforces the earlier conclusions of the Seismic Capability Engineers. !O 10-6 l' 1
4 4
- 14. On the instrument air question where credit cannot be taken for the assumed loss of instrument air, the PRT would like to verify that operator action can in fact be l reasonably taken (the appropriate valves which may have to be operated by hand are accessible). It is requested that the PRT be provided with an explanation for what will be done in the different scenarios. See item number 11 form R. L. McCoy's letter of November 19, 1995. As stated above, it is worthwhile to document other required j operator actions.
l Action: All operator actions are addressed in question # 12. In the generation of the SSEL, actions taken were assumed to be reasonable. These same actions were further confirmed ) to be reasonable thru the Station Operations review of the SSEL and the station ! procedures. Therefore, the conclusion is the failure or lack of failure of Instrument Air and any associated actions have been incorporated in the review of the SSEL.
- 15. The observation is provided that the outlier list (especially for block walls) could be j reduced further by more realistically assessing failure modes. j Action: 1 This comment could apply to all outliers, but its primary focus and origin are the block
^ walls. At the time of this question, approximately 75 separate block walls had p undocumented seismic capacity. The walls had not been determined to be unacceptable-Q but could not be easily proven acceptable as-is. Since that time, about 50% of those walls have been proven to be seismically adequate for the SQUG program. The balance , of the walls have either unknown capacities, or have been identified as needing an upgrade. Reduction of outliers is an ongoing effort. This reassessment of outliers is not limited to l block walls, but has been applied to relays, equipment, cable trays, etc..
- 16. In Section 2.2 of the relay report titled " Relay Outliers," be sure to include all the
- outliers.
4 Action: Section 2.4 of the Relay Evaluation Report for the Oconee Nuclear Station addresses all the relay Outliers, including those resolved and those having proposed resolutions. l !O 10-7
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- O 10-8
Section 11 REFERENCES ! 1. Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) for Seismic Verification of Nuclear Plant Equipment, dated February 1992, copyright Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQU'i), , Revision 2, corrected February 14,1992. l
- 2. USNRC, " Supplement No. I to Generic Letter (GL) 87-02 that Transmits Supplemental Safety Evaluation Repoit No. 2 (SSER No. 2) on SQUG Generic Implementation j l Procedure, Revision 2, as Corrected on February 14,1992 (GIP-2)," dated May 22,1992.
- 3. ONS USI A-46 Relay Evaluation Summary Report l 4. Duke Power Company Letter to USNRC Responding to GL 87-02 -- Letter Dated:
September 21,1992. r\ () 5. USNRC Letter Accepting Duke Power Company Plan for Resolving USI A Letter l Dated: April 5,1993. l
- j. 6. Duke Power Company - Oconee Nuclear Station - Updated Final Safety Analysis Repon l (UFSAR)- Updated 12/31/95.
l l l l l 1 l 1 l I 11-1
4 O i Appendix A Rssumes for Seismic Capability Engineers 1 O
RESUME RAYMOND L. McCOY PAGE1 RfSUME Name: RAYMOND L. McCOY Company: Duke Engineering & Services, Inc. Title / Position: Senior Engineer Years with Firm: 15 Years Experience: 19 Education / Training: BS, Civil Engineering, University of Cincinnati,1981 Graduate course work, Nuclear Engineering, University of South Carolina, 1981-1985 C% Professional Affiliations / Certifications: Q) Professional Licensed Engineer, North Carolina Engineer in Training Certificate, Ohio American Society of Civil Engineers, Associate Member Society of American Military Engineers, Student Member Experience: 08/92-Present Senior Engineer - Duke Power Co. Serves as Project Manager for Individual Plant Evaluation for External Events (IPEEE) and A-46 effort for Oconee Nuclear Station. Completed training in Safe Shutdown Equipment Selection, Relay Evaluation and Seismic Walkdown for both A-46 and IPEEE programs. Duties also l include scoping, planning, scheduling, technical support and serving as l group leader. o 1 l
RESUME
~ RAYMOND L. McCOY .
PAGE2 08/86-07/92 Design Engineer - Duke Power Co. Conducted research on the reactor vessel support in a Plant Life Extension (PLEX) Study co-sponsored by Duke and the Electric Power Research ; Institute (EPRI), used by EPRI to generate a typical approach to PLEX work. Presented the results of this work at the American Nuclear Society 1 Life Extension Seminar in August 1988. Also responsible for viewing other PLEX work performed by vendors. Involved in development of Design Basis Documentation for Civil Structures and seismic issues for Oconee Nuclear Station. Performed an extensive study on the seismic instrumentation program at one of Duke's three nuclear plants. Researched vendors' recommendations, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) commitments,- and current licensing requirements. Generated Training Manual for using a structural design / analysis l computer program (STRUDL). Conducted a training class on the same program. O Coordinated civil effort in the evaluation of reactor building temperature limits and in the thermal analysis of concrete exposed to the evaluated temperature. Assisted work group supervisor, during his absence, in assigning work, providing administrative support, and in the resolution of questions directed to the group. . Provided technical support / direction to North Carolina State University Research Center on Low Fluence Radiation Embrittlement of Ferritic Steels. 08/83-07/86 Engineer Associate - Duke Power Co. Designed the addition of a hoist / elevator to existing reinforced concrete structure. Investigation included but not limited to capacity of the existing : structure, extensive investigation into NRC commitments, design alternatives satisfying Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) and Fire Code requirements. Performed the required inspections on nuclear safety related structures at McGuire Nuclear Station. These included the standby nuclear service - water dam and outlet, and the reinforced concrete structure of the reactor building.
RESUME RAYMOND L. McCOY PAGE3 p O Analyzed and documented the effects of large impact loadings at the request of the NRC. Developed procedure for qualifying and documenting the loads from stmetural attachments (e.g., lifting lugs, pipe supports, etc.) made to an operating plant. Responsible for qualifying attachment loads made to McGuire. 07/81-07/83 Engineer Associate - Duke Power Co. Performed analysis using STRUDL for static and seismic loads, and design of maintenance access platforms. Reviewed drawings and coordinated with vendors and manufacturing representatives to complete station modifications. 09/77-09/80 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers O V Co-op assignment in Louisville, Ky., included: structural and general engineering groups, geotechnical, relocations, and survey branches. Assignments in construction division included field inspection of projects and interfacing with contracting supervisors. Awards / Honors: Certificate of Achievement in Structural Design, University of Cincinnati Eugene A. Carsey Award, Engineers and Scientists of Cincinnati (past Member) Chi Epsilon Civil Engineering Honor Society (past Associate Editor) Tau Beta Pi Engineering Honor Society Charles and Oneida B. Herfurth Scholarship, 1980-1981 O
Lawrence Brantley Elrod { l 4001 Brackenberty Drive Anderson SC 29621 803-225-9876 Oconee Nuclear Station P.O. Box 1439 Seneca SC 29679 803-885-4400 Education Clemson University: BSCE,1980 l l Professional registration 1 Registered Professional Engineer South Carolira, North Camlina Professional experience 8//94 - Present Senior Engineer Part of A-46/IPEEE Seismic Review Team at Oconee Nuclear Station. Duties include performing overall project scheduling, seismic walkdowns of SSEL equipment, and perform / checking calculations as needed to support walkdown results and conclusions. I ! 1/92 - 8/94 Senior Engineer involved with general civil engineering related projects including safety-related structural steel design / qualification. Also, performed miscellaneous envimnmental related work activities which were performed in an effort to enhance compliance with latest regulations. 11/89 - 12/91 Design Engineer Responsible for assessing corporate impact and interfacing with local, State, Federal envimnmental agencies concerning various regulatory and legislative emimnmental issues. Also responsible for environmental assessments of all Company property bought and/or sold. 5/88 - 11/89 Design Engineer Served as the assistant to chief civil engineer. Responsible for the development and monitoring of a 300 person /13 million dollar yearly budget. Also served as the division quality assurance coordinator, coordinated disision personnel trammg needs and other l admimstrative duties, as needed. I {
12/85 - 5/88 Design Engineer I I Responsible for overall coordination and design of all high temperature pipe suppon designs for the EPRI Atmospheric Fluidized Bed Combustion Project. Also involved in miscellaneous structural steel design and resohing steel erection problems at the jobsite. Worked closely with vendors, Flour-Daniel, and Tennessee Valley Authority personnel. 12/84 -12/85 Engineer Associate Primarily responsible for the supervision of three contmet personnel performing seismic design / qualification of HVAC duct supports. Also responsible for coordinating the work effort and sohing design related problems among seven other engineers. Served as the interface between the HVAC contractor and the Design Engineering Department. Responsible for prosiding rapid solutions to HVAC duct support installation problems as they occurred at thejobsite. 5/84 - 12/84 Engineer Associate One of four Design Engineering employees directly involved with a pipe support and stress analysis study done by Duke Power Company for the Tennessee Valley Authority. Work involved an extensive evaluation of the pipe support design and construction techniques in use at the Bellefonte and Watts Bar Nuclear Plants. 7/80 - 5/84 Engineer Associate Work involved the stress analysis and support of small bore nuclear safety related piping systems invoh'ed with piping stress analysis, structural steel design of pipe supports, establishing math model boundaries and coordinating the work effod of these { } models among seven engineers. Responsible for resohing field installation problems, and resiewing as-built change notices for impact and reanalysis requirements. l l Security clearance Currently badged for unescorted access to Oconee Nuclear Station References Available upon request see.................. ....................................*******e............................ l I l fn k v
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Russell P. Childs j 211 Devon Way ' ' As; g Anderson SC 29621 803-261-9353 Oconee Nuclear Station P.O. Box 1439 Seneca SC 29679 803-885-4402
- Education Clemson University
- BSCE,1982 Professional registration Registered Professional Engineer: State of South Carolira Professional experience 9//93 - Present Senior Engineer Part of A-46/IPEEE Seismic Review Team at Oconee Nuclear Station. Duties include set up and organization of electronic data collection method using field computers, performing seismic walkdowns of SSEL equipment, overall organization and scheduling of walkdowns and performed / checking calculations as needed to support p) walkdown results and conclusions.
(% ) 6/87 - 9/93 Design Engineer Designed structural steel to suppon and restrain nuclear safety related piping systems at Oconce Nuclear Station. Duties included performing appropriate calculations to qualify the support structure and providing engineering support to construction during implementation. Calculations consisted of baseplate, anchor bolt, weld and member designs by use ofICES STRUDL, ANSYS BASEPLATE Il and manual methods. 6/85 - 6/87 Engineer Associate On site representative for Design Engineer at Oconee Nuclear Station. Performed the duties of" Accountable Engineer" for station modifications ranging from valve and equipment replacement or repair to station additions. Duties included coordinating implementation, providing engineering support to construction and ensuring that plant specifications are met. 2/83 - 6/85 Engineer Associate Provided engineering field support at Catawba Nuclear Station. Primary duty was to interpret and evaluate structural steel erection problems and provide optimum action for resolution. Solutions ranged from minor sketch changes to majorredesigns. 5/82 - 2/83 Engineer Assistant Designed structural steel to support and restrain nuclear safety related piping systems at Oconee Nuclear Station. Duties included performing appropriate calculations to qualify the support structure and providing engineering O l
i l l support to constmetion during implementation., Calculations consisted of baseplate, anchor bolt, weld and member ! , designs by use ofICES STRUDL, ANSYS BASEPLATE II and manual methods. Professional memberships Associate Member ASCE l Security clearance Currently badged for unescorted access to Oconee Nuclear Station References Available upon request l r
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I 1 1 Robert V. Hester G 130 Lakewood Dr. West Union, SC 29696 < l Oconee Nuclear Station i P.O. Box 1439 ( Seneca SC 29679 ' 803-885 4 333 Education University of South Carolina BS Engineering,1973 University of South Carolina MS Engineering ( Structures),1983 University of South Carolina MS Engineering ( Mechanical),1988 1 l Professional registration I i Registered Professional Engineer State of South Carolina Professional experience 9//93 - Present Engineer Part of A46/IPEEE Seismic Review Team at Oconee Nuclear Station. Duties include performing seismic walkdowns of SSEL equipment, origination and checking of calculations relative to equipment anchorage, seismic interaction, frequency evaluations, and structural adequacy. 6n9 - 9/93 Design Engineer Analysed and designed structural steel and reinforced concrete structures for Nuclear Power Plant applications, performed Safety Evaluations in support of 10CFR50.59 commitments, designed instrumentation program for Bad Creek Pumped Storage Hydroelectric Project. Sn4-609 Engineer Associate Analysed and designed structural steel and reinforced concrete structures for Nuclear Power Plant applications. Sn4-6n9 Engineer Assisstant Analysed and designed earthworks and ayymuumces for Lee Steam Station Ash Basin. Analysed and designed structural steel and reinforced ennerste structures for Nuclear Power Plant applications. Security clearance l Currently badged for unescorted access to Oconee Nuclear Station References
' l Available upon request oseeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee+++eeeeeeeeeeeeeeee++
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/,_,T Cl RESUME DARRYL ALLEN KELLEY FORMAL EDUCATION: North Carolina State University, BSCE, 1975 University of South Carolina, MCE, 1980 ADDITIONAL McAuto Strudl Usage Seminar TRAINING: Miscellaneous ASME Sections III & XI teminar - ASME Steel Design Current Design P:ractice Seminar - AISC Load and Resistance Factor De-sign Seminar - AISC Miscellaneous Welding Seminar - Lincoln Arc Welding SQUG/IPEEE Walkdown Training - SQUG PROFESSIONAL INVOLVEMENT: Registered Professional Engineer - NC 8990 (1979)
SC 8006 1980) _ Member - American Society of Civil Engineers t l
'%/
WORK EXPERIENCE: From In Title Procram Comnany 8/95 Present Engineering Oconee Nuclear Duke Power Company Supervisor II Station Team leader of engineers and technical specialists responsible for Mechanical Equipment design, modification, and maintenance programs at Oconee Nuclear and Keowee Hydro Stations. Scope ,of work include site point contact for welding, piping, erosion / corrosion, mechanical fasteners, tanks, heat exchangers, accumulators, filters, strainers, Inservice Inspection, pressure testing, miscellaneous ASME Section XI activities, cranes, reactor vessel, control rod drive mechanisms, dry spent fuel storage, and fuel handling l equipment. Scope of activities includes predictive and preventative l maintenance, failure, trending, root cause of equipment failures,
,. and maintenance engineering technical support. Manager responsible l -'
i
, ) for implementation of SQUG program.
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l From In Title Procram Comoany 4/91 8/95 Engineering Oconee Nuclear Duke Power Company Supervisor II Station Team leader of engineers responsible for design, implementation and maintenance of Civil Engineering scope projects and equipment at Oconee Nuclear Station and portions of Keowee Hydro (including SQUG program). Site point contact for all civil engineering related problems and concerns. Duties include: effective organization, planning, direction, and monitoring of team activities to ensure both internal / external customers needs are met with high quality, cost-effective solutions to problems in a timely manner; providing effective team leadership to motivate and reward team members; effective management of individual and team performance to ensure site and individual goals / objectives are met; providing and promoting safe work environment. t
\- Ergm Comoany In Title Procram 10/89 4/91 Senior Engineer Duke Nuclear Duke Power Company Stations Work leader of engineers responsible for seismic qualification of equipment and commercial grade evaluations in support of Duke nuclear stations. Duties include:
planning / estimating / scheduling / monitoring of group work effort; directing preparation, review, and revision of commercial grade evaluations; preparation, review, evaluation of specifications / vendor proposals; coordination with clients; providing effective team leadership. Additional responsibilities include coordination of utility input to NSSS vendor certification efforts for future ALWR and supporting EPRI on resolution of issues identified through ALWR Project.
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, Page 3 l t ,. %J l From In Title Procram Comoany 11/87 10/89 Senior Engineer DOE /ALWR Duke Power Company Project Member of, EPRI sponsored, multi-discipline contractor team that organized and developed ALWR Utility Requirements Document. Duties included providing input to document in areas of plant constructability, building design \ arrangement, and fueling / refueling systems. Attended working meetings with other contractors to resolve issues impacting standardized design requirements.
Member of Contractor Team responsible for administrative and I technical management of DOE / Duke Design for Constructability Program. Purpose of program was to identify and develop areas that could improve cost and schedule of ALWR construction. Duties included organization of working meetings / workshops to involve numerous industry representatives (utilities, A/E's, vendors, etc.) and preparation of written reports on such meetings. l [T \- Member of Subcontractor Team that managed portions of Combustion Engineering's System 80+ Standard ALWR Design Certification effort at Duke. Duties included preparation of scope documents, manpower estimates, schedules, and budget associated with work effort performed by Duke. From In Title Procram Comoanv_ 11/85 11/87 Design Engineer II Power Plant Duke Power Company Modifications l Performed technical reviews of engineering studies, cost estimates, and design modifications to operating Fossil and Nuclear Generation Stations. Scope of reviews included constructability, code / regulatory compliance, material procurement, and schedule. Provided technical support through DE&S on miscellaneous projects for 14ississippi Power and Light Quality Assurance Department and WashD.ngton Public Power Supply System. Designed powerhouse strut:tural steel for TVA AFBC demonstration project. Ch U
l l l Page 4 l gS N_] 10/82 11/85 Design Engineer I Catawba Duke Power Company Nuclear Station i l Supervised engineers responsible for: designing rupture
- restraint / jet barriers, qualification of structural steel frames for l l pipe hanger / rupture restraint loads, analysis / design of small bore ASME code pipe and associated pipe supports. Duties included supervision of assigned personnel, employee evaluations, counseling, scheduling / planning, developing / reviewing design l specifications / construction procedures, reviewing design l calculations and drawings, interfacing with various Design Engineering, Construction, and Nuclear Production personnel. l 06/80 10/82 Design Engineer I Oconee Duke Power Company Nuclear Station Supervised engineers responsible for miscellaneous civil projects at Oconee. Scope of work included
- structural qualification of
['\ reactor, auxiliary, and turbine buildings for design loads
\-- associated with NRC IE Bulletin 79-14, generation of specifications summarizing seismic design commitments for civil structures, updating Oconee Final Safety Analysis Report, design of small bore ASME code pipe supports in SSF, miscellaneous station modifications.
Duties included supervision of assigned personnel, employee evaluations, counseling, developing / reviewing design specifications, reviewing design calculations, scheduling / planning, originating cost estimates for modifications, and interfacing with various Design Engineering, Construction, and Nuclear Production personnel. From Ig Title Procram Comoany 06/75 06/80 Engineer Assistant / Power Plant Duke Power Company l Engineer Associate Modifications Performed engineering studies, cost estimates, and design l modifications to operating hydroelectric, fossil, and nuclear l generating power plants. Work responsibilities included preparation of engineering calculations, design sketches, specifications, bill f'} of materials, cost estimates, personal / project schedules, and
\/ construction drawings. Additional duties includes technical l
l evaluation of vendor proposals, interfacing with !
- l. . Mechanical / Electrical / Vendor / Construction Groups, annual ,
l inspections of civil structures, monitoring of construction ;
- l. progress, and resolution of field installation problems. Design -l experience includes: analysis and design of structural steel / reinforced. concrete structures, hydrological flood routing '
studies including weir /open channel / pipe flow calculations,
- foundation design, evaluation of soil investigation and laboratory
!' test data, earth dam analysis, and ASME Code. ; l l l i lO f i. I \ i l - ,- , . . , - , +- - . . , . . , - - . , - . . . , , - - , - ~. . . - . . - - - . , - - , -
i JOHN M. RICHARDS l l PERSONAL: Address: 6233 Edmore Blvd. Telephone: (704) 394-4140 (Home) l Charlotte, NC 28216 (704) 382-3916 (Office) i EDUCATION: Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, BSCE 1980 Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, MECE 1982 PROFESSIONAL Registered Professional Engineer, North Carolina, South Carolina AFFILIATIONS: Member of American Society of Civil Engineers ; Seismic Qualification Reporting and Testing Standardization (Chairman 1994- ; 1995) EPRI Seismic Design & Qualification Committee (Chairman 1995-Present) l EPRI Seismic Technical Evaluation of Replacement items Task Group i COURSES & SQUG New and Replacement Equipment Training l SEMINARS: SQUG Walkdown Screening and Seismic Evaluation Training Course I SQUG Safe Shutdown Equipment Selection & Relay Screening and Evaluation Training Seminar on Reducing Seismic Stresses in Structures, Equipment, and Piping - NCSU O Symposium on Current Issues Related to Nuclear Structures, Equipment, and Piping - NCSU international Modal Analysis Conference - Union College American Institute of Steel Construction LRFD Seminar- UNC Charlotte l ANSYS Computer Program Seminar- Patel Engineers EDASP Computer Program Seminar- Stevenson & Associates Miscellaneous Technical and Professional Development Seminars (15) at Duke Power Computer Program Usage Seminars and Training (DOS, Lotus, dBASE lil, i Project Management Workbench, Windows, ACCESS, etc) at Duke Power , WORK EXPERIENCE: l FROM TQ TITLE COMPANY 4/91 Present Senior Engineer Duke Power ! Coordination and supervision of seismic qualification activities. Activities include generic analysis of equipment seismic adequacy, evaluations for Nuclear Station modifications and component replacements, l, and Commercial Grade component seismic evaluations. Specified, observed, and reviewed shake table and low level in-situ modal tests. Participate on numerous industry seismic committees and working 3 groups. Review proposed modifications to industry standards and NRC regulatory guides. i i
i l WORK EXPERIENCE (Continued): FROM TQ TITLE COMPANY 9/86 4/91 Design Engineer i Duke Power Seismic qualification of electrical equipment for all three Duke Power Nuclear Stations. Includes analysis of ; cquipment mountings; review of shaker table test reports and vendor stress reports; and static and dynamic ! finite element analysis. Perform stress analysis using finite element techniques. Perform response spectra generation using finite element and " direct generation" techniques. Obsetved and reviewed shake table cnd low level in-situ modal tests. Participated in the Seismic Margin Assessment of Catawba Nuclear Station. Review proposed modifications to industry standards and NRC regulatory guides.
- l 9/83 9/86 Engineer Associate Duke Power l I
l Seismic qualification of electrical equipment for all three Duke Power Nuclear Stations. Analysis of equipment mountings and seismic qualification; review of shaker table test reports and vendor stress r: ports; and static and dynamic finite element analysis. Performed stress analysis and response spem generation using finite element techniques. Developed techniques to pre qualify modifications to large main O control Control board Boards. assemblies. Participated in the in-situ model testing of the Oconee Nucle 2/82 9/83 Engineer Assistant Duke Power ! Seismic qualifications of electrical equipment for Catawba Nuclear Station. Performed seismic stress [ Enalysis and response spectra generation using finite element techniques. Reviewed low level in-situ modal tests and verified finite element models using the test results, l B)fpCATIONS Co-author of Seismic Qualification of Main Control Boards by Combined Mathematical Model and in-Situ Modal Test. submitted to the Specialty Conference on Structural Engineering in Nuclear Facilities, September 1984.
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l Robert W. McAuley, Jr. l l l Formal Education: North Carolina State University: BSCE 1975 University of South Carolina: Master of Engineering 1981 Professional Involvement: Registered Professional Engineer - NC 9009 SC 8739 l Member- ASCE Work Experience: From To Title Program Company i 11/91 Present Senior Engineer Nuclear Services Duke Power Serves as overall leader and coordinator for Duke's Individual Plant Examination For Extemal Events (IPEEE) efforts at its three nuclear stations. Duties include strategy and plan development, leadership, technical im'olvement, and project coordination and l management. l 7/91 11/91 Engr. Supenisor I Oconee Duke Power Supervised Oconee Civil Engineering Group that provided general civil engineering design and support for modification work and other support activities of all structures, systems, and equipment at Oconee. l I 2/86 7/91 Design Engr. D/ Power Group Duke Power Project Manager Projects Served as Project Manager for various Power Group Projects, including Oconee Standby Shutdown Facility, Oconee Radwaste Facility, McGuire QA OfIice Building, and Oconee Technical Training Center Expansion. Responsibilities included corporate leaderslup and focus for all businest activities of assigned projects, assunng that an integrated project schedule and business plan, in accordance with the Company Business Plan, were developed and followed. 10/85 2/86 Design Engr. I Fossil Stations Duke Power Lead Engineer for group of engineers designing pipe supports for fossil stations. Duties included coordination of all group activities. 12/79 10/85 Engr. Associate / Catawba Duke Power Design Engr. I Supervised group of engineers designing pipe supports for large bore ASME code pipe analyzed by Rigorous Analysis Criteria. Duties included supenision, review of design calculations and drawings, and interfacing, as necessary, with Construction Department and other groups.
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i F i 1 \ 1 ! \ l )6/78 12n9 Engr. Associate / Bad Creek Duke Power Asst. Project Civil l Catawba Engineer Served as Assistant Project Civil Engineer for Catawba Nuclear Station and Bad Creek Pumped Storage projects. Duties included coordinating and monitoring Civil Division project schedules, coordinating between divisions, and preparing monthly status j reports for management. I 5/75 6U8 Engr. Assistant / Catawba Duke Power i Engr. Associate i 1 Part of design team that designed the Catawba Nuclear Station reinforced concrete Auxiliary Building. Responsibilities included i design, technical supervision for preparation of all construction drawings and material lists, and consultation with construction ) engineers to resolve any problems during erection. Designed Catawba spent fuel storage racks and performed technical evaluation ! I of contractor's bids. Prepared original draft of the " seismic design" portion of the Catawba Final Safety Analysis Report. Designed two-story structural steel office building addition.
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pd RESUME Name: RICHARD W. HOUGH i Company: Duke Engineering & Services, Inc. Title / Position: Design Engineer Years with Firm: 15 Years Experience: 15 l Mr. Hough has nuclear expertise includes structural design. He hasperformed structural designs at Duke Power's Catawba, McGuire, and Oconee Nuclear Stations. His experience has included designs associated with turbine, auxiliary and reactor buildings and has worked on steam generator l replacement projects at St. Lucie and Point Beach nuclear plants. Most recently, Mr. Hough has prepared concrete construction documents and converted to Russian equivalents for Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine. l Educationfirmining: BS, Civil Engineering, Clemson University,1981 Graduate Courses in Structural Design, University of South Carolina l Duke Power Training: Computer Program Usage Seminar; STRUDL/ BASIC /DYNAL Advanced STRUDL II Finite Elements l Engineering Scheduling Piping Analysis Design of Welded Steel Stmetures Seminar, Lincoln Electric Co. EPRI A-46 and IPE SQUG Training l Central Piedmont Community College, 1995-1996: l Microsoft Word Training (Excel Level 1 &2, Word Level 1& 2, Access Level 1) !- Wordperfect Level 1 .vO l i
O Professional Amliations and Certifications: Registered Professional Engineer, N.C. #12987, S.C. #11258 American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) Experience: 09/92-Present Design Engineer - Duke Engineering & Services Currently working on the Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant Spent Fuel Storage Project, in South Ukraine. Responsible for concrete documents, comparison and conversion of U.S. documents into equivalent Russian constmetion documents. ! Has originated calculations for new, existing and modified pipe supports in i clients, including Carolina Power & Light's Brunswick Nuclear Station. l Designed / analyzed building steel and estimated steel, earthwork, concrete ; and form work requirements on buildings of the Monitored Retrievable Storage Facility (MRS). Audited St. Lucie Steam Generator Replacement j documents for technical and quality assurance requirements. ) l Completed A-46 and IPE SQUG training courses. In accordance with this training, surveyed safe shutdown equipment at Oconee Nuclear Station. Checked calculations that analyzed and designed concrete and re' m forcing for the main steam valve house wall, steam generator wing wall, diesel generator interior and exterior walls, east-west shear walls, and nonh-south shear walls for the System 80+ ALWR standardized nuclear plant.
- Designed permanent and temporary supports in preparation for the removal of steam generators at the Florida Power & Light Port St. Lucie Nuclear Plant. Responsible for designing suppons for the replacement steam l generator blowdown piping reroute. Researched rupture restraint and jet impingement requirements for the blowdown nozzles and piping for the L replacement steam generator.
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- Qualified pipe support load increases at Oconee Nuclear Station. Wrote l aging management review sections for electrical equipment (structural l section) in support of the Oconee Nuclear Station License Renewal effort.
Also performed tubing analysis and support qualification calculation for , new tube routes for the Point Beach Steam Generator Replacement l Project. I
( 01/89-09/92 Design Engineer- Duke Power Company Responsible for estimating and scheduling work hour requirements and time frames for support / restraint calculations at McGuire Nuclear Station. Coordinated work tasks for nuclear station modifications. Performed and checked calculations of suppon/ restraints for mechanical piping in the turbine, auxiliary, and reactor buildings. Designed HVAC supports and
- analyzed duct spans for static and dynamic analysis. Provided field survey
, support / restraint configurations for later office analysis. Performed a ,
stiffness analysis calculations on suppon restraints for pressurizer relief ' i piping. 09/84-01/89 Engineer Associate - Duke Power Company Designed and analyzed McGuire Nuclear Station's HVAC supports for i seismic adequacy. Worked as a field engineer at Bad Creek Hydroelectric Pumped Storage Project. Designed and analyzed foundation and pedestal
- concrete in preparation for a high capacity concrete mix plant. Designed shoring to support concrete pours for roofs and floors of the Bad Crxk
, Powerhouse. Designed beam steel for temporary walkway platform extending the length of the Bad Creek Powerhouse. Checked walkway shop drawings. Performed calculations on as-built conditions for Oconee Nuclear Station's support / restraints. Worked as field engineer supponing 1
night shift outage work at Oconee Nuclear Station. Checked support / restraints for construction and initiated changes. Verified engineering information on in-service inspection support / restraint reports. 05/81-09/84 Engineer Assistant - Duke Power Company Peiformed calculations on McGuire Nuclear Station's HVAC fan supports and duct layouts. Performed and checked calculations on support / restraints for mechanical piping within the turbine and auxiliary buildings. Performed field surveys locating requested platforms required for personnel access to valves and instruments at Catawba Nuclear Station. Originated calculations for the design of these platforms. Designed beams and supports for bridge cranes. Performed calculations to verify the adequacy of load changes on the pressurizer lower lateral support. Checked calculations on embedded plate allowable capacities, reactor vessel stud guide brackets, and missile shield lifting rigs. Performed and checked calculations tabulating loads for various cable tray suppon a configurations, verifying the structural integrity of the reactor vessel prunary shield and upper shield concrete walls. Checked adequacy of 4
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McGuire Nuclear Station access platforms for seismic loads. Reviewed . field initiated rebar cuts and concrete attachments. Analyzed masonry
. block walls for seismic loads and designed supports to restrain these block walls from failing.
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l l c RESUME i l Name: GERALD L. GREEN l Company: Duke Engineering & Services, Inc. ! Title / Position: Senior Engineer Years with Firm: 22 Years Experience: 26 Mr. Green is experienced as a structural engineer. He has extensive experience with McGuire and Catawba Nuclear Stations' reactor building components including the crane wall, concrete portiou of the steam generator and pressurizer enclosures, annulus floors and partition walls, and the primary shield wall. He was part of the original group preparing DBDsfor McGuire p) Q Nuclear Station. He completed the DBDfor the standby nuclear service water pond and associated safety-related structures and supported completion of the reactor building DBD. Heprepared the structural design criteria specifications for the System 80+ Advanced Light Water Reactor. Education /fraining: ME, Structures and Mechanics, University of South Carolina,1969 BS, Civil Engineering, University of South Carolina,1968 Civil Engineer Corps Officer School, US Naval Construction Battalion Center, Port Hueneme, Calif.,1969 Structural Steel Connections, University of South Carolina, APOGEE Principles of Accounting, University of North Carolina at Charlotte, 1985-86 Strength Design of Reinforced Concrete, Central Piedmont Community College l Welding Seminar, Lincoln Electric i l
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-~s Duke Power Training:
'h Performance Ma'lagement Program Effective Management Program Management Development Program Basic Engineering Professional Technical Training Engineering Nuclear Power Fundamentals Technical and Effective Writing Classes SQUG Walkdown Screening and Seismic Evaluation Training Course, Follow-up Seismic IPE Add-On Course 1 Knowledgeable in the use of STRUDL for structural analysis Professional Affiliations / Certifications: Registered Professional Engineer, N.C. # 6950 Registered Professional Engineer, S.C.# 7949 American Society of Civil Engineers > NSI N690 Committee on Nuclear Safety Related Steel Stmetures,1992-present 1 Experience- I f~ Q) 05/94-Present Senior Engineer, Advanced Nuclear Programs - Duke Engineering & Services Participating as a Seismic Engineer in the SQUG seismic evaluation , walkdowns at Oconee Nuclear Station. Prepared update of the ABB-CE I System 80+ Design Certification Distribution Systems Design Guide. l Prepared scoping document relating to nuclear plant life extension for the 1 Oconee Nuclear Station Reactor Buildings. 02/93-05/94 Senior Engine *I, Advanced Nuclear Programs - Duke Engineering & Services l Prepared the Structural Design Criteria Specification for the ABB-CE System 80+ Advanced Light Water Reactor. Prepared calculations using STRUDL generated reactions and ABB-CE provided SAP 90 design loads to determine reinforcing requirements for critical areas of the Nuclear Annex (i.e. Auxiliary Building) exterior walls. Provided technical assistance in support of other engineers working on the System i 80+ in the areas of concrete design and concrete reinforcing details. q 12/92-02/93 Senior Engineer - Carolina Power and I.ight Co. b
]i Assigned under DE&S contract to provide detailed technical review of calculations generated to seismically qualify Bmnswick Nuclear Station Reactor Building miscellaneous platforms. Calculations were being performed by Bechtel Corp. with an NRC requirement mandating that all platform calculations would be completed prior to unit startup.
04'.S '2/92 Senior Engineer, McGuire Nuclear -Station - Duke Power Provided engineering and technical support to other station groups for questions involving structural modifications and equipment anchorage. Served as work leader while providing technical support for projects at McGuire Nuclear Station. Participated on stmetural and dam inspection teams, and assisted with maintenance requirements for stmetural steel ,i corrosion in the McGuire Turbine Building. Provided maintenance recommendations for alleviating leakage problems into the Turbine Building. Performed inspection and qualification of structural steel for QA condition upgrades. 07/86-04/92 Senior Engineer, Design Engineering - Duke Power
.p Transferred to new group to serve as lead Civil Engineer V for the expansion of the McGuire Nuclear Station Auxiliary Building.
Project was to add space for low level radwaste collection and consolidation as well as additional office space. The building addition consisted of a steel frame stmeture of approximately 14,000 square feet on three levels. Performed the structural steel design, overseeing the preparation of structural drawings. Interfaced with steel fabricator to review and approve shop drawings and resolve fabrication questions. Prepared calculations required to qualify the modifications to the adjacent steel structure needed to provide functional tie-ins. Provided engineering and technical support to other station groups for questions involving structural modifications and equipment anchorage. Served as work leader while providing technical support for projects at McGuire Nuclear Station. Performed reverification of original calculations documenting available free volume inside containment. Intent was to evaluate loss of steam expansion space due to the addition of equipment. Participated in the original group preparing Design Basis Documents (DBDs) for McGuire Nuclear Station. Completed the DBD for the (q) Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond and associated safety related structures.
l 3 l (Q Served as de facto supervisor for a period of 6 months coinciding with terminal illness of assigned supervisor. Responsible for providing day-to-day technical support to otherjunior engineers 11/83-07/86 Design Engineer, Design Engineering - Duke Power Served as work leader under the combined Oconee and McGuire pipe support organization, following reorganization in anticipation of completion of design work related to IEB 79-14. Responsible for completeness and technical accuracy of support / restraint calculations. 09/78-11/83 Design Engineering Supervisor, Design Engineering - Duke Power Assisted in the planning required for the organizational structure as well as the procedures needed to efficiently prepare support restraint designs for the proposed Cherokee Nuclear Station. With the release of IEB 79-14 after the Three Mile Island incident, work group efforts were refocused from new S/Rs to surveillance and analysis to qualify existing piping q support restraints. Responsible for main steam and main feedwater Q systems with loads on some support restraints near 200 kips. Approved 1 support restraint calculations consisting of qualification for existing ! structural steel, including connections and reinforced concrete components , for the increased support restraint loads. 1 Major support restraint modifications required adding steel members for support restraint attachments and new steel beams to transfer heavier loads through the existing structural steel framework. Supervised workforce including six Duke employees and as many as 13 job shoppers. 09/76-09/78 Assistant Design Engineer, Design Engineering - Duke Power Designed structural steel for the Cherokee Nuclear Station Control Annex Building as well as the Catawba and Cherokee turbine buildings. Performed calculations and checked design drawings. Checked and approved vendor fabrication drawings prior to fabrication. The Control Annex was a steel framed, seismic QAl structure, measuring 80'X240'X90'
- high. The Control Annex involved a gantry crane mounted on railroad l tracks approximately 100 feet above the basement floor. Crane runway l 9 support beams were mounted on column segments that extended above the C) roof and were designed to be removed prior to project completion.
l q 09/73-09/76 Engineer Associate, Design Engineering - Duke Power g < Assigned to the Design Engineering group responsible for the McGuire and Catawba Nuclear Stations' reactor building components, primarily reinforced concrete. Specific assignments included McGuire's crane wall ' and the concrete portions of the steam generator and pressurizer ! enclosures. Catawba assignments included the crane wall, the annulus floors and partition walls supported from the outside face of the crane wall, and the primary shield wall. 11/71- 09/73 Lieutenant, Mobile Construction Battalion 62 - U.S. Navy As the Plans and Training Officer (S2), administered the battalion training 1 program and maintained the battalion contingency plans. Was designated ! Project Manager for the permanent runway paving project on Diego Garcia in the British Indian Ocean Territories. Supervised construction crews transporting concrete from local batch i plant in open dump trucks to another crew operating the slip form paver l and associated construction equipment. Paving consisted of a 150 by 8000-foot concrete runway with paved overruns, taxiways, parking apron ! and surrounding site preparation. Supervised electrical crew installing d- runway lighting Managed earthmoving personnel and equipment performing final site clearing and grading around the aidield site.
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Served as NMCB-62 Delta Company Commander (builders, plumbers, and electricians) following deployment until release from active duty. 11/69-11/71 Lieutenant Jr. Grade / Lieutenant, U. S Naval Communications Station, Sidi Yahia, Morocco - U.S. Navy Served as Assistant Public Works Officer. Administered preparation of military construction and special project funding requests. l Inspected maintenance, remodeling and construction projects performed by local contractors. Projects included base kindergarten building, barracks remodeling and road improvements. Provided technical expertise to station personnel on civil engineering matters. Supervised maintenance and operation duties. l 4 Served as station civilian personnel officer. Supervised preparation of q weekly payroll records. Maintained liaison with local union V representatives.
l l g 09/69-11/69 Lieutenant Jr. Grade, Civil Engineer Corps Officers School, Port Hueneme, Calif. - U. S. Navy i Attended Basic and Public Works Management classes at the Navy Civil Engineer Officers School. 07/69-08/69 Engineer Assistant, Design Engineering - Duke Power 1 Designed miscellaneous steel equipment supports and I participated in the design of steel columns for the Oconee Nuclear Station I Turbine Building. l l i 1 l l l O ; l l L i l l l l
I l RICHARD D. AUGUSTINE l PROFESSIONAL HISTORY EQE lncorporated, Stratham, New Hampshire, Principal Engineer,1987-present Impell Corporation, New York, New York, Project Engineer, 1986-1987 Cygna Energy Services, Boston, Massachusetts, Structural Engineer, 1985-1986 Butler Service Group, Charlotte, . North Carolina, Structural Engineer, 1984-1985 l- Pullman-Higgins, Seabrook, New Hampshire, Field Engineer, 1983-1984 I Butler Service Group, Braintree, Massachusetts, Design Engineer, 1981-1982 Bechtel Power Corporation, San Francisco, California, Design Engineer, 1980-1981 PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE Since joinmg EQE, Mr. Augustine has been involved in various projects relating to the EQE seismic experience data base. In the field he has used the data base to seismically qualify electrical and mechanical equipment and various piping systems in nuclear power plants. Similar evaluation work has been performed on nuclear-plant cranes. He has used his extensive knowledge of nuclear piping in conjunction with data base experience to perform piping qualification tasks and develop performance criteria. It addition he has been involved in organieng and updating the seismic experience data base. s
'Mr. Augustine was assigned as USI A-46 Task Leader at Indian Point Unit 2. He has completed the SQUG Seismic Capability Traming required for USI A-46 evaluations.
In addition to work at Indian Point, he has performed IPEEE/A-46 walkdowns as an SCE at the TMI, Savannah River, Oyster Creek, Calvert Cliffs 1 and 2, and Keonee facilities. His work has included seismic screening of equipment, tanks and heat exchangers; conduit and cable tray screening and analytical reviews; and outlier resolutions. Mr. Augustine has participated in various piping and equipment evaluation projects for DOE facilities including work at the Savannah River Plant and Princeton Plaama Physics Laboratory. At Savannah River, Mr. Augustine was a member of seismic review teams who reviewed relays, raceways, control panels, piping, and equipment in the K, L, and P reactors. At Princeton, he was project engineer for the seismic evaluation of Tritium handling systems. Other assignments have included acting as project lead for the seismic verification of the diesel air start system at the Ginna Nuclear Plant, cable tray verification at TMI Unit 1, seismic II/I interaction review at Browns Ferry Unit 2 and Salem Unit 1, equipment seismic verification at Surry and North Anna, and seismic verification of HVAC. duct and isolation dampers at Oyster Creek. Mr. Augustine has also participated as a seismic capability engineer on seismic review teams for seismic ! verification of equipment at several nuclear power plants. l Before joinmg EQE, Mr. Augustine was involved in the evaluation of anchorage for I safety-related rotating equipment at the Comanche Peak Nuclear Station. Mr. l Augustine has also participated in a number of conduit projects. At the Fitzpatrick
RICHARD D. AUGUSTINE PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE (CONTINUED) t Nuclear Station in upstate New York, he provided engineering solutions to conduit l routing and support problems. At the Pilgrim Nuclear station he contributed to the design of a conduit support framework in the cable spreading room. t l Also at Pilgnm, Mr. Augustine was involved in the seismic requalification of the main ; fuel pool hoist and trolley. In another project at this facility, he participated in the i design of a reinforced concrete shield-wall to be placed on the operating floor of the turbine building. l At the Seabrook Nuclear Station, he was involved in reconciliation of ASME Class 1,2, , and 3 piping and pipe supports. This effort required determming from design change I documents for each support the capacity of these components to withstand , deadweight, thermal, seismic, and transient loads imposed by the piping systems. 1 In a prior assignment at Seabrook, Mr. Augustine was responsible for overseeing the installation of piping and supports in the diesel generator building. Work involved l checking the layout and structural configurations of piping and restraints, instructing staff on both drawing interpretation and procedural requirements, and resolving l interferences encountered during construction. He also supervised completion of as-built drawings. i At the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Mr. Augustine worked in the engineering support group dunng refueling and plant modification outages. He participated in the design of new pipe supports and the redesign of existing ones. Following design, he i supervised installation of supports and resolved interference problems. Non-outage work consisted primarily of routing and supporting Class IE conduit. l Mr. Augustine designed the supporting structure framework for the mainsteam, feedwater, and pressunzer piping systems at the McGuire Nuclear Station. The design included seismic analysis, field measurement and layout, and base plate analysis. While with Bechtel, Mr. Augustine supervised the piping simplified stress analysis group for the Susquehanna Nuclear project. In this capacity he managed the stress review and new design of piping systems and supports. He also performed seismic and gravity stress calculations. During this period, he also designed both large and small bore supports, including snubbers, struts, anchors, and springs. EDUCATION COLORADO STATE UNIVERStrY: B.S. Civil Engineering,1979 REGISTRATIONS Civil Engineer: New Hampshire Structural Engineer: New Hampshire I l Augustine /hn.95 I
l i l BASILIO N. SUMODOBILA, JR. l Q < l PROFESSIONAL HISTORY EQE Incorporated, San Francisco, California, Principal Engineer,1986-present East Bay Municipal Utility District, Oakland, California, Associate Engineer, 1984-1986 URS/ John A. Blume and Associates, San Francisco, California, Senior Engineer, 1982-1984 Bechtel Power Corporation, San Francisco, California, Senior Engineer 1979-1982 1 URS/ John A. Blume and Associates, San Francisco, California, Senior Engineer, i 1973-1979 I PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE Mr. Sumodobila has over 19 years of experience in seismic evaluations, structural L dynamic analysis, seismic analysis, structural design, linear and nonlinear analysis, -
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l and finite element software development. As Principal Engineer for EQE's Engineering Consultants Division, he provided support for the equipment qualification at the Savannah River Site. Mr. Sumodobila is responsible as a seismic capability engineer for Toledo Edison. This includes resolution of USI A-46 using the SQUG GIP l methodology, and IPEEE using the EPRI margin assessment methodology at the Davis-Besse nuclear power plant. At EQE Mr. Sumodobila has performed various aspects of seismic evaluation and analysis of a variety of electrical, mechanical and structural components. He has i extensive experience in seismic evaluation of electrical raceways and components, ( mechanical equipment, piping, and structures. He has also performed seismic interaction evaluations, including 11/1 interaction, and seismic-induced spray hazards evaluation. In addition, he has performed building structure analysis and evaluation, including soil-structure interaction effects. He is well versed with the actual , performance of industnal components and structures in actual earthquake, and has i applied the seismic experience approach in qualification of equipment. For the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Cooper Station, and Savannah River Plant, Mr. Sumodobila was involved with the seismic evaluation of electrical raceways. For the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, and Savannah River Plant he has performed II/I j interaction hazards evaluation. For the Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant, Beznau l' Nuclear Power Plant (Switzerland), High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR-Oakridge), and
- Savannah River Plant he has performed piping analysis and evaluation. For the l Winfrith Generating Station (UK), and Savannah River Plant he was involved 'with the
!- seismic evaluation of confinement system. For the Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Plant, j he was involved with seismic induced spray hazards evaluation. Mr. Sumodobila has also performed a number of seismic analysis of structures, including soil-structrure interaction effects. For the SRS 105-K, L, and P Reactors, he i
- performed the structural analysis of the VTS monorail frames. He performed the
- seismic analysis including soil-structure interaction for the Tower Shielding Reactor
- (TSR-Oak Ridge), Suny Nuclear Power Plant, N-Reactor Intake Pump Structure, and
- the Bellene Nuclear Plant (Bulgaria). He also performed the seismic analysis and evaluation of the HFIR Reactor Building.
res2/sumodob/Feb23-93 wr - w r-v-w:
BASILIO N. CUMODOIILA, JR.
- PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE (Continued) l At East Bay Municipal Utility District, Mr. Sumodobila was responsible for seismic l analysis of Water Storage Tanks. He developed a computer code for seismic analysis l and design of water storage tanks per AWWA D-100 Code. He was also involved with layout of filter plants for the San Ramon Valley Filter Plant.
l As a senior engineer at URS/Blume, he was responsible for the dynamic analysis of i structures using finite element methods, which included mathematical modeling, calculation of structural response, and determination of critical sections. In addition, I l he provided modifications to structures to reduce stresses. . He completed the analysis of several nuclear power plant structures. For the Diablo ! Canyon Nuclear Plant, he completed the analysis of the Turbine Buildings for the l Hongri Earthquake load. As a lead engineer, his responsibilities included mathematical modeling for finite element analysis, time history analysis, calculation of dynamic time history response, generation of response spectra, preparation of calculations and reports, and supenision of other engineers working on the specified task. He was also responsible for the dynamic seismic analysis of the Turbine and Admmistration buildings of the Nine Mile Point Unit 1 Power Plant. While employed at Bechtel Power Corporation, he completed several aspects of design, structural analysis, and stress evaluation for the Limerick Nuclear Power Plant. He was involved in the stress analysis of various structural components such as the contamment primary structures, suppression chamber columns, downcomers and g downcomer bracing system for dead, seismic and various hydrodynamic loads such as safety relief valve actuation, chuggmg, condensation oscillation and thermal loads. Tasks included the development of mathematical models for ANSYS, BSAP (a Bechtel program), STRUDL and NASTRAN computer programs. He also performed design assessment of these structural components and was responsible for the complete analysis and design of the downcomer bracing system constructed of stainless steel, which was designed by analysis iterative process due to the numerous loadmgs. Various methods were developed in the analysis for the hydrodynamic loads. Some unusual design approaches were used. He developed a computer program to check member stresses for numerous loadmg combinations for acceptab21ity. He was also involved in the stress evaluation of the concrete slab and walls for the spent fuel pool for the Limerick Plant for dead, seismic and thermalloads. Performed a finite element nonlinear analysis of the spent fuel pool to determine the stress distribution and the capacities of the critical sections in the concrete slab and walls of the spent fuel pool. While employed at URS/Blume, he was responsible for the seismic and stress analysis of structures, equipment, and piping systems of nuclear facilities. For the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, he performed the dynamic analysis of the containment structure, (using axisymmetric finite element method) the auxiliary l building, (including torsional modes of vibration) and the turbine building, as well as performmg the seismic analysis 'of piping systems for the DE and DDE. He was involved in the stress analysis of several underground waste storage tanks for I
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the Hanford Resenation in Washmgton, for dead, live, and thermal loads and earthquake ground motions, and evaluated stresses at the steel tank shell in j accordance with the ASME Section VIII Division 2 code. res2/sumodob/Feb23 93
BASILIO N. CUMODOZILA, JR. PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE (Continued) Also, he assisted in the development and debuggmg of various computer programs for structural analysis. He developed a module for direct integration and modal superposition time history analysis for a piping analysis program and other algorithms for time series analysis, i In addition, he is proficient in the use of the following computer programs: SAPlV, ANSYS, BSAP, STRUDL, AXIDYN, NASTRAN, DRAIN-2D, STARDYNE. i i EDUCATION MAPUA INSTTIVTE OF TECHNOLOGY, Manda, Philippines: B.S. Environmental Engineering,1973 MAPUA INSTTrtTTE OF TECHNOLOGY, Manila, Philippines: B.S. Civil Engineering,1970 I U.C. BERKELEY EXTENSION: Courses in structural dynamics, design and computer programmina REGISTRATION l California: Civil Engmeer i Philippines: Civil Engineer HONORS A] ( Philippine Board Exammation for Civil Engineers, First Place,1970 Philippine Association of Civil Engineers, Certificate of Merit,1971 PUBLICATIONS With J. J. Johnson and R. L. Stover. 1989_ " Seismic and Cask Drop Excitation Evaluations of the Tower Shielding Reactor." Second DOE Natural Phenomena Hazards Mitigation Conference. l With S. J. Eder and J. P. Conoscente. 1989. " Seismic Fatigue Evaluation of Rod Hung Systems." Tenth Conference on Structural Mechanics in Reactor Technology. With S. P. Harris, P. S. Hashunoto, J. O. Dizon, G. M. Zaharoff, and L. J. Bragagnolo. March 1988. " Seismic Evaluation of the High Flux Isotope Reactor Pnmary Containment System." Report prepared for Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc. San Francisco: EQE Engineering. O i V I res2/sumodob/Feb23-93 l
l RONALD M. POLIVKA I i EDUCATION I
- UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, Berkeley, California
- Ph.D., Structural Engineering,1976 l UNIVERSTTY OF CAUFORNIA, Berkeley, California: M.S., Structural Engineering,1970
- UNIVERStrY OF CAUFORNIA, Berkeley, California
- B.S. (Honors), Civil Engineering,1969 l
SQUG Walkdown Screening and Seismic Evaluation Trauung Course, September 1994 l Department of Energy Workshop on Walkthrough Field Guide and SQUG/EPRI Seisuaic Evaluations, Denver, Colorado, April 1993 Workshop on the Design and Evaluation Guidelines for Department of Energy l l Facilities Subjected to Natural Phenomena Hazards, UCRL 15910 (DOE Orders 5480.23 and 5480.28), Lincolnshire, Illinois, April 1991 PROFESSIONAL HISTORY l EQE International, San Francisco, California, Vice President,1994-present Cygna Energy Services, Oakland, California, Vice President and Western Regional Manager, 1987-1994 URS/ John A. Blume & Associates, San Francisco, California, Vice President,1983-O U 1987. Impell Corporation (formerly EDS Nuclear), San Francisco, California, Manager, Structural Analysis Section, 1976-1983. Bechtel Corporation, San Francisco, California, Engineer, Special Structures Group, Nuclear Power Division, Summers of 1968,1969, and 1971 PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE Dr. Polivka has 20 years of experience in providing project management, seismic and structural consultation for commercial, energy, industrial and transportation facilities. He has had operational and management responsibility of engineering and technical staffs in excess of 80, performme over $8 million in annual revenues. Currently, Dr. Polivka is responsible for providing senior-level project management and technical support for commercial, nuclear, and DOE projects. His nuclear power plant experience includes:
- Project and Technical Manager for the A-46 and IPEEE Seismic assessment of the Keowee Hydro Station and the 230 Ky switchyard for the Oconee Nuclear Station, owned by Duke l Power Company. The Keowee Hydro Station provides a source of l emergency power generation for the Oconee Nuclear Station.
I The evaluations included unique components outside the typical f res12/PolivDOE/Marlo-94 1 l i
m.. _ m m. _. . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ RONALD M. POLIVKA I PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE (Continued) l SQUG evaluations, such as the turbine generators, governor l control devices, exciter cabinets, current transformers, Cogenal circuit breakers, and overhead and underground transmission lines e Project and Technical Manager for the IPEEE Programmatic l Assessment performed for Tennessee Valley Authority's (TVA) Watts Bar Nuclear (WBN) Plant. Recommended the appropriate ! methodology to be employed (e.g., SMA versus SPRA), along with associated costs. Also recommended how other related programs at WBN, such as the Appendix R and IPE work, could be effectively integrated into the IPEEE program. j i e Project Engineer for the seismic reevaluation of essential p2pmg l systems at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1, l owned by the Southern California Edison Company. Developed ' l functionality criteria in support of SCE's intention to return to power prior to completion of their SEP seismic upgrade program I for piping. The program involved selecting representative piping i systems and demonstrating through nonlinear analyses that integrity and functionality were maintained below the criteria streas limits. 1 e Project Engineer for the seismic soil-structure interaction l evaluation of the Hope Creek plant containment structure, owned by Public Service Electric as Gas.
- Project Engineer for the $12 million structural reevaluation of Nebraaka Public Power District's Cooper Nuclear Station BWR toroidal suppression chamber and its associated vent system and support structures. .
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. Developed a combined testing and analytical program to generically define vent downcomer loads for GE Mark. I BWR contamment systems. Represented General Electric Company ;
and the Mark I Owners Group at licensing heanngs before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
. Developed probabilistic-based site-specific seismic design criteria for the proposed San Joaquin Nuclear Project, owned by the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power.
e Evaluated the seismic vulnerability of the main electrical control panel for the R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, using a combined analytical and in-situ testing methodology. l
- Project Manager for the development of emergency plannmg/
evacuation procedures and traming effort for Pacific Gas 86 Electric's Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant. res12/PolivDOE/ Mar 10-94 2
RONALD M. POLIVKA i I PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE (Continued) k . Conducted dynamic fluid-soil-structure-interaction evaluations of Offshore Power Systems' proposed floating nuclear power
- plant station subjected to a wide variety of seismic and environmentalloadings.
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. Conducted seismic analyses of submerged fuel storage rack modules for the Salem, Peach Bottom, and Indian Point nuclear power plants. These nonlinear analyses evaluated the extent to which the racks would slide on the floor of the spent fuel pool and determined the resultant impact forces against the pool wall.
Dynamic evaluations were also conducted for individual fuel canisters in the grid assembly. His DOE experience includes:
. Program Manager for a 55-person project team which was responsible for implementation of the Rocky Flats Facilities Safety Assessment Program. This program entailed developing safety evaluation reports on key building systems; identifying functional performance requirements; defining measurable test functions and criteria; managmg the issues resolution phase of this project; and perfornung comprehensive vital safety system functional assessments for Buildings 559, 707 and 771.
( . Program Manager for selected seismic and safety analysis projects which were conducted at the DOE /Hanford site in support of Kaiser Engineers Hanford Company. These projects included: Performed safety evaluations, developed hazard classifications, component / system safety classifica- tions, and safety analysis reports. An example project included preparation of the safety assessment document for the Liquid Efiluent Retention Facility (LERF). This assessment provided the risk analysis, safety analysis, and described the design basis, design criteria, and how the facility met the criteria and complied with DOE Order 6430.1A. Performed seismic analysis and design of the Multi-Function Waste Tank Facility Project, W236A, to be used for the storage of high-level waste in double shell tanks. This project was conducted in accordance with DOE Order 6430.1A, DOE Order 5480.28, UCRL 15910, and l the Tank Seismic Expert Panel's Seismic Guidelines, which supplement UCRL 15910. I i O)
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RONALD M. POLIVKA l l PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE (Continued) l e Pnneipal-in-Charge for the Management / Integration Overview of l the Yucca Mountain Project Office Study Plan entitled " Historical l and Current Seismicity" for the Yucca Mountain site. This l review consisted of a technical overview of the Study Plan and a determination of the Study Plan's consistency with the Site l Characterization Plan (SCP). Prior to conducting this review, l Dr. Polivka successfully completed the D O E's Certification Traming Program for DOE /HQ Study Plan Reviewers. l
- In a study prepared for the Savannah River Plant, Dr. Polivka performed a comparative study of the seismic response of Reactor and Process Area Building 105-C using both the Housner and Blume seismic criteria.
- Dr. Polivka provided Senior-Level Project Management for the seismic / structural and mechanical / systems design portion of a major project comprised four, 500,000-gallon high-level radioactive waste storage tanks located at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) DOE facility, i
Dr. Polivka's commercial, industrial, and transportation experience is primarily I focused in the area of earthquake engineering and rehabilitation design programs. His experience in this areaincludes:
- Project Manager for seismic analysis of San Mateo Bridge, a major 5-mile crossing of the southern portion of the San Francisco Bay.
e Member of the Canadian Ministry of Transportation (MOTH) Seismic Peer Rev4w Panel for the Port Mann Bridge seismic retrofit project. Yhe Port Mann Bridge is a one-mile long, steel tied-arch structure which spans the Fraser River in Vancouver, B.C., and is a major link on the Trans-Canada highway.
- Project Manager for various seismic analysis and consultation projects conducted for Caltrans (State of California Transportation Department). Following the October 1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake, Dr. Polivka provided project overview and consultation of seismic analysis work performed by six consultants on the elevated viaducts in San Francisco. Dr.
Polivka also supported Caltrans in presentations to the Governor's Board ofInquiry, and directed a series of seismic parametric studies of bridge structures which both validated and improved upon existmg Caltrans seismic analysis procedures.
- O l
res12/PolivDOE/ Mar 10-94 4
RONALD M. POLIVKA PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE (Continued)
. Project Manager for a comprehensive $20 million seismic reliability assessment and upgrade of facilities and pipelines owned by the Seattle Water Department. This program, accomplished over an 8-year period, encompassed the major storage, transmission, treatment, and distribution facilities, and included a review and upgrade of the existing emergency response plan.
. Conducted a seismic / structural evaluation of 4 major water tanks owned by the Olympic View Water as Sewer District in Edmonds, Washington. The tanks included a 1.5 M.G. ground reservoir and 2.5 M.G. standpipe reservoir.
. Project Manager for a major seismic vulnerability assessment of facilities owned by the Southern California Gas Company. Thia
. project encompassed 13 gas compression and storage facilities, and included the evaluation of the seismic vulnerability of 550 items of major equipment and 40 structures, thus representing one of the largest seismic risk assessments to have been i
conducted of a lifeline gas-supply system in the State of California.
. Principal-in-Charge for an area-wide earthquake loss studies which encompassed the City of Boston and the City and County
)' ( of St. Louis and two adjacent counties. This project was sponsored by the Federal Emergency Management Agency l (FEMA) and predicted effects of a recurrence of the 1811-1812 New Madrid earthquake.
. Project Manager for a number of earthquake risk reduction projects for major industrial clients such as Apple Computer, National Semiconductor, Genentech, Raychem, Kaiser l
Alummum, Del Monte, City of San Francisco (Moscone Convention Center), and the May Company.
. Conducted site investigations and investigated causes of failures from damagtng earthquakes, including 1984 Morgan Hill,1985 l Mexico City, and 1989 Loma Prieta earthquakes.
l
. Organtzed and sponsored regional earthquake conferences in San Francisco, Los Angeles, Salt Lake City, and Seattle. These l conferences were widely attended by business and industry and received local television and news coverage.
. Served as guest speaker at a number of civic and business functions, including the Rotary Club, Risk and Insurance Managers Society, American Institute of Plant Engineers, National Safety Council, Society of Fire Protection Engineers, i'
res12/PolivDOE/ Mar 10-94 5 i (
RONALD M. POLIVKA and Johnson and Higgins' Western Property Loss Control O Conference. PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE (Continued) e Performed soil-structure interaction (SSI) seismic analyses of three 160-ton transformers situated on a common foundation. These transformers are located at the Sylmar Converter Station, terminus of the Pacific DC Intertie Project.
. Dr. Polivka has specialized experience in the evaluation of offshore oil platforms subjected to extreme environmental loadmgs. He served as Project Engineer for the Offshore Structural Assessment (OSA) program, sponsored by a consortium of 13 oil companies, for determming the practicality of using a combination of instrumentation and structural analysis to monitor the vibration signatures and associated structural integrity of offshore production platforms in the Gulf of Mexico. Three operating platforms were evaluated as part of this study, owned by Gulf, Conoco, and Shell Oil companies.
Each platform was instrumented with accelerometers and the acquired data was correlated with analytical studies. Dr. Polivka provided consultation services to Shell Oil Company on the manne installation of the Cognac Platform, which is one of the tallest offshore platforms in the world. The platform O consisted of three large space frame structures that were lowered to a subsea assembly location and joined together to form a tower extending 1,050 feet to the surface. The installation was simulated by development of a linear dynamic system model consistmg of a submerged platform section suspended by lowering cables from two derrick barges moored side by side over the installation site. Environmental disturbances considered included the loads imposed by wind, waves, and current, as well as on-board mechanical equipment vibrations. Dr. Polivka served as an instructor of a structural analysis class at San Francisco State University. Dunng the course of his studies at the University of California, he worked both as a Research and Teaching Assistant and worked three summers at Bechtel Corporatien in their Special Structures Group. He has written several public-domain finite element computer programs for solving a variety of structural problems, such as nonlinear heat transfer analysis, temperature stresses in concrete dams, and time-dependent behavior of reinforced concrete columns. i res12/PolivDOE/ Mar 10-94 6 1
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I RONALD M. POLIVKA l A PROFESSIONAL REGISTRATION 1
)
California: Professional Civil Eng'.aeer Michigan: Professional Civil Engineer
. Washmgton: Professional Civil Engineer 1 i
PROFESSIONA?> AFFILIATIONS American Society of Civil Engineers (Fellow) l Structural Engineers Association of Northern California i Board of Directors, Engineering Alumni Society, University of California at Berkeley ' Tau Beta Pi Chi E}dlon PUBLICATIONS I 1
"S2ismic Retrofit of Elevated Steel Water Tanks Using Base Isolation," with D. Bleiman and S. Kim, Fifth U.S. National Conference on Earthquake Engineering (July 1994).
' Technical Issues Associated with the Seismic Analysis of the San Mateo-Hayward i Bridge", with R. Donikian, C.-Y. Chang, M. Tabatabaie, lith International Bridge !
Conference, Pittsburgh, PA (June 1994). I l
"A Case Study: Seismic Retrofit of a Historic Brick land ==rk Using Base Isolation," l with D. Bleiman, S. Kim and M. Alhurabi, Fifth U.S. National Conference on !
Earthquake Engineering (July 1994). i
" Seismic Vulnerability Assessment of the San Mateo-Hayward Bridge, with R.
Dozukian, submitted to Catrans District 59, Contract No. 59S283 (December 1993).
" Seismic Vulnerability Assessment of the Seattle Water Department's Water Supply I System Facilities," with W. Anton and L. Harnngton, Third U.S. Conference on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering (August 1991). )
" Evaluation of Techniques for the Seismic Modeling of Elevated Freeway Bridges," with A. Ghose, B. Maroney, Third U.S. Conference on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering l (August 1991).
1 "Brief Comparative Study of the Seismic Response of Building 105-C at the Savannah l Rive- Plant for the Housner and Blume Criteria," prepared for E.I. du Pont de Nemours l 86 Cozu,2any (December 1983).
"BWR Mark I Contamment Suppression Chamber Reevaluation," with A.P. Cimento, Transactions of the Seventh International Conference on Structural Mechanics in Reactor Technology, Chicago, Illinois (August 1983).
- " Survey of Seismic Risk Assessment in the Nuclear Industry," prepared for Kaihatsu Architects 86 Engineers (December 1981).
I I !O l ses12/PolivDOE/Marlo-94 7 l l.
RONALD M. POLIVKA f l PUBLICATIONS (Continued) l " Survey of Seismic Engineering Practices in the U.S. Nuclear Industry," prepared for l Toshiba Corporation (November 1981). j " Mark I Contamment Evaluation and Review," prepared for Tokyo Electric Power l Company (March 1981).
" Uniform Probability Response Spectra for a Site near the San Andreas Fault," with l R.D. Wheaton, Transactions of the Seventh World Conference on Earthquake l Engineering, Istanbul, Turkey (September 1980).
l
" Finite Element Analysis of Nonlinear Heat Transfer Problems," Ph.D. Thesis, University of California, Berkeley (June 1976).
1 l ' Time-Dependent Behavior of Reinforced Concrete Columns, Including Effects 01 j Shnnkage, Creep and Cracking," University of California, Berkeley (June 1975).
"A Method for Predicting the Time-Dependent Response of Reinforced Concrete Columns."
Master's Thesis, University of California, Berkeley (December 1970). l , n t i l v 1 i I l I i ( res12/PolivDOE/ Mar 10 94 8
p GAYLES. JOHNSON U l l PROFESSIONAL IG8 TORY EQE Intemational, San Francisco, California, Technical Manager, 1986-1988; 1990-present
- PMB Engineering Inc., San Francisco, California, and Oslo, Norway, Project Engineer, 1981-1986 and 1988-1990 ~
SUMMARY
Mr. Johnson has over 15 years of experience in seismic safety evaluations, seismic criteria development, structural design, linear and nonlinear analysis, and software development. He has participated in and managed several seismic evaluations of industrial and petrochemical facilities, blast evaluations of petrochemical control
. buildings, and analysis and design projects in the offshore industry. He is currently Chairman of the ASCE Committee on Seismic Evaluation and Design of Petrochemical Facilities. Specific projects are briefly described as follows.
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE l Industria! and Petrochemical Faalities: ( Mr. Johnson has managed and performed seismic structural evaluations of numerous refineries, petrochemical facilities, power plants, and other industrial facilities, including on-site evaluations, analytical reviews, and conceptual upgrade recommendations. Specific facilities include the following:
- Unocal Refinery - Rodeo, California: Seismic evaluation of structures and equipment contauung acutely hazardous materials in all process units.
- Shell Refineries - Martinez, California: Seismic evalustion of ;
structures and equipment contaming acutely hazardous 1 materials in all process units.
. Tosco Refinery - Martinez, California: Seismic evaluation of structures and equipment containing acutely hazardous materials in chemical plant.
. Exxon Refinery - Benicia, California: Seismic risk evaluation of ,
l all process units, tank farms, and marme termmal. '
- Pacific Refinery - Hercules, California: Seismic evaluation of all i process units and tank farms. Structural evaluation of vapor l recovery unit on offshore manne loadmg wharf.
resumecc\sf\gjohn6\2-% 1 {
l GAYLEC. JOHNSON PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE (Continued) l l Q . PG&E Power Plants - San Francisco and Pittsburg, California: Seismic evaluation of structures and specific equipment l contauung acutely hazardous materials. [ l
. ICI Agricultural Products (Zeneca) - Richmond, California: l Seismic evaluation of structures and specific equipment !
contauung acutely hazardous materials.
. Imperial West Chemical Facilities - Antioch and Pittsburg, California: Seismic evaluation of structures and specific
- equipment contauung acutely hazardous materials.
1
. General Chemical - Pittsburg, California: Seismic evaluation of l structures and equipment contauung acutely hazardous materials in all process units.
1
. DuPont - Antioch, California: Development of seismic criteria and review of piping evaluation for systems containing acutely hazardous materials.
. Catalytica Fine Chemicals - East Palo Alto, California: Seismic j evaluation of process building and equipment contaimng acutely l hazardous materials.
' (% . IDC Yokohama Center - Yokohama, Japan: Seismic evaluation L of telecommunication facility to determine potential damage and j financial exposure (Probable Maximum Loss and Business l Interruption) in a major earthquake.
. Sugar Mills - Guatemala: Seismic evaluation of five large sugar j mills to determine potential damage and financial exposure
, (Probable Maximum Loss and Business Interruption) in a major l earthquake. l
. Chevron Estero Marine Terminal - Morro Bay, California: Seismic evaluation of tank farm and pipelines for marine termmal in l support of environmental impact report.
Other projects include:
. On-site hurricane and earthquake risk evaluation of entire water and power system for the Virgin Islands Water and Power i Authority as part of a review ofinsurance requirements.
l
. Structural evaluation of typical refinery buildings and l development of siting criteria for control buildings for blast loads I for Amoco. /~~T
(.7 , I resumecc\sf\gjohn6\2-96 2
GAYLE G. JOHNSON PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE (Continued) e Structural evaluation of several refinery buildings for blast loading at Clark Blue Island Refinery. ] e Structural evaluation of control and office buildings for blast loads at Frontier Refinery in Cheyenne, Wyommg. Development l of conceptual upgrade schemes.
- Managed multi-year research project for National Center for Earthquake Engineering Research to develop practical methodology for the rapid evaluation of key equipment systems in critical facilities such as hospitals, data centers, and telecommunications centers that must remam functional after earthquakes.
OfTshore Faalities: Mr. Johnson has managed and participated in numerous structural design and analysis projects in the offshore industry, including the following:
- Seismic evaluation of topsides and appurtenances for AIOC Chirag I platform, C==nian Sea, Azerbaijan. Reviewed systems l
designs, procurement specifications, vendor packages, and i piping analyses for seismic vulnerabilities. ! e Performed on-site evaluation of British Petroleum Clyde platform to assess response of equipment to blast induced vibration i loadmg for the UK Health and Safety Executive. l l e Independent certification and verification (CVA) of the fatigue design of the Texaco Harvest platform.
. Responsible for fatigue analysis and design of the Chevron Hidalgo platform.
- Lead engineer responsible for design wave analyses, fatigue analysis and design, transportation analysis, and seismic ductility analysis of the Cities Service Julius platform.
. Performed fatigue reevaluation of the Occidental Claymore platform, including analysis of the as-built and as-repaired conditions, calibration of actual damage to analytical results, and evaluations of existing and proposed repairs.
. Responsible for conceptual design and analysis of several l deepwater structures, including conceptual design, foundation analysis, spectral fatigue analysis, time domain fatigue analysis, seismic ductility analysis, reserve strength pushover analysis, risk analyses, cost estimating and scheduhng, and fabrication /insta11ation studies.
i l l l resumecc\sf\gjohn6\2 96 3 i r-. 3 -
GAYLE2. JOHNSON O PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE (Costisued) e Developed methodologies and software to evaluate low frequency
}
fatigue of compliant towers using time domain nonlinear analysis and rainflow cycle counting techniques.
- Project manager for meismic hazard evaluation of the Amoco Azeri Project in the Caspian Sea, osshore Azerbaijan. Project included seismicity studies and hazard evaluations for offshore platforms, onshore facilities, and pipelines, fault crossing studies for pipelines, and seismic zonation for the pipeline route.
- Project manager for seismic hazard evaluation of offshore and onshore sites, S=Wah Island, Russia, for Marathon and Exxon.
The projects included hazard evaluations for offshore platforms, onshore facilities, and pipelines; pipeline liquefaction studies; fault crossmg evaluations; tsunamt evaluations; and interpretation and evaluation of Russtan seismic building codes and pipeline design codes.
- Pushover analyses of Statoil's Veslefrikk platform.
. Conceptual design, design analyses, and pile / sleeve wear evaluation of the Aker Concrete Compliant Tower, for Aker Engineering in Oslo, Norway.
-O
- Earthauake htvestnaatiorts:
Mr. Johnson has participated in numerous post-earthquake reconnaissance investigations to evaluate the performance of structures, piping, and equipment. Earthquakes include the 1992 Landers and Big Bear,1992 Cape Mendocino,1989 Loma Prieta,1987 Whittier,1986 Chalfant Valley,1985 Mexico, and 1984 Morgan Hill earthquakes. Nuclear FacGities: While with EQE Mr. Johnson has been involved with several seismic safety programs, including the evaluation of Category I(L) piping at Sequoyah; cable trays and conduit at Sequoyah, Browns Ferry, and Bellefonte; HVAC at Brunswick and Bellefonte; seismic interaction at Salem, Comanche Peak, and Watts Bar; and tank qualification at Cooper Station. He has managed the data base development and criteria development for cable trays and conduit for the Seismic Qualificatien Utility Group (SQUG) and participated in the trial plant cable tray walkdown at Zion. He has participated in the development of the SQUG seismic evaluation trauung courses and has been an instructor for all trammr courses given to date. EDUCATION UNIVERSffY OF MINNESOTA, Minneapolis: B.S. Civil Engineering,1980 UNIVERSflY OF CAUFORNIA, Berkeley: M.S. Civil Engineering,1981 ! U l resumecc\sf\giohn6\2.% 4
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i l GAYLEC.J3HNSON l l' l { PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) ASCE, Petrochemical Energy Committee, Chairman - Taak Committee on Seismic Evaluation and Design Seismology Society of America Structural Engineers Association of Northern California Earthquake Engineering Research Institute Norwegian Earthquake Engineering Society REGISTRATION California: Civil Engineer PUBLICATIONS With I. Sharrock, and M. P. Wong. 1993. " Seismic Evaluation of Offshore Platform Topsides Equipment." Presented at the 2nd International Conference and Exhibition,
" Offshore Structural Design Against Extreme Loads," London, UK, November 3-4, 1993.
, With C. Scawthorn, M. Zadeh, and S. Eder. 1993. " Economic Impacts of Earthquake j l Damage to Nonstructural Components." _40th North American Meetings of the ' Regional Sciences Association International, Houston, Texas. O y " Effects of Agmg on the Seismic Performance of Petrochemical Facilities." Presented at the DOE Workshop on Agmg of Fuergy Production and Distribution Systems, Houston, l Texas, October 1992. With M. K. Ravindra, W. H. Tong, and M. J. Gnffin. 1991. " Seismic Assessment Under l l RMPP; Recent Applications." In Proceedings for the HAZMACON 1991 Conference. Santa Clara, CA. < With A. E. Hasle, and R. F. Figgers. 1989. " Evaluation of Wear in Compliant Tower Pile Systems." OTC 5912. Presented at the 21st Annual Offshore Technology Conference, Houston, Texas, May 1-4, 1989. With P. I. Yanev and S. J. Eder. 1987. " Qualification of Nuclear Plant Raceway Systems Based on Earthquake Experience Data." Presented at the 9th SMiRT Conference,1987. l l l resumecc\sf\gjohn6\2-% 5 l
__ _ . . _.- _.._.____.._..__._.-___.m. _ _ _ . _ _ . - i i p STEPHEN J. EDER - PROFESSIONAL HISTORY EQE International, San Francisco, California President, EQE Japan,1995-present Vice President and Regional Manager, 1985-1995
' URS/ John A. Blume & Associates, Engineers, San Francisco, California, 1982-1985 J. G. Bouwkamp, Inc., Structural Engineers, Berkeley, California, 1981-1982 PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE Mr. Eder provides engineering and management consulting for safety evaluation of power plants, national laboratories, and industnal facilities. He is currently President i
of EQE Japan. His experience includes structural dynamic analyses seismic evaluation and margm assessments, post-earthquake reconriaimmance studies, and shake table and other dynamic tests and qualification. Mr. Eder provides technical direction to many projects, targeted at efficient balance of computational analysis and experience-based screening evaluations. l In support of the Seismic Quali6 cation Utility Group (SQUG), Mr. Eder assisted development of the SQUG Generic Implementation Procedure, and provides the - Steering Group with ongoing technical and licensmg support. As a SQUG Subject - , Matter Expert, Mr. Eder is responsible for technical areas of the Unresolved Safety ! Issue A-46 (USI A-46) walkdown screening and seismic evaluation traimng course, ' follow-up workshops, and bulletin board support. He also served as a key developer of the SQUG Management Guidelines for seismic qualification of new and replacement equipment and parts, and is an instructor for that training course. For the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), in conjunction with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Mr. Eder was responsible for developing and conducting the training course of use of SQUG methods at DOE facilities. He also developed and provides training for the field guide for walkthrough screening evaluation of DOE facilities. This included trial walkthroughs at Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, LLNL, and Stanford Linear Accelerator Center. He assisted in developing the Program Plan for evaluating existmg DOE facilities and serves as Technical Liaison for the DOE N=&g Facilities Steering Grcup. Mr. Eder was lead reviewer in support of the Tiger Team Technical Safety Appraisal of Los Alamos National Laboratory and Idaho Chemical Processmg Plant for the Natural Phenomena Hazard (NPH) team. For the Advanced Reactor Corporation (ARC), Mr. Eder supported development of experience-based seismic qualification criteria for the Advanced Light Water Reactor I. (ALWR) First-of-a-Kind Engineering (FOAKE) project on equipment and distribution j systems. This included establishing the basis for and developing the Design-by-Rule l methodology for HVAC ducting, cable trays, and conduit systems. res2/eder3/Jan31-% 1 i
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STEPHEN J. EDER f A PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE (Continued)Mr. Eder has provided a leadmg role in
- ' Q program plan development, criteria definition, program implementation, and i
configuration control design for DOE facilities. These projects include the Savannah River Site (SRS) K, L, and P reactors; Oak Ridge f National Laboratory High Flux Isotope Reactor; and the LLNL Plutonium Facility. While at SRS, Mr. Eder was a member of the Senior Review Team for seismic issues in
- support of reactor restart.
Mr. Eder pioneered the development of the innovative raceway system seismic evaluation guidelines for SQUG, using earthquake experience data, test results, and fatigue analysis as a basis. To ensure applicability of the SQUG procedure for conduit and cable trays, he performed trial reviews for several nuclear power plants including Zion, Three Mile Island, Oyster Creek, Vermont Yankee, Prairie Island, Kewnaunee, Point Beach, Palisades, Yankee Rowe, Millstone, Calvert Cliffs, Beaver Valley, and Nine Mile Point. Mr. Eder has been involved with cable tray and conduit system seismic evaluation programs at many nuclear power plants. His involvement includes plant-specific criteria development and review. He has supported raceway qualification at near-term operating license plants, including Seabrook Station, Watts Bar, Bellefonte, and Darlington. He performed raceway evaluations at several older operating plants including Tihange, Browns Ferry, Cooper Station, Sequoyah, Davis-Besse, Robinson, Peach Bottom, Hatch, and Duane Arnold. He conducted raceway qualification trammg l courses for engineers from General Public Utilities, Toledo Edison, Carolina Power and Light, and Southern Company Services, as well as generic courses for SQUG. O Mr. Eder participates in expansion of experienced-based evaluation techniques to technical areas outside of the scope of the USI A-46 program. Mr. Eder supports development of the evaluation program for piping systems at SRS and Oak Ridge National Laboratory. He assisted in developing design criteria for fire protection piping at SRS, Watts Bar, and Darlington. He has performed non-safety piping reviews in support of systems interaction reviews at Browns Ferry, Sequoyah, Watts Bar, , j Darlington, and Savannah River. He has supported development of duct system i t seismic evaluation guidelines for Salem, Brunswick, Browns Ferry, Bellefonte, and , Comanche Peak. He also has contributed to anchorage design and evaluation criteria l and procedure development programs for Savannah River and Beznau, and systems , interaction programs at Washington Public Power Supply Systems, Watts Bar, and i Comanche Peak. At SRS, he provided consulting for the in-situ test program for lead cinch anchors. Mr. Eder provides the Davis-Besse A-46 and IPEEE programs with senior consultant i support. Mr. Eder also is the screening evaluation and walkdown manager for the Duane Arnold A-46 and IPEEE program. He performed the seismic margins assessment IPEEE screening evaluation walkdowns for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station. He also supports the A-46 and IPEEE reviews for Browns Feny, Brunswick, I Robinson, and Three Mile Island. Mr. Eder has supported miscellaneous component and equipment qualification efforts for several nuclear power and DOE facilities, including Rancho Seco, Browns Ferry, Duane Amold, Robinson, Davis-Besse, Fort Calhoun, Cooper Station, Beznau, Rocky Flats, Savannah River, and Oak Ridge l Nationa1 Laboratory. res2/eder3/Jan3196 2 r
l STEPHEN J. EDER l p PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE (Continued)Mr. Eder also supports general t, engineering use of experienced based methods for equipment components and systems evaluation. Mr. Eder is a member of the Seismic Task Group of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Technical Committee on Automatic Sprinklers, responsible for evaluating, developing, and recommending ) changes to NFPA 13 provisions for seismic support of sprinkler system piping and I components. He is Co-chairman of the Special Working Group on the standardization of the experience-based seismic equipment qualiScation methodology for the American I l Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). He serves as Principal Investigator for the National Center for Earthquake Engineering Research (NCEER) development of design and performance l guidelines for non-structural building elements. He serves on the Seismic l Rehabilitation Advisory Panel (SRAP) for the Federal Emergency Management Agency I (FEMA) and Building Seismic Safety Council (BSSC). He also serves on the Technical I Subcommittee for systems and components seismic evaluation for the BSSC National Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program (NEHRP) recommended seismic design provisions. At URS/Blume, Mr. Eder served as Project Engineer to assess the fragility of structures in St. Louis for a reoccurrmg New Madrid Earthquake. He also conducted j seismic vulnerability assessment of processmg facilities for Southern California Gas
- Company which included structures, pipelines, tanks, and equipment. Mr. Eder j performed seismic analysis and design review of the Diablo Canyon Unit 1 and 2 l turbine buildings. He also conducted seismic analyses of the Diablo Canyon Unit 1 l
contamment building annulus structure and piping, and buildings at Millstone 3 Nuclear Plant. s w) l Mr. Eder's research projects include development of decoupling criteria for piping and equipment systems dynamic models, and statistical evaluations to compare the validity of modal combination techniques used in dynamic analysis. He developed guidelines on nonlinear tubular strut behavior for seismic evaluation of offshore l platforms, by correlative analysis of shake-table tests. He also performed correlative dynamic analyses of high-rise towers to evaluate the effects of modeling assumptions on predicting response for seismic design, and to assess earthquake building code practices. EDUCATION UNIVERSTTY OF CAUFORNIA, Berkeley: M.Eng., Structural Engineering and Structural Mechanics,1982 t CLARKSON COLLEGE OF TECHNOLOGY, Potsdam, New York: B.S. Civil and Environmental Engineering,1980 CANISIUS COLLEGE, Buffalo, New York: Engineering Science and Computer Science, l 1978 REGISTRATION l California: Civil Engineer D O Its2/eder3/Jan3196 3 4
1 1 STEPHEN J. EDER
. p AFFILIATIONS 'O National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Technical Committee on Automatic :
Spnnklers American Society of Civil Engineers ASCE Seismic Raceway Working Group I
- ASCE HVAC Duct Design and Analysis Working Group, Chatrperson !
Earthquake Engineering Research Institute 1 Applied Technology Council American Society of Mechanical Engineers and Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Special Work Group, Chatrperson
)
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Structural Engineers Association of Northern California (SEAONC) ! SEAONC Seismology Subcommittee on Non-Building Structures and Building l Componentu ! Building Seismic Safety Council Seismic Rehabilitation Advisory Panel 1 Electric Power Research Institute's Post Earthquake Investigation Team Tau Beta Pi National Engineering Honor Society Phi Kappa Phi National Honor Society FUBLICATIONS
- With G. A. Antaki. 1994. " Recommended Provisions for Equipment Seismic j Qualification Consistent with IEEE and ASME Criteria for Use of Experience." ASME l 1994, PVP-Vol. 275-2, Seismic Engineering, Volume 2.
i With P. J. Butler and R. P. Kanaawara. 1994. " Application of the GIP Methodology to O(/ Demonstrate Seismic Adequacy of New and Replacement Equipment and Parts in USI A-46 Plants." ASME 1994, PVP-Vol. 275-2, Seismic Engineering - Volume 2. Proceedings American Power Conference, Illinois Institute of Technology, April 1994, Chicago, Illinois. With N. P. Smith and R. P. Kassawara. 1994. " Future Direction for the Use of Earthquake Experience Data." Proceedings American Power Conference, Illinois Institute ofTechnology, April 1994, Chicago, Illinois. With M. W. Eli and M. W. Salmon. November 1993. "Walkthrough Screening Evaluation Field Guide, Natural Phenomena Hazards at Department of Energy Facilities." UCRI ID-115714, Revision 2. Lawrence Livermore Nationallaboratory.
" Seismic Design of Important Systems and Components--Functionality Considerations." 1993. Structural Engineers Association of Northern Californ. ,1993 Fall Seminar, Nonstructural Components: Design and Detailmg San Francisco, California.
With C. Scawthorn, M. Zadeh, and G. Johnson. 1993. " Economic Impacts of Earthquake Damage to Nonstructural Components." 40th North American Meetings of l the Regional Sciences Association International, Houston, Texas. i With M. W. Barlow, R. J. Budnitz, and M. W. Eli. 1993. "Use of Experience Data for DOE Seismic Evaluations." 4th DOE Natural Phenomena Hazards Mitigation Conference, At' :nta, Georgia. ,' J T res2/eder3/Jan31-96 4
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I STEPHEN J. EDER f PUBLICATIONS (Continued) With K. Porter, G. S. Johnson, M. M. Zadeh, and C. Scawthorn. 1993. " Seismic ; l Vulnerability of Equipment in Critical Facilities: Life-safety and Operational ' l Consequences." National Center for Earthquake Engineering Research. l With M. W. Eli 1991. "Use of Earthquake Experience Data." Prepared for the Third l DOE Natural Phenomena Hazards Mitigation Conference, St. Louis, Missouri. j With J. O. Dizon. 1991. " Advancement in Design Standards for Raceway Supports l l and its Applicability to Piping systems." PVP-Volume 210-1, Codes and Standards and Applications for Design and Analysis of Pressure Vessel and Piping Components. ASME 1991.
" Cable Tray and Conduit System Seismic Evaluation Guidelines." March 1991. EPRI l Report NP-7151. Prepared for the Electric Power Research Institute. San Francisco, I CA EQE International.
l With G. S. Johnson. March 1991. 'The Performance of Raceway Systems in Strong-motion Earthquakes." EPRI Report NP-7150. Prepared for the Electric Power Research Institute. San Francisco, CA: EQE International. With G. S. Johnson. March 1991. "Longitudmal Load Resistance in Seismic Experience Data Base Raceway Systems." EPRI Report NP-7153. Prepared for the Electric Power Research Institute. San Francisco, CA: EQE International. l l With J. P. Conoscente and B. N. Sumodobila. March 1991. " Seismic Evaluation of Rod Hanger Supports for Electrical Raceway Systems." EPRI Report NP-7152. Prepared for ; the Electric Power Research Institute. San Francisco, CA: EQE International. With Winston as Strawn, MPR Associates, Inc., etal. June 1991. " Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) for Seismic Verification of Nuclear Plant Equipment." Revision 2. Prepared for the Seismic Qualification Utility Group. With L. J. Bragagnole rnd J. P. Conoscente. 1990. "A Proposed Methodology for the Seismic Design of Rectangular Duct Systems." Applied Technology Center (ATC) Seminar on Seismic Design and Performance of Equipment and Nonstructural Elements in Building and Industrial Structures, Irvine, California. ATC-29. With J. J. Johnson and N. P. Smith. 1993. " Developments of the Seismic Qualification Utility Group." Applied Technology Center (ATC) Seminar on Seismic Design and Performance of Equipment and Nonstructural Elements in Building and Industrial Structures, Irvine, California. ATC-29. With W. Djordjevic, J. Eidinger, and F. Hettinger. 1990. "American Society of Civil Engineers Activities on Seismic Design of Electrical Raceways." Current Issues Related of Nuclear Power Plant Structures, Equipment, and Piping. Proceedings of the Third Symposium, Orlando, Florida, December 1990. I l l l res2/eder3/Jan3196 5 I _ _ . - ~ - _
l 1 STEPHEN J. EDER p PUBLICATIONS (Continued) l With H. L. Williams. 1990. " Qualification of Cable Tray Supports by Earthquake l Experience Data: Application at H. B. Robinson Plant" Current Issues Related of Nuclear Power Plant Structures, Equipment, and Pipirg. Proceedings of the Third i Symposium, Orlando, Florida, December 1990, f With J. P. Conoscente, B. N. Sumodobila, and S. P. Harris. 1989. " Seismic Fatigue Evaluation of Rod Hung Systems." Prepared for the Tenth Conference on Stn ctural Mechanics in Reactor Technology, (SMiRT). With P. D. Smith and J. P. Conoscente. December 1988. "SQUG Cable Tray and Conduit Evaluation Procedure." Paper presented at the Second Symposium on Current Issues Related to Nuclear Power Plant Structures, Equipment and Piping, l Orlando, FL. I l With P. I. Yanev. 1988. " Evaluation of Cable Tray and Conduit Systems Using the ' i Seismic Experience Data Base." Nuclear Engineering and Design (North-Holland, Amsterdam) 107:149-153. With S. W. Swan, " Summary of the Effects of the 1985 Mexico Earthquak- .wr I and Industrial Facilities." Proceedings of the American Society of Civil Eng.a.ers j International Conference on the 1985 Mexico Earthquake, Factors Involve d and ! Lessons Learned, Mexico City, Mexico, September 1986. g With A. F. Kabir and S. Bolourchi, " Seismic Response of Pipes Supported on Complex l i Frammg Systems." Proceedings of the American Society of Civil Engineers Structures Congress, New Orleans, Louisiana, September 1986. With S. W. Swan, "The Mexico Earthquake of September 19, 1985; Performance of Power and Industrial Facilities," Proceedings of the Third U. S. National Conference on Earthquake Enginee-ing, Charleston, South Carolina, August 1986.
- " Performance of Industrial Facilities in the Mexican Earthquake of September 19, i 1985," Electric Power Research Institute Report No. NP-4605, Project 1707-30 Final Report, Palo Alto, California, June 1986, also presented at the IEEE Power Engineering Society Summer Meeting, Mexico City, Mexico, July 1986.
" Earthquake Response Analysis of a Braced Offshore Platform," Master of Engineering l Thesis, University of California, Berkeley (June 1982), also presented at American l Petroleum Institute Committee Heanng, October 1982, San Francisco, California.
l REPORTS l-l With J. O. Dizon. 1993. " Seismic Adequacy Verification of HVAC Duct Systems and Supports." - Technical Standard SC.DE-TS.ZZ-4707(Q). Prepared for Public Service Electric and Gas Company. With J. K. Arros. 1993. " Applications of Experience-based Methods for Seismic ! Qualification of Distribution Systems." Prepared for Advanced Reactor Corporation FOAKE ALWR Seismic Qualification Project. res2/eder3/Jan31-% 6
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STEPHEN J. EDER REPORTS (Continued) j l With MPR Associates and Winston and Strawn. 1993. "Venfymg the Seismic l Adequacy of New and Replacement Equipment and Parts." Prepared for the SQUG ) l Management Guidelines Document. With G. S. Johnson. 1993. "II/I Seismic Evaluation of the WPPSS Nuclear Plant No. 2 i Turbine Building." Prepared for Washmgton Public Power Supply System. l With Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. 1992. " Program Plan for the Evaluation of Systems and Components in Existing DOE Facilities Subject to NPH." Prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy. [ With J. O. Dizon, P. D. Baughman, and G. S. Johnson. 1992. " Peer Review of the j
- j. ' Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Integrated Interaction Program Suspended Systems Proximity '
l Task;" Prepared for Tennessee Valley Authority. With G. S. Hardy, G. S. Johnson, and R. W. Cushmg of EQE; MPR; S&A; and URS. 1992. "Walkdown Screening and Seismic Evaluation Trammg Course." Prepared for Seismic Qualification Utility Group. With M. W. Salmon. ' Technical Safety Appraisal of the Idaho Chemical Processmg Plant, NPH Discipline." Prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy. With M. W. Eli. "NPH Walkdown Evaluation Summary Report - Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant." Prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy. l j With G. S. Johnson, R. H. Kincaid, and G. S. Hardy. 1992. "High-rise Building Critical Equipment Study." Prepared for National Center for Earthquake Engineering Research. i With K. E. Smith. 1992. " Seismic Performance of Standby and Emergency Power Engine Generator Systems." Prepared for National Center for Earthquake Engineering Research. With M. W. Eli and L. J. Bragagnolo. 1991. "Walkthrough Screening Evaluation Field Guide, Natural Phenomena Hazards at Department of Energy Facilities." Special Release for 3rd DOE Natural Phenomena Hazard Mitigation Conference, October 1991, St. Louis, Missouri. With G. S. Johnson and T. R. Kipp. 1991. " Integrated Interaction Program Screening and Acceptance Criteria." Design Criteria WB-DC-20-32. Prepared for Tennessee Valley Authority. With R. J. Hookway and T. R. Kipp. 1991. ~ " Commodity Clearance Requirements." l Engineering Specification N3C-941. Prepared for Tennessee Valley Authority. With R. D. Hookway and T. R. Kipp. 1991. " Seismic Qualification of Category I(L) Fluid System Components and Electrical or Mechanical Equipment." Design Criteria WB-DC-40-31.13. Prepared for Tennessee Valley Authority. res2/eder3/Jan31.% 7
l STEPHEN J. EDER j l REPORTS (Continued) l With R. D. Hookway and T. R. Kipp. 1991. " Seismic Design Specification for Category , I(L) Piping, Pipe Supports, and in-line Components." Engineering Specification N3C- l l 943. Prepared for Tennessee Valley Authority. l-With R. P. Kennedy, J. D. Stevenson, J. J. Johnson, W. R. Schmidt, and K. Collins. June 1990. " Watts Bar Civil Program Review." Prepared for Tennessee Valley Authority. I With J. O. Dizon and G. M. Zaharoff. 1989. " Evaluation of Seismic-induced Spray l Hazards at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant." Report No. 51001.02-R-001. Prepared for the Tennessee Valley Authority. San Francisco, CA: EQE Engineering. , " Seismic Evaluation of Cable Tray Systems at H. B. Robinson Plant, Unit 2." 1989. I Report No. 50018.01-R-01. Prepared for Carolina Power ar. Light Company. San Francisco, CA: EQE Engineering. With L. J. Bragagnolo, K. M. David, J. E. Hoekendijk, and G. M. Zaharoff. 1989.
" Program Plan for the Seismic Evaluation of HVAC Duct at Brunswick Steam Electric Plant." Prepared for Carolina Power as Light Company. Project No. 52029.03. San Francisco, CA: EQE Engineering.
l With P. D. Smith. 1989. ' Trial Implementation of the SQUG Raceway Seismic l Evaluation Guidelines at A-46 Plants." Report prepared for the Seismic Qualification Utilities Group. San Francisco: EQE Engineering. i i t l With S. P. Harris, P. D. Smith, and J. E. Hockendijk. October 1988. " Performance of Condensers and Main Steam Piping in Past Earthquakes." Report prepared for General Electric Nuclear Energy Boiling Water Reactor Owners Group. San Francisco: EQE Engineering. l With J. J. Johnson, G. S. Hardy, N. G. Horstman, G. Rigamonti, M. R. Reyne, and D. R. l Ketcham. August 1988. ' Technical Basis, Procedures and Guidelines for Seismic ! Characterization of Savannah River Plant Reactors." E. I. Dupont De Nemours as Co, Aiken, South Carolina. l l With S. P. Harris, P. S. Hashimoto, J. O. Dizon, B. Sumodobila, G. M. Zaharoff, and L. J. Bragagnolo. March 1988. " Seismic Evaluation of the High Flux Isotope Reactor l Pnmary Containment System." Report prepared for Martin Marietta Energy Systems, l Inc. San Francisec: EQE Engineering. I i i I i I t res2/eder3/Jan31-96 8
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] JOHN O. DIZON PROFESSIONAL HISTORY ,
i EQE International, San Francisco, California, Associate,1986-present Engineering Decision Analysis Company, Cupertino, California, Project Engineer,1984-1986 General Electric Company, San Jose, California, Senior Engineer,'1984 URS/ John A. Blume Associates, San Francisco, California, Senior Engineer, 1982-1984; Associate Engineer, 1977-1980 Structural Systems Engineering, Inc., Lafayette, California, Senior Engineer, 1980-1982 Stanford Universrty, John A. Blume Earthquake Engineering Center, Palo Alto, i California, Teachmg and Research Assistant, 1975-1977 I PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE Mr. Dizon has over 15 years of experience in seismic analyses and design assessments of primary structures and piping systems, and seismic qualification of mechanical and ; electrical systems. As a Principal Engineer for EQE's Engineering Consultants j Division, he has taken prunary responsibility for the technical development of several i seismic evaluation programs. These include acting as Group Manager for evaluatmg essential systems and components at the Savannah River Site; developing alternate
/" analysis criteria for Category 1 mmall bore piping at the Donald C. Cook plant, alternate
( design criteria to the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) for the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, and alternate design criteria for Category I HVAC duct systems and supports at TVA Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant; and providing guidance to the seismic equipment qualification program for the Plutonium Handhng Facility at Lawrence Livermore Nationa1 Laboratory. Mr. Dizon recently served as the responsible Project Manger for the resolution of USI A-46 using the SQUG GIP methodology, and IPEEE using the EPRI margin assessment methodology for Toledo Edison (Davis-Besse) and Tennessee Valley Authority (Browns Ferry 2 and 3) nuclear power plants. As Group Manager for EQE at the Savannah River Site, Mr. Dizon was responsible for the seismic verification program of safety-related mechanical and electrical systems and components. His tasks included developing seismic evaluation criteria and procedures for restart and long-term seismic programs, consistent with the SQUG Generic Implementation Procedure for use in USI A-46 plants; managing the seismic walkdown and evaluation efforts; providing technical support in resolving seismic issues; and serving as an interface with the client. ; Mr. Dizon has participated in the seismic evaluation of the High Flux Isotope Reactor at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. This project involved performmg seismic analyses and upgrades for the prunary coolant piping system and related equipment and the reactor and control buildings. He was responsible for the raceway evaluation program ; for Cooper Nuclear Station and Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, and participated in the seismic piping reevaluation programs for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant and Comanche Peak Nuclear Plant where he performed plant walkdowns and pipe stress analyses for piping g systems. res2/dizon3/ApfJ1-93/HVAC
__ _ _ . - _ _ - - ~ _ . . .. . - _ . _.__ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - - _ _ _ _ _ _ JOHN O. DIZON PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE (Continued) J With General Electric Company, Mr. Dizon was responsible for stress analysis and code conformation of main steam and recirculation piping systems for BWR power plants. He was involved in the evaluation and development work on a pipe support optimization program. l At EDAC, Mr. Dizon was responsible for the evaluation and development of a pipe support optimb ion t program (OPTPIPE). He was responsible for the snubber reduction pilot program for Commonwealth Edison's La Salle County Station Unit 1. Other areas of his involvement consisted of finite element analyses of MX-missile I launch tube components and systems for thermal and pressure loads, equipment qualification of major mechanical and electrical components, and seismic evaluation of cooling towers for the Vermont Yankee Power Plant. ; At URS/Blume as Associates, Mr. Dizon was responsible for the development and ! maintenance ofin-house computer programs for both linear and nonlinear analyses of l l structural and piping systems. He was also involved in the seismic analysis and i evaluation of the reactor, turbine and admmistration buildings for Nine Mile Point Unit 1 in New York. He helped develop a soil-structure interaction computer program using : a three-dimensional finite element technique to evaluate the dynamic response of ; structures due to arbitrary plane body .a.nd surface wave excitations. He performed a l research study involving soil-structure interaction analysis using the finite element FLUSH program to investigate the dynamic response of typical containment structures , due to underground blast excitations. He was also involved in the linear and ! nonlinear dynamic analyses, finite element modeling, and generation of floor response spectra for the contamment and turbine buildings at the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power plant near San Luis Obispo, California. j Mr. Dizon worked as a consultant to Bechtel Power Corporation with Structural ! Systems Engineering, Inc. He performed structural analyses and design assessments of the pnmary containment structure and the reactor / control buildings of Limerick l Generating Station in Pennsylvania for various types of hydrodynamic loads. He was i involved in the Limerick in-plant test procedures, data reduction and correlation study l to determine the dynamic response, including soil-structure interaction of the reactor / control buildings dunng Mark II hydrodynamic load actuation in the pnmary containment. l At Stanford University, Mr. Dizon performed statistical analyses of earthquake j acclerograms and various response parameters. He conducted seismic risk analyses and formulated seismic design criteria for Nicaragua. In addition, he was involved in
- the dynamic testing of structural models and equipment.
l EDUCATION STANFORD UNIVERSTTY, Palo Alto, California: Engineer Degree,1977 STANFORD UNIVERStrY, Palo Alto, California: M.S. Structural Engineering,1975 MAPUA INSTrrtrrE OF TECHNOLOGY, Manila, Philippines: B.S. Civil Engineering,1973 1 l ! \ res2/dizon3/AprO1-93/HVAC
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JOHN O. DIZON
. REGISTRATION
- California
- Civil Engineer .
j Philippines: Civil Engineer 1 I PUBLICATIONS i ! With E. J. Frevold and P. D. Osborne. 1993. " Seismic Qualification of Safety-related HVAC Duct Systems and Supports." Presented at the 1993 ASME Pressure Vessel and
- Piping Division Conference, Denver, Colorado, July 1993.
With S. J. Eder. 1991. " Advancement in Design Standards for Raceway Supports and Its Applicability to Piping Systems." Presented at the 1991 American Society of f Mechanical Engineer (ASME) Pressure Vessel and Piping Division Conference, San i Diego, California, June 1991. 1 With R. D. Campbell and L. W. Tiong. 1990 " Response Predictions for Piping Systems Which Have Experienced Strong Motion Earthquakes." ASME Pressure Vessel and
, Piping Conference, Nashville, Tennessee, June 17-21,1990.
With S. P. Hanis, R. S. Hashunoto, and R. L. Stover. 1989. " Seismic, High Wind, and Probabilistic Risk Assessments of the High Flux Isotope Reactor." Second DOE Natural Phenomena Hazards Mitigation Conference. With D. Ray and A. Kabtr.1979. "A 3-D Seismic Analysis for Arbitrary Plane Body and
.(' Surface Wave Excitations." American Society of Civil Engineers Nuclear Specialty Conference, Boston, Ma==achusetts.
With D. Ray and A. Zebarjadian. 1978. " Dynamic Response of Surface and Embedded Disk Foundations for SH, SV, P and Rayleigh Wave Excitations." Sixth Indian Symposium on Earthquake Engineering, Roorkee, India.
"A Statistical Analysis of Earthquake Acclerograms and Response Parameters." 1977.
Thesis, Stanford University, Palo Alto, California, With H. Shah, T. Zsutty, H. Krawinkler, and L. Padilla- 1977. "A Seismic Design Procedure for Nicaragua." Paper presented at the Sixth World Conference on Earthquake Engineering, New Delhi, India.
; H. Shah, T. Zsutty, H. Krawinkler, C. P. Mortgat, and A. Kiremidjian. 1976. "A S, y of Seismic Rink for Nicaragua, Part II, Summary and Commentary." John A.
Bluzne Earthquake Engineering Center, Report No.12A and 12B. Stanford University, Palo Alto, California.
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res2/dizon3/Aprol-93/HVAC
JAMES R. DISSER rN JAMES R. DISSER PROFESSIONAL HISTORY EGElnternational, Stratham, New Hampshire, Project Engineer,1993-present Alitchell, Jobe & Company, Dallas, Texas, Senior Engineer, 1992-1993 TU Electric, Glen Rose, Texas, Senior Engineer, 1987-1992 Stone & WebsterEngineering Corporation, Engineering Supervisor,1980-1987 PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE Mr. Disser has over 14 years of experience in civil and structural engineering, earthquake engineering, field engineering, construction and project management. His responsibilities have included seismic design and analysis of nuclear power piping, piping support systems, cable tray, conduit and HVAC support systems; seismic qualification of equipment; analysis of stmetures and development of design criteria, design procedures, test procedures and construction specifications. He has also been active in the implementation of several USI A46 projects, a major material condition upgrade program, various MSIV leakage path seismic evaluation projects and seismic margins evaluations. Mr. Disser has supervised engineering design teams and successfully managed a variety of engineering and test projects. Selected project accomplishments include the following: p e USI A-46 Seismic Verification Program and IPEEE Seismic Afargins 'q } Assessmentfor D'A Browns Ferry Units 2 and 3. Seismic verification of BWR safe shutdown equipment using the Seismic Qualification Utilities Grow (SQUG) Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) and EPRI NP-604i methodology. Performed walkdowns, anchorage calculations, outiler evaluations and HCLPF calculations. Participated in Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) evaluation to ensure completeness and development of the A-46 and IPEEE response spectra.
- A61VLeakage Path Seismic Verification Programfor D'A Browns Ferry Unit 3.
Performed walkdowns and evaluation of piping, active valves and equipment in the BWR Main Steam Isolatiotion Valve leakage path boundary to the condenser using carthquake experience data and seismic margms evaluation criteria. Participated in identification of system boundary valves / equipment and production of the walkdown report.
- ASIVLeakage Path Seismic Verification Programfor CP&L Brunswick Nuclear Plant Unit 1. Performed walkdowns and evaluation of piping, active vah es and equipment in the BWR Main Steam Isolatiotion Vah'e leakage path boundary to the condenser using earthquake experience data and seismic margins evaluation criteria. Also performed calculations for the evaluation of the anchorage for the main turbine stop and contml valves, the bypass valve chest and the main ccadenser. Outlier evaluations, analysis of the main steam drain supports and development and design of modifications were also performed. Participated in production of the walkdown report.
e USI A-46 Seismic Verification Program and 1PEEE Seismic Afargins (O Assessment for CP&L Brunswick Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2. Seismic verification of BWR safe shutdown equipment using the GIP and EPRI NP-Disser. doc /Oct-95 1
JAMES R. DISSER PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE (Continued) 6041, Performed walkdowns, anchorage calculations, outlier evaluations and HCLPF calculations. Also performed the A46 conduit and cable tray walkdowns, and selected the worst case representative samples for the Limited Analytical Review. Participated in completing the SVDS, and the final evaluation of outliers in preparation for the NRC submittal.
- ASIV Leakage Path Seismic Verification Program for WPPSS WNP Unit 2.
Performed walkdowns and evaluation of piping, piping supports, active valves and equipment in the BWR Main Steam Isolatiotion Vah'e leakage path boundary to the condenser using earthquake experience data and seismic margins evaluation criteria. Prepared walkdown and outlier documentation. Provided recommendations for evaluation or modification of outliers. Participated in production of the walkdown report.
- USI A-46 Seismic Verification Program and IPEEE Seismic Margins Assessmentfor Duke Power Oconee Units 1, 2 and 3. Seismic verification of selected PWR safe shutdown equipment. The equipment involved was a subset of the SSEL which for the most part could not be seismically verified strictly by da* abase comparison. The project scope included development of A46 and IPEEE seismic floor response spectra for the areas invoh'ed, walkdowns of the equipment previously identified as problems by the utility, research into existing documentation, performance of anchorage calculations and resolution of outliers.
Performed the outlier evaluation and A-46 verification by calculation of the CCW vertical deepwell pumps, and the A-46 and IPEEE verification by
.(,
p) calculation of the anchorage for the steam turbine driven feedwater pumps. HCLPF calculations were performed for the CCW pumps. Walkdowns were performed using the GIP and EPRI NP-6041 methodology, l e USI A-46 Seismic Verification Program and IPEEE Seismic Margms l Assessmentfor Toledo Edison Davis-Besse Nuclear Plant. Seismic verification of PWR safe shutdown equipment using the GIP and EPRI NP-6041 methodology. Performed walkdowns and anchorage calculations considering A-46 and IPEEE seismic response for a large group of mechanical and electrical equipment including the 4.16 kv switchgear.
- USI A-46 Seismic Versfication Program and IPEEE Seismic Margins Assessment for GPU Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station. beismic verification of BWR safe shutdown equipment using the SQUG Generic
- Implementation Procedure and EPRI NP-6041 methodology. Performed l walkdowns, anchorage calculations and outlier evaluations considering A46 and I IPEEE seismic response for a large group of electrical and mechanical l equipment including the station's RHR Service Water Pumps. Lead Walkdown Engineer for the A46 Cable Tray and Conduit walkdowns. Selected the worst case bounding samples and performed the calculations for the Raceway Limited Analytical Review.
- USI A-46 Seismic Veryication Program for CP&L Robinson Nuclear Plant.
- Walkdown Engineer for the A-46 Cable Tray and Conduit Walkdowrt
! Performed walkdowns, selected cases for the bounding sample and reviewed the calculations for the conduit and cable tray Limited Analytical Review. Also 4 reviewed SSEL equipment anchorage calculations. 4 Disser. doc /Oct-95 2 l
._ _ . _ _ _ . _ . - _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ . - - _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ . . _ . . ~ JAMES R. DISSER PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE (Continued)
- AGIVLeakage Path Seismic Verification Programfor PP&L Susquehanna Unit
- 2. Performed walkdowns and evaluation of piping, active valves and equipment in the BWR Main Steam Isolatiotion Valve leakage path boundary to the condenser using canhquake experience data and seismic margms evaluation criteria. Prepared walkdown and outlier documentation. Prosided
~
recommendations for evaluation or modification of outliers. e A61V Leakage Path Seismic Verification Program for lowa Electric Duane Arnold Energy Center. Prepared and reviewed load path calculations for the main steam drain support system and anchorage calculations for the SJAEs and other equipment included in the MSIV steam leakage boundary in support of the effort to seismically qualify the drain path piping using seismic margms evaluation criteria.
- Material Condition Upgrade Program at CP&L Brunswick Nuclear Plant Units I and 2. Provided engineering resolutions to ensure short-term structural integrity.(STSI) for a wide variety of plant equipment, including structural elements of the plant buildings, suspended systems, and mechanical and I
electrical equipment. STSI resolutions were provided using established plant shon-term acceptance criteria; accepted USI A-46 methodology; and/or other j sound, short-term engineering qualification . methods. Performed in-plant walkdowns to identify potential material condition deficiencies; research of ; E design documentation related to the identified concerns; evaluation of the ; structural condition, production, review, and design verification of euypmGug j calculations; initiation and design of any modifications to suppon the STSI resolutions; and engineering support of construction or maintenance crews in the installation of the modifications. The project was also responsible for follow-up engineenng to provide long-term qualification of the STSI resolutions within the Plant Design Basis. This included additional engineering work and/or plant modifications for long-term qualification of the equipment and commodities involved. 'Itc project's STSI and long-term resolutions qualified the equipment and commodities for operational, seismic, and postulated accident conditions as reqmred by the Plant's current Design Basis. Also performed the STSI seismic qualification evaluation for the BNP vertical deepwell Service Water pumps and the long term seismic qualification for the replacement vertical deepwell Sersice Water Pumps.
- Unit 2 Construction Completion Projectfor TU Electric Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station. TU Electric Unit 2 Civil / Structural, Engmeering Mechanics, and Suspended Support Systems Engineering Manager. Provided oversight and I
management of the A/E performing engineering services for CPSES Unit 2 for the civil, structural, engineering mechanics, seismic equipment qualification, protective coatings, HVAC supports, conduit and conduit suppons, cable tray and cable tray supports, instrumentation tubing and supports, non-ASME piping and support, pipe rupture and commodity clearance disciplines. Also oversaw and managed the subcontractor performing the CPSES Unit 2 Seismic Category II/I Adequacy Evaluation. Reviewed and approved budgets; presided technical management of the architect / engineer and subcontractor, conducted detailed , technical assessments of the contractors' products and programs; reviewed and j approved design criteria and process procedures; and was responsible for 3 interface with project management, construction, startup, Quality Assurance (QA)/ Quality Control (QC), CPSES Unit 1, and the NRC. Deser. doc /Oct-95 3 , i cm-, ~ . - , , , - - ,- -n. - -- , +
JAMES R. DISSER PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE (Continued) e TU Electric CPSES Unit 2 Reactor Containment StructuralIntegrity Test (SIT) Milestone Project. Project Manager of the SIT. Responsible for all aspects of the Unit 2 SIT and directed all related activities performed by the Civil / Structural Engineer, Startup, and Construction. Developed the schedule and budget; revised the engineering specification; wrote and obtained appmval of the test procedures; directed pre-test preparations, engineering and startup test activities and the restoration of the Containment building after completion of the test; reviewed and appmved the SIT test report; and was responsible for coordination with personnel associated with the concurrently conducted Integrated Leakage Rate Test. Also performed the Volume Calculations for the Containment Integrated Leakage Rate Test.
- TU Electric CPSES Unit 2 Construction Restart Estimating Project. Member of the project group that developed the engineering baseline scope, man-hour estimate, and budget for the Unit 2 Completion Project that preceded restart of CPSES Unit 2 engineering activities in 1990. Responsibilities included Project Lead Fngmeer for development of the baseline scope for the ASME and non-
, ASME piping and supports analysis scope, the Unit 2 Seismic Category II/I ! Adequacy Evaluation; project member for preparation of the baseline scope for i i the civil / structural, engineermg mechanics, mechanical systems, and NSSS Engineering scopes of work; prepantion of the technical reqmrements and workscope sections of the contracts; and member of the committees charged with selection of the ASME Pipe Stress and Supports A/E and the Civil Lp Structural A/E.
- TU Electric CPSES Unit 2 in Unit i Seismic Evaluation Project. TU Electric Project Manager for the seismic evaluation ofincomplete Unit 2 construction in Unit I areas in support of the Unit 1 operating license. The project performed i
walkdowns of the Unit 2/ Unit I common areas, documented seismically inadequate incomplete construction, performed engineering evaluations and recommended hardware resolutions to ensure seismic integrity or removal of inadequate partialinstallations. i i e TU Electric CPSES Seismic Evaluation ofNon-Seismic and Seismic Category 11 Piping in Seismic Category 1 Areas Program. Lead Engineer for the engineering gmup perfonning the seismic qualification of the piping and supports evaluated in this program. Performed detailed seismic analysis of piping systems selected as bounding samples during walkdowns perfor ned in all seismic areas of the plant. 'Ihe walkdown program and qualifying calculations were reviewed in detail by the NRC, which eventually accepted the program as justification for closure of one of the major issues that delayed the issuance of the CPSES operating license.
- TU Electric CPSES Balance of Plant Piping Completion Project. Performed analysis of non-seismic piping and designed their support systems in support of the construction completion of CPSES. Also performed analysis in support of modifications to structures, ASME piping and seismic suspended systems in TU
! Electric Operations custody.
- 0 V e
Comanche PeakReview Team (CPRT) QA/QCReview of TUElectric Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station. Engineer in the CPRT Mechanical Safety i Significance Evaluation Group. Performed evaluations of deviation reports i Disser. doc /Oct-95 4 l
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1 JAMES R. DISSER q PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE (Continued) generated as a result of inspections for construction deviations from design requirements. The evaluations determined the safety significance of the I deviations thmugh research into design reqmrements in effect during the construction phase of Comanche Peak Unit 1. Analyzed the design and construction evolution of the deviating item and performed calculations, as required, to determine the effects of the deviation on the integrity of the item. Duquesne Light Company Beaver Valley Nuclear Power Station Unit 2 Project. Engineering Supenisor responsible for final qualification of pipe stress calculations in support of the BVPS-2 AShE III N-5 Certification Program. Responsibilities included preparation and independent review of the final stress calculations for ASME III Class 2 and 3 piping. Also performed analysis and i calculation reviews for AShE buried piping. Site Engineering Supervisor responsible for special tasks related to pipe and duct supports including maintenance of the pipe and duct support installation specifications, resolution of construction problems, disposition of nonconformances, development and implementation of backfit construction and inspection programs, resolution of NRC Infractions and Open Items related to pipe supports, resolution of vendor problems, and supenision of all pipe support engineering activities of the Site Engineering Group. Also responsible for engineering evaluation of deviations documented in the Commodity Clearance l Program. l D l l g Engineering / Design Supervisor responsible for pipe support engineering and design activities in the home office for the BV-2 Project. Responsibilities included redesign of supports in support of construction, suppon of licensing activities related to pipe supports, engineering support of the site instrumentation tubing stress analysis and support group, design support of the stress reconciliation program, and general pipe suppon engineering support of the Site Engineering Group, Toronto and New York offices. Developed and implemented project design criteria for piping, tubing and suppons. I Site Engineering / Design Supenisor responsible for pipe, duct, and mstrumentation tubing support engineering actisities at the BV-2 site. Responsible for technical direction and supenision of all BV-2 site assigned Engineering Mechanics Division suppon engineers and all design personnel engaged in the instrumentation tubing stress analysis and suppon design effort. Also developed field construction procedures and installation specifications for supports, provided generic resolution of construction problems with support installations, and was responsible for interface with NRC personnel during site inspections. 1
- Final Safety Analysis Report (FS4R) Development Project for Duquesne Light Company Beaver Valley Nuclear Power Station Unit 2. Lead Engineer for a l project group responsible for wTiting and developing the BV-2 FSAR sections l related to Civil / Structural and Engineering Mechanics plant design. Also responsible for technical review of BV-2 resolutions to licensing issues (NRC g.s infractions, open items, etc.).
t O) e Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Project for Long Island Lighting Company. l Performed ASME III Class 1 pipe stress analysis.
, Disser. doc /Oct.95 5
JAMES R. DISSER O EDUCATION University of Michigan: B.S. Civil Engineering,1980 TRAINING j Seismic Qualification Utility Group Walkdown Screening and Seismic Evaluation Training , January,1994 i l AFFILIATIONS Past Utility Representative, ASME Section IX Subgroup for Repairs and Replacements Past Alternate Member, NClG-14, Seismic Evaluation and Design of Small Bore Piping Advisory Group l PUBLICATIONS With T. Roche, C. Abou-Jaoude, and J. P. Conoscente. " Comparison Between Analytical and Test Results for Transformer Base Details." ASME Pressure Vessel and Piping Conference, Seismic Engineering, July 1993. O l [ f l I i I 1 Disser. doc /Oct-95 6
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t 1 L( CARL R. NELMAN L( I j PROFESSIONAL HISTORY l l EQE lnternational, Inc., Irvine, California, Lead Engineer,1990-present j RockwellInternational Corporation, Do vney, California, Stress Analyst, 1987-1989; Project Engineer, 1984-1987 BechtelPower Corporation, Norwalk, California, Piping Engineer, 1983-1984 l FROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE I At EQE Mr. Nelman is Lead Engineer for various seismic interaction, analysis, and i seismic qualification efforts for nuclear facility systems, piping, and equipment. The l efforts involve review of data from past earthquake investigations, post earthquake ' l investigations, development of criteria based on the EQE Earthquake Experience l Database, analysis, field investigations, and retrofit design. The systems and ! components evaluated include mechanical, electrical, instrumentation, electrical raceways, and piping systems. Major programs have included seismic interaction evaluation for both Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station and Watts Bar Nuclear
. Plant equipment, piping,' HVAC, and electrical raceways, and piping evaluation for the i Beznau Facility in Switzerland.
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Q As a mechanical engineer for Rockwell International from 1987 to 1990, Mr. Nelman performed duties as a Stress Analyst for the Space Shuttle program. He performed j various analysis reports for numerous components of the Stabilized Payload
- Deployment System; and performed numerous NASTRAN analyses for many and varied components of payload integration mounting hardware, and Shuttle component systems, payloads, and hardware kits.
Mr. Nelman also served as a Project Engineer for Rockwell from 1984 to 1987. His primary responsibility was for the design, development, manufacture, and installation j of an MX Missile Guidance and Control Assembly (GCA) Insertion / Removal Trainer for the Air Force. In addition, he provided project engineer services for design, development, and manufacture of coolant hoses and test equipment fixtures for the SmallICBM GCA. 1 As a Piping Engineer for Bechtel Power Corp. from 1983 to 1984 Mr. Nelman was l assigned to the Palo Verde Nuclear Power Plant project. He was responsible for l ! specifying piping and valves for installation, performmg material suitability studies, '
- and researching ASME B & PV Code interpretations.
1 In addition to his work in the private sector, Mr. Nelman is a member of the Naval Reserve Civil Engineer Corps. He holds the rank of Commander, and has a Secret security clearance. Mr. Nelman, a registered Professional and Mechanical engineer in the State of California, has several years of professional engineering experience. As Stress Analyst for the Space Shuttle Program for Rockwell International, he performed various stress analysis calculations for numerous components of Stabilized Payload lg Deployment, performed NASTRAN stress analysis for numerous components of payload H716nb/crnstand/4-93 1 i
CARL R. NELMAN O PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE (Continued) integration mounting hardware, performed stress analysis and prepared final report for various Shuttle components, payloads, and hardware " kits." For the MX and Small ICBM Missile Programs, he was also the Project Engineer responsible for the design, development, manufacturmg, and installation of an MX Missile Guidance and Control Assembly (GCA) Insertion / Removal Trainer and Coolant Hoses for the Ema111CBM GCA. EDUCATION SAN DIEoO STATE UNIVERSTTY, San Diego, CA: B.S. Mechanical Engineering,1982 UNIVERSTTY OF SOITTHERN CAUFORNIA, Los Angeles, CA: B.A. Psychology,1974 AFFILIATIONS Society of American Military Engineers - Tau Beta Pi PiTau Sigma REGISTRATION Professional Engineer: California Mechanical Engineer: California
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b l l r (h H716nb/cmstand/4-93 2 i
' BRANTLEY C. BUERGER PROFESSIONAL HISTORY I l
EQElnternational, Stratham, New Hampshire, Project Engineer,1993-present l ABB Impell Corporation, Syracuse, New York, Supervisor - Engineering Mechanics Division,1991-1992; ! 1988-1990' Sene Technical Services, Southport, North Carolina, Engineer,1990-1991 Melcrarek Construction, Deerfield, Illinois, Carpenter,1988 Gilbert Commonwealth (Tennessee Valley Authority), Engineer,1986-1988 Duke Power Company, Charlotte, North Carolina, Engmeer,1981-1986 EXPERIENCE
SUMMARY
- Mr. Buerger has over 13 years ofprofessional engineering experience as a structural en;;ineer in the nuclear utility industry, participating in a wide range of projects. Currently, he is a Project Engineer for EQE's Engmeering Consultants Division.
Mr. Buerger's experience includes: i e Seismic IPEEE/A46 implementation and outlier resolution
. ( ,/ . Seismic Margins Assessments and Fragilities Development
- Piping Analysis
.. Structural Steel Analysis and Design e Reinforced Concrete and Masonry Analysis and Design
- Finite Element Qualification
- Major Building Design e General Civil Projects As a Project Engineer for EQE's Engineering Consultants, Mr. Buerger has been responsible for.
- IPEEE/A46 inspections and subsequent resolution of outliers l'
- Seismic Margins Assessments and the development of Seismic Fragilities for piping l- and structures i'
* . MSIV leakage inspections and outlier resolutions
- STERI evaluations for replacement parts
.O resumenh/ buerger 2. doc /Jan-95 1 f
BRANTLEY C. BUERGER l ! PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE (Continued) l O As Supervisor for the Engineering Mechanics Division at ABB Impell, Mr. Buerger prosided the following senices:
. Design and analysis of block walls e Structural design and dynamic qualification of I&C performance monitoring equipment on diesel generators e
Analysis / failure evaluation of bound intake water head gate; subsequent requalification of all intake / discharge gates / hoists / rigging
- Reportability evaluations and occurrence reports e Systems Turnover Program for reload / restart
- Design and analysis oflead shielding, heavy equipment anchorages, and building steel modifications e Implementation of the client's modification program with supportmg 10CFR50.59 evaluations a Authored procedures, specifications, and technical reports
.n For Sene Tec'anical Senices, Mr. Buerger provided the following:
(j b e Extensive use of ALGOR SUPERSAP finite element analysis program for qualification of plate /shell structures; performed benchmark of same e Formal training on Class 1 plate /shell design and analysis per ASME code, and on finite element modeling/ theory / methods e Analysis, design, and short-term structural integrity reviews of pipe supports and miscellaneous steel to support calculation reconciliation effort For Gilbert Commonwealth, Mr. Buerger performed 53rious enginecting tasks at Browns Ferry and Sequoyah Nuclear Plants. Work included the following:
- Qualification of miscellaneous steel componcats for seismic loadings; performed detailed failure evaluation and subsequent redesign of upper dr>vell floor stect; identified errors in GTSTRUDL NF17 code check method of computing torsional stresses e Seismic qualification and design of electrical conduit supports; extensive use of AISI code For Duke Power Company, Mr. Buerger provided services at McGuire and Oconee Nuclear Stations that included:
i e Seismic design of major addition to the Reactor Building. Two hundred (200) l , tons of steel and connections; included 150 ton bridge crane. Mat slab over l\ caisson foundation. i resumenh/ buerger 2. doc /Jan-95 2
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I BRANTLEY C. BUERGER l PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE (Continued) , l
- Lead responsible for scope, sdiedule, and cost development on several major i projects ($2 to 3 million range)
- Civil lead on analysis of turbine-generator foundation vibration
- IEB 79-14 design and analysis of pipe supports and mise. steel EDUCATION UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA, Charlottesville, VA B.S. Civil Engineering,1981 PROFESSIONAL REGISTRATIONS l ProfessionalEngineer: Vermont (18-0006271)
ProfessionalEngineer Illinois (062-044370) Professional Engineer. North Carolina (13321) l
,I I
resumenh/ buerger 2. doc /Jan-95 3
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FARZIN R. 3EIGI i i ( l PROFESSIONAI, HISTORY EQE International, San Francisco, California, Principal Engineer,1990-Present TENERA L.P., Berksley, California, Structural Engineer, 1982-1990 PROFESSIONAL E3PERIENCE Mr. Beigi has over thirteen years of professional structural and civil engineering - experience. As a principal engineer for EQE's Engineering Consultants Division, Mr. Belgi providea consulting engineering services for civil, structural, and structural mechanics engineering solutions primarily for seismic evaluation projects. Most recently, Mr. Beigi has been involved in development of design verification criteria for seismic adequacy of HVAC duct systems at Salem Nuclear Power Plant. He has performed field verification of as-installed HVAC systems and provided engineering evaluations documenting seismic adequacy of these systems, which included dynamic analyses of selected worst-case bounding samples. l Mr. Beigi has performed non-linear analysis of bridge cranes at DOE's Paducah Gascous Diffusion Plant unlizing Drain-2Dx non-linear structural program. Mr. Beigi has generated simplified models of structures for facilities at Los Alamos National Lab and Cooper Nuclear Station for use in development of building response spectra considering the effects of soil-structure-interactions. Mr. Beigi has participated as a seismic capability engineer for resolution of A-46 issues and Seismic Margm Assessment at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Plant (TVA), Oconee Nuclear Plant (Duke Power Co.), Duane Arnold Energy Center (lowa Electric Company), Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant (Baltimore Gas and Electric), and Robinson Nuclear Power Plant (Carolina Power & Light). He has performed extensive fragility studies of the equipment and components in the switchyard at the Oconee power plant. l Mr. Beigi has developed standards for design of distributive systems to be utilized in the new generation of Light Water Reactor (LWR) power plants. These standards are based on the seismic experience data base, testmg results, and analytical methods. Mr. Beigi managed EQE's on-site office at the Tennessee Valley Authority Watts Bar Nuclear Power Plant. His responsibilities included staff supervision and technical oversight for closure of seismic systems interaction issues in support of the Watts Bar ! start-up schedule. Interaction issues that related to qualification for Category I systems l and components included seismic and thermal proximity issues, structural failure and falhng of non-seismic Category 1 plant features, flexibility of systems crossmg between adjacent building structures, and seismic-induced spray and flooding concerns. Mr. Beigi utilized seismic experience data coupled with analytical methods to address these i seismic issues. i resumecc\sf\beigi\ mar-96 1
l FARZIN R. EEIGI l PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE (Continued) ! I As a project engineer, Mr. Belgi conducted the seismic qualification of electrical raceway supports at the Watts Bar Plant. The qualification method involved in-plant walkdown i screening evaluations and bounding analysis of critical case samples. The acceptance criteria for the bounding analyses utilized ductility-based criteria to ensure consistent design margins. Mr. Beigi also provided conceptual design modifications and assisted I in the assessment of the constructability of these modifications. Mr. Beigi utilized similar methods for qualification of all non-seismic Category I HVAC ducts and supports at Watts Bar, and assisted criteria and procedures development for HVAC ducting, cable i trays, conduit and supports at the TVA Bellefonte nuclear power plant. I Mr. Belgi also has extensive experience utihzmg finite element computer codes in performmg design and analysis of heavy industdal structures, systems, and components in accordance with AISC and ACI structural design codes. At the Texas Utility j Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Mr. Beigi admmistered and scheduled individuals ' to execute design reviews of cable tray supports; evaluated genede design criteria for the design and construction of nr lear power plant systems and components and authored engineering evaluations documenting these resiews. He performed various construction inspections, walkdowns, and as-builting at nuclear power plants. Also, Mr. Beigi's engineedng experience includes: analysis of reinforced concrete slabs and walls due to impactive loads; design and analysis of conduit and cable tray supports for earthquake loading; determination of the adequacy of reinforced concrete slabs and walls due to omission of reinforcing bars or improper cutting of bars; d>mamic analysis of heavy steci structures; and design of seismic supports for tanks and other equipment at inductrial facilities. l EDUCATION SAN FRANCISCO STATE UMVERStrY, San Francisco, CA: B.S. Civil Engineering,1982 REGISTRATION Pn. t uional Engineer: California Certhied as Seismic Capability Engineer for SQUG Seismic Evaluation Walkdowns 1 i l
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resumecc/sf/belgi/ mar-96 2
JAMES L. WHITE O l i PROFESSIONAL HISTORY EQEInternational, Stratham, New Hampshire, Senior Consultant,1987-present Cygna Energy Services, Boston, Massachusetts, Project Manager,1980-1987 Bechtel Power Corporation, Plymouth, Massachusetts, Senior Construction Engineer,1977-1980 Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation, Boston, Massachusetts, Stmetural Engmeer, 1970-1977 PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE Mr. White has over 20 years experience in structural engineering and construction for existing and under-construction nuclear power plants. His responsibilities have included development of design criteria, specifications, and drawings for power plant buildings and specialized structures such as circulating water tunnels and power piping systems. At EQE, Mr. White has acted as project manager and seismic review team member on numerous seismic evaluation projects using the EQE seismic experience data base, and the SQUG Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP). He is currently Task Leader for USI A-46 at Three Mile Island l and Oyster Creek. He has completed the SQUG trammg for Seismic Capability Engineers. Mr. White has also participated in IPEEE/A 46 walkdowns and subsequent resolution of outliers at : Indian Point 2, Calvert Cliffs 1 and 2, and Savannah Rh'er. He has performed cable tray and l p conduit screening, analytical review and resolution of outliers at TMI, Oyster Creek, Calvert Cliffs 1 and 2, and Indian Point 2. Mr. White has performed seismic qualifications of Regulatory Guide 1.97 l equipment, piping, valves, control panels, and miscellaneous equipment for Boston Edison's Pilgrim Nv-lear Power Plant. Mr. White acted as seismic review team member at the Savannah River Plant, penbrming seismic reviews of relays, raceways, control panels, tubing, valves, and various equipment in the K, L, and P reactors. In addition, he has analyzed the seismic adequacy of cranes at EDF nuclear power plant through comparison with cranes in the EQE reismic experience data base. He has also utilized the data base in analyzing the seismic adequacy and hazard potential of equipment at the Salem Nuclear Power plant. This work involved site inspection and evaluation with safety-related equipment as targets and nonsafety-related piping as sources. Mr. White has also extensive piping experience and was Project Manager and Project Engineer on several piping and pipe support analysis and modification projects. Specific projects are desented as l follows: 1 o Performed field review of Salem Unit 2 small bore piping in containment for seismic II/I and j pressure integrity using deflection screening. ; o Participating in data gathering walkdowns of data base sites for tubing, piping, and piping fittings. o Performed field walkdowns and review of piping and pipe supports for seismic ?I/I at Browns i' Ferry. Mr. White was Pmject Engineer in c!nT;. of piping penetration walkdowns to estimate piping movement for Browns Ferry Unit 2. i ! o Project Engineer for the seismic qualification of diesel air start system piping at Ginna Nuclear Power Station. Evaluated piping using seismic experience data and conventional techniques. o BECo Pilgrim reactor water level piping modification. I l i o L A. Fitzpatrick emironmental enclosure chilled water piping project.
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JAMES L. WHITE PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE (Continued) , In previous assignments, Mr. White implemented various design changes for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. Projects for which he was responsible include H.P. checkpoint reconfiguration, seismic building separation, and reactor water level (RWL) modification. On the RWL project he was responsible for engineering interface for core drilling of two holes through the primary l containment to install new ASME instrumentation penetations. His responsibilities also included engineering interface for installation of ASME Class I piping and pipe supports, modification of reactor water level instnunentation, and cutting and replacement of Reactor Pressure vessel nozzles. This assignment was a continuation of work that he performed at Cygna as a lead structural engineer prepanng the design change package for the RWL modification. l l Mr. White served as Project Manager and Project Engineer for analysis and modification of many nuclear plants, including the J. A. Fitzpatrick, Salem, Maine Yankee, Vermont Yankee, Pilgrim, and Millstone Unit I stations. Several important projects for which he held primary responsibility, including supervision of staffs of multi-disciplined engineers and designers, are described below, o Engineering and designing environmental enclosures for Class lE electrical equipment. This project included pipe stress analysis, piping layout and design, structural design of steel-frame enclosure structures, and specification and qualification of HVAC equipment in accordance with IEEE 344. l o Assessing management and work practices for piping, pipe support, and as-built documentation for the Public Service Electric and Gas Company. 1 o Analyzing safety related pipe support baseplates for Maine Yankee in response to NRC Bulletin 79-02. Designing modifications for baseplates that failed analytical criteria. 1 o Designing on-site structural, HVAC, electrical, and piping modifications at Millstone Unit 1 in relation to 79-OlB. o Analyzing and designing piping and pipe supports for Vermont Yankee to resolve NRC Bulletins 79-02 and 79-14. While with Bechtel, Mr. White implemented plant modifications for Boston Edison's Construction Management Group, a position that required supervision of approximately 16 engineers. In presions assignments for Boston Edison he managed completion of a security building, access roads, and parking lot modifications. Prior to this period, as a structural engineer for Stone and Webster, Mr. White engineered major plant structures and foundations and prepared design criteria, cost esumates, calculations, specifications, dmwings, and reports. He was also responsible for evaluating, l awarding, and admmistrating various procurement and construction contracts as well as resohing construction problems. Additional projects in which Mr. White was involved include the following: o ProjedManager: Seismic review and evaluation of piping, pipe supports, equipment, and structures for maintaining integrity of main steam system at lowa Electric power plant. Evaluated steel-frame structures and subcomponents for seismic capacity. t o StrudaralEngineer: Participated in the design review of tritium piping and related equipment
- at the Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory in New Jersey. Performed seismic resiew and evaluated structural and mechanical components.
o StruduralEngineer: Pasticipated in seismic qualification and anchorage evaluation of motor generator sets, control panels, battery chargers, and miscellaneous electrical equipment for Consolidated Edison's Indian Point Power Plant.
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i JAMES L. WHITE s PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE (Continued) i : i o hojedManager: Structural evaluation for second-story addition to a 20,000-square-foot l vocational school bldg. Reviewed existing building components and design of foundations, and structural / steel concrete slabs. o StraduralEngineer: In charge of structural engineering sersices for renovation of Hanscomb Air Force Base's officer's club building. Responsible for structural design, construction specifications, and installation drawings for building and HVAC renovations. o StraduralEngineer: Responsible for evaluation and roiew of retrofit work for the Massachusetts College of Art Review included structural assessment of a six-story reinforced concrete-frame building with concrete masonry partition walls. Renovation work was performed to incorporate classroom use changes. o ProjedManager: Seismic evaluation and upgrade of HVAC system for Boston Edison's , Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant. Project included evaluating and modifymg seismic loadings. ! Equipment included large centrifugal fans, motor contml centers, dampers, control panels, plenum structures, electrical raceways, and other rechanical and electrical equipment. o NjedEngineer: Seismic evaluation of service water piping, pipe supports, and equipment for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant. Project included seismic review oflarge steel-frame power plant structures to ensure structural integrity. o NjedManager: Seismic evaluations of diesel generator building fire protection piping for , Boston Edison's Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant. Seismic review / modification of sprinkler & O deluge fire protection systems. o StraduralEngineer: In charge of design of new diesel generator building for Boston City Hall. Project included structural design, drawing preparation, cost estimates, and preparation of construction specifications. Interiorbuilding renovations were also performed as part of this project. o NjedManager: Structural design of modifications to the Bioenergy wood-burning power plant. Projects included design of catalytic converter stack and ductwork modifications, and building floor strengthening for additicn of water treatment tank and clean-up system. Projects included structural design, specification, and dawing preparation. o Njed Engineer: Responsible for seismic resiew and design modifications for control room electrical cabinets and panels for the Consolidated Edison Indian Point Power Plant. o ProjedManager: Seismic qualification of skid-mounted 12-cylinder diesel generators for SEI/PEICO. Seismic analysis and review of diesel generator anchorage and installation at five different power facilities. o StraduralEngineer: Responsible for structural evaluation of 500 MW pcwer plant structure for Boston Edison's balanced draft stack conversion project. Structural analysis of ten-story structural steel boiler support structure for wind, seismic, and operating loading conditions. o StruderalEngineer: Investigation of structumi cracking and deterioration of swimming pool / gymnasium building at the Brackton Veterans Administration Hospital. Design and
) review of structural renovations and repair work including constmetion drawings and J' specifications.
madebe9
l JAMES L WHITE p PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE (Continued) i l o Project Engineer: Seismic evaluation of bridge cranes and structures for Electricity de France l powerplants. Project required site inspection and seismic evaluation of various bridge cranes and crane structures. o StraduralEngineer: Responsible for due diligence review of several commercial buildings for a King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, realty company. Project included the structural renew of large warehouse type buildings for commercial office space. EDUCATION 1 Ttwrs UNIVERsnY, Medford, Massachusetts: B.S. Civil Engineering,1970 ) REGISTRATION i ProfessionalEngmeer: Massachusetts l ProfessionalEngineer* Maine CivilEngineer: Vermont O l l utdW3e M i
i OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION 1 USI A-46 SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT Volume 2 of 2 1 b Duke EdPower. A Duke Energy Company September 1998 r --- --.-, n-. , . , , , - - -
4 l Appencix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List j Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 h d
l l l Appendix B 4LJ COMPOSITE SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL) l OCONEE UNITS 1,2 & 3 The following Composite Safe Shutdown List (SSEL) represents all components
)
l identified as part of the SSEL exclusive of contact devices. See Section 5 of the Relay Evaluation Report for these items. All components requiring seismic evaluation are identified within Appendix B by either a "S" or "S,R" under " Eval. Type" Equipment ; which was evaluated by " Rule of the Box" with another component is designated with a l "RB" in the Signature Group field. The seismic evaluation for these items can be found l with the equipment listed in the "Walkdown Host" field. The results of the seismic evaluations for all equipment comprising the Seismic Review SSEL can be found in the SVDS forms located in Appendix D.I. These items are grouped within Appendix D by there SVDS signature group. All outliers are addressed in Table 8.1 and 8.2. Outliers can be identified within the Composite SSEL by their Outlier Reference Number. Outliers in Tables 8.1 & 8.2 grouped by their GIP equipment class. I O l l l nv l
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een a,e Appendix B ' Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconec Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name WalkdnWn Ref. DWg/Zane Bldg. Floor Norm. State Power Supp Sys. Power Eval Grnup Ref. No. S3 tem Ilest EleV. Des. State Req'd DWg No/Rev. Source Type 33 MA 9CCWCD0008 SMF itVAC CONDENSER S MIA OFht33A-2.S(J9) SSF st?W Mat t! sed NO MIA MIA S Not 14ed SWRAFHVAC la N/A OCCWCDn002 SSF HVAC CONDENSER I N/A OFb l33A-2.S (R9) SSF 317+0" Not tined No M/A N/A S Nat 14sd 54 RSF HVAC N/A WA OCCW918H01 SERVICE WAIER MIA OHk t33A-2.S (J3) ENF N/A Md t%ed NO MIA MIA NOME I STRAINER Not 14ed Ito servko Water 10 MA eCCWPtW005 At'X SERVICE WAT ER N/A OFtk12t EIJ (E3) AB 771'+0* ON YES CL7J2.At ASWS06B R.R Ft'Mr On I4 Aeulitary Service Wetse l 10 N/A OCCWPt96N!2 SSF AlfX SERVICE WATER MIA OFD-133A-2.S (J6) SSF 734'+0" On NO N/A N#A S.R Pt'%fr Orr j te NSF At1X Service Water to N'A UCCWrt'UGG3 RMF H VAC COOLJNG N#A OFD 133A-2.S (H4) SSF 734'+0" On NO MIA MIA S.R I WATER Pt'ntP S ON [ If055F HVAC i 10 N/A OCCW Pt'0004 BRF HVAC COOLINC N/A OFD I33A-23(34) SSF 734*+0" ON NO N/A N/A R.R WATER ritMP2 on ID SSF HVAC
- 10 WA OCCWrt9005 SSF DIESEL WAT ER N/A OFB l33A-2.S (GS) SSF 7%'+0" ON NO N/A N/A S.R j
.fACKET PtfMP on 19 SSF DtESEL MA WA OCCWYA0277 3 WAY FRESS REC VALVE N/A OFB l33A-2.S (JM) SSF N/A Cleeed NO NIA NIA NONE nw to Condeneer Circulouns Weier l ;
Notes:
- Etaquathm type "NONE" bidkates that equipnient is passive.
- Nignature group "RB" bedicates tiest the equipnient is a " Ride of the Rex" itene.
No selsnaic or relay evaluation required. The selsnile evalusthm for these itenis is included with the equipenent
- Evaluathm ty pe "S*" or "S*,R" indkates that equipnient is a rugged, passive, designated in the "Walkdown liest" field. ,
in line desire. No seisnde evaluation is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates that the equipnient is part of the NSSS systeln t
- Esatuathm type "S" indicates that a selsnde evaluation was perfonned. and does not require a seismic evaluation. ,
- Evaluathm type "R" indicates that a relay evaluatien was perfeneted.
- The results of the setsemic evaluatica for mE equipnient designated as "S" or "S,R" f
can be located in Appendix D.1 (SVDS) by signature group. ;
- Evaluation type "S.R" indicates that both a seisade and relay evaluation {
was perfonned.
- M 'WPment Mrs can k located MaWes E1 & R2 g ;
by their Equipment Class & Outlier Ref. No. p'8' '
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s 88/w-i/98 Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 , Signature Outlier Equipment ID NBme Walkdown Ref. Dug / Zone Bldg. Floor Norm. h ate Power Supp Sys. Power Eval Group Ref. No. Sytem Host Elev. Des. State Req'd Dwg No/Rev. Source Type WA N/A OCCWVAG2BS 3-WAY PRENS REG VALVE MIA OFB133A 23(1E8) SSF N/A (losed NO MIA NfA NONE EHher te r CiretdettaC Weser l 10 WA ODJWHX000A SSF DJW REAT MA OFE133A.23(G7) SSF 777+0* Net tfeed NO N/A N/A S ! EXCHANGER A Not l'aed ! Ife stendhy Shusdows Facthty to N/A ODJWHX0008 SSF DJW HEAT N/A OF&l33A.23(CS) SSF 777*+0" Net t'oed NO N/A MFA S EXCHANGERR Not t' sed , tio standby sheed e i FactInty N/A N/A eHrspinot HrSW Punip la8st Stronner N/A OFE t 24C.I.I(14) IB 796 % " In ese NO MIA N#A S* mee used te High Pressure serohe Water , t WA WA eHFSplan2 Er$W rumip inlet Strainer N#A OFIkI24C.R.1{F4) TB 796 % " la use NO NA N?A S* not used 44 High Pressure Servlee , Water l
}
WA N/A cHrsflue3 ItPSW Jachey Pun.p lates N/A OFIAl24C.I.1(B4) TS 796 % " le ase NO NA N/A 8* I Strainer eat used ! tre High Pressere sesvke Weser i t WA A BIIPSIU04 Hr$W Poemp seel Eiker NfA OFD-1240-1.l(J9) IB 796 % " la mes No NIA N/A s* met used tin esith rtoaaore Aenico Water E l NsA WA OHPSILOO$ MPSW Punip Sest FHeer NIA OFEl24C.I.l(G9) TB 796H" la use NO N/A N'A S* i Notes:
- Evalunehise type "NONE" indicates that equipsment is passive.
- Signature group "RB" indicates that the equipnient is a " Rule of the Box" items. l No selsnele er relay etaluation required. The selsnaic evaluation for these itemis is incheded a 6th the equipnient l
- Evaluatiosi t3pe "S*" or "S*,R" indicates that equiptsient is a rugged, passive, designated in the "Waikdown flest" field. !
in.line desice. No seismic evaluation is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates that ::ne equipenent is part of the NSSS systein j
- Evaluation type "S" indicates that a seismic evalentlen was perf'ositied. and does not require a selsnaic evaluation.
- Evaluathm type "R" indicates that a relay evaluation was perfM
- The restdts of the selsnile evaluation for nW equipnient designated as "S" or "S,R" ;
can Pener N WS by signature group.
- Evaluatism type "S,R" indicates that both a selsnile and relay evaluathe l was perf*M
- All equipenent outNers can be located in Tables 8.1 & 8.2 i ge 2 by their Equipament Gass & Outlier Ref. No.
i L
03 w g99 Appendix B , Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) ! Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. Dwg/ Zone Bldg. Floor Norm. State Power Supp Sys. PuWer Eval. Group Ref. No. Sytem Host Elev. Des. State Dwg No/ReV. Source Type r Req'd (Ced) (Cent.) (Cont) (ConL) (Cent.) dCont.) (Cont) (Cent) (Ceest) (Cent) Font) (Cent) (Cent) I noe need t1 High Freasure serwke l Waior ' N/A N/A OHM 1m6 HFSW Jockey Fueny Seat NA OfD 124C.B.t(C9) TB 796'+6" In use NO N/A NiA S* fneer mot d it High Pressure Servko Water 64 N/A DHPSVA148 Sest Bapply Ret.Veke N/A OfDt2sC.I.1:J7) TB 77T+0* THRLTEWCt. NO MIA MIA B Cl.DSED t*0 High Pressure Service ' Weier . t 64 N/A 60tPSVAt47 Seel sepsdy Reg. Volve NtA OfD124C.I.I(G1) TB 77F+0" THRLTD/Ct. NO NIA N/A B CLERSED j I'e High Pressure Service [ wr ! 64 N/A GHFSVAtm4 Sest Supply ras Veke N/A OfDt24C.S t(C7) TB 77T+0" THRI.TIWCt. NO N/A N/A 8 CLOSED [ 14 High Pressure Serv 6re Water N/A N/A GSSWfl.Doet Sepgdy Headst flifer N/A OfDt294-I.1(H3) YB 797+6" la use NO N/A N/A S* la use Eto Seel Water N/A N/A OSSWFtmal Supply Hendor f1ter MIA OfD B 29A-l.l(C3) VB 797+6" la use NO N/A N/A S* e l'O Seat Water - 20 N/A DVSAHtWie AtR H ANDLING ilNIT O.34 MtA OfD124A12 (rle) IB s v+0" In Servko NO N/A N/A S Elther le Plant Heaeng i Notes:
- Evaluations type "NONE" indicates that equipnient is passive.
- Signature group "RB" indicates that the equipment is a " Rule of the Box" itent. l No seismic or relay evaluation requireJ. The selsnde evahsation for these itents is included with the equipnient
- Evatuation type "S*" or "S*,R" indis ates that equipment Is a rugged, passive, designated in the "Walkdown llost" field.
in-line desice. No selsnde etalaation is required.
- Evaluation typc "NSSS" indicates that the equipinent is part of the NSSS systent
- Evahsation ty pc "S" indicates that a seisade evaluation was perf'o rined. and does ned require a selssitic evaluation.
- Esaluation type "R" indicates that a relay evalumfhm was perforsned.
- The resuks of the selsnde evaluation for all eqidyneemt designated as "S" or "S.R" [
can be located in Appendix D.1 (SVDS) by signature group.
- Evaluation ty pc "S,R" bedicates that both a selsude and relay evaluation
- was perfernied. eqi pnient dman be Md Mah EI & R2 by their Equipment Class & Outlier Ref. No. P"I' 3 b
s -
) i' oel'sr/se Appendix B lt Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL)
Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 i Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. DWg/ Zone Bldg. Hoor Norm. State Supp Sys. Power Eval. Power I Group Ref No. Sytem Ifest Elev. Des. State Dwg No/Rev. Source Reg'd Type ! x 20 N/A OVSAHist5 AIB H ANDLING UNIT O.t3 N/A OFILII44,5 2 trial TB atr+o" In Servko NO NtA N/A S Elther 14 Plant Hosting ! I
$1 MA OVEMN0001 CHLORINE DETECTOR N/A OEF,13144 AB R38'+e" In Servko NsA G704 IIC34 5 MtW!IOR PANEL In Seevice HVAC i
32 la7 l&2POWDEXPANEL R&2IPWDEXPANEL N/A NO ELEMENT ARY IB 77T*e* Fhher NO N/A N/A S,R Enber ' t I Camdensete 9 N/A BAft B!SW I ArtB REC RFER SW N/A G705A AB 796'M" In Service YES E733-F t%nntE
- 5.R In Service Ut 24Gft2CV AC PWR f
9 wA SAIMCB 24er12eV IA RECI'LATOR MIA 3795A AB 796'M" (1need . YES E703.F IKa ntE 8,R US 24Gf120V AC PWR OUTPUT BKR Chised le WA I A/RL. RFr0IATFD PWR St'PP N/A O.70s. A AB 790 4 " la servko YES O-703 F IEG F0t E 5.R t't 24nr120V AC PWR REGIA In Servtre i il 463 I AIXFMR XFMR I A (608V TO 240V) N/A G76A AB 796'+4" In Bervere YES 4703-F t%O 51 PIE S [ la Servko US 240It2GV AC PWR } l RH fCA RAbt CONTROL BOARD I ABI I t'Bl.2; t ABI.2 NO FLEMENI ARY AB E22 In service N/A N/A NsA S,R UI Cenirst Boarde la Seevice , k 19 N/A RAB) CONTROL BOARD I AB3 N/A NO FI,EMENT ARY AB 522*+0" le Servire N/A N/A N/A S.R Ifl Onatrn1 Baerde in Service r a t to N/A RADA ISOL DIODE ASSEMBLY NIA G795 AB 796*M" le Servko YES G705 IDCAJ13A S.R l til 125/2s0V DC PWR BADA In Service I 10 164 lADB 1508. DIODE ASSEMBLY N/A OJOS AB 796'M" In Servko YES 4 705 IDCA438 S.R Notes:
- Evaluathm type "NONE" hidkates that equipment is pasalve.
- Signature group "RB" indicates that the equipment is a " Rule of the Box"itena. l No s.as inic or relay evaluathm required. The seismic evstuntiosi for these iteens is included wleh the equipment
- Evaluation type "S*" or "S*,R" indkates that equipnient is a rugged, passive, designated in the "Walkden n Ilost" fictd.
ha line desice. No seismic evaluations is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates that the equipnient is part of the NSSS systen
- Evaluathm type "S" indicates that a seismic evaluation was performed. and does not require a seisade evaluathm.
- Evaluation type "R" indicates that a relay evaluathm was performed.
- The results of the seisade evaluation for all equipment designated as "S" or "S,R" l can be lomted in Aprendis D.1 (SVDS) by nignature gevup. ;
- Evaluathm type "S.R" mdicates that both a seisade and relay evaluation was performed.
- All equipment outHers can be located in Tables s.1 & R.2 !
by their Equipment Class & Outher Ref. No. Page 4
.m 087a,v/98 Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) -
Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equiprnent ID Nance Walkdown Ref. Dwg/ Zone Bldg. Floor Norm. State Supp Sys. Power Evat PDwer Group Ref. No. Sytem Host Elev. Des. State Dwg No/Rev. Source Reg'd Type , (Comy (CenQ tComQ (CeaQ tComy (CeaQ (ComQ (Comy (Cony (Cent ) (ComQ (CeaQ (ComQ 05 82N23eV DC rWR SADB le Service 10 Ni A BADC ISOL DIODE ASSFMBLY MA O.109 AB 796 % " la Servare YES G705 IDCB4.lA 8.R 551 t192WV DC rWR SADC le Servlee r 80 N/A IADD ISOL DIODE ASSEMBLY a:IA O-755 AB 796 % " le Service YES 0.785 IDCB433 B.It UI I25/250V DC FWR IADD In Servko I to N/A SADE ISOL DIODE ARSEMBLY IWA O.705A AB 796 % " le Service YES O-2795 3DCA-64B 5.R US 240r12eV Ar FWR RADE la Service 50 WA BADr ISOL DIODE ASSEMBLY Nfa 0 7BSA AB 796 % " la Sevvice YES G17US 3DCA43E 5.R UI 240f128V AC FWR IADF h Serwho la N/A lADC BSOL DIODE ASSEMBLV N/A O-705A AB 796 % " In Service VES O 2705 3DCA43F S.R l'8 24GII20V AC PwR BADG In Servko i i I45 I AllCC AIR HANDLING UNITS 11 NA OEE.IJI AB 8?S'+9" In Servko YES n7ns-314I193E IIR44E72X S.R
- HVAC &12(UNIROLPANFL la service le N/A BARRCU_A AUX RBCU A NA OEE 13845 RB e44%" In Service VES 4703-F IIR42CT S.R Em.er UI GENERIC 10 N/A I ARBOU B AUX RSCU B NtA OEE.13145 RB e61%" la Servko YES 0.MF IXR-82CB S.R Eltlier UI GENERIC 10 N/A RARBCU,C AUX RBCU C MIA DEE 53146 RB S44 % " la servica YES 07140 tXT42CT 5.R Fisher Ut GENERIC 10 N/A RARBCU_D AUX RBCU D N/A OEE 531-06 RB B44H" In Servko YES 443-D IXT42CB S.R Either UI GENFRIC Notes:
- Erminations type "NONE"Indkates that equipment is passive.
- Signature group "RB" indkates that the equipment is a " Rule of the Bos" itent No seismic or relay etatuation required. Tlie seisade evaluation for these iterns is included with the equipnienst
- Evaluattan type "S*" or "S*,R" indkates that equipment is a rtsgged, passive, designated in the "Walkdown ilost" ficId.
in-line desice. No selsnile etetuation is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates that the equipment is part of the NSSS systeen
- Evaluattom e3 pe "S" indkates that a selsnile evaluation was performed. and does no'. require a seismic evaluation.
- Evaluathm typc "R" indicates that a relay evaluation was perfornied.
- The results sf the seksnic evaluation for all equipnient designated as "S" or "S,R"
- Evaluathm type "S,R" indkates that both a selsante and relay evaluation #" I"*'" E n as perfeied.
- AE '1alPment outliers can be located bi Tables 8.1 & 8.2 by their Equipment Umss & OutHer Ref. Nik Page 5
. . . . - - - - ~ . . - - - - _ _~ > - .. - -. .. ~ _ . _ . - < _ _ ~ - - - - _ . ~ - .
00)w I98 Appendix 3 Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) . Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 l Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. Dwg/Zane Bldg. Moor Norm. State Power Supp Syn. Powcr Ev3L Group Ref. No. S3 tem ilust EleV. Des. State Dwg No/Rev. Source Type Req'd l RR N/A BASEFIGUG VALVEPOS3YIONERFOR IMSVA9129 OEE.14S g5 TB mm le service VES n7os IKVigkas S,R Mil 29 In Servko I Ut Main hee + RB N/A I ASFrietil VALVI PUSATIONFR FDR B MSVA6126 OEE.14SBS IB EU7 Re servko YES 3 709 IKVID le E.R MS326 In Service 01 Menn ha:
- i i N/A lA$r AUX 918"iDOWN FANFL N/A NO ELEMEN TARY TB 822'+0" la Servko NO N/A NtA S,R US Centrei Boards '
la Service 52 N/A SASriell?P AUX SIEAM PRESSt*RE N/A DEE.14S BS TB 796'+6" In Service YES G705 IKVltkl0 8,R , TRANSMlllER (MSI26 A In Servke f I'I Main han MS 129) Rft N/A lASSS0087 YALVE CONT ROLLER 10Bt.2; l ABI,2 OFE-14SS4 AB 822 Ia Service VES n?OS R KYED-le 5,R FDk M1126 AND MSt29 In Servke UI Male hen 52 166 1ATJ AREA TERM CAB IAT) N/A N/A AB 809'+0" In Servko NJA N/A NIA S.R Ut Contret Cabinet la Servko I N/A sal $ ARRA TERM CAB B ATS NdA N/A AB WIW+0" In service N/A N/A N/A B,R 02 Centrol Cah6 met la Servtce 18 N/A GATE AREA T FRM CAB I ATS N/A NrA AB mW+G" te nervlee N#A MIA NIA S.a i t'I Centret Cohenet In Service i N/A IATWRCP US ATwS CONT ROL N/A NIA AB E38'+0" In Sereke N/A N/A N/A 8,R FANEL Be Sereke Ifl Cenered rene4 14 167 IB 609V rrB IB @UR PER LA NO EL5:MFNTARY RB sts'+0" la service YES R703 K IXSF-F93B S,R R I Presserker Hesters HIR GROUP B BANK 2) In Serv 1ce l 9 N/A IB/MCB 24Gft29V tB RECULATOR N/A n185 A AB 796'+6" Oseed TES O-763-E IXP.fDI AS S.R t Notes:
- Evaluathm ty pe "NONE" indicates that equipnient is passive.
- Signature group "RB" indicates float the equipnient is a " Rule of the Box"itera No selsnile er relay evaluatiosi required. The scisnde evaluation for these itema is tartaded with the equipnient
- Evalueth,n type "S*" or "S*,R" indicates that equipment is a rugged, passive, desfgnated la the *Welkdown liest" field.
hi une desice. No selsnite evaluatiosiis required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates that the equipment is part of the NSSS systein
- Evaluation type "S" indicates that a seisade evaluation was perfonned. med does not nquire a seismic evaluation. ,
- Evaluationi type "R" indicates that a relay evaluation was perfanned.
- The results of the seismic evaluation for aH equipenent designated as "S" er "S,R" 8" In Pen & N WS by dgnatun group. ;
- Evaluathm ty pe "N,R" hidicates that botta a seisnde and relay evaluatioon was perfanned. " All equipment outliers can be located in Tables 8.1 & 8.2 l by their Equipnierat Class & OutBer Ref. No. Page 6 l
t
C ( (~ L w a,-)i,. Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. Dwg! Zone Bldg. Hoor Norm. State Power Supp Sys. Power Eval i Group Ref. No. Sytem Host Elev. Des. State Dwg No/Rev. Req'd Source Type (ConQ # Cont.) (Cony (Cert.) (ConQ (Cent? (Cent.) (Cent) (Cant) (Cent) (Cent.) (Cent.) (Cent.) l's 24Grt20Y AC PWR Ol'IPtfi BKR (1ased le N/A 3 R/RFC KFGI'tATED PWk st'PF Ns4 E70%A AB 790+f* In servko YES G783 E IXP.F01AB S.R t'l 248tl2dV AC PWR REG IB In Servlee ' 10 las IB/%FntR XIlbtR IB (600V YO 240V) N/A E7DNA AB 790+4" In Servko ) FS (1783 E t X P.711t AS S la Service I!l 24Gr120V AC PWR l i MA IBSPSuola RB PRFSS Switch tES CH N/A OfE h83A-1.1 AB 309'+e" In Servko NO NdA NfA S.R SA) In Servke Itt Engineered Safeguarda i i N/A IBSPSont9 RB PRESS SWITCH (ES CH N/A OfBle3A-1.3 AB IRPr+0" In Service NO NIA NEA B,R 1 A) In Servko l's Fagineered3efrguards i N/A IBSPSne28 RB PRF3S $ WITCH (ES CH NtA Ofble3A.I.I AB s09'+0" In Servire NO N/A N/A S.II 1B) In Servko ili Fngineered Seregeerds i t N/A IBSPSn021 RB PRESS SWITCII(ES CII N/A Ofbl03A-l.1 AB 9U9'+0* In Service NO N/A N/A S.R t B) la Service 6 t's FngineeredSefeguards i i N/A IBSP50022 RB PRESS SWITCH (ES CH N/A OFD-193A-I.I AB 309'+0* In Service NO N/A N/A S.R
- 90) In Service l'I Fagineered Safegeerds -
t N/A IBMPSo023 RB PRESS SWITCH (ES CII N/A OfRIa3A.I.I AB 309'+0" En Servko NO N/A N/A S.R IC) In Servko I t'l Fagineered Sefeguards t N/A IBSP10uo4P RB PRE 5S XMIR (ES CH N/A NO ELEMEMI ARY AB B09'+0" In Sereke ) ES E70S R EVIA.02 S.R j 1A) In Servko [ t'l Fagineered Sefugverds i Notes:
- Esaluathm typc "NONE" indicates that equipment is panive.
- Signature group "RB" indicates that the equipment is a " Rule of the Box" itene.
No scissnic or relay evaluathm required. The seismic evaluation for these itents is included with the equipment designated in the "Walkdown Host" fleId. '
- Evaluatkun type "S*" or "S*,R" indicates that equipment is a rugged, passive, in line desice. No seism.ic evaluationa ls required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates that the equipnient is part of the NSSS systesa !
- Evaluation type "S" tulicates that a seismic evaluation was perfoswied. and does not require a selsnile evaluation.
- Esaluation type "R" indicates that a relay evalumflon was performed.
- The resuks of the seismic evaluation for all equipnient designated as "S" or "S,R" '
can be located in Appendis D.1 (SVDS) by signature group.
- Evaluatkun type "S,R" indicates that both a seismic and relay esatuationi was performed.
- All equipment outliers can be located in Tables 8.1 & 8.2 l by their Equipment Class & Outlier Ref. No. Page 7
____________._.__..______t
)
. . w. .
Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL)
.Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipmenit ID Name Walkdown l Ref. Dwg/ Zone Bldg. Floor Nornt. State Power Supp Sys. Power Ev8L Group Ref. No. Sytem Host Elev. Des. State Dwn No/Rev. Source Type Req'd i N/A IB5FT0n95F RS PRESS XMIR(ES CH N/A NO ELEMENI ARY AB #D9'+9" le Servke TES O'103 IKVIR42 S,R I8) In Senke UI Engineered Secremorde I wA IBNPT000@ RS PRES 5 XMIR (ES CII MIA P.O ELEMENT ARY AB $09'+0" la Servko TES UL70$ I KVIC-82 S.R SC) le Servko UR Engineered Sefoguards N/A NA IBMPt'cest RBS Pt'MF I A N/A OFEIG3Al 1(J5) AB 791r*0" Met Used NO N/A N/A NONE Mut Used Us Reecear B.Bdina Sprey WA N/A IBsrtetM2 RBS rt1MP IB N/A OUhle3A-l.I (E9) AB 758'+e" Net Used NO N/A N/A NONE Nas IW Ut Reectar Building Spey i N/A IBSVAnIWS 98 SPRAY HEADER S A N/A OFD IG3A I.1 (JR) AB 809*+0" Mosed NO N/A N/A R ISOLAYIOf4 Closed Ut Reactor BoHdtwg Sprey i N/A IB5VA0002 RB SPRAY MEADFR IB N/A OFB IG3A-l.l (Es) AD 309'+e" Closed NO N/A MIA R ISOLATION Clueed Ut Reecw Bending Spesy i N/A $ BMVAuuG3 NBs Ft'MP BtHriMm lSUL N/A OfD 192A l 1 (EI2) AB 758'4e" Open NO N/A N/A S.R Open Ut Reseter Buildlag Spesy i N/A I BSV A0004 RBS PltMP 5tCYRON isoL N/A OFD ie2 A-3.l (Cl2) AB 793ree" Open NO N/A N/A S,R Open E!I Reseter Bolkhng Spray 32 N/A IC 600V FFB IC(EUR NtA NO ELEMENI ARY RB s18'49" la Servke TFS B 703E IX8 02A S,R UI Presserker Hestere PRESSt'RIZER PEATERS la Servke CRot'F C BANK 2)
Notes:
- Esatuation type "NONE" indicates that equipnient is passive.
- Signature group "RB" indicates that the equipnient is a " Rule et the Box" item.
No setsenic or relay evaluathm required. The seismic evaluation for these itenis is included alth the equipment 3
- Esatuation t)pe "S*" or "S*,R" indicates that equipment is a nigged, passive, designated in the "Walkdown llest" field.
la line desice. No seismic evaluathm is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates that the equipment is part of the NSSS system
- Evaluation type "S" indicates that a selsude evaluation was performed, and does not require a seismic evaluathm.
- Evaluation 13 pe "R" indicates that a relay evaluations was performed.
- The results of the selsnile evaluation for mil equipment designated as "S" or "S,R" can be located in Appendia D.I (SVDS) by signature group.
- Evaluationi type "S,R" indicates that both a selsnaic and relay esaluation
,,, p,,g,
- All equipnient outtlers can be located in Tables B.I & 8.2 by their Equipment Gass & Outfier Ref No. Page 8
1 Dej21/se Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 SignSture Outlier Equipment ID NBine WBlkdown Ref. DWg/Zane Bldg. Floor Norm. StBre Power Supp Sys. Power Ev8L GrDup Ref. No. Sytem Host Elev. Des. StBte DWg No/Rev. Source Type Req'd 18 N/A ICA/SB CON 1ROL BATi tCA NdA OEEl3642 AB s09'*0" In Service ) FS O 795 BCA1RC S l'I 123/2%Y DC FWR in Service 30 WA ICA/BC CONTBOL BATT CHGR N/A O.7R$ AB 796'+6" In Service TES B703-C EXSI Hl4A S.R If t 123r230V DC PW R SCA la Service to WA ICAP CnEMICAL ADDITION N#A No rt.KMEN T ARY AB 771*+0" In Service N/A NfA NIA S,R t?t Centret ruswt PANEL to Servire 18 N/A 308/B8 CONIkOt.BATi tCB N#A DEF 33843 AB uo9'+0" In Service VES 0.705 :CB/Bc- 5 If t 12V250V DC FWR Ea Servaco 19 N/A ICB/BC CONTROL BATT CHCR NIA G70$ AB 794'+6
- la Service YES O 75AG IX32,5154D S,R t!1823/250V DC PWR ICh la Service N/A N/A ICE *IKanet COMPONENT COOT.ING N#A NO ELEMENTARY AB E35'+9" N/A N/A MIA NiA S,R StfRGE I ANK MIA t'l C ._: CooEng N/A N/A ICCWM Mumt C(N Ft;MP EXPJOINT NEA OFB 133A-I.1 (K2) iD NJA la service NO N/A MIA NOME la Service t'I Camdenser Cireuesting Water N/A N/A ICCWMJutm2 CCW Ft'MP EXPJOIN T N#A Omt33A.I.I (K5) YD N/A In Service NO N/A N/A NOME la Service t'l O Circutsene Weser N/A N/A IWWM 30tFR3 CCW Pt'MP EXP JO!NT N/A Ofbl33A.I.I (K7) VD MIA In Servhe NO N/A N/A NOME In Service t'l Condenser Carevisung Water N/A N/A ICCWMJotme CCW rt'MP EXP JOINT N#A OFl]Lt33A.I.I (K10) YD N/A In Service NO N/A N/A NOME In Servere Notes:
- Evaluation ty pe "NONE" indicates that equipment is passive.
- Signature group "RS" indicates that the equipnient is a " Rule of the Box" iteni.
No selsnde or relay evaluationi reqidred. The setsenic evaluation for these items is included with the equipment
- Evaluation type "S*" or "S*,R" Indicates that equipnient is a rugged, passive, designated in the "Walkdown Host" field.
in line device. No setsnde evaluation is required.
- Evaluation type *NSSS* Indicates that the equipment is part of the NSSS systen:
- Evaluationi type "S" indicates (Inst a melannic evaluatius was perfernied. and does not require a seismic evaluation.
- Esatuation type "R" indicates that a relay evaluation was performed.
- The results of the selsede evaluation for el equipement designated as "S" or "S,R" can be located in Appendix D.1 (SVDS) by signature group.
- Evaluation type "S,R" indicates that both a seisode and relay evaluation was perfornied.
- AE equirment eufuen can k located in Tables El & E2 '
PaE' ' by their Equipnient Omss & Outiler Ret No.
s b o* w /se Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 ' Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref Dwg/ Zone Bldg. Floor Norm. State Power Supp Sys. Power Erst Group Ref. No. Sytem Ilust Elev. Des. State Req'd DWg No/Rev. Source T)T* sComa (C.au tC.au (C au (Coma (Ceau (Coao (Coma (Ce=9 10.=4 (Coma (Como (C.=u l's Condenser Circulating W eier N/A N/A ICCWM MM COND INIET EXPJOINT N/A Olbl33A.tJ tK2) TB N/A le Service NO MIA N/A NONF. In Service Ef t C . Circulaties Water NdA N/A ICCWMJean6 (VND EMtJT FIPJOINT NfA OFIE133A.IJ (K4) IS MIA la service NO NIA N/A NOME la Serv 6ce t'l Condeneer Orcu6 sting Weier , N/A N/A 1(TWMJim CONDINLET EXPJOINT MIA OFD t33A l.2 (K5) TB N/A In Service NO N/A MIA NOME , in Servke U1 C Circeleting Water i N/A N/A 3(TH M Rinns (VNDINLET E1PJOINT N/A OFDl33A-EJ (KR) 13 N/A la Service NO NfA N/A NONE In Service l't C Circeisting Water N/A N/A 3CCWM RW CONDINLET EXPJOINT N/A OFD-133A.tJ tK9) IB NIA la Ser=ke NO NIA N/A NONE la Servire t I Condeneer Circuleting Water N/A N/A KTWM.30919 CONDINLET EXPJOINT N/A OFB133A 8.2 (KII) IB N/A In service NO N/A N/A NONE la Sartire t!! C . Greetating W.ie, 20 N/A SCCWFt10008 CCW PlJMP I A N/A OFD-033A-8.9 (K3) VD Et0*+0" On/off TFJI (M82 11043 S.R U* ten C de.eer Circ.ien.: Notes:
- Evaluathm type "NONE" indicates that equipment is passive.
- Signature group "RB" indicates that the equipawnt is a " Ride of the Box"itene.
Ne selsnaic or relay evm!uathni required. The selsede evaluatkun for fliese items is iminded wich the equipment
- Evaluation type "S*" or "S*,R" indicates that equipniesit is a rugged, passive, designat*d in the "Walkdown liest" field.
he-thie device. No scianale evaluathniis regidred.
- Evaluathus type "NSSS" indicates that the equipment is patt of the NSSS systein
- Es atuatlogi typc "S" indicates that a seismic evaluations was perfornied. and does not require a seismic evaluation.
- Evaluation type "R" indicates that a relay evaluathm was perfienned.
- The results of the seismic evaluation for all equipnient designated as "S" or "S.R*
can be located in Appendix D.I (SVDS) by signature group.
- Evaluathus type "S,R" indicates that tweth a winnde and relav evaluethme
, , , g,
- All equipment entliers can be located in Tables 3.1 & 8.2 by their Equipment Qass & OutBer Ref. Nw *E'
_ .m. _ _ . - .m. . ._ _ . . = . - -.. .-. m_ m . _ .. . ._ _ . . - - - - - m . .. m. - . ._ _ ..
% N 0$ywr/98 Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL)
Oconec Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name l Walkdown Ref. DWg/ Zone Bldg. Floor Norm. State Supp Sys. Power Evat Power r Group Ref. No. Sytem ilost Elev. Des. State Req'd DWg No/Rev. Source Type F.au r=o reau (C==o (Cod.) (C==4 (Coy (Co.o (C o <C no <C m.3 (Con r m> Water I 20 le/A ICNrl'0002 CCW Pt'MP IB N/A OFEI33A.BJ (IW VD s#8'40" Ospoff TES O 102 IIDS9 5,R Un trl Camdenser Circulatant Water 20 N/A 3CCWrUe003 (TW PUMP lc N/A OFD.8334.l.5 (EN) YD S10'+0" Ombit )ES O 102 ITE.84 S.R On ; US C Cirewoung l Wa4rr t 20 N/A ICCWFl*ceme CM PUMP ID N/A Ollb t33A l.3 (103 TD sis'+0" Onbit YES O 'M2 ITC.86 S.R On US C . Circ eletlee Water 10 N/A 3CCWFUuG24 EfWri otL COOLER N/A OFD-IJ3A.I.2 (Kl3) IB 775'40" Off TES EMG I K53-04C S.R [ Pt?MP On t'l Ceedenser Circulating i Water 20 N/A ICCWVA0008 CCW EM DISCIIISOL N#A OfE133 Art.2 (12) VD 796'+6" Closed YES O 705 8 IllfVC24t A S.R Open tan Condenser Cireve tine Water i 20 MA ICCWVA0002 CCW EM DiscillSOL N/A OF&l33 Art.1(I4) VD 796'+6" Closed T ES O.705 B IMVC24tB S.R l Ope = l's C arew.nne Water 20 N/A ICCWVAnn03 CCW FM DEMCIIIRol, N/A OFILl33A.I.2 (16) VD 796 +6" Oused %Es & 705 3 IMVC2 -010 S,R I r'" t*l Condenser Cirew. tine ; Water Notes:
- Evaluation type "NONE" indicates that equipnwnt is passive.
- Signature Erwup "RB" indicates that the equipnient is a " Rule of the Box" iteni.
- No selsnaic or relay evalensioni required. The seisede evaluation for these iteras is included With the equipenent
- Evaluation type "S*" or "S*,R" indicates that equipnient is a rugged, passive, designated in the "WalkdOWn llest field. l In-time device. No selsnaic evaluatioen is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates that the equipnient is part of the NSSS systern
- Evaluation fype "S"ludicates that a scisnde evalention was perfelmied. and does not require a scissnic evalisation. !
- Evalumflon type "R" indicates that a relay esaluations was perfosined.
- The results of the selsnile evaluationi for all equipnient designanted as "S" or "S,R" can be located in Appendit D.I (SVDS) by signature troup. .
- Evaluations type "S,R" indicates that both a selsnile and relay evaluattoli t Was perfornied.
- All equipinent outtlers can be located in Tables 8.1 & 8.2 l by their Equipinent Class & Outlier Ref. Na, "E' II
^ N J 08/27/98
. .)
Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) , Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name WalkdoWn Ret DWgfZone Bldg. Moor Norm. State Power Supp Sys. Power Eval Group Ret No. Sytem Host EleV. Des. State DWg No/ReV. Source Type Reg'd 20 N/A ICCWVAoGod CCW EM DISCH ISOL N/A OllE133A.1.2 (t?) YD 736 % " Clemed YES O'M B IMVC24tD S.P OP88 t'l C are leens Water 20 N/A 1MWVAN CCW FM DISCH ISOL N/A Oml33AIJ (19) YD 796'M" (1osed YFE GMB IMW182A S.R O Pe8 t!I Condenser Cire.leting water t i 20 N/A IWWVAouo6 (Tw FM DISCH ISOL N/A OmIJ3AIJ (Ill) YD 796'+6" Cleoed Y93 EMB IMVC242B S,R ' Open
- n C Cire.nenne Water fI t
20 N'A ICCWVA0008 EM DISCH ARGE VALVE N#A DNI334,3.2 (BI) YD 796'+6" CIceed YES GMB IDP fDSC S.R i Open I rt C Carewonne t w e, 2o N/A ICCWVA4010 Dt9CM 4MOL VALVE NdA UFIAt33A l.1 (K2) )D 796*M* OpenM1osed NO O.781 4 IKSI-FD2C S.R Open j t!10 Cere.tettas . Weier 1 20 N/A IWWVAeoll DISCH ISOL VALVE MfA OfD133A RJ (kS) YD 196'M" OpenM1osed NO E763.G IKS2-fU2D 5.R One. t sin Conde.netare nethe Water 20 N/A ICCWVA0012 DISCH ISOL VALVE N/A Om133A.I.I (K7) YD 79ei'+6" OpenKlemed NO O.703-G IKS342E 5.R Open t*l Condenser Cire.lsthe Weier 20 N/A ICCWYA0013 DISCIIISOL VALVE NfA OfDt3JA-1.5 (Kle) YD 794*M" Open#Clueed NO G703.G SKSt.Fe3C S.R Netes:
- Evaluation type "NONE" indicates that equipment is passive.
- Signatu e group "RB" indicates that the equipnient is a " Rule of the Box"itens.
No selsnile or relay esalame lon required. The seisode evaluation for these itents is included with the equipenennt i
- Esatuation typc "S*" or "S*,R" indicates that equirnient is a rutted. Passise, designated in the "Walkdown flest" field.
In-line device. No selsnaic evnlaation is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates that the equipment is part of the NSSS systene t
- Evaluation type "S" indicates that a seismic evaluation was perfernied. and does not require a selsnaic evaluation. l
- Evaluathis type "R" hidicates that a relay evalentless was perfernied.
- The results of the selsnde evahastion for all equipsuent designated as "S" or "S,R" E" "" E#""E
- Esaluation type "S.R" indicates that both n selsnaic and relay evaluation was pertorined.
- AB eqidpenent euttlers can be located in Tables 8.1 & 8.2 by their Equipenent dass & Outtier Ref. No. age 12
1 P
. . w. . '
Appendix B l Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconec Units 1,2 & 3 , Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ret DWg/Z4me Bldg. Floor Norm. State Supp Sys. Power Evat Power Group Ret No. Sytem Host Elev. Des. State DWg No/Rev. Source Type Req'd (ConQ (Cu=Q (Cent.) (CenQ (CeaQ (CeaQ (CenQ (Cent) (Cant) (Cent) (ConQ (Cent) (Cens) O P's US Condeemer Circulating Water N/A NtA ICCWVA0026 CCW VENT VALVE N/A OFTAt33A-I I (13) YD stS Closed NO N/A N!A R Clnned Ut Ceedenser Circulating Wster ' i N/A N/A SCCWVA0027 CCW VFET VALVE N/A 05%I3348.3 tHS VD 796 Clueed NO N/A N/A R t Closed k UI C . Clrretsang Weter I i N< A N/A ICOVVA002s CCW YEN T VALVE NsA Olbl33A LI (H7) YD RIS (lamed NO N/A N/A R
~
til C Ciremienns Water N/A N/A strWVAno29 (TW VENT VALVE MlA Ofbl33A-1.3 (110) YD 796 (1caed NO N/A N/A R Closed 01 Condessee rirewleting Water . I N/A N/A ICCWVA0268 EMF ASW FtWF DESCH N/A OHILl33A 1.S (Mit SSF N/A Closed NO N/A N/A NONE ISOL Flthee l l'8 Condeneer Cirevisting Weier NrA N'A 1(TWYAtt269 CRORNOVER IMOLATION N/A OFB 121D I.l(Cl3) At 77r+e" Closed NO N/A N/A R TOA Closed US Camdenser Circulating Weser NtA N/A ICCWYA0257 SsF ISOL VALVE N/A Ofbl33A1.5 (G14) SSF 734'+0* Closed NO N/A N/A R n.e. 4 Notes:
- Evaluathen type *NONE* Indicates that equipnient is passive.
- Signature group "RB" bidkates that the equipenent is a " Rule of the Box" itene.
Ne scissenic or relay evaluation required. The selsnaic evaluation for these itenis is included with flee equipnient
- Evaluation ty pc "N*" or "S*,R" indicates that equipment is a rugged, passive, designated in the "Walkdowa flest" field.
in-line device. No seismic es atuath>sils required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates that the equipnient is part of the NSSS system
- Evaluations type "S" indicates that a seismic evaluatiosi was performaed. and does not require a selsnile evaluation.
- Esatuathm type "R" indicates ths.t a relay evaluation was perfornied.
- The results of the seismic evaluation for all equipnient desigsmated as "S" or "S,R"
#"" ' * " I
- Evaluation type "S,R" indicates that both a seisade and relay evalr.ation was performed. * ' M 'qul P ment ou&n can Wated ki Tahl & R2 by their Equipment Class & OutBer Ref. No. p8te
s os/s /se Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. Dwg/ Zone Bldg. Floor Norm. State Supp Sys. Power Power Eval. Group Ref. No. Sytem Host Elev. Des. State Dwg No/Rev. Reg'd Source Type <C o ro o trw) sc ) sc.ma <C <C o <Co.o tc o <C o (c o tc o (c o t's reademeerorees ung water 18 NsA 3CDM000A POLISHING N/A OIRI2 tA.t3(I3) TB 77T+e" In Rervice NO N/A N/A S DEMINERALIZER S A Fhher t!I PbusMag Dendmerettner it N/A BCD%t0005 POLISHING N/A OFD-12tA-83 0S 15 775W im Service NO N/A M4A a DEnttNFRAIJZER 1B EMher t'l Puhebing DeedneraNzer 18 N/A ICDMo00C POLISHING NfA OFD-12 8 A-13 08) TB 775ee* Ia Serelce NO N/A N/A S DEMINERALIZER IC Uther UI PuusMna Deadnersuzer la N/A SCDMemtfD FULISHING N/A OFD 121 A-l.5 010) TB 775W In Service NO N/A N#4 S DEMINf'RALIZER ID Faher I'l PausMon Deeminerenser la KA ICDM900E FOLISillMC N/A OfR t27 A-13 013) 13 775'+0" In Service NO N/A N/A R DEMINERALIZER RE Elther Ut PultsMos Dendnetenser NsA N/A SCET tit C.re Estt iL. N/A N/A RB N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Ut C.re Exit TC N/A N/A N/A ICFlono2 RFSIN IRAP N#4 ODR121 A-13 (F7) TB 775'+0" le Service NO MIA N/A S* Mut thed UI Condensate N/A N/A ICFL000A HOIWELLPUMP N/A OED 121 A 1.4 (I.J) TB 775**e* In Servies NO N/A NrA S* STRAINER A Not Used til C nde. esse N/A N/A 3CH ouGB HOIHELLFUMP N/A OFD-1214.l.4 (J3) IB 775'+0* In Serrace NO N/A N/A S* STRAINER B Mot Used Notes:
- Evaluation type "NON E" hulicates that equipment is passive.
- Signature group "RB" indicates that the equipment is a " Rule of the Box" liens.
Ne seisnde or relay esaluation required. Tine selsnile evaluatime for these items is included alth the equipnient
- Esaluation type "S*" er "S*eR" indicates that equipment is a rugged, passive, de532 nated in the "Waikdown flest" field.
in-line desire. Ne selsnele esaluation is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates that the equipenent is part of the NSSS system
- Evaluathm type "S" indicates that a selsude evaluation was performed. and does smi require a selsnele esahiation.
- Evaluathm type "R" indicates that a relay evaluation was perfornied.
- The resinks of the seismic evaluation for all equipnient desigenated as "S" or "S,R"
- Evaluations type "S,R" ludicates that both a seisade and relav evaluathm
"" '" ' " ""I '
~
nas perforined.
- All equipmenet outHers can be located be Tables 2.1 & S.2 by their Equipment Class & Outtler Ref. No. E'
Appendix B d
)
}
CL w 98 Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 I Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walldown Ref. Dwg/ Zone Bldg. Floor Norm. State Supp Sys. Power EvBl. Power ! Group Ref. No. Sytem llost Elev. Des. State Req'd Dwg No/Rev. SourEe Type ; (Comtj (Cons) (Cont) Feat) (Cent) (Cent) (Coat) (CunL) (ConL) (ConL) (Cent) (Cent) (Cent] Un Condensem N/A N/A ICR.00er HOTWF11 Pt'MP N/A OF1k I2 t A-l.4 (83) IB 775'+e* Re Servere NO N#A MtA S* SIRAt"FR C %s I sed t's condensom 16 N/A ICFTK000A mRE P1DOD T ANK 1 A N/A MO FI EMENTARY BB 7s7'+0" In Servire NO N/A N/A S.R In Servece Ut Core Fhead i . 16 N/A SCPT K0008 CORE FIDODIANK IB N/A NO FtJMENT ARY BB sit'+e" In servko NO N/A N/A S,R [ Ba sertice t!I Core Hood 40 N/A ICHX002A CONttENSAT E COOLER N/A OFD-121 AI 4 (D3) TB 773'+e" Ia Servare NO N/A N/A 5 IA Either I!I Condensate i 10 N/A 103t1[002B CONDENSATE CDOLFR N/A Ofik 12 t A.I.4 (C3) TB 77P+e" te Reevere NO MIA NtA 5 13 Elther Ef t rendeneste '
?
12 NeA ICLTo035A UST IS LEVEL N/A Ollk t2t A-l.7 4ft t) TB R3R'+0" In Service YFS (L1D9 IEVIAAS S.R ta Servies (11 KTM 12 N/A 10LT0036 UNT tA LEWL N/A OF1kI2t A l.7 (J2) IB E38'+0" la service YFJB O.705 IKVfB 13 5.R , le Service i UI ICCM I N/A N/A SCMRm07 UST DOME TO IA UST N/A OFIkI28 A-I.7(JS TB MIA le Service NO MtA N/A NONE EXPJOINT In soevece 5 UI Entergency 5eedwater Ne A N/A sce45mne IST DOME IO tB UST EXP N/A OFIk 12t A-l.7 (J7) TB N#A le Service NO NtA N/A NONE
.MHNT la service Notes:
- Evaluation type "NONE" indicates that equiprnent is passive.
- Signature group "RB* Indicates that the equipenent is a " Rule of the Bes"itens. l No selsudc er relay evaluation required. The selende evaluathm for these items is included with the equipement ,
- Evaluation ty pe "S*" or "S*,R" ludicates that equipeneut is a rugged. Pa*5ite. designated in the "Walkdown llost" field.
l in line desice. No seisnde evaluathm is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates that the eqtdyneent is part of the NSSS systent j
- Evaluathm type "S" indicates that a seisode evaluation was performed. and does not regt are a seismic evaluation.
l
- Evaluathm type "R" indicates that a relay evaluations was perfarnied.
- The results of the selsnde evaluation for au equipsient designated as "S" or "S.R" *
#""
- I I"*'"" I
- Esatuation type "S,R" hidicates that both a selsnde and relay evaluathm was perfernied.
- AB equlP ment essen ran b&ated in Tabin 11 & R2 ,
by their Rquipament Umms & Outiler Ret No. Page 15 t i
6 O carifise Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walldown Ref. Dwg/ Zone Bldg. Floor Norm. State power Supp Sy s. Power Evat I Group Ref. No. S3 tem fiost EleV. Des. State Req'd Dwg No/RcV. Source Type treau (Co-u (C=) (Cen reau (Ceau (C o rom.: r.=4 rom.) ro rem.3 iC.a) I?I Eneergency Feedweter RB WA 3CPenst t5itBLEVEL It:Bt.2; t ABl.2 Ofbl2I Al.7(Jt t) AB S22 Is servics YES 06705 IKVIAes 5R t'l lCCM INDICATION (ICOM) la servke RB N/A ICP0343 t'Si l A LEVEL IAB3 OfEI2tA-L7(J2) AB $22 tu Servko TES O 795 IKVIBsI3 S,R . I'l KTM INDICAIION (ICC%f) la Service
$2 WA ICP50015 15f MAKEl'PLEVEL N/A OEE-84% 73 IB R3sv le servko N/A M1A N/A S,R COMY ROL (f'E 15) Nas t! sed UI Condemente
$2 wA GCPMafl34 UST ZlARLEt'PI EVEL NtA OEE-14t73 TB B3sv in Service N/A NfA MlA S.R Cth'4I ROL (PS 36) Net tieed ltt C to 0 WA ICrno227 CONDENMATE BOfMETER N#A OFE-1410tLA IB 775'e0" la servko N/A N#A NrA S.R PU htP stM'T RNI HEADER Net t'oed ,
l'I Condannete DC PRESS LinV I Interlocks 20 NA ICPUnute HOIw ELL PUMP I A MIA OED121 A-1 A(L5) TB 775'+9" On NO N/A N/A S.R ON l'I Condensate 20 WA ICPt100It HO1wELL P0MP IB MIA OFD-I2 t A.t A (35) IB 775'+9" On NO N/A N/A S.R ON t'l Condensate i 20 FA ICPticet! HolwELL rt MP IC NsA ofD B2t h-I A (19) IB 775'oe" On NO N/A N/A S.R , tra Condensene i, wA BCPUuGI9 HOLDPEG Pt'MP I A NIA 09EI2 t A-l.5 (H3) TB 775v le Servko NO N/A NIA S Not reed 01 Camdensate ; i Notes:
- Evaluation type "NONE" indicates that equipment is passive.
- Signature group "RB" indicates that the equipatent is a " Rule of el.e Ben" tient !
No seismic or relay evaluation required. The seismic evaluation for these itents is bacluded with the equipment
- Evaluation eyye "S*" or *S*,R" indicates that equipnient is a rugtede Passhee designated in the "Walkdowa liest" field. [
In-line device. No seimnic evaluation is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" bedicates that the equipment is part of the NSSS systesa
- Esmination type "S" indicates that a selsneic evaluation was performoed. and does not require a selsnaic evaluation.
- Esatuation type "R" indicates that a relay esaluation was performed.
- The results of the selsnele evaluation for mE equipnient designated as "S" or "S,R" cast be located in Appendix D.1 (SVDS) by signature group.
- Evaluathm type "S,R" indicates that both a seismic and relay evaluntless was performed.
- M egid ment P euttlers can be kated be Taliles &1 & R2 j by their Equipement Class & Outilar Ref. No. P"I' 36 i
I
s t u-n Appendix B 1 Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) . Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. Dwg/ Zone Bldg. Floor Norm. State Supp Sys. Power Eval Power Group Ref. No. Sytem Host Elev. des. State Dwg No/Rev. Source Type Req'd , 10 N/A SCPtNm28 HOLDiNC Pt:MF t B N/A OfEt2t A 1.S(RS TB 779+0" In Servko No NIA NA S Net Used I?! Candensete i 10 N/A 3CPUtNv2R HOLDINC itMPlc N/A OFEt21 A-8,5 (M8) TB 775W Sa Servke NO N/A N/A S Nos t%ed Ut Camdennen. 10 N/A 3CPleu22 HothtNC Pt3MPID N/A OED 12t A-l.5 (H10) IB 77?+0" Es Service NO N/A N/A E Ned twed Ut Condensete [ 10 N/A ICPU0023 IBOLDINC P0MPIE N/A OFD-82t A-l 9 (R13) IB 775'+0" le Servko NO N/A N/A S i Not Used t!I Ceedensate [ M N/A ICRDACBkRCAR CRDSYsIEM AC BAR N/A NU ELEMENTARY AB 809'+0" le Servko MIA N/A N/A S.R ! CAR In servke l Ua Reacter Trip [ 11 N/A ICRDDCBkRCAR ORD SYSTEM DC BKR N/A NO ELEMENI ARY AB 009'+0" le Service NIA N/A MIA S.R CAB Im Service I UI Reacier Trip r I to N/A ICRDB C CONT ROL ROD DRIVE MIA NO rLEMENTARY AB 809'+0* Ba Servke N/A N/A N/A S.R I EECIC CABINEIS Im 5ervice I't Reactor Irty f R It ICRDL TWIT 1 NIROL ROO%I N/A NG ELEn*ENTARY At 822W N/A NtA 4705B IDe t-86 5 Ut Emnergency iJghelag EMERGENCY LICHIS NIA 10 16es It'T hunp3 fat.I'RRY TANK Nth DFE12 t A-l.5 (D9 TB 775Ne'* Be Service NO N/A NA $ an service Ul Condeneste 34 169 ICIK000A UPrf R St'RCE TANE I A N/A OFEI2 5 A-l.7 (.IN) TD B38'+0" In Service NO N/A N/A S f Notes:
- Evaluation ty pe "NO!%E" bidkstes that equipment is passive.
- Signature group "RB" indicates that the equipnienet is a " Ride of the Bes" item.
No seismic or relay esatuation required. The selsnile evaluathm for these items is included with the equipnient
- Evaluation type "S** er "S*,R" indicates that equipment is a entged, passive, designated in the "Walkdown Ilost" field.
he line destce. No seisnaic evaluation is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates that the equipnient is part of the NSSS systeau
- Evaluatiosa type "S" tudicates that a scisnaic evaluation was perfosnied. and does not require a seismic evaluation. i
- Evaluation type "R* indicates that a relay evaluation was perfornied.
- The results of the scisnde evaluation for all equipenent designated as "S" er "S,R" i can be located in Appendis D 1 (SVDS) by signature group. !
- Evaluation type "S,R" indicates that both a seisnile and relay evaluation i
,,,,,,.g,g,
- AB equipenent outtlers can be located in Tables 8.1 & 8.2 ;
by their Equipment Oass & Outiler Ref. No. Page 17
coufss Appendix B Composite Safe Snutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown ReE Dwg/Zime Bldg. Floor Norm. State Power Supp Syn. Power Eval Group Ret No. Sytem liest Elev. Des. State Req'd Dwg No/Rev. Source Type (Conu ICom) (Cam) (C.nu r.no (Cano ren) (Con) (Con) (C ma r ma (Con, er.ma i es servko et Condeneste ta 169 1C1K0008 t'FPfit 5t'RCE I ANK IB N/A Omt2f A-l.7(J3) TB R38'+F' In Service NO N/A NsA s in fleevies l'1 Camdentele 16 170 ICT K900C t'FFEB st:RCE TAME N/A OFILI21 A-I.7(K6) TB B38'+0" In Seevko NO NA N/A 8 DOME la Servko I'1 Candenssie N/A N/A ICVA0001 IIOTWI LL rrMPINIET MIA 02 821 A-3.4 (12) 13 Nia Open NO MIA N/A NOME 190L VALVE Faner l's Condenemie N'A N/A ICVA0003 ItOTWELL FtfMP OUTLET MIA 02 821 A.I.4 (I7) TB N/A Open NO NIA NrA MONE ISOL YLY FJeher , ItI Candensees N'A N/A ICVAnon4 HOTWELL Pt'MPINtJT N/A Of1k12 TAI.4 J2) TB NtA Open NO NA N/A NOME
- ISOL VALVE Elther t'l Condensele N:A N/A ICVAuo06 HOTWFLL Ft'MF Ot!T LE T N/A OrD.121 A-l.4187) TB N/A Open NO N/A N/A NOME ISOL YLV Elther t's Conde*sete NIA N/A ICVA0007 RIOTWELL PtiMPINLET NsA Om3214 t.4(L2) TB h/A Open NO N/A N/A NONE ISOL VALVE ENher t's Camdeneete N/A N/A ICVA0009 HOTWELL Ft'MP OUTLET MtA OFIk t 2 t A-l.4 (L7) TB NIA Open NO NIA N/A NONE ISOL VLY Elther t s Condenamie ;
MrA N/A ICVA0014 HOTHELL PUMP N/A OFD t21 A.I.4(ll7) TB N/A Open NO N/A N/A NONE Notes:
- Evaluathm t 3pe "NONE" indicates that equipnient is passive.
- Signature group *RB" indicates that the equipnient is a " Rule of the Bon"itene.
No seismic or relay etaluation required. The seisade etaluathm for these items is hicluded with the equipnient
- Evaluathm type "S** or "S*,R" indicates that equipnient is a rugged, passive, designated in the "Walkdown llost" field.
in-line desice. No sehntic evaluation is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates that the equipment is part of the NSSS systeni
- Evaluathm type *S" indicates that a selsnde evaluation was perfernied. and does not require a selsnele evaluation.
- Evalunehm type *R" indicates that a relay evaluation was perfernied.
- The results of the selsenic evaluation for all equipment designated as "S" or "S R" can be located la Apredis til (WIM by signature grep.
- Evaluation type *S.R" bedicates that both a seisade and relay evaluation was perfarnied.
- M ei d Penmt Men can be located in TaWes El & E2 by their Equipment Gass & Outiler Ref. No. I*E' 38
~ ~
.~m Appendix B ,
Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. Dwg/ Zone Bldg. Floor Norm. State Power Supp Sys. Power EsmL Group Ref. No. S3 tem Host EleV. Des. State Req'd Dng No/Rev. Source Type (Cent.) (Cent) (Cany (Cony (CoaQ (ComQ (CoeQ (ComQ (CouQ (Cene.) (ConLI (cheQ (Ceay ISOLAYlON VALVE Ekeur Ul Condensate N/A N/A ICVA0014 HolwfLLF0%IP NfA 05 tk l2 t A1.4 (H9) IB N/A Open NO M#A NJA NOME T HROTILE VALVE FMher Ut Condensete N/A NA SCVA0015 HwrBVFASsVALVE NrA OFD-121 Al 4 (ItM) 15 N/A Open NO N/A MIA NONE
- Either l'1 Camdessene N/A N/A SCVA0017 POL DEMIN ISOL VALVE N/A OfD B 28 A-l.5 (K3) in N/A Opee NO MfA N/A NONE Either US Ceedeneste N/A N/A SCVAnots FOL DEMIN ISOL VALVE MIA OHkl28A.13(G3) IB N/A Open NO MfA MIA NOME Ekbee US Condensete N/A NrA ICVA0019 POL DrMIN ISOL VALVE N/A OHk121rel3(E9) TB MIA Open NO MIA NtA NONE Euher UI Camdeneste N/A N/A ICVA0026 POL DFMIN ISOL VALVE M1A OFik121413(G9) IB N'A Open NO N/A N!A NOME Either l'1 Condenseqe N' A N/A ICVAnp23 Fol, DFMIN ISOL VALVE NIA OFlkillA 13(KN) 15 N/A Open NO N/A N#4 NONE Elther Ua Condennete N/A N'A ICVAGo22 Pol, DFMIN ISOL VALVE Mth Ortkl21 A-1.5 (CR) YB NfA Open NO NtA NfA NONE
- E6ther i US Condemente ,
N/A NrA ICVA0023 POL DEMIN ISOL VALs E N/A OFlk128 A-53 (Klet IB MIA (4=a NO MiA N/A NONE , Notes:
- Evaluatiosi t3 pe *NONE" indicates that equipment is passive.
- Signature troup "RB" indicates that the equipnient is a "Rute of the Bon
- Itena.
No seismic or relay esatuation required. The seisnde evaluation for these items is included with the equipment
- Evaluation type "S** or "S*,R" indicates that equipnient is a rugged, passise, designated in the "Walkdown IInst" field.
in-line device. No seismic evaluations is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS* ludicates that the equipment is part of the NSSS system
- Evaluation type "S" indicates that a seismic evaluation was performed. and does not regidre a seismic evaluation.
- Evaluathm type *R" indicates that a relay evaluathm was perfernied.
- The results of the setsnde evaluation for aH equipement designated as "S" or "S.R" casa be located in Appendis D.1 (SVDS) by signature group.
- Evaluatkm t3 pe "S.R" indicates that both a selsude and relay evalusthe was perfimned.
- AG equipnient outliers can be located in Tables 8.t & 8.2 by thenc Lguipenent dass & Outiler Ref. No. E' I'
b_
~ s )
Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. Dng/Zame Bldg. ROor Norm. State Supp Sys. Power Erst Power Group Ref. No. Sytem ilust Elev. Des. State Req'd Dwg No/ReV. Source T3pe (Cent ) (Caet ) (Cont) (Camt.) (CoeQ (Cost.) (Coat.) (Cent.) (CentJ (CentJ (Cent.) (Comt,) (ConQ Ekhar UI Condemente N/A MA ICVA0024 FOL DEMIN ISOL VALVE N/A OfDl21 A l.5 N'10) TB NrA Oywe NO N/A MIA NOME Ektwe t!! Condensete NA MA ICVA8"J25 rOL D*. MIN ISOL VALVE N/A OfD128 Al.5 (E13) TB N/A Ogen NO NfA NWA PnME rHtur t'l Camdesente MA MA ICVA0026 FOL DEMIN ISOL VAL % E N/A OfD12 t A-l.3 (G13) TB N/A Open 40 NIA N#A NOME Either I'l Condeneste WA N/A ICTA014s Cai rl' MIS CONT ROL NtA Ofb l2 t A-l.7 (Cl2) TB N/A Opse NO MTA NtA MONE Ekher Itl Condemoeta N/A MA 1CV A61 *2 l'ST RISER ISOLATION MIA OfD 121 Al.7 (!') TB 775'+0* Opes NO NJA NJA R Open l'1 Condeneste , sw m % ICVAel33 Mi RISFR ISOLAilON N!A OFB121Al.7(15) IB 822v Open NO MIA N/A R l'1 Condensete MA N/A ICVAels6 UST RISERISOLATION MIA OBE121 AI.7(17) TB 822'+0" Upon NO MIA MfA R O P*# Ifl Condemente N, A N, A ICVAel59 l'ST RISFRISOLATION N/A OfD12t kl.7(15) TB B22'+0" Open NO MtA N/A R O l *n til Cr adeneste yp WA ICVAel68 t'ST St'rrLY ISOL TG NIA Ofbl28A-I A( rs) IB T73'+0" Cleeed NO N/A N/A R Notes:
- Evaluathm type "NON E" indicates that equipment is passive.
- Signature group "RB* indicates that the equipreent is a " Rule eef the Bou"iteen.
No seismic or relay etsluathm required. The n-issnie esatuathm for these items is included n9th the equipment
- Esaluathwi type "S*" or "S*,R" indicates that equipment is a rugged, passise, designated in the "Walkdon n llest" neld.
In line desice. No seismic evaluation is required.
- Esatuation type *NSSS" indicates that the egntpsnemt is part of the NSSS systen
- Evaluation type "S" indicates that a seismic evaluation was perfortmed. and does not reqssire a selsusic evalwathm.
- Evaluathm type "R" indicates that a utlay esatuation was performed.
- The results of the seismic evaluathm for all equipment designated as "S" or "S,R" run be located in Appendis D.I (SVDS) by signature group.
- Eseluation (3 pe "S,R" indicates that both a selsnde and relav
- evaluathm nas perfonned.
- AH ettuipinent ans can Morated Mables El As 12 by their Equipment Gass & Outlier Ref. New psee 20
( O v C s O Q ,( 98 Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. Dwg/ Zone Bldg. Floor Norm. State power Supp Sys. Power EYat Group Ref. No. Sytem Ilost EleV. Des. State Req'd Dwg No/ReV. Source Type (Cent.) (Cent) (Cent.) (Cent) (Coat) (Cent) (Cent) (Cent) (Come) (Caet) (Came) (Cent) treasj TDrfwr Cineed UI Candensete 12 N'A 1('VA0l?6 USY TO COND ISOL MIA OFEI21 A.I A (H7) it 771v opeeklased VF5 n104 E IgKE24 s,n VAI.YE Clused UI Camdemente 12 N'A ICVA91s7 ffST TOCONDISOL N/A OfD1214.12(G7) TB 77tv Openkinsed ) FS G7B4 IILA.26 S.R VALVE Cleeed I'l Condameete 12 N/A ICVA0192 UST IO COND ISOL N/A (m. *28 A.I A(17) TB 17V+e" Opeektesed 1 Fs n7e4 3 EA.26 S.R . VALVE (1oemd U1 Condense 4e NeA NA SCVA0225 POL DEMIN INOL VALVE NIA OFD B2 3 41.5 (H4) IB 775**0" CInsed No N/A N/A It l (RACKw 4.Sn lNI ET WTA (losed I'l Condensate VALVE) N/A NdA ICVA0229 POL DEMIN ISOL VALVE NIA OfD 321 A-1.5 (I2) fB N/A Open NO N/A NIA MONE Entwr F1 Ceedensste N/A N'A ICVA0238 POL DEMfM ISOL VALVE MfA OFE125 A-l.5(12) IB M1A Osen NO N/A N/A NOME Fittier 01 Condensate N'A N'A ICVA0232 POL DFMIN ISOL VALVE MIA OfE12t A.LS(K2) 1B 775'+9" Closed NO M1A MIA R (DRAIN IVA VALVF) Canned l'1 Condeneste NrA WA ICVA0233 POL DEMIN ISOL VALVE N/A OFD B2t A.I.S (H6) IB 775v Closed NO N/A N/A R (BACKWASH INLET M/B Cansed , UI Condeesete VALVF) N'A WA ICVA0237 POL DEMIM INOL VALVE N/A OfDI21 A.I.S(K5) TB 775v Claesd NO N/A M1A It Notes:
- Evaluathm type "NON E" indicates that equipnient is passise.
- Signatine group "RB" indkates that the equipment is a
- Ride of the Bes" item.
No seismic or relay esalustiasi required. The setsenk evaluation for these itemis is inchaded with the equipment
- Evaluatkin type "S** or "S*.R" indicater that equipnient is a liitted, passive, designated in the "Walkdown llest" field.
in-line devke. No nelsmk esatuation is required.
- Evaluathne type *NSSS* Indkates that the equipnient is part of the NSSS system
- Evaluation ty pe "S" indkates that a seismic evaluation was performed. and does not require a selsnile evaluation.
- Evaluatina type "R" indicates that a relay evaluatinas was perfiwaned.
- Tlac results of slee seM essluntion for mil equipment designated as "S" er "S R" can be located in Appendit D.1 (SVDS) by signature group. -
- Esatuneinn type "S,R" Indicates tlwt Imth a selsude and relay evaluation was performed.
- AB eppnsM ouhn can k Wed MmMn 11 & E2 by their Egidpnient Class & Outger Ref. No. P"I' 21 I'
b
..ua, .
Appendix B ! Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL)
. Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. Dwg/ Zone Bldg. Hoor Norm. State Power Supp Sys. Power Eval Group Ref. No. Sytem IIost Elev. Des. State Req'd Dwg No/Rev. Source Type (Cent) (Cant) (Cage) tient) Fant) (Cent) (ConL) (Cent) (Coat) tCent) treet) (Cent) treet)
(BRAIN titt VALVE) Useed I's Condensese N/A WA 3CVA0234 POL DEMEN bSOL VALVE N/A OFEt28 A.83 (Is) TB NtA Open NO NA N/A NONE EMhw US Caeleasete N/A WA $CVA023s POL DEMIN ISOL VALVE N/A Om 32tA-13(Is) TB N/A Open MO NA NfA NOME Ekhee Ut Condeneste N/A N/A ICVA0240 POL DEMIN ISOL VALVE N/A OFD 121 A-13 (Its) TB 77++0" Closed NO N/A NtA R (BAClOTASIR INLET wie Cineed Ut feedeneste VALVF) N/A WA ICVA0244 PDL DEMIN ISOL VALVE NIA Om l2t A-1.5 (K7) TB 7F+0" Closed NO N/A N/A R (DRAIN IVC VALVE) Cleeed U1 Ceedeneste WA WA ICVA0245 POL DEMIN t90L VALVE NA ()FEI21 A.13 (17) TB N/A Open NO N/A MIA MONE Either UI Condensete WA N/A ICVA0246 POL DEMIN ISOL VALVE MtA Om 121 A.1.5 (17) 75 N/A Open NO N/A NsA NONE FJther Ul Camdenssie ! N/A N'A ICVA0247 POL DEMIN ISOL VALVE N/A OFB121 A-13(Itti) TB 77F+0" Closed NO N/A N/A R (BArl(wASIIIMI ET wrD Closed UI Condeneste VALVE) N/A N/A ICVA0251 POL DEMIN INOL VALVE N/A OFD-12 t A-13 (Kle) TB 779'+0" named NO N/A MIA R (DRAIN UtD VALVE) Clueed Un Camdensei. N/A N/A ICVA0252 POI. DEMIN ISOL VALVE N/A Om121 A-13(Ito) TB N/A Open NO N/A N/A NOME , A Notes:
- Evaluation eype "NON E* indicates that equipinent is passive. Signature greesp "RB" indicates that the equipnient is a " Rule of the Box" itene.
Ne seisade er relay evaluation required. The seisade evaluation for these iteins is included with the equipnient
- Esaluation type "S*" or "S*,R" indicates that equipnient is a sugged, passives desituated in the "Walkdown Ilont" field.
in-line desice. No seisade evaluation is required.
- Evaluation typc "NSSS" ludicates that the equipenent is par 1 of the NSSS systeni
- Es atuation type "S" indicates that a scisnaic evaluation was perfarnied. and does not reqidre a selsnile evaluation. i
- Esatuation type "R" hidicates that a relay evaluation was perfommed.
- The results of the seismic evaluation for all equipnient designated as "S" or "S,R*
ran be located in Appendiu D.I (SVDS) by signature group.
- Es aluation type "S.R" indicates that both a selsude and relay esatuation was perfornied.
- All equipinent entilers can be located in Tables 8.8 & S.2 Page 22 by their Equipment Class & Outlier Ref. No.
O ee/u/ss Appendix B Composite Sak Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outtier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. Dwg/Zene Bldg. Floor Norm. State Power Supp Sys. Poner EYat Group Ref. No. Sytem Ilost Elev. Des. State Req'd Dwg No/ReV. Source Type ; (Ceno (Ceno (Ceno ICeno (Ceno (C m (Cano (C% trono (Ceno ttw3 tCeno poo ; Eithw t'l Condensate
}
N/A N/A ICVA02SJ FOL DEMIN ISOL VAL % E N/A OfiLI28 A-l.5 (110) TB Mia Open NO MiA N/A MONE Ehher l't Condensene N/ A N/A BCVA0294 POL DEMIN ISOL VALVE MIA OFILt2tA E3(n14) TB 775'*0" Closed NO N/A NsA R (SACILWAsH IMLET WIE (1osed I U1 Condensete VALVE) N/A N/A ICVAS298 FOL DFMIN INOL VALVE N/A OfikI21 A-13 (E12) IB 775'ee" Closed NO N/A N/A R (DRAIN tt/E VALVE) Clueed til Condensete NeA N/A ICVA0259 FOL DFMIN ISOL VALVE N/A OFD-I2tA-IS(fl2) TB N/A Open NO N/A N/A MONE Elther t!l Condenesse i N/A N/A ICVA6240 FOL DEMIN ISOL VALVE N/A OED t21 A 1.5 (Il2) TB MIA Open NO N/A MiA NONE Either t'l Condensete NrA N'A ICVAn262 Rt.I'RRV T AMK N/A OHk121 A-13 (ES) IB 773*+e" Closed NO N/A MIA R ISOLAI BON VALVE (1 Closed PI Condenoste VALVF) [ ICVAJ263 POL DEMIN IMOL VALVE N>A N/A N/A OFILI2t A-3 5(F9) IB 775'+0* Closed NO MIA N/A R (X VALVF) Gesed til rendenoste se N/A N/A ICVA026* SLt'RRY T ANK NIA OFIk t 21 A- 13 (DJ) IB 775'ee" Ctened NO N/A NtA R 6 IstlLAIHWG VALVE (L Clueed if1 Condensete VALVE) , N/A N/A ICVAG265 SLl'RRY T ANK N/A UFtk111 A-LS (D3) IB 775*+6" Ctened NO N/A N/A R ! Notes:
- Evahinthm ey pc "NON2" indicates that equipment is passive.
- Signature group "RB" indicates that the equipnient is a " Rule of the Box" itent.
- No setemic or relay evaluation required. The selsnde evaluathm for these items is included with the equipment .
- F.valuatiose t3 pe *S*" or "N*,R" hedicates that equipnaent is a rugged, passive, designated in the "Walkdown liest" field. !
In line desice. No selsnde esatuation is required.
- Evaluathm type *NSSS" bidicates that the equipnient is pesi of the NSSS systein ,
- Evaluation type "S" indicates that a selsnile evaluation was perfernied. and does not require a selsnile evaluathia.
- Esalusthm type "R" Indicates that a relay evaluation was performed.
- The results of the selsnile evaluation for all equipment designated as "S" or "S,R"
" * * "' I
- Evaluathm type "S,R" indicates that both a selsnile ar.d relay evaluation
,,, p,,g ,g,
- AII equipment outtlers can be located be Tables 5.1 & 5.2 by their Equirnient (1 ass & Outlier Ref. No. I'8'
( s . o ..1A-,1,. l Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdowlt Ref. Dwg/ Zone Bldg. Floor Norm. State power Supp Sys. Ptmer Eval. l Group Ref. No. Sytem Ilost Elev. Des. State Reg'd Dwg No/ReV. Source Type font ) (Cont.) (Cont.) (Cont.) (Cont.) (Cont.) (Cael) (CenL) (Cent.) (Cent.) (Cont) (Cent) (Cent) ISOLATION VALVE (D Oseed ffI Condessete VALVE) N/A N/A SCVA0266 IUL DEMlM ISOL VALVE N/A OFD12t A-13(F4) IB N/A Open NO N/A N/A NONF. Either If t Condenssee N!A N/A SCVAG267 POL DFMIN IMOR. VALVE N/A Olbl21 A-13 (F3) T'4 775'+0* Oused NO N/A N/A R (VR VALVE) Closed I!1 Condesmote N/A N/A ICVAft268 POL DEMIN ISOL VALVE N#A Of tk12t A-l S (Fit) TB 775'+0" Clueed NO MIA NrA R (QR VALVE) Closed I'I Candensate i NIA N/A ICVAn278 POL DEMIN ISOL VALVE N/A OFIkl11 A I S(K2) IB N/A Closed NO MIA N/A NOME rJther l'I Condensete N/A N/A ICVA0272 POL DEMIN ISOL VALVE N/A OID 121 A-l.5 (KS) TB N/A Desed NO MIA N/A NONE Ficher I'l Condensete N/A N/A 30VA9273 POL DEMIN IROL VALVE N/A Of fk128 A-I.S (K7) TB N/A Gosed NO N(A N/A NONE Either til Condensete N/A N/A ICVA0274 POL DEMIN ISOL VALVE NfA OED I2 t A-I.S (Kle) TB NIA Gosed NO MIA MiA NUME Eittwr t'l rendensate N/A Ni A SCVA0273 POL DEMIN ISOL VALVE N/A 05D B21 A 1.S (K12) TB MIA Gosed NO MIA MtA NHNE Elther til Condensate 21 N/A ICVA0391 HOTWFLL StiPPLY ISOL NsA OFD-12 t A-l.8 ( Kl2) IB 775'+0" Oesed NO N/A N/A 9.R Notes:
- Ewaluation type "NONE" indicates that equipmesit is passive.
- Signature group "RB" indicates that the equipnient is a " Rule of the Box"iteni.
No seismic or relay evaluathm required. The selsede evalestion for these iteens is buinded with the equipenent
- Esatuatiam type "S*" or "S*,R" indicates that equipment is a lugged, passive, designated in the "Walkdown Ilost" field, in-line desice. Ne seisade evaluation is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates that the equipment is part of the NSSS systeni
- Esaluation type "S" indicates that a seismic evaluatiose was perfosvned. and does not require a selsnile evaluation.
- Evaluation type "R" indicates that a relay evaluation was perfarined.
- The results of the seLunde evaluation for all equirenent designated as "S" or "S,R" ran be located in Appendis D.1 (SVD9 by signature group.
- Esatuation ty pe "S,R" hulicates that both a selsnile and relay evaluation was performed.
- All equipment outliers can be h>cated in Tables 3.1 & 8.2 Page 24 by their Equipnient Gass & Outtier Ref. Nu.
p - cofu/ss Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref' Dwg/ Zone Bldg. Floor Nurm. State Supp S3s. I%wer Power Etal Group Ref' No. Sytem Ilost Elev. Des. State Dwg No/Rev. Source Req'd Type (Co=Q (Coa 4 treat ) (Ceno (Ceno (Ceny (Cony (Cony Keny reno treaQ (C =4 (Ceau TOIDFFW M>rEN t'l Condeneese WA N/A ICVADB26 FOL DEMIN ISOL VALVE NIA OFILl21 A-l.5 (K3) TB N/A Cbeed NO N/A MIA MONE Ekber Ett Condemente WA WA ICVAnt29 POL DEMIN ISOL VARAE NtA 09%l2t A1.S tk6) TB MtA Closed NO N/A MfA MONE Elther ttt Condemoete WA RA ICVAns32 POL DEMEN ISUL VALVE N/A OFD B21A-1.S(kB) 18 N/A Claeed NO N/A MIA MONE Flther 18I Condensste WA N/A SCVA0sJ5 FDL DEMIN ISOL VALVE N/A DFlkt2tAl.5(K11) TB NIA Cheed NO MIA N/A MohE Fhher t'l Condensete WA WA ICVA0838 FDL DFMIN ISOL VALVE N/A Of1Fl2 t AI.5(K13) TB MiA Closed NO MIA NtA NONE Either til Condensate 32 N/A ID 600Y PPB ID (FOR N/A NO ELEMENT ARY RB B19'49" la servke YES GMS F IX182A SR til Presserizer Hesters FRESSt RIZER HEATERS In Servere C.kOl'P D RANK 2) l 35 N/A IDCA 125V DC IDCA MIA O.705 AB 796'+6" In service TES E703.C 1%514944 S.R l!! 325/250V DC rwR Im Service i 35 N/A IDCB I25V DC IDCB N/A U 705 AB 796'44" Is Service VES G703 C IXS2454D E,R t'l 125/250V DC FH R In Servlee to WA IDIAllMV 120V SI A11C INY lDIA N/A O.709 AB 796'+6" In Servko YES EK705 IBMAJ3 S,R la Service l'I 240/120V AC PWR Notes:
- Es atuation ty pe "NONE" indicates that equipment is passive.
- Signature group "RB" indicates that the equirinent is a " Ride of the Bos" itene.
No seismic or relay evaluation required. The seismic evaluation fier these iteins is included with the equipment
- Es atuathan ty pe "S*" or "S*,R" indicates that equigunent is a rugged, passis e, designated in the "Walkdown Ilest" fletd.
in-line desice. No seismic evaluation is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates timt the equipment is part of the NSSS system
- Evaluattain type "S" indicates that a seisade evaluation was performed. and does not require a seisade evalaminon.
- Evaluatiam type "R" indicates that a relay evaluation was perfimned.
- Tlw ruuks of the seismic evaluation for a8 eqidyment dedgnated as "S" er "S.R*
rass be located in Appendiz D.I (SVDS) by signature group.
- Evaluatism type "S R" indicates that both a seisade and relay evaluations n as performed.
- AM equipment outHen ran k located Maws 11 & E2 by their Egidpawnt dass & OutHer Ret No. P"ge 25
3 x cohi)ne Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name WCLdown Ref. Dwg/Zame Bldg. Floor Norm. State Power Supp Sys. Power EsBL Group Ref. No. Sytem Host EleV. Des. State Req'd Dwg No/Rev. Source Type 16 N/A IDIA/ PPB 12?V PPB IDIA NIA O.D5 AB B09'+0* Ia Servke TES G7BS lADA S,R In Servare Ut 12W2%V Dt' PWR 10 N/A IDfB4NV 120V ST ATIC l4V IDIB NfA U.705 AB 796'+6' le Servko TES G705 IDIS 33 S.R l'8 24W120V AC PWR In Servko 16 N/A IDIB/ PPB 125V PPB IDIB N/A O.703 AB 809'ee" le pervke YES G7DS IADB S.R la Servics t'l 125/2%V DC PWR 10 N/A 'DIC41V 820V SI AllC INV IDIC h/A G70$ AB 796'+6" le Mereko YES G705 1 D10.33 S,R In Servko Ut 24T120V AC PWR
?$ N/A IDICIPPB 125V PPB IDiC I O-703 AB 909'+0" In Service TES G705 1ADC S,R in Serske t'l 12N230V DC PWR 80 N, A IDID41V 129V SI AllC INY lDID N/A 0 705 AB 796'+6" In Servko )FS 0 795 IDfELJJ S.R In Service US 24N120V AC PWR 16 N/A IDtD/ PPB 125V PPB IDtD N!A O 795 AB 009'+0" In Service YFS G793 BADD S,R In Servke Ut 12N250V Dr PWR I N/A IDL2# PPB 2%V DC IDE 2 PPB MIA GMB AB 796'+4" In Servere TFS O.M B IDP M3CL S,R In Service US 1292%V DC PWR 31 N/A IDP 8292%V DC IDF N/A O.79%B IB 796'+6" Ba Servko TES G103 F IXO nt B 5,R Ut 1292%V DC P% R Ba Service RR N/A lEBt ELECT RICAL BOARD IEBl.a.EFl.3 NO FLFMENT ARY AB a22 In Servke NtA N/A MsA S.R US Central Boarde IFBI le Servko Notes:
- Evaluathm ty pe "NONE" indicates that equipment is passhe.
- Signature troup "RB" indicates that the equipnient is a " Rule of the Bos* Item.
No seisnde or relay evaluation required. The selsnaic etaluathm for these itenis is included nich the equipnient
- Evaluatism type ' S*" or "S*,R" Indica *es that equipenent is a rugged, passhe, designated in the "Walkdown llust" fleid.
In line desice. No seismic evaluation is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates that the equipnient is part of the NSSS system
- Evaluathan type "S" indicates that a seismic evaluation was perfornied. and does not require a sensade evaluation.
- Etatuathm t3 pc "R" indicates that a relay evaluation nas performed.
- Tlie results of the seismic paluation for all equipment designeWed as "S" or "S,R" can be located in Appendin D.I (SVDS) by signature group.
- Evaluation type "S,R" indicates that both a seisade and relay evaluation was perfornied.
- All equi Pment nedliers can be located in Tables II.I & S.2 by their Equipnient Class & Outlier Ret No. Page 26
b C' N O cB/sosB l Appendix B ' Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name WBikdown Ref Dwg/Zime Bldg. Floor Norm. State Power Supp S3s. Pmver EtBL (;raup Ref' No. S) tem llust Elev. Des. State Req'd Dwg No/Rev. Source Type l 59 WA I F BI-8.E F l.9 El Fri RICAL BOARDS N/A MOFLEMENTARY AB 822'+0" la serweee MIA NA '* 4 S.R , IEBt 8.FFI a le service 115 Control Buerde RB N/A 19 82 ELFCT RICAL BOARD R EBl.a.FF1-5 NO EEEMENT ARY AB S22 In Servko N/A MiA MsA S.R l'1 Centrol Boards IFB2 la servere RR N/A IFB3 ELB.CINICAL BOARD REBt S.EF14 NO ELEMENT ARY AB 822 In servke N/A MIA NA E.R UI Control Beeres 1EB3 la servtre RH N/A IFB4 ELECT RICAL BOARD IFBi s,F99 5 NOELEMENTA AY AB S22 In Servko MIA N/A N/A S.R Ut Contral Koerde IEB4 la Service RH WA IEFI FLFCT RICAL BOARD IFBI A.FFt.m NO FE FMFN . ARi AB 522 In Servire M!A N/A NsA %R til t'entroI Bnerds IFFE In Ser=ke pH WA IFt1 ELECT RICAL BOARD REB 14 FFI-8 NOFLEMENIARY AB S22 1 Service N/A N/A NA S.R l'l Control Baerds IEF1 la Fervice RH MA IFHCl FHC CAB IFHCl I k HC1.2,3 NO FLEMENI ARY AB SO9*+0" le Service N/A MIA N/A S.R l'1 Control Catrinets la !tervice 10 NA IF hcl.2J E HC COMI ROL CABINFT N, A N/A AB E89'+0" la Servlee N/A N/A N/A S.R IEHCI.2) le Service I'l Centrol Cabinets RR N!A IFHC2 FHC CAB IFHC2 R EHCl,2) NU ELEMENI ARY AB AG9'+0" In Service N/A N/A N/A S,R L'I Control Cohenets la Service kB WA lEHC3 EllC CAB IEHC3 IFHCI.2J NO FLFMENTARY AB DrP+0" le Servare NIA NJA N/A S,R lit Contral OstAnets la Service to N/A IFMIC1 E HC TERM CAB IEHICI N/A NO ELEMENTARY AB B09'+0" In Servko MtA N/A N/A S.R UI Control Oshinets in Service l 33 IFPSLPI E PSL FANEL IEPsLPt N/A N/A AB 909*+0" le Ser-tce N/A NsA N/A S.R Notes:
- Evaluation type "NONE" indicates that equipment is passive.
- Signature group "RB" indicates that the equipment is a " Rule of the Hex"itesn.
No setsude er relay evaluation required. The seismic evaluation for these items is included with the equipsisent
- Es shiathm type "S" or "S*,R" indicates that equipment is a lugged, passive, designated in the "Watkdown IInt.t" field.
in-line desice. No selsnde evaluathm is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates that the equipnient is part of the NSSS systent
- Evaluation 13 pe "S" indicates that a seismic evaluation was perfonned. amid does not require a selsnde evalusthm.
- Evaluation t3 pc "R" indicates that a relay evaluation was perfo wied.
- Tlie results of the seisade evaluation for all equipment designated as "S" or "S,R" cru be located in Appendis D.I (SVDS) by signature gruesp.
- Esatuathm type "S,R" indicates that both a seismic and relay evaluatious was performed.
- AII equipnient outliers can be located in Tables N.I & 8.2 by their Equipnient (1 ass & Outlier Ref No. Page 27
N
~
() h a eel 27/se J v Appendix B < Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 ' Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkduwn Ref. Dwg/ Zone Bldg. Floor Norm. State Power Supp Sys. Power Eval Group Ref. No. Sytern Ilost Elo. Des. State Req'd Dwg No/Rev. Source Type (Cent) (Cong (Cent.) (CoaQ (Cany (CeaQ (ComQ (Cany (Cone) (Ceny (Ceny (Ceny (cmay I'l Emergency Power la Service SwierMaa teak i N/A IFrSt r2 FfsL rANEL t 5 rStr2 N/A N/A AB S09'+9" In Serdeo N/A N/A NIA S,R Ut Emergency rower la Servke SulicWng Legle is WA IFSFAS FMFAS CABINETS N/A MO ELEMENT ARY AB E22'+W' In Serske N/A MIA N#A S.R { UI Control CsNast In Servko RH N/A RESIC1 ESFAS ODD Cll T ERM IESTCI.2 NO FLEMFNTARY AB SfW+0" Is Servko N/A NfA NJA S,R US Castral Cahinet CAR IESTCI le Servko 10 N/A IESTCI2 ESFAS CARINETS ESTC1,2 N/A NiA AB sirr+9" Be Servks MIA N/A NA S.R US Centret CeWnet la Service RH N/A IESIC2 ESFAS EVEN CIE T ERM IFSICl.2 NO FLEMENT ARY AB stW+0" laSwvko N/A N/A N/A SR Ut Centrol CsMnet CAB IESTC2 le Servko 63 N/A IFSTC2A ESFAS Al'X RLY CAB N/A NO ELEMENI ARY AB 309"+0" la servko N/A NtA N/A S,R RESIC2A le Service t'l Central reWnet I 11 N/A 1ESIC3 ESFAS FVENsOBD TERM N/A NO FLEMEN T ARY AB 309'+4" Re Serv 6ce N/A NtA NtA S.R ; Ifl ControI CsNnet CAR IFS f C3 le Service ! l 14A wA IFDWFEOR M I A EFW HEADF R FLOW N/A 0%I2 t B l.i tK9) Aa 7E3 Nat Used NO N#A MIA B*.R Be Nervles l'I Ensergency Feedwater $ NIA NIA IFDWFE0154 IB Elv HEADER M.OW N/A OFIk 121tkl.1 (D9) AR 796 Not Used NO N/A MIA M*.a la Servko l'I Entergency Feedwater 32 NrA IFD% FT0129 I A EFW HEADER FLOW N/A OHk121D.I.1(K9) AB 77F*6" Net t' sed )FS 0003 IKVIC499 S.R in Swvk. Notes:
- Evaluatkne typc "NON E" indkates that equipment is passive.
- Signature group "RB" hidicates that the equipenent is a " Rule of the Box" itena.
No seisade or relay esatuation required. Tine seisade evaluation for these itenis is included with the equipenent
- Evaluations typc "S** or "S*,R" indicates disat equipnient is a rugged, passise, designated in the "Walkdown llost" field.
in-line device. No scisnde evaluation is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" bidicates that the equipenent is pa 1 of the NSSS systein
- Esuluation typc "S" indicates that a selsenic evaluation was perforwied. and does not require a selsnde evaluation.
- Evaluation type "R" indicates that a relay evaluation was perforined.
- The results of the selsnile evaluatkun for all equipenent designated as "S" or "S.R" can be located in Appendit D.1 (SVDS) by signature group.
- Evaluation type "S R" indicates that lusih a setsude and relay evaluation
- AE equipnient outliers eman be located in Tables s.1 & s.2 was perfornied. l' age 28 by their Equipanent dass & Outher Ref. No,
k e.wb. Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconec Units 1,2 & 3 I L Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. DWg/ Zone Bldg. Floor Norm. State PnWer Supp Sys. Ptmer Eval Group Ref. No. Sytem Host Elev. Des. StBte Req'd DWg No/Rev. Source Type ro <conta (cono (c.no (c ena trenta (cwn r ia tc ia r ia tem) tema tc o t'l renertency Feedweter 32 f* A IFDWFT013e IB FFW HEADFR FIDW N#A OFIbl2tikt.l(D9) AB 790W NA Used YFS O-2795 301c 09 s.R la Servlee t'l Eawrgency Feedwater i 52 MA IFDWFTetS3 I A Ffw HFADFR FLOW N/A OftkI2tikt l (KT) AB 7EJ'+0" Net Umed YES 0 7a5 IKVIB 09 s.R TRANSMITTFR In fiervlee Ut Fawrgency Feedwater , I 12 MA IFDH Fl0134 IB Efw E3ADFR f1DW NIA OFikI215kI I (lW) AB 753'+0" Met Used YES 0.785 I K415-09 S.R TRANSMITTER Re service 01 Esmergency Feed = ster RR MA IID% H.10004 EfW r0Mr IA MOIOR IFDWrluno4 OFD.124AlJaK3) TR 7 F+0" Nat Used NO N/A N/A 5 cOGI.FR la servlee US Feeduster RR N#A IfDWH%ml0S EfW r0MP IB M010R IIDWrt4003 Ofik124A-lJ(13) TB 7F+0" Not Used NO N/A N/A 5 c0810ER la service nel Feedwater 10 MA IfBWLT0090 NGIAtEVEL N/A OF1kl2 3 8.lJ (.f t 2) RB 777+0" lo ses dee YFS E705 IBLVIA UB S.R TRANSMllIf R la Service 01 Essersency Feedwater le N/A IFDH LT0081 SG IB LETTL NIA OfD 1218-lJ(F12) RB 777'+#" In Nervice VFA O.709 IKVIAce 3,R
~
TRAMMMITTFR la service UI Euwrgeary Feedmiter 90 N/A IfDHI TonR2 SG I A LEVEL NIA OFD-1218-13 4fl4) RB 777'+0" In Service YES (k703 IKylgL g3 s,n TRANSMITT ER In Service UI f asergency Feedwater le MA IFDWLY0083 BG IB LEVFL N/A DElk1215-13 (F14) RB 777'+0" le servere TER O.701 IKVIIL l3 s,R TRAN14tTTFR la servire Notes:
- Evaluation ty pe "NONE" hidicates tliat equipement is passise.
- Sigrature group "RB" indicates that the equipnient is a " Rule of the Box" item.
No setsi .'c or relay evaluation required. The selsnaic evaluation for these iteins is incheded with the eqidpnient
- Evaluation typc "S*" or "S*,R" indicates that equipment is a rugged, passive, designated in the "Walkdown flest" field.
In-line desice. No seisnde evaluation is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates that the equipenent is part of the NSSS systens
- Esatuatiost type "S" indicates that a seismic esatuation was perfarnied. and does not require a seisade evaluation.
- Esaluations 13 pe "R" tudicates that a relay evaluation n as performed.
- The residts of the selsnile evaluation for eB equipment designated as "S" or "S,R"
"" "" I
- Esatuatiost type "S,R" indicates that both a seisade and relay evaluation was pehed.
- All eqidyment outliers can be located in Tables 8.1 & 8.2 by their Equipment dass & Outiler Ret No. Page 29
I p ( ochr/ss
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Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdonn Ret Dwg/Zame Bldg. floor Norm. State Power Supp Sys. Power Ev3L Group Ret NO. Sytem IIOst Elev. Des. StBte Req'd Dwg NO/RcV. Source Type (Cent ) (CenQ (CenQ (Cony (CanQ (ConQ (Ceny (Ceng (CenQ (ConQ (CenQ (c.nq qCenQ I!l Fenergeery Feedwater WA MA IFDWLT008A LOOF 2A STEAM NiA OM 2GI-N-79 RB 777'+4" Ia Service VES MIA Fewered By R CEi4FRATOR OITRATE In Servko I US Meln Turtdne LEYFL Y MNRMITTFR WA NA IFDWL1880A LOOF 2B S TEAM NA OM 281 II 79 BB 777+4* In Sereke VES N/A Fewered By R GENERATOR OPERATE la servere UI Mein Turidae LFYFL T MNNMITT FR WA WA IFDWLToSI A LOOP 3A SIEAM N/A OM 294-N-79 RB 777+4" In Service TES N/A Fowered By R CENERATOR OPERATE la Service UI Mein Turtdne LEVEL TMNSMITTER I N/A MA IfDWLT052A LOOP 3B STEAM N/A OM 201-H-79 RB 777+4" In Service YES NA Fewered By R CENERATOR OPERATE In Servira UI Main Turtene LEVEL TRANSMITT FR l RR WA IFDWMLOG46 FDWJ15 MANUAL t rBl,2; 1 ABl.2 0-422MJ4 AB S22 In Service NtA N/A NA S,R LOADER Im Service I t UI Fanersency Feedweeer RB WA IFDWML9847 PDWJt4 MANUAL 1031,2; I AB1,2 6422MJ4-03 AB E22 In Servke N/A N/A N/A SJB LOADF.R In Servko UI Fawrgency Feedwsser i RB WA IFDH PU270 SG I A LEVIL INDBCATOR 80Bl 2; t ABl.2 OfD l21B IJ p12) AB B22 In Service VES 4 775 IKVIE86 S.R i In Servko Ut Espertency Feedwater RB WA IFDu ce271 SU tB LEVD L INDICAIOR ll'Bl.2; TAB 1,2 OfD B21B lJ(FI2) AB 322 In Service VES O 778 SKYlC46 R.R in Servko U1 Esmorgency Feedesier RH WA IFD% F0272 SG I A LEVEL INDIf'AIOR It'Bl.2; I ABS,2 Olbl213.lJ p14) AB S22 In Survke VES E775 IIMC.06 S,R I. Servke [ t Notes:
- Es atuation type "NONE" indicates that equipment is passive.
- Signature group "RB" indicates that the equipement is a " Rule of the Ben" item.
No relude or relay evaluation required. The selsnile esaluation for these itenis is included with the eqelynient
- Esatuation type "N** or "S*,R" indicates that equipment is a rugged, passive, decignated in the "Walkdown llest" fleid.
in-line desice. No selsnde esaluation is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates that the equipenent is part of the NSSS system
- Evaluation type "S" indicates that a selsnde evaluation was perfarnied. and does not require a seisade evaluathan.
- Esatuation ty pe "R" indicates that a relay evaluation was performed.
- The results of the netsade evaluation for all equipment designated as "S" or "S.R" can be located in Appendin 111 (SVDS) by signature group.
- Evalu. tion t 3pe "S R" indicates that boili a sclede and rehey evaluatkui was perforneed.
- All equipment outliers can belocated biTables 3.1 & s.2 by their Equipment Oass & Outher Ref. No. l' age 30 1
e
C O
..o..
Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconec Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. DWg/ Zone Bldg. Moor Norm. State Power Supp Sys. Power Eval Group Ref. No. Sytem IIost Elev. Des. State Req'd Dwg No/Rev. Source Type (Capt ) (Cent.) (Cont.) ICent) (Cent.) (ContJ (Cent) (CentJ (Cent 4 (ConL) (Cent) (ConL) (Cont) L:1 Eneerseecy Feedweter RB N/A IFDWF0273 SG IB l.EVI'L INDICATOR IUBI.2; 1 AB1,2 OFIkl21ElJ (F14) AB 822 le Servko YES 06778 ID'IEst S,R la Servko f L'1 Eawrgency Fredwatee RR N/A IFDWro275 BA FfW HEADER $ LOW t t'BI,3; 1 ABl.2 Of1L11tD.I.1(t.9) AB R22 hea tised YES 0.795 llWBC49 ER IND In Service t'1 Emnergency Feed neer RR WA IFDWr0376 1B EfW mEADFR ELOW 11'BI,2; I ABS,3 OFD-12tikLl(89) AB E22 Nat Used YF3 n199 I KVIC-e9 B,R , I IND la Servko Ill Emiertenry Feedweter R9 N/A I m WrD277 lA FfW HEADFR FLOW 1081,2; I AB1.2 OFIkI211kl.l(L9) AB S22 Nat the VES Glie$ 2EVIC.es R,R IND la Service l'I Esmergemey Feedwever RB N/A BFDWro27s IB EfW HEADER FLOW lt'Bl.2; t AB1,2 Oft lL12tikt.l(B9) AB E22 Not tised YES OL705 IKVIB.09 3,R IND la Service t'l Emiergency Feedweter 1 N/A IFDWrS0306 IEF1"T LOW HYDRAl' TIC N/A OELl47.05 TB 775'+o" le Service NO N/A NiA S.R OIL PRESS SWITrit la Service til Emiertency Feedweter 39 N/A IFDWrS03S2 fWrlBCONTROLOIL NiA DELil7.99 TB 773*+0" In Sereke NO N/A N/A S,R FitESS SWITCH la Servere 01 Feiertency Fredweier i N/A IF1WrSc383 fWrT IB CONT ROL OIL N/A DEL 187-98 TB 779'+6" In Servire NO N/A N/A S.R FRESS LOW la Service f U1 Feiertency Feed = ster t i N/A B FDWrS03a4 fWr tA CONTROL OIL N/A DELil7.99 TB 775'+0" le Service NO N/A N/A S,R j FRF35 SWITCn la Servko ' Noter
- Evaluation type "NONE" indicates that equipsnent is passive.
- Signature group "RB" indicates that the equipment is a " Ride of the Box" iteen.
No seismic or relay esaluattom required. The scissinic evaluation for these items is included with the equipment
- Evaluathm ty pe "S*" eer "S*eR" indicates that equirnient is a rugged, passive e designated in the "Walkdown liest" fielet.
In line Jei tre. No selsude evaluation is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates that the equipnient is part of the NSSS systene
- Es aluathni ty pc "S" indicates that a selsude evaluation was perfonned. and does not require a seismic evaluathni.
- Evaluation type "R" indicates that a relay evaluation was performed.
- The results of the seisade evalisation for all equipment designated as "S" er "S.R" can be located in Appendix D.I (SVDS) by signature group.
- Esatuation ty pe "S,R* Indicates that both a selsude and relay evaluation was perfonned.
- AM equiP ment outhers can k located in Taws E1 & E2 by their Equipment Gass & Outlier Ref. No. I*E' 3I
s
. Bun,B
)
Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Narne Walkdown Ret Dwg/ Zone BIdg. Moor NorIn. State Power Supp Sys. Power Evat Group Ref. No. Sytem Host Elev. Des. State Req'd Dwg No/Rev. Source Type er o tr ni (Con) tr e> r.=o r =u r. u res < Con > ro eC.=o e ni esap til Fanersency Feedweier i N/A IfDWPSG385 FWrilB00NTROLDIL M!A OFE-Il7-95 TB 77?W In Sereke NO NtA NtA S.R FRFSS5.OW In Seevko UI Eniergeary Feedwoter i WA IIDWFS0386 MDENF R A DISrH FRESS N/A OFD.12 t h-l.1 IB 779'+1F* In Serske NO N/A MIA S,R LOW Im Serrke Ill Eanergency Feedweter i N/A IFDH FS03s7 MDENF R A DISCH FRESS MtA OFEI2tEl.3 TB 77T+0" In Sereke NO NtA MIA S,R IDW Ba Servke til Knwrgency teedwater i N/A B FDWFSG3sn SWFi lB DISCll FRESS N/A OED121B-l.B TB 779*+0" In Service NO N/A NtA S,R LOW In Sereke UI Enwrgency Feedwater I I N, A IFDWF903s9 FWF1 IB DLSCII FRESS N/A OFD 1218-1.9 IB 77T+0" In Servko NO N/A NrA S,R LOW In Servka UI Euwrgency Feedwater i WA If1JWPS1009 MAIN IWF DISCH HDR N/A OEE.I47-02 TB 77T W la servke NO NIA N/A S,R FRFSS SWITCH la Service UI Emiertency Feedwater 1 WA IFDWFS1019 MAIN IWF B DISCHARGE N/A OFE.147.02 TB 77T+0" la Service NO MIA N/A S,R FRESSl'RE SWITCH In Service I'l Fasergeary Feedester j WA SEDWFSICBI IVF I A CONT ROL OIL N/A OEE.147 02 TB 77T+0" In Servke NO N/A N/A SR ! FRFSSURE SHIICH In Servko I'l Fawrgency Feedweser i N/A IFD% rSIO12 rwrtBCONIROI.01L N/A ore.147.02 IB 775'+0" le Servke NO N/A N/A S.R FRESS SWIICH la Servtco %tes:
- Evaluatinen type "NONE" indkates that equipreent is passive.
- Signature group "RR" luelkates that the eq ', .:is a
- Rule of the Reu" itens.
No seismic or relay evalentlen required. The selsnile evaluation toe these itenes is included with the equipement
- Euluatiosi ty pc "S*" or "S*,R" indkates that equipmesat is a rugted Passiva, designated in the "Walkdown liest" field.
In line desice. Ne seismic evaluation is required.
- Evaluation type *NSSS" indicates that the equipment is part of the NSSS systein
- Esaluathina type "S" indicates that a seismic evaluation was perfonimed. and does not require a seismic evaluettosi.
- Evaluation ey pe "R" indicates that a relay evaluation was perfornied.
- The results of the selsnile evaluation for all equipment designated as "S" or "S R" can be located in Aprendix D.I (SVDS) by signature group.
- Esatuation ty pe "S R" indicates that both a seismic and relay evaluation
- AB equipment outtlers enin be located in Tables 3.1 & 8.2 was perft.rmed. Pete 32 by their Equipment cass & Outlier Ref. No.
O s b b maa., , Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref' DWg/Zane Bldg. Floor Norni. State power Supp Sys. PDWer EYat Group Ref. No. Sytem Ilost Elev. Des. State DWg No/Rev. Req'd Source Type (ConQ (Cent) (Coat.) (Cent) (Cent) (Cant) (Cent.) (Cent.) (CenQ (Cent.) (ConL) (CamQ (Cont.) UI Emiergeewy Feedwater 10 N/A IFDWFtMm3 TDFFW rt'MF N/A Ofbl2tEl t (E3) IB 77 Tee" Off Y*;S MIA STEAhl 5,R on Ut Emergemey Feedwater 3.J N/A IIVWFlume MDFFW P1'MPI A MIA OPD12tD S.1(IL2) TB 7 F+e" Off YES O.702 a f Das BR On U1 Fawrgency Feedweier 10 N/A IIVH Ft'Orm3 MDEFW r0MP IB NIA ODD-121D I.1 (C2) IB 7 F+e" Off YES tA7n2 ITF ee 5,R On t i Eniertency Feedwater RI4 N/A IFDWPY0129 I A FTW HEADFR FImW ISCLC 0-422 4547 AB 309 Not t%d YES O 105 In1B-09 s.R t (POWER 5t'ITLY) In 9ervice t'l Itamorgency Deedwster Rn N/A IFDW rY9130 IB F5W HEADFR FII)W BM;If (E422 MJ7 As see Not Used YES n1n$ in1B 09 3,R (POWFR St'FFLY) la Service UI Emergency Feedentee RB N/A IFDWFYO153 I A FFW READFR FDWFR ISCtf OFE-147J4 AB 309 Nat Used TES 0 705 t D1C.89 R.R SI:PPLY (H.OW IND) Ir Servlee l'1 Emergency Feedweter RB N/A IFDWF40134 IB FfW HEADER FOWFR IMCff OFE-147JS At 809 Not Used )ES n?OS 3 n'80.09 R,R st'rPLY(FLOW IMD) In Service UI Emergency feedweter Rn N/A IFDWrY20no ATWS POWER SUFFLY IATWSOP OFF 147.13 AB R3s Mot t'eed YES E704 IKt125 S.R (tWII I AMSACCHANNFL Be Service t'l Emiergency Feedweier 3) RR N/A IFDWrY2001 AYWS POWER SUrrLY 1ATWSCP OFE.147-13 At R3a Met Us=d )FS (1984 1ktL29 S.It (UNIT I AMMAC CHANNFL In Servlee Notes:
- Evahnat!*n 13 pe "NONE" indicates that equipment is passive.
- Signature group "RB" indicates that the equipment is a
- Rule of the Box" item.
No seisade or relay evaluathm requimt. The selsnde evaluation for these iteins is included with the eqsdpment
- Evshaathm type "S*" er "S*,R" indicates that equipment is a sugged, passise, designated in the "Walkdown ilest" field.
In line desice. No seismic evaluathm is required.
- Evaluathm type "NSSS" indicates that the equipnient is part of the NSSS system
- Evaluathm type "S" hidicates that a selsnde evaluation was perfotnied. and does not require a seisadc evaluation.
- Evaluation type "R" indicates that a relay evaluation was perforsned.
- W sestdts of the seismic evaluation for all equipenent designated as "S" or "S,R" can be located in Appendix D.1 (SVDS) by signature group.
- Evaluathm type "S,R" indicates that both a selsinic and relay evaluation was perfosined.
- All eqtdyment outliers can be located in Tables N.1 & IL2 by their Equipment Cass & Outtler Ref No. Page 33
c o Appendix B 2 ee'/2 tse Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) , Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 I Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walldown Ret Dwg/ Zone Bldg. Floor Norm. State Supp Sys. PuWer Evat Power Group Ret No. Sytem flest Elev. Des. State DWg No/Rev. Source Reg'd Type (C x) (CenQ (ConQ (CenQ (ConQ (Can4 (CenQ (ConQ (CenQ (CenQ (CanQ (ConQ (ConQ t t's Fnwegesey Feedwever 2) RB N/A IFDWSIOS29 I A EfW HEADFR FLOW ISCLC 4422.M47 AB 809 Not t:eed TES n199 1 D18-99 S.R f (ISOLAT FD SIGNAL Ic Service l t'l Enneegency Feed = ster TRANSMIT 1 ER) Rtl NA ISDwSlo839 IB FfW HEADFR fl.OW ISGLC 0-422-MJ7 At 809 Nat tfeed )FS G705 I D18-89 S,R (ISOLATED SIGNAL la Servere t's Fawrgency Feedeetse IRANSMITTF R) RB N/A IFDnSI0t33 IA EfW NEADFR ISGLC OEF 147 34 AB 909 Ne thod 1 FS n701 I D'tc.e9 S.R ISOLAT FD SIGNAL In Service Ifl Entergency Feedentee TRANSMITTER (51.OW END) PR N/A IFDWSletSS 1R EfW HEADER ISct.C OEF-147J5 AB S09 ht t'aed TFS E105 ID'IC.pt S.R ISOtAT ED SIGN AL In Service l'8 Eniertency Feedweter TRANsMII T F R (ll.OW t/n) i RR N/A IFDWSQRT0129 1A EFW ie? ADER F1.OW ISCLC (E422-MJ7 AB 909 Not t'oed TES G705 IKvlB 09 S,R (SQt'ARE Roev in Service l't Eniergency Feedweter EX1 RACIOR) RB N/A IFDWSQRT013e IB EIW HEADER F11h' ISGLC E422 MJ7 AB 909 Not tised YES n1U9 ID'IB e9 SR (SQtiARE ROOI la Servire l'1 Ensergency Ieedwater EXIRACIOR) RB N/A ISDWSQRT0153 I A EFW HEADER SQIFARE ISCLC OFF 14744 A8 an9 Nat tseed VFS 0.105 I kVic.09 S.R ROOT FXTRACTOR In Service t I Freergency Feedweter (FLOW IND) RR N/A IFDwSQRiots4 t B Ffw llEADER SQtfARE INCLC OFF 147 35 AB 909 Nat t'eed YFS 0.7Bs IKVIC-09 5,R ROOI EXTRACTOR In Servsee l'I Fewegency Feedester (FLOW IND) Notes:
- Es aluation typc "NONE" indicates that equipment is passive.
- Signature group "RR" indicates that the equipment is a " Rule of the Bos" item.
No seismic or relay evaluatiori required. The selsnile evaluation for these items is included with the equipnient
- Esalnation typc "S*" or "S*,R" indicates that equipment is a rugged, passive, designated be the "Walkdowa liest*- field.
In line desIce. No seismic evaluation is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates that the equipnient is part of the NSSS systent
- Es atuation type *S" indicates that a seismic evaluation was performed. and does not require a selsude evaluation.
- Evalentiers type "R" ludicates that a relay evaluation nas performed.
- The results of the selsnde evaluation for all equipsnent designated as "S" or "S,R" can be located in Appendiu D.I (SVDS) by signature group.
- Esaluattain type "S.R" indicates that both a seisade and relay evaluations was perred
- AII equipment outtiers can be located in Tahles 3.1 & 8.2 by their Equipenent Oass & Outtler Ref. No. Page M
s
- o. w ,.
Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Siginature Outlier Eqidpment ID Narne Walkdown Ret DwgIZone Bldg. Floor Norm. State Power Supp Sys. Power Eval Group Ret No. Sytem Ilust Elev. Des. State Req'd Dwg No/RcV. Source Type o RB N/A 17DWT R0003 Efwr IL RBtNE 1FDWFt1M03 OFD.122A-l.4 (Glo) TB 7*3*W Off NO NfA N/A S I brattled I'1 Emergency Feedestee 40 WA t FDWYAODR6 PRFRS REG TD Pt'MP N#A OID12Ik t.1(G3) TB 775*W (losed NO N/A NfA S SEA 13 Thrctued t't Fmeegency Feedwater 40 WA A FDWYA0087 PRESS REC T D rt'MF N/A OFB t2 t b t.l(G3) TB MW (1need NO MiA MIA S NFALS Threened I'l Feiergency Feedwater 3s N/A IFDWYA0105 SG 1A SAMPLE N/A OFE f 10A-l.1 (D3) RB 797+tr' Opeaktened VFS (MRS-G IXSt-RG6D S,R ISOLAllON (1need UI Einergency Feedweeer i N/A 1FDWVA01b6 SG t A SAMPLE N/A Ofb t idA-1 I (D6) An ED9*W Openklueed TIS 0 70% 3 Dia.23 S.R isotATION (1osed I'I Fmergency Feeduster i 24 MA IFDWVA0107 SG IB SAMPLE N/A OfD I t 0A- Li (F3) RB 7*7W O lwaktened VES O 193-G t%St-RtisE s.a [ ISOLATION Ctweed l 08 Fmergency Feedweter ) i
! WA IfDHVA0108 SG IB SAMPLE N/A OfD-IIGA t 1(f4) AB B09'+0" Opeakensed YES EMOS IDIB 29 S.R ,
ISOLATION 01need a l'1 Fmergency Feedwater 40 N/A IFDWVA0129 PRESS RFG T D FUMP N/A Of E12t D 1.l(C3) TB 775'+e" (laced NO N/A N/A S SEAT 3 Throttled 01 Fneerkenew Feedwe'ee e; RA 1FDRVA021: PRESS REC T D FtfMr N/A - OFE l2 t D-I.l(G3) TB 775'+0* Closed No N/A N/A S SEA 13 Throttled l vi Emeree.<r reedweter ! t Notes:
- Esaluation ty pe "NONE" indicates that equipment is passive.
- Signature group "RB* Indicates that the equipment is a " Rule of the Box" item. ,
No seismic or relay evaluathus required. The sessade evaluation for these items is included with the equipsnent l
- Evaluation type "S*" or "S*,R" indicates that eqidyment is a rugged, passivee designated in the *Walkdown llost" field, in-liste desice. No setsnde evaluation is required.
- Evahsation type "NSNS" indicates that the eqidpmes,t is part of the NSSS systeni
- Evaluations type "S" indicates that a selsnde evaluation was perfonned. and h not require a seismic evaluation.
- Esaluation t) pe "R" indicates that a relay evaluation was perfenised.
- The results of the selsnde evaluation for all equipnient designated as "S" or "S.R" can Iw located in Appendlu D.I (SVDS) by signature group.
- Es aluation type "S,R" indicates that both a selsude and relay evaluation was performed.
- All equirement outliers can be located in Tables 8.1 & 8.2 by fleeir Equipment Class & Outlier Ret No. Page 35
('
\
N oe/ar/sa ! Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) l Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name WalkdoWri Ref. DWg/Ztme Bidg. Floor Norm. State Power Supp Sys. I%Wer Eval. ; Gruup Ref. No. Stem 3 Ilust Elev. Des. State Req'd Dng No/Rev. Source Type t WA t FDWVA03 t 3 MDFfv FUMPIA NfA UFB iltlkt.I (Eta) As so9'+s= closed gg3 g yg5 3pgg yg g,g ISOIATHF4 T hromled til Enwrgency Feedwater i NA IFDWVA8386 MDEfW FUMP IB NIA OfD t2tB l.l(D10) AB 309'+ft" Cheed 1 ES GL7DS I DIC.13 S,R 8501ATION t hroetted UI Kawrgency Feedesert N/A N/A IftWVAG347 MDEfWFUMPIb MIA D3D B2ttkl I (Dt3) AB B22'+0" Open NO N#A ' . WA It tvitATION Open UI Fawraency Feedwater N/A N/A IFDWVA0368 T DEtwr MEADER R A N/A OFE S2tEl t OS) TB 77T+a" Opee NO MIA NrA R IsOIAilON open Ut Enwegemey Feedwater N/A N/A 1FDWVA0369 TDFEM P HEADER IB N/A 0FD 12I th i.l (D6) IB 775'+e" Open NO NfA N/A It ISOIAftoM open sin r ortery Feeduster WA N/A IFDWVA0372 MDEFW FUMP IA N/A OfD E11Ek t I(K7) TB 775*+e* Open No hiA Nia a ISOLATION open l's Fnwrgency Feed *3ter WA WA IFDWVAa374 SI ARIUFIREADER N/A UFD 12tEI.l #7) IB 775'+0* Clueed NO MIA N#A R ISOEATION Closed Ut Fawetency Fwd **ter N/A N/A IFDWVA0382 MDEFW FUMP IB N#A OFB I2 i n t.I (D7) Ik 773'+6" Open NO N/A NIA R ISOLATION Open I'l Fawrgency Feedwater N/A WA IFDWYA0384 STARit'F READER N/A OFIk12 tEI.I (D7) IB 775'+0" Clueed NO N/A MtA R ISOLATION Cheed Ut Emeergency Feedester Notes:
- Es aluation type "NONE" indicates that equipnient is passive.
- hignature group *RB" indicates that the equipment is a " Rule of tw 'lon" itena.
No seismic or relay evaluation required. The seisade evaluation for these itesns is included witle the equipment
- Evaluation type "S** or "S*,R" indicates that equipment is a avgEed, passive, designated in the "Walkdown liest" field.
in-line desice. No seisade evaluation is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates that the equipmesit is pad of the NSSS systens
- Esaluation type "S" indicates that a seismic evaluation was performed. and does not require a seismic esalentless.
- Evaluation type "R" indicates final a relay evaluation was perforened.
- The results of the selsude evaluation for aH equipnient designated as "S" or "S R" can be located in Appendin D.I (SVDS by signature group.
- Evaluation type "S,R" indicates that both a selssede and relay evaluation was fmned.
- AB equipnient outtlers can be located in Tables R.I & R.2 by their Equipenent Class & Outlier Ref. No. "I'
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)
Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) ; Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Rcr. Dwg/Zune Bldg. Rmr Norm. State Supp Sys. Power Eval Power Group Ref. No. Sytem Ilust Elev. Des. State Req'd Dwg No/Rev. Source Type N/A N/A IFDWVA0$49 1A MDEFDwP RECIRC NIA OlikI2 Elkl.l EJ2) TB 7 F+0" Open NO MIA MIA 3* REGt'LATOR Open US Eniergency Feedenter N/A N'A $ FDwYA45$8 IB MDEFDwP RECIRC N/A OFIk121tkl.l (EI) TB 775'+9" OPen NO NA h/A S* REGtLATOR Open t'l Eater ency Feedesier i N/A IHBP UNIT l HEATER M!A NO ELEMENTARY TB 512'oe* la servko N/A N/A NA A.R t'I Controi remel BLA%ETING PANEL In tervire l I N/A IMDPS0377 IST STAGE RH PREAS N#A DEE IS4 0$ TB 822*+9" la servke YES 0.193 R IX A.A.Fe:A s,R SwlTCH la servke I'l Mete Stesne I N/A lHPIFF9tMt2 IRP-31 VALVE NA OFD iel A-1.4 AB 773*+0" In servko TE5 O 7ttSA IKtLl9 s,R POSITIONER (IHril E/P) In servke US High Presserelajecties N/A N/A IMPfFFmm7 HPI A TRAIN INJ FLOW N/A ODD 101 A-lJ (312) AB N/A Nas Used NO N/A NA NONE ELEMENT In Servko t'l High Pressere Injection N/A N/A IHPlFFmuut HPl B T RAIN INJ FLOW N/A OFB lel A-IJ (Cl2) AB N/A Net t'oed NO NA N/A NOME ELEMENT In Service UI High Preescre lajection NiA N/A IHPIFEoG75 RCP EEAL INJ FLOW N/A OFD I9t A.I.4 (G5) AB N#A la Servke NO N/A N/A NOME ELEMENT In Service til Hish Pressere injection N/A NA SMPIFFol62 B LOOP INJ FLOW N/A OFD 191 A 1.4 (EN) AS NIA Not Used NO N/A N/A NONE F.LEMENT In Service til High Pressere Injection N/A N/A IHPtribMIA RCP SEAL SUPPLY N/A OF& t el A.R.4 (E4) AB 753 In Servlee NO N/A NJA 8* Notes:
- Evalmethna ty pe "NONE" hidicates that equirnient is passive.
- Signature group "Rll" indicates that the equipnient is a " Rule of the Bon
- Item.
Ne selsnde or relay evaluation required. The seisade evaluation for these items is included with the equipment
- Esaluathwi ty pe "S*" or "S*,R" Indicates that eqidpenent is a rugged, passive, designated be the "Watkdown liest" field.
la line desice. No seismic evahnations is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" isodicates that the eginpment is part of the NSSS system
- Evaluatime type "S" indicates that a scisnde evaluation was perfornied. and does not regidre a selsnaie evaluation,
- Esalusthm type "R" indicates that a relay evaluation was performed.
- The results of the selsnile evahsation for mE eqidyment designated as "S" or "S,R" can be located in Appendix D.1 (SVDS) by signature group. '
- Evaluatimi type "S,R" indicates that both a selunde and relay evaluatka was perfornied.
- AB equipenent outliers can be located in Tables 8.1 & 8.2 by their Equipnient Gass & Outlier Ref. No. Page 37
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)
Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name WalkduWn Ret Dwn/ Zone Bldg. Floor Norm. State Power Supp Sys. Power Eval Group Ret No. Sytem Host Elev. Des. State Req'd Dag No/Rev. Source Type (Cent ) (CamL) (Cent) (Cent) (Cent.) (Cent) (Cent.) (Coat) (Cent) (Cont) (Cent) (Cent) temat.) FILT FR le Serv 6ee t!t Hi h t PressereInjoetine WA N/A E MPIFim0B RCP SEAL SitPPLY NA nFILia14.8 4 (G4) AB 1a3 le servire NO NA NA s' FttTER in Servtre grg igigh Pioneers 'ojectina i N/ A IHMFT0007A HPI A TRAIN IN.f f1OW N/A OfD l01 A tJ tJ32) AB 7 T+0" Nat baed YF3 n1Rs 3 D14.ns S,R YRANS In Service 171 High Pressure Injection 1 N/A 3 HPtFTo00ltA HFI B T RAIN INJ FIRW N/A OID.tetA 13 (C12) AB 743r+9" Nat Used YES n7BS IM13-13 S,R TRANS In Service I'l H!gh Pressure Injection 10 N/A IHPIF10075 RCP SEAL INJ HEW NtA OFtk t01 A-l.4 (G9) AB 7R3'+4r* In Servko YFS 0 70%.A ICS Powra S.R TRANSMITTFE In tervice t'l High Pressure injectiam l NeA IHPIFTelet RC Pt'MP SEAL INLET MIA DELIST 53 AB 783'+e" In Service D ES n194 lEL2e S,R Ft OW XMT R In Service 181 High Pressure Injectlee i N/A f HrtfT9tD2 RC Pl!MP SEAL INLET N/A OEE-ISt.53 AB 783*+0" te Servko YES n704 t h120 AR l FLOW 1MT R la Servke UI Eligh Pressure injectine t N/A IMPIriet03 RC Pl?MP SEAL INLET N/A OFE-153 53 AB 783*+0" is Service VES O 704 11428 S.R 910W XMTR In Servere I!I Migh Pressure Injecthin f i N/A IMPIFIOt04 RClTMP SEALINLET N/A OEF 151-53 AB tt3'+0" In Service YFS 0.704 IEL2e S.R FLOW XMT R la Service I'l High PressureInjectica i I N/A B HPlFT0160 B IAM)PINJ f10W N/A Of1k tet A.I.4 (ES) AB 809*+9" Not tised YES O 705 I M1C- 13 S.R Notes:
- F.valuathm type "NONE" indicates that equipment is 3.assive.
- Signature group "RB" indkates that the equipnient is a " Rule of the Bes"itene.
Ne seismic or relay esatuathm required. The seismic esaluation for these items is included with the equipment ,
- Fvaluation type "S*" or "S*,R* Indicates that equipment is a rugged, passise, designated in the "Watkdown Ilost" fleid.
t In line desice. No selsnile evaluation is required.
- Evaluation type *NSSS" indicates flest the equipment is part of the NSSS systeni
- F.valuathm type "S" indicates that a seismic evaluation was perfarnied. and does not require a seismic esataathm.
- Evaluathm type "R" indicates that a relay evalentlem was perfismed.
- The Mn of alie seismic naluation for au equipment designated as "S" or "S,R" can be located in Appendix D.I (SVDS) by signature group.
- Es atuation t3 pe "S,R" indicates that both a seismic and relay evalethne
,,, p,,g,g
- All equipment outliers can be located be Tables 3.1 & B.2 by their Equipment Cass & Outlier Ref. No. I'"E' 38
_ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ = _ . . _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
w 0$yw//93 Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Watkdown Ref. Dwg/Zane Bldg. Floor Norm. State Power Supp Sys. Power Enl. Group Ref. No. 53tem Host Elev. Des. State Reg'd Dwg No/Rev. Source Type (Con 4 (Cont-) WenQ (CanQ (ComQ (Ceny (CenQ (Coot.) (CanQ fonQ fonQ (CenQ (ConQ IRANSMITTER Re servko US High Pressure lajecteam RB N/A IHP1HXfmot HPI Pt'MP I A MOTOR SHPIPUen95 UFik124EL t.l(IL11) AB 758'+0" Im 5ervice NO MfA NA S COOLER la Servke UI High Pressure Injecean pH N/A INPtHX0mt2 MPI PUMP IB MOTOR IHPIPt'un02 09D l24B l.I(li t) AB 74+0" In Service NO M/A N/A S COOLFR In Service F1 High Pressere Injection RB N/A IHf1H40nn3 HPi rlfMP IC MOTOR IMP 1Ptfont3 UFlkl245-1.1(HII) AB 7ss'+0" Not Used MO M/A MIA 8 COOLER le service Ul High Pressere Injection 10 NrA lHPlHX000A IST DirA'N COORTR I A N/A OFikl01 A-l.I (L4) RB 777'+e" le servko No MIA M1A S Met Used UI High Pressure injecitun to N/A INPlHX000B LET DOWN COOIER IB MIA OFikl88 A l l(34) RB 777'+0" Mos Used MO MlA NIA S Not lined UI High Pressure Injection 52 N/A IMPILT0033PI l DST isvet et N/A OFIElelA-lJ (CS) AB 77P+0* In Service VES tA70'LA likl 01 S la Servko US High Pressure Injectlen 12 Ns 4 IHPtLTen33P2 LD5f imet e2 MIA Of1Llet A.I.2 (CS) AB 770+0" le Service YES (L79tA th3 83 5 In Service Ut High Pressere injecthus RH N/A IHFIML0n64 IHPJSS MANUAL 10BI,2; i ABI,2 OFF-IS147 AB R22 In 5ervko YES (A705 timCJB7 s.R BRADFR la Servko l'1 Higen Pressure Injecune RR N/A IMPIPon25 RC PUMP REALINiti 1081,2; t AB1.2 OM-20t H491 AB S22 In Bervire VES (1705 llWIC-97 5.R Notes:
- Evaleathm typc "NONE" indicates that equipment is passive.
- Signature group "RB" indicates that the equipment is a " Rule of the Bos"itens.
No selsnde or relay evaluation required. The seismic evaluation for these items is included with the equirnient
- Esahiathat type "S*" or "S*,R" buticates that equipment is a rugged. passises designated in the *Walkdown Ilost" field.
in-line device. No seismic evaluation is required.
- Evaluathm type "NSSS" indicates that the equipnient is part of the NSSS system
- Evaluatiosi type "S" indicates that a seismic evaluation was perfernied. and does not require a seismic evaluation.
- E*ntuation ty pe "R" indicates that a relay evalusthm was performed.
- The results of the seismic evaluation for su equipnient designated as "S" or "S.R" can be located in Aprendix D.I (SVDS) by signature group.
- Esaluation t3 pc "S,R" indicates that both a selsede and relay evaluation was performed. " AII +9miPnient outlien can be located he Tables s.1 & s.2 by their Equipment dass & Outlier Ref. No. I"E' M
O O E es/s//ps Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconec Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. Dwg/ Zone Bldg. Floor Norm. State power Supp Sys. Power Evat Group Ref.NO. Sytem llost Elev. Des. State Req'd Dwg No/Rev. Source Type (Coat) (Cent ) (Cent.) (Cent.) (Cent.) (CanQ feat.) (Cent.) feaQ feaQ (CenQ fonQ feaQ FIDW INDICATOR la Servire UI M6gh Presswo Injeeden RR WA IHrtre319 HPI CROSSOYER FLOW 10Bl.2; l ABl.2 OFLl55-33-A AB E22 In Service MS n199 I tMC.13 S.R INDICATION la servlee i I High Pressere injection RB 16A INFIP0348 RC PUMP Al & BI SEAL IVBl.2J OFLl51-53 AB S22 le Service TIE E7BSA I SLF.29 S.R IMJECilON FLOW Sa Seevice l'I High Pressere lajectina RR N/A IHPlP0349 RC FUMP A2 & B2 SEAL IVBl.2J OEL151-53 AR 522 la Servire TES E10%A IKL20 S.R IM.fECTION ft OW te Service US mth Fressure injectlan RB MA IHPIPU360 E DST LEVFL INDICATION lt'Bl.2; t AB1,2 OFlk l05 A-lJ f5) AB S22 Is Service YES n70SA 01048 S.R In Service til m na Pressurelujunna , ER MA INFIPG363 Mrt A TRAIN INJ ilOW IrBl.2; l ABI.2 OFlkl01 A-13 (ll2) AB S22 le Service VES 0.704 E ISKJ 21 S.R IND in Service til H!gh Presswo injectinu RB l&A INFIPG364 HFI S T RAIN INJ FLOW ll'Bl.2; l ABl.2 OF&l8t A-lJ (Cl2p AB 822 Nat Used YES G704 E IMKJ-21 S.R IND in Servire , 11 High Pressues injection 52 l&A IRPIPSG357 LETDOWM FLOW 1EMP N/A DELISS.G3 AB 783'+0* In Servire TES O-705 IDIB 25 S.R HIGR INTERLOCK la service UI High PressureInjectlan 10 N'A IHPIFt'Oncl NFI PUMP I A NtA OfBlel A lJ (JaQ AB 798'+6" On/Off YIS O 'F92 11009 S,R On 01 Htah Pressere lejectlan 10 N/A IHPIPUnon2 IIFI PUMP IB N/A OfB161 A lJ (C5) AB 748'+0" On/Off YES 0.702 11 E-10 8,R Notes:
- Evaluation type "NONE" indicates that eqidpnient is passive.
- Signature group "RB" indicates that the equipment is a " Rate of the Ben
- Iteni.
No seismic or relay evaluathat required. The seismic evaluation for these items is included with the equipnient
- Evaluation type "S*" or "S*,R" indicates that equipnient is a rugged, passive, designated in the "Walkdown Itost" field. ,
in line desice. No seismic evaluathm is required.
- Evaluation type *NSSS" indicates that the equipment is part of the NSSS systeni
- Evaluation type "S" hulicates that a seismic evaluathm nas performed. and does not require a seisade evaluation.
- Es atuatkui type "R" Indicates that a relay evaluation was performed.
- The results of the selsnde evaluationi for all equipment designated as "S" or "S R"
- Evaluathni 83 pe *S.R" indicates that both a selsnde and relay evaluation r*" " P 5 SIE na M En*P-
- All equipnient entliers can be larated in Tables 8.1 & 8.2
,,, p,,.fonned. I"E' 4 by their Equipnient Cass & Outlier Ref. No.
obr.//98 Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ret DWg/Zt ne Bldg. Floor Norm. State Supp Sys. Power Evat Power Group Ret No. Sytem Ilust Elev. Des. State DWg No/Rev. Source Type Reg'd ir au w.=> tc== > tc o tc==4 tcom.: (c.au sc.=u tc o tc o ro ic u tr o um UI High Pressure Injectlam 10 N/A IMPIPUOnto EPIPUMPtC N/A Of%tet A-l.l (D4) AB 7W+G" Off TES O-702 115k89 S,R On US High Pressure injection RB N/A IMPISRol68 H:I CROM30VER FLOW eMTCl.2.3,4 OELI5tJ3-A AB N09W Pa Servire TES (MDS I KVIC.13 3,k SQRT EXT R IDOP In Service US High Preteere Iajectiese 26 N/A 1HPliK0001 LETDOWN STORACE NIA OfD ial A.I.2 (D6) AB 771**6 " le Service NO NA MtA S YANK Ie Servlee Un Hieh Pressure lajecenne N/A N/A IMPSVA0l#4 TDElvf 0ILCOOLER MIA 05W124C-8.2 C6) TB MIA Cineed NO NA NFA nONE ISOL VALVIE Either UI High Preware service Water I N/A N/A 1HPYA000I LETDOWN INE ET N/A OFD-16B A-l.I (K2) RB 777+0" OFFN NO NIA NfA NOME i IMOLATION Elther , US High Pressore injectica l N/A N/A IHPVA0002 LEIDOWN INLET N/A OfD181 A.I.l (.f2) RB 777+6" OPEN NO MIA N/A NONE 190LAYlON EMher 01 High Pressure lajection 31 N/A 1HPVA0003 LEiDOWN INOLATION N/A Of&l01 A-l.1 (L6) RB 77 Tee" OPEN ) ES O-783-K IKSF-FDic 5.R oneed Itl High Pressere injection j 33 N/A IllPVA0004 LEIDOWN INOLATION N/A OfD 501 A-l.l p6) RB 777+6" OPEN YFS Ek7n3-K IINF-FDtB S.R comed I'l Hlah Pressere Injectina Notes:
- Evaluation type "NONE" indkates that equipenent is passive.
- Signature group "RB"indkates that the equipnicat is a "Gule of the fles"liene.
No seismic or relay evaluathm regidred. He selsnile evaluath m for these Steens is hittaded with the eqidyment
- Einluation type "S*" or "S*,R" indicates that equipnient is a nigged, passive, designoted in flee "WaBute,wn IIost" field.
In-line desice. No seisade evaluatlosiis required.
- Evaluathm type "NSSS" indicates that the equipment is part of the NSSS system
- Evaluation type "S" indicates that a seisade evaluation was perfunned. and does not require a seissnic evaluation.
- Esatuation type "R" indicates that a relay evaluathm was perfonned.
- The results of the meismic esaluation far all equip.nent designatcJ ns "S" or "S,R"
*
- I "* E
- Evaluation type "S,R" indicates that both a seismic and relay evaluathm was perfarnied.
- All equipnient outliers can be located in Tables 3.1 & 8.2 by their Egidyment Gass & Outlier Ret New P"C' 43
O O coransa l Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) l Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. Dwg/ Zone Bldg. Door Norm. State Power Supp Sys. Power Eval Group Ref. No. Syteni Host Elev. Des. State Req'd D"2 No/Rev. Source Type 32 N/A t tIPVA0nDS LETDOWN ESOLATION N/A Omlel A-l.I (KS) AB kW+6" O I =e VFS O.7e9 IDiB-29 S,R (1ased US High Pressere Injectina 24 MA IMPVA0020 RCP SEAL RETT'RN NA Omlet ALI (F5) RB 797+6" open YES O.7n1K tX1F-ftt2C 5,R IMOLATION Chmed I'l nlah Pressure lajeceben I WA IHPVAGG2l RCP SEAL RETT'RN N/A OFD 191 AI.i tFT) Ra WW+e" Open Yrs n 1o* Dsaas e,R 1ROI.ATION (1 aced Ut n6th Pressureinjeruna 1* A MA IRPVAn022 LDST DRAIN N/A OSIO1 A.lJ (CS) AB 783 Closed NO N/A NA R Closed til High PressureInjecena Ni A NrA IHPVA0023 HPt LDMT St'CilON N/A OfD iel A.l.2 (Dl3) AB 783 Open No N/A N/A R ISOLATION Open Ut High Pressure injection i N/A IMPYA0024 BWST SUCTION N/A OF9101 AlJ (13) AB 77t"+4" (1 aced YES 0 793 G IISI-R')t D 5,R ISOLATION Open til High Pressere injecttom i N/A IllPVAOU25 BWST SUCTION N/A Omtel A-tJ (F3) AB 77t'+0" Clumed TrS 0.703-42 1452 RGIA S,R ISOEATION Open SY1 Stigh Pretsure lajeetten i N/A lHPVAmt26 HPI T RAIN l A INJECTION N/A OfD t91 A-l.4 (17) AB 909'*6" Cleeed VFS GL7034 IXSI Rn2A R.R Opee U1 attgh Prcosure Injection i N/A IMPVAdo27 HPI1RAINIB NIA OFD let A.I 4 (D7) AB BlW+9" Open VES O.7C34 IXS2-Rott S,R (EMFRCENCY) Open t'l H6th Pressere Injectlen INJFCTMtN Notes:
- Evaluation type "NONE" Indicates that equipenent is passive.
- Mignature group "RB* hidicates that the equipnient is a " Rule of the Box" itens.
No selsnde or silay es aluation required. The selsinic evaluation for fliese liesns is included with the equipenent
- Etaluation f3 pe "S*" or "S*,R" indicates that equipement is a rugged. Pa*She. designated in the "Wallidown liest" field.
in-line desice. No seismic evaluation is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates that the equipenent is part of the NSSS systeni
- Evaluatims type "S" indicates that a scistule evaluations was perfW nied. and does net require a seisade evaluation.
- Evaluation ty pe "R" indicates that a relay evaluction was perfor1ned.
- The results of the selssnic evaluation for eB equipnient designated as "S" or "S,R" can be located in Appendix D.1 (SVDS) by signatum group.
- Evaluation t)pe "S.R" indicates finat both a selsnile and relay evaluation was perfornied.
- All equipnient outNers can be located in Tables 8.1 & 3.2 by their Equipeneset Class & Outiler Ref. Nu, Page 2
m m
' .)
01r.-/93 Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL)
. Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. Dng/ Zone Bldg. Floor Norm. State Supp Sys. Power Eval.
Power Group Ref. No. Sytem Ilost Elev. Des. State Req'd Dwg No/Rev. Source Type le N/4 IMPVA0031 RCP SEAL i't3 FLOW MfA PFD.10l Al.4 (FE) AS 796'+6" Open#Cleoed YES G705LA ICS POWFR R,R CONTROL OpenTleoed 1.'l High Presswe lajernos N/A NA IllPVAseD9s HPI SI'CilOM MIA OFDIGI A-IJ G3) AB 74r+0" Open NO N/A MIA R CRottSOYER Open t'n High Pressure Injerdue i WA WA IRP% Aall$ HFI DIMCH READER WA OfD IGI A IJ (M11) At 7ss'+0" Open NO NIA NA R SEPARATION Opse UI High Presswo injection N/A N/A lHPVA0226 RCPSEAL REf t'RM ISOL N/A ODRI61A l.1 (C2) RB N/A Open NO NtA MsA MONE VALVE Ekher t'l High Preneure injectson i N> A WA IMPVAG228 RCP SEAL REit'RM ISOL N/A OED IOlA l 1 (F2) RB N/A Open NO MIA N/A NONE VALVE Ekhee t'l High Pressure Injectine N/A N#A IMPVA0230 RCP SKAL RFilfRM tW)L MIA OfDielA l.I (12) RB NsA Open NO NIA MIA NOME VALVE 93ther 01 High Pressure lajectieg 5 N/A MA IHPVA0232 RCP SEAL RET URN ISOL N/A OFDl01 Al.I {H2) RB N/A Open NO N/A N/A NOME VALVE Elther ! t's High PressureInjection WA N/A IHPVA027S RCP RFAL REllfRN INOL N/A DFDiel A-l l fES RB 797*4" Clused NO N/A MIA R VALVE Closed Ut Iflah Pressure Injection N/A N'A litPVA0276 RCP SF AL RF TURN ISOL N/A OFD-rot A-9.I (ES) kB 797+4" Clueed NO NrA NrA R VALVE Cheed t'l High Pressure injeche Notes:
- Evaluation type "NONE" indicates that equipment is passive. E Signature group *RB" indicates that the equipenent is a " Ride of the Bos" liens.
No seismic or relay etaluathm required. The selsnile evaluation for these tients is included with the equipnient
- Esaluation typc "S*" or "S*,R" indicates that equipenent is a rugged, passi,c e designated in the "Walkdown liest" field.
Iwline device. Ne seisasiir esatuathm is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates that the equipment is part of the NSSS systeni
- Evaluathm type "S" hidicates (list a pelssenic evaluation was perfornied. and does not require a selsnaic evaluation.
- Esaluation type "R* hidicates tlist a relay evaluathm was perfouweed.
- The results of the selsenic evaluation for all equipnient designated as "S" or "S,R" can belocated in Appendix D.I (SVDS)by signature group.
- Evaluathm t) pe "S,R" indicates that both a selsnile and relay evaluation
=as performed.
- AII equipement outliers can be located ha Tables 11.1 & 8.2 by their Hquipment Class & Outiler Ret No. Page d3
03/Af/98 Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. Dwg/ Zone Bldg. Floor Norm. State Power Supp Sys. Power EYat Group Ref. No. Sytem Ilost Elev. Des. State Req'd Dwg No!ReV. Source Type t N/A IHPVAa353 ItPI AL'X SPRAY N/A OEDiet A.I.4 (14) AB ser+6" CLil%ED TES E705 IKVIC47 5.R THROTILE *0PCL US High Presswe Injection N/A N/A IRPVAn40S ALT LETDOWN N/A OFD-letA 13(Mt0) RB 777+6" Cheed NO NtA NtA R BOttNDARY (1ased UI High Pressere injection i N/A IHPVA0409 IIPI CROSSOVER MIA OIDiet A.I.4 (Es) AB ser+0" (losed YES ENG IM3.02D S,R ISOLATION OpenK1need Ifl Ifish Presswo injecteam I N/A INPVA0410 HPI CRORMOVER N/A 05D t01 A-1.4 (H7) AB 309'+0" Cluesd VFa (b1G3.C 5 %SS-82 D S.R ISOLATION OpenMlosse Ut High Pressure lajecthus NrA N/A 1ItPVA04t? ALT LETDOWN N/A OFESSI At3(19) RB 77P+6" Cineed NO N/A NtA R bot'NDARY Ctesed I's High Freesere Injecelan 10 N/A IMPVA8426 ALT LETDOWM PATH N/A OFD.19t Al.S (.It0) RB 77T+0" Cleoed YES 3.101.E 1%SF-F04a AR ISOLATION *OPEN t's High Pressure lajecthMe to N/A IHPVA042s ALT LETDOWM PATH N/A OfD 19t A-l.S (113) RD 77 Pee" Cleoed D ES O.103-K IXSF.3 428 5.R ISOI ATION *0FFN Ut Hiah Pressure Injection 1 N/A IICC MA UNIT IICCM TRAIN A N/A NOELEMENTARY AB S22*+0" Be service YFS N/A N/A S.R CABINET in Service Ut Cure Fun TC 1 N/A IICCMB l' NET S ICCM TILAIM B N/A NO FLEMENTARY AB 822v In Service TES N/A N/A S.R CABINET Be Servere I'l Reactor Casdent Notes:
- Evaluation type "NONE" indicates that equipenent is passive.
- Signature group "RB" hidicates that the equipnient is a " Rule of the Hou" iteen.
No seisnde or relay evaluation required. The scinnile evaluation for these items is hwinded with the equipinent
- Evaluation type "S*" or "S*,R" indicates that equipment is a rugged, passive, designated la the "Walkdown fleet" fleid.
In line desIce. Ne selsnde etaluatten is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates that the equipenent is part of the NSSS systeen
- Evaluation type "S" indicates that a seisade evaluation was perforsized. and does not require a seisadc evaluatiosi.
- Evahration type "R" indicates that a relay evahmation was perfonncd.
- The resuks of the selsnile evaluation for mit equipsurnt designated as "S" or "S.R" can be located in Aprendis D.I (SVDS) by signature group.
- Evaluation type "S,R" indicates that both a selsnaic and relay esalusthen was perfonned.
- All equipenent outliess can be located in Tables 3.1 & 8.2 by their Fquipinent dans & Outlier Ret No. Page d4
~ s es/a-r/ss
)
Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdow i Ref. Dwg/ Zone Bldg. Floor Noren. State Power Supp SyS. Power Ev Bl. Group Ref. No. Sytern Ilost EleV. Des. State Req'd Dwg No/Rev. Source Type f 12 N/A IICS CABS IN TECRATED CONT ROL NA NO ELEMENTARY AB 822'+0" In Service TES N/A N/A S.R SYSTEM CABINETS Sn Servko j l'8 Control Caldnea 32 N/A IK 600V rrB IK(FOR MIA NOELEMENTARY RB SI t'+0" le Servko YES N/A N/A AR til Freeserker Hesters PRESSL RIZER HEAIFRS la Savvko l CRot'P K SANK 2) 32 N/A IKA 12CVPrBlKA N/A ELEMENT ARY NOT TB 775'+#" la Servko YES G703.C REC.F02AB S.It i t'l 2nsY PWR (FrB) Not tw i 3 N/A SEC B20V PrB IKC MIA 0 704 TB 796'+6" le Sert 1ce TES 0 703 81CB 9114BB S.R l'I 20sV FWR (FrB) la Servko , i i N/A IEC/XFMit RFMR IKC(600:20R:120V) N/A O.704 TB 796'+6" In Servko YES EL7u3 IKGR 994BB S In Servke I'l 20RV P% R (FFB) 10 N/A LEE 120V PPR ikE N/A O.704 AB 7 6'+6" le Servko Y FS nME 81F It#3AT S.R , Irl 20sV FM R (PFB) la Servko 16 N/A IKESP KEDWEE EM START N/A NOILEMENTARY AB 309'+0" fu Servko N/A N/A N/A S.R l'1 Canerni Penel PANFL la Servtre 5 37 IkG 120V PPB IEC N/A O-704 AB E38*+0" In Servko YES 0.703-F IXR-06BT 5.R l'8 2GBV FM R (FFB) la Servko ; I WA IKI 129V rFB IEI NsA EMA AB B09'+0" In Service i ES 0 7DS A INV ild S.R l'8 240tl20Y AC FWR *e Servko 10 N!A IkillNV ST ATIC INVFRIT R IES NsA n70tA AB 7 6'+6" In Serwke VES O.MA SADF S.R l'8 240tl20V AC r% R (INCLt'IES SI AIIC1tl.R In Servlee ! SW) i N'A IKitMW3BP STATICSWl1CH AND N/A O.70tA AB 796'+6* In bevko YES O.705. A INV iki S.R t IN% ERIER BYPASS la servko Notes:
- Esatuation type "NONE" indicates that equipenent is passive.
- Signature group "Ril" indicates that the equipnient is a " Rule of the Ilon" item.
No seismic or relay esaluation required. The sei nde evahsation for these items is included with flie equipment ,
- Es atuatiosi 30 pe "S*" or "S*,R" indicates that equipment is a sistged, passive, designated in the "Walkdenn llest" neld. L in hne device. No seismic es atuation is required.
- Evaluatices type *NSSS" indicates that the equipnieset is part of the NSSS systesa
- Evaluation type "S" indicates that a sensnnic evaluations was perfornied. and does not require a seismic evaluatima.
- Evaluation ty pe "R" indicates that a relay evaluation was performed.
- The results of the selsnde evaluation for all equipsuent designated as "S" or "S,R" ,
can be located la Appendiu D.I (SVDS) by signature group.
- Evaluation type "S,R" indicates that both a seisudc and relay evaluation
- All equirnment outliers can be located in Tables 3.1 A S.2 was perforined. Page e by their Egidpnient Class & Outlier Ref. No.
m s os ar/ss , Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID NBute Walkdown Ref. DWg/ Zone Bldg. Floor Norm. State Power Supp Sys. Power Eval. Gruup Ref. No. Sytem ilost EleV. Des. State Reg'd Dng No/Rev. Source Type (Cont.) (Cont.) (Cent-) (Cent.) (Cont ) (Cent.) (Cent.) (Cant.) (Cont.) (Cont.) (Cent.) (Cont.) (Cent) 012WW120V AC PWR SWIICH Ikl i N/A T KIf!EW/T T RANKFFR SWITCH lKI MIA O-MA AB 796'M" la servko YES O-?DSA INV 1kl S,R In Service l'I 24W120V AC FWR I N/A 1EI/XntR INotATIOM XFMR NJA E70SA AB 796*M" In Service YES O.705A INY 1KI S RHIFLDFD 1El In Servko Ut 24tk120V AC PWR I N/A IKRA 320V PPB IKRA NIA O.70i A AB 909*+8" In Nervko YF3 0-MA SA S,R l'3 2mv.20V AC PWR In Nervice 36 N/A IkRB 120V rPB akRB NIA n?OSA AB RU9'+0" In Scrvice T ES O'705A IA S,R E I 24W120V AC PH R In Servke i N/A IE5C 20st120V PU%TR N/A 4704A BR 796'+6" In Service YES t' MG IXSt-R4C 8,R , t'l 208V FW R (FrB) FANEIBOARDSESG In Service i N/A Ik3GIX mtR 60tW12VV PFB tkSC NfA 0 704A BN 796'M" In tervko VES G703 C l%5t Fn4C 8 1RANSFURhtFR Im Rervice l'I 2It#V FH R (PPB) r i N/A 1 Kt) 12evrrBtKU NiA t.L7 USA AB 8109'49" In servke 1 FS 0.M A INV IkU S,R US 24W12cv AC PH R la Nervko 10 N/A IkUtlNY ST AIIC INVERIER IKU N/A O.705A AB 796'M" In Servke YFS O 1BSA IADE S.R UI 2WW120V AC FWR (INCLl' DES SI ATIC If FTR Ia Service SWITCH) 3 N/A t ht 'f5WIB F STATICSWITCH AND N/A O.70SA AB 796'M" la $ervko Y FR O leSA INY t Eff S,R INVERIFR BYPASS In servke UI 2*W120V AC FW R RWITCH IKU t N/A I kt'tNWIT IRANSHR SWITCH IKU N/A GMA AB 796*M" In servko YFS 0 7DiA INV IKtt 5,R In Sert are e Notes:
- Evaluations type "NONE" indicates that equipnwnt is passive.
- Signature group "RB* indicates that the equipawat is a " Rule of the Rou" iteni.
No seismic or relay etatuathni required. The seisade evaluathni for these iteins is included with the equipnient
- Evaluation ty pe "S*" or "S*,R" indicates that equipinent is a asegged, passive, designated in the " Wall 6down liest" field. ,
in line desice. No selsnde evaluathne is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates that the equipnient is part of the NSSS systens !
- Es aluation type "S" indicates that a setsenic evaluatloen was perforie:ed. and does seet regidre a scissaic evaluathus.
- Es alusthni type "R" indicates that a relay evaluation was perforisied.
- The results of the selsnde evaluation for all equipment designated as "S" or "S,R*
an 8 Penh M @M h Qnatun gg
- Esaluation type "S,R" hidicates that both a selsnile and relay evaluation i was perfornied.
- M equi lnnent numen can k located in Tabin 8.1 & 83 by their Equipnient Omss & Outiler Ref. No. p"E' " ,
.. ~ . . . . . c w. -
b 03)n190 Appendix B i Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 l Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. Dwg/ Zone Bldg. Floor Norin. State Power Supp Sys. Power Eval I j Grot:p Ref. No. Sytem IIost EleV. Des. State Req'd Dng No/RcV. Soerce Type [ (Cent) (Con 4 (ConQ (ConQ (ConQ (ConQ (Cony (ComQ (ConQ (Cent) (CeaQ (CeaQ (Comy t!I 2ml20V AC FH R f I N/A IKUt%D%IR ISOLATION XFhlR NIA O 705A AB 796'+6" la Swvice TES G705A IN% IU S SHIELDED IKU In Servko t?l 240ft29V AC FWR M N/A IKVIA 120V PPB 1KVIA N/A O.705 AB 309'+0" la Servko YES O.10$ INV IDBA S.R j l'1240ft20V AC FWR In Servko M N/A IKVla 12cv rrsIKYIs NiA (A7US AB 309'+0" la Service TES G7DS INV IDl3 S.R f UI 240ft20V AC FWR in Service u N/A s kVIC 120V PFB lKVIC N/A B795 AB $m9'+0" In Service VES 0.70$ INV IDIC S.R _ l'8 24fWl20V AC FWR In Service M N/A IKYlD 12eV ITE B KYlD N/A O.705 AB 309'+0" la Swvice TES 0 70s INV IDID S.R US 26120V AC FWR In Service
% N/A IKX 12cvPPSIKX NIA O.705A AB 309*+0" la Servlee YES n?OSA INVIKX S,R US 24Gft20V AC FWR la Service 10 N/A IKX/INV ST AIICINVERikR lKX N/A G705A AB 796'+6" In Service TES 0 705A IADC S.R l'8 24fltt20V AC FWR (INCLifDES STATIC X5TR in Service SWITCH) I I N/A IKXtNW/BP STATICSWITCH AND N/A O.70SA AB 796'+6" Ie Service VES (A70SA INYlKX S.R INVER1ER 3) PARS la Service I'l 24ttl20V AC PWR SWITCH IKX a N/A IKX/SWIT TRANSFER SWITCH IKX N/A 3101A AB 796'+6" la tervice YES 0 701A INV ikX S.R In Service US 24Gf t20V AC FWR 10 -lA IL3 820VrPRIL2 N/A NO Fl.EMENT ARY A8 7'l *+0" In Servke YES E703.E IXN.leAB 8,R U2 Poet Accident Sanople la Service Notes:
- Evaluation type "NONE" indicates that equipment is passive.
- Nignature group "RB" indicates that the equirmient is a " Rule of the Box"iteni.
No seisude or relay evaluation required. The seisade evalentian for these iteens is included with the equipnient
- Evaluation type "S*" or "S*,R" indicates that equipment is a rugted. Passive, designated in the "Walkdown Ilost" fleId.
in line device. No seismic evaluation is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS' ludicates that the equipmenent is part of the NSSS systeni
- Evaluation type "S" indicates that a seisnaie evaluation was perfonised. and does not require a seismic evaluatiese.
- Evaluatiosa typc "R" indicates that a relay esatuation was perfonned.
- The results of the seismic esaquation for all equipenent designated as "S* or "S.R*
can be located in Aprendit D.1 (SVDS) by signatuit group.
- Evaluation type "S R" indicates that both a seisade and relay evaluation was perferined.
- All'1uipment outtlers caen be located tu Tables 8.1 & 8.2 Page 47 by their Equipenent Class & Outtler Ref. No.
1 y 08[s-//99
)
3 Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) ; Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 i Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Waikdown Ref. Dwg/ Zone Bldg. Floor Norm. State Supp Sys. Power Eval. Power ; Group Ref. No. Sytem Ilost Elev. des. State Req'd Dwg No/Rev. Source Type 1 39 IL2 t/ITS 12?V DC PPR IL25 N/A NU ELEMENTARY AB S22'*8" In Servko YES 0.705B IDL2.s4 8,R l'I Emiergency tJghting la Serstee RH N/A II P2.TI B LPI CDOLFR Dt'TLET IICS CABS NO FLEMEN T ARY AB B22 le Service YES NIA N/A S.R TEMP SIGNAL La Sers1ce i Ut Low Preesure tnjection CONVFRIER (Powered by [ ICS) RB N/A I LP2-I I 2 LPI COOLER OUI LET IICS CARS NO FLEMENTARY At 822 Is service YES NIA N/A S.R ' T EMP SIGNAL la Servke l'I Low Pressure injectica CON 4 FRTFR (Powered by i ICS) i N/A N/A IL PIFE0004 LPl iRAIN IB INJ f10W N/A f* '*2 A IJ (EI2) AB N/A Net t' sed NO N/A N/A NONE ELEMENT la servko t's Low Pressure Injective r NfA N/A ILPittuGOS LPt TRAIN I A INJ ILOW N/A OfD102A.tJ (E12) AB N/A Not Used NO NIA MIA NONE ELEMENT la Servko UI Law Pressure Injection i N/A II PIF10004P LP11 RAIN IB lNJ FLOW NIA OfDlo2A l.3 (E12) AB 809'40" Met Used YFS G705 IKVIB-t3 S.R 1RANS(Pomered by ICCM) Im Service 1:t Lew Pressure pajecteum I N/A ILPIFititNs5P LPI T RAIN I A INJ FLOW N/A OFIAIG2A-8.2 (KI2) AB 309'*6" Met Used YES 0.705 IKVIAJIS 5.R , TRANS(Powered by BCCM) la Servko t?t Low Pressure Injection 10 N/A 1LPtHX000A LPI COOLER JA N/A OfDIO2A-I.2 (Ks) AB 775'+0" Not Used NO N/A N/A 5 la Servke
- 08 Lew Pressere Injection I
10 N/A ILPtH10005 LPI COOLER 3B N/A OfDIG2A.IJ (E9) AB 771'+0" Not Used NO MIA N/A S ta Serrk. UI tow FreneureInject6am Notes:
- Etaleathm typc "NONE" indicates that equipnient is passive.
- Signature group "RB" indicates that the equipsnent is a " Rule of the Box" item.
No seismic or relay evaluation required. The seismic evaluation for these items is included with the equipment
- Etaluathm typc "S*" or "S* R" indicates that equipment is a rugted. PaSalves designated in the "Walkdown liest" f!cid.
in-line desIce. No seismic evaluathm is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates that the equipnient is part of the NSSS systens
- Es aluathm type "S" indicates that a selsntic evaluathm nas performoed. and does not require a seismic evaluatioet
- Evaluation type "R" hidicates that a relay evaluathm was perfornied.
- The results of the seismic evaluation for mII equipment designated as "S" or "S,R" can be located in Appendix D.I (SVDS) by signature group.
- Evaluation type "S,R" indicates that both a seismic and relay evaluation was performed.
- AII equipment outliers can be located in Tables 8.1 & 8.2 by their Equipenent Class & Outlier Ref. No. Page 4s
t 08/27/98 [ Appendix B
~
Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) , Oconce Units 1,2 & 3 i Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ret Dwg/Ztme Bldg. Floor Norm. State Power Supp Sys. Power Eval Group Ret No. Sytem Ilust Elev. Des. State Dng No/Rev. Source Req'd Type Rn N/A II_riL E tHm2 A awSTLEVEL ILPITKonel OFlkl#2AI.B al9) iD 796 In Rervice YES 0.793 ID1 AGE S.R { IRANRMITTER In Service t'l Low Ptesoure Injection f-RR N'A ILPirouBS RwsI TFMP ANDICATION S UBl.2; l ABl.2 OFD.302A 8.l(Ile) AB 822 la Service VFS N/A N/A R.R (PNEt'MATIC) In Servko UI low Pressure Injection [ RR N/A ILPf r0030 LPI I RAIN IB INJ H.OW IUBI,2; I ABl.2 OF1klo2 AIJ (Fil) AB E22 Net tleed TES O.105 IO1El3 S.R IND In Service t'l Imw Pressure Infec%n RH N/A ILPIPUO37 LPB I RAIN I A INJ FIDW ll'Bl.2; 1 ABI,2 OFB l02A-l.2 (.fl2) AB 822 Met Used TES 470$ IKYlA48 l 8,R END In Service I l'8 Imw Pressore Injecttius Rlt N/A E LPIP0346 BWNT LEVFL ll'Bl.2; I ABl.2 UFD 102A I.l(19) AB 822 Ba Servko YES n705 I KVIA.08 S.R INDICAf f0N le Service f l'I Low Pressure Injecha RM N/A ILPIP0342 LPI CEM3LER IEMP IUBlJ; 3ABl.2 NO FLEMENTARY AB 822 Be Service TES 4705A IKI-Ol S.R IMDBCATOR(Powered by la Service l'I l.ew Pressure Injection ICS) 10 N'A ILPtrl'onot ILPB rt'MP A PfA OFD iO2A B.2 (IO) AB 758'+0* Off % ES 0.702 ITC.16 S.R US Lew Presesre Injection i 10 N/A II.Pirt'om 2 ILPI PI'M P B N/A OFBklo2AI.2 (C3) AB 758'+0" Off VES 4 702 ITBkle S.R Ut Low Pressure injection ! f B0 N/A ILPtrUo003 IIPIPUMPC MtA OFlkle2AI.2 (E4) AB 75s'+e" Off YES 4 702 ITE te S,R ; On Ul Low Pressure Injection Notes:
- Evaluathm type "NONE" indicates that equipnient is passisc.
- Signature group "RB" indicates that the equipnient is a " Rule of the Bos" itent.
No seismic or relay evaluathn required. The selsnile evaluation for these itenis is included with the equipnient
- Evaluatiusi ty pe "S*" or "S*,R" indicates that eqidpinent is a rugged, passive, designated in the "Walkdown llost" field.
in-line desice. No setsenic evaluation is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates that the equipment is part of the NSSS systen
- Evaluatism sy pc "S" indicates that a seismic evalumflon was perfonned. and does not require a seisade evaluathm.
- Esaluattem type "R" imlicates that a relay evaluation was perfernied.
- The results of the meisade evaluation for all equipenent designated as "S" or "S,R" can be located in Appendix D.I (SVDS) by signature group,
- Esatuatism ty pe "S,R" indicates that both a seisade and relay evaluation was perfonned.
- All equipment outliers can be located bi Tables B.1 & 8.2 by their Equipment Class & Outlier Ref. No. Pete 49
s
~
ce/21]Se Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdow n Ref Dwg/Zame Bldg. floor Norm. State Power Supp Syn. Power Evat Group Ref. No. Sy tem Hunt Elev. Des. State Dwg No/Rev. Source Type Req'd I WA ILPIT E9299 1.PlCOOLER tB OUTLET MIA UFIk te2A.tJ (Et2) AB 909'ee" Net t' sed YES G70SA IKL25 8,R T EMP(ICS Impet) In Servire j UI Low Preneure Injectine , t WA ELPIT F021e LPI CDOLFR f A DUT LET N/A OFILIO2A.I.2 (LIU) AR 779'+9 Net Use4B YES O-70SA RKI.25 s,R IEMP(ICS inpet) In Servko Ut Low Pressure Injection i la N/A ILPITK0001 Ewsi N/A OFIAIG2A.B.I(IID) YD 7s6*ee" In Barvko NO N/A NiA S la Servke I Ut law Preenere Injection RB N/A 11.PITTUn01 A BwSITEMP ILPITKonnt OFTk te2 A-1.t (IIO) TD 796 Ie Servko YES N/A NA S,R TRANSMITTER In Servko UI Low Pressere Injection (PNFl'MATIC) i N/A ILPStrus22 DFCAY NEAT COOLFR N/A OFtht24EI.t TB 773'e0" le Serwke )ES (k705 IKVIE tt 5,R F1PCONVERIER In Service t*t Low Pressere Service atLPSw 258) weser i i NIA ILPSFPtsR23 DECAY BIEAT COOLER N/A Ollkt24B l.3 TB 775'oe" In $ervke YES 4 705 IKVIC-se S,R FJF CONYFRTFR In Servko Ut Low Pressere Servtre (1I PSw.252) woest i N/A N/A B LrsFLtMaol NORMAL St'PPLY FILT ER NIA C 814B l.l (L5) AB 7B3 la Servko NO N/A N/A S* TO HPI Pt'MP 3a Servko l'1 Low rreenere Nervke water N/A N/A ILPSFT. coo 2 EM SUPPLY HLTER TO N/A OFD 124E 1.l (FW) AB 7E3 In Servke NO N/A N/A S* HPI PUMP to Service ri e,w Pressere Ser ke water Notes:
- Fraluathm type "NONE" indicates that equipment is passive.
- Signature troup "RB" hadicates that the equipnient is a " Rule of the Box" iteen.
No selande or relay esalunthm reqidred. The sessenle evaluatkut for these items is included with the eqidpnient
- Evaluation type "S*" or "N*.R" indicates that equipmeant is a rugged, passive, designated in the "Walkdown Ifost" fletd.
in-line desIce. No seismic evahnation is required.
- Evaluation tyye "NSSS" indicates flint the equipnient is part of the NSSS systein
- Evaluation type "S" indicates that a seismic evaluation was performed. and does not reqidre a seismic evaluatloa.
- Evaluation type "R" indicates that a relay evaluathna was perfonned.
- Tlie results of the seismic evalusthus for all equipunent designated as "S" or "S,R" can be located in Appendix D.I (SVDS) by signature group.
- Evalusth n type "S R" indicates that both a scisnde and relay evaluathm was perfunned.
- All equipnient outliers can be located ha Tables B.I & 8,2 by their Equipseient Gass & Outlier Ref. No. Page 50
_ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - - _ _ _ - _ _ -l
. .. . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ . . . . _ . . . _ . . ._. . ~ _
i
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02/2f/98 Appendix B ; Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) ; Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 ; Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. DWg/ Zone Bldg. Floor Norm. StBte Supp Sys. Power Eval Power ! Group Ref. No. Sytem Ilost Elev. Des. State Req'd DWg No/Rev. Source Type I l NIA NIA ELPSFLm43 LPSw r0MP A PACKIW NIA UDDl24A-l.l(J6) IB 775'+0" In service NO MIA N/A S* SEAL E1LTER In Servko ti tow Free.we Servue w.ier l 1 N/A N/A ILPSFL0004 LPSW PUMP R PACKING N/A OfD124A.I.l (16) 4R 775'+0" In Serske NO MIA N/A S* SEAL F1LTER la Servtre Ut 14w Presswe Servko Weier i N'A NtA II.PSFleuG5 LPSW Pl!MFC PACKING N/A 05D B24A.I.I (D6) 15 775'+0" le Service NO N/A N/A R* ST.AL FILTER Im Service f 0i Lew Presswe Servke W.ier 10 N/A ELPSR000A LPSW Pt:MP A ST RAINFR N/A OfD124A-1.I(.83) TB 775'+e" In Servko NO N/A MIA B f la servko 5 Ut Low Presews Servko Water i> 10 N/A S LPSFIDub L PSW PI'MP B 91 RAINFR NfA 05DB24A 8 l(G3) TB 775'+0" le Serwks NO N/A N/A S ' In Service j t'l Law Proomwe Service Water t 10 Ni A ILPtR00nc LPSW PUMPO SIRAINER N/A OFD 124A l.l(D3) TB 77T+0" le Service NO N/A NsA $ la Servka l UI Low Presswe Service l Water 5 i N/A ILPSFict24 LPI COOLER I A FLOW N/A OfD 124El.I \ AB 770+0" la Service YES 0 705 IEYtEll S.R
- XMIR(ILPSW.251) In Service !
Ul Low Pressure Servko We,e, 1 N/A ILPSFT9125 LPI COOLER IB FLOW N/A OFIk124El.1 AB 770+0" le Service YES E705 IKVIC.18 S,R Notes:
- Evaluationi type *NONE" indicates that equipment is pessive.
- S'gnature group "RB" indicates that the eqidyment is a
- Rule of the Box"itent.
No scisudr or relay etatuation required. "llie seinante evaluation for these items is included with the equipement
- Esatuation type "S*" or "S*,R" indicates that equipinent is a netted, passive, designated in the "Walkdown llost" field.
in line desice. No seismic evaluation is required.
- Evaluation type *NSSS" indicates that the equipnient is part of the NSSS systemi
- Evaluatioen type "S" indicates that a seismic evaluation nas performed. and does not require a seismic evaluation. j
- Esa? nation type "R" indicates tinat a relay esalumfloen was performed.
- The resides of the selsnile evaluation for eB equipenent designated as "S" or "S,R" I" 'b
- Evaluation ty pc "S,R"leadicates siist botti a selsnile and relay esaluation !
was perfonned.
- All equipment outBers can be located in Tables 3.1 & 8.2 +
by tlicir Equipment Class & Outtler Ref. No. Pete 51
e e gw i
' \ /
03/af/99 Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) ' Oconce Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. Dwg/Zoae Bldg. Floor Norm. State Power Supp SyS. Power Eval. Group Ref. No. Sytem llant Elev. Des. State Req'd DWg NO/Rev. Source Type (Cent ) (Cont.) (Cent) (Cent.) (Cent ) (Cont.) (Cont.) (Cent) (Cent.) (Cont.) (Cent) (Cent) (Cont.) X MI R (1 LFSW.252) In Servko itI taw Pressure Servke Water N/A N/A ILrSMJUU09 LFSW FUMP A EXP OINT N/A OF1kI24A-1.B (J4) IB NIA In Servke NO N/A N/A NOME In Service US Law Pressure Serslee Water N/A N/A ILPSM Rioto trSW PttMr B EXP Altml NiA UFEkl24A t.I(C4) TB N/A In Service NO N/A N/A NONE la Service Ut Lew Pressere Servko W.te, I N/A N/A BLP5MAmit LPMW Ft<MFC EXFJOIMI N/A OHil24A R.l(D4) it NIA In Service NO N/A N/A NONE ta Servko [ US tow Pressure Service Water I i i NrA IIJ'SFS0095 LFSW HEADER PRESSURE NIA OFD-124 Art.I(08) TB 775*+0" In servko YES 0 704 IKFAB S.R In Service ! I'1 law Presseee Serv % Water t N/A ItXSFSH096 LPSW HEADER PRESSt'RE NIA ORkl24A-l.l(J8) TS 775'+0" la Servlee YES 0.704 IKFAs R.R ; la servko ! l'1 tew Pressere $revice Water 10 N/A I L PSFt'D001 LFSW Pt'MP A N/A OFIkl24A-1.t(35) TR 77 Tee" Onteff YES O 702 IIC.I2 S.k ; On i Ut Low Pressere Sereke W.t.r i to N/A ILPNFIm0H2 LFSW PUMP B N/A OFIkt24A.I.l(CS) TB 77Teo* Ontoff YES O-102 81tkISI2TIA S.R , On Notes:
- Evaluathna type "NONE" hidicates that equipnient is passive.
- Signature group "RB" indicates that the equirnient is a " Rule of the Box" item. I No scinide or relay evaluation required. The scissnic eratuatiosi for these items is included with the equipenent ;
- Evalention tyye "S*" or "S*,R" indicates that equipsnent is a rugged, passhe, designated ha the "Walkdown Ilost" field.
in line desire. No scismic evaluation is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS"ludicates that the equipment is past of the NSSS systems
- Evaluatkaa type "S" indicates that a scissule evaluation Was performied. and does not requier a seismic evahastion.
- Evaluation type "R" indicates that a relay evaluatima Was performed.
- The results of the selsnde evaluathm for au equipnient designated as "S" or "S R" r can be Incated in Appendis D.I (.WDS) by signature group.
- Evaluation type "S,R" hidicates that both a selsnde and relay evaluation ,
was perfarnied.
- AB equipsunit matBers can be located in Tables 11 & 12 ;
by their Equipment dass & Outtier Ref. No. Page 52 ; I
~h h (G J ..w..
Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name WalkdoWn Ref. DWg/ Zone Bldg. Floor Norm. State power Supp Sys. Power Eval. I Gnsup Ref. No. Sytem flost Elev. Des. State DWg No/Rev. Req'd Source Type (t eat.) (Cont.) (ConQ (CanQ (Cont.) (CeaQ (ConQ (Cony trant.) (Cony (CenQ (CeaQ (CeaQ t'l Ime Pressure Servke Water 10 NrA ILPSrtM1003 LPSW Pl1MP C N/A 05D124AB.l (D9) TB 775'+0" Ontoff YES 4 1702 2TC.Il S. De til tee Pressere Sereke Woen NsA N/A ILPSVAliU01 LPSW PtfMP A StCTION N/A OFDl24A.I.l(D2) TB 775'+0" Open NO N/A MiA R ISOI, VALV E Open l'1 lew Preeevre Servko Weier i N/A N/A ILPSVA0002 LPSW PllMP B StfCTION MIA Olv l 2eA.I.I (.32) TB 77P+o" Open NO N/A N/A R BSOL VALVE Open f III Low Pressere Serwke Water i N/A N/A ILPSVA0003 LPeW PtfMP C SITTION NfA OfD124A l.l(G2) TB 775N9" Open NO N/A N/A R ISOL VALVE Open t's 14. Pressure Service Water 10 N/A ILPSVA0004 LPI COOLER IA MIA OFS 124E R.l(K6) AB 7a3'+0" Cleeed YES *Wi c S KSt.RG3D S.a ISOLAYION VALVE Orem til 84. rreesure Sereke Water 1 WA ILPSVAon0* LPlCOOR.ERIB N/A DEDl248 5.l(H6) AB 783'+0" Closed VES 4103.C 1%S2 Rn2C S.R ISOLAIION VALVE Open til 14. Prese Servke Weter gA wA ILPSVA0006 SI'PPLY lSOL TO RC N/A Ofbl241L t.4 (L2) TB N/A Open NO N/A N/A NONE Pl!MPCOOLERs ruber trI to. Presser Servke Notes:
- Evaluatlan type "NONE" indicain that equipenent is passive.
- Signature group "RB" indicates that the equipment is a "Hule of the Bos" iteen. '!
No seismic or relay esaluation required. The selsude evaluation for these items is included with the equipnient
- Evaluation type "S*" or "S*,R" Indicater that equipment is a rugged, passive, designated in the "Walkdown Ilust" field.
In line desice. No seismic evaluation is required.
- Evaluatiost type "NSSS" hidicates that the equipnient is part of the NSSS system
- Esatuation type "S" indicates that a seismic evaluation was perfornied. and does not require a selspiie evaluation.
- Es aluation type "R" indicates that a relay evahsation was performed
- The residts of the seismic evaluation for all equipenent designated as "S" or "S,R" '
can be located in Appendix D.I (SVDS by signature group.
- Evaluation type "S R" indicates flut both a seisade and relay evaluation
- was performed.
- All equipment outliers can be located bi Tables 8.1 & S.2 by their Equipment Gans & Outlier Ret No. Pate 53
os W /ss Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Narne Walkdown Ref. Dwg/ Zone Bldg. Floor Norni. State Power Supp Sys. Power Eval Gtusp Ref. No. Sytem IIOst Elev. Des. State Dwg No/RcV. Source T3pe Req'd (Cont) (Cont) (Cont.) treat.) (Cent ) (Cent) (Cent) (ContJ (Cent) (Cent) (Cent) (Cont) (Cent) weier N/A NA II P5VAno07 RCF COOLER ISOLAIION N/A Olb t 243- 8.4 (IC7) RB N/A Open NO N/A N/A NOME VALVE Either UI Low Freeewre Servko s weier , I WA N/A ILFSVAnous RCPCDOLER RROLATION N/A 05BI24E RA (Ce) RB N/A Open NO N/A NtA NOME VALVE Ekher l't law Fressure Servko water i NA WA ILPSVAnne9 RCP COOtIR l50LATION N/A Ofbl248 I.4 (FF) Ra N/A (1pse NO MIA NtA NONE t VALVE Elther 5 til Law Pressere servke water l MA WA Bl PSVA0019 RCP COOLER ISOLAllON N/A Opht24E SA(ta) Ra N/A Opse NO MIA NtA fetDE VALVE Etel.or f I't Rew Pressere Serwke Water N/A N/A t t.PSVA0011 BCP COOLER IMOtATION N/A OPEt24El.4(GII) RB N/A Open NO N/A N/A NONE VALVE Ekker t'l Low Pressere Nervice wow N< A N/A l I' MVA4012 B'!? COOLER ISOI.AIION N/A OIDI24E-I 4 (Cll) RB NtA Open NO N/A N/A NONE g VALVE Elther t'l Lew Freneure Servke water MA N/A ILPRVA0013 RCP COOLER IMOLAllON N/A Olbl24R-I 4 (LB) RB N/A Open NO N/A N/A NONE VALVE Either vsI ,=rrese. e h vke water Notes:
- Evaluation type "NONE" ludicates that equipment is passive.
- Signature group "RB" bidicates that the equipment is a " Rule of the Box" item.
No seismile er relay evaluation arquired. The selsenic evaluation for these Eems is included with the equipment
- Evaluathm t3 pe "S*" or "S*,R* Indicates that equipment is a rugged, passive, designated in the "Walkdown liest" field.
In thee desire. No seismic evaluation is required.
- Evaluation ty ye "NSSS" indicates that the equipenent is rart of the NSSS systens
- Evaluathm type "S" indicates that a seismic esatuation was perfernied. and does not require a selsnde evalentions.
- Evaluathm type "R" indicates that a relay evaluatloss was perfositied.
- The results of the seismic evahnation for aB equipnient designated as "S" or "S R" can be located in Appendiu D.I (SVDS) by signature group.
- Evaluathm type "S,R" indicates that both a selsniac and relay evaluation was perforined.
- All equipment autters can be located in Tables 8.1 & 8.2 by their Equipsnent Mass & Outlier Ref. No. Page 54
_ . _ _ _ _ _- . _ _ - _ _ _ . _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . 2
O
- s. v ..i.ri,.
Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Oi.tlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. DWg/7;me Bldg. Floor Norm. State Supp Sys. Power Eval Power Group Ref. No. Stem IIost Elev. Des. State Dwg No/RcV. 3 Reg'd Source T3pe NsA N/A ILPNVA0014 RCP COULER INOLAT HM N/A OFtk I24EI.4 (C9) RB N#A Open NO N/A N/A NONE VALVE Ftther UI Low Freenere Service Water N/A N'A ILF5VAHU15 REl t'RN ISOL FROM RC N/A OF1k1248-l.4 tC14) IB MIA Open NO N/A N/A NONE PtfMFCOt4.rRS Either l'I tew Pressure Service
% ser N/A NA ILPSVAUDI6 RBCU I A St'PrLY VALVE N/A OFILI2431.2tK3) AB B09'+0* Open hC NtA N/A R O Pea l'I l.ow Freesure Nerves Water I N/A ILPSVA00!$ RBCtf lA REll'RN VALVE N/A OFtk124R_1.2(D3) AB ser+n" Ihrthf YES D 793-C 1155 RG3E S.R Open l'I Low Freesers Servko Water N/A Nh* li r5VAGU19 RBCU 1B SE'PPLY VALVE N/A OFtkI245.5.2(Es) AB #09"+e" Open NO N/A N/A R Open t'l Low Poesoure Servlee Wster i N/A s t.PNVA0023 RBCU 1B REl ttRN VALVE N/A OFD B24B l.2(DS) AB IM9'+e" Thrtid TES O'703-G IXS3 ESC 8.R O l **
l's tew Pressure Servko Water N/A WA ILPSVAnn22 RBCU IC st!ITLV VALVE N/A OFtht24ER.2(K12) AB 309'+e" Open NO N/A N/A R Otwa ra t,= rrese re se-vice Water i N/A ILPSVA0024 RBCU tC REit'RN VALVE N/A OFIkt24El2(D12) AB 309'+e" Thrtid VES O.703-C IKS2-R02D S.R Notes:
- Esaluationi type "NON E" indicates that equipment is passive.
- Signiature group "RB" indicates that the equipsinente is a " Rule of the Bes" itent.
Na seisenic er relay evalenthese required. The selsnaie evaluatioen for these items is included with the equipement
- Es atuathm type "S*" or "S*,R* Indicates that equiernent is a meged, passive, designated in the "Walkdown Itost" field.
In line desice. No scisinic evahnmelusi is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates that the equipnient is palt of the NSSS systema j
- Esaluathisi type "S" indicates that a seismic evait .a was perrenned. ased does not require a selsnite evaluation.
- Esaluatiosi type "R" indicates slist a relay esaluation was perfornied.
- The results eithe seismic evaluation for all equernment designated as "S" or "S,R"
"" *
- I " *I
- Evaluathwi type "S,R" ludicates that both a seisuiir and relay evalumflosa t was pehied.
- All equipenent euthers can be located in Tables 8.1 & 8.2 '
by their Equipenent dass & OutNer Ref. No. age 5 r
p m , ot/27/se Appendix B Composite Scre Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) ; Oconce Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. DWg/Zame Bldg. Floor Norm. State Power Supp Sys. Power Eval Group Ref. No. Sytem Host Elev. Des. State DWg No/Rev. Source Type Req'd tc o icono ic o (c o (c o (c o (Como (c.no tc o (c o (c o cc o cc a) l (4== I tra Low Freewe Rervke Watee , 21 N/A ILPNVAus37 IDEfW IM)LAllON N/A Ofbl24A-1.BaKII) TB 775'+0" cleeed YES a7s).C Igc_ROSD S.R VAL % E Open j
^
t'I L.w Pressure Serelce Wetse ( N/A N/A ILP5VAel3s TDEfW ISOLATION N/A OfDB24A-RJ(LII) TB N/A closed NO N/A MIA NONE ! VALVE Either l'1 LAe Pressere Servko Weeer 64 WA ELPSVA0139 N ' Heeder leristle. N/A OfEI2441.I(Kle) IB 77T+0" OPEN YES O 19343 BIS 3 EAR s,d Vetwo cIDSED I'l Imw Pressere Serwks Watee 44 N/A ILPSVA0175 LP5W PtfMP A SML N/A Ofh t 24A.B.l (K5) TB 775'+e" Throttled NO N/A N#A S 51DW REC Throteed ri a.. rre.e-e ser.ke Water { 44 N/A # LPSVAOIS2 LP5W Pl!MP B 5EAL N/A OfW124A-l.I (H5) 13 775'ee" T hrottled NO N/A N/A S ! f1EW REC Throttled , iti Lew Preneure service , Water r 44 N, A ILP$VASIs9 LPMW Pt'MPC SEAL NfA OfD 124A-l.l (E5) IB 775'+0" Throttled NO N/A N/A S 51DW REC Throttke j 1:a te.Premureser ke Weter i 21 N/A ILP5VA0251 LPl COOLER I A N/A OfD B248-l.t(ks) TB 775'+8" closed YES a705 IKVIB.is s.R - cONIROL VALVE Ope. f Notes:
- Esshameless type "NONE"indkates that equipnienet is passive.
- Signature group "RB* Indicates that the eqidpenent is a " Rule of the Box"itenu.
No seismic or relay evaluation required. The seisade evaluation for these items is harluded with the equipment
- Esaluations type "S*" or "S*,R" tudkates that equipneemt is a rugged, passive, designated in the "Walkdown llast" tield. j in line deske. No seisade evaluation is required.
- Esaluation type "NSNS" indicates that the equipment is pas 1 of the NSSS systena ;
~
- Esalaationi type "S" indkates that a seisade esaluathe was perfonned, and does not require a selsnile evaluation.
- Evaluati.m type "R" bidicaw
- hat a relay evaluntlem was performed.
- The resuks of the selsnile evaluation for mE equipnient designated as "S" or "S,R" can be located in Appendix D.t (SVDS) by signature group.
- Evaluation type "S,R* isedkm.cs that both a selsnile and relay evaluatten I was performed.
- AB equipment outliers can be located in Tables 8.1 & 8.2 by their Equipment Class & Outlier Ref. Nr. I*E' M
i e m -
\
- ,,,a ,j ,,
Appendix B , Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) '
. Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. DWgflone Bldg. Floor Norm. State Power Supp Sys. Power Eval Group Ref. No. Sytem IInst Elev. Des. State Reg'd DWg No/Rev. Source Type -
(Como rg (Cony (Cony (Ceau (Ceny frang (Ceny (Cong (Cen4 (Ceny Keny (Cony ; l'1 taw Preemare Serwke Water 21 N/A ILPSVA0252 LFI COOLER IB N/A OHkI248-t t(Hh is M+0" Clueed YES OW t KVIC.te S,R CONIROL VALVE Open t* see Freenere servke Water 9 N/A ILPSVA0284 CONT VAC PRIMING ISOL N/A OFik124A.I.3 (JR) IB 775'+e" Open TES 0.103-A a15-833 S,R VALVE ('Eused Of Low Pressere Servko Water I i 44 N/A ILFSVA0290 CONT VAC PRIMINC ISOS. N/A OFD-124A-t J (M TB 775'*e* (1 pea % ES G703-A IXB43C fR t VALVE Cluead Ut Low Freneure Servko Water ameme N/A N/A ILPSVA0M12 LPSW TO CufLLER ENND NIA OFD-124A-3 2 (32) is N/A Open NO N/A N/A NONE esOL raher 01 Imw Pressere Serwke Water 21 N/A ILPSVA0516 E5W Pt'MP t A LPSW N/A OFik t 24A-tJ(K5) TB 775'+0" Cluned ) ES G785 tDtB 32 S.R filotAIBON VALVE Open UI Emeergency Feedwater 21 N/A ILPSVAp525 M W r0MPtBLrsW N/A OFD-124A IJ(15) TB 775**0" Closed VES 0.705 IDIC.28 5,B ISOIAIBON VALVE Open til Emeergency Feedwater 24 N/A ILPSVAUM5 Ra At'X COOLERS N/A OFILI248-RJ(Js) RB 797+0" Open TFS 0 703-C I KS3-83CT S.R St'PPLY VALVE Closed t!! 14w Pressere Servke We,er Notes:
- Evaluation t)pe "NON E" hidicates that equipment is passive.
- Signature group *RB" indicates that the equipnient is a " Rule of the Box" iteni.
No seisade or relay evaluation required. The selsniic evaluathm for these f tenis is included with the equipment
- Evaluation type "S*" or "S* R" indicates that equipment is a rugged, passive s designated in the "Well denn liest" field.
in-line device. No scisnde evaluation is required.
- Evaluathm type "NSSS" indicates that the equipment is part of the NSSS systesu .
- Evaluation type "S" indicates that a schuile evaluation was performed. and does not require a seismic evaluation.
- Evaluathm type "R" indicates that a relay evaluathm Was performied.
- The results of the scisenic evaluation for all equipnient designated as "S" or "S.R"
- I
- Evaluath.n type "S R" indicates that both a selsnde ased relay evaluation
,,, ,,,go,g,
- AII equipment outBers can be located in Tables 8.1 & 8.2 by their Fquipement dass & Outlier Ref No. Page 5
I i w 08/2I/98 [ Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) ; Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. Dwg/ Zone Bldg. Floor Norm. State Power Supp Sys. Power Eval Group Ref. No. S3 tem Ilust Elev. Des. State Dwg No/Rev. Source Type Req'd v 10 N/A ILPSVAG%6 RBCtf 3B INLET VALVE N/A OEDt24ER.2(Is) RR 797*+0" t1ased YES G7034 IEs1.e303 %R O l *a t's 14w rrenew.Sw.ke Weser N/A N'A E LPSVAuT72 RBCU TO RIA rtOL MIA OEDI24&IJ (D4) AS N/A Open NO Ni N/A NOME l VALVE EMher I l'1 las= Pressere Seroke Wster t WA WA ILFSVA RBOU TO RIA ISOL N/A OfDt245 lJ (DS) AB N/A Open NO N/A N/A NONE VALVE Fisher til tew Frenews Service Weier WA N/A ILPSVA0774 RBOU TO RIA ISOL N/A OrIlt t24B.I.2 (D13) AS N/A Open NO N/A N/A NONE VALVE Ember I'l Lew Pressure Service water
$2 N/A ILPVAGGGt Ift DROPLINE RSOL MIA OEDt02A R.I(H2) Rt 797e4" Closed YES 4703 G IX514U4D S,3 ,
f ROM kCS *OPEN ! t'l Low Pres ==re injection f NiA 11PVA0002 I PI DROPLINE ISOL MIA RB 797e6* l 52 OEDIu2A I.I(II2) Onsed YES OL7034 IX514DSC S.R ' f NOM RCS *UPEN , 1:1 Lew Freeswe injection 1 N/ A ILPVAtHW3 LFI MOT LEU stCTION N/A OfD te24-1.I (Hs) AB No9'+9" Closed YES O 103- P 1XO R03E 5,R 0 =a I t's tew Prenewe sajecmon WA wA ILPVA0005 LPI Pl%IPI A SUCTION N/A DER IO2 Art.l (FIO) AB 753'e0" Upea NO N/A N/A R f Osaa , til Law Frenewe Injection Notes:
- Evaluation ty pe "NONE" indicates that equipenent is passive.
- Signature gewup "RB" indicates that the equipsiaent is a " Rule of the Box" item.
No seismic or relay evaluatimi required. The seisnile evaknation for timese iteins is inebded wkh the equipment x
- Esaluation type "S*" or "S*,R" hidicates tient equipnient is a rugged, passive, designated in the "Walkdown llost" fleid.
in Ikie desice. No schmit evaluatkus ts required. * ' Evaluations type "NSSS* indicates that the equipment is part of the NSSS system i
- Evatuation ey pe "S" indicates flu = . a selsnile evaluation was perforined. and does niet require a seismic evaluation.
- Esatuations type "R* Indlemtes timmt a relay evaluation was perrerined.
- The results of the selsnaic evaluation for all equipnient designated as "S" or "S,R" can be located be Appendix D.1 (SVDS) by signature group.
- Evaluatloan type "N,R" bedicates that botta a scissiele and relay evaluathne +
nas perf'ornied.
- AII equipment outliers can be located in Tables 8.5 & 8.2 by their Equipment Class & Outfier Ret New Page 58 ;
}
i
087,ey98 Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. Dwg/Zame Bidg. Floor Norm. State Power Supp Sys. Power Eval Group Ref. No. Sytem llost Elev. Des. State Req'd Dwg No/Rev. Source Type I N/A t LPVAuuu6 LFI St3CTION NtA OFb le2AR.l (ES) AB 758'+0" Cleoed YES O.101D IXtAnE S.R CROSSOVER *OrEN l'I Imw Pressure lajeceke I N/A ILPVA0007 LPI St'CTION N/A OF& t02 A.I.I (DB) AB 758'+0" Clueed TES 4703-E 11N.osE S.R CROS2 VER *OPEN I'l 14w Pressure Injection NiA N/A II FVAnone tit rt'MF 1B St'CTION MIA OFE t02Al.I FE) AB 758'+0" Open NO N/A N/A R Open I'l L were Injecibe N/A N/A 1LPVA0009 LPI CROSSOVER N/A OFB IO2 A.I.2 (17) AB 7Nr+0" Ctaned NO N/A N/A R Chised I:l lmw Preneure Injection N'A N/A II PVAnett I.PI CROSSi:VER N/A OFD.102A l2 (C7) AB 758*+8" Clueed NO N/A N/A R Clueed t's law Pressure injection N/A N/A t LPVA0ut t LPI COOLER I A N/A OFE102A.I.2 (K7) AB 778'+0" Open NO N/A N/A R ISOLATION Open t's now Pree.ure injecen to N/A ILPVA0012 l#ECOOLERIA NiA OFEle2A-tJ tK11) AB 773'+e" Open YES 3 70342 IXSt-Rol A S.R ISOLAllON Tlirectled t'l Rae Pressure lajecteun N/A N/A ILPVA0013 LFI COOLER 3B N/A OF&l02A l.2 (E7) AB 771'+8" Opr 3 NO MIA N/A R ISOLATION Open l'1 tew Pressure Injecitun to N'A ILPVA0014 LFI COOLER IB N/A OFE t02A-1.2 (El t) AB 771'+0" Open 1ES 0 703.G 8%S2-R02A S.R ISOLATION Thromd t'l Low Pressure Injection Notes:
- Evaluation type "NONE" indicates that equipnient is passise.
- Signature group "RB" indicates that the equirenent is a " Rule ef the Box"Ifens.
No seisade or relay evaluation required. The sensade evaluation for these itenes is inchaded whh (Ine equipmenet
- Evahistion type "S*" or "S*,R" indicates that eqidyment is a sugged passive, designated in the "Walkdown liest" fictd.
ha line desice. No seismic evaluation is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates that the equipnieset is part of time NSSS systena
- Evaluathm 13 pe "S" indicates that a seisade evalusthian was perfarnu d. and does not regidre a selsnile evaluation.
- Evaluation type "R" hidicates that a relay evalisation was perf'o rnied.
- The residts of the selsnile evaluation for all equipament dedgnated as "S" or "S.R" can be located in Appendix D.1 (SVDS) by signature group.
- Esatuathm tyye "S,R" hidicates that both a seismic and relay evaluethm was perforniaed.
- All equipmer outliers can be located biTables 8.1 & 8.2 by their Equipnient Gass & Outlier Ref No. Pete 59
Appendix B ce/n?se
)
Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. Dwg/ Zone Bldg. Moor Norm. State Power Supp Sys. Power EvsL Group Ref. No. Sytem Host Elev. Des. State Dwg No/Rev. Reg'd Source Type 10 N/A E LPVA0035 RPito nPtiRSS N/A Ofh te2ARJ (EtI) AB 77I'+0'* Closed YES G703-D IXIA *D 5.R FICCY RACis IRAIN B A *OPM1 I'114e Presswo Injecuen 10 N/A II.PVAfiol6 LPlio nPS/RBS N/A OtBIO2A12 (D11) AB 77t'+0" Closed YF3 Ow7G).E g gM.39D S.R PICCYBACK TRAIN IB *OPrCL l's les tveesure injeccan i N/A ILPVAGGI7 t.PIIRA!NIAINJECTHIN N/A 05D182A-lJ (l(13) AB 809'+0" Closed YES 07034 IXSI-FBes S.R IsotATION Open t!I Low Preneure injection 1 N/A II.PVAHes s LPIIRAIN IB I'tJECilON N/A 05D ie2A l2 (E13) AB 809'+0" Claced YES O'103 4 IXS2-51ME S.R ESOLAIR)N Opee I?I Law Pressure Injection I N/A ILPVA0029 RB hi st'MP S1TTION MfA Ot% 382A-8.l (D*) AB 758'*0" Clumed YES O-193 4 IXS3#$D S.R
*OPICL t'l Law Pressure lajection t N/A t LrVAun20 RB F%E Rt*fr 5t'CIION MIA OFRie2Al.I tD5B AB 738*+0" Closed YES O 703 4 IXS2.Ro4C 5.R
*DPfCL l's I em Preneurs Injectiene 52 N/A II PVA002 t BWST StrCTION MIA 09E RG2 A-l.I (9~7) AB 77t'+0* Open YFS NIA N/A S.R ESollilON
- CLOSED til Low Pressure Injection 12 N/A ILPVA0022 RwST SITTION MIA 05B t 02 A-t I (C7) AB 779'+0" Open itA N/A N/A S.R IMOIAllON
- CLOSED l'1 Low Pressure Injection 12 N/A ILPVA006l SwST VACE't%8 N/A ODD 502Al.I (JIO) TD 796'+6 Closed NO N/A N/A S BRFAKFR Open 121 Low Freneure Injection Notes:
- Etatuation typc "NONE" indicates that equipenent is passive.
- Situature group "RB" indicates that the equipenent is a " Rule of tlie Box" lleni.
No seismic or relay evaluation required. The seisade evaluation for these leenis is luctuded with the equipsnent
- Esatuations typc "S*" or "S*,R" indicates that equipinent is a rugged, passive, designated in the "Wakdown 11est" ficid.
in line device. No seinnic evaluation is required.
- Evaluation type *NSSS" indicates that the equipment is part of the NSSS systeni
- Evahistion eypc "S" indicates that a seisnde esatuations was perfarnied. and does not require a selsnaic evaluation.
- Evaluation type "R" indicates that a relay evaluation was perfornied.
- The results of the seismic evaluation for all equipnient designated as "S" or "S,R"
'"" I "" b
- Evaluation type "N,R" indicates that both a selsnile and relay evaluation
,,, ,,,.fmied.
- AE equlPanent ou&rs can be located in Tables 8.1 & a.2 by their Equipnient dass & Ou&r Ret No. p"I' "
__ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - . _ . - _ . _ . . . - - _ - _ _ _ _ = .--- _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ - _ _ _ -
O ( U ) ove. Appendix B i Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. Dwg/ Zone Bldg. Floor Norm. State Power Supp Sys. Power Etat. Group Ref. No. Sytem Ilest Elev. Des. State Req'd Dwg No/Rev. Source Type ! I N/A ILPVA0069 t.FI swilCHOYER FLOW N/A OF D 192A l.2 (H7) AB 758'+0" Closed TES 0 7tt3 E IXN-89E S.R 7 mNTROL *OrtCL
- UI lew Pressure lajectka N/A N/A II FYA6193 BnRON DELt'llON MIA USR B02A l.l(H2) RB 797+4" Closed NO N/A N/A R IMOLATION Closed t'l I ow Pressure Injecties N'A N/A ILFVAelse BORON Dill!IlON NtA ODD IU2 A l.l (C2) RB 797+6" Closed NO NIA N/A R ISOLATION dosed Ut Low Pressure hjection N/A N/A ILPVA0105 BURON DELUIMIN N/A OfD SU2A L1(1B2) RB 777+6" Closed NO N/A N/A R IHOLAllON Closed itI low Pressure lajectiem {
I N/A II.FVADI26 5,PI PONT ACCIDENT NtA OFIkilaA-1.4(39) AB 79er+0" Closed TES U SJ9 BL2J9 S,R f SAMPLE ISOL *OPK1. t>l Low Pressere injection i N/A S MC.29 IN51RtfMENT RACE MIA N/A TB 79WM" In Service NO N/A NA S.R l'1 Main Steam IMC-M20 in Service i 9 N/A iMC.D24 INSTRUMENT RACK N/A N/A IB 773'+6" En ttervice NO MtA MIA SR IMC.D24 in Serv 6co 1:1 Main Stesen I I N'A IMC.El6 INSTRllMENT RACK N/A DEL t 47.02-A 1B 796'+6" In Nerette NO MIA WA S.It 1Mr.F86 In Service t 1 Main Steem [ t N/A SMC E25 INSTRUMENT RACK NtA N/A TB 775'+e" In Service NO N/A WA S.R i IMC F29 la Service , t*l Mein Steein i N/A IMC FIS INflRI MENT RACK N/A GERIte-03 TB 796'+6" la Service NO MIA NIA S.R Notes:
- Evaluation type "NONE" indicates that equipment is passive.
- Signature group "RB" ludicates that the equipment is a " Ride of the Bou" itent. :
t No seismic or relay evaluation required. The selrede evaluation for these itenis is included with the equipment
- Evaluattom eypc "S*" or "S*,R" hidicates float equipnient is a rugged, pas ise, designated in the "Walkdown Itost" field.
in-line desIce. No seisnde evaluation is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS"indacctes that the equipnient is part of the NSSS system
- Evaluatiosi type *S" ludicates that a seisade esatuation was performed. and does not require a seismic evaluatien. ,
- Evaluathm type "R" indicates that a relay evaluation was perfortned.
- The results of the selssnic evaluation for all equipment designated as *S" or "S,R" {
can be located in Appendiu D.I (SVDS) by signature group. t
- Evaluation tyye "S R" indicates that both a scisnde and relay evaluation !
was perf d.
- All equipment outtlers can be located in Tables 8.I & 8.2 by their Equipment Gass & Outtler Ref. No. "I' l
o o_, . . Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) 0:once Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. Dwg/ Zone Bldg. Floor Norm. State power Supp Sys. Power Eval Group Ref. No. Sytem Ilust Elev. Ees. State Reg'd Dwg No/Rev. Scurce Type trong (Cong (Ceno (Cony (c'ent.) (Cent.) (Cent.) (Cone.) (Cent) (Cony (Comy (Cony (Ceau , rt Mein Steem I MC.Ft S In Service l 16 WA IMFBMRP Mi1N fDR Bl:S MONITOR N/A NO ELEMENTARY AM 309'+6" In Service YES O-705 IDIA43flDE S.R RLY PA1FL la Service r I'l Mein Feodor Bus u i,,, t h RB N. A IMsFroul6 IMS 87 EtP CONVERIER IMSVAnn87 OFE.84742-A TB 796 Ia Serstee YFS G704 IECJS S.R In Servtre , I'l Fanergency Feedester ! I RR WA IMSMIOnth MAIN SIEAM DP I MC.20 OM 8201.H419 TB 796 In Service YES OL70SA IKI41tIKI-2 S.R CONVFRT FR (MSI?) In Servire l'I Main Strom RB WA IMSM10007 MAIN STEAM F/P I MO.20 OM s201.H419 TB 796 te Service VES 010SA R EI48tIKI 2 S,R l CONVERIFR (M532) la Servare ! t's Mein Steam f RH N/A IMSMIUel3 MAIN SIEAM E/F I MO.20 OM 0291.it419 TB 796 In Service YES 0.MSA IEI41t1KI-2 S.R [ CONYFRIFR (MS28) In Service f Ut Main Siese ret !@A 3 MSMTn014 MAIN STEAM EtP I MC-20 DM 8208.H-ett TB ?96 Ea Service YES O-705A R ER.01H El-2 S.R CONVERIER (MsJf) la Service 01 Mean Steenn [ s RB WA I MSF'ES9 SGIA&lEFRE850RE 30RI.2; t Att,2 OFkl22A.I.I (D2,32) AB 822 te Service YES 0 705A IE34ttlIG-2 5,R { Im Service ; til Male Steam j i WA IMSPSeem6 MAIN STEAM PRESS N/A OEF 84%36 IB 796'+6" te Service YES 0 7 USA IEE-et S.R SWITCH (IMSI9) la Service i r1 Main Steem I t I WA IMSPS0087 MAIN SIEAM PRESS NA DEE.14596 TB 796'+4" In Service TES 0.705A IEl43 S.R ! I Notes:
- Es mInstion type "NONE" indicates that equipnient is passive.
- Mignature group "RB" indicates that the equipenent is a " Rule of the Rou" iteni. I No seismic or relay evaluatiasi required. The seisade evaluation for these itenas is included with the equipment I
- Evaluation type "S*" or "S*,R" indicates that equipnient is a rugged, passive, designated in the "Walkdown liest" tield. f in line device. No selsnde esatuation is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates that the equipuient is part of the NSSS systena ,
- Etatuation type "S" indicates that a seisade + valuation was performed, and does met req 4e a selsnde evaluation.
l
- Esatuation type "R" indicates that a relay evaluation was perfornied.
- The ressdes of the seisade evaluation for all equipenent designated as "S" or "S.R" ,
can be larated an Apresidiu D.I(NVDS)by signature group. !
- Evaluation type "S,R" indicates that both a seisade and relay esaluations was perfunned.
- All equipenent outliers can be located in Tables 8.1 & S.2 by their Equipenent Gass & Outlier Ref. No. "C' -
q 03 M G0 6 Appendix B ' Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) l Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 t Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. Dwg/ Zone Bldg. Floor Norm. State Supp Syn. Power Evat Power Group Ref. No. Sytern Ilust Elev. Des. State Req'd Dwg No/Rev. Source Type , (Cent.) (Cent.) (Con * ) (Cent.) (Cont.) (Cent.) # Cent.) (Cent) (Cent.) (Cent.) treet.) (Cont.) (Cent.) ! SwtICH (IML22) In Service l'I Main Steam i NfA IMRPS00Its MAIN STEAM PRESS N/A OEE- t st96 TB 796v In Service YES OLMA IKI4s S.R SwlTCH (E MS28) In Service I!l Mein Steam I N/A IMRPSim89 MAIN ST EAM PRFSS N/A DEE.14M6 YB 796'+4" In Service VES O' M A IKI41 S.R SwtYCH (IMt31) In service Ef t Mein Stenen t le N/A IMSrice24P SG I A PRESSt'RE N/A DE& t22A-I.I (52) RB B23'+e" In Service % ES rk10%A I kl.09 S.R In Service t!I Mein Steam { I to N/A IMSPT0029P SG t A PRESSt:RE N/A OEDI22A.I.t (J2) RB 825'+0" In Service Yr1 0.795A E KI-OS S.R l In Serv 6ce i l'1 Main Steem I 10 N/A iMMPIUD26P SG tB PRESSt?RE N/A OFD- E 22A.I.l (D2) RB R2 S'+9" In Service VF1 0.705A B KI.a5 S.R i In Service If 3 MetuSteem f I 10 N/A iMSriun27F SG 1B PRESSt'RE N/A OFIkI22A.I.1 (D2) RB 825*+0" In Service YES 0.70$A IKI45 S.R In Service I t'l Mein Steam RB N/A iMSPT0057 STEAM TO EfMPT PRESS t MC.Et4 OFE.14742-A TB 794 In Service YES 0 704 IKC 31 S.R i XMIR In Service Ifl Fmergency Feedweter l i 1 9 12 IMsrY0042 t' NIT I t'PS (t MMSSo642 N/A OFE-147-e2 A AB 796'+4" In Service YES O'704 I KC.38 S.R 1 1 MS-87) In Service ! If 3 Fmergency Feedweier 27 N/A IMMVAonot MAI'4 ST EAM SAFEYY N/A Of1b l22A-I.I (JT) TD *I****'* Closed No N/A N#A S i Notes:
- Evaluation type "NONE" indicates that equipment is passive.
- Signature group "RR" indicates that the equipnient is a " Rule of the Box" liens. [
No seismic or relay ei sluation required. The seismic evaluation for these leems is included with the equipenent *
- Evaluation type "S*" or "S*,R" indicates that equipnient is a rugged, passive, designated in the "Walkdowa llost" field.
in-line desice. No seismic evaluation is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates that the equirmient is part of the NSSS systein i
- Evaluation type "S" hidicates that a seismic evaluation was perferined. and does not require a scissaic evaluation. l
- Evaluation type "It" hidicates that a relay evaluation was performed.
- The results of the seismic evaluatices for all equirenent designated as "S" or "S,R" !
can be loested in Appendix D.1 (SVDS) by signature group. I
- Erstua%n type "S.R"ludicates that both a seismic and relay evaluation i
,,, p,,g,g
- AB equipunent outliers can be located in Tables 8.1 & 8.2 by their Equipment Oass & Outlier Ref. No. "E' l
t f i
a.b,. i Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL)
.Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 ;
Signature Outlier Equipmerit ID Name Walkdown Ref. Dag/ Zone Bldg. Moor Norm. State power Supp Sys. Power Eval Ref. No. Sytem Ilost [ Croup Elev. Des. State Req'd Dwg No/Rev. Source Type j (Cont.) (Cont.) (Cont.) (Cent.) (Coat ) (Cent.) (Cont.) (Cent) (Cont.) (Cont) (Cont.) (CentJ (Coat) l t RELIFF Opaa I?l Mean Steam 1 27 NIA IMSVA0tm2 MAIN S1EAM SAFE 1Y NIA Ofh t 22A.I.I (J4) YD S13*+0" Closed NO N/A NdA S RFLIEF Open l'I Malm Stenne 27 N/A IMSVA0003 MAaN 51EAM SAFETY N/A 05D B22A.I.3 (JR) YD 813'+e" Closed NO N/A N/A S f mEurr Ope. l til Main Steem i 27 N/A 1MSVA0004 MAIN SIEAM SA5 TTY N/A OfW122 A.I.l (J5) YD St3W Clueed NO N/A N/A S RELIEF Oswa i US Main Steenn 27 MA IMSWAnuG5 MAIN SIEAM SAFETY N/A OFD122A-l.t (JM) YD 813*+0" Clemed NO N#A N/A S j RELIFF Open ! UI Mean Steemt ! 27 NdA iMSVAGun6 MAIN STEAM SAFETY *T OFhl22A.I.l (JS YD 813W Gosed NO N/A MIA S l REllEF Opse UI Male steem ' F 27 N/A S MMVAUUU7 MAIN SIEAM SAFET Y N#A OFB 122A-1.l (J7) YD SI3W Closed NO NIA N/A S RELIFF Open US Malm Steens 27 N/A iMSVAsmos MAIN SIEAM SAFE 1Y N/A OED122A l.l (J6) YD 313'+0" Closed NO MIA Ntr S [ RELIFF Open r Un Mein Steem 27 N/A IMSVAmm9 MAIN SIEAM SAFETY NIA 09Dl22A I.l(D9) VD 813'+0" Closed NO N/A NIA S RELIFF Opse !
' Un Met.Steem 27 WA IMSVA0018 MA?N FIEAM SAfT TY NIA OED t 22A.I.l (D4) YD 813W Clemed NO N/A NIA S I
Notes:
- Evaluath.si type "NONE" i edicates that equipnient is passive.
- Signature group "RB" indicates that the equipnient is a " Rule of the Box"itena.
No scismic or relay c*alv Alen required. The selsnaic evaluatinsi for these itesses is induded with flee equipisient
- Es aluation type "S*" er "S*,R" indicates c=t I quipnient is a rugged, passise, designated in the "WalI6dowa flest" field.
In line desire. No scinante esaluation is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates that the equipenent is part of the NSSS systens
- Evaluation tyye "S" indicates that a selsnile evalaations was perfornied. and does not require a selsndC evaluation.
- Evaluation type R" hidicates that a relay evaluation was performed.
- The reSults of the selsnaic evaluation for all equipsment designated as "S" or "S.R" cm be located las A prendix D.I (SVDS) by signature group.
- Evaluation type "S,R" indicates that both a setsnile and relay evaluation was perimed.
- AE equl Patent outHers can be located in Tables 8.1 & 8.2 by their 10guipnient Umss & Outlier Ref. No. Page 64
I C8}xrj98 Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 ; t
- Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Watkdown Ref. Dwg/ Zone Bldg. Moor Norm. State Power Supp Sys. Power EYat Gruup Ret No. Sytem Host Elev. Des. State Reg *d Dwg No/Rev. Source Type (Cent.) (CoeQ (Cont.) (CeaQ (CenQ (Cent.) (CeaQ (CeaQ (CenQ (ConQ (Cont.) (Cony treaQ ;
RELIEF Open 01 Main Steese 27 N/A S MSVApoll M AIN STEAM SAf7TV N/A OFIE122Al.I(D7) YD RI3'+0" Closed NO N/A MIA S RELIEF Open UI Mein Saeems 27 N/A iMSVA0012 MAIM STEAM SAFETY N/A OFD.112 A.I.I (D9) YD 3t 3"+0* Closed NO N/A N/A 3 $ ItFI.3FF Open r I'l Meta 5temen , 27 NeA IMSVA0013 MAIN STEAM SAFETY N/A OFIkt22A.I I(Ds) YD 813'+0" Oused NO MIA MIA S f RF1.IFF Open Ut Mete Steem { 27 N/A IMSVA0014 MAIN SIEAM SAFET Y NfA ODIk t22AI.t (DS) YD 313*+0" Chued NO N/A N/A 5 [ ItFIJFF Open f Ut Me6a hea
?
27 N'A iMSVA0015 MAIN STEAM SAFETY N/A OFIkI22AI.I(D') VD 813'*e" Need NO N/A N/A S t'l Main han i 27 N/A IMSVA0HI6 MAIN STEAM SAf7TY N/A OfDB22 Art l(D6) YD 3 t3'+0" Omeet NO N/A N/A S , BruFF Open Un Mean mm i t N/A IMSVA00t7 TURBtNE B1FASS N/A OEDt22Alj (D4) TB 796'+4" Open TES 0.703 tKGB-ROI A S.R ISOLAIION Chaed - [ l's Mein Sseem f g N/A IMSVAoul9 . TURBINE BTFASS VALVE N/A OFIkl22AIJ (IM) TB 796'+6" Openclueed YES n?OSA I EI-83 S.R rhaed t I Meim mm i i N/A SMSVA0022 TI'RBINE BYFASS VALVE N/A OFIkI22A.lj (ER) TB 796'+6" Open# Closed YES G795.A IKI4R S.R Notes:
- Esaluation type "NONE" indicates that equipment is passive.
- Signature group "RR* indicates that flee equipnientiis a " Rule of the Hex" items. !
No seismic or relay evaluathm required. The seismile evaluatten for these iteens is included with the equipenent I
- Esatuation type "S*" or "S*,R" indicates that equipnient is a tugged, passive, designated in the "Walkdown liest" field. !
la mee desBre. Ne senesen:e evaluathm is required.
- Evoluntlan type "NSSS" indicates that the equipment is part of the NSSS systems 1
- Esatisatheen type "S" 44 -etes that a selsnile evaluathm was perforwied. and does not require a selsnele evaluation. !
- Es ahamshm type "R" indkates that a reIny esalusthms was perfosiemed.
- h results of the scismic evaluathm for mil equipement designanted as "S" or "S.R" can be located in Appendix D.1 (SVDS) by signature group. r
- Eselmation type "S,R" indicates that both a selsnJc ased relay evaluntless was otined.
- All equipenent eintliers can be located bi Tables 3.1 & 8.2 by their Equipment Class & Outlier Ref. No. "E' I
3 (V own.. Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment iD Name Walkdown Ref. Dwg/ Zone Bldg. Floor Norm. State Puner Supp Sys. Power Erst Group Ref. No. Sytem Ilust Elev. Des. St.ite Req'd Dwg No/ReV. Source Type (Cent) (CenI.) (Cent.) (Cent.) (Cont.) (Cent.) (Cent.) (ConL) (Cont) (Cant.) (Cent) (Cent.) (Cent.) ned UI Me6e Steems g WA IMSVA0024 AS ISOLATION NrA OFIk 122A.I.2 (H3) TB 796'+6" Open TES E783 IXGB-RGIC S,R i Gued l'8 Main Steeno j l 44 MA iMSVA0026 TlfRBINE RYPASS N/A OF&l224tJ (le) TB 796' 4 " Open TES O-703 IXGR Ret B 5.R ISOLATION (lueed i I US Mein Steam I N/A IMSVA0028 TURBINE BYrASS VALVE N/A OFD-t22A.I.2 (111) TB 796*M" OpenKlaced VF3 G70SA IKI4B S.R r Cineed I I'l Mein Steams i i N/A i MSVAq'#3 9 T1'RBINE RYFASS VALVE N/A OFik l22A.l J (DM TB 796'* ? OpenKlueed YES O'79%A IA141 S.R 08 Meta Saeem ' g HjA 3 %l9VA0633 AS l90LATION N/A OfD 322A l.2 (E3) IB 796'*6" Open VES O-703- B MfA S.R Clueed 01 Main Steene 44 N/A S MSVA0tO5 DWPTI90LAllON NIA OFIkl22A 13 (LI) TB 196'M" Open VF3 0 703 IXA-Rp6A S.R (1need til Mstn Stemme 21 N/A IM9VADIG6 PWPTINOLATKME N/A 06 E t224.IJ (FI) TB 796'M" Open YFS 4 703 IXA-Rn6B S.R Ceased Iil Main Stessa 28 N/A IMSVAm44 fWrT STGP VALVE MIA DFikI22AIJ (L8) TB 775'*0" Open YES G705B IDP.FD6BR S.R UB C.mdensate 21 N/A iMSVA0043 SWPT S10PVALVE N/A 051Ll12A IJ (FE) TB 775'+0" Open TES OMOSB I DP-706DC S.R Notes:
- Esaluation type "NONE" indicates (Imt equipement is passive.
- Signature group "RB" indicates that the equipment is a
- Rule of the Bos"itens.
No seismic or relay evaluath.n required. The seisade evaluation for these iteous is included with the equipnient
- Esaluation type "S*" or "S*,R* indicates tient equipment is a rugged, passive, designated in the "WmIkdown Itost" Acid.
in line desice. No selsude evaluation is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" ludicates that the equipsment is part of the NSSS systeni
- Evaluation type "S" indicates that a seisnde evaluation was performed. and does not require a seisade evaluation.
- En aluation type "R" indicates that a relay evaluation was performed.
- The results of the seisade evaluation for mE egidpenent designated as "S" or "S.R" ran be located in Appendiu D.I (SVDS) by signature gremp.
- Evaluation ty pe "S,R" indicates flaat both a selsnaic and relay evaluation o as performated.
- AD equipnient outBers can be located in Tables 8.1 & 8.2 by their Equipnient dass & Outlier Ret No. 88'
D ) os/2f/se Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) i Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 i Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. Dwg/ Zone Bldg. Floor Norm. State Power Supp Sy s. Power Eval Group Ref. No. Sytem Ilust Elev. Des. State Req'd Dwg No/Rev. Source Type r.au r au re o re.o 80.m4 tc o r) r.ma r ma r.ma go r.ma IC o , Closed U1 Condensate N/A N/A iMSVA0046 EMFRCENCV SAE ISOL N/A OFEI2tC-l l (Il3) TR N/A Closed NO N/A N/A MONE VARVE Eithee If a Main Stenen 21 N/A IntSVA0047 MSIOCSAE N/A Ophl22A RJ (E4) 18 796'M" Open YES a193-C 110-Re4F 8,R i Cleoed Ut MelmSteous
% WA iMSVA0076 MS RH ISOLAIION N/A OFD-122A-l 8 (Ill) IB 796'M" Open YES 0 703 IKA-Rth6C S,R ;
C8**'d ) Ut Melm Steenn 28 N/A IMSVA0077 MS TO 2ND STAGE RHIR N/A OfD122C-8 2 (E4) IB 796'M" Opee VES O-703-H R EA-A-PU2A E.R ISOL (losed ( UI Main Seeone m 21 N/A IMSVA0078 MS IO 2ND SI AGfC RMIR N/A OfD 122C-12 (KN) IB 796'M" Open YES G783-H 11A.A-FB2B s,St ISOL Clueed f UI Mein Steam j i 40 N/A iMSVA0079 MS RM ISOIATION MIA OFEl22Al.I tCII) TB 796'+6" Open YES G703 IKA R06D 5.R [ Claced UI Main Steam i N/A IMSVAtene MS TO 2ND $TAGE RHTR N!A OFbl22C 12 (F4) TB 196'M" Open YES &EH IKA-A-FD2D SR = ISOL Clemed f UI Mein Stesse l l 9 N/A iMSVAsmal MS TO IND STAGE RHIR N/A OFE122C-lJ tR) TB 796'+6" Open YES n101-H I KA.A-fil2C S,R i ISOL CIseed UI Mein Steene I N/A N/A RMSVAous2 T DEfW SY EAM 88'rrLY N/A OFIk 122 A. I.4 (12) IB 796'+4" Open NO N/A N/A R { Notes:
- Evaluation type "NONE" indicates that equipnient is passise.
- Signature group "RB" indicates that the equipnient is a " Ride of the Box"itene.
No seisnde or relay evaination required. The seisonic esaluation for these items is included seith the equipneent j
- Esatuation type "S*" or "S*,R" indicates that equipasent is a rugged, passive, designated be the "Walkdonn liest" ikId. i in thie desice. No selsnile evaluation is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates that the equipunent is part of the NSSS systene i
- Evaluation type "S" hidicates that a seisade evalustless was perforened and does not require a selsnde evaluation. i
- Evaluation type "R" indicates that a relay evaluation was perforened.
- The results of the sensade evaluatlose for a5 equipenent designated as "S" or "S.R" caen be located in Appendix D 1 (SVDS) by signature group. i
- Evaluation type "N,R" indicates that both a selsnde and relay evaluation was perforenet
- All *98I nnent P outilers cass be located in Tables 3.1 & s.2 by their Equipment Class & Outiler Ref. Na Page 67
(- s 08)arise
)
Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. Dwg/ Zone Bldg. Floor Norm. State Power Supp Sys. Power EVmL > Group Ref' No. Sytem Ilust EleV. des. State Dwg No/Rev. Source Type Req'd (Cent ) (Cent.) (Cent.) (Cont.) (Cent.) (Cant.) (Cent ) (Cant ) (Cest.) (Cens) (Cent) tCent.) (Cent) Osan t'I Fniertency Feedeout N/A N/A BMsVAHUB4 IDEfW STEAM St!PFLV N/A OFD.122A.B.4 (F2) TB 796'+4" Open NO N/A MIA R i O Pro I!I Emiergency Feedwater 9 MA IMsVAens? IDEDW MSBSOLAllON N/A ODE t22AI.4(G4) TB 796'+4" Throttled YES n*p4 I EC.31 S.R VALVE Throttled t'l Emiertency Feedwater 21 WA BMsVAnn93 TDDW MS BsOLAIION N/A OFILI22A l.4 (C7) TB 775'+0" Clueed YES 0 785 IKVID49 S,R VALVE Open t*1 Emergency Feedwater
+
N/A N/A IMsVA0094 9.Ew i t*MBINE STOP NIA OTB t22Al.4(CE) TB 775'+0" Open NO N/A N/A R VALVE Open t's Emergency Feedwater w - __ 9 N< A IMsVAUo95 E DHW CONIROL VALVE N/A OFD 322A 1.4(C9) TB 77'+0" Threstled VES OM.200A40!O Ost STEAM S.R Threetted tf t Eneergency Feedwater 1 20 125 iMMVAOIG2 I t'RBINE SIOP VALVE NIA USD l22 B-I I (13) IB 796'+6" Open YES O.705 IDIA47 S.R Closed I'I Main Steene 20 4 2$ IMMVAnte) it'RBINE STOF WALVE N#A OFtkt22RLI.I(14) IB 796'M" Open YES 0 705 IDIA 07 S,R Closed t)I Main Steene 20 32s IMSVAGl04 Tt'RatNE STOF WALVE N/A DEB 122B-i t (IM) 18 796'+6" Open TES 0 705 IDIA 87 S,k Cla8ed h 115 Mein Steene , s 20 525 IMsVAntes it'mesNE sTOP VALVE N/A 05E122B t.l(19) TB 796'+4" Open VES 0 705 IDIA 47 S.R I Notes:
- Esalumilen type "NONE" indicates that equipmenet is passive.
- Signature group "RB" indicates that the equipnient is a " Rule of the Bos" item.
No selsnile or relay evahastion required. The scLsmic evahsation for these items is included with the equipenent
- Es aluathni typc "S*" or "S*,R" ludicates that equipment is a rugged, passive, designated be the "Walkdown flest" field.
In thee desIce. No seisnde evaluation is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates that the equipment is part of the NSSS system .
- Evaluation eype "S" ludicates that a seisade evaluatlun was performed. and does not require a selsnaic evaluation. [
- Evaluation type "R" indicates that a relay evaluation was perfosined.
- The results of the seisade evaluation for all equipnient designated as "S" or "S.R" can be located in Appendix D.I (SVDS) by signature group. i*
- Evaluation type "S,R" indicates that both a seismic and relay evaluattoss
, ,, p ,.g ,.,,g,
- All equipment outliers can be located in TaSles 3.1 & 8.2 ,
by their Equipment Gass & Outtler Ref Not age 6
ce/27/ss Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconec Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outtier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. Dwg/Zune BIdg. Floor Norm. State Supp Sys. Power EYat Power Group Ref. No. Sytem Ilust Elev. Des. State Req'd Dwg No/Rev. Source Type (Cent.) (Conta (Cent) (Cent.) (Cant.) (CenQ (Conj (CentJ (Cent) (Come) (Cent.) ICent) (Centa (losed t's Mein seese 20 [2s IM3VA0106 MAIN STFAM CONTROL N/A ONL228-IJ (EJ) TB 796'+6" Open YES G705 IDIA-07 S.R VALVE Cleoed t:t Mom sienni 20 1 26 E MSVAGt07 MAIN SIEAM CONTItOL N/A OFILI223. I.l (G5) IB 7Wes" Open VES G70$ IDIA47 S.R VALVE (1ased t't Main Steem 20 126 IMSVA0108 MAIM SI F.AM ( ON T Rot. NIA OFD. I228.I.I (F4) TB 7W+6" Open YES O'705 IDIA47 S,R VALVE (losed Ett Main steena 20 126 iMSVAG109 MAIN SIEAM CONT ROL MiA OFTkt22B-8.I tC9) IB 7W+6" Open YES 0.705 IDL4 07 S.R f VAR.YE Closed t'l Mein Ste . [ 21 N/A IMSVADI 2 MM TOIND STAGE RHIR N/A OFIk1220.8.2 (K5) TB 7*5'+6" Open TES N/A N/A 4.R ISOL Closed I't Main Stenit 52 N/A IMRVA0126 MS TO AS CVNTROL NIA OFIkl2sAJ.I (16) TB 796'+6" OpenM1ased YES (k705 8 KVf D-10 S.R VALVE Clueed I's Mein stees a
$2 N/A iMSVAGt29 MS TO AS CONTROL N/A 051kI2sAJ.l (I7) TB 796*+6" openM1eeed YES 0.7e5 IKvitk te 5.It VALVE Closed I!t Main Sr om 6
28 N/A IMSV '.0173 MS TO 2ND STAGE kIIT R N/A OFtk I220.I.2 (F5) TB 796'+6" Open YES G422N-2s rnemone s.R ISOL Closed l'I Mom steens i
)
RB N/A I M T.82(3DU6A) wR LOOP I AI XM TR ITDC3 OEF-t50 23 AB 509 In 5ervice VES E7DSA IKS-IS 8.R 1 Notes:
- Esatuation type "NOFi" indicates that eqidpnient is passive.
- Signature group "RB" indicates that the equipement is a " Rule of the Box" itent.
No seisnde or relay .valuationi required. The selsude evaluation for these items is included with the equipment
- Es6 ion type ' S*" or "S*,R" indicates that eqtdyment is a rugged, passive, designated he the "Walkdown llost" field. )
in-thie desice. No selsudc evaluation is required.
- Etalustion type "NSSS" indicates that the equipment is part of the NSSS systen
- Esatuation t3 pe "S" hidicates that a setsudc evaluation was perfonnied. and does not require a seismic evaluation.
- Es atuatteli type "R" indicates that a relay evaluation was perfanned.
- The resmits of the seisade evaluation for an equipnient designated as "S" or "S,R" j can be Israted in Aprendit D.I (SVDS) by signature group.
- Esaluation type "S.R" ludicates that both a scissnic and relay evalustion ,
was perfunned.
- All'1"f ment P outtlerii can be located in Tables 8.1 & 8.2 by their Equipment Gass & Outlier Ref. No. E' L
~
- o. n i,.
)
Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. DWg/ Zone Bldg. Hoor Norm. State Power Supp Sys. Power Eval Cruup Ref. No. S3 tem llost Elev. Des. State Req'd Dwg No/Rev. Source Type (CenQ (CanQ (ConQ (CenQ (ConQ (CenQ (Con 4 (Con 4 (CouQ (CanQ (CenQ (ConQ (CenQ Is swvice Ut Resetor Content RB N/A IMT-R3(RDoSB) WR COLDLEC T EMP ITDC3 OEbl%25 AB lt09 in Service YES GMSA IKI ts S.R SICMALCONDITIONFR In Service t'l Iteactor Condant RO N/A IMT SKRD08A) WR RCIDor tBl XMTR ITDCJ OELI58 25 AB 809 la Service VES O.70$A IKI-IS SJt in Sereke til Reacter Coulent RB N/A IMI-BMRDU7B) H R mLDLEC T EMP ITDCJ OELl%25 AB 809 In Service YES (MOSA BEI-18 S.R SIGNAL CONDlilONER In Service UI Iteactor Coulent Rli N/A IMT 87(RDu43) WR T EMP RICNAL 11DC3 OELl?S23 AB 809 In Service VES 0.70SA SEE-18 SJt CONDtilONER (ICC A) In Service US Reacter Coulent RB N/A SMT 89(RDR5B) WR TEMP SICNAL STDC3 OELt?S23 AB 809 In Service VES 470SA IKB te S,R CONDITIGNER(ICC B) In Swvice til Reacter Coulant RH N/A IMICS MISC IERM CAB IMTC9 IMTCl 2A4 NO FLEMENTARY AB 8tW+0" Ba Service N/A N/A NA S.R 811 Cuatrol Cstninets In Service 16 N/A I M T C t.2.3.4 MISCB LIAMFOttS N/A MIA AB StW+0" NJA NA N/A NtA SJt IERMINAL CABINET S N/A til Contral Caldness (1 M T C'S) RH N/A IMIC2 MISC IERM CAs tMIC2 IMICt.2A4 NO ELEMENTARY AB 309'+0" la service N/A N/A NtA S.R U1 Centrol Cetenete In Sereke RR N/A iMTC3 MISC T ERM CAB IMTC3 SMTCl.2.3.4 NO ELEMENTARY AB 809'+6" In Service N/A MIA N/A S,R Ifl Central CeNness la Service Notes:
- Evaluation t3 pe "NONE" indicates that equipenent is passive.
- Signature group "RB" indicates that the equipenent is a " Ride of the Ben" itent No selsnaic or relay evaluation required. The selsnaic evaluatiosa for these iteins is included with the equipneent
- Evahnation type "S*" or "S*,R" indicates that equirenesit is a rugged, passive, designated in the "Walkdown flest" field.
ine line doice. No selsenic evaluation is required.
- Evalsation type "NSSS" Indicates that the equipenent is part of the NSSS systeni
- Esatuations type "S" indicates that a selsnaic evalaathan was perfonned. and does not require a selsnde evahiation.
- Evaluation type "R" indicates that a relay evahiation was perfonned.
- The results of the scissnic evaluation for a5 equipnient designated as "S" or "S,R*
essa be located in Appendix D.I (SVDS) by signature grwup.
- Evaluation type "S,R" indicates that both a seismile and relay evaluation was perfonned.
- All equipinent outliers can be located in Tables 8.1 & 8.2 by their Egidpunent Cass & Outlier Ref. Na, l' age 70
O (" ' ('/ eshf/ss Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL)
.Oconce Units 1,2 & 3 SignSture Outlier Equipment ID NBme WBlkdnwn Ref. Dwo Ione Bldg. Moor Norm. StSte Power Supp Sys. Power Ev3L r Group Ref. No. Sytem Host Elev. Des. StSte Dwg No/Rev. Source Type Reg'd RH NA EMTC4 MiscirRM CAB IMTC4 IM TC1.2.2.4 NO FLEMFNT ARY AB 009'+0" In Bervice N/A N/A N/A S,R 01 Central Candmets in service L 35 N/A IMVC2 250V DC MCC IMVC2 N/A O.70SB 15 773'+6" In Service VES OL7BSB 3 DP-HISAC S.R r L'l 125/250V DC PH R In Service M WA IMVC3 2MV DC MCC IMVC3 N/A nMB IB 775'+e" In Reevice VES O 70$ 3 IDP-fBSBT S.E t's 123/2*0V DC PWR la Service 18 N/A IPA /SB FWR BATT IPA N/A DEE.130-03 IB 796'*6" In *ervire VES O-7e5B t rA/BC S UI 123/190V DC PWR in Service t
to N/A 1rA/BC FWR BATT CHCR IPA MtA 4705B TB 796'+6" In Service VES G703 F IXaF01B S.R [ l'I E25/250V DC FW R In Servire i 52 N/A trAMLio090 RB Centstament weisr lmet N/A DELL 58 28 RB 777'+0" &4 Used VES O 705A I El.16 S.R Train A in Service I:1 Post Accident Munstering N/A N/A IPAMl immvitCVR RB rentainneens Water levet a LIB 1,2; t ABI,2 OE Lt 38-2 B AB R22 Nat t eed YES O 704 E tsEJ t2 S.R ! Train A Receiver In Service US rest Acektent f Monttaring , [ 52 N/A IPAMLiuott RB renteinment Wrier tmel N/A OELISE23 RB 777'+0" Net Used VF3 0.70AA s kI-20 S.R [ Train B In Service i 0t Post Accident f Waituring N/A N/A IPAMLT009t/RCVR RB Containneent Weter tmel 10Bl.2; t ABl.2 OELISE23 AB S22 Not tised VFS O-704 E tsacK.te BR Train B Receiver la Service Ut Ptet Accident Mee.arina l Rn wA IPAMF0304 RD Containneent Water tevel It'BI,2; p AB9,2 Of Ll5dL21 AB 522 Nat 0 sed VES G705A 15 I 20
. B.R Notes:
- Esaluatinen ty pc "NONE" indicates that equipment is passive. 4 Signature group "RB" indicates that the egalpment is a " Rule of the Box" item.
No selsnaic or relay evaluatkm required. The scissnic evaluation for these itenis is included with the equipment
- Esatuathan typc "S*" or "S*,R" indicates that eqtdpment is a stagged, passive, designated in the "Walkdown llest" field. j in-line desice. No selsnde evaluathm is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates that the equipnt.nt is part of the NSSS systema l
- Esaluathwi type "S* indicates that a seismile evaluation was pertierisied. and does not require a selsnde evaluatisti. j
- Esaluathan ey pe "R" hulicates that a relav evaluati ns was perfornied.
- The results of the seisnde evaluathni for all equipnient designated as "S" or "S,R"
- f can be located in Appendix D.I (SVI)S) by signature group, i
- Eistenti no type "S,R" hidicates that both a selsude and relay evaluathna >
was perfornied.
- AII ettuipment oidliers can be located in Tables 3.1 & 8.2 ,
by their Hquipment Gass & Outlier Ref. No. Page 78 ; i
~ ;
seitris8 Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 ' Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. Dwg/Zene Bldg. Hoor Norm. State Power Supp Sys. Power Eval Group Ref. No. S3 tem Host Elev. Des. State Reg'd Dwg No/Rev. Source Type , cC no (C.no tCom.) (Como (C.no tCom.3 (Cono (C.no (Como (Com > (C.no (Cono (Com. Train A Indicatlan In Service Ut Post Accktent hionitoring [ RB N/A IPAMPU305 RS Centsinneent Weter tmel it'Bt.2; t AB1.2 OELIM&28 AB B12 Nat Used YES G795A 1 El-20 S.R f Treen B Badlestion in Servire i UI Post Accident j Monttorlag 10 N/A IPARCP POST ACCIDENT SAMPLE N/A OFE-I62-02 AB 77t'+e" In Service VFA 4 8.19 IL2J9 SR UI Resctor Coelant CONT PANEL (1RC.I79) In Service 18 N/A IFB/BB PWRBATTIPS N/A OEE.830-et TB 796'W In Service TES 0 705-B IPR /BC 8 l'I 125/29tlV DC PWR in Service ! 10 NA IFB'BC PWR BATT CHCR IPS N/A O 70%A IR 79C+4" In seevko VES O-1705 E 2XP FBIC S.R I E'I 125t250V DC PW R In Servlee el N/A IFtR UNIT I PMEUMATIC N/A NO ELEMENTARY AB 809'+0 En Service NIA N/A N/A S.R l'I Centred Penets INRTRRACK in Servlee l N/A N> A IFRZ UI PRESSURIZER IPZR NO ELEMENT ARY RB N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NSSS 08 Pressurtner Heaters N/A > 3 33 IPN157ABt.'s103 LOW HYDRAtILIC N/A OELI2145 IB 775'+0" In Service YES 4 705 IDIA-27 S.R PRFSSt:RE SWIICH In Service l's Mein fortdes , [ 10 N/A 3 RBCAHolf20 A RBCU FAN I A N/A OfD R I6El.l (H 4) RB 825'+0" On.hich YES 0103-c exos.86C S.R
*OM-I.OW [
Ut Reactor Bu6tding I Comitas 6 to N. A IRBCAHUU208 RBCU FAN IR N/A OfD I t 6E.I.t (H-3) RB B25'+6" Off YE.S 0.7eLC 3%S343A S.R y
*0N-LOW Ut Rescsur Buildkig Notes:
- Evaluation type "NONE" indicates that eqidpnient is passive.
- Signature group "RB" indicates that the eqidyniefit is a " Rule of the Box"iteni. !
No selsinic or relay evaluation required. The seisnde evaluation for these iteins is included with the equipnient {
- Esalention type "S*" or "S* R" ludicates tiaat eqidpenent is a sugged, passive, designated in the *Wallidown llest" field. !
In Ilene desIce. No selsude evaluatiosa is required.
- Evaluation nype "NSSS" indicates that the equipnient is part of the NSSS sysiens i
- Esatuation type "S" indicates that a selsude evaluation was perfunned. and does not require a selsude evaluation.
- Esaluathna type "R" indicates that a relay evaluntloan was perfortmed.
- The results of the selsnik evaluation for all equipenent designated as "S" or *S.R" l l can be located in Appendix D.I (SVDS) by signature group, t
- Esaluation type "S,R" indicates that both a selsnde and relay evaluathun i was perfmied.
- AII equipement outtlers can be located in Tables 3.1 & 8.2 by their Egidpenent Umss & Outtler Ref. No. Page 72
f
% ') -
e.w.e-i . Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. Dag/ Zone Bldg. Floor Norm. State Power Supp Sys. Power Erst. Group Ref. No. Sytem Host Elev. Des. State Req'd Dwg No/Rev. Source Type - j (C o <C o (C o <C o <C o (C o (C o <C o <C.st 3 ro <C o gC o ro , Cadag I to N/A IRBCAHi1020C RECT! FAN IC NIA 05Dit6Lt.I(ILie) RB 525'+0" O. Idgh YES GL783-C SX09 66C S,R l
*0N-LOW j til Iteeesar Edding O ling i
le N/A IRBCHIODBA TB CDOLING tlNIl 1A N/A ODB12431.2(C3) RB $25'+0" In Service NO MIA N/A 5
. Se,*e tII Reseter Butiding C d.
i 10 N/A t RBCHXuouB RB COOLINC tlNIT IS N/A OISI243-RJ(GB) RB 797'+0" Ba Service NO N/A N/A S fa service Ut Reactor Bdding , Codng 10 N/A IRBCHX000C RB OOOLINC UMET IC N/A OFE t248-I.2(G12) RB 797ee" la seroice NO N/A N/A S la service l'8 Reacter Bu6tding C.dag RR N/A IRBCMXOOAS RB VE NTILATION 1ARBC1'_A OFEI243-5.l(K6) RB S44'+6" ta Service NO N/A N/A B COOLING COIL iAI Either til Reactor Betodin6 C.dng EB N/A IRBCHX00A2 RB VENTII.ATION l AR BClf_A OFE824ILBJ(J6) RB S44*+6" in nervice NO NfA MIA S COOLINC MIL BA2 Either t'l Reactor BuHdi.g C dag RH N!A 1RECn%GHA3 RB VENTILATION SARBCtf_A OD E t245-tJ (16) RB s44'+6" Ea Bervice NO N/A NiA 5 ctu)LsNG nML I A3 Either t's Reector Bdding C ohng Notes:
- Evaluation type "NONE" imidicates that equipment is passive.
- Signature group "RB" indicates that the equipnient is a
- Rate of the Ben" itene.
No seisade or relay etatuation required. The seisade evaluation for these itenis is included with the equipment
- Evaluathan type "S*" or "S*,R" indicates that equipment is a rugged, passive, designated la the "Walkdown Itost" field.
in line device. No seismic evaluation is required.
- Evaluation type *NSSS" indicates that the equipment is part of the NSSS systein
- Evaluation type "S" indicates that a seisade ermImation was perfarnied. and does not regidre a seismic evaluation.
- Evaluation type "R" indicates that a relay evaluation was performed.
- Tlie residts of the sensude evaluation for all equipreent designated as "S* er "S.R"
# * *I
- Daluathm type "S R" indicates that both a seisade and relay evaluations was perforened.
- AM equipament outliers can be located bi Tables 8.1 & 8.2 by their Equipsuent Class & Outlier Ref. No. P*f' 73
b oe h ris8 Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. DwgrL ne Bldg. Fhlor Norm. State Power Sug,p Sys. Power Eval Group Ref. No. Sytem llost Elev. Des. State Req'd Dng NO/Rev. Source Type RB N/A 1RBCMXORA4 RB VENIILAllON B ARBCU_A Ofbl24B lJ (H6) CB 844*+6" In service NO N/A N/A 8 } COOLING COIL lA4 Ekher j l'! Reacter Belfding CenMag RH N/A IRBCMXDeBI RB VENilLATION 1ARBCU_B OFIbl248.IJ (Kil) RB 844*+4" In Service NO N/A N/A S COOLING Coll IBI Elther l'8 Reacter Bouding Connne t l RB N< A IRBCHtfMtB2 RB VE.*TILATION BARrCII_B OfDI24ElJ tJil) RB 844*M" In Service PO N/A N/A B COOtJNG Coll IB2 Eteher 0t Resetor Butiding ConHng RR N/A t RBCHX0083 RE VENTILAllON BARBOU_B OFD l24EIJ (lli) RB 844'M" la servtre NO N/A N/A S COOLINC COIL IR3 kJther 6 til Resctor Bunding ConHng RH JA IRRCHtonB4 RB VENYlLATION IARBCl_B OrtL1245-t J (Hil) R3 844'M" la service NO N/A N/A S CtM) LING COtt 184 Ekber Ut Resetor Bending Caoung [** i RR N/A IRBCHTHpCI RB VEMillAIRIN IARBCU_C OfDl24R l3 (N) AB 044*+6" la service No N/A I- S COOLING COIL ICI E'1her t I Reecent Bending CouNng I RB N/A IRBCHX0002 RB YENitLATION lARBCU_C OFIkl24EIJ (E6) RB 844*+6" In Service NO N/A N/A S COOLING COIL SC2 EHher 03 Reector Bwitieng Cn= ting RB N/A IRBCHtuoC3 RB VENilLAllON lARBCU_C Ofbl24ERJ (D6) BB 844'M* In Service NO N/A MIA S Notes:
- Esslusthm type "NON E" indicates that equipment is passive.
- Signature group "RB" indicates that the equipenent is a " Rule of the Ben" itens.
No seismic or relay evalenationi required. The selsnele evaluatkm for these iteens is included with the equipment
- Evaluathm type "S*" or "S*,R" indicates that equipment is a rugged, passive, designated in the "Walkdown Ilost" field.
in-line des k e. No seisade evaluation is required.
- Evaluatkni type "NSSS" indicates that the equipment is past of the NSSS system
- eTsalustian type "S" indicates that a seisnde evaluatines was perforniecd. and dsees not restedre a seisenic evaluation.
- Evaluathm type "R" indicates that a relay evalumflose was perfonned.
- The resuits of the seismic evaluation for mII equipnient designated as "S" or "S,R"
"" ' I I" E
- Evaluatten typc "S,R" indicates that both a seismic and relay evaluation was perfmed.
- All'1"lpment outlien can be located in Tables It t & S.2 by their Equipment Class & Outtler Ref. No. Page 74 ;
m
]
3J p c .r.n , . Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ret Dwg/ Zone Bldg. Floor Norm. State power Supp Sys. Power Eval. Gioup Ret NO. Sytem Host Elev. Des. State Dwg No/Rev. Source Type Reg'd (Cont) (Cont) (Cont) (CentJ (Cent.) (Cent.) (Cont.) (Cont.) (Cons ) (Cent.) (Cent.) (Cent.) (Cent.) COOLING Ctsll103 ENewr t'l Reectar Bulld6ng Ceunns RH WA 1r 4%0004 RB VENTILATION B ARBCIf_C OfDB24ERJ ((4) RB S44*M" la servlee NO N/A N/A B 6 COOLING COIL IC4 Elttwr 01 Reacter BelWine CanHng 5 RB WA 1RBCHXOCDI RB VENTILATION I ARBCtI_D OFIk1241Ll3 (Fil) RB 844' 4 " In Servko NO N/A N/A S COut.ING COIL IDI Fuher 6 til Resctor Butkiing Coellag RH N/A 1RBCH%00D2 RB VENTILATION BARBCU_D OFD I24ILIJ (E31) RB B44*M" In Servko NO N/A N/A S CootJNG CD8L ID2 EMher Ut Reactor Buttdtag rooHng i RR N/A 1RBCHX80D3 RB VFNTtIATIO*f I ARBCU_D OFILE24ERJ (D11) RB B44'+4" la servlee NO N/A N/A 5 (YlOLING COIL ID3 FJther I'l Reese Belldtag ' CenHng RR WA tRBCHinnD4 RB YENilLATION IARBCtf_D 9FDl248-lJ (C11) RB 844'M" le Servlee NO N/A N/A 5 COOLINC COIL ID4 Etttwr i I Resctor BulWing CouHng RB N/A 1RCHED002 Ci rRF. HEAYERS BANK 2 fr1R OED IGGA-l.2 (FR) RB sit On YES 0.'03.-K IX5F-fB3B NSSS On t'l Pressortzer Hesters WA WA 1RCHX0001 RCrl Al l'rrER BRNC OIL NSSS 05Dl24E-1.4(16) RB N/A la service NO N/A MIA NSSS COOLfR Not t' sed i t's Reector Cerdent i Notes:
- Es atuation type "NONE" indicates that equipment is passive.
- Signature tr=#P "RB" indicates that the equipment is a " Rule of the Box"itent.
No seismic or relay evalustlan required. The seisade evaluation for these items is included with the equipment
- Es atuatian type "S*" or "S*,R" indicates that equipment is a rugged, passive, designated in the "Walkdown llest" field.
In line desice. No selsenic etatuations is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates that the equipment is part of the NSSS systeine
- Evaluati<m type "S" !=adicates that a seisnile evaluation was perfarined. and does not require a selsnile evaluation. '
- Evaluation type "R" indicates that a relay esaluation was performed.
- The results of the selsnaic evaluations for all equipment designated as "S" or "S,R" can be located in Appendix D.1 (SVDS) by signature group.
- Fvaluation type "S,R* ludicates that both a seismic and relay evaluattim m perforsned.
- All equipment outilers can be located in Tables 3.1 & S.2 by their Equipment Class & Outlier Ref No. "I'
J b
.hu?..
Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ret Dwgi7ane Bldg. Floor Norm. State Power Supp Sys. Power Eval Group Ret No. Sytem llust Elev. Des. State Req'd Dwg No/Rev. Source Type M'A N/A IRCHXaoul RCPI AI LOWER BRNG NMS Ofh124El.4tl5) RB N/A la Servke NO N/A N/A NSSS ofL COOLER Notitsed C1 Reseter toutene 1 WA N/A $ Rf'4'9003A RCPS Al %f0 TOR AIR NSSR OEDI24El.4(17) RB N/A In Sereke NO N/A MIA NSSS COOLER Not (W l'I keector Coolent N/A N/A IRCHXtum3B RCFIAI MOIOR AIR NSSS OfB 124B l.AtR) RB N/A In Service NO N/A N/A NSSS COOLFR Not t' sed t'l Reetter Ceent N/A NtA IRCMXD8104 Rf?! A2 t!PlFR BRNG OBL MSSS OFD I245L t 4(It6) RB N/A In Service NO N/A N/A NSSS COOLFR Not t' sed t'l Reactor Content N/A N/A 1RCHXenBS RCPI A2 LOWFR BRNG MSSS OfD 124B l.H19) RB N/A In Servko NO N/A NIA NSSS OIL COOLER Not l'aed t'l Rescoor Content N/A N'A 1 RCH XIMlH6A RCPI A2 MOTOR AIR NSSS Othl24B l. Hill) RB N/A In Servlee NO N/A MIA NSSS COOLER Not tw t!! Reactor Coolant N/A N/g t RCHtono6B RCPIA2 M010R AIR MSSS OfB1249 I.4(ll2) RB ' Ra Servko NO N/A N/A NSSS COOLFR Met t' sed l'I Reactor Coolant WA N/A 1RCHT0007 RCPIB10PPFR BRNG OIL NSSS OFD.1248-l.AD6) RB NA In Servko NO N/A N/A NSRS CtMPLFR Not l'oed t'l Reactor Ca.aiset N< A N'A t RCHXDU8MB RCF1BI LOWER BRNG NSSS OfS1245-l.4(DS) kB N/A In Service NO N/A N/A NSSS Ott COOLER Not l'end l'1 Reactor Content Notes:
- Evnhanthne type "NONE" indicates that equipesient in passive.
- Signature group "RB" indicates that the equipnient is a " Rule of the Bot"itena.
No seismic or relay evaluathian svguired. The seisade evaluation for these itenis is included with the equipment
- Evaluathe fy pe "S** or "S*,R" indicates that equipment is a rugged, passive, designated in the "Walkdown llosi" field.
he line desice. No selsnile evaluation is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates that the equipment is par 1 of the NSSS systein
- Evaluation ty pe "S" indicates that a selende evaluation was perfornied. and does not require a selmanic evaluation.
- Es aluation type "R" indi sten that a relay evaluation nas performed.
- The nsults of time seismic paluation for mII equipeneRt designated as "S" or "S,R"
**" ' I " " EN
- Evaluatk n type "S R" indicates that both a seisade and relay evaluation
,,, p,77,,,,,,,g,
- AH equipment outliers can be located in Tables 3.1 & 8.2 by their Equipment Cass & Outiler Ref. No. Page 76
(~ 0
. .>.m .
Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconec Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. Dwg/ Zone Bldg. Floor Norm. State Supp Sys. Power Eval. Power Group Ref. No. Sytem IInst Elev. Des. State Req'd Dwg No/Rev. Source Type . N/A N/A SkcliX8ue9A RCFIBI MOTOR AIR NSSS OFik124E R A(D7) RE N/A le Servire NO N/A N/A NSSS COOT.FR Noe 1%d t'l Reecint Coolsat NA N/4 IRCll%0Ho9B RCPIBl MoiOR AIR NMRS OFIL124El.4(DN) RB N/A In Servke NO N/A N/A NSNS CEM)lfit Not tfeed til Reector Coolant i
)&A N/A IRCllXente RCFIB2 VrrFR BRMC oll NSSS OFIk124El.4Dt0) RB N/A la servko NO MIA MIA NESS COOLFR "
Mat 11eed t'l Reedor Coelant N/A N/A 1RCil%0012 RCPIR2 t owFR BRNG NSSS OFIk124El.4(D9) RB N/A In Nervice NO MIA NfA NSSS DEL COOL.ER Not1%d l l'8 keectar Coedenf k N"A N/A IRCII49912A RCr182 MOTOR AIR M959 OfD1243-l.4(Dil) RB N/A In Service NO N/A N/A M555 ftMDI FR Not t' sed I's Reecteer Condent NA N/A 1RCHXODI2B RortB2 MOTOR AIR NSSS OFIk12451.4(D1t) R3 N/A la Serviro NO MIA NfA NMSS CEM.)LFR Not 11eed I'l Reertar Content 19 N'A 1RCLion04r1 FRZLEVFL N/A OIDIC0A.I.2 (CR) RB 797+0" Ba Servko Y t2 (k7ns IKVIA4R R.R
- T RANSMITTER In servlee I'l Resctor Coolone t
IO ICA 1RCL10nn4P3 FRZ LFVFL NIA OFb 500A.I.2 (Gft) RB 797+0" le Service TES (k703 IKV1813 S.R TRA45%ESTIFR In Servko I:n Reactor Ce=4 sat U N/A IRCLTEtl23 1 A RCS IIOT LFG LYL N/A - OPEltIGA.I.I (12) RR 999'+0" Net t'oed YF3 0 703 IKVIA.ca S,R (ICOM A) la Mervice i l'a lCCM Notes:
- Evaluation 13 pe "NONE" indicates that equipnient is passi,c.
- Signature group "RB" indicates that the equipnient is a " Rule of the Box" itent No seismic or rclay evaluation required. The seisade evaluation for these items is bwleded with the equipinent
- Es aluation type "S*" or "S*.R" indicates that equipment is a fugged, passive, designated in the "Walkdowa liest" tield.
in line dnice. No selsnde evaluation is required.
- Esatuation type "NSSS" indicates that slee equipnient is part of the NSSS systene
- Esaluation type "S" indicales that a selsnde evalentless nas perfernied. and does not require a selsnaic evalentless. *
- Es atuation type *R" indicates that a relay es atuation was perfernied.
- The results of the selsnile evaluation for all equipnient designated as "S" or "S,R" can be located in Appendis D.I (SVDS) by signature group.
- Esaluation type "S,R" indicates thai both a seismic and relay evaluation '
was perfortned.
- All equipment outilers can be located in Tables 8.1 & B.2 by their Equipement Gass & Outiler Ref. No. Pate 77
-- -_.m ..m. - _m..m. _ . . . _ . . . . . _ . _m ._. _ . - - . . . _ - - < .
03)2rf98 Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdowli Ref. Dwg/Zolic Bldg. Floor Norm. State Power Supp Sys. Power Evat Group Ref. No. Sytem Ilust EleV. Des. State Req'd Dwg No/Rev. Source Type 52 N/A 1RCLTe124 IB RCS HOT LEG LYL N/A OFD-100A.I.I (113) RB BD9'+0" Not timed YES G705 IEVIEl3 S,R (ICCM B) in Servko l's ICCM 52 10A IR( LT8125 RVHEADLEVEL(ICCM A) NIA OF1kl00A.I.l tl7) RB 809"+0" Nat t' sed YES G109 1D1 A.08 S,R In Sereke t'l ICCM 12 N/A B RCLT8126 RV MEAD LEVEL (ICCM B) N/A OFD 190A-1.l(IR) RS 999'ee" Not tised %ES G7DS IKVIELl3 S,R le Servko t*l ICCM RH N/A IRCMielet WR RCS FRESS TRAIN A ITBATWSt OELl5S24 AB SO9 In Seroke VES E795 IKVIA435 S.R (ICCM) In Service l'I ICCM RB N/A IRCMTDIC2 wR R4 .ESS TRAIN B 115ATwS2 OELISS25 AB SO9"+0" in Sereke VFS 0.70s IEVIR-t3 S,R (ICCM) la Service til lCCM RR N>A IRCPU345 PZR LEVEL INDICATOR lt'Bl.2; tABI 2 OELISS34 AB 822 In Service VES 0.765 1EVIA-OS S.R In Service I'l Resetor Cantant RH ICA B RCroM7 FIR IEMP IMDICATOR S UB t.2; l ABl.2 OFLl5S34 AB #22 In Servko VES 0.705 IKVIAJie S,R In Servko I'l Reector Cantent RB NeA IRCP0368 PE R LEVFL IMDICATOR lifBI,1; I ABtj OFE,15S37 AB 822 In Servka VES E7DS IKVIE13 S.R la Service UI Reacter Centsat Rit N/A IRCPGM9 PER IEMP INDICAIOR It'Bl.I; t ABl.2 OFLl5S37 AB 522 In Servko VES G795 IKVIEl3 S,R In Servko UI Reactor Coolent Notes:
- Es aluation type "NONE" indicates that equipment is passive. d Signature group *RB' ludicates that the equipnicut is a " Rule of the Box" itena.
No scismic or relay evaluation required. The seismic evaluation for these iterns is included with the equipment
- Esatuation type "S** or "S*,R" indicates that equipment is a rugged. passive, designated in the "Wallodown Ilost" neld.
In-line desice. No seismic evaluation is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates that the eqisipment is part of the NSSS system
- Evaluatim typc "S" indicates that a seismic esaluation was perfotnied. and does not require a seismic evalusthus.
- Etsination type "R" Indicates that a relay evaluation was performed.
- The results of the seismic evaluatiost for all equipment designated as "S" or "S,R" can be located in Appendiu D.I (SVDS) by signature groep.
- Esaluation type "S,R" indicates tha' both a seismic and relay evaluatiosi was perfornied.
- All e9ul P ment outHers can be located in Tables 5.1 & 8.2 by their Equipment Class & Outlier Ref No. "E' m _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____ __ _ ._ __
<n '
03'twef 9 9 , Appendix B , Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) ' Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. Dwg/ Zone Bldg. Floor Norm. State power Supp Sys. Power Eval. Group Ref. No. Sytem lloit Elev. Des. State Dwg No/Rev. Source Type Req'd RH WA IRCre376 ICCM wR HOT LEG IFMP It'Bl.2; t ABI.2 OFB looA-l.l (19) AB 822 la servke VES G70s A IKLis S.R l INDICATION la Servko t'l Reactur Coclent RH WA 1RCPtO77 RCS COLD LEc it M* ll?BI.2; t ABlJ OFB lohA-l.l (D9) AB 822 ta Serv 6ce TES G70SA IKI-15 S.R INDICAYlON la Servlee { l's Reector Content 6
=m .
26 WA IRCPSG364 RC PRESS SwllCH N/A OFD 100AJ.2 RB R25%" k Service YES 0.70SC IXSt-HISC S.R In Servlee t'l Lew Pressure Injection 26 WA 1 RCPT 0017F RCS LOOP A PRFSS N/A 06D luna I.l(H5) RB 525'ee" le Servlee YES O 705 Ita'lA el S.R TRANS In Service t'l Reedor Coolant g WA IRCPTUG21P RC PRESS EMIR (ES CH NIA OHLIUGA-l.1 RB 82s"+4" la Servlee TES O 7US IKVIA42 5.R , A) la Servlee I'l Fngineered Safeawardo 26 NA 1RCrino22P RC PRFSS XMIR (FS CII B) MfA OFlkitmA.l.3 RB E25%" In Service VES S 705 110'1C-82 S.It la Service I'l Factmeered Seiraweeds 26 MA 1RCrion23P RC PRESS XMI R (ES CH NiA OFD IODA.I.3 RB 32T+0" le Servko VES E705 I KVIk-82 S.R l'1 Fagineered Safeguerds I 26 WA IRCP19966P RCS LOOP S PRESS NfA OFD 100AB.l (H9) RB E2T+0" le Servire VES n70SA IBJ-10 S.R i TILtNS la servko l'8 Reector Content 52 N/A IRCPY5244 WR RCS PRF.SS iitA11 A N/A Opik t neA.I.l (H2) AB 309'ee" In Servko YES G705 I KVI A.08 8.R (ICCM) In Servko j l'1 ICCM Notes:
- Evaluathm type "NONE"indkates that eqidpment is passive.
- Signature group "RB" indicates that the equipnient is a " Rule of the Box" itent.
No seismk or relay evaluation required. The setsnde evaluation for these items is included with the equipment
- Eva?unthm type "S** er *S*,R" indicates that equipment is a rugged, passive, designated in the "Walkdown liest" field.
In line desice. No seismic esatestion is requiref.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates that the equipanent is part of the NSSS systent
- Evaluation type "S" indicates that a seisanic evaluation was perf6rmed. and does not require a seismic evaluation.
- Esalusthm type "R" indicates that a relay evaluathm was perfornied.
- The results of the selmnic evaluation for mII equipment designated as "S" or "S,R" can w I cated in Appendix D.I (SVDS) by signature group.
- Evaluathm type "S,R" indicates that both a seismic and relay evaluation nas performed.
- All equipment outtlers can be located bl Tables 8.1 & 8.2 by their Equipment dass & Outtler Ref. New Page 79
m ,
.?
08/37/98 Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signatu re Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. Dwg/ Zone Bldg. Floor Norm. State Power Supp Sys. Power Evat Group Ref. No. Sytem flest Elev. Des. State Req'd Dwg No/Rev. Source Type
$2 WA 1RCrYB249 wR RCS rRr551RAIM B N/A OFlk1GRA I.I (117) AB 909'e0" In Servko YES 0.705 1M18-13 S.R (K'Cht) la Serske I'l ICOM r s le N/A 1RCRD0005B A2 COLD LEG RID N/A Of1L100A-l.l (E5) RB 797+0" In Service YES G70SA Rett S.R In Servks til Reectie Coulent
)
10 N/A IRCRD0006A AS cot D LEG RID N/A OFlklosA-1.l(DS RB 797+0" in Servko YES 0 70SA Ints 8,R in Servko L l'1 Reactur Coolunt i N/A IRCRDon075 B2 COLD I EG RID N/A OFlkl0BA l.l (D10) RB 7974e" In Service YES 0 705A IRIB 5.R la Servke ! i l's ReactorCmdent I WA IRCRDemuSA - DI CUI.D LrG RID N/A OFD.ItmA.R.1 (Cil) RB 797+0" in Service YES 0.7BSA IKLIS S,R la Service t'l Reacter Coolant i t 24 WA IRCRD0043A rRZ RID N/A OFIkl00A-1.2 (C6) RB 7974e" la Servko YES (k705 IKVIA 05 S,R . In Service t'l Reector Cedent 24 N/A 1RCRDnO435 rRZ RYD N/A Of1k lDDA-1.2 (G6) RB 797+0" In Service YES 0 705 IKVilkl3 S.R I le Service l'8 Reactor Coolent !
! N/A 1RCRDUUH45 A HUI LFG RID N/A OFD RODA l.l(HS RB B44'+4" In Servtco YES 47DSA SEla 8,R la Service t!I Reacter Coolant i
i N/A 1RCRDon958 B HOI LEG RI D NtA Of1kl00A-l.l(Hil) RB 844'+6" In nervice YES O.7DSA IKI.it 8,R [ la Servko t'l Reector Coolent I Notes:
- Esaluation 13 pe "NONE" indicates that equipnient is passive.
- Signature group *RB* indicates that the equipment is a " Rule of the Box" itent.
No seismic or relay evaluation reoutred. The seisade evaluation for these items is included with the equipment
- Es atualkm type "S*" or "S*,R" indicates that equipment is a rugged, passive, designated in the "Walkdown llost" lleid.
In line desice. No seisade esaluathm is required.
- Evaluation type *NSSS" indicates that the equipment is past of the NSSS system t
- Es aluation type "S" hidicates that a selsnde esminathm was perfonned. and does not regtdre a scissnic evaluation.
- Es atuation type *R" indicates that a relay evaluation was perfonned.
- The results of the setsenic evaluation for all equipment designated as "S" or "S,R" can be located in Appendix D.I (SYSS) by signature group.
- Evaluation type "S,R" indicates that both a seisade and relay evahnation was per'enned.
- All equipment outliers can be Ioented biTables 8.1 & 8.2 &
by their Equipment Class & Outlier Ref. No. Pete 80 j l _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___________m_ _ _ . - _ _ -
(% ) cayaf/se Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) , Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature OuCler Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. Dwg/ Zone Bldg. Floor Norm. State Supp Sys. Power Eval Power Group Ref. No. Sytem IIost Elev. Des. State Req'd Dwg No/Rev. Source Type RB WA IRCTIO6?3PLRD6A) R AI COLD LEG IEMP tlCS CABS ONIDeAl.i tDS) AS B22 IN t:SE VFs O'705A IKI.t3 S.R XMIR (IRD6A) IN UNE I'I Reector t'enlema Rn N/A IRCTIOctSP(RDNA) IBI COLD LEC TEMP Ik3 CABS Oml00Al.I (Ca t) AB S22 INUSE YES O 70%A IKI.it S,R XMTR(IRD8A) IN l'SE Ut Reactor Ceolant RB N'A IRCIT0016PtRDSB) IA2 COLD LEGIEMP IICS CASS OFD-10DA I.I AB B22 IN USE YES (L3tSA IKI-In S.R XMT R (IRDTB) IN l'SE If1 Reectar Coolent RH N'A 1RCIT00 TSP (RD7B) IB2 COLD LEG TEMP IICS CABS Om t00Al.1 AB 822 INUSE YDS 0.70tA IKI-19 S.R XMYR(IRD7B) IN trSE t's Reertorreagent N'A NrA 3 RCVA0001 PRF35t'RIZER SPRAY N/A IDFIIL t 0BA-l.2 (G9) RB N/A Closed NO MIA N/A NONE VALVE Ftther 6 03 Resetw Canisal e 4 19 1RCVA0003 FRZSPRAYlSOLATH3N MIA Oml00A.L2 (H9) RB e50'+0" Open VES 0.70s-F IXO-ke3D S.R i OpenM'Ioned t l's Reecent Coolant i 19 13tCVA0004 PRZ PORY BLDCK VAINE NsA OFikIO0A-13 0f9) RB 951r+0" Open YES O 103 K IXSFID6C S.R
*OPM't, r 05 Reect.w Coulent t
52 N/A 1RCVA0005 PRZ SIEAM SAMPLE N/A Om l10A-3.I (IJ) RB 797'+0" OpenM1osed NO NfA N/A S.R IAOLATION Ctcoed its keector routent 12 N/A IROVA0006 PRZ wAT ER SAMPLE N/A OmlIGAI.I (H3) ItB 797'+0" OpWinsed NO N/A N/A S.R ISOLATION Cissed t'l Reactor Coolent Notes:
- Evaluations type "NON E" indicates that equipment is passive.
- Signature group *RB" indicates that the equipment as a " Rule wf the Ilon" itene.
No seismic or relay evaluathni required. The seismic evaluation for these iteens is included with the equipment
- IS aluation type "S*" or "S*,R" indicates that equipment is a rugged, passive, designated in the "Walkdown llost" fleid.
In line desice. Ne sefsniic esatuathni is required.
- Evaluation type *NSSS" indicates that the equipnient is part of the NSSS systeni
- Es mIuation type "S" indicates that a seismic evaluation was performed. and daen not require a seismic evaluation.
- Esatuation type "R" indicates that a relay esaluathm was perfonned.
- The results of the selsinic evaluation for eB equipment designated as "S" or "S R" can be located in Appendix D.1 (SVDS) by signature geoup,
- ISaluation type "S,R" bulicates that both a seismic and relay evaluatiosi was performed.
- AB equipment outliers can be located in Tables 8.1 & 8.2 '
by their Equipment flass & Outiler Ref. No. Page RI
^
F m 08/27/98 Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) , Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. Dwg/ Zone Bldg. Iloor Norm. State Power Supp Sys. Power Ev8L Group Ref. No. Sytem Ilost Elev. Des. State Req'd Dwg No/Rev. Source Type 12 WA 1RCVA00GT PRE WAIER SAMPLE N/A Of1kI f 8A I.t (H3) AB s09'+0" OpenKlosed NO N/A N/A S.It ISOLAllON (losed I'l Reectne Condene
] 20 1RCVA0066 PRZPORY MIA Of1E 300A f I(K9) Ra s w+0" Cineed YES 0.709 3D33 24 g,a (hmtElesed [
Ut ReectorComient 1 20 S RCVAno67 PRZ C1)DE SAFETY N/A OFD.100A-3 2 (ks) RB 830'+0" Cluned NO N/A MIA S OPowClueed III Reactnr Coolant 3 23 1RCVA0063 FRZ CODE SAP ETY N/A OfD100A.IJ (K7) RB 35a'+0" Clened hO NtA MIA S OpenClosed Ut Reortar Centent WA WA IRCVADISS RCS HOT LFG IA VENT NsA OFD 100A.I.I (34) RB S25'+0 Okeed NO N/A N/A R I til Reactor Cootent i RA WA IRCVA0157 RCS HOT LEG IB YENT N#A Ofbl00A-t S till) RB B25'+0" Cluesd NO N/A N/A R Cinned I l's ReactorConient 9 WA IRCVA0159 RV VENT ISOLATM)N N/A ofE3 nDA-l.1 (19) RB S44'+6" Closed YES 0.70+ E ISKIAls S.R *
*0F,Ct 0t ReactorCaetant 46 WA 1RCVA0160 RV VENT ISOLATION MtA OfEIGOA.I.3 (19) RB S44'+4" Closed Y ES n104E 3sKgAge n,R
*0PfCL 1
t 1 Rescear Coolant . 6 10 WA 1RCVA0162 POST ACCSAMPLE PATH N/A OfD ileA.I.4 (GI) RB 777+0" Closed YES & 703 s kTIB.14 S.R ISOL *OPEN rs ReactorC ae.ie l Notes:
- Evaluation type "NONE" indicates that equipment is passive.
- Signature group *RB" indicates that the equipment is a " Rule of the lion" item.
No seismic or relay evaluattosi required. The seisade evaluation for these items is hicluded with the eqtdyment
- Evaluation ty pe "S*" or "S*,R" hidicates that equipment is a rugged, panives designated in the "Walkdown liest* field.
he line deslee. No seismic etaluation is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates tiint the equipnient is part of the NSSS system
- Esahuathm type *S" indicates that a seisade evaluation wa. perfornied. and does not require a seismic evaluation.
- Esatuation ty pe "R" indicates that a relay evaluathm was performed.
- The results of the selsnaie evaluation for all equipnient desA t uated as "S" or "S.R"
- Evaluation type "S,R" indicates that both a seismic and relay evahsatlosi
#""
- E""'"" I'""E was perforIned.
- All etul ment t outliers can be located in Tables 8.1 & 8.2 by their F4uipment Gass & Outlier Ref Nos Pate 82 ,
l N 02',mM 8 Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) l' Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outiler Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. Dwg/ Zone Bldg. Floor Norm. State poner Supp Sys. Power Eval. Group Ref. No. Sytem llost Eu. Des. State Req'd DWg Nn/Rev. Source Type ! le N/A 1ROVA0163 POST ACCSAMPLE PATM for OfD 110A-l.4 (C2) IRB 777'+0" Clueed TES 6 705 IKV C.34 S.R ISOL *OPEN t't React.w Cootent is N/A 1RCYAel64 FU!II ACCSAMPLE FAIR N/A OfD iIGA-1.4 (C3) AB 759'W Clemt YFS EL7DS IKVIB.14 S,R ITIL *OPEN US Reector Coolant ; 1 11 N/A t RCVAD165 POsI ACC SAMPLE FATEI NtA OFD-Il8A l.4 (C4) AB 798*+0" Closed TES O '05 IlsVIA 44 S,R ISOL *OPItN j UI Reactor Cootent = i N/A 1RCVA0179 POSI ACC SAMPLE N/A OFD il8A 1.4 (C4) AB 798'*0" Closed TFS ' IL249 S.R 1RROTTLE *OFEN 01 Rescher Coulent SR N/A IRPS UNil l RFS CABINETS N/A NO ELEMENT ARY AB B23*+0" In Service TES O-765 IKYEA4}lllK S,R 1:1 Generic la Service i NrA I RSC.10CW.287tENCL REMOR E STARTER N#A DEFA 5149 S$F 79B*+tr* Net t4ed NO N/A NfA S,R ENCE OSI'RE R)R Not Used I'l S5r Al'X Service Water ICCW-257 1 22 IRSC.1FDWJ6A/ ENCL REMOT E ST ARTER N/A OFFA4 12 AB 809'+0" Net tfeed NO N/A NIA S,R ENCLD5t'RE DUR Not fleed t'l Feiergency Feedwe6er If1)WJ68 I 22 B RMC.l fBWJ6srF NCL RFMOT E ST AR TER NIA DEErI47-t B AB 809'+0" Not Used NO N/A MIA S,R
- ENCLOSI'RE FUR Mat Used Ul Eneergency Feedweter IFDWJ69 3 22 1RMC lFDWJ72/FNCL REMolE STARIFR mA OEE.847.07 AB 809W' Nat tleed NO N/A N/A SR ENCLosttRE RHt Mcq thed 01 Emiergency Feedweser iFDWJ72 .
1 I 22 IRMC.lFDWJ74/ ENCL RFMOTE START FR N/A O'F I47.08 AB SO9'+e" Not t' sed NO MIA N/A S.R Notes:
- Evaluation typc "NONE" indicates that equipment is passive.
- Signature group "RB* Indicates that the equipmend is a " Rule of the Bou" iteen.
No seisnde or relay evaluation required. The seismic evaluation for these items is lacluded with the equipnient
- Evaluatinen type "S*" or "S*,R" indicates that equipment is a rugged, passive, designated in the "Walkdown liest* field. F ha line desice. No seismic evaluathm is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates that the egulpnient is part of the NSSS systeni
- Es atuative ty pe "S* indicates that a seismic esaluation was perfonned. and does not require a selsnde evaluation.
- The results of the selsnaic evaluation for mE equipnient designated as "S" or "S,R"
- Esatuation (3 pe R" indicates that a relay evaluation was performed.
- can be located in Appendix D.I (SVDS) by signature group.
- Esatuation type "S,R" indicates that both a seismic and relay evaluation a
- All equipnient entliers can be located bi Tables 8.1 & 8.2 nas perfed. P"C' 83 by their Equipment dans & Outlier ReE No.
l t
h t
')
0 8les tj'9 8 Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 > Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. DWg/ Zone Bldg. Floor Norm. State Power Supp Sys. Power Evat , Group Rei. No. Sytem Host Elev. Des. State Reg'd DWg No/Rev. Source Type (Canu (Cont) (Cont.) (Cent.) Font.) (Cont.) (Cant.) (Cent.) (Cant.) (Cent.) (Coat ) (Cant.) tComQ ENCIAMitRE FOR Mut l'oed t'l Enwrgency Feedestee 3 FDWJ74 1 22 IRSC-IFDWJ82/ ENCL REMOIE STARIER N/A DEE-14749 AB 809"+0" Net t:eed NO NIA N/A S.R ENnOSI'RE FUR Not IIsod lil Finnertency Feedwater iFDWJ82 3 22 I RSC-I FDW Ja4/ ENCL REMOIE S TART ER N/A OFLl47-IS AB 8tW+0" Not tleed NO N/A N/A R.R ENCLOSt"RE IUR Not tised , l!I Feiertency Feedweter IFDWJ#4 ; I N/A IRSC.lHP 409tENCL REMUI E EI ARIER Nt4 ore.158J2 AB 796'+6" In Service VES OL703 C IKS3-02D S.R FNCLOSI'RE FOR IMP 489 la Servko
!!t Higli Pressere injection i N/A 1RSC-lHP 41GfENCL REMOIE SI ARIFR N/A OFE 15133 AB 796'+6" In Service TES N/A IKS3-02D S,R FNCLOSt'RE FUR IHP-410 In Servko ;
I'l Hi tit Pressere Injectlan 64 191 I RNC-I LPSW- 3 39/ ENCL REMU t E SI ARI FR h/A N/A AB 796'+6" In Serske YES G703-C IKS3-05AB S,R [ FNCLOSE'RE IUR in Service t!! Ime Pressere Sereke ILFSW IJ9 Wate-I N/A IRSC ILPSW 545/ ENCL REMOTE ST ARTER N/A OFL131L36 AB 796'+6* In Servare TES G70343 IKS3-03CT S.R ENCLORI'RE FUR la Servke l's Low Pressure Serske ILFSW-565 Weter i N/A 1 RSC.1 LPSW.566/ ENCL REMOT E ST ART FR NrA OELlJ847 AR 796'+6" In Service YES OL703-G IXS3-83CB S.R ENCLOSl'RE FOR In Service l!1 I nw Prestore Service Il PSW.566 Wster i 22 l RSC-I PR-59/ ENCL REMOIE STARIFR N/A OFLl58-Is AB Bn9'+0" le Service TES G703-D IKI,aAB S.R FNCLORI'RE FOR IPR 59 la Service Notes:
- Es aluation t)pe "NONE" indicates that equipnient is passive.
- Signature group "RB" indicates that the equipment is a " Ride of the BoK" itent.
No seismic or relay evaluation required. The selsnile evaluation for these items is included with the equipment
- Etaluation ty pe "S*" or "S*,R" hulicates that equippient is a rugged, passive, designated he the "Walkdown llost" field.
hi line desice. No seismic evaluatime is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates that the equipnient is part of the NSSS systent
- Evaluathan type "S" indicates that a seismic evaluation was perfonace". and does not lequire a seisade evaluation.
- Esahlation type "R" indicates that a relay evaluation was perfanned.
- The results of the seismic evaluation for all eqtdpment designated as "S" or "S,R" can be located he Appendix D.! (SVDS) by signature group.
- Evaluation type "S,R" bidicates that both a se asnde and relay evaluation was perfonned.
- AWPmenWilers can k located Maws 11 & M by their Equipnient Gass & Outlier Ref. No. P"8' R4
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ ___________.__._l
f 08Mr 98 Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name W alkdoWrl Ref. DWg/ Zone Bldg. Floor Norm. State Supp Sys. Power Evnt PuWer Group Ref No. Sytem 11est Elev. Des. State DWg Nu/Rev. Source Type Reg'd (t eat.) (Cent.) (t eat.) (Cont ) (Coat.) (Cent.) (Cont ) (Cont.) feat _) trent.) (('ent.) (Cent.) (Cent.) 151 Penetration Rm Ven8Matlem i 22 IRSC.lPR 6& ENCL REM 01E ST ARTFR N#4 OEE-l5tL19 All 809'+e" la servke T ES OME R11011 S.R ENCLOSt'RE SUR IFR 68 la Service UI Penetrothe Ras Ventilation I RH MA ISA9 ANNUNCIATOR ISA9 IVBl.2.3 OFF,Ilt 19 AB S22 in Servko VES 0 705A IIGil S.R t U1 Eme Pressure Service in Servko ! Water i RR N/A ISA9.09 ANNt2NCIATOR ISA9 IVB1.2,5 001 11589 AB S22 In Servlee TES 0.705-A IKB-Il S,R Ut Low Pressere Servko WINDOW 09(LFMW HDR Be Service Weser PRFM ALAR %f) le MA ISCHX000A t;FMFRATOR W ATFR NIA OFTE121A L4(D7) IB 775'40" Ba Servko NO N/A NIA B COURIRIA la Service t Ifl Stator Cootent 10 MA t%CIEX0tm3 CENFRATOR WAIFR N/A OFIE I21 A-l.4 (C7) IB 775'+0" In Service NO N/A N!A S CtXlLFR B3 la Servko ! UI Statur Cootent gh gA ISCH P ITNIT I STAIOR COULING N/A NO ELEMENI ARY IB 775'+0" le Ser*ke N/A N/A N/A R US Main l urtene WAI ER FAMkL la Service to g71 ISFIK00D2 INCORK INST HANDLING N/A Of1kl04A.1 l(C2) RB 823ee" Not tleed NO N/A N/A S i TANK Net tleed til Emargency Feedester l FrA ISCFP SG FWF FANEL MIA OEE 146 TB 775'+0" le Rervice YES (E70%R IDP-Fo6ER S.R UI Condemoste la Itervke 12 172 ISCLC RTEAM CEN LOGIC NIA NO ELEMENT ARY AB B09 In Servko YES (E703 I KVI A-17 S.R l'1 Stesen Generetar CABINET In Servko Notes:
- Evaluation t3 pe *NONE" indicates that equipment is passive.
- Signature group "RB" indicates that the equipnient is a " Rule of the Box" itent.
No seisnde or relay etahistbni required. The seinnde evaluation for these itenes is included with the equipment
- Evaluathna type "S*" er "S*,R" indicates that equiprient is a rugged, p==sise, designated in the "Walkdown Ilest" field.
In line desice. Nu seismic evaluation is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates that the equipement is part of the NSSS systens
- Evaluation eypc "S" ind! cates Ihat a seismic c,aluathne was performed. *nd does Inst require a seisade evaluation.
- Esaluathni type "R" indicates tinat a relay evaluatinn was performed.
- The results of the seisade evaluathne for all equipment designated as "S" or "S R"
" * ' " #E
- ISaluathni type "S,R" indicates titat both a seisade and relay evaluation was perftmned.
- M eqidrawat euen can be kated in Tah El & R2 by their F,quipnient dass & Outlier Ret No. Page 16
r (
..nn,. :
Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconce Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. Dwg/ Zone Bldg. Floor Norm. State Power Supp Sys. Power Eval Group Ref. No. Sytem IIost EleV. Des. State Req'd Dwg No/Rev. Source Type 6 63 N/A ISK.B 129V FFB ISK.B N/A B704E AB B09'+0" In Servko VES 0 703-G 1158-RS4B 5,R i Efl 20sv rwR (FrB) la Servko 3 M WA ISkK 120V rPB ISEX N/A G704E AB 909"+0" In Scrvice YES O-793-G IKS2-Ro3CT 8,R Ut 20RV FWR (FFB) la Service 23 WA ISEL 120V rPB ISKL N/A O.704 E AB 309*40'* In Sereke YF3 4703-C IXS3-R04BT S.R I'l 20sY FWR (PrB) la Service 1 RB NA 138,5 CRD SYsIEM LOGIC CAB ICRDif NO ELEMENTARY AB SO9'+e" In Senke N/A 47090.7o5A R EVIA.14rlK 8,R E!I Control Ostdnets 5 In Servko RB N/A ISI,6 CRD RYST EM EDGIC CAR ICRDLC NO ELEMENT ARY AB 309'+8'* In Servka N/A 47U545.705A I KYl A-14/l K S.R lii Centrei OsNnets 6 la Service j L RA WA ISSHVAG001 SIEAM SEA *u MEADER MA Of1D-32181 I (J7) TB 796*+6" Closed NO N/A N/A R 6 ISOLAllON Claced til Mein Tinbene t MA N/A ISSHVA0003 SIEAM SEAL IIEADER N/A OFB122El.l (36) TB 796*+6" Closed NO N/A MIA R l ISOLATION Closed til Mats TarNne ' t N/A N/A I SV.2 *9 POL DEMIN ISOL IA2 FOWDEX OM 225A 36 IB 771 Cluned NO N/A N/A R ! Erl C te (LATCMINQ SOLENOID PANEL Closed [ VALVE FUR C-232 N, A '4/A ISV.233 POL DEMIN ESOL IA2 POWDEX OM 225A-36 YB 775 Cheed NO N/A N/A R I!1 Condensate (LATCHINQ SOLENOID FAMEL Closed V ALVE IUR C.3.37 * [ MA MA ISV.267 POL DEMIN 160L IA2 POWDEX OM 225A-36 75 7'l Cinmed No N/A N<A R l'l Condensate (LATCHENQ SOLENOID FANEL Omed ! VALVE FOR C-244 I i NrA N/A ISV.2?) FOL DEMIN ISOL 1&2 POWDEX OM 225A-36 TB 771 Goed NO N/A N/A R i Notes:
- Evaination ty pe "NONE" indicates that equipament is passive.
- Signature group "RB" indicates that the equipenent is a " Rule of the Box" itent No seinnic or relay etaluation required. The seismic evaluation far these iteses is included with the equipenent
- Evaluation type "S*" er "S*,R" indicates tl'at equipment is a rugged, passive, designated in the "Walkdown liest" neld.
In line des ke. No seismic evahmation is required.
- Evahmation type "NSSS" indicates that the equipment is part of the NSSS systent and does not require a seiselle evaluatiost !
- Evaluation type "S" indicates that a seismic es atuation was perfornled.
- Evaluation type "R" indicates that a relay esatuation was perfonned
- The residts of the seisade evaluation for all equipnient designsted as "S" or *S,R" i I
can be located in Appendiu D.1 MDS by signature group.
- Evaluation type "S,R" indicates that both a selsnde and relay evaluatices
- All equipenent outiners can be located blTables Ill & B.2 ,
was performed. Page 86 ! by flielr Equipsnent Class & Outlier Ref. No.
b ) ce M iss
)
Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Watkdown Ref. Dwg/ Zone Bldg. Floor Norm. State Power Supp Sys. Power Eval Crnup Ref. No. 53tem Host E!ev. Des. State Req'd Dwg No/Rev. Source Type (Ce> (Coma w.=9 (Coma Ceau (Coma (Ceau (C =9 (Como (C=au (Ca.o (Cony (Cel UI Camdennete (LAT CHINC) SOLEh0!D FANFL Clemed VALVE FOR C.258 WA N/A ISV.279 FOL DEMIN isOL ta2 FUwDEX OM 225AJ6 TB 771 Closed NO N/A N/A R UI C - te (LAICHENC) SOLENOID PANEL Clueed VALVE DT)R C.258 I t v3 11 5-111 TERM BOX lli N/A OEF 136 24 VD 796'+6" la Servko YES G705 IKYlD-03 S.R US Condenser Circuteting In Service Water 1 WA IIB-Il3 T ERM BOX I!2 N.'A DEE-136 20 YD 796*+6" In Service TES O 705 IKVID O3 S,R l's Condeneer Circuleung In Serv 6ce Watee 18 N/A ITBATWSt ATSW TFRM BOX I N/A OFE-847-18 AB 309*+6" In Service VES G794 IKG29 S,R In Service 01 Emersency Feed =nese il N/A IIBATWS2 ATSW TFRM BOX 2 MIA OELl47-te AB 309'+o" la service TES G104 IKG29 S,R
- i. Se,vko US Ennergency Feeduster 27 N/A ITt: 4KY SWGR IIC N/A N0 ELEMENTARY IB 796'+6" In Servke YES G7U2 MFB S,R Ut 4160V FWR In Service 10 N/A liCFA Tt'RB CONT PANEL N/A NOELFMFNTARY TB 1*6H" In Service YES G791 IDIAJI S.R I'l Centrol( eldmets IICFA la Service 27 N/A ITD 4KV r% CR IT D N/A NO FI EMENT ARY TB 796 % " Ba Service VES O-702 MFB S.R US 4160V FH R In Servko 16 N/A IIDCJ T RANSDITER CAB ITDC3 N/A OFEI51L23 AB 009'+e" la Service VES G705-A IK313 . S.R UI Reeder Centent la Servke 27 N/A ITF 4KY SWGR IT E NtA NOFLFMENTARY TB 796'+6" In Service VES 0.702 Mrs 3,R Notes:
- Evaluation ty pc "NONE" indicates that equipnient is passive.
- Signatore group "RB" indicates that the equipment is a " Rule of the Ben" itern. I Ne seisade or relay evaluatten required. The sensinde evaluation for these iteens is included with the equipnient i
- Esalaathm type *S** er "S*,R" indicates that equipnient is a rugged, passhe, designated in the "Walkdown Ilost" field.
In-tine device. No selande evaluation is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates that the equipnient is part of the NSSS system
- Evaluati.m eype "S" tudicates that a seismic evaluation was performed. and does na,t regidre a selsnaic esshBation. !
- Es aluathm type "R" indicates that a relay evaluation was performied.
- The results of the selsinic evaluation for eB eqidpement designated as "S" or "S,R" ,
- Evnluationi ty pe "S,R" indicates staat both a selsude and relay evaluation
'""
- 7 E""'"" E'""E was perfor7ned.
- AB equipment outBers can be located in Tables 8.1 & 8.2 by their Equipnient (Inss & Outlier Ref. No. Page 87
V
) b ]
os/W/se Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. Dwg/ Zone Bldg. Floor Norm. State Supp Sys. Power Eval Power Group Ref. No. Sytem Host Elev. Des. StBte Dwg No/Rev. Source Type Reg'd F ao (c.au (c.au (c d.) tc==4 r==4 (c o (c au (c =u r.au (c y ro co UI 4168V FH R In Servko N/A N, A ITOFLD009 ElW PUMPit RBINE Olt N/A Of1klJ5E l.2 (Ilo) TB 775'+e" Mee Used NO N/A N/A S* E1LTER la servko UI Ea.orgency Feedweter RB "4/A ITOMXOuel EF% FT OIL (TBORJR 110180202 Ofikl33A.lJ (Il4) IB 775'+9" nee Used NO N'A N/A S la Nervko I UI Emmenency Feedester t N/A ITCTSol765 FWPT IA BEARING OIL N/A OEF-1450ELA TB 773'e0* In Serske TFS OL705 IDIA.29 5,R PRFSS LOW In Servle, t% Candeenste De lac ~5e I N/A ITOPSDI928 IWFT IB BEAPING OIL N/A DEF-84500.A TB 775'*e" la service YES O'70S IDIA20 S.R FRESSl.OW la Service i Irl condensste De Interlocks le NrA ITOPU0022 Efte rT AU% OIL Ft'MP N/A OF1kl358 0 2 tH4p TB 775'+e" ON Y B.S (kMa InF-Ra3A S.R , On LI Euwrgency Feedwatee RR Nf4 ITOct91029 FFWFT SIIAFT DRIVEN ITOPUD022 Of1kl3581.2 (F4) TB 779*+0* Off NO MtA N#A 5 OttFUMP On Un Emergency Feedwater g B74 ITOIK0002 Ffw FUMPit'RBINE OIL MIA OFIE1331Lt.2 <12) TB 77t+0" Net t'oed NO NtA NtA 5 I TAMK In Servko I UI Ensorgency Deedwster 20 N/A ITOVA0039 EfW FUMP Tt'RRINE GIL N/A OFlkl355-IJ (Mil) TB 77e+4r' closed NO N/A N/A 5 Pa VAI.YE I 1hroened l'8 Emiertency ree# 4eer [ t t i Notes:
- Evaluation type "NONE" hidicates that equipement is passive.
- Signature group "RB" indicates that the equipnient is a " Rule of the Ros" itene.
No seisade er relay evaluatten required. The sebanic evalustian for fliese idenis is included with the eqdpnient
- Evaluation type "S*" or "S*,R" indicates that equipnient is a mgged, passive, designated in the "Waikdown llest" field. '
in-line desice. No seismic evaluation is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS* Indicates that the equipment is part of the NSSS systene l
- Eva!aation type "S" indicates that a selsnde es aluation was performed. and does not require a selsnaic evaluation.
- Evakation type "R" indicates that a relay evaluation was performed.
- The results atthe seismic evakation for mII equipenent designated as "S" or "S,R" 3 can be located in Appendix D.1 (SVDS) by signature group.
- Esaluation type "S,R" ludicates that both a seisade and relay evaluation was perfemned.
- AB equipneemt outliers can be km'ed in Tables 11 & E2 [
by their Equipement Class & Outlier Ret No. Pete 88 I
s s ot/27/se Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 i l Signatt:re Outlier Equipment ID Name WBikdown Ref. Dwg/ Zone Bldg. Floor Norm. State Power Supp Sys. Power Erst j Gruup Ref.No. S3 tem Ilust Elev. Des. State Req'd Dwg No/Rev. Source T3pe 10 N/A IIIC6 It'ItB 19 R%f CAB li106 N/A NO ELEMENTARY IB 796H" In Service NO MIA MIA S.R lil CsNnets la Servke l RB WA 11'B1 CONTROL BOARD it'St it'BI,2; 1 ABl.2 NO ELEMENT ARY AB S22'+0" In Servke N/A MIA MIA S.R 4 111 Central Baards la Servko ! i 12 N/A II'El.2 l ABl.2 CONT ROL BOARDS N/A N/A AB B22*+e" In Service N/A N/A N/A S.R litBl.2.ABI In Servke
!!I Castral Bnerde i
t RB N/A 11'B2 CONT ROL BOARD it'B2 11'Bl.2; I ABI,2 NO FI.FMENT ARY AB S21 la Service N/A N/A N/A S.R
!!I Centrul Boards le Service 20 I?6 I V.'.E0001 EM SIFAM AIII FJECTOR N/A OFlkl210 3.l(H2) TB 77V+0" Off NO N/A N/A S (SAE) Either I t?l Emerecary Steens RB RA 3%B9 CONT ROL BOARD IVBt 14 B1,2,5 NO ELEMENT ARY AB 822'+0* Be Service MtA N/A N/A S.R US Conkul Boards la Service f
19 N. A S V R I.2.3 e weI ROL BOARDS N/A MIA AB B22*+0" la Service N/A N/A N!A S,R t's Control Boerde n stJ,3 la Servko i RR RA IVB2 CONT ROL BO4RD IVB2 IVBI,2.3 NO ELEMEN T ARY AB 822'+6" le Service N/A N/A N/A S.R til Central Bue.de In Service f R[I N'A IVB) CONT ROL BOARD IVB3 IVBl.2.3 NO ELEMFET ARY AB R22'4e" le Service MIA MIA N/A S,R 171 Contral Boards la Servke I 177 IVSAH B1i EV.A Bli & B2T ENCLOSI'RE N/A DEE.lJi-08 BH 796'+6" On VFR (k706 A IKSG03 5,R VF.NT FAN A Os i 177 IVSAH B1I-I V-B Bli & B2i ENCLORitRE MIA OFF lJl.08 BH 796'+6" C-n ) FA U 706-A IKSC04 S.R VENT FAN B Os I ilVAC i Notes:
- Esaluathm type "NONE" indicates that equipnient is passise.
- Stenature group "RB" indicates that the equipenent is a " Rule of the Box" itelu.
No sensudc or relay etatuati.m required. The seismic evaluation for these items is included with she equipnient
- Esaluattam typc *S** or "S*,R" bidicates that equipenent is a avgged, passive, designated in the "Walkdown llost" field. !
in line desice. No vismic e'
- St.cn is reqidred.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates that the equipment is part of the NSSS system !
- Evaluations ty pc "S" indicates thse a seismic esaluath n was perfornied. and does not require a selsnde evaluation, j
- Es atuation ty pe "R" indicatea t; at a relay evahiathm nas perfonned.
- The results of the seismic evaluation for aH equipsnent designated as "S" or "S,R" can be located in Arpendix D.I (SVDS) by signature grinp.
- Evaluation type "S,R" indicates that both a setsnde and relay evaluathm nas performed.
- AB equipment outbers can be located in Tables 3.1 & 8.2 by their Equipment Gess & Outlier Ref. No. Page 89 i
~
)
esta(/ss Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 ' Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. Dwg/Zime Bldg. Floor Norm. State Supp Sys. Power Evat Power Gruup Ref. No. Sytem liost EleV. Des. State Req'd Dwg No/Rev. Source Type (Cent) (Cent) (Cent) (Cent) (Cent) (Cont.) (Cont.) trent.) (Cost) (Cont.) (Cent.) (Cent) I (Cent) 1 g 177 IVRAH -CT & E V. A CT4 ENCLD50RE VENT MIA OFL t31 -09 BH 796 % " On YES O'74A IKSG01 5,R l FA'4 A On IIVAC e 377 IVMAH-CT4 EY.B CT4 B MCIDSt'RE VEN T N#A DEL 131-09 BH 796'+6" On YES G784-A IKSG02 S.R FAN B On HVAC si I ?g IV34H00f t AHILil MJA DELI 31 AB E3r+0" On YES G703-F 11R.04E 3.R On HVAC si in IVSAH0012 AHtf.12 N/A 08 013 t AB S3r+0" On YES GI703-C 2XR-03E 5,R On {' HVAC ' 51 1 73 IVSAH0026 sufiMIDE AIR BotMETER MIA OFLl31.69 AB R3r+9" Off YES O.703- F 11R-85C S,R FAN *A'(F-22) On HVAC st t 73 IVRAllDH27 OUTSIDE AIR BoosIFR N/A OFLl35 01 AB M3r+U" Off YES O- 8703-C 2XR 018 S.R FAN *B'tr.23) On HVAC s.f.h RB N/A IVRDYunel CHLORINE GAS SENSOR HVAC DUCT OELI33 66 AD R3F+6" In Service TES G7D4 * . C34 S.R (UI C1 RL ROOM INTAKE) In Service HVAC NtA N/A IVSFLn026 CRYS FAC FILTER"A" HVAC Dl'CT N/A AB SJr+0" Off MU N/A N/A N/A I (18MITS I & 2) On 38VAC 9 N/A Na A IVSFLOO27 CRYS FAC FILTER "B" HVAC Di'CT N/A AB R3r+6" Off NO N/A N/A MIA (t'NIIS I & 2) On HVAC Notes:
- Evaluatime 13 pc "NON E" indicates that equipment is passive.
- Signatan group "RB" indicates that the equipment is a " Rule of the Box" hens.
No seisade or relay evaluatinen required. The seismic evaluation for these iteens is included wl:h the equipment
- Esatuatlan 43pe "S*" or "S*,R" indicates that eganiennent is a rugged, passive, designated in the "Walkdown 11est" ficId.
in-line desice. No scismic evaluation is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates that the equipment is part of the NSSS systent
- Esatuathm ty pe "s" indicates that a seismic evaluation was performed. and does stot require a seisade evaluation.
- Evaluation type "R" indicates that a relay evaluation was performed.
- TInc nsults of the seimduvaluation for all equipment designated as "S" or "S,R" can be located in Appendix D.I (SVDS) by signature group.
- Esatuation type "S.R" indicates that both a niswile and relay evaluathm
, g ,g g
- All equipment outliers can be located in Tables 3.1 & S.2 ,
by their Equipnient Gass & Outlier Ref. No. Page 90 t
s s ca/u/ss
)
Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signatut e Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. DwgTIone Bldg. Moor Norm. State Eval Power Supp Sys. Power Group Ref. No. Sytem llost Elev. Des. State Req'd Dwg No/ReV, Source Type 20 N/A IVVAnts6 COND VActTM N/A OFD-12tC-1.I(II4) TB 79CM" Clened YES O-703 IXA- RS3A S,R BREAIJR Opea , US Mata Turlane ' le 979 1X99 600V ir IX81 PE/A O.703 TB 796'M" In Norwice YES 4 742 ITC-13 5,R Ul 60DV FwR (LOAD in servko CENI FRS) 6 RB N/A IXstI%F%IR(1TC.I3) 600V LC 3%ot XFMR 1%enA OELII7 51 TB 79CM" ta Servlee VES O 702 11013 5 14160V TO 600V) le Servae, Ut 6enV PH R(LOAD CFNIFRM) 30 179 IXo2 600V LC IED2 NiA G703-A TB 79CM" In Rentre YES O.782 IT D-13 S,R l'160eV PH R (LOAD la Service CENT FRS) Rin N/A IXG2/XFLIR(tTIA13) 600V LC 3%n2 XFMR IX02 OELII746 IB 196"M" In Service TES O'192 ITIL13 8 (4160V TO 600V) la Service l'I soeV FwR (LOAD CEN1 FIS) 30 gao IXO4 600V LC 1XM NIA 0 703 C IB 79CM" Ia Service YES G702 IILO3 S.R I!16nDV FM R(LOAD In Service CENIh KS) RP N. A IXe4/XFMR(IIE.a3) suoV LC 3%84 XFMR l%04 OF Li t ?.70 IB 796'M" la service VES O 702 ITLe3 8 14160V TO 60nV) In servle, til 600V tvR (LOAD CEN E F RS) 10 179 IXBS 600V LC tX05 MtA 4703 D TB 796'M" In Service VES 0.102 ITIkO2 F,R I?I 600V FWR (LOA D la Servko CFNIE RM) RR N/A 1%95/%FMR(ITEke2) 6SnV lf l%Ds %FMR IXGS DELL 17-55 TB 796'M" In Servies YES 0.702 1 TILE 2 S Notes-
- Es atuation ty pe "NONE" indicates that equipment is passisc.
- Signature group "RB" indicates that the equipment is a " Rule of the Box" itene. ;
No selsnaic or relay evaluatinen required. The seisade evaluation for these items is included =ith the equipment
- Esatuation ty pe "S*" or "Sa,R" indicates that equipement is a rugged, passise, designated in the "Walkdown liest" field. ,
in-line desice. No seismic evalustion is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates that the equipnient is part of the NSSS systeni
- Evaluation type "S" indicates than a selsnile evaluations was perfors ned. and does not require a selsnde evaluation.
- Evaluathun 43 pe "R" indicates that a relay evaluation was performed.
- The results of the seisade evaheation for all equipment designated as "S" or "S R"
- can be located in Appendix D.1 (SVDS) by signature group.
- Evaluation ty pe "N,R" indicates that both a seismic and svlay evaluation was performed.
- All equipnient outliers can be located in Tables 8.1 & 8.2 by their Equipnient Oms: & Outlier Ref. No. Page 91 ;
. _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ - _ _ _ m ________.. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . - _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ ____
( r i 08hT/93 Appendix B ' Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL)
. Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment 10 Name Walkdown Ref. Dwg/ Zone Bldg. Floor Norm. State Supp Sys.
Power Power Ev8L Ctvup Ref. No. Sytem IIost EleV. Des. State Dng Na/Rev. Req'd Source Type tc.ai) (cono (como (cony (c.au (c.=4 cc.a) (con) (c.au rano (c no (c.au tc.no (4160V TO 600V) la service 181600V f% R (LOAD CENT ERS) to 179 IXO6 680V LC IX86 N/A G703.E TB 796'M" In $ervice YES G702 ITED2 8.R US enoV FWR (LOAD la Service CENT FRS) , i RH N/A IX96AFMR(IT Lo2) 600V LC IXo6 KFMK IX86 OEEll749 TS 796'M" la service YES 0 702 IT E02 S (4160V TO 600V) la Service UI 600V PWR(LOAD CENT FRS) to l *9 1107 6nuY LC 1XU7 N/A O 703-F TB 796*M" la Service YES 0.102 ITc.a2 S.R , 014cnY FWR (LOAD la Service C's.NIERS) RB N/A IX07/XFMR(ITC 02) 60cv ir IXe71ntit IXU7 OEE.Il7-40 " JB 796'M" la service TES G702 I TC-02 S (4160V TO 6nUV) la se vice [ 01600V PWR(LOAD CEN T E RS) 10 lal IXIe 6tmV LC tXue N#A OFLil6.cl AB 796'+6" le Service VES EM2 310 83 S,R l't 600V PWR(LOAD le Service C'FNI F RS) I RB MA IXOR/XbMR(IICS) 600V A IXDS IXOB OELil7-43 TB 796'M" != Service TFS 0.702 1 T 0.03 S l (4' JV) le Servee+ t III 60eV PH R (LOAD CENT ERS) I
, 10 182 IX39 60DV LC lXe9 N/A OEE-116-01 AB 796'+6" I= Service VES O 102 11 D-83 S.R ;
if1600V PWR(LOAO la 9ervire I CENT ERS) t RB N/A IXO9(X FM R(1 T D-83) 600V LC XFMR IXo9 IXO9 OEE-Il7-56 AB 796 le Service T ES n702 IIDS S I l Notes:
- Evaluation type "NONE" indicates that equipment is passive.
- Signature group "RB" indicates that the equipment is a " Rule of the Box" liesn.
No seismic or relay cialuatiem required. The setunic evaluation for these itenas is included with the equipment
- Evaluation typc "S*" or "5*,R" indicates that equipment is a meged, passive, designated in the " Wall 6down liest" field. ;
in-line desice. No svismic evaluation is required.
- Evaination type "NSSS" indicates that the egalpment is part of the NSSS system
- Evaluatl<m type "S" indicates that a seisenic evaluation was perform,4. and does not require a retsade evaluation.
- Evaluation ty pe "R" indicates that a relay evaluation was perfunned.
- The results of the seismic evaluation for all equipenent designated as "S* or "S.R"
"" *
- I"" I
- Evaluation type "S,R" indicates that both a seismic amt relay evalentione
- All equipment outliers can be located in Tables 8.1 & 3.2 Womd. age 92 by their Equipment Class & Outlier Ref. No.
t
--. . -.n=. -. .-. . .+ . - . - - . ~ - . - - - ~ .-
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~
09fst)98 A ppeut.s.. . Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) , Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outiler Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. Dwg/ Zone Bldg. Floor Norm. State Power Supp Sys. Power Eval Group Ref. No. Sytem llost Elev. Des. State Req'd Dwg Na/Rev. Source Type (Cent.) (Cent-) (ConL) (Cent.) (Cent) (Cent) (Cont) (Cent.) (Cent.) (Cent) (Cent) (Opert.) (Cent.) I (4160V TO En0V) In servke Ut 600Y PWR(LOAD CENT ERS) 10 153 3XIe/XntR 600V LC IX10 XFMR N/A G7034 IB 7e6*+6* In nervko YES O 782 ITC 12 8
- i. serv =e j
t'l 600V PWR (LOAD CENIFRM) i I 884 IXA hfCC BKA Nei O.703 IB 796*M" Bu Servko % ES G7BJ IX03-84C 5.R UI 50W208V MOTOR la Servko CONTRot. CENT rRS RB WA IXA(208V) 20sv MCC IXA IXA E703 TB 796'M" la Serv 6te YES G703 IKA M7AT S.R la Servko Ut 6 Hor 208V ht010R CONT ROL CENTFRS f RH N/A 1XA(600Y) 600V hfCC lXA IXA O.7n3 TB 796'M" la Bervko YES G7D3 l%9844C S.R I la servke I t'l 600/2tarV MOIOR C04I ROL CENIFRS t 184 IXA.A 20sV MCC IKA A N/A G193.H IB 796*M" Is Servlee YES 0 703 IXA-R05BB 5.R i US 600r20sV MOTOR In Service CONI ROL CENIERS I N/A IXA!XBtR XFMRSXA MIA E793 T3 796'M" In Service YES 4 703 IKA.FD7AT S la service Ut 6m/20sv MOIGR , COMiROL CENIFRS , r iG NA WR 600V htCC IXB N/A G703.A TB 7799" In Servke YES G703-A IXe244C 5.R l Us 6ew20nv hnoloR le Servko CONY ROL CENTERS Notes:
- Evaluattem t) pc ".NON E" hidicates that equipment is passive.
- Signature groep "RB" indicates that the equipement is a " Rule of the Box" itent No seismic or relay evaluation required. The scismic evaluation for these licens is included with the equipnient
- Evaluattom type "S** ar "S*,R" hidicates that equipment is a rugged, passive, designated in the "Walkdown llest" field. ;
bi line desice. No seismic esaluation is required.
- Evaluation type *NSSS" indicates tinat the equipment is part of *he NSSS sygem
- Evaluation type "S" hidicates that a seismic evaluation was perforened. and does not regidre a seismic evaluation. '
- Evaluation ey pe "R" indicates that a relay evaluatt m was perfornied. " The resides of the seismic evaluation for all equipnient designated as "S" or "S,R" can be located in Aprendix D.1 (SVDS) by signature genup, j
- Fvuluation type "S,R" indicates that both a seisade and relay evaluation was perfortued.
- AB equipment outilers can be located in Tables 3.1 & 8.2 by their Equipneent Class & Outlier Ref. No. Page n ;
I
. ~. . ._
p p g - t i s s on.-eise Appendix B ; Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. Dwg/ Zone Bidg. Floor Norm. State Supp Sys. Power Evat Power , Group Ref. No. Sytem llost Elev. Des. State Req'd Dwg No/Rev. Source Type t I I 40 1%C EfCC 3%C N/A B703C TB 775 % " In servere VES 0.MC IXO484C S.R [ 09 60tif20sV MOTOR la Service CONT ROL CENTERS RB N/A IIC(20RV) 208V MCC TIC IIC O.'Mt3 C TB 775 In Service YES 0.7o1C exC-ptAT S,R ; in Servire 016ner20sy M01DR > CONI ROL CEN T > Rs RR N/A 31C(600V) 60NV MCC t%C l%C B7B3-C TB 773 In Servire VES 0.7aAC IIste4C 3,R , la Service 08 600r20NV MOIOR + CONT ROL CENIERS t N/A B EC/XMtR XptR 11C(eenV TO InsV) MtA G703 C IB 775'+e" In service YES O-703-C IXC-FUBAT S In Service Ul 600/20sV MOTOR CONT ROL CENT ERS 64 N/A 1XE MCCIXE MIA 07tG B TB 775'+0" ta Swetes VES O-703-8 l%03-940 5,R UI 600r20sv MOTOR In Service CONTROL CENTERS M N/A IXGA s%CA MIA U-7h1C TB 196"+4" le Service VES 0.703-C IX8485A S,R I Ul 600/2U8V MO10R la Service CONIROL CENT ERS I RR N/A IXGA(20sV) 2GeV MCC IXGA IXGA U.701C IB 796'+6* Ie Servlee YES 0 7E34' IXGA RSAT S.R In Service t's 60er20sv MOTOR CONIROL CENIERS RB N/A IXGA(6mW) 688V MCC t KCA 3%GA B193 C TB 796'+6" In Servm TES 4703-C IXo4-05A S.R la Servk e , l'1600f208V MOTOR CONTROL CENT ERS l Notes:
- Evaluation tyy 'NONE" indicates that equipment is passive.
- Signature group "RB* Indicates that the equipment is a " Rule of the Box" itern. l No seismic or resay evaluation required. The seismic evaluation for these items is included with the equipment
- Es alustkna type "S** or "S*,R" indicates that equipment is a rugged, passive, designated be the "Walkden Ilost" fleid. ,
in-line desice. No sei3mic evaluathm is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates that the equipment is pan 1 of the NSSM syst m and does not require a selsnaic evaluatioet i
- Es aluation typc "S" indicates that a seisade evaluation was perfosined.
- Evaluation type "R" ludicates that a relay evaluation was performed
- The resides of the selsnde evaluation for all equipment designated as "S" cr "8,R* i can be located in Appendix D.I (SVDS) by signature group. I
- Esaluaties: type "S.R" indicates that both a scissnic and relay evalu.ation was perfornied.
- All equipnient outtlers can be located in Tables N.1 & 8.2 by their Equipment dass & Outlier Ref No, Page 94 i !
/. )
k omhy/ss Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) ; Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 ~ l Signalterr OutDer Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. Dwg/ Zone Bldg. Moor Norm. State Supp Sys. Power Eval Power Group Ref. No. Sytem Host Elev. Des. State Dwg No/Rev. Source Type Req'd 1 1 NrA IXCA/XFMR XiltE IXGA N#A SEISMIC REVIEW TB 796 % " !a Servko TES O 193 4 IXGA-FDSAT S la Service t!160w2ony MOTOR CONY Rt1 CENIFRS 34 N'A IXCB MCCtXCB N/4 n7n3-B TB 796 % " In Service TES E703 IXolets S,R i Ut aant20av MOT 7R In servtre
- COM I ROL CEN I ERS RIL N/A IXGB(20s% 208V MCC 1XGB IXGB O-703 B TB 196 % " Ba Service VFS E783 IXGB-F464 S,R In Service l's 6 ant 20RV MOTOR L (UNiliOL CENIB RS !
RR N/A IXCft(600V) 600V M(T lXCB IXCB nMB TB 796 % " ge Service TES G703 IXos.eSo s.It ! s la Service U1 aM20NV MolUE [ CONT ROL CENTERS b I g 43 IXGR/XFMR XFMR IXCB N/A G703 TB 796 % " In Servko VES 470J IXCB-F.04A S 5 la servko til 600t208V MOTOR CONT ROL CENIERS f to N/A IXI 600V MCC IXt NIA GME AB 309'+0" le Service TES G102 4 TC-13 S,k { 01600t20sV MOTOR In Service l CONIROL CEN1 FRS 10 N/A IXJ 600V MM EXJ N/A G103.F AB su9'+0" In Service TES OLM F 119744C S.R l Ut 60nr201tV MOTOR la Service CONT ROL CENT ERS
, 45 IXK 400VMCCIXK NIA n703 D AB 909'+0" la Service YES O 763 E IX0006B S.R US 600/20RV MUTOR in Service i CONIROL CEMIERS
{ r l Ni,tes:
- Evaluathm eype *NONE" indicates that equipment is pmSsive.
- Signature group "RB" indicates that the equipak ls a "R4 ale of f se Box"itena.
No seisade er relay centuatiosa required. The seisade evaluathm for these henes is included with the equipnien.*
- Evaluation typc "S*" or "S*,R" indicates that equipment is a rugged, passive, designated la the "Walkdewa llost" field.
ha line desice. No seismic etaluation is required
- EvaluaHon type "NSSS" indicates that the equipment is palt of the ESS systene ,
and does not require a seismic evaluation.
~
- Evaluathm type "S" indicates that a seismic evaluatioen was performed.
- The residts of the seismic evaluation for all equipsment designated as "S or "S R" '
- Esaluation type "R" indicates that a relay evaluathm was perfoM m PWI N @W by dentum grq r
- Evaluathm type "S.R" indicates that both a seisade and relay evaluation
,,,,,,g,,,,g,
- All equipment outliers can be located ha Tables Itt & 3.2 ,
by their Equipment Gass & OutBer Ref New Page 95 -
08/11 98 Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 i Signaturr Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. DwgfZone Bldg. Floor Norm. State Supp Sys. Power Power Ev8L Group Ref. No. Sytem Host Elev. Des. State Dwg No/Rev. Req'd Source Type i 35 N/A IXL MCC li!- MtA O.7tk3 D AB 77tv In Servko )ES E793-E I XD6.86D 5.R Ut 60tW2imV MOTOR In Service CONT ROL CENiFRS
-~ I lib N/A IXt420BY) 20tV MCC l%L IXL G703 D AB 771 In Servko YFA SED 1XtA4AT S.R in Servko UI 600r208V MOTOR CON 1 ROL CENT FRS RB N/A IXL(sonV) 600V MCC IXL IXL 4703.D AB 771 la Service YES EME nX0La6D s.R !
se ser ke Ul 600r20gV MOTOR CONTROL CFNTFRt f i N/A IXIJXntR XFMR IXL(600V TO 2MT) NfA 470LD AB 771'+0" In Service T ES E701D IXIA 4AT S In Servke UI 60fv2nBV MUIOR CONTROL CENT ERS t 10 NrA IXN MCCIXN N/A O.7tn E AB 778W Ia Servko YES E703 E IXO605B S.k 0160ef20BV MOTOR in Service CONIROL CENIER5 RB N/A IXM(208V) 20BY MCC IXN IXN G703 E AR 778 In servko YES E703 E IXN-02AT S.R , la Servko i l'8 600/20sv MOTOR CONT ROL CENTFRS i BB N/A IXN(600V) 600V MJC IXN EXN O.703-E AB 771 In Servire )ES O-7o3 E IXe6-058 sR In Service & Ut 69ur2cuV M3 TOR CONY ROL CENTERS 4 i N/A IXN/XDER XFMR $ XM (600V TO 200V) MIA E7DLE AB 77t'+0" Ea Service TF5 0.703-E IXN.02AT S ( , la Service t?l 6the20sV MOTOR f i ! Notes:
- Evaluation type "NONE" indicates that equipmend is passhe.
- Signature group "RB" indicates that the equipement is a " Rule of the Box" itens.
No selsude or relay esalusthn required. The setsude evaluation for these itenis is haciuded with the equipnient
- Evaluathm ty pc "S*" or "S*,R" indicates that equipneemt is a rugged, passive, designated in the "Walkdown Ilust" field.
in thae desire. Na selunic esshantion is required.
- Evaluattaen type "NSSS" ludicates that the equipennent is part of the NSSS systeni j
- Evaluathm typc "S" indicates that a seismic ev.sinatiums was perfernsed. and does not require a seismic esaluatkut ;
- Evaluathm t 3pe "R" indicates that a relay evaluathm was perfunned.
- The results of the seisade evaluation for all equipmer.t designated as "S" or "S,R" can PNs N @@y dgnatun gg
- Esatuatinen typc "S,R" indicates that both a seisade and relay evaluation
, ,, p,,g ,.,,,,4
- All equipsient entliers can be located be Tables 3.1 & 8.2 ;
by finelr Equipenent Gass & Outiler Ref. Nc6 I"E' %
- I
}
s 3 oztufse Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equin nent List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 s J Signature Outtler Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. Dwg/ Zone I,. g. Floor Norin. State Supp Sys. Power Eval Power Group Ref No. Sytem llast Elev. Des. State Reg'd Dwg No/Rev. Source Type
<C =4 (C.c4 (Como (Cano iCaan (Como (C==9 (Ceau (Como (C.a4 (C.=4 (C au (Ce=4 CONT ROL CFMT ERS 31 N/A IXO M('CB10 N/A O 783 F AB 796'+6" la service YES G703-F IX07-05B B.R UI sw2nsV MO]OR gag ,,k, CON 1 NOL CENIERS RR N/A 1%D(705V) 20RY MCC IXO 310 GMF AB 796 != Service YES O 703-F IEGWB S,R I
la Serwko t!! 60Gt20SV MOIOR CC.f ROL CFNT ERS
=
RB MA 3 %O(60pV) 6mV MCC IXO 310 GMF AB 796 la service YES 47a3 F 1%07-05B S,R in Ser k. I'l 600/20SY MOT OR CONTRot.CrNTrRS i N/A 1%Of%FMR KFMR IXO (600V TO 20sV) N/A O 703 F AB 796'+6" In Servko YES 4701F W PBSB S t In Servko Ut edW2e8V %f0 TOR CONT ROL CFNIFR3 35 N/A IX# MCCIXO N/A OME AB 796'+6" le Serske YES 0.70S E 1106.05B S.R t*16t#V208V MOTOR In servke N)MIROL CENT FRS RH N/A 3%P(2nnV) 208V MCC IXP IXP G7u1E AB 796 In Service YES O.703 E IXP.F99B 5,R la Servko t!seu2nsvMONOR n)NIROL CENIERS RR N/A 1%F160cv) 60pV MCC IXF IXP 67DSE AB 796 Ea servko YES G703-E IXO6.093 S,R la Servk. L'I 60ur209V MOIOR i CONT ROL CENTERS 10 MA 1XPI1FMR XIM41%P(50eV TO 20RY) N/A O.101E AB 796'+6" In servlee TES G703-E 1XP 91155 S Notes:
- Eiahsatism ty pc "NONE" indicates that equipenent is passive.
- Signature group "RB" indicates that the equirnment is a " Rule of the Box" item.
No selsude or relay etatuation required. The seismic evaluation for these tienes is included with the equipment
- Esaluathm typc "S*" or "S*,R* Indicates that equipment is a rugged, passivee designated in the "Walladown IIost* field. l in line desice. No seismic evaluation is required.
- Evaluathm tyye "NSSS" had' cates that the equipnient is part of the NSSS systen
- Evaluation type "S" indicates that a seismic evaluation was perfonned. and does not require a selsnile evaluation.
- Evaluation type "R" indicates that a relay evalention was perfernied.
- The results of the selsnaic evaluation for mit equipenent designated as "S" er "S,R" can be located in Appendix D.1 (SVDS by signature group.
- Evaluathm type "S,R" indicates that both a seismic and relay evaluation us perfmed
- All equipment outtiers can be located in Tables 8.1 & 8.2 by their Equipment Gass & Outtler Ref No. Pete 9 ;
b esjaffsa Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Eqtilpment ID Name Walkdown Ref. Dwg/ Zone Bldg. Floor Norm. State Power Supp Sys. Power EvRL Group Ref. No. Sytem Host Eter. Des. State Dwg No/Rev. Source Type Reg'd tre) (Ce.o (C-au tr.au (Como (C =u (C o (Cano (C =4 ro 80.=9 r m> (C o In Service t's 6aer2csV MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS t 49 IXR MCCIXR N/A G703- F AB S38'+0" le Service YES G7EF IX07.64B 3.R l's 60er208V MUTOR In Servare CONT ROL CEN1 ERS RB N/A IXR(20BV) 29sV MCC tXR IXR 47B F AB B38 In Service YES 470FF IXR-053 S,R in Servies l't 6nOf208V MOTOR CONT ROL CENTFR9 RR N/A 1%R(600V) 60sV MCC IER IXR G10LF AB m38 2n Servies YES G70LF EX07 04B S.R In Service if 8 60er20RV MOTOR CONT ROL CENIF RS t $0 11R/XFMR XFMR IKR(600V 20BY) N/A G703-F AB R3s'+0 In Server. Y ES n?OFF IXR e5B S In Service
!!! 6m20sY MOIOR
('ON T ROL CE NT F RS 31 wA IXS1 MCC IXSt N/A 3703-C AB 79646" In Service YES O.701C IXOS-OSA S.R til 6nnt20sV MOTOR la Service CONT ROL CENIFRS gg MA IXSt(2G8V) 20BV MCC lKSI IXSt 4703-C AB 796 In Service YES O-7034: IXSt4DSAT S.R In Service ! I t11600/20sV MOIOR CONT ROL CENT ERS pg WA IXSit600V) 6 ROV MCC tXSt 115% E793 C AB 796 In Service YES O-703-C IXos-OSA 5,R [ In Service Ut 60w201V MOTOR (UNTROL CENIFRS Notes:
- Esatuatios 43 pe "NON E" indicates that equipment is passive.
- Signature group "RB" indicates that the equipnient is a " Rule of the Box" item.
No seisnde or relay evaluation required. The seismic evaluation for these iteens is included with the equipment
- ISaluation ty pe "S*" or "S*,R" ludic:stes that equipeseent is a rwered, passive, designated in the "Walkdown Itost" ficId. I hi-line desice. No seismic evaluation is required.
- Evaluatien type *NSSS" indicates that the equipenent is part of the NSSS systenn
- Esatuation t 3pe "S" indicates that a seismic evaluation was perfosined. and does not require a seismic evaluation. ;
- Evaluation type "R" indicates that a relay evaluation was performed.
- The results of the seisnde evaluation for a8 eqidpnient designated as "S" or "S.R" !
can be located in Appendin D.I (SVDS) by signature group. r
- Esaluation type "S,R" indicates that both a seismic and relay evaluation was performed.
- All equipnient outliers can belocated in Tables 8.1 & 8.2 by their Equipnient Class & Outiler Ref. New Page 98 L
~ ( D)
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Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL)
. Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 ,
Sigtiature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. Dwg/Zo'e Bldg. Floor Nortn. State Supp SyS. Power EYat ! Power Group Ref. No. Sytem linst Elev. Des. State Req'd Dwg No/Rev. Source Type Il WA IXSIA/XFMR XFMR IXSI A(600V TO N/A G793-G AR 796*e6" Is servko YES 0.703-G IXSI-MBAT S 20dV) la Service I'160n/20BV MOTOR CON T ROL CE NIERS 35 WA IXS2 MCCIXS2 M!A G1RLG AB 796'+4" In tervke V FS n1u34 IX99-05A R.R f 1J1600/20RV MOYOR In Servko CONIROL CEMIERS l i RB WA IXS2(20sv) 2eeV MCC lXS2 IXS2 G1nLG AB 796 Bn Service 1 E': n7034 IXS2-fB4AT 5.R ! se Service ! l'1600/20RV MOIOR E CON TROL CENT ERS l l RB N' A IXS2(600Y) 600VMCCIKS9 IXS2 0.793 4 AB 796 in Service YES O-783 4 1199-8SA S.R . In Servire til 600/20gV Mof 0R CONIROL CENTFRS , f 13 wA IXS2A/XFMR XFMR IXS2A(600V 10 N/A O-703 G At 796'+6" In Service TES 4763-G IXS2-FD4AT S 20EV) la Servko t!l 600r2MV MOTOR i CONT ROL CEMIERS 31 WA IXS3 MCC lXS3 MIA G703-G AB 796'+6" In Servko VES 4 702 170-12 S.R UI 600/20BV MOTOR In Servko COM1ROL , i RB WA IX13(20mV) 208V MCC IXS3 IXS3 E703-C AB 796 Ba servke YES G1034 IXS343BT 5.R la Servko i trl 6*W20RV MOTOR (VMIROL CENI FRS I Rn WA IKS3(600V) 60pV MCC lKS3 IXS3 4103-G AB 794 Ba Servko YES 4 702 I T F,12 S.R Ba Servko 1:1600r208V MOTOR { t Notes:
- Evaluation type "NONE" indicates that equipment is passive.
- Signature group "RB" indicates that the equipment is a " Rule of the Bou" item.
Ne seismic or relay evslaation required. The selsnile evaluallen for these items is included with the equipment
- Esaluation ty pe "S*" or "S*,R" indicates that equipanent is a sug*+*, p esr.e, designated in the "Walkdown llost" field.
In-line desire. No seismic evaluation is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates that the equipment is part of the NSSS systeln l
- Evaluation type "S" indicates that a selsnele evaluation was perfarnied. and does not requise a seismic evaluation. '
- Esatuation type "R" indicates that a relay evaluation was perferined.
- The results of the seismic evaluation for all equipment designated as "S" or "S,R*
" *
- I I"*'"" E
- Evalaallon type "S,R" indicates tinat both a setsnile and relay evaluation was performed.
- AB eWpment ou&ss can k located 'a Tables 3.1 & 8.2 by their Equipment Omss & Outiler Ref. No. I'E' "
- - - - - _ - - - - - - - - - - - - __- --- -_- ~
s s. oehlfse
)
Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdoni Ref. Dug / Zone Bldg. Floor Norm. State Supp Sys. Power Erst Power Group Ref. No. Sy tem Host Elev. Des. State Dwg No/Rev. Source Req'd Type Co (Com.) (C o C.ao C=) (C.=u r.m-3 10.=> (C.=-) cC.=> (C.=) cC o (C=) CONIROL CENI ERS 15 N/A IXS3NXFMR XFMR IXS3A (600V TO N/A O.703-C AB 796 % " In Servko YES E7834 IXS343BT s 20EV) In Rerdre til 6mer20sV MOION CONI ROL CENTERS I MA IXSr 268V) MCC IXSFI299V) NfA OM 30sJ68 SSF El7 In servko YES G783-K IXSF-F04A S,R Be Service t!I 60Gt208V ASOIOR CONIROL CEMIERS 10 N/A IXSr(600V) MCC tXSF(600V) N/A OM 30E341 SSF 317 le Servire YES 4703GE702-8 IXCEOSBOX S.R Im Sereke UI 600/208V MOIOR CONTROLCENTERS RH N/A IXSF t(208V) MCC IXSF-I (20EV) XSF.1(t.2.A3) OM 30E36I SSF 797'+0" le Servko YES G703-K IXSF-M2BL 5,R Im Sereke til 60GI20EV MOTOR tM T ROR. CrN I S RS S N/A IXSFfXFMR soof298V XFMR 1XSF MiA OM 30&360 SSF StT+0* Ba Servke TES n103.K tXSF n4A S In servko Ut 600t208V MOTOR CONT ROL CEmIERS 9 34 2N28/SW 2A/2B REG IFER SW MIA NO ELEMENT ARY AB 796 %
- In Servko VES n1783-D 2XO04BT S.R la Service l'2 240t120V AC PWR 9 54 2A/MCB 24er120V 2A REGULAIOR N/A NOFIIMFMTARY AB 796'+6" Closed YES E1703 D 210 W4BT 5.R l*2 24G(120V AC FwR Ol'TPl!T BKR Closed 11 N/A 2A/ REG REGUI.AI ED FWR St'PP N/A NO ELEMENTARY AB 796'+6" le Service VES El703-D 2XO-F04BT S,R 1124nr120Y AC FWR REG 2A In Servko Notes:
- Evaluation type "NONE" indkstes that equipnient is ym9sive.
- Signature group "RB" indkates that the equipenent is a " Rule of the Box" Hem.
Nu seisnde or relay evaluationi required. The selsnile evaluation for these items is included with the equipnient
- Evaluation type "S*" or "S*,R" indicates tlist equipneesit is a rugged, passive, designated in the "Wauulown flest" field.
In line desice. No seisnile evatumelon is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates that the eginipnient is part of the NSSS system
- Etaluatioin 13pe "S" hidkates that a nelsnde evaluation was perfbrmed. and does not require a seisente evahmation.
- Evaluatiosi type "R" indicates that a relay evaluation was perfonneed.
- The resuks of the seismic evaluation ihr all equipenent designated as "S" er "S.R"
*** I " E""E
- F.5atuation type "S.R" hidicates that both a selsanic and relay esatuation was perfornied.
- AE 'WPment outhers can be located in Tables 11 & u by their Equipnient Class & OutBer Ref No. Pate 100
08}af/ 98 Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 t Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. Dwg/ Zone Bldg. Floor Norm. State Supp Sys. Power Eval. Power Group Ref. No. S3 tem IIost Elev. Des. State Dwg No/Rev. Source Type Reg'd r il N/A 2A/XI%fR XFMR 2A (6n0V IO 240V) NA NO rt.EMENI ARY AB 796'M" In service YES &l703 D 2KaF04BT S ! In Service it2 24 art 2eV AC FWR $ RB NsA 2ABI CUh1ROL BOARDIABI 21'Bl.2.2Att.2 NO FLEMEN T ARY AB 822*+0" In Servko N/A N/A N/A S,k t'2 Centrol Baseds la Service s9 N/A 2ARJ COMIROL BOARD IAB3 N/A NO ELEMENT ARY AB 822'M" le Servko N/A N/A NA S.R l'2 Control Boards la Servire IO WA 2ADA ISOi DRODE ASSEMBLY N/A NO ELEMENT ARY AB 796*M" In Servke YES 0 1705 2DCAa3C 5,R g t'212s/250V DC PH R 2ADA la Service . f 10 WA 2ADB ESUL DIODE ASSEMBLY N/A NO ELEMENTARY AB 796'M" le Servko )ES O.2705 3DCA-83D 8.R I'2125/250V DC FW R 2ADB is Servke 10 NiA 2AllC ISOL DIDDE ASSFMBLY N/A NO ELEMENI ARY AB 796'M" la Servko 1 ES O 2705 3DCB 83C 5.R f t'2 325/2suV DC PWR 2ADC la Service f i to N/A 2 ADD ISOL DIODE ASSEMBLY N/A NO FLFMFMT ARY AB 796*M" la Servko YES O-2705 3DCB-eJD 8,R 1r2 323r250V DC FWR 2 ADD In Servko la WA 2ADE ISOL DIODE ASSEMBLY N/A NO FI EMENTARY - AB 796'M" In Serwke YES 061705 2DCA.048 8,R l'124W120Y AC FWR 2ADE In Servire la N/A 2ADF ISOL Df0DE ASSFMBLY N/A NO ELEMENT ARY AB 796'+6" In Service YES G 3705 2DCA.03E SR L'124Gr320V AC PWR 2ADF In Servke to NrA 2ADC ISOL DIODE ASSEMBLY N/A
- J 'LEMENI ARY AB 796'M" an servke YES G17DS 2DCA43F 5,R f
I"2 240rI29V AC FH R 2ADG la Service k RR N/A 2ASFPt000 VALVE FOSITIONER FUR 2MSVA812' OFF-24534 TB sus Ea Service VES nI70s 2EVIIEle S,3 ; Mtl29 In servke I f*2 Male Steene I RH N/A 2ASFPlaGI VALVE FOSIISONFR FOR 2MSVA8126 OFE.24ts4 TB 307 In Servko YES 0 170S 2 KVf D.19 5,R { Notes:
- Es aluation t3 pc "NONE" indicates that equipenent is panive.
- Signature group "RB" indicates that the equipment is a " Rule of the Box" leem.
No seismic or relay esaluatloan required. The seisade evaluathm for these iteens is included wIth the equipnient I
- Esaluation type "S** or "S*,R" ludicates that equipment is a sitged, pantse, designated in the "Walkdown Ilost" field.
- In Ihie desice. No seismic evaluations is required.
- Evaluation type "NSSS" indicates that the equipment is part of the NSSS system
- Esatuathne eypc "S" indicates that a seismic evaluathm was perforened. and does not require a seismic evaluation. j
- Esaluationi type "R" indicates that a relay evaluation was perfarnied.
- Tlee usults of ela selsnde evaluatiosa for all equipunent designated as "S" or "S.R" [
an e 8 Penh M M9 D gnatun gg
- Evaluationi ty pe "S.R" hedicates that both a seisanic and relay esatuatiese was performed.
- AH equipment outliers can be located in Tables 8.1 & 8.2 by their Equipnient Class & Outlier Ref. No. Page 101
4 es1xr/ss Appendix B ; Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconce Units 1,2 & 3 7 ; Signature Outlier Equipment ID Name WalkdaWn Ref. Dng/ Zone Bldg. Floor Norm. StBte power Supp S3s. Poner I. [ Gruup Ref. No. Sy tem llost Elev. Des. State Req'd Dwg Nn/Rev. Source T (Cont.) (CM) (Cent) (Caet) (Cent ) (CentJ (Cent.) (Come) (Cent.) (Cent) (Cont) (Cent)
- 3 MS $26 in Servko 1.2 Make Steene i N/A 2ARP AUX Mt!TDOWN FANEL Nf4 NOELEMENTARY Tis 522'+0" la servko NO N/A Nt4 S.R U2 Central Boards In Servko r
$2 N/A 2ASPIst t7F AUX ST EAM PRESSURE NIA OEF-24584 TB 796'+4" le Servko VES E1795 2kYIIAte S.P IRANSMIT TER(MSt26 & In Servko U2 Mew *.sesne MS129)
RB N/A 2 AS159 .) VALVE CONT ROLLFR 2t'Bl.2;2ABI.2 GEF 24555 AB 822 Ig Servke D ES O 1705 2KVItEle 5,R PUR MSi26 AND MSl29 In Servko U2 Meh Steous 12 N/A 2AI) AREA IFRM CA3 2AIS N/A Nta AB S09'+0 In Servko MIA N#A N/A S,R U2 Centret Caldnet la Sereke g 3g 2AIS AREA T E RM CAB 2ATB N/A NO ELEMEMY ARY AB 809'+e" la servko N/A N/A N/A 8,R U2 Control Cebtnet In stervko I N/A 2ATWSOP U2 ATWS CONTROL N/A NO ELEMENTA RY AB E38'+e" In Servke NIA N#A N/A S,R FANFL la Servke U2 Centrol Penel 15 N/A FB 600V rrS 2B (FUR N/A NO FLFMFNTARY RB 900'40" In Servke YES G70SK 2XSF. PUB 5,R I U2 Pressuriser Heets PRFAsttRRIFR HF AlFRS In Serware Grot'P 2B BANK 7) 9 54 2B/MCB 240/t20Y2B REGULATOR N/A NO ELEMENI ARY AB 796'+6" Cansed YES 48703 E 2 XF-7DI E S,R U2140/120V AC rwR DUTPUT BK't Closed 11 RA 28/RFC REGULATED PWR SUPP h/A NO ELEMENT ARY AB 796'+6" Ea Servko YES ELt10SE 2XF-FDIE S,R tt2 24Grt20V AC FWR R*'G 2B la service it N/A 2B/XFMR XFMR 23 (600V TO 240V) N/A NO ELEMENTARY AB 796'+6* In Servke YES St10SE 2XP-591E S to Seryk. Notes:
- Evaluathm t) pe "NONE" indicates that equipment is passive.
- Nignature group "RB" hidicates that the eq=lynnent is a " Rule of the Box" itene.
No scismic or relay evaluathm required. The selsnaic evaluation for these items is included wleh the equipnient
- Esaluation t3 pe "S*" or "S*,R" indicates that equipment is a rugged, passive, designated in the "Walkdown llost" fleid.
hi-line desire. No seismic evaluation is required.
- Evalention type "NSSS* indicates that the equipnient is part of the NSSS systeta
- Evaluathm type "S" indicates that a seismic evaluation was p*eformed. and does not require a selsnile evaktathm.
- Etatusation type "R" indicates that a relay evaluation was pern,tmed.
- The sudts of the selsnile evah .tlen for all equiptuent designated as "S" or "S,R" can he 5twated la Appendix D.I (SVDS) by signature group.
- Evaluathm type "S.R" indicates that indh a seismic and relay evaluation was perf'ornied.
- All equipnient outBers een be located in Tables 3.1 & 8.2 by their Equipniem Oass & Outlier Ref. No. Page 102
s s S1
. . ,_f, .
Appendix B Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 SignBture Outlier Equipment ID NBme WRIkdown Ret DWg/Zune Bldg. Floar Norm. StBte Supp SyS. Power Ev3L Power Group Ret No. Sytem Ilust Elev. Des. StBte Dwg No/Rev. Source Type Req'd !
<Como r.no (Cen) (C au (C au (C au reau (Como (Como (como (Ceau (C==o (C==o U2 240f120V AC PWR I N/A 2BSPSemle RB rRESS SWITCH (ES CII MIA OFD.183A.I.t AB 809'eo" In Servlee NO MIA N/A S,R 2A) In Service U2 Fagineered Safeguards !
I N/A 2 BSP50019 RB PRFSS SWITCH (FS CH N/A OFD-183AI.I AB s09'60" In Servire NO MIA MtA S,R 2A) la Servlee
- I U2 Engineered Sefoguerds t N/A 2BSFS0020 RB PRESS SWITCH (ES CH N/A OFD-le3A.I.E AB 909'ee" se Service NO N/A MIA SR 2B) h Service U2 Engineered Safegverds t
i N/A 2BSPSH021 RB PRESS SWITCH (ES CH N/A OF1kt03 A.I.I 1B 809'+0* In Service No N/A N/A S.R 2B) la service U2 Fagineered Safeguards I N/A 2BSPS0022 RB PRESS SWITCH (ES CH N/A OFD.la3A-l.3 AB 809'ee" In Servko NO MIA N/A S,R 2C; la Service 172 Enetneered Safeguards i N/A 2BSFS0023 RB PRESS SWITCH (ES CH NIA OFIkt03A.I.I AB WWee" In Service NO N/A N/A S.R [ 2C) In Servko tr2 Engineered Setegeerde N/A 2LSFTmm4P RB PRESS XMIR(ES CH N/A OFIkfi3A-2.I AB WWee" In Service VES 017tl5 20CVI A.U2 S.It 2A) In Servko i l'2 Fat neered Safeguards I N/A 2BSPT000SP RB PRFSS XMT R (ES CH N#A OED IG3A-1.1 AB WW+0" In Servire VES CLITO? 2KVIE-82 S.R 2B) In Service ! I'2 Fagineered Mesogoerde I N/A 2BSriono6P RB PRESS XMI R(ES CH N/A O*Dl02A 2.1 AB 909'*0" 3= Servlee VFS O-IW 2KVIC42 S.R 20 In Service {
~
t Notes:
- Evaluathni type "NONE" indicates that equipment is passive.
- Situsture group "RB" indicates that the equips.nent is a
- Rule of the Box"iteni. ~
No selwnic or relay evaluath.n required. The seismic evahmation for these itenas is included with the equipnient
- Evaluation type "S*" or "S*,R" indicates that equipesient is a ruggrd, passive, aesignated in the "Walksown llost* Reld.
in line desice. No seismic esatuation is required.
- Evaluattoen type "NSSS" indicates that the equipnient is part of the NSSS systen
- Evaluatiosi type "S" hulicates that a seisadc evaluation was perfarnied. and does not require a scissnie evahmation. ;
- Evaluath n ty pc "R" bulicates that a relay evaluation was perforined.
- The results of the seismic evaluation for an equirnwnt designated as "S" or "S,R"
- I""
- Es atuathni type "S,R" indicates that Imth a seissnic and relay evaluatiose was perfarnied.
- AU 'WPment oWilers can k located ist Tah 8.1 & BJ by their Equipenent Class & Outlier Ref. No. page 103
s 5 % , o.w, ). Appendix B . Composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) . Oconee Units 1,2 & 3 l i Signature Outtier Equipment ID Name Walkdown Ref. Dwg/Znme Bldg. Floor Norm. State Power Supp Sys. Power Eval Group Ref. No. Sytem Host Elev. Des. State Req'd Dwg No/Rev. Source Type (Cont) (Cont.) (Cont.) aant.) (Cans.) fant.) (Cent.) Feat) (Cant) (Cent.) (Cent.) (Cent.) (cens ) e-i Emaineered Segrauerde N/A N/A 2 BSPt'0001 RBS Pt'MP2A MfA OmlG3A-2.l (.lS) AB 758'+0" Natthd NO N!A N/A NONE Nat t! sed t'2 Reactor Bwsol'ta Spray N/A WA 2BSPtmott2 RBS Pt:MP 2B NtA OfV IO3A-2.I (E S) AB MS'+6" Mos tleed NO MtA M4A NONE Nee t'oed I'2 Reactnr Boliding Sprey i N/A 2 BSVAG001 RB SPRAY MEADFR 2A N/A Oml034 2.I (.BN) AB RF+0" Oomed NO MIA N/A R ISOt.AIION Oooed t'2 R-ectar Buildtag Sprey i N/A 2BSVAINIO2 RB SPRAY MEADER 2B N/A OFD-103A-2.I (TS) AB}}