ML17345A162

LER 88-005-00:on 880415,loss of Flowpath from Boric Acid Storage Tanks to RCS Occurred.Caused by Loose Screw in Motor/Pump Coupling.Boric Acid Transfer Pump 4A Realigned to Provide Boric Acid Flow Path to Unit 3.W/880513 Ltr

ML17345A162
Person / Time
Site:	Turkey Point
Issue date:	05/13/1988
From:	Conway W, Salamon G FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
L-88-225, LER-88-005, LER-88-5, NUDOCS 8805230009
Download: ML17345A162 (6)

Text

AC CELE RATED DISHBUTION DEMON STRA'+3N SYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS).i ACCESSION NBR:8805230009 DOC.DATE: 88/05/13 NOTARIZED:

NO DOCKET FACIL:50-250 Turkey Point Plant, Unit 3, Florida Power and Light C 05000250 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION SALAMON,G.

Florida Power&Light Co.CONWAY,W.F.

Florida Power&Light Co.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 88-005-00:on 880415,loss of flowpath from boric acid storage tanks to RCS due to coupling failure.W/8 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE: TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.NOTES RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD2-2 LA EDISON,G INTERNAL ACRS MICHELSON AEOD/DOA AEOD/DSP/ROAB ARM/DCTS/DAB NRR/DEST/ADS 7E NRR/DEST/ESB 8D NRR/DEST/MEB 9H NRR/DEST/PSB 8D NRR/DEST/SGB 8D NRR/DLPQ/QAB 10 NRR/DREP/RAB 10*NRR/DRIS/SIB 9A NUDOCS-ABSTRACT RES TELFORD i J RES/DRPS DEPY EXTERNAL EG&G WI LLIAMS i S H ST LOBBY WARD NRC PDR NSIC MAYS,G COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD2-2 PD.ACRS MOELLER AEOD/DS P/NAS AEOD/DSP/TPAB DEDRO NRR/DEST/CEB 8H NRR/DEST/ICSB 7 NRR/DEST/MTB 9H NRR/DEST/RSB 8E NRR/DLPQ/HFB 10 NRR/DOEA/EAB ll NRR/DREP/RPB 10 NR~~S ILRB12 G FILE 02 RES IB RGN2 FILE Ol FORD BLDG HOY i A LPDR NSIC HARRIS,J COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 j A h TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 46 ENCL 45 Form 365)3)FACILI'TY NAME III Turke Point Unit 3 t v.S.NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO.3150-0104 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)'"""'N'v DOCKET NUMBER (2)PACE (3I 5 p 0 p 2 5 0 1 OF Loss of Flowpath from Boric Acid Storage Tanks to Reactor Coolant System Due to Coupling Failure of the 3B Boric Acid Transfer Pump (BATP)and Seal Failure of the 3A BAT EVENT DATE ISI LER NVMSE'R (6)REPORT DATE (7)OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED IS)MON TN DAY YEAR YEAR SCavENTIAL i6 NUMBER'4 i: REVISION NUMBER MONTH OAY YEAR FACILITY NAMES Turke Poxnt UnLt 4 OOCKFT NVMSERISI 0 5 0 0 0 15 88 88 0 0 5 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 OPERATINO MODE (1)1 POWER LEVEL (10)'.x-le Y,p<.Q 20.402(b)20.405 I~I I I I (i)20.405(~)ill(iil 20.406(r)(ll(iii) 20A05 (4)I 1)(Iv)20.405(~l(1 l(v)20.405(cl 60.35(c)(I I 50.35 (cl (2)50.73(~l(2)lil 60.73(~I(2)(ill 50.73(~l(2)(iii)LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)60,73(~)(2)(ir)50.73(~I (2 I HI 50.73(el(21 (vol 50.73(~I(2)lviii)(Al 60.73(~l(2)(riii)

ISI 60.73(r)(2)(xl THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT T 0 THE REOUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR (I;(Cn<<fr Onr or move of tnr fonowinPl (11)73.71(5)73.71(cl DTHER ISpecily in Aorrrrct oelow end in Tear, Jyf)C Form 366A)NAME Gabe Salamon, Compliance Engineer TFLEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 3 05 24 6-65 60 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANVFAC TVRER SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC TURER XCACPLG X C A SEA L G 0 G 0 0 N N$g~>'+~Ox'~z'P~'VPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)YES llf yn, complrre EXPECTED S(fEMISStDIY DA TEI NO ABSTRACT lLimi t ro 1400 g>>cer, I r., rpproeimr rely fifteen rlnplrrpecr typerwlrren linnl (16)EXPECTFD SV BM ISS ION DATE I)5)MONTH DAY YEAR On April 14, 1988, at 0305, the 3B Boric Acid Transfer Pump (BATP)was taken out of service (OOS)due to the pump s failure to deliver flow.Technical Specification (TS)3.6.b.4 requires a flow path from the boric acid storage tanks (BAST)when a reactor is critical.On April 15, at 1315, a Nuclear Operator reported that the 3A BATP seal tank was showing no water.As both pumps which were aligned to Unit 3 were now OOS, no flow path from the BASTs to Unit 3 for which credit could be taken existed.This placed the unit in TS 3.0.1, which requires that action be initiated within one hour to place the unit in a mode in which TS 3.6.b.4 does not apply (MODE 3).At 1415, the 4A BATP was aligned to Unit 3.The unit exited TS 3.0.1 and entered TS 3.6.d.2, which permits continued power operation with one of the three required BATPs OOS for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.IST of the 3B BATP was completed and the pump was returned to service at 1715 on April 15, at which time the unit exited TS 3.6.d.2.The cause of the 3B BATP s failure was a loose set screw in the motor/pump coupling.The cause of the 3A BATP s seal water level decrease was a failed seal.The 4A BATP was realigned to provide a boric acid flowpath to Unit 3, and the 3B BATP was returned to service at 1715 on April 15.The mechanical seal for the 3A BATP was replaced, and the pump was returned to service at 1600 on April 18.NRC Form 366 (9 63)8805230009 380513 PDR ADOCK 05000250 S ncn

C Form 3dda 831 V.S.NVCLEAA AEGULATOR Y COMMISSION LICENSEE EVE REPORT HLER)TEXT CONTINUATIQ~

APPAOYEooMBNO.3150M(04 EXPI RES I 8/3(I 88 FACILITY NAME 111 Turkey Point Unit 3 TEXT (II mruo FINoo ro Foouuors uro oddro'oool tvRc Form 3dsa FI (IT(OOCKET NUMBEA (ll p g p p p 2 5 0 8 8 LEA NUMBER (8)SEQUENTIAL NUMSEA 0 0 5 i<v%4%1 REVISION NUMSEA 00 02 PAGE (3)OF 0 3 EVENT On April 14, 1988, at 0305, with both units in MODE 1, the 3B Boric Acid Transfer Pump (BATP)(EIIS:CA)was taken out of service (OOS)due to the pump s failure to deliver'low.

Turkey Point has four BATPs: two designated Unit 3 and two designated unit 4, and 3 Boric Acid Storage Tanks (BAST).Any of the pumps or tanks can be aligned to either unit.Technical Specification (TS)3.6.c.2 requires three BATPs to be operable during dual unit operation.

TS 3.6.b.4 requires the establishment of one flow path from the BASTs when a reactor is critical.With the 3B BATP OOS, three pumps remained operable, and entry into a TS action statement was not required.The pump was repaired by 0540 on April 15, however, it was not returned to service at that time as inservice testing (IST)was not yet complete.On April 15, at 1315, on his normal rounds, a Nuclear Operator reported that the 3A BATP seal tank was showing no water and the nitrogen cover gas pressure, which should have been greater than 35 psig, was at 15 psig and decreasing.

At the time of this event, the 4A and 4B BATPs were aligned to Unit 4, the 3A BATP was OOS, and though the 3B BATP was capable of delivering flow to Unit 3, it too was technically OOS.As both pumps which were aligned to Unit 3 were OOS, no flow path from the BASTs to Unit 3 for which credit could be taken existed.Failure to have a flow path places the unit in TS 3.0.1, which requires that action be initiated within one hour to place the unit in a mode in which TS 3.6.b.4 does not apply (MODE 3).Preparations to enter mode 2 were initiated.

At 1415, the 4A BATP was aligned to Unit 3.The unit exited TS 3.0.1 and entered TS 3.6.d.2, which permits continued power operation with one of the three required BATPs OOS, provided that it is restored to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.IST of the 3B BATP was completed and the pump was returned to service at 1715 on April 15.With only the 3A BATP now OOS and three BATPs operable, the unit exited TS 3.6.d.2.CAUSE OF EVENT The cause of the 3B BATP s failure to deliver adequate flow was a loose set screw in the coupling between the pump motor and the pump.The loose set screw permitted the motor to turn without imparting any motive force to the pump.The cause of the set screw becoming loose is not known as no excessive vibration was noted and the pump had been operating satisfactorily.

Th cause of the 3A BATP s seal water level decrease was a failed seal.The seal is cooled by inleakage of water from the seal tank.This water is pressurized by a nitrogen cover.NRC FORM SddA (9 831 R Form 366A)4)3)LICENSEE EV REPORT{LER)TEXT CONTINUATI U.S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEO OMB NO319)M(04 EXPIRESI 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME (()OOCKET NUMBER (3)LER NUMBER (6)PAGE (3l Turkey Point Unit 3 TEXT/i/mOro s/rsoo is ror/vr'rod, vss sddrrr'Orrs/

/YRC Form 3684 4/()T)o so oo 250 YEAR P5).)8 8 SEGUENT/AL srUMBE/I 005 REYISIGN rr U M B E R 00 030F 0 3 ANALYSIS OF EVENT.During this event, both units were in NODE 1.With a unit in HODE 1, an emergency boration path is required.Even though the 3A BATP was OOS and the 3B BATP was technically OOS, the 3B BATP had the coupling set screw tightened and was available for use had emergency boration been required.In fact, no emergency boration was required as no transients or events requiring emergency boration occurred.Additionally, upon discovery of the loss of flowpath, one of the Unit 4 BATPs was quickly aligned to provide a flowpath to Unit 3.Additionally, the flowpath from the Refueling Water Storage Tank to the charging pumps and the safety injection pumps was available.

Based on the above, the health and safety of the public were not affected.CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 1)The 4A BATP was realigned to provide a boric acid flowpath to Unit 3 at 1415 on April 15.2)IST of the 3B BATP was initiated at 1350 on April 15, completed satisfactorily, and the 3B BATP was returned to service at 1715 on April 15.3)The mechanical seal for the 3A BATP was replaced, and the pump was returned to service at 1600 on April 18.ADDITIONAL DETAILS The BATPs are manufactured by Goulds, Ines)model number 3196-ST-8.

The mechanical seals are manufactured by Durametallic.

Similar occurrences:

a previous BATP seal failure was reported in LER 250-87-17.

IIRC<<ORM 366A (94)3)

NAY 1 3 l9d8 L-88-225 10 CFR 50.73 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.20555 Gentlemen:

Re: Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 Docket Nos.50-250 and 50-251 Reportable Event: 88-05 Date of Event: April 15, 1988 Loss of Flowpath from Boric Acid Storage Tanks to Reactor Coolant System Due to Coupling Failure qf 3B Boric Acid Transfer Pum BATP and Seal Failure of 3A BATP The attached Licensee Event Report (LER)is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 to provide notification of the subject event.Very truly yours, W.F.nway Senio ice President-Nuclear WFC/SDF/gp Attachment cc: Dr.J.Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator, Region II, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, Turkey Point Plant SDF3.LER an FPL Group company