TXX-6270, Forwards Addl Info Re Bisco Electrical Penetration Seals & Penetration Switches,Per IE Bulletin 79-28 & 870201 & 06 Requests.Related Documentation Encl

Forwards Addl Info Re Bisco Electrical Penetration Seals & Penetration Switches,Per IE Bulletin 79-28 & 870201 & 06 Requests.Related Documentation Encl

ML20210F821
Person / Time
Site:	Comanche Peak
Issue date:	02/09/1987
From:	Counsil W, Woodlan D TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC CO. (TU ELECTRIC)
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
IEB-79-28, TXX-6270, NUDOCS 8702110170
Download: ML20210F821 (23)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:4 e 1 ~ .r = 1UELECTRIC February 9, 1987 w u,, c. cw Emurne Vke l'rrmlem U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

SUBJECT:

COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION (CPSES) DOCKET NOS. 50-445 AND 50-446 REQUEST FOR INFORMATION REGARDING BISCO ELECTRICAL PENETRATION SEALS AND NAMC0 SWITCHES (IEB 79-28) Ref: 1) NRC letter from V. S. Noonan to W. G. Counsil dated February 1, 1987. 2) NRC letter from V. S. Noonan to W. G. Counsil dated February 6, 1987. Gentlemen: We have reviewed your letters referenced above, requesting additional information on BISCO electrical penetration seals and NAMCO switches. We hereby respond to the requests for additional information for reference 1 in attachments I and 2 and for reference 2 in attachment 3 to this letter. Very truly yours, idlo W. G. Counsil By: D. R. Woodlan Supervisor, Docket Licensing RSB/amb Attachments Enclosure c - Mr. E. H. Johnson, Region IV Mr. D. L. Kelley, RI - Region IV Mr. H. S. Phillips, RI - Region IV b 0 8702110170 870209 l\\0 ' PDR ADOCK 05000445 [I \\g G PDR

• N) North Olise Street I.. It 8 I Dallas. Texas 75201

' Attachment 1-to TXX-6270 February-9~ 1987 Page 1 of 4 SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON BISCO ELECTRICAL PENETRATION SEALS 4-1. Identify the location of the BISCO electrical penetration seals identified in NRC Inspection Report 85-16/85-13, Appendix C, Item 6 (penetration numbers AB-790-174-1022A, EC-854-150A-1018A and B, EC-854-151A-2003A and 2004A, EC-854-1518-2025A and 2026A, and TB-803-010A-1008A). RESPONSE TO ITEM 1 The location of the electrical penetration seals addressed in NRC Inspection Report 85-16/85-13 item 6, are shown on the attached sketches 1 (Enclosure 1). The fire duration is noted for the fire areas / zones bounding the electrical penetrations. This information was obtained from preliminary calculation numbers 0210-063-002, 003, 005, and 006. The information reflects the current plant configuration and is being reviewed and revised as part of the. Fire Protection Corrective Action Program (CAP). This program is intended to update fire protection to reflect the as-built condition of the plant. 2. Indicate what redundant equipment / cabling for safe shutdown components would be affected in the event a fire were to spread from one area through the above penetrations to the adjacent area. RESPONSE TO ITEM 2 Based on discussions with the NRC staff on February 9, 1987, the scope of this question is limited to fire seals in 3-hour fire zone boundaries. Penetration seals EC-854-150A-1018A and B, EC-854-151A-2003A and -2004A, and EC-854-1518-2025A and -2026A are installed 'in 1-hour fire zone boundaries.. Generic Letter 86-10 evaluations have been performed for the fire area boundaries containing the above penetrations to withstand the hazards associated with the area. These analyses have been reviewed and approved by a fire protection engineer. The evaluations indicated that the above existing seals are adequate for the hazards in the area and, therefore, the integrity of the 1-hour barrier would be maintained. The fire hazards and fire safe shutdown analyses were performed using the 1-hour rating. The fire safe shutdown analysis demonstrates the plant's ability to achieve and maintain cold shutdown. 1 i

Attachment I to TXX-6270 February 9, 1987 Page 2 of 4 SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON BISCO ELECTRICAL PENETRATION SEALS - CONT'D RESPONSE TO ITEM 2 - CONT'D Penetration TB-803-010A-1008A is located in the north wall of the turbine lube oil reservoir room and is a 3 hour rated fire boundary. Based on EPM calculation 152 Rev. 2, Fire Area Separation Analysis, no safe shutdown equipment exists in the room. Therefore, propagation of the fire to the Turbine Building Mezzanine will not affect the ability of the plant to-achieve and maintain cold shutdown. Penetration AB-790-174-1022A is located in the north wall of the Auxiliary Building Elev. 790' (a common Unit 1/ Unit 2 area) and is also a 3-hour rated fire boundary. This barrier adjoins the Unit 2 Safeguards Building wall. Based on EPM calculation 152 Rev. 2, Fire Area Separation Analysis, Unit I does not use equipment / cabling in the Unit 2 Safeguards Building to achieve safe shutdown, therefore, the postulated failure of this seal does not introduce any redundant safe shutdown equipment / cabling to the fire for Unit 1. 3. What action has been taken to assure conformance of the above penetration seals with the specified three-hour fire rating requirement 7 RESPONSE TO ITEM 3 Action to assure conformance of the above penetration seals with CPSES requirements has been taken as follows: L - AB-790-174-1022A: Seal has been removed by Interim Removal Notice to support construction activities. It is scheduled to be re-installed in j accordance with BISCO procedure SP-110, Rev. 5, prior to fuel load. EC-854-150A-1018A and B, EC-854-151A-2003A and -2004A, EC-854-1518-2025A and -2026A: Seals are installed in 1-hour barriers and meet this requirement. 3-hour rating is not a requirement. No action is planned or necessary. TB-803-010A-1008A: Seal is not required for safe shutdown (based on EPM calculation 152 Rev. 2, Fire Area Separation Analysis). The penetration in question will be reworked prior to fuel load. BISCO will schedule a final as-built walkdown of all penetration seals using procedure DC-28. As areas of the plant are completed, Impell corporation will accompany the BISCO walkdown to provide a third-party verification. Impell verification will be performed as described in CPE-FVM-FP-055, " Final As-Built Verification of Unit 1 and Common Penetration Seals." This document is presently in draft form. to TXX-6270 February 9, 1987 Page 3 of 4 SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON BISCO ELECTRICAL PENETRATION SEALS - CONT'D 4. By letter dated September 10, 1986, TV Electric notified NRC Region IV that the concern regarding BISCO fire seal qualification was determined not to be reportable under 10CFR50.55(e). However, the letter does not provide details as to how the determination that "The deficiency could not have adversely affected safe operation of the plant if it had remained undetected" was made. Provide a technical basis for your position with any necessary supporting documentation. RESPONSE TO ITEM 4 Our September 10, 1986 letter referenced SDAR 86-47, which was generated as a result of a Nonconformace Report (BISCO #25). The report identified a seal assembly that was not installed to the design requirements of BISCO. One seal assembly had been installed incorrectly. Another seal assembly identified by BISCO memorandum dated September 24, 1985, was also included 1 in our evaluation. The seal assemblies were used for the following penetrations. PSSF No. BISCO No. 7010179000 AB-790-174-1022A 6006883100 SG-831-096-12-5022A, B, & C The letter stated the "as-built" seal assemblies condition was not considered reportable because the deficiency could not have adversely affected the safe operation of the plant had it remained undetected. The technical basis used to determine non-reportability is as follows: - Equivalency of the installed seal assembly to a similar configuration as listed in the U. L. Penetration Fire Stop System #30. - Existing combustible loading fire durations. - Comparison of fire durations to the " equivalent" fire rating of the installed seal assembly. The installed seal assembly was compared to UL Firestop Penetration System

1. 30.

It was judged that the 9" installed seal depth, as opposed to the tested 7" depth, established an equivalent hour fire rating. The combination of low combustible loading and the approximated 2-hour equivalent fire rating provided reasonable assurance that the fire barrier would remain intact. In addition, re-evaluations of the seals assemblies and the impact of their potential failure on the Unit 1 safe shutdown capability have been conducted and are being design reviewed. The re-evaluations may be summarized as follows:

Attachment I to TXX-6270 February 9, 1987 Page 4 of 4 SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON BISCO ELECTRICAL PENETRATION SEALS - CONT'D RESPONSE TO ITEM 4 - CONT'D AB-790-174-1022A Safe operation of the plant will not be adversely affected as discussed in response (2) above. SG-831-096-12-5022A. B. and C Barrier integrity will not be adversely affected as documented by. The fire duration values used in our initial evaluation were conservative. The following comparison demonstrates this case. Impell Calc

1. 0210-063-00 TSG-19248 Fire Area Fire Duration Fire Duration SE-16 23 min 33.4 min SD-9 34 min 40.6 min AA-21A 11 min 30.3 min Please note the TSG-19248 fire duration calculation were preliminary determinations. The predictions were confirmed by Impell calculation
2. 0210-063-00 results which indicated that the TSG-19248 preliminary determination was overly conservative.

In summary, the failure of the subject seal assemblies installation to conform to design requirements is not reportable. Analyses indicate that safe operation of the plant is not affected since:

1) No safe shutdown equipment is threatened or,

2) Fire barrier integrity is maintained due to the low combustible loading in the vicinity of the seal assembly.

l l l r

~ to TXX-6270 February 9, 1987 Page 1 of 2 SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON NAMC0 SWITCHES (IEB 79-28) 1. In response to IEB 79-28, TUGC0 replaced NAMCO switches utilized in safety-related applications with new switches not subject to the failure mechanism addressed in the Bulletin. What are the safety-related functions performed by the switches that were replaced and the consequence of their failure? RESPONSE TO ITEM 1 Originally, TV Electric identified fourteen switches affected by IEB 28. While planning the repair / replacement of these switches, TU Electric recognized that all of the switches affected by the bulletin were going to be replaced as a result of the ongoing environmental qualification program. All Class 1E NAMC0 model EA180 limit switches with a date code before the 6th week in 1980 were being replaced as a result of these environment qualification efforts. In this larger effort, switches subject to the failure mechanism described in the bulletin were replaced. A list of the switches affected by this bulletin, their functions and the consequences of their failure is tabulated below: REMARKS OR CONSEQUENCES VALVE NO.S LIMIT SW. FUNCTION DUE TO FAILURE OF LS 1-HV-4165 Input signal to ERF Failure of limit switches will computer, position cause the loss of ERF signal, indication of valve, position indication and monitor-and signal to light light box. monitor box for indication. Note: Similar functions for Note: Similar failure as valves 1-HV-4166, 4171, described above. 4172, 4173, and 4174. 1-HV-4167 Input signal to ERF We will lose ERF signal position computer, position indication of valve, monitor light indication of valve, box and solenoid will not stay l signal to monitor light energized. I box, also used in the l valve control circuit as a seal in contact to keep solenoid energize after it is manually energized (if all the other permissives are met) Note: Similar functions for Note: Similar failure as described valves 1-HV-4175, 4176, above. i 4178, 4179, 4168, 4169, and 4170 i f-

T . to TXX-6270 February 9, 1987 Page 2 of 2 SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON NAMC0 SWITCHES (IEB 79-28) - CONT'D 2. What were the administrative controls utilized to control the replacement of NAMC0 switches in response to IEB 79-28? RESPONSE TO ITEM 2 The administrative controls used to replace the affected limit switches were documented, tracked and dispositioned on two non-conformance reports. The replacement and subsequent reinspection was performed using construction operational travelers, and quality control inspection procedures. 3. Today, on what basis does TUGC0 know that all defective NAMC0 switches have been replaced? Credit should be taken for any relevant CPRT activity such as ISAP VII.a.2 that has been performed to assess the adequacy of TUGC0's corrective action programs. RESPONSE TO ITEM 3 TU Electric can state that all switches affected by 1EB-79-28 were identified and replaced based on the programs in-place for procurement documentation, walkdowns, and the administrative controls discussed above. As part of the present Corrective Action Program (CAP) in the Equipment Qualification (EQ) area, a complete field verification of IE equipment and devices and documentation verification has been undertaken to identify and subsequenty resolve all as-built EQ discrepancies; therefore, this process will identify and resolve any limit switch discrepancy found. This program provides a second level of assurance that all problem switches have been replaced.

. to TXX-6270 February 9, 1987 Page 1 of 2 REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON TU ELECTRIC RESPONSE TO IEB 79-28 1. Inspection Reports 50-445/85-16 and 50-446/85-13 identified a discrepancy between the part numbers on travelers EE 82-1415-5801 and EE 83-0373-5801 and the part numbers on the installed NAMC0 switches. The discrepancies in part numbers indicate that switches with specific environmental qualification specifications and physical orientation requirements (counter clockwise rotation) have been installed on the RHR system valves contrary to the installation instruction and design requirements. On what basis has TU Electric determined that the NAMC0 switches installed on 1-HCV-606 and 1-FCV-618 are acceptable? On what basis does TU Electric know that other NAMC0 switches installed in the plant satisfy relevant design basis requirements? RESPONSE TO ITEM 1 The NAMC0 limit switch on valve 1-HCV-606 was replaced by Operational Traveler EE-83-0459-5801. The traveler indicates that limit switch EA 180-32302 was replaced with EA 180-31302. During the initial replacement program for unqualified limit switches, TV Electric replaced the existing type and model with equivalent type and model limit switches. In this particular case, Test Deficiency Report #1136 was written to change the switch from counter clockwise rotation to clockwise rotation. Operational Traveler EE-83-0459-5801 was used for the change. Similarly, the limit switch on valve 1-FCV-618 was replaced by Operational Traveler EE 83-1851-5801. The traveler indicates that limit switch EA 180-32302 was replaced with EA 180-31302. These records are on site and available for review. Based on these records and subsequent testing, the as-installed configuration satisfies the functional requirements of the design. Also note that for both of these limit switch problems, the original design for the valves called for model EA 170 and neither of these valves were included within the scope of IE Bulletin 79-28. Furthermore, one of these switches (for valve 1-FCV-618) is non IE service. The other switch (for valve 1-HCV-606) is 1E, but is beyond the scope of IEB 79-28. REMARKS OR CONSEQUENCES VALVE N0.S LIMIT SW. FUNCTION DUE TO FAILURE OF LS 1-HCV-606 Input to ERF computer We will lose ERF computer input multiplexer and Monitor signal and Monitor light Box light Box indicator. indication. 1-FCV-618 Input to ERF computer We will lose ERF signal. multiplexer (Non-IE) l

. to TXX-6270 February 9, 1987 Page 2 of 2 REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON TU ELECTRIC RESPONSE TO IEB 79 CONT'D RESPONSE TO ITEM 1 - CONT'D As for the other NAMC0 switches in the plant, proper function and operability has been assured during plant testing. In addition IE switches are part of the plant review by equipment qualification personnel in which all documentation is being reviewed against as-built conditions. This effort will give further confidence as to the acceptability of these valves.

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