ML19317F492
| ML19317F492 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 08/23/1976 |
| From: | DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19317F490 | List: |
| References | |
| RO-270-76-09, RO-270-76-9, NUDOCS 8001140722 | |
| Download: ML19317F492 (1) | |
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hh DUKE POWER COMPANY OCONEE UNIT 2 Report No.:
R0-270/76-9 Report Datc; Au gus t 2 3, 19; ',
Occurrence Date:_ August 9, 1976 Facility: Oconee Unit 2, Seneca, South Carolina Identification of Occurrence: Low Pressure Injection Train "A" taken out of service for maintenance without verifying operability of Train "B" h
Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Unit at 100 percent full power l
Descriptica of Occurrence:
On August 9, 1976, the Low Pressure Injection Train "A" was taken out of service for valve maintenance without assuring the operability of LP Injection Train "B" as required by Technical Specification 3.3.7.
Approxi-mately three hours later, during shift turnover, the failure to assure the operability of Train "B" was discovered.
The operability of Train "B" was then verified by successfully cycling the low pressure injection cooler outlet valve for Train "B."
Apparent Cause of Occurrence:
The apparent cause of this incident was a failure to follow Technical Specification requirements when initiating maintenante on the Low Pressure Injection System.
While reviewing shift occurrences prior to turnover to next shift, the shif t supervisor realized the error and immediately began steps to assure Train "B" operability.
Analysis of Occurrence-Even though the cooler outlet valve for LPI Train "B" was not tested to assure operability, the normal Engineered Safeguard valve position is open, therefore, the valve would not have deterred the ES function of the train. Also, at the last performance test of LPI Train "B," on July 29, 1976, the train was demonstrated operable.
It can therefore be concluded that it would have functioned properly if needed, and that the health and safety of the public was not affected by this incident.
Corrective Action:
An operational procedure, " Removal and Restoration of the Station Equipment,"
has been written and will be approved by Septenber 1, 1976. This procedure should climinate future recurrence of this incident. Also, all Operations Supervisors will review this incident.to assure that all licensed personnel are aware of Technical Specifications concerning the removal of any component q
h or flow path in the Emergency Core Cooling System.
8 001140 7M
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